ML20140H012
| ML20140H012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 11/15/1996 |
| From: | WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140G761 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9705120282 | |
| Download: ML20140H012 (10) | |
Text
fly..; Uyg)I wtU A N D nacvuticilt CLtWru. .u ou f MA UU. ,., d UlU O lM NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMFNT 1
RA FFTV FVALUATION REPORT SER_
Page1 Titla cf Proposed Modification, Procedure Change, Test or Experiment:
MR 96-070," Replace Breskersisa 2Y 05/06" Reference Document (s) #: CR 96-539, Calculation %0245, Calculation 96-0262 Prepared By-
//
Reviewed By: /
Date: (//g/c Date: i //r/ %
Reviewed by Mu1Iidisciptfnary Review T/am:
1.
1 Date:
2.
Date:
Date:
i MSS Review /Date:
MSS #:
Manager- PBNP Approval:
Date:
In lieu of MSS and Manager signature, attach PDF-0026d if serial review has been conducted. (MSS a approvals are not necessary for a determination of non-applicability.)
Section _1_
$crJenina - Determinstinn if Raretv_Evsluntion is Recuired A.
Describe the modification, procedure change, test, or experiment and its expected effects, include interim configurations or conditions.
y l gg . g te Modification MR 96 070 involves the r lacement of the rnolded-case circuit breakers for six circuits in non-cafety-related 120 2Y-06-01, and VAC instrument 2Y-06-05. Action it panels
- 2 2Y S and 2Y 06. The affectd circuits are 2Y-05-01,2Y-05-05,2Y-05-0 f condition report CR 96-539 identifies that the existing breakers for these circuits do not provide adequate short-circuit protection for the internal main control board wiring in the circuits. A short circuit fault on one of the circuits could therefore result in damage to not only the circuit conductors the but also to adjacent conductors for enfety-related circuits. Furthermore, because of an identified tack of electrical separation in the main control boards, such a fault could result in simultaneous damage to conductors for opposite-tra safety-related circuits. Such damage could. in turn. simultaneously disable redundant, opposite-train safety functions Modification MR 96 070 will replace the existing circuit breakers for the six non-safety-related circuits identified above with breakers having lower trip ratings. The final design description for MR 96-070 documents the acceptability of th replacement breakers in providing fault protection for the ma:n control board conductors in these circuits. The modification will therefore eliminate the potential for conductor damage in these circuits under short-circuit conditions, and will thus also eliminate the potential for damage to adjacent safety related conductors.
B.
List the FSAR sections or VSC 24-SAR netions where the system, structure, component, procedure, test te exper'unent is described.
N/A C. Does the chance. test or experiment involve a change in the Technical specification? t-} yes gg No if a change is required, briefly describe what the change'shbuld be and why it is required.
NOTE: NRCapprovalis requiredprior to implementation.
PI 9705120282 970505 Re PDR ADOCK 05000301 p PDR
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Page 2 !
Section 1 - Continuation D. Screenine for 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 7? 4R Annlienbility:
- 1. 10 CFR 50.59 Screening:
l figures, be altered? (Refer to NP 10.3.1, step 3.1.2 for exception. This question may be O Yes 0 No l i
answered "no" although the SSC is described in the PBNP FSAR.)
b.
Could, within reasonable possibility, the proposed change affect the intended design, operation, function, or method of function, of an SSC imponant to safety which is described in the PBNP O Yes g No FSAR? (%is includes interim conditions.)
c.
Will any procedure described in the PBNP FSAR be altered? (Refer to NP 10.3.1, Atuchment A, Part E, for guidance.) O Yes g No d.
Will a test or experiment be perforTned which is not described in the PBNP FSAR and affects the design, operation, function, or method of function, of an SSC important to safety which is O Yes g No described in the PDNP FSAR? '
e.
Will implementation affect a prior documented regulatory commitment to the NRC O pertaining Yes to the design, operation, function, or method of function, of an SSC important to safety which is @ No described in the PBNP FSAR?
f.
Is a.10 CFR 50.59 evaluation required (are any of the above questions answered yes)?
O Yes @ No NOTE: Ifno, then provide basisfor deci. tion in Pan D.
