IR 05000454/1988003

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Insp Repts 50-454/88-03 & 50-455/88-03 on 880111-0217. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previously Identified Finding,Ser/Technical Evaluation Rept Commitment & Environ Qualification Program Compliance
ML20147F506
Person / Time
Site: Byron  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 02/26/1988
From: Gardner R, Gautam A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20147F399 List:
References
50-454-88-03, 50-454-88-3, 50-455-88-03, 50-455-88-3, NUDOCS 8803070366
Download: ML20147F506 (13)


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U'S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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. REGION!III

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. Reports No.' 50-454/88003(DRS); 50-455/88003(DRS)-

. Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. NPF-37; NPF-66 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Facility Name: Byron, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Byron Site and Glen.Ellyn, Illinois Inspection Conducted: January 11 through February-17, 1988

^ d Inspecte': A. S. Gautam 2f2 86 Regional Inspector, Region II Date  !

Also participating in the inspection and contributing to the report were:

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M. Kopp, RIII S. Alexander, NRR

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J. McGhee, INE i Q. Decker, INEL-C. Kido, INEL H. Jacobus, Sandia Approved By: R. N. Gardner, Chief

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Plant Systems, Section, Region III -Date

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Inspection Summary Inspection on January 11 through February 17, 1988 (Reports No. 50-454/88003(DRS);

No. 50-455/88003(DRS))

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Areas Inspected: Special, announced safety inspection of the environmental qualification (EQ) of electric equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.4 The inspection included licensee action on previously identified findings; SER/TER commitments; EQ program compliance to 10 CFR 50.49; adequacy of EQ documentation; and a plant physical inspection of EQ equipment (Modules No. 30703, No. 25576, and No. 92701).

Results: The licensee has implemented a program to meet the requirements

.of 10 CFR 50.49. Deficiencies in the areas inspected are summarized below:

8803070366 DR ADOCK 0 8802]y4

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VIOLATIONS Report Item N Description Section 50-454/88003-07(DRS) Failure to install qualified components on containment isolc.'. ion valve 1PR066,

. prior to the EQ deadlin POTENTIALLY ENFORCEABLE UNRESOLVED ITEMS Report Item N Description Section 50-454/88003-01(DRS) Inadequate similarity analysis of 2 50-455/88003-01(DRS) tested and installed HVAC system components from Johnson Control /88003-02(DRS) Borg-Warner solenoid valve coils 5.c.(1)

50-455/88003-02(DRS) unqualified far service conditions based on inadequate documentatio OPEN ITEMS Report Item N Description Section 50-454/8dOO3-03(DRS) Lack of implementation of EQ training 5.e.(2)

50-455/88003-03(DRS) progra /68003 04(DRS) Dircrepancies in EQ report for BISCO S/88003-04(DRS) LOCA seal /88003-05(DRS) Discrepancies in EO report for /88003-05(DRS) Rockbestos Coaxial cable assembly 50-454/88003-06(DRS) Questions regarding the Westinghouse /88003-06(DRS) set point methodology evaluating the effects of harsh environments on 10 CFR 50.49 and R.G 1.97 designated EQ instrument e-

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company

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  • L.'Soth, Vice President, PWR Staff'
  • K. L._ Graesser, General Manager, PWR Divisio '*R. E. Querto, Manager, Byron Station
  • R.;Pleniewicz, Superintendent, Production
  • R.: Ward,: Superintendent,. Services
  • R.-A.:Flahive, Superintendent,' Technical Staff
  • Buakamper, Superintendent- Quality Assurance

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  • Walter,'. Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor ,
  • D.! Robinson, Supervisor, Nuclear Safety

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  • L.. A. Sues, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services

+*S. C. Hunsader, Nuclear Licensing Administrator

  • D. Schrader, Technical Staff
  • J. Gluck, Technica1' Staff
  • D. Kruger, EQ Coordinator

+*E. E. Adams, EQ Coordinator ,

  • C. A. Moeske, PWR Engineering
  • T. G. Hibst, Technical Staff .
  • T.-Lamb, Technical Staf *G. Stauffer, Regulatory Assurance
  • B. Pirnat, Regulatory Assurance

+*E.- Zittle, _ Regulatory Assurance

  • C. Lamb, Production Services
  • J. L. Schraefer,' General'Fo-eman, Electrical Maintenance
  • J. Snyder, Electrical Mainten9nce Staff
  • J. Vogl, Electrical Maintenan,e Staff
  • P. Johnson, Mechanic, Instrument Maintenance
  • J. Rogh, EQ Coordinator, Braidwood

