ML20140G994

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MR 96-069*A, Replace Breakers in 1Y-06, MR 96-069*B, Replace Breakers in 1Y-05
ML20140G994
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/27/1997
From:
WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20140G761 List:
References
SER-97-032, SER-97-32, NUDOCS 9705120277
Download: ML20140G994 (9)


Text

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's a NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMENI SER @-gj.2, J.' SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT PageI Title of Proposed Modification, Procedure Change, Test or Experiment: MR 96-069*A," Replace Breakers in I Y-06"; MR 96-069*H," Replace lireakers in IY-05".

Reference Document (s) #: CR 96-539, Calculation 96-0245, Calculation 97-0024. I Y-05 WO 9612055,1 Y-05 WO

. 9612029, I Y-05 WO 9612014. I Y-05 WO 9612012, I Y-06 WO 9612072, I Y-06 WO 9612057, I Y-06 WO 9612056, and i Y-06 WO 9612073.

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Prepared By: , , , , , , , _ , , , _ _ [ __

Date: 02-26-97 U

Reviewed By:

[ ' -~~' Date: ,2,p-f7 I j Reviewed by MM idid ' d E-"-" h tm: j, Date: 2 - t y-. j y 2.

O Date: ,g_gg sf 7 1

} b h Date:

. MSS Review /Date: MSS #: [g Manager - PBNP Approval:

[ gbp,gg,1-6cl M r MUfe W 5h Date: gg7/77

! In lieu of MSS and Manager sigIi'ature, atta'ch PBF-0026d if serial reMw has been conduded. (MSS and manager j approvals are not necessary for a determination of non-applicability.)

, Section I Surgnine - Determination if Safety Evaluation is Required f

A. Describe the modification, procedure change, test, or e.speriment and its expected effects. Include interim configurations or conditions.

Modifications MR 96-069*A and MR 96-069*B involve the replacement of the molded-case circuit breakers for eight circuits in non-safety related 120 VAC instrument panels lY-05 and lY-06. The affected circuits are lY-05-01, IV 05, IY-05-06, IY-05-22, IY-06-01,1Y-06-03,1Y-06-05, and IY-06-ll. Action item #2 of condition report CR 96-539 identifies that the existing breakers for these circuits do not provide adequate short-circuit protection for the internal main control board wiring in the circuits. A short-circuit fault on one of the circuits could therefore result in damage to not only the circuit conductors, but also the adjacent conductors for safety related circuits. This condition has been evaluated for operability in the CR.

Modifications MR 96-069'A and MR 96-069*H will replace the existing circuit breakers for the eight non safety related circuits identified above with breakers having lower trip ratings. The final design descriptions for MR 96-069*A and MR 96-069*B document the acceptability of the replacement breakers in providing fault protection for the main control board con <luctors in these circuits. The modifications will therefore eliminate the potential for conductor damage in these circuits under short circuit conditions, and will thus eliminate the potential for damage to adjacent safety related conductors. The final design descriptions also verify that the new lower trip ratings provide adequate load carrying capacity for normal operation current demands and will not result in spurious breaker trips.

There are several factors important to the installation of these breakers that are important to safely performing the breaker change-out. These breakers were changed out in 1995, new inserts were installed to facilitate installation of the new style breakers, all hardware was torqued to manufacturer specifications, and the mechanic-electricians are experienced gcemy of these breakers. The breakers will be changed out one at time. The change-out out of service time i een YMEnty minutes.W:t d ' mr-' cf 0'; :t; p'--* ' ";: " h

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eu4 During installation, Unit 2 will be defueled and Unit I will b?"r"--

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a2-2747 P PDR

NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMENT SER -dd2 SAFETY EVALUATIONEEPORT Page2 The following is a list of the equipment that is non safety related which will require steps to be taken to ensurc no impact on safety related equipment will occur:

lY-05-06 Priming air ejectors are required to be secured.

lY-05-06 Steam Generator Illowdown is required to be secured due to outlet tank vah e going shut.

lY-05-22 RC-431 A/B PZR spray line control solenoid and switch will be deenergized. Spray vah es shut prior to opening brkr. Auxiliary spray sia CVCS is available.

lY-05-22 RCP vibration and smoke detector panel will be deenergind, lY-06-01 Turning gear required to be operated in manual.

lY-06-01 Local flow and remote alarm indication will be lost for CCW t. the seal water heat exchangers for P-10A/H (RilR pumps), P-14A/B(Containment Spray pumps), and P-ISA/B(Ili Head SI pumps).

lY-06-01 Ileating boiler day tank loss of alarm and filling capability, loss of aSility to fill the Emergency Fuel Oil Tank.

IY-06-01 Loss of alarm for G01 and G02 day tank les el alarms (alarm only, atto fill as ailable).

lY-06-01 Steam generator sample isolation will be required.

IY-06-03 Steam Generator Blowdown is required to be secured due to control vah es going shut.

lY-06-03 Solenoid from service water to the bearings on IP.29 (Steam Drisen Aux Feed pump) will fail open.

lY-06-03 Both P-l16 pump need to be secured due to loss of pow er to the hand controllers for the valves associated with the P-Il6s (Boric Acid Storage Tank recire pumps).

lY-06-03 The alarm function for condenser vacuuni will be secured.

This safety evaluation is being w ritten to cos er both the modification and installation.

B. 1.ist the FSAR sections or VSC-24-SAR sections where the sy stem, structure, component, procedure,M ggt test or experiment is described. gg 7,, r/4 C/\hrst

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C. Does the change, test or experiment insolve a change in the Technical Specification? O Yes 8 No 1 If a change is required, briefly describe what the change should be and why it is required. l NOTE: NRC approvalis requireilprior to implementation.

D. Screening for 10.EIL10 50 and 10 CFR 72.48 Applicability:

1. 10 CFR 50.59 Screening:
a. Will any system, structure or component (SSC) described in the PBNP FSAR, including its O Yes E No ;

figures, be altered? (Refer to NP 10.3.1, step 3.1.2 for exception. This question may be I answered "no" although the SSC is described in the l'BF" FSAR.)

b. Could, within reasonable possibility, the proposed change affect the intended design, operation, E Yes O No function, or method of function, of an SSC important to safety which is described in the PBNP j FSAR? (This includes interim conditions.)
c. Will any procedure described in the PUNP FSAR be altered? (Refer to NP 10.3.1, O Yes @ No Attachment A, Part E, for guidance.)

1

d. Will a test or experiment be performed which is not described in the PBNP FSAR and affects the O Yes E No design, operation, function, or method of function, of an SSC important to safety which is described in the PBNP FSAR?

Pitf.1515 Rewion 5 9'2N96

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NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMENT SER NO SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT Page 3

c. Will implementation affect a prior documented regulatory commitment to the NRC pertaining to O Yes @ No the design, operation, function, or method of function, of an SSC important to safety w hich is described in the PBNP FSAR? l j f. Is a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation required (are any of the above questions answered yes)? @ Yes O No  ;

1 i

NOTE: Ifno, then provide basisfor decision in Part D. .

Ifyes, complete Sections 2 and 3.

l 2. 10 CFR 72.48 Screenine for the Indeoendent Soent Fuel Storace Installation (ISFSik l

l . a. Will any system, structure, or component (SSC) described in the ISFSI Licensing Basis O Yes E No-document, including its figures, be altered? (Refer to Step 3.1.2 forexception. This question )

l may be answered "no" although the SSC is described in the ISFSI Licensing Basis documents.)

b. Could, within reasonable possibility, the proposed change affect the intended design, operation, O Yes @ No l function, or method of function, of an SSC important to safety w hich is described in the ISFSI q Licensing Basis documents? (This includes interim conditions.) j l
c. Will any procedures described in the ISFSI Licensing Basis documents be altered? O Yes @ No l
d. Will a test or experiment be performed w hich is not described in the ISFSI Licensing Basis O Yes E No documents and affects the design, operation, function, or method of function, of an SSC I important to safety which is described in the ISFSI Licensing Basis documents? l
e. Will. implementation affect a prior documented regulatory commitment to the NRC pertaining to- O Yes @ No the design, opettion, function, or method of function, of an SSC important to safety which is described in the ISFSI Licensing Basis documents?

I

f. . Is a 10 CFR 72.48 evaluation required (are any of the above questions answered yes)? O Yes @ No NOTE: Ifno, then provide basisfor decision in Part D.

Ifyes, complete Sections 4 and 5.

D. ' Basis for determination that a safety evaluation is not required:

Since none of the described breaker change outs affect the ISFSI or design description, operator or function of an ISFSI SSC or any ISFSI heensing document, a 10 CFR 72.48 evaluation isyrcquired, ,

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Section 2 g

Determination if a 10 CFR 50.59 Unreviewed Safets Ouestion is ins oh ed

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A. List the licensing basis documents (FS AR, SER, etc.) and sections where the system, structure, component, procedure, test, or experiment is described. gl,cdm W. PMP FSME.

Neither the lY-05 or lY-06 panels, nor the breakers to be replacchfhe associated loads are described in the PBNP FSAR j Secre 4.2(Art sga FAlvej ) ,3dere 7.2 (P-lids 6e'v., mJ reene. W) 3t2w:d  !

Cesses 9.LZ.blm. IP-29whors dmen am pg W q sal *ned).

B. I, Does the proposed activity increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated in O Yes @ No

, the PBNP FSAR?

l-Pnr.1515 Resisi"n 5 9/26196

NU.CUAIUOWER DEPARTMFnl SF.R bdN SAFETY EVALUATION REPORI Page4 The breakers and the respectise equipment remosed from service do not initiate any of the acci(ents liyd in the FSAP. The equipment affected by this project is non safety relatcd equipment. Unit I will bt[ shut [oNn and the change )

out will be performed one breaker at a time. The new breakers are phy sically similar to the current ones. Their lower trip settings have been evaluated in the modification package to proside adequate fault protection while maintaining adequate current carrying capability. Operations will resiew the list of affected equipment prior to each change out.

- Eaa a ng uui o ryuini iu inkv obuoi ; 5 :n. Therefore, the breaker change-opts do not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously esaluated in the PBNP FSAR. +-s 02-2747 I

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, 2. Does the proposed activity increase the E0niegacncc of an accident presiously evaluated in the PBNP O Yes @ No FSAR?

The scope of work, breaker replacement,is equipment classified as non safety related equipment. Equipment that is powered from the breakers that supports important to safety equipment will be placed in a safe condition prior to and during breaker replacement work. IY05 is lost on a LOOP and not assumed to be available during accident conditions.

I YO6 is feed from 1832 and as such is supplied by emergency power during a LOOP. While the pressurizer spray valves are closed, auxiliary spray will be available from CVCS G01 and G02 day tanks will still have auto fill capability when the level alarms are deenerglic< new > akers and their associated trip settings will ensure operability of allloads in the circuit. Unit I ill be shutdow n dur g the installation. Therefore, equipment important to safety impacted by the breaker change out s ' I meet,al,Lds n requirements and be able to properly respond to any evaluated necident, thus ensuring that there are no mereases to previously evaluated accident consequences.

3. Does the proposed activity increase the probabihty of occurrence of a malfuncuan of equipment O Yes @ No j important to safety previously evaluated in the PBNP FSAR? l The non safety related breakers are a ph>sically similar replacement. The replacement breakers hase a lower interrupting rating than the preuously installed breakers which is more conservatisc for fault protection. The replacement breakers will reduce probability that faults on the non safety related circuits will cause damage to safety related wiring. The final design descriptions serify that the new lower trip ratings prmide adequate load carrying capacity for normal operation current demands and will not result in spurious breaker trips. Therefore the change in the breakers do not increase probability of the breakers to perform their designed function.

There are sescral factors important to the installation of these breakers that are important to safely performing the breaker change-out. These breakers were changed out in 1995, new inserts were installed to facilitate installation of the new style breakers, all hardware was torqued to manufacturer specificativas, and the mechanic-electricians are experienced with replacement of these breakers. The breakers will be changed out one at time. Other breakers in the panel will not be affected.-The derge su; us; uf n.nu ium  % ' '" r:e mumin nima raken :tc ;;  ; ~f

-etme4h p k ' - V M b) 'hc M a'm a .o r m : During installation, Unit 2 will be defueled and Unit I will be

[f7 jshutdown.Therefore, probability of a malfunction will not change.

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4. Does the proposed activity increase the consequenqn of a malfunction of equipment important to safety 0 Yes @ No previously evaluated in the PBNP FSAR?

The proposed activity does not sequences increase of athe con / There malfunction. b2 Nis no effect upon the important to safety equ!Nent for which support is provided by the equipment that is isolated by tise breaker. The new breakers and their revised trip settings will ngt advgeely affect the operation of equipment heiry, supplied by these breakers.

During installation, Unit I will behutfoWh and the breakers changed out one at timt. Operations will review the affected equipment prior to replacement of each breaker. While the pressurizer spray va lses are closed, auxiliary spray will be available from CVCS. G01 and G02 day tanks will still hase auto fill capability i hen the level alarms are deenergized. Therefore, consequences of a malfunction will not change.

5. Does the proposed activity create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously 0 Yes @ No evaluated in the PBNP FSAR?

Pili .1515 Reusion 5 9 W96

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. NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMENI .sEnf'/-032 I SAFETY EVALUATIONREPORT Page 5 l l

None of the breaker replacements would create the possibility of an accident different than what is currently in the

' FSAp.The gw breakers and their associated trip settings will ensure operability of allloads in the circuit. Unit I will beMuNn during the installation. No new failure mechanisms will be created, the system is fundamentally the same, r dt-2747

6. Does the proposed activity create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety of a O Yes 00 No  !

different type than any previously evaluatcJ in the PBNP FSAR?

The breaker replacement reduces the possibility of a malfunction of safty related wiring circuits in the main control board cable raceways that are adjacent to the breake y deder wire by preiding adequate breaker coordination and protection of circuit wiring from overcurrent condMons. The new brea ers and their associated trip settings will ensure operability of allloads in the circuit. Uniy1 will be shutdown uring the installation. No new failure mechanisms will be created, the system is funda entally the same,Xherefore, the possibility of different malfunction to j important to safety related equipment is not cre ed. /

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l 7. Does the proposed activity reduce the marcin of safetv defined in the Basis for any Technical O Yes DD No I

! Specification?

r The replacement of the breakers does not reduce the margin of safety defined in the basis of Technical Specifications.

The new breakers and their associated trip settings will ensure operability of allloads in the circuit. Unit I will be l gshutdown during the installation. Operations will review the list of affected equipment prior to each change out.

' g.sidi mbor e a>ld.

DOES Tile CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT INVOLVE A 10 CFR 50.59 UNREVIEWED 0 Yes 09 No SAFETY QUESTION? (IS Tile ANSWER TO ANY OF TILE ABOVE QUESTIONS YES?)

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i PDF.1515 Rnision 5 976/95

NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMENT SER b M SAFETY EVALUA110N REPORT Page 6 Section 3 10 CFR 50.59 Es atuatiordummny (This summary must be sufficiently complete [ summary of description in Section 1, summary of the answers to the questions in Section 2. and a concise conclusion] to submit to the NRC for review.)

Modifications MR 96-069*A and MR 96-069*B invohe the replacement of the molded-case circuit breakers for eight circuits in non-safety related 120 VAC instrument panels IY-05 and lY-06. The affected circuits are lY-05-01, IY 05, !Y-05-06, lY-05-22,1Y-06-01, t Y-06-03,1Y-06-05, and IY-06-il. Action item #2 of condition report CR 96-539 identifies that the existing breakers for these circuits do not provide adequate short-circuit protection for the internal m:in control board wiring in the circuits. A short-circuit fault on one of the circuits could therefore result in damage to not only the circuit conductors, but also the adjacent conductors for safety related circuits. This condition has been evclu:ted for operability in the CR.

Modifications MR 96-069*A and MR 96-069*H will replace the existing circuit breakers for the eight non safety related circuits identified above with breakers having lower trip ratings. The final design descriptions for MR 96-069* A and MR 96-069*H document the acceptability of the replacement breakers la providing fault protection for the main control board conductors in these circuits. The modifications will therefore climinate the potential for conductor d:m:ge in these circuits under short circuit conditions, and will thus eliminate the potential for damage to adjacent ,

safety related conductors. The final design descriptions also serify that the new lower trip ratings provide adequate )

lo:d carrying capacity for normal operation current demands and will not result in spurious breaker trips. l There are several factors important to the installation of these breakers that are important to safely performing the breaker change-out. These breakers were changed out in 1995, new inserts were installed to facilitate installation of the new style breakers, all hardware was torqued to manufacturer specifications, and the mechanic-electricians are esperienced w th egegerg 3of these breakers. The breakers will be changed out one at time. The change-out out of l service time i.- een to twenty minutes.r P r~'"m 6 - :: M ise iLc iant pe' h :hi LA ang. l l

.*wt:-During installation, Unit 2 will be defueled and Unit I will beyshutdown. d d m har or eoI gg7 The following is a list of the equipment that is non safety related which will require steps to be taken to ensure no l imp:ct on safety related equipment will occur-lY-05-06 Priming air ejectors are required to be secured.

lY-05-06 Steam Generator Blowdown is required to be secured due to outlet tank val e going shut. I IY-05-22 RC-43] A/B PZR spray line control solenoid and switch will be deenergized. Spray valves shut prior to I opening brkr. Autiliary spray via CVCS is available. j iY-05-22 RCP vibration and smoke detector panel will be deenergized.

lY-06-01 Turning gear required to be operated in manual.

06-01 Local flow and remote alarm indication will be lost for CCW to the seat water heat exchangers for P-10A/B gilR pumps), P-14A/B (Containment Spray pumps), and P-ISA/B (Ili llead SI pumps).

lY-06-01 lleating boiler day tank loss of alarm and filling capability, loss of ability to fill the Emergency Fuel Oil Ta k.

lY-06-01 Loss of alarm for G01 and G02 day tank level alarms (s.larm only, auto fill available).

lY-06-01 Steam generator sample isolation will be required.

lY-06-03 Steam Generator Blowdown is required to be secured due to control valves going shut.

lY-06-03 Solenoid from service water to the bearings on IP-29 (Steam Driven Aux Feed pump) will fail open.

lY-06-03 Both P-Il6 pump need to be secured due to loss of power to the hand controllers for the valves associated with th P-ll6s (Boric Acid Storage Tank recire pumps).

lY-06-03 The alarm function for condenser sacuum will be secured.

This safety evaluation is being written to cover both the modific% ion and installation.

In Summary, replacement of these lY05 and lYO6 breakers does not involve an unreviewed safety question.

PDF.1515 Reson 5 9/26/06

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POINT BEACH NUCt. EAR PLANT PaceI of

. MNS SERI AL REVIEW l DOCUMENT NUMBER & N AME 6O,h M Sy/J.h k8., Af4 rwa-4 Jy\ / Y--03-Ol-Oj4p j h l Y-OS> ~Cl '?D1 ~DE .'~-11

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sef % s.L-I NOTES:

FILE NO. 1. The provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 apply to all changes and must be evaluated and documented in accordance uith NP 103.1," Authorization of Changes. Tests and DATE O 2 -- 2 7 d '7 Esperiments " Attach PBF-1515 if review is required.

2. Technical Specification 15.6.8 applies for procedure changes. An MSS Quorum (four different disciplines, shall review the proposed changes prior to approval by the rnanager.

REVIEW REQllGtED

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