Ifyes, completeSections 2 anJ3.
2, 10 CFR 714A Screening for the Indenendent kent F51Senme installeien (ISFSfh a.
Will any system, structure, or component (SSC) described in the ISFSI I.icensing Basis O Yes g No document, including its figures, be altered? (Refer to Step 3.1.2 for exception. His question may be answered "no" althou5 h the SSC is described in the ISFSI Licensing Basis documents.)
b.
Could, within reasonable possibility, the proposed change affect the intended design, operation, function, or method of function, of en SSC important to safety which is described in the ISFS1 O Yes a No Licensing Basis documents? (This includes interim conditions.)
- c. Will any procedures described in the ISFSI Licensing Basis documents be altered?
O Yes @ No d.
Will a test or experiment be performed which is not described in the ISFSI Licensing Basis documents and affects the design, operation, function, or method of function, of an SSC O Ves G No irnportant to safety which is described in the ISFSI Licensing Basis documents?
e.
Will implementatic>n affect a prior documented regulatory commitment to the NRC pertaining to 3 O Yes No the design, operation, function, or method of function, of an SSC important to safety which is described in the ISFS! Licensing Basis documents?
l t
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,. ECLFAR POWER DEPARTMENT SER MFETY EVALif ATION REPORT Page 3 Lctinn 1 - Cantinuation f.
Is a 10 CFR 72.48 evaluation required (are any of the above ques'ioits answered yes)?
O Yes g No NOTE: llno. then provide basisfor decision in Part D.
Ifyet, completeSections 4 amlS.
D. Basis for determination that a nafety evaluation is not required:
Modification MR 96 070 will replace the existing molded-case circuit breakers for six circuits in non-safety-related instrument panels 2Y-05 and 2Y-06 with breakers having lower trip ratings. The possible safety consequences of the configuration changes and interim conditions associated with the modification will be discussed separately below:
Cants. oration Nean This modification will replace six circuit breakers in 120 VAC instrument panels 2Y-05 and 2Y-06. The replacement breakers will be identicat in manufacturer and style to the existing breakers, but will have reduced trip ratings to provide improved MCB conductor protection. The physical dimensions, mounting configuration, and failure mechanisms for the replacement breakers will also be identical to those of the existing breakers. The replacement breakers meet all requirements of Design Guideline DC-E04, " Selection of Molded-Case Circuit Breakers." All parts used for the modification will bc QA-scope, so the Augacated-QA classification of the 2Y-06 panel will not be affected (the 2Y-05. panel is classified as non-QA scope). The only configuration change associated with MR 96-070 is therefore the reduction la trip rating for the six breakers which will be replaced.
The final design descriptica for the modification determines that the trip ratings of the replacement breakers are adequate to ensure that the breakers will be able to supply their maximum possible load currents without tripping. The design description also determines that the breakers will provide adequate short-circuit and overload protection for all downstream field cable conductors and MCB internal wiring. Furthermore, neither the breakers themselves nor any of the associated loads are classified as safety-related, and moae are espable of initiating any equipment malfunctions or accidents described in the FSAR.
Based on the above,it is concluded that there are no safety conceras regarding the configuration changes associated with modification MR 96-070.
Int: rim Conditions t This modification will replace circuit breakers 2Y-05-01,2Y-05-05,2Y-05-06,2Y-05-10,2Y-06-01,and 2Y-06-05 l in 120 VAC instrument panels 2Y-05 and 2Y-06. Daring the installation of the modification, the loads supplied from these six breakers will be deenergized to facilitate breaker replaccment A complete list of the louds which .
will be deenergized is attached to this evaluation. Other loads on the 2Y-05 and 2Y-06 panels will not be I affected. Nose of the loads which will be deenergized are classified as safety-related, and none are required to mitigate the consequences of any accidents. With the exception of annunciator cooling fans and power failure alarms (see below), all of the affected loads are specific to Unit 2. The lastallation will be performed with Unit 2 shutdown and defueled. Under these conditions, none of the affected Unit 2 loads will be required to perform ,
their design functions, so there will be no potential for a plant transient to result from the installation. Since all !
' loads (other than amounciator cooling fans and power failure alarm) are specific to Unit 2, the installation will not affect the operation of Unit 1 or any required common plant equipment.
i As mentioned above, the installation of this modification will require the decaergitation of the annunciator cooling fans and annunciator DC power failure alarms for main control boards C-01, C-02,2C-03, and 2C-04.
To compensate for the loss of sonnaciator cooling during installation, the control boards will he provided with j
temporary saxiliary cooling if deemed necessary by the DSS. No compensatory actions will be taken regarding the annunciator power failure alarm. However, the duration of the lastallation will be very brief(less than one shift), so the probability of a loss of annunciator DC power occurring during the installation is extremely small.
Furthermore, the alarm is not safety-related, and its operation is not credited for mitigatiat the consequences of Par-1515 Revista5 9/2696 :
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- NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMENT _ S E R __
SA FETY EVALUATION RFPORT Page 4 Section 1 - Continuation
! l l any accidents or equipment malfunctions.
[ g gr4 The installation of this modification will be performed under Work Order work plans. A se j wiR be created for each of the six breakers which are to be replaced. Each work plan willlist the s' to be deenergized, indicate any expected effects or alarms, and specify any required or recommended compcasatory actions (e.g. auxiliary annunciator cooling). Each work plan will also inejude DSS or Operation signoffs to nothorize the deenergiration of specific loads. These signoffs will serve as a final pre-installation
' verification that load deenergization will not have any adverse impacu on plant operations. Finally, each work plan will specify appropriate post-maintenance and/or return-to service testing requirements to ensure the proper operation of all affected loads following the installation.
i Based on the above, it is concluded that there are no safety concerns regarding the interim (installation) i conditions associated with modification MR 96-070.
1
- Conclusion i
j There are no safety concerns regarding either the configuration changes or the intcrim installation conditions associated with anodification MR 96-070. The modification will not alter or affect the operation of any systems, 4
structures, or components which are safety-related,important to safety, or described in the FS AR. No FSAR procedures will be altered. The modification will not affect any equipment capable ofinitiating an FSAR 1
" accident or equipment malfunction, or any equipment credited for initigating the consequences of such an accident or equipment malfunction. None of the equipment affected by the modification is specified in the basis i for any Technical Specifications. The implementation of the modification does not constitute an Unreviewed Safety Question. A 10CFRSO.S9 evaluation is not required.
None of the equipment affected by modification MR 96-070 is described in the ISFSI Licensing Basis documents.
1 Configuration changes and interim conditions associated with the modification will not affect any systems,
' structures, or components described in the ISFSI documents. Implementation of the modification will not affect any prior NRC commitments pertaining to the ISFSI or any ofits associated SSCs. A 10CFR72.48 evaluation is
- not required.
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2 P,19/27 1
MR 96-070 List of Affected Loads Supply Breaker Description of Load 2 Y-05-01 Unit 2 Turbine Lett/M.ht Ssp Valves Test Circuit / Valves 2Y 05-01 Unit 2 Turbine Left/Right Stop Valves (Position Indication on 2C-03) -
2Y-05 01 Unit 2 Turbine Upper / Lower Lett/Right Govemor Valves (Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-05 2C-03 Annunciator 2F 4-3 '"rurbine Supervisory" 2Y-05-05 Unit 2 Turbine Supervisory ludication on 2C 03 2Y 05-06 2MS-2085, HX-22D Moisture Separator Reheater Inlet Steam Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2MS-2086, HX-22C Moisture Separator Reheater Inlet Steam Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-OS-06 (
2MS-2087, HX-22B Moisture Separator Reheater Inlet Steam Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2MS-2088, HX-22B Monture Separator Reheater Inlet Steam Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD-2517A, HX-22D Moisture Separator Reheater Shell Side Level Control (Indication on 2C-03) 2Y 05-06 2FD-2521 B. T-25C Moisture Separator Reheater Stilling Manifold Dump to Condenser Control (Indication on 2C 03) 2Y-05-06 2fD-2522B, T-25B Moistere Separator Reheater Stilling Manifold Dump to Condenser Control Ondication on 2C-03) i 2Y-05-06 2FD-2641 B, T 25A Moistt.re Separator Reheater Stilling Mamfold Dump to Condenser Control (Indication on 2C-03) .
2Y-05-06 2FD-2642B, T-25D Moisture Separator Reheater Stilling Manifold Dump to Condenser Control (Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD-2516A. HX-22A Moisture Separator Reheater Shell Side Level Control (Indication on 2C-03) - !
2Y-05-06 2FD-2516B, HX-22A Moisture Separator Reheater Durnp to Condenser Control (Indication on 2C-03) !
2Y-05-06 2FD-2515A, HX-22C Moisture Separator Reheater Shell Side Level Control (Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD-2518A. HX 228 Moisture Separator hheater Shell Side Level Control (Indication on 2C 03) i 2 Y-05-06 2FD-2513B, HX-21B High Prenure feed Water Heater 5B Dump to Condenser Control (Ind: cation on l 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 l 2FD-2514B, HX-21 A Hi hS Pressure Feed Water Heater SA Dump to Condenser Control (Indication on 2C-03) 2Y 05-06 2FD-25328, T-23 Hester Dram Tank Dump to Condenser Control (Indication on 2C-03) I 2 Y-05-06 2FD-2516B, HX-22A Moisture Separator Reheater Dump to Condenser Control (Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD-2518B, HX-22B Moisture Separator Reheater Dump to Condenser Control (Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD 2515B. HX-22C Moisture Separator hheater Dump to Condenser Contrel(Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD-2517B, ilX-22D Meisture Separator Reheater Dump to Condenser Control (Indication on 2C-03) l 2Y-05-06 2MS 2037, Z 53A/B Priming Atr Ejector inlet Steam Regulator Control (Solenoid and Position
{
indication on 2C-03) I 2Y-05-05 2AR-35 t l, Z-53 A Priming Air Ejector Air Sice Suction Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2AR-3512. Z-53B Priming Air Ejector Air Side Suction Control (Solenoid and Position Indicaticn on 2C-03) 2 Y-05-06 Unit 2 Turbine Auto Stop Reset Solenoid 20/ASR 2Y-05-06 Unit 2 Turbine Vacuum Trip Reset Solenoid 20/VTL 2Y 05-06 2MS-2701, High Pressure Turbine Drain Upper Left Control (Solenold) 2Y-05-06 2MS-2702. High Pressure Turbine Drain Lower I. eft Control (Solenoid) 2 Y-05-06 2MS-2703, High Pressure Turbine Drain Upper Right Control (Solenoid) 2Y-05-06 2MS-2704 High Pressure Turbme Dram Lower Right Control (Solenoid) 2Y-05-06 2MS-2705, High Pressure Turbine Drain Inlet Control (Solenoid) 2Y-05-06 2MS-2706, High Pressure Turbine Drain Extraction Outlet Control Wolenoid)
Page 1 of 3
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.}05-37 WD 14!28 WISCONSINELECTRICNPBu FAX NO, 4142212010 P,20/27
. MR 96-070 List of Affected L0 ads Supply --
Breaker Description of Load 2Y-05-06 2MS-2729, HX 22A/C Moisture Separator Reheater Crossunder Piping Drain Control (Solenoid)
! 2Y-05 06 l 2MS-2730, HX 22B/D Moismre Separator Reheater Crossunder Piping Drain Control (Solenold) 2Y-05-06 2MS 2040, T 26 Steam Generator Blowdown Tank Outlet Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD-2504B, HX-17A Low Pressure Feed Water Henter 2A Dump to Condenser Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C-03) l 2Y-05-06 2FD-2505B, HX-17A Low Pressure Feed Water Heater l A Dump to Condenser Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C 03) 2 Y-05-06 2FD-2501B, HX-17B Low Pressure Feed Water Heater 2B Dump to Condenser Cnntrol (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD-2502B, HX-17B Low Pressure Feed Water Heater IB Dump to Condenser Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C 03) 2 Y-05-06 2FD-25438. HX-19B Low Pressure Feed Water Heater 3B Dump to Condenser Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD-25448, HX-19A Low Pressure feed Water Heater 3A Dmnp to Condenser Control (Solenoid and i PositionIndication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD-2504A, HX-17A Low Pressure Feed Water Hester 2A Drain to I A Control (Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD 2501 A. HX-17B Low Pressure Feed Water Hearer 2B Drain to IB Control (Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD-2502A, HX-17B Low Pressure feed Water Heater IB Drain to Condenser Control (Position l'
Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2FD-2543 A, HX 198 Low Pressure Feed Water Heater 3B Dram to HX-17B Control (Positica Indication on 2C-03)
, 2Y-05-06 2FD-2544A, EX-19A Low Pressure Feed Water Heater 3A Drain to HX-17A Control (Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-05-06 2C-03 Annunciator Cooling Fans 2Y-05-06 2C-03 Annunciator DC Power Failure Relay / Alarm 2Y-05-10 2TR-2001, Plant Thermocouple Monitor Temperature Recorder 2Y-05-10 2TR-2002. Generator Hydrneen Gas Ternperature Recorder 2Y-05 10 2C.04 Permissive and Dypass Status Lights ,
2Y-05-10 Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Make Up Control (Unit 2 Blender) and Indication on 2C-04 2Y-05-10 2C-04 Annunciator Cochng Fans 2Y-05-10 2C-04 Annunciator DC Power Failure Relay / Alarm 2Y-05-10 2VNPSE 03269. W 2A/B Unit 2 Containment Purge Supply Fan Outside Air Suction Damper (Solenoid) 2Y-05-10 2FS-3233, R-1 Reactor Vessel Cavity Cooling Air Flow Switch (Status Light on 2C-04) ;
2Y-05-10 2FS-3222A, W 3 A/B Control Rod Drive Shroud Fan Flow Switch (Status Light on 2C-04) '
2Y-05-10 2FS-3222B, W-3A/B Control Rod Drive Shroud fan Flow Switch (Status Light on 2C-04) 2 Y-05-10 2FS-3214, W-43 A/B Unit 2 Contamment Fan Inlet Flow Switch (Status Light on 2C-04) 2 Y-05-10 2FS-3278, W-6A/B Containment Purge Exhaust Fan Suetion Flow Switch (Status Light on 2C-04) 2Y-05-10 2FS-3206, W-2A/B Unit 2 Containment Purge Supply Fan Discharge Flow Switch (Staats Light on 2C-04) 2Y 05-10 Unit 2 NIS " Channel Test" Alarm Relay A29 (2C-04) 2Y-05-10 2TR-2000A, Plant Dermocouple Momtor Temperature Recorder l 2Y-05-10 2TR-2000B. Plant Thermocouple Monitor Temperature Recorder l 2Y-05-10 Unit 2 DeIta Flux Differential AmpliGers 2-1DA and 2-2DA (for 2NR-45)
! 2Y-06-01 C-01 Annunctator Cooling fans 2Y-06-01 C-01 Annunciator DC Power Failure Relay / Alarm Page 2 of 3
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- MR 96-070 1 List of Affected Loads '
Supply Dreaker Description of Loa 6 2 Y-06-01 C-02 AnnunciatorCooling Fans 2Y-06-01 C-02 Annunciator DC Power failure Relay / Alarm 2Y-06-01 j 2 WL-4101, P-10B Residual Heat Removal Pump Drain to Sump Control (Solenoid and Indica Lights on C-01) 2Y-06-01 2LS 4102, P-10A Residual Heat Removal Pump Room Level Switch (Indicating Light on C-01) 2 Y-06-01 2WL-4100, Lights on C-01)
P-10A Residual Heat Removal Pump Drain to Sump Control (Solenoid and Indicat ,
2Y 06-01 2LS 4103, P-10B Residual Heat Remova.' Pump Room Level Switch (Amber Indicating Light on C 01) 2Y-06-01 2FIS-640, P-10A/B Residual Heat Removal Pump Seal Water Heat Exchanger Shell Side Outlet Flow Indicating Switch 2Y-06-01 2FIS-649. P-14A/B Containment Spray Pump Seal Water Heat Exchanger ShcIl Side Outlet flow Indicating Switr.:h 2Y-06-01 2FIS-650, P 15A/B Safety injection Pump Seal Water Heat Exchanger Shell Side Outlet Flow Indicating Switch l 2Y-06-01 2 HIC-957. T-34A/D Safety injection Accumulator Nitrogen Supply Lme Vent Hand Controller 2Y-06-01 2HC-105, T-34A/B Safety injection Accumulator Nitrogen Supply Line Vent Hand Controller l 2Y-06-01 2 POT /12085, Pneumatic Time Pattern Tmnsmitter 2Y-06-01 2TC-2520 TurbineTemperatureController 2 Y-06-01 Unit i Main Generator Breaker #122 Auxiliary Relay for " Generator On Line" Computer Input and Annunciator 2Y-06-01 Unit 2 Main Generator Breaker F142 Auxiliary Relay for " Generator On LIr~ie" Computer Input and Annunciator 2Y-06-01 2MS 2083, HX-I A Steam Generator Sample Isulation Control (Solenoid and Politton Indication on C-01) 2Y-06-01 2MS-2084. HX-1B Steam Generator Sample Isolation Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on C-01) 2Y-06 01 2PS 2115, Condenser Pressure High Alarm Pressure Switch 2Y-06-01 2C-03 Annunciator 2F 4 2," Turbine Rotor Stopped" 2Y-06-01 Unit 2 Turbine Tuming Gear Engage Solenoid 20/ TOE 2Y-06-01 Unit 2 Turbine Turning Gear Disengage Solenoid 20/TGD 2Y-06-01 Unit 2 Turbine Turning Gear Engage Air Vent Solenoid 20/TGV 2Y-06-01 Unit 2 Turbine Turning Gear 011 Solenoid 20/TGO 2Y 06-01 2MS-2045, HX-1B Steam Generator Steam Header Blowdown Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-06-01 2MS-2042, HX-1 A Steam Generator Steam Header Blowdown Control (Solenoid and Position Indication on 2C-03) 2Y-06-01 2MS-2090, F 29 Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Bearmg Cooling inlet (Solenoid and Local Position Indication at 2TB-174) 2Y-06-01 2MS-5958. HX 1B Steam Generator Blowdown isolation (Auto open Disabled) 2 Y-06-01 2MS 5959, HX-I A Steam Generator Blowdown isolation (Auto Open Disabled) 2Y-06-05 Unit 2 Preseparator System Page 3 of 3
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CONDITION REPORT CR 96-539 l
STATUS: OPEN UNIT: O SYSTEM: AF INITIATED: 08/15/~96~-- ~ CLOSEn:
MSS #: ADMINISTRATOR:
INITIATOR: . . ISSUE MANAGER: . . . . . :R NUMBER OF OPEN ACTIONS: 1 NUMBER OF CLOSEu ACTIONS: 0 Redundant Safety-Related Circuits Routed in Common Raceway DESCRIPTION:he During t evaluation of CR 96-385 #1 (Potential for inadequate main it was discovered that several conductors in control the control board separation)b-29 circuit for 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump minimum recirculation valve 1AF-4002 may have inadequate electrical prot 9ction. The conductors in this circuit are identified on Wolfe+Mann drawing E-1267E-B as #14 AWG type SIS. Per CHAMPS and Westinghouse drawing 499B466 Sheet 816 the conductors are protected by a 30 amp Westinghouse type HFA2030, circuit breaker in panel D-12 (breaker D-12-16). Inspection of the breaker time-current characteristics and the conductor thermal damage curve indicaces thaq conductor damage could 4 accur prior to breaker operation for short circuit faults between 90 and 485 amps. Preliminary calculations performed using the DC/ ELF software
. indicate that the maximum short circuit current available in this circuit at main control board 1C-03 exceeds 1900 amps. During the '
l evaluation of CR 96-385 #1, it was determined that portions of the circuit are routed in common raceways with other redundant ,
safety-related circuits. Therefore a short-circuit fault on the i 1AF-4002 conductors in 1C-03 could p,otentially result in both conductor l damage and damage to other safety-related circuits. l Significance: Potential for short-circuit fault in 1AF-4002 control !
circuitry at 1C-03 to result in damage to adjacent circuits, including redundant safety-related circuits.
Completed corrective actions; MTN has replaced the 30 amp breaker on Unit 1 with a more conservative 15 amp breaker. They are also replacing the 40 amp breaker on Unit 2 with a 15 amp breaker. Additionally, more fuses are being installed on both units to protect the neighboring wiring.
STATUS UPDATE:
(0 /16/96 .. This was sugmittedtoteNRCon9/13/96An LER was written on this event by .
SCREENED-BY : . . _ . 2R DATE: 08/16/96 REGULATORY REPORTABLE.. .. : Y TS VIOLATION.............. : N 10 CFR 21................. : N TS LCO.................... : Y OPERABILITY IMPACT PER TS. : Y JCO REQUIRED.............. : N MSS REVIEW................ : N SCAQ...................... : Y OPERABILITY DETERMINATION. : N COMMITMENT................ : N SUPPORTING DETERMINATIONS:
A one-hour report was made to the NRC regarding this CR. This directly l affects the operability of the Aux, Feedwater system. This report is j being classified as a scao due to its direct relationship to nuclear i safety. Action items wilI evaluate if this report is applicable to other safety-related systems.
REFERENCES:
CARDS CHAMPS WEST. EWG. 499B466 SH. 816 WOLFE & MANN DWG. E-1267E-R CR 96-385 LET 266/96-007-00 i TRENDING INFORMATION: ,
WHEN--: NON-OUTAGE l THIRD QUARTER OF 1996 WHO :
WHY : DESIGN SPECIFICATION WAS LESS THAN ADEQUATE WHAT . ELECTRICAL BREAKER RELATED SYSTEM: '
ACTIONS PRI ACTION STATUS RESPONSIBLE PERSON DUE DATE
~
. ACTION ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGE 1
- 03/06/97 Responsible Person: . . . . . ..
- Trkid: CR 96-539
- Urgency: NOT DUE / IN CLOSEOUT I Action Number: 1
- +*************
- Work Priority: 43 Activity Pending is: ACTION VERIFICATION
TITLE AND TASK DESCRIPTION---- -------------------------------------
Redundant Safety-Related Circuits Routed in Common Raceway Evaluate the applicability of this condition report to similar main l control board circuits, and recommend modifications to correct the situations. Also ensure that preventive measures taken to provide adequate protection to the #14 SIS conductors in the 1AF-4002 control circuit are adequate.
DATES--------------------------------------------------- --~~-------
Source Record: 08/15/96 ******* Evaluation ********* ****** Correction ******
Commitment: Eval Due: Corr Act Due: 10 15 96 Action Create: 08/16/96 Orig Eval Due: Orig CA Due: 10 15 96 Action Closed: Eval Done: Corr Act Done:12 14 96
PEOPLE-------------------------------------------------------------- <
l Responsible for Overall Action: EEG _.
Responsible for Current Pending Activity: OER .
I Issue Mana Initiator:ger: '
< 1 l
Punchlist Administrator:
___..-----UPDATE--------------------------------------------------------------
(08/16/96 ) Set Work Priority to 43. This is an initial priority set.
Evaluation of this action item may result in a change to this work priority.EEG i Responsible Person: l (08/29/96 Requested Due Date: 10/15/96
, (09/11/96 Changed the Due Date from: << BLANK >> to 10/15/96 l (10/15/96 ~~ Passed to for acceptance of work.
10 The operability re ort for Main Control Board Separation h(as/15/96 been updated and included wit the closeout documentation. This
. report covers the circuit reviews completed to determine any other l
potential separation problems. Design changes have been initiated to replace the 15 breakers that may not adequately protect #14 SIS wire.
(10/15/96 ) In addition the breaker supplying the 3AF-4002 control l circuit was changed to a 15 amp breaker.
(11/15/96 ...C) After reviewing the circuits again only fourteen circuits need to be replaced. MR 96-069 and MR 96-070 will replace the circuit breakers with acceptable breakers.
I (12/14/96 ....$ Passed to for Verification.
l AC/DC Cabling Review and Analysis Results A review of al D routed through the in Control Panel was completed on 8 22f96cablinkheACcablingca10/f96.
and This review concluded that no single failure would result in the loss of redundant safety Related AC or DC control circuit functionality.
125 VDC CONTROL CIRCUITS A review was performed of all 125 VDC control cables routed to determine if a single faulted cable could damage A Train and B Train control circuits of redundant equipment.
A 125 VDC control circuit was deemed operable if it satisfied at least one of the following criteria :
- 1. The conductor was not routed into the Main Control Panels. 2. The maximum calculated conductor temperature reached during short circuit conditions was determined to be less than the wire short circuit temperature rating of 250 C. This criteria is bounded by criteria #3, howevgr it is included as a separate category to demonstrate that the ma]ority of conductors have fault protection that is adequate to ensure
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ACTION. ITEM STATUS REPORT PAGF :.
i that peak temperatures will not exceed this more conservative criteria. 3.
03/06/97 l Khe maximum calculated cenductor temperature reached during shdrt circuit bonditions was determined to be less than the insulation. ignition L temoerature, thus ensuring that insufficient energy is available for l
[ ins'ulation ignition. Criteria #2 is bounded by this criteria, however it '
i I l isfall included within as a separate criteria to show that the majority of cables l'Atotalof281breakerEositionsonDCdistributionpanelswereanalyzed.
i 220 of the breaker pgsi ions were used in a 125 VDC. The results of the 1
- DC circuit analysis is summarized in Table 1. .
l l 120 VAC CIRCUITS l A review of all 120 VAC circuits was completed on 10/4/96. This review -
' determined if there is a potential for damaging A Train and B Train cgntrgl circuits of redundant equipment due to a fault on a 120 VAC circuit.
A 120 VAC circuit was deemed operable if it satisfied at least one of the following criteria:
- 1. The conductor was not routed through the Main Control Boards. t
- 2. Either the breaker location is a spare or unused space.
- 3. The circuit was protected per the requirements of the National Electrical Code. Table 310-12 of the 1965 NEC states that insulated cooper,-#14 SIS cable has an ampacity of 25 amperes. There is a 50% -
debating factor for more than 42 conauctors in a raceway (exception #8 from the Notes to Table 310-12). This would create a final ampacity of :
12.5 amperes. Exception #10 from the Notes for Table 310-12 states '
"Where the standard ratings and settings of overcurrent devices do n,ot correspond with the ratings and settings allowed for conductors, the next higher setting may be used, This allows instaliation of a 15 ampere overcurrent protective device to protect #14 SIS wire. Therefore a circuit protected by a 15 ampere or smaller breaker or fuse is dee,med-acceptable.
- 4. Only enter's 1C-20 and 2C-20 ASIP control boards. Train seoaration criteria was reviewed during the design and installation of these panels.
Therefore, no separation problems are assumed.
All 120 VAC instrumentation pane:.s listed in Master Data Book Section 3.2.11 were included in this revtew. A total of 888 breaker positions on the AC instrumentation panels were analyzed. Also the control circuits from 25 motor control centers were reviewed for ade,quate overcurrent protection. In all the MCC circuits reviewed, 15 ampere or smaller fuse protection was installed. The results of the 120 VAC instrument panel ,
circuit analysis is summarized in Table 2. !
References:
)
- 1. Calculation # 95-0040 Determination of Voltage Drop in Safety- Related MCC control circuits 2. Short Circuit Curves for # 14 AWG type SIS rnnanc*nv- (Attachment 2 3. Memorandum of Talechone Conversation between a of Heinemann) Electric Co. and 1 of Sargent and Lund? Engineers, dated 7-29-96 (Attachment 3) 4. Protective Device Time vs. Current Curves (Attachment 4 - XX) 5. 1965 National Electrical Code Design changes were initiated to replace the circuit breakers on the f1fteen circuits. The breakers will be replaced with 15 ampere or smaller .
circuit breakers to conform with the National Electrical Code. !
(12/14/96 The operability review for the main control board separation iss)ue still needs to be updated to include the results of the above described evaluation.
REFERENCES----------------------------------------------------------
CARDS CHAMPS WEST. DWG. 499B466 SH. 816 WOLFE & MANN DWG. E-1267E-B i CR 96-385
MISCELLANEOUS---------------------- -------------------------------- :
Originating Agency: S stem: AF NRC Open Item Nuder: N C Status:
Related Outages:
Engineering work Type: None Specified 1
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