+ Ainger, Nuclear Licensing Consultants - Sargent and Lundy

  • S. M. Malak, EQ Coordinator, Project Management Division
  • M. M. Hassaballa, Supervisor
  • R. J. Kokesh, Sr. Project Engineer
  • A. Mohiuddin, Sr. Component Engineer -
  • A. Alsammaroc, EQ Engineer
  • S. Akhtar, EQ Engineer
  • R. Hoke, EQ Engineer
  • A. Behera, Consultant
  • H. Heidarisafa, EQ Engineer I
  • B. Pandit, EQ Engineer
  • R. John, EQ Engineer
  • D. Drankhan, EQ Engineer

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4- 4 4 Nuclear Regulatory'Comission (NRC)

P. Brochman, Senior Resident Inspector, Byron

- + Denotes those participating in the exit interview on February 17. 1988 at the conclusion of the inspectio . Allegation Follow-up (0 pen)RIII-86-A-0131 During' July and August 1986 an unidentified alleger contacted the NRC regarding concerns with components supplied by Westinghouse to Johnson Controls, Inc. (JCI) for installation at Byron Units 1 & 2. . The alleger stated that-W-2 and 0T-2 switches, AR relays, and EZC indicating lights were not properly environmentally qualified to the requirements of 10CFR50.49, Paragraph (f). As a result of this allegation, an inspection was performed at Johnson Controls by inspectors.of the NRC:

VendorBranch(InspectionReportNo. 99901072/86001) who concluded _that the HVAC systems provided by JCI at Byron and Braidwood were located in mild environments and were not required to meet 10 CFR 50.49. As a followup, Region III was requested by the NRC Vendor Branch to confinn whether the HVAC equipment supplied by Johnson Controls per JCI specification F/L 2783 was in fact located in a mild environmen In this regard RIII performed an inspection at the Byron site en-February 2, 1988. During the inspection, the following documents were reviewed:

- Vendor Branch Inspection Report Nc. 99901072/86001

- Byron Environmental Qualification (EQ), Safety Related Component List Index (SRCL)

- Byron FSAR Chapter 3.11 and Table 3.11-2, EQ zones A8 thru A13

- Byron EQ binders, BB-016 Westinghouse EZC indicating lights, BB-019 Westinghouse OT-2 switches, BB-022 Westing house AR relays

- Johnson Controls Purchase Orders, P-11129, P-18002-1, P-18143-2, P-_12493-2

- Johnson Controls Certificate of Conformance/ System Turnover Package, No. 84.11, VA System, Revision 1, dated 9/28/84

- Notes of ' Meeting' - April 22, 1980 Comonwealth Edison Company Office Qualification of Westinghouse Manufactured Equipment and Devices

- Johnson Controls Letter BY-83, dated March 13, 1980

- Johnson Controls Letter BY/BR-84, dated March 13, 1980

- Johnson Controls Letter JC/BY/BR-80, dated March 3,1980

- Ahnson Controls Letter JC/BY/BR-75, dated February 22, 1980 The NRC inspector confirmed that the Westinghouse W-2 switches in question were located in mild environments, and, therefore, were not within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49. The inspector also observed that the Westinghouse OT-2 switches, EZC indicating lights, and the AR relays in

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question were located in harsh environments.

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The licensee's EQ files contained EQ test reports for certain components-

' purchased by JCI for installation at Byron. The licensee was requested to provide evidence that the Westinghouse components installed by JCI were similar or identical to the components tested by JCI. The licensee could not provide the appropriate evidence during this inspection, however, the licensee committed to perform a materials analysis of the tested and installed components. In addition, the licensee provided a letter from Westinghouse that implied that the components-tested by JCI were representative of the components installed at the Byron station. The inspectors had no immediate safety concerns because the components were located in a radiation harsh environment only, and because the inspectors were aware of the testing of similar components in the industry for similar environments. Pending further NRC review of.the licensee's material analysis, this is considered a Potentially Enforceable / Unresolved Item (50-454/88003-001(DRS); 50-455/88003-001(DRS)). Previously Identified Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (454/86025-03(DRS)): On June 13, 1986, S&L

notified the licensee that the ASCO solenoid valve and NAMCO limit switches associated with containment isolation valve IPR 066 did not meet the environmental qualification requirements of NUREG 0588, Category I. The licensee declared the valve inoperable. . Subsequent to the finding, the licensee replaced the solenoid valve and two limit switches with qualified components. The licensee also performed a 50.59 revie During this inspection, the inspectors determined that the licensee's EQ files contained proper documentation for the environmental qualification of the replaced components. 10 CFR 50.49, Paragraphs (f)

and (g) requires equipmert important to safety to be environmentally qualified by test and/.tr analyst: prior to the EQ deadline of November 30, 1985. The inspectors informed the licensee that failure to qualify the refercnced equipment prior to the EQ deadline was a violation of 10 CFR 50.49 (50-454/88003-07(DRS)). The inspectors confimed that action had been taken to correct the identified violation and to prevent recurrence. Consequently, no reply to the violation is required and we have no further questions regarding this matter. This item (454/88003-07(DRS)) is closed, (Closed) Unresolved Item (454/86025-04(DRS)): This item addressed the environmental qualification of Connectron terminal blocks Model NU2, located in junction boxes associated with the Byron main steam isolation valves. During their review of IE Notice 84-90, for the effects of a main steam line break and subsequent super heat releases on plant environmental profiles, the licensee determined that a higher temperature would be postulated during steam line breaks in the vicinity of the Connectron terminal blocks. The licensee took corrective action and replaced all teminations with qualified Raychem splices. IE Notice 84-90 was based on a Westinghouse analysis which concluded that temperature and pressure would exceed previously calculated profile The inspectors

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concluded that the licensee's corrective action was in response to new data invalidating old and that in this regard the licensee had not been in non compliance to 10 CFR 50.4 No further concerns were identifie . Licensee Action on SER/TER Commitments The NRC inspection team evaluated the implementation of the licensee's EQ corrective action commitments discussed in Byron SSERs' 5, 6, and 7 included in the Byron FSAR. The majority of the deficiencies identified in the SERs addressed documentation, similarity, aging, qualified life, and replacement schedule All open items identified in the NRC June 21-23, 1983 audit were addressed by the licensee in their April 1983 through October 1984 responses to the NRC staff. The licensee's proposed resolutions to these items were found acceptable by the NRC, as stated in Section 3.11.4.2 of the Byron SSER 5. The primary objective of the current Region III EQ Audit in this area was to verify that appropriate analyses and necessary documentation to support the licensee's proposed and accepted resolutions were contained in the licensee's EQ files, and that appropriate modifications or replacements of equipment had been implemente During this review, the NRC inspection team reviewed EQ documentation and examined equipment in the plant relevant to prior discrepancies identified in the SERs, including replacement of equipment having qualification deficiencie No violations of NRC requirements were identifie . EQ Program Compliance to 10 CFR 50.49 The inspectors reviewed selected areas of the licensee's EQ Program to verify compliance to 10 CFR 50.49. The licensee's EQ program was found to identify methods of equipment qualification; provide for evaluation and maintenance of EQ documentation in an auditable form; provide for upgrading of replacement equipment; and incorporato controls for plant modifications. Based on their review, the inspectors determined that the licensee had established an EQ program in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. The licensee's methods for establishing and maintaining the environmental qualification of electrical equipment were reviewed in the following areas: EQ Program Procedures The inspectors examined the adequacy of the licensee's policies and procedures for establishing and maintaining the environmental qualification of equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49. The licensee's EQ program was reviewed for procurement of qualified equipment; maintenance of qualified equipment; modifications to

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the plant thatcould affect qualified: equipment; updating of the q 4 EQ master list; and review and approval of EQ documentatio 'we -Procedures reviewed included the following. documents.

l s L* BAP 400-14, Revision 3, Maintenance and Surveillance

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of EQ Plant-

  • BAP 1250-10, Revision 0,-Potential EQ Variations
  • 'BAP 1400-16, Revision 0, EQ Satisfied During Maintenance / Inspection
  • BAP 1610-1, Revision 0, Modification Requests
  • BAP 370-1, Revision ~22, Station Lubrication Program
  • BIP 2400-115, Revision 0, Calibration of U.E. Temp _ Switch (EQ)

Inspection and Maintenance

  • IBHS EQ-03-1, Revision 0, Electric Motor Inspection-
  • IBHS EQ-03-2, Revision 0, Electric Motor Insulation Resistance Testing
  • IBHS EQ-25, Revision 0, Borg-Warner Valve Operator Inspection I
  • BHP EQ-26-1, Revision 0, ASCO NP8316 SW Maintenance
  • IBHS EQ-27, Revision 0, limitorque Valve Operation Inspection
  • BVP 100-2, Revision 5, Classification / Procurement of Parts / Components
  • BMP 3114-4, Revision 2, Periodic Inspection and Repair of the MSIV's Actuator Specific areas reviewed in these procedures included definitions of harsh and mild environments, equipment qualified life, service conditions, periodic testing, maintenance and surveillance, and upgrading of replacement equipment purchased after February 22, 198 No violations of NRC requirements were identifie .- __ _ . ._ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _

.-- , CFR 50.49 Master Equipment List (MEL) of EQ Equipment IE Bulletin No.79-01B required licensees of all power reactor- '

facilities with an-operating license to provide a MEL that

' identified each Class 1E electrical equipment item relied upon to perform'a safety function during a design basis even CFR 50.49, Paragraph (d), requires licensees to prepare a list .

of electrical equipment important to safety and within the scope

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of.the rul r The NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's MEL for compliance to 10 CFR 50.49. Areas reviewed included adequacy of the HEL, technical justifications for removal of items from the MEL, and licensee reviews of the MEL changes due to field modifications. The inspectors verified the completeness / adequacy of the list in terms of equipment needed during accident conditions through review of piping and instrumentation drawings (P& IDS), emergency procedures, technical specifications, and FSARs. Documents reviewed included:

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  • Post LOCA and Capressurization (1, 2 REP-ES-1.2)
  • Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation (1, 2 REP-ES-1,3) i
  • Response to Inadequate Core Cooling (1, 2, RFR-C.1)
  • Degraded Core Cooling (1, 2 BFR-C.2)

No violations of NRC requirements were identifie EQ Maintenance and Surveillance Program The inspector reviewed specific maintenance, replacement, .

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surveillance tests, and inspections necessary to preserve the environmental qualification of EQ components identified on the ME EQ requirements in the licensee's maintenance procedures and EQ files were reviewed against maintenance records of selected

equipment to verify performance of maintenance and surveillance activities at prescribed interval Activities reviewed included gasket inspection, lubrication, torquing of housing covers and installation of replacement part The following exceptions were ,

identifie (1) File EQ-BB-025 - Borg-Warner Solenoid Valves, Model Nos. 38878-1 and 38878-3

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During review of this file, the inspectors obsqrved that EQ t solenoid valve coils (Part No. 38903) had failed during '

qualification testing due to a lack of proper insulation  ;

(Kapton tape) covering the start lead on the coil. The  :

short occurred at the point where the start lead and windings L intersect. The vendor subsequently identified all solenoid l

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valve coils manufactured between December 1984 and 1985 to be suspec ,

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During this current inspection, the inspectors observed that two solenoid valves.(Model No. 38878-1) had been requisitioned from Byron spare parts.and installed to actuate feedwater isolation valve.1FW009A, as evidenced by NWR B30268, April 29, 1987. >The licensee stated that these' valves wcre procured via-Purchase Order No. 295741 from Borg Warner, in February 1985,-

and that the' solenoid valves were received at the Byron site in July 198 The licensee,:however, could not demonstrate that these1 solenoid coils were not part of the batch of suspect coils identified by the vendo Subsequent to this fi5 ding the licensee performed a review of applicable records and determined that there were sixteen suspect coils installed at the Byron Unit 1 sit The licensee Ltook .immediate corrective _ action and raplaced six suspect solenoid valves with solenoid valves having qualified coil The licensee also performed an operability analysis to justify continued operation with the installed suspect coils associated

< with the feedwater isolation valves. The licensee has-committed to replace the remaining ten suspect coils during their upcoming outage. Pending further NRC Review, this is considered a Potentially Enforceable / Unresolved Item (No. 50-454/88003-02(DRS); No. 50-455/88003-02(DRS)).

d. Plant Procurement and Upgrading of Replacement Equipment Licensee procedures were found to adequately address upgrading of appropriate ~ replacement equipment. Procurement procedures and documents were found to adequately address appropriate quality and regulatory requirements regarding the environmental qualification of equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49. Checklists were observed to have beer, used to provide evidence of reviews and approvals. For. example, procurement packages for the procurement of ASCO solenoid valves, P.O. No. 749247 and NAMCO controls limit switches, P.O. No. 309632 were found to properly address procurement of equipment to the requirements of IEEE 323-197 No violations of NRC requirements were identifie e. Quality Assurance (QA) and Training Program (1) During this review, the inspectors determined that the licensee had implemented a program to monitor the quality of EQ activities through surveillance, audits, and reviews of the records and files for plant modifications and equipment procurement. NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee's QA audits including QA Audit Nos. 06-80-15 and 06-87-15 conducted in May 1986 and May 1987, and the inspectors found the methodology, results and followup corrective action relative to the audits acceptabl _

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j (2) The NRC inspectors also reviewed the. licensee's staff training program and associated records. relative to the performance of

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EQ' activities. .The training records indicated that the licensee had implemented a formal EQ training program for newly hired personnel; however, there was no evidence that other

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appropriate. staff (management, operations and maintenance)

responsible for EQ activities had received this trainin Th training program was found to adequately address: key aspects of 10 CFR 50.49 requirements, and the licensee agreed t incorporate EQ training into.an ongoing training program.for

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appropriate plant personnel. Pending further review, this is an Open Item (No. 50-454/88003-03(DRS);

No. 50-455/88003-03(DRS)).

6. Detailed Review of Qual:fication Files The licensee qualified their EQ equipment to the requirements of NUREG 0588, Category I (10 CFR 50.49 Paragraph K). The inspectors reviewed over 40 equipment qualification files for evidence of the environmental-qualification of equipment within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49, and evidence of equipment qualification to NUREG 0588, Category I. Files were found to include a description of the equipment; similarity analysis of tested equipment to that installed in the plant; allowed mounting metnods and orientation; qualification of interfaces (conduit, housing, seal, etc.); evaluation of aging effects on equipment; description of -

test sequence and methodology; environmental conditions for the equipment during an accident; qualification for submergence of applicable equipment; resolution of test anomalies; and maintenance / surveillance criteria for the preservation of the qualified status of equipmen The inspectors selectively reviewed the above areas, as applicable, including special reviews for the required duration of operability of equipment; licensee evaluation of tested materials and configurations relative to actual plant installations; adequacy of test conditions; :

aging calculations for qualified life and replacement intervals; effects of decreases in insulation resistance on equip'nent performance; adequacy of demonstrated accuracy of equipment and interfaces during an accident; and licensee evaluations of discrepancies identified in IE Notices and Bulletin EQ files were reviewed for electrical cables, cable splices, terminations, terminal blocks, electric motors, solenoid valves, electrical penetrations, seals, lubricants, transmitters, temperature elements, radiation monitors, control and position switches, switch gear, control panels and miscellaneous electrical devices. The int.pectors found that the EQ files allowed verification of equipment qualification to a specified performance fcr accident conditions. Exceptions are noted below:

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a. Joy / Reliance Motors, Model No. 500826-2047/2031 EQ File No. EQ-BB-003 This file is used to document the qualification of motors installed on the Auxiliary Building HVAC exhaust fan A test summary was included in the files, but the actual test reports were maintained in the vendor's file in Cleveland, Ohio. The summary report, however, did not contain adequate information to allow the inspector to verify the equipment qualificatio The licensee could not provide evidence that they had audited the vendor's file to assure that the equipment qualification was in accordance with NUREG 0588, Category Subsequent to the finding, the licensee performed a review of the test data on January 19, 1988, at the Reliance Electric Company in Cleveland, Ohio and confirmed that the test data contained in Reliance Report No. NUC-22 qualified the motor to the requirements of NUREG 0588, Category No violations of NRC requirements were identified, b. BISCO LOCA Seal (EQ File No. EQ-BB-117)

The inspectors reviewed the qualification of BISCO LOCA seals to the requirements of NUREG 0588, Category I. This seal is used primarily to seal NAMCO limit switches. A special LOCA test was conducted by Wyle Laboratories for Byron applications with a test specimen made from the material used in the plan Some degradation of the limit switch contacts was recorded after testing. The inspectors observed that the qualified life as extrapolated, using the Arrhenius technique, did not account for this contact corrosion / degradatio The licensee performed additional reviews and calculations and stated that the switches in question were only required for about 17 days, and that the BISCO seal was not used on any other equipment. Pending further NRC review of revisions to the EQ file and applications of the BISCO seal, this is considered an Open Item (No. 50-454/88003-04(DRS); No. 50-455/88993-04(ORS)).

c. Rockbestos Firewall III Coaxial Cable for General Atomic (CA',

Radiation Monitors (EQ File No. EQ-BB-039)

The inspectors reviewed the Rockbestos coaxial cable RSS-6-104/LD and RSS-6-105/LE for qualification to NUREG 0588, Category I and Regulatory Guide 1.97. The cable is used for connections to the high range radiation monitors. The tested cable is similar to the installed cable based on a Rockbestos similarity analysis. Although environmental parameters of the test exceed plant requirements, the insulation resistance (IR) values demonstrated during the test did not meet the GA specification of 5 x 10s 0 at elevated temperature The licensee also demonstrated that at high dose rates the instrument would maintain an acceptable accuracy. The licensee concluded that low IR's would only occur at high temperatures, and that thermal lag would prevent the cable from reaching temperatures where inaccuracies could occu _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _. - _ _ _ -

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The inspectors could not determine from the file if the thermal lag calculations applied to the installed configurations. The licensee agreed to update their file to address these question Pending NRC retfew of the updated file, this is considered an Open Item (No. 50-454/88003-05(ORS); No. 50-455/88003-05(ORS)). Instrument Accuracy During review of the Westinghouse setpoint methodology, dated December 1982, for EQ instruments installed in the Nuclear Steam Supply Systems (NSSS), the inspectors observed that Westinghouse had considered an "environmental allowance" (EA) for instruments. It was not clear, however, if this approach-had been adequately and consistently applied to all appropriate instruments within the scope 10 CFR 50.49 and Regulatory Guide 1.97. For example the following questions were not clearly addressed in the documen (1) The Westinghouse methodology states that if an error due to cable degradation is in excess of 0.1% of instrument span, then this error must be directly added to the total instrument error as an environmental error. It was not clear if the licensee had done s '

(2) Several calculation sheets in the Westinghouse document state the environmental allowance to be zero. It was not clear why no environmental allowance was considered for these instrument ;

(3) It was not clear if the methodology considers environmental effects on post accident instrumentatio The licensee was requested to address the above question Pending further NRC review this is considered an Open Item (50-454/88003-06(DRS); 50-455/88003-06(DRS)).

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7. Plant Physical Inspection The NRC inspectors selected over 50 items on the MEL for examination in the plant. The EQ file of each item had been reviewed, and information regarding the location, manufacturer, model/ serial number, mounting, ,

l orientation, environment, and interfaces had been note The inspectors examined the selected items in the field, as accessible, and verified that the method of installation of each item was not in conflict with l Its environmental qualificatio Specific areas reviewed included I l

traceability of installed items to EQ files, ambient environmental conditions, qualification of interfaces (connectors, wires, seals, insulation, lubricants, etc.), evidence of signification temperature rise from process, drainage, mounting methods, physical conditions and t j housekeepin In almost all cases the items examined in the field during ,

this walkdown were found to meet their appropriate EQ requirements.

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.. Water was observed to be leaking from the valve packing of the valve associated with actuator 1CC94128. The licensee stated that a work / repair order had been processed. No further concerns were identified, The inspectors examined BSE Pressure Switch Model BIT-A4855 on the main ~ steam isolation valve IMS0010. The switch housing was found.to be covered with hydraulic fluid (Fryquel 220) leaking from the relief part of the hydraulic actuator to the MSIV.- The licensee was asked to determine the cause of the leak and verify if the qualification of the switch had been compromised by the~ oil. The lir.ensee contacted Anchor Darling Valve Company (vendor), who stated.that the Fryquel 220 and viton seal of the switch housing were compatible, and that no degradation of the viton would result from their contac In addition, the licensee confirmed that the electrical portion of the subject pressure switches were considered "non-safety". No further concerns were identifie No violations of NRC requirements were identifie . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or bot Open items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs Se(2), 6b, 6c, and 6 . Potentially Enforceable / Unresolved Items An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a deviation, or a violation. Potentially Enforceable / Unresolved Items are discussed in Paragraphs 2 and Sc(1).

10. Exit Interview The Region III inspectors met with the licensee's representatives (denoted under Paragraph 1) during an interim exit on January 15, 1988, and discussed their findings by phone at the conclusion of the inspection on February 17, 1988. The inspectors discussed the likely content of the inspection report with regard to document or processes reviewed by the inspectors. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar