IR 05000454/1988020

Insp Repts 50-454/88-20 & 50-455/88-17 on 881001-1114.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Lers,Operations Summary,Training, Maint/Surveillance,Operational Safety & Region III Requests

ML20206J149
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	11/23/1988
From:	Hinds J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206J134	List: IR 05000454/1988020 ML20206J131
References
50-454-88-20, 50-455-88-17, NUDOCS 8811280078
Download: ML20206J149 (10)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0l44ISS10N

REGION III

Report Nos. 50-454/88020(ORP);50-455/88017(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 License Nos. NPF-37; NPF-66 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Station Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Byron Station, Byron, Illinois Inspection Conducted: October 1 - November 14, 1988 Inspectors: P. G. Brochman N. V. Gilles T. M. Tongue Approved By:

AA Asa< m J. M. Hinds, Jr. , Chief // .2 3- # #

Reactor Projects Section 1A Date Inspection Summary Inspection from October 1 - November 14, 1988 (Report Nos. 50-454/88020(ORP);

50-455/88017(DRP))

Areas inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; licensee event reports; operations summary; training; maintenance / surveillance; operational sefety; engineering / technical support; Region III requests; event follow-up; and meetings with local public official Results: No violations or deviations we e identified, nor were any items  !

identified which could affect the public's health and safet !

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Com6.* wealth Edison Company

• R. Pleniewicz, Station Manager

• T. Joyce, Production Superintendent '

• R. Ward, Services Superintendent  ;

D. Winchester, Quality Assurance Superintendent

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• T. Tulon, Assistant Superintendent, Operating

• G. Schwartz, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance ,

• L. Sues, Assistant Superintendent. Technical Services l

• D. St. Clair, Assistant Superintendent Work Planning ,

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T. Higgins, Operating Engineer, Unit 0 J. Schrock, Operating Engineer, Unit 1 9. Brindle, Operating Engineer, Unit 2 T. Didier, Operating Engineer, Rad-Waste

• M. Snow, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor R. Flahive, Technical Staff Supervisor S. Barret, Radiation / Chemistry Supervisor P. O'Neil, Quality Control Supervisor

• Pirnat, Regulatory Assurance Staff

• E. Zittle, Regulatory Assurance Staff

• Dijstelbergen, PWR Field Engineering Supervisor

• D. Bump, Quality Assurance

• Dean, Nuclear Safety

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The inspectcr also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspectio * Denotes those present during the exit interview on November 14, 198 :

l ActiononpreviousInspectionFindings(92701) (Closed) Unresolved Item (454/860^0-02(ORP ): Should pump ISX04P l

be included in the inservice testing (IST)) progra Pump ISX04P, '

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l "Essential Service Water Booster Pump," provides cooling to the t i diesel, which drives one of the auxiliary feedwater pumps during i i a loss of all AC power accident. The inspector requested that NRR l evaluate whetht e' this pump should be periodically tested under the !

l IST program, as this pump is powered by an emergency power source l and don mitigate the consequence of an accident. NRR has determined that since the loss of all AC power is a "beyond design basis" accident, pump ISX04P is not required to be tested by the i ASME code and pump ISXO4P has ne' been included in the IST progran f (letter from L. Olshan to H. Bliss, dated September 15,1938). (

Based on this action by NRR, this item is considered close l l 2 l

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' (Closed) Unresolved Item (454/86040-06(DRP); 455/86040-09(DRP))?

Should valves AF024 be included in the IST program. As in paragraph (a) above, these valves mitigate a "beyond design basis" accident and consequently are not required to be incorporated in the IST prog ram. Based on this action by NRR, this item is considered close . Licensee Event Report (LER) Follow-up (90712 & 92700) (Closed)LERs 454/88007-LL; 454/88008-LL; 455/88001-1L; 455/88011-LL))(: Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following LERs were

.l reviewed to determine that the reportability requirements were fulfilled, imediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification LER N Title

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Unit 1

454/88007 Loss of shutdown cooling during reactor

! cavity level lowering evolutio /88008 Containixnt ventilation isolation during

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reactor vessel upper internals remova Unit 2

455/88001-1 Reactor trip due to a feedwater pump trip j 455/88011 Both trains of manual Phase A isolation circuit not tested properly.

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With regard to LER 454/88007, this event involved the loss of one train of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system and is discussed in detail in 1 Inspection Report No. 454/88019. With regard to LER 455/88001-1, the

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supplement was issued to report the results of the vendor analysis of

the failed servo-valve and corrective actions.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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, Summary of Operations j

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Unit I remained shutdown in a scheduled refueling outage until the unit was taken critical at 1116 on November 4,1988. The unit was taken to Mode 4 at 1746 on November 5 when an unisolable leak on the 1A Safety j Injection Accumulator fill line was identified (see paragraph 10). The unit was again taken critical at 1117 on November 7 and synchronited to

the grid at 0126 on November 9. The unit was taken offline at 1326 that day, as part of a planned test, and was resynchronized to the grid at 0930 on November 13, after several days of turbine balancing. The unit operated at power levels up to 50% for the rest of the report period.

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I Major activities performed during the Unit I refueling outage included l

major work on the main turbine, including replacement of e low pressure i turbine rotor; a 5-year inspection of the IB diesel generator; an 18-month inspection of the 1A diesel generator; completion of the snubber reduction modification; and eddy current testing and U-bend stress

, relieving on all 4 steam generators. The results of the eddy current

testing led to the plugging of 3 tubes on the 1A steam generator, 4 tubes

on the IB steam generator, 4 tubes on the IC steam generator, and 3 tubes on the 10 steam generator, i Unit 2 operated at power levels up to 64% for the entire report period, j 5. Training (41400 & 41701)

The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed l 1 personnel was reviewed by the inspectors during witnessing of the i licensee's performance of routine surveillance, maintenance, and ,

operational activities and during review of the licensee's response to events which occurred during October and November,1988. Personnel .

appeared to be knowledgeable of the tasks being performed, and nothing was observed which indicated ineffective trainin ;

] No violations or deviations were identifie (

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l 6. Maintenance / Surveillance (61715, (1726, & 62703)

, Station maintenance activities of the safety-related systems and comparents listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain that

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they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory l 3 guides, and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with  :

Technical Specifications.

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! Unit I reactor vessel head installation (

! 18 month inspection of the 1A diesel generator t

! Removal of Limitorque actuator for valve 15188128 t

) Repair of IVQ002A following failure of local leak rate test "

! Repair of check valve 1518819C  !

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The nuclear work request (NWR) for repair of IVQ002A required rework i

due to failure of the local leak rate test (LLRT). The inspector '

i monitored the rework and interviewed maintenance personne The l l inspector raised questions about the us9 of "Scotch Bright" as a r

cleaning abrasive on the neoprene seat of the valve, as it was not l

specifically authorized in the vendor's manual. The inspector also j l questioned the installation orientation of the 48 inch diameter  ;

i containnent vent and purge valves which appeared reversed from the  !

manufacturer's recomendation. The licensee promptly contacted the  !

manufacturer and provided documentation authorizing the use of "Scotch  ;

Bright" and produced a letter showing that the vent and purge valves  !

were installed in accordance with the manufacturer's recomendation (

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! inspector requested a list of recent maintenance requests (NWRs) where [

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problems were encountered requiring rework, field change requests (FCRs),etc. From a list of eleven NWRs, the following were selected as a sample for a cross-section of maintenance work groups, various systems being safety-related or being in an area of agency interes The following NWRs were reviewed:

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ISX213A 1A Essential Service Water Pump Drain l Valve obstructed and replacement - NWR B61223 i

i 2DG01SA-B #2 Starting Air Compressor for 2A Emergency

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Diesel Generator Discharge Line leak repair and replacement - NWR B59595 1CV85220 CV Cation Demineralizer Outlet Yalve

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Investigation of leakage and diaphragm replacement -

1WR B58720

! 1RY455A Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve

riock open for containment integrated leak rate test

atd diaphragm replacement - NWR B53359

J 1CC9421A Compenent Cooling Relief Valve for the seal water l heat exchanger - verify accumulation and blowdown, j removal, seat and disc replacement - NWR B55636 ISD002F Steam Generator Blowdown Containment Isolation i Valve - Repair after failing local leak rate test -

l NWR 860130.

] Repaired per NWR B61533 I ISD002F Steam Generator Blowdown Containment Isolation

! Valve - Repair, test, and replacement - NWR B61533

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The following modifications were reviewed and the associated NWRs that were used to perform the modifications were reviewed as above:

Modification H6-0-86-286 OSX02PA and OSX02PB OA and OB replacement of hard seated check valves with soft seated spring loaded check valves in the fuel oil system to prevent back leakage and engine start failures - NWR 833141 and 83314 The test of the system did not appear to demonstrate assurance that the valve seats did not leak. However, the inspector reviewed operational surveillance, 0805 7.5.e.1-1, "Essential Service Water Hakeup Pump OA (0B) Honthly Operability Surveillance," data from January 1988 to September 1988, and found only one start failure early in 1988. This modification appears to have corrected the proble _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Modification M6-1-87-105 Rod Drive Cabinets - Reroute RD system ground cables per PECN P-850

- NWR B47800 Modification M6-1-85-714 Relocate instruments (temperature detectors) 1TS-S0045 A&B; ITS-50046 A&B per PECN P-534 and 531 to prevent false isolations from temperature interference of nearby steam lines - NWR 650035 Modification M6-1-86 D117 Main Turbine Impulse Pressure Indica'.or added potentiometer to IPI-MdOO4 to create a more meaningfs,1 indication, i.e., compatible with other instruments - NWR B2161f Modification M6-1-85-554 Alarm Annunciator, "Source Range tiigh Voltage Failure" Redesign and rewire circuitry se the annunciator is deenergized above P-10 permissive (10% Reactor Power). This was done to help achieve the "Black Board" operation or remove control room distractions - NWR B21568 On October 11, 1988, with Unit 1 in Mode 6. mechanical maintenance personnel were performing work on 15188128 (RHR pump 1B suction from RWST isolation valve). The mechanics were removing the valve actuator in order to change the gear box grease and were attemating to release the stem nut. To do this requires turning the valv e landwheel in the close direction, which will raise the stem nut. However, the mechanics mistakenly turned the handwheel in the open direction, raising the valve off its seat approximately one inch. With the IB RHR train operating in shutdown cooling at the time, this provided a flow path from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).

Approximately 10,000 gallons of water were transferred from the RWST, most of which overflowed through the reactor vessel flange area into the refueling cavity (the reactor vessel head was set on the vessel but not bolted in place). Due to the mechanics' error, the licensee had to remove the reactor vessel head, replace the vessel o-rings, clean the reactor vessel flange area, and reset the vessel head. The inspectors are concerned with the apparent lack of attention to detail by the mechanics who turnad the ilandwheel in the wrong direction even though the direction of rotation is embossed on the handwheel. In addition, when the stem nut did not come free at first, the mechanics realized they had turned the handwheel in the wrong direction, and turned it the other way to free the stem nut. Hewever, they did not realize they had lifted the valve stem, and were unaware of this until told by an operator that they had opened the valve and were transferring water from the RWS The licensee is making revisions to their prorxdures for valve actuator removal. In addition, a change will be made to require locking the valve stem in place when working on any valves which cannot be isolated from system pressure or fluid thrust. The present procedure contains a caution to this regard, but management decided the work being done on 1S18812B did not warrant locking the stem in place since 15188128 was a

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gate va've and would not be expected to be moved by fluid pressure, f

, it appears that managemer.t did not take into account the possibility .

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of error on the part of the personnel performing the maintenanc Station surveillance activities of the safety-related systems and components listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain '. hat -

they were conducted in accordance with approved p*ocedures and a :

conformance with Technical Specification t

, 2A diesel generator monthly surveillance l 1A diesel generator undervoltage sequence test t

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The following items were considered during these reviews

the limiting !

con?tions for operation were met while affected components or systems ,

were renoved from and restored to servica; approvals we': abtained prior :

] to initiating work or testing; quality control records , pre maintained;

) arts and materials used were properly certified; radiological courols :

and fire prevention controls were implemented; maintenance and testing l

. activities were accomplished in accordance with appreved procedures; '

maintenance and testing were accomplished by qualified personnel; test

! instrumentation was within its calibration interval; functional testing i and/or calibr6+ ions were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; .est results conformed with Technical Specifications

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and procedural requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than i the individual directing the test; any deficiencies identified during

the testing were properly documented, reviewed, and resolved by j appropriate nanagement personnel; work requests were reviewed to

! detemine the status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority t

was assigned to sOfety.related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance, l

l The inspectors performed a verification of the integrity of the Unit 1 l

containment after it was estabiished by *he lic*nsee, following the refueling outage. The inspectors toured the Unit I containment with plant management after integrity was established. The inspectors

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verified that containment mechanical and electricei penetrations were j intact and in their proper positions and verified the operability of l the containment air lock.

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! No violations or deviations were identified.

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7. Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71709, & 71N1)

The inspectors observed control rcom operation, reviewed applicable logs i and conducted discussions with ce"trol room operators during October and

! November 1988. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, i

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and atter.tive to changes in t?,ose cenditions, and that they took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of

selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified the

! proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary,

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fuel-handling, rad-waste, turbine, and Unit I c,ntainment buildings were j conducted to observe plant equipment ccnditions, including potential fire l

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h3zards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations, and to verify that maintenance requests hac ., en initiated for equipment in need of maintenance, f

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The inspectors verified by observation and direct interviews that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the  !

station security plo i The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and f verified implementation of radiation protection controls. The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with rad-waste shipments and barrelin The observed facility operations were verified to be in accordance with  !

the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and  !'

administrative procedure No violations or deviations were identifie [ Engineering / Technical Support (71711)

The inspectors observed plant startup, approach to criticality, and the performance of physics tests to verify that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedires and Technical Specifications. The inspectors witnessed the approach to criticality and verified that source range nuclear instruments were ops..cing f properly, that 1/H plots were being perfortned, that approved procedures  !

were being used, and that activitiet were conducted in accordance with  :

Technical Specifications. The inspectors witnessed portions of control  !

rod worth measurement tests, e No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Region III Requests (92701)

In accordance with a memorandum from Region III. E. G. Greer, man, dated October PA, 1988, the following information notices (IN) were reviewed for their applicability to Byron, (Closed)IN88-55: "Potential problems caused by single failure of an engineered safety feature swing bus." This IN is not applicable to Byron, as Byron doas not have an engineered safety feature swing bu (Closed) IN 88-57: "PWR auxiliary feedwater pump turbine overspeed trip failure." This IN is not applicable to Byron which does not have turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump . Onsite follow-up of Events ,at Operatitio Reactors (93702)

The inspector performed onsite followup activities for an event which l occurred during November 1908. This followup included reviews of i

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operating logs, procedures, Deviation Repcets. Licensee Event Reports, and interviews with licensec personnel. Fcr the event, the inspector developed a chronology, reviewed the functioning of safety systems required by plemt conditions, reviewed licensee actions to verify consistency with procedures, license conditions, and the nature of the event. Additionally, the inspector verified that the licensee  ;

investigation had identified root causes of equipment malfunctions  !

and/or personnel error and had taken appropriate corrective actions r prior to plant restart. Details of the event and the licensee's ,

corrective actions developed through inspector followup is provided below, f

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Unit 1 - Unusual Event Declared Due to Inoperable St Accumulator

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At 1100 on November 5,1988, with the reactor in Mode 2, alarms were received in the control room for low pressure on the 1A SI accumulator and high containment sump level. Personnel entered containment and

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discovered water spraying out of an one-inch fill line on the ,

I accumulator. At 1158, the licensee declared an Unusual Event (UE) and i began to shutdown the reactor in accordance with Technical Specification [

At 1746, the unit entered Mode 4 and the UE was terminated. The cause i of the leak was a circumferential crack In the accumulator fill line

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where it was welded to the accumulator. The licensee performed a dye  !

penetrant test (PT) on the other fill lines and found indications of  ;

cracks in these lines for the IC and 10 accumulators. The licensee  ;

repaired all the cracks and modified the support for the 1A fill lin :

There have been several previous repairs to these lines, both at Byron  !

and at Braidwood. The licensee has been performing periodic inspections l of tnese lines since April, 1988. The last inspection on all the Unit 1  !

fill lines was performed on August 10, 1988, and Unit 2 was last  !

inspected on November 4,198 The licensee has reviewed data from ;

testing done at Braidwood following their most recent failure and is l

considering doing additional testing of these lines during the upcoming i Unit 2 refueling outage, to help in determining the cause o' this type l of failur '

The inspectors will review this event in a subsequent report after the  ;

LER is issue ;

No violations or deviations were identifie . Meeting with Local Public Officials (94600) j On November 10,198f,, the senior resident inspector attended a meeting with local public officials from coernunities surrounding Byron Statio The meeting was held by the licensee as part of a annual program to meet  !

with officials of agencies which are responsible for offsite emergency i preparadness activitie !

1 Exit Interview (30703)  !

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph  !

I at the conclusion of the inspection on November 14, 1988. The l l

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inspectors sumarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The insper*-~ also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report, with regard to docunents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar