ML20107G642

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Control Room Design Review, Final Rept,Suppl 1
ML20107G642
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/1984
From:
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Shared Package
ML20107G625 List:
References
NUDOCS 8411080178
Download: ML20107G642 (68)


Text

w PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY'S LIMERICK PLANT CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT NUMBER 1 FINAL REPORT OF JUNE 1984 OCTOBER 1984

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TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE INTRODUCTION 1 1 METHODOLOGY 3 1.1 Overview 3 1.2 Validation 3 1.3 Outstanding Control Room Design Review Items 11 1.4 NRC/LLL and PECo/ Interlock Meeting 13 3 ., .2' FINDINGS 14 2.1 Validation 14 2.2 Control Room Survey of Outstanding Items 17 3- IMPLEMENTATION 18

3.1 Control Room Panel Enhancements 18

'- 3.2 Implementation of Additional Improvements 18 s

LIST OF APPENDICES APPENDIX TITLE PAGE A Human Engineering Discrepancies 21 B Data Collection Forms 6E e

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LIST OF TABLES TABLE TITLE PAGE l-1 TRIP Procedures '

Analyzed 4 l-2 T-200 Series Procedures 5 r

LIST OF FIGURES J

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FIGURE TITLE PAGE 1 Control Room Panels

- Before Enhancements 19 2- . Control Room Panels After Enhancements t

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c LIMERICK PLANT CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT INTRODUCTION This document constitutes Philadelphia Electric Company's (PECo) Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) Supplemental Report for the Limerick Unit 1 Nuclear Generating Station. On June 25, 1984, PECo submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion (NRC) the DCR0R Final Report, which documented results of both the original Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group (BWROG) ,

review and the formal DCRDR per the Limerick Program Plan of August, 1983.

This report documents the results of DCRDR activities that have been completed subsequent to the submittal of the Final Report. These activities are, DCRDR Validation, disposition /res-olution of Outstanding Control Room Survey (CRS) items, implementation of actual control room enhancements, and results of a follow-on meeting between the NRC, with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and PECo/ Interlock.

As indicated in the Final Report, a formal task analysis would be completed for Limerick. Completion-and evaluation of the SPDS, a subset of displays off the ERFDS, system has also been deferred. Both the task analysis and SPDS efforts are scheduled for completion by June 30, 1985 and will be reported on at that time. (Reference PECo letter from Mr. J.S. Kempe r to Mr. A. Schwencer, dated August 16, 1984.)

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As was the' Final Report, this document is configured with three major sections: Methodology, Findings, and Implementation.

Section 1, Methodology, includes three subsections:

e DCRDR Validation e Outstanding CRS items e NRC/LLL, PECo/ Interlock meeting Section 2, Findings, discusses in general terms, the types of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) (seo Appendix A) iden-

'tified- during the Validation and CRS activities.

Section 3, Implementation, discusses the actual control room enhancement effort indicating how the overall DCRDR process culminated into actual panel enhancements. Also included in this section is a discussion of how the new HEDs identified were resolved.

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Section 1 METHODOLOGY l l

1.1 Overview This section discusses the Methodology used in conducting I

the DCRDR Validation and.the CRS of outstanding items. In addition, the purpose and objectives of the NRC/LLL and PECO/ Interlock meeting of August 7, 8, and 9 will be discussed.

It should be. recognized that this report is a. supplement to the Final Report and does not contain historic and/or background information. This report documents only those items indicated in the Introduction.

1.2 Validation The objective of the Limerick Control Room Design Review

. Validation was' to determine whether functions allocated to the control room operating crew could be effectively accomplished within the structure of the Transient Response Implementation Procedures (TRIP) and the improved design of the control room.

As . indicated in the Program Plan and referenced in the Final Report,- the TRIPS are the BWROG plant specific symptom-based emergency operating procedures. As part of the validation of the control- room- improvements, it was possible to determine if improvements created additional discrepancies, and to identify discrepancies not previously noted.

The validation methodology involved three phases:

Preparation, Walkthrough/Talkthrough, and Documentation.

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Preparation This phase involved developing the validation and the data collection guidelines in addition to analyzing the TRIP procedure flow diagrams. The guidelines were developed to ensure that the participants (control room licensed operators) were aware of why the validation was being done, what was expected of them, and how the CRDR team would be conducting the validation. As part of this, guidelines were developed for the observers to ensure appropriate data collection was accomplished. The requisite forms for collecting data are included in Appendix B.

An analysis of the TRIP procedures was done to ensure that the validation -effort examined the appropriate steps and contingencies of the procedures while minimizing the redundancies. This ensured that the main flow and branches to a TRIP were examined, and also provided for the particular appropriate crossing between particular TRIPS.in a walkthrough context.

TABLE 1.1. TRIP PROCEDURES ANALYZED T-100 . SCRAM T-99 Post SCRAM Restoration T-101 Reactor Pressure Vessel Control Reactor Power (including ATWS)

Reactor Level Reactor Pressure T-102 Containment Control T-ll2 Suppression Pool Temperature Suppression Pool Level Drywell Pressure T-116 Drywell Temperature 4

T-101 Reactor Level Restoration Emergency Blowdown Blowdown Cooling Core Spray Cooling Alternate Shutdown Cooling Reactor Pressure Vessel Flooding T-117 Reactor Level / Power Control The above TRIP procedures occasionally referred to additional technical procedures (T-200 series) . These procedures were reviewed for control room actions, and those applicable to the control room were also walked through.

TABLE 1.2. T-200 dERIES PROCEDURES T-221 Main Steam Line Low Level Isolation Valve Bypass Procedure T-230 Remote manual Primary Containment Isolations T-231 RHR to Suppression Pool Procedure T-233 Dumping Suppression Pool Inventory to Radwaste via RHR LOOP "A" T-243 Alternate Injection via RHRSW to RHR LOOP "B" T-250 Suppression Pool to CST via HPCI or RCIC T-251 Establish HPCI Injection Flow Path via either Feedwater or Core Spray Walkthroughs/Talkthroughs The- actual validation activity was conducted via walkthroughs and talkthroughs using the enhanced control room mockup. The mockup had been previously verified against prints ensuring all controls and indications were properly labeled, scaled, .and identified, and all enhancements and other improve-ments as a result of HED resolutions identified in the CRDR Final Report were as reported. The method used for the walkthrough was as described in NUREG 0700, Section 3.8.2. Although NUREG 0700 suggests the use of audio and video recordings only for real time exercises where it is not possible to stop activity to clarify 5

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points during the run, recordings were taken of all runs (activities) only as backup information if required during follow-up analysis. No data collection was specified or intended from these recordings.

Prior to starting the runs for the walkthroughs/ talk-throughs, the operators and CRDR team members were briefed on the purpose of the validation. In addition, the operators were briefed on the mockup enhancements, philosophy of the design, and changes from the present control room configuration. The mockup contained the final configuration intended for the control room. The approach to enhancements altered the appearance of the panels, such that the operators were not familiar with the new arrangement. As a result, the lack of-familiarity with the new design would serve to determine how easily the operators would be able to adapt to the new configuration,and label terminology.

Walkthroughs were performed by the operators in near real time, but were interrupted from time to time to allow clarifications for the review team members. In addition,

. operators were encouraged to comment on anything they noticed during the exercise. In one instance, runs were repeated in order to obtain a more 'real time' environment for observation purposes. Recognizing the constraints of a static mockup, this uninterrupted run proved useful.

Data was taken by two human factors consultants who have been regular members of the CRDR core team, augmented by another human factors specialist who has worked extensively on the CRDR.

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The team leader also completed a comment sheet for each run.

Operators performed as a three-person team, which is normal minimum staffing for one unit operation. Each operator was accompanied by a data taker using an Operator Activity sheet to record movements from station to station, and a comment sheet to record comments by the operator and observer notes. An example of a completed activity sheet is enclosed in Appendix B.

Time lines were not prepared for these walkthroughs because the TRIP procedures being used have been thoroughly evaluated by PECo and approved by the NRC Procedures Branch as described in the Program Plan. The extensive evaluation process included plant specific simulator exercises. All operators participating in the walkthroughs had been trained on these procedures on the simulator. Therefore, the operator's evaluation was considered to be the best source of timing, phasing, frequency, and duration of actions.

Although the SPDS (ERFDS) implementation has been delayed, proposed ERFDS computer displays were available and were used in a_ black and white hard copy format during the walkthroughs. The TRIP procedures include many graphs for manual plotting. These same graphs are in.cluded in the ERFDS displays and are therefore readily related to the immediate operating problem. Operators were asked to identify when they would use the displays and to refer to the hard copy as they would refer to the ERFDS display.

They simulated obtaining readings from the appropriate displays l

and compa ring them with panel indications. As the operators l l

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! became comfortr51e with their role as actors, this turned out to be a' reasonably effective validation of the integration of ERFDS displays with the operational procedures and the improved control room panels.

,; Communications between operators within the control room and

.from control' room operators to floor operators was also acted out and observed. Operators simulated using internal communications ,

equipment and identified what circuits they were using. Teamwork and operator coordination was observed during all runs.

The ~ organization of the exercise runs was in three segments. First, all TRIP procedures were walked through using the procedures listed in Table 1-1. For this segment, the. runs were arranged in logical sequences that would take the operators 4 through all steps of all task branches. In some cases, a minor deviation to the logical process was made' to pickup an alternative branch that would otherwise be skipped. This ensured that'all. task actions were covered in this series of runs. Each of these runs were conducted in a serial format, that is, if

. concurrent branch actions were required by the procedure, the run executed them in series. This was done to ensure that the L 'whole team was able'to follow all steps. Even though some DCRDR team members were assigned to-following one particular operator, each .was ' expected to follow all operations, maintain overall 1-continuity, and to provide additional abservations on every ,

action.

Secondly,~ -because the TRIP procedures occasionally require

- the operators to follow more than one branch concurrently, the 8

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.e preceding. series' operations did not fully indicate the operator loading- conditions. Therefore, upon completion of the first i- segment of. exercise runs, a second segment of runs was conducted to demonstrate concurrent branch operations. For these, the most difficult concurrent exercises were chosen. Because the observers-and operators had already been through all branches in i

the first-segment, the overall flow of actions and communications during these concurrent runs was easier to follow and record.

F ina'lly, a walkthrough/talkthrough of the T-200 series pro-

.cedures, with control room functions, was conducted'to satisfy t

the observers that procedures referenced in the TRIPS could be satisfactorily accomplished . - These procedures required the control room operators to make a particularly complex lineup of sys tem s . - Since these procedures simply required a single operator to follow.the procedure in performing a specific series

" of. individual steps, each procedure was accomplished by subteams of -operators. and observers. Although' simple from a team, coordination standpoint, this effort reinforced already -

identified- discrepancy Pl-01 as reported in the Limerick Final I

Report.  ;

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Documentation

-Each run was documented on the forms indicated previously.

Subsequent to .the . walkthrough/talkthrough, these f o rms were j l

' reviewed and analyzed. The operation was critiqued and any  ;

I further comments or questions.were clarified and recorded. To j i

aid in the review of the run, a Critique Checklist was used. It l l

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._ A

consists of statements drawn from NUREG 0700 Section 6 items that applied to walkthrough operations. One checklist was filled in for each' run. Comments were made on the run comment sheets rather than on the critique checklist. A copy is included in Appendix B.

The potential discrepancies noted during the walkthroughs/talkthroughs that were subsequently reviewed and analyzed to be discrepancies were documented as HEDs on HED Assesment Fo rm s .

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1.3 Outstanding Control Room Survey Items The Final Report indicated that several items had not been completed' due to the construction status of-the control room.

Those outstanding items included:

e Illumination e A tmosphere e Noise e . Communications e Emergency equipment e Portable furnishings e Computers The survey. was completed using the BWROG CRS checklists (original and supplemental). For the purposes of accountability, the below listed checklists-were administered:

BWROG CRS Category- BWROG CRS Item No.'s e COMPUTERS Consoles (D & SD)

- Capability (Dl'& SDl)

CRTs (D2 & SD2)

Printers (D3 & SD3)

(D4 & SD4) e PROCEDURES (E & SE)

- Availability (El & SE2)

~~

Access (E2)-

Standardization (E3)

. Format (E4 & SEl)

Reference material (ES)

Revisions (E6)

Administrative (E7) 11

.BWROG CRS Category BWROG CRS Item No.'s e CONTROL ROOM ENVIRONMENT (F & SF)

Communciations systems (F1 & SF1)

Audible signals (F2)

- Lightings (F3 & SF2)

Control Room Heating and Ventilation (F4)

Fire (F5)

Emergency situations (F6)

General (F7)

Emergency Response Equipment (SF3) e MAINTENANCE and SURVEILLANCE (G & SG)

-- Responsibilities (Gl)

Jumpers and lif ted leads (G2)

Permanent modifications (G3)

Tagouts (G4 & SGl)

Spare parts (G5 & SG2)

Procedures (G6) e TRAINING & MANNING (H)

Training and Requalification (Hl)

Administrative Guideline (H2)

Shift change (H3)

No BWROG (original / supplemental) checklist survey items are outstanding. -All checklists have been administered.

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7 1.4 NRC/LLL and PECo/ Interlock Meeting On August 7, 1984, a meeting was held at the NRC in Bethesda, Maryland. This meeting included representatives from the Human Factors Safety Branch of the NRC, Lawerence Livermore

' Laboratory (NRC consultant) , the Philadelphia Electric Company,

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and The Interlock Group (PECo Consultant) . The major thrust of the meeting was to gain a clearer understanding of specific methodologies used during the formal Limerick DCRDR. The Bethesda meeting was continued at Limerick, August 8 and 9, primarily in the mockup room and training center.

Throughout the discussions the NRC and LLL became more familiar with the details of each step of the DCRDR as documented in both the Limerick Program Plan and Final Report. The enhanced mockup provided the forum to visually verify the

' product' of the DCRDR. Discussion between LLL and PECo/ Interlock indicated that the issues of methodology and procedure for the Limerick DCRDR were acceptable.

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l Section 2 FINDINGS j l

This section highlights the findings resulting from the Validation effort and CRS of outstanding items. In F 'I m m a r y ,

36 HEDs have been identified as a result of the above. The HEDs have been categorized as follows:

e Validation Panel Design 15 Instrumentation 5 Procedural 7 e Computer 7 e Procedures 2 TOTAL 36 2.1 Validation As discussed previously in the Final Report, the control room was designed to be compact. This design resulted in a high density of instruments on the panels, but also contributed to less _ movement- by the operators. Control room staffing was initially based upon a three man team performing emergency (TRIP) procedures. Consequently, operator movement was, in fact, minimal and duties were well distributed among the three-man team.

There were no instances of excessive movement with respect to distance or time required to perform the operation. Some duplication of' instruments at different stations for key parameters appeared to be beneficial because it reduced the need for operator-to-operator communication and allowed one operator to back up the other. No excessive duplication of instruments was observed.

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The_ improved design of the control room panels was~ also validated. Operators had no difficulty in locating controls and indicators,- even when locations had-changed from the current-control: room. Often the rearranged groups were not noticed to be different. 1As a result of- the enhancements and hierarchal

-labeling, the' operator found no difficulty identifying - panel-components (with. the exception of those noted below) . The hierarchal labeling received. frequent ~ favorable comments. The

.h'ighlighting of control 1 groupings, particularly in the emergency ,

core cooling systems, was found to be effective. The validation did,. however, reveal the need for modifications. Some new  :

nomenclature.was found to be less:than optimum. As an example, the label " Reactivity Control" on panel 10C-603 was ambiguous, therefore,l " Redundant"- was added.to clarify the label. Other

changes - were made based upon operator comments- during the execution- of. TRIP procedures. Also, some additions to mimics were suggested. <

The -selection of. prospective displays for the ERFDS seemed ,

, to be.well suited to-the needs of the operators. The location of -

ERFDS displays might be.better arranged so that the supervisor

'who .is directing the execution'of TRIP procedures will have direct access to the' displays.. ,

Considering the team approach to operations and the redundancy / availability of ERFDS displays, this is'not considered a detriment to operations.

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, Communications were found to be adequate for emergency conditions. This conclusion is supported by a separate analysis

~of communications circuits as part of the DCRDR survey. It

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appears that the concept of the Operations Support Center would provide the necessary flexibility in later portions of complex accidents, although this feature was not exercised.

The TRIP. procedures were found to be effective. Some additional notes referencing the ERFDS display that relates to a particular step could be incorporated in the procedure when the ERFDS is finalized. (T-200 The technical procedures series) require some updating to reflect some new control room nomenclature. Generally, these procedures were adequately related by component ID numbers and similar nomenclature, but in some cases nomenclature was missing or misleading in the procedures.

It is concluded that the Final Validation process effec-tively consolidated the four major initiatives that effect control room operation: the CRDR, the emergency procedure upgrade, the addition of an SPDS capability, and identification of Reg. Guide 1.97 instrumentation. The validation was effective in identifying refinement of control panel redesign. Finally, the process indicated that communications with Technical and Operational Support Centers will be effective.

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2.2- Control Room Survey of Outstanding Items Section 1.3 indicated specific surveys which were conducted l subsequent to submission of the Final Report. As indicated above, seven computer-related HEDs resulted from this survey. In summary, _ these discrepancies included keyboard design, terminology and visibility items; and minor software terminology inconsistencies with overall CRDR established terminology. Of ' the seve,n HEDs, five are dispositioned per stated resolution, and two are not discrepancies.

In: addition to the' computer HEDs, two procedures-related HEDs were identified. The discrepancies were concerned with  ;

component identification and related procedure referencing. The team's assessment was that these were not discrepancies.

The surveying of the control room environment, maintenance and surveillance, and training and manning revealed no discrepancies. All. BWROG (original / supplemental) checklists survey items have .been administered, and the CRS effort is completed.

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7 Section 3 IMPLEMENTATION

'This section reports on the implementation of enhancements on the actual control room panels, and discusses the status and i

plans for the implementation of improvements resulting from the validation and outstanding CRS efforts.

3.1 Control Room Panel Enhancements The Final Report discussed, in detail, the types and methods of improvements to the panels. These methods and techniques were used and the actual panel enhancement effort was completed in mid-September 1984. Subsequent refinements to the enhancements are currently ongoing. Figures 1 and 2 show photographs of the o Additional control ' room panels before and after enhancement.

improvements will be implemented as dictated by the schedule as indicated"on individual HED Assessment sheets.

3.2 Implementation of Additional Improvements As indicated in Section 2, 36 new HEDs were identified subsequent to submission of the Final Report. Of those 36.

9 relating to computers are discussed in Section 2.2. Fifteen Eleven of those HEDs have either been concerned panel , design.

or scheduled for correction, four were judged by the corrected be discrepancies. Five HEDs were identified as teams not to instrumentatica problems. Of those five, three have either been rectified or are scheduled for correction, two were j udged as not discrepancies. Finally, seven procedural HEDs were

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' identified.- Fiveare scheduled for correction, one requires additional. investigation, and one was judged not to be a

discrepancy.

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In summary, none of the 36 new HEDs were assessed as Priority 1 safety significant, 15 were assessed as Priority 2, 7 were Priority 4, and 14 were assessed as not being discrepan-cies. All 36 HEDs are included in Appendix A.

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APPENDIX A HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES w

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HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SCl-01 EP = 4 TITLE: Process Computer Key Arrangement

- COMMENT: Functional keys difficult to understand.

- Item: .N/A Ref.: SD1.3 Source: SCRS IDENTIFICATION: Panel: N/A Component Name: Process Computer ID or Number: Keyboard DESCRIPTION:

Keys used by operator are mixed with . keys used only by.

programmers. Keys are not grouped by function, and the_ color coding of keys is not consistent or effective in clarifying functions. Keyboard' differences are not highlighted.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: C) (Priority: 4) (Sched: N/A )

~

Block ~ color programmer function keys and delete any words_ on those keys. In a different color, block operational. function keys. Common : keys should be a neutral color. Replace keys to proper color arrangement.

TRAINING REQUIREME.NTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

' Approval-Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached 4

A-1

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SCl-02 EP = 4 TITLE: Process Computer Key Identification COMMENT: Function keys are not clearly identified.

Item: N/A. Ref.: SDl.5 Source: SCRS IDENTIFICATION: Panel: N/A Component Name: Process Computer

, ID or Number: Keyboards DESCRIPTION:

Operational and non-operational keys use conflicting terminology.

Some keys are incorrectly labeled.

I' MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) .(Priority: 4) (Sched: N/A )

Consistent with color blocking, label operational keys to be as

- consistent aus possible with CRDR terminology. Blank non-operator

. keys.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

f PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

4 Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-2

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SC2-01 EP = 6 TITLE: Computer Data-Save Capability COMMENT: Data not saved during periods where the printer is down.

Item: N/A Ref.: SD2.2 Source: SCRS IDENTIFICATION: Panel:. N/A Component Name: Process Comp 1ter ID or Number: Software DESCRIPTION:

Data is not saved if printer is not operating, no . auto-file function. Backup printers are available.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

Computer automatically switches to backup printer if main printer is down. Backup -printers are available in the event the' main printer goes down.

RESOLUTION: (Code: D) (Priority: N/A) (Sched: N/A )

Due to main printer redundancy and automatic printer selection, this is not a discrepancy.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page (s) attached A-3 1

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HED ASSESSMENT  :

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HED No. SC3-01 EP = 4 g TITLE: Process Computer Keyboard Glare

/

COMMENT: Glare makes keys difficult to read.

. Item: N/A Ref.: SD3.1 Source: SCRS IDENTIFICATION: Panel: N/A Component Name: Process Computer ID or Number: Keyboard DESCRIPTION:

Keys are glass finish and.are concave ~ so they reflect the overhead lights. The operator must move his/her head from side to side to read the various keys.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

i RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority: 4) (Sched: N/A )

Treat keyboard with a matte finish to eliminate glare.

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I TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

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PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-4

HED ASSESSMENT s

HED No. SC3-02 EP = 6 TITLE: Process Computer Alarm Display

-COMMENT: Alarm display not complete.

Item: N/A Ref.: SD3.2 Source: SCRS IDENTIFICATION: Panel: N/A Component Name: Process Compute ID or Number:. Alarm Display DESCRIPTION:

Not all alarms that are printed out are displayed on the CRT screen.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A ) (Priority: N/A) (Sched: N/A )

All alarms displayed are printed therefore this is not a discrepancy..

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page (s) attached A-5

i HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SC3-03 EP =' 4 TITLE:- Process Computer Error Messages COMMENT:- Error messages not clear.

Item: N/A Ref.: SD3.3 Source: SCRS

. IDENTIFICATION: Panel: N/A Component Name: Process Computer ID or~ Number: Software DESCRIPTION:

Error messages are mis-leading and are unclearly and insuccinctly worded making it difficult-for the operator to understand them.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

-24 character fields only.

RESOLUTION: (Code: A)_ ( P ri o ri,ty: 4) (Sched: N/A )

Rewrite- error messages to be clearly written in consistant CRDR terrinology within the -limits of the computer character field.

. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

~

I/

!' PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

l' j

Approval Signature: Date: 10/2/84

( ( ). Additional page (s) attached f

g l

l

A-6

l I

HED ASSESSMENT l l

HED No. SC3-04 l EP = 8 TITLE: Process Computer Terminology COMMENT: Terminology used on CRT is not consistent with control panel terminology.

Item: N/A Ref.: SD3.4 Source: .SCRS IDENTIFICATION: Panel: N/A Component Name: Process Computer ID or Jumher: Software

-DESCRIPTION:

Nomenclature, acronyms, and abbreviations used on CRT displays are not consistent with those used on the control panels.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

24 character fields only.

RESOLUTION: - (Code : - A) (Priority:. 4) (Sched: N/A ) )

Review and rewrite terminology to be consistent with CRDR design improvements and CRDR terminology within the limits of the

computer character field.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

L PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

' Approval. Signature: Date: 10/2/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached 1

A-7

.. ,; . . .... . . - _ _ , - --. . ,. - . _ - . ~ . . - . . , - . . . . - _ - . - . - . - . . - . . . . - _ . - - . -

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-01 EP = N/A TITLE: Residual Heat Mimic COMMENT: Points .where condensate and stay fill lines enter. RHR are' difficult to remember.

Item: Run 3 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-4-

idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 601

, Component Name:-Mimic ID or Number: N/A DESCRIPTION:

The mimic.does not show-points where-these support systems enter.

It would be~ helpful to the operator to have the. points marked on

-the mim'ic.

MITIGATING. CONSIDERATIONS:

POSSIBLE. SOLUTIONS:

I ' Add appropriate mimic.

r

. RESOLUTION: (Code: D) . (Priority: 4 ) (Sched: N/A )

i

.... These. . support- systems are controlled external to the control'

'- room. To. properly mimic these would require nine additional

[ lines and labels in an already' densely mimicked board. It is the team's-judgement-to not include these mimics.

TRAINING REQUA28MENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page (s) attached A-8

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-02 EP = N/A TITLE: Injection Flow COMMENT: Enhancement label " Injection A" for flow is misleading.

Item: Run 5 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: -Panel: 601 Component Name: Label

. ID or Number: N/A DESCRIPTION:

This indication is total loop flow, not just injection flow.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A ) (Priority: 2 ) (Sched: 1st Refuel )

Change name to LOOP A, LOOP B, LOOP C, LOOP D for four flow indications.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page (s) attached A-9

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-03 EP = N/A TITLE: EREDS Locations

, COMMENT: An ERFDS display is not conveniently located for use by 4

the shift supervisor.

Item: Run 2 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation

. IDENTIFICATION: Panel: Supervisor ' Station while using TRIP procedures Component Name: ,ERFDS Display and Control 7.D or Number: N/A DESCRIPTION:

The' shift supervisor is responsible-for directing the execution

  • of TRIP procedures. This includes determining plant conditions and making decisions. The manual plots required to be used by him are on. the-TRIP procedures and are also automated on the ERFDS, yet the ERFDS cannot be observed from his station.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

TRIP' procedures are based upon communications between operators (team) whether it's information from control panel indications or ERFDS display.

'RBSOLUTION: (Code: ) (Priority: 2 ) (Sched: w/ERFDS turnover)

The reactor operator- has an ERFDS monitor at his station to provide required information to the shift supervisor. Also a 2nd senior licensed operator or STA is available to monitor ERFDS at the command console.to rectify these relationships.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

During training, it will be emphasized that ERFDS should be monitored during TRIPS.

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/22/84 k ( ) Additional page (s) . attached A-10

I l

1 l

l HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-04 EP = N/A TITLE: Instrument Line Isolation Labels COMMENT: Hierarchy-label does not stand out clearly.

. Item: T-250 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 601 Component Name: Instrument-Isolation ID or Number: N/A DESCRIPTION:

Hierarchy labels are not large enough.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority: 2) (Sched: Done )

. Increased size to 24 pt..

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

i PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval ~ Signature: Date: 10/3/84

' ( ) Additional page (s) attached r-I. .

A-11

_ _ . _ _ .. . _ _ . . _ _ . . _ , . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . . . _ _ . _ , . . . _ . _ . . _ . . _ . . . . _ . _ _ . _ _ . . . - . , _ . ~ .

i I

l HED ASSESSMENT

-HED No. SDV-05 EP = N/A TITLE: Redundant Reactivity Control COMMENT: Hierarchy label " Reactivity Control" is ambiguous.

Item: Run 11 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation

. IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 603 Component Name: Label ID or Number: N/A DESCRIPTION:

' Initiation and reset buttons are for redundant reactivity Control.

i MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS

RESOLUTION: .(Code: A) (Priority: 2) (Sched: Done )

Added word " Redundant" to hierarchy label.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-12

r

]- HED' ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-06 EP = N/A TITLE: Standby Liquid Component ids 4;

. COMMENT: Panel enhancements use the wrong set of component ID numbers.

. Item: T-250 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 603 Component Name: Standby Liquid ID or Number: N/A

' DESCRIPTION:

Labels used are from GE list C41 series instead of Bechtel list HV48 series.

-MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A ) (Priority: 2) (Sched: 1st Refuel )

Change numbers to 48 series.

l

[ TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

\

PROCEDURE REQUIRE.5ENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page (s) attached A-13

(, .-.

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-07 EP = N/A

-TITLE: HPCI/RCIC Return to CST COMMENT: Enhancement labels are not clear.

Item: T-230 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 647, 648 Component Name: HPCI, RCIC Test Isolation ID or Number: HV55-IF071,.HV55-IF022 DESCRIPTION:

Labels are ambiguous. .They relate to Full Flow. Test return to CST.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: J) (Priority:-N/A) (Sched: N/A )

Test Isolation is acceptable since primary concern is to have test lines shut off under emergency conditions.

. 'fRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

t Approval _ Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page (s) attached 4

A-14

l HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-08

-EP = N/A TITLE: ESW Nomenclature COMMENT: The use of " Train" is not normal in this plant.

Item: Run 1 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION:. Panel: 00C-667 Component Name: ESW ID or Number: N/A DESCRIPTION:

There are two. loops A and B.. Each loop is subdivided. These have_-been labeled Train A, C, B, D. The word " Train" is not

=normally used in this plant and is therefore confusing in meaning.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A)- (Priority: 2 ) (Sched: Do'e )

Changed labels to "DIV A", "DIV C", etc.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10'3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached i<

1 A-15

l HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-09 l

EP = N/A

' TITLE: RHRSW Labels

. COMMENT: Labels do not clearly identify function.

Item: Run 2 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATIOP:: Panel:- 00C-667 Component Name: ESW ID or Number: 559,560,579,581,580,582 DESCRIPTION:

Control numbers 559, 560 are Pump Trip Bypasses.

Control numbers 579-582 are INLET / OUTLET Isolation Bypasses, MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: .A) (Priority: .2 ) (Sched: 1st Refuel )

Changed. labels to include " Trip" and "Isol" as indicated above.

i' i -TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

i PROCEDURE = REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s)' attached i'

A-16

l l

l HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-10 EP = N/A

. TITLE: ADS Valve Enhancements COMMENT: Not sufficiently highlighted.

Item: Run 4 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 10C-626 Component Name: ADS Valves

.ID or Number: 481,482,483,484,485 DESCRIPTION:

These controls must,be quickly located visually from a distance.

-They do not stand out sufficiently.

-MITIGATING-CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority: 2) (Sched: Done )

Enclosed five ADS valve controls in a solid red background.

' TRAINING REQUIREME,NTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

. Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached i- .

1 A-17

HED ASSESSMENT.

HED No. SDV-ll EP = N/A

. TITLE: Containment Isloation Light Matrix

' COMMENT: Lights-labeled only with valve identification numbers.

-Item: Run 4 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-1 idatio-IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 691 Center Component Name: Light located above 527,528,529,539 ID or Number:

DESCRIPTION:

This-light matrix is used to verify proper containment isolation.

Operators ~ must take action.if a light is not on when isolation

-occurs.- No name labels appear on the panel.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority:- N/A) (Sched: N/A )

This: light matrix duplicates position indJr, tion of hand switches below operator sight lines when stationec c consoles. With an

' isolation this light matrix should light up all green. Those valves which did= not operate would remain red. A redundant ,

position indication exists at the hand switch on the lower part of'the vertical board, identifying the control to be manipulated.

As a result, this is not a discrepancy.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

. Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84 ]

( ) Additional page (s) attached I

A-18

L HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-12 EP = N/A TITLE:- Testable Check Valve Nomenclature COMMENT: These valves are not clearly labeled.

Item: Run 8 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 601 R and L Component Name: RHR ID or Number:. 463,467,469,763,767,769 DESCRIPTION:

Controls'are labeled " Test". They are used to bypass the valves to which they are.related by mimic. Terminology.is confusing.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority:'N/A) (Sched: N/A )

The term BYPASS in operational terminology refers to a full flow capability around a process component. These lines discussed  ;

-above are used to equalize pressure around a check valve for test purposesLand could.not physically bypass required flow for system operation. This.is not a discrepancy.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

Training will reinforce the purpose and functioning of these test valves.

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-19

F.

l l

HED ASSESSMENT '

HED No. SDV-13 EP = N/A TITLE: RHR Crossconnect to Heat Exchanger COMMENT: The mimic for this crossconnect line is not correct for C and - D loops.

? Item: Run 8 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 601 L and R Component Name: RHR -

ID or Number: Mimic from above 493 and 805' to below 488 and 788 DESCRIPTION:

This mimic discharges to the PHR Heat Exchanger line downstream of'the isolation valves 491 and 791.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority: .2) 'Sched: Done Revised mimic to show correct discharge point.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-20

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-14 EP = N/A TITLE: Off Gas Label Incorrect COMMENT: Adsorber incorrectly identified.

Item: N/A . Ref.: R.E.C. Source :- Val-idation IDENTIFICATION:= Panel: 10C-673 Component Name: Off Gas ID or Number: Mimic Component DESCRIPTION:

'Large mimic component to right of " Cooler" should be "ADSORBER".

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority: 2) (Sched: Done )

Relabeled "ADSORBER".

-TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date:.19/3/84

( ) Additional page (s): -ttached A-21

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SDV-15 EP = N/A TITLE: Off Gas Mimic COMMENT: Main steam supply mimic not easily distinguished.

Item: N/A Ref.: R.E.C. Source:, Val-

  • idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 10C-673 Component Name: Off Gas ID or Number: Mimic to 31 and 32 DESCRIPTION:

Main steam supply and auxiliary steam supply mimic are the. same _

size giving them same importance. -

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority: 4 )- -(Sched: N/A )

Increase size of main steam mimic; leave Aux Steam as is.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-22

2 HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SIV-01 4

EP = N/A TITLE: Cooldown Rate

. COMMENT: Cooldown rate must be calculated.

Item: Run 2 Ref.: T.J.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 602, 603 Component Name: N/A ID or Number: N/A DESCRIPTION:

1 - The rate of normal plant cooldowns must not exceed 100 degrees

- per hour. This rate must be estimated by the operator from~ the recorder chart which moves one inch per hour. The computer gives only instantaneous cooldown rate.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: -(Code: A) (Priority: 2) -(Sched:-Done }

A Surveillance Test (ST) has been written to verify this cooldown rate. This ST checks cooldown rate every 15 minutes to ensure that 25 F is not exceeded in any 15 minute interval.

It directs the operator to.take action to avoid 100 F cooldown rate in one hour if.25 F is exceeded in'any-15 minute interval.

TRAINING REQUIREMENT,S:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMdNTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-23

1

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SIV-02 EP = N/A

'rITLE : RHR System Flow Indication COMMENT: Difficult to determine spray flow or flow to suppression pool.

Item: Run 3 Ref.: T.J.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 601 Component Name: See below.

ID or Number: See below.

.DESCR1PTION:

Only the RHR total system flow has an indicator. This indication includes all flow through that system. It is difficult to determine individual flows to suppression pool and drywell spray.

Operator must manipulate system and mentally compute flow from difference readings.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: D ) (Priority: N/A) (Sched: N/A )

This particular mode of operation is infrequent. The flow is determined by computing a simple differential. The procedure is clear and the control / display arrangement facilitates the operation. (Reference LGS FSAR section 7.5.2.5.1.1.2.4.6 Rev. 35 August '84.) This'is not a discrepancy.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

It will be emphasized in training; the use of the LOOP FLOW indicator in different RHR modes of operation. '

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-24

,1 HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SIV-03

~

EP = N/A f

~

TITLE: RHR Discharge Pressure ,

COMMENT: There is no direct indication of RHR discharge pressure.

\

Item: Run 3 Ref.: T.J.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 601 Component Name: See below.

ID or Number: See below.

-DESCRIPTION:

Operators used heat exchanger steam supply pressure indication

.(if heat exchanger inlet. valve is open) to determine this pressure.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONc:

s.

RESOLUTION: (Code: D) (Priority: N/A) (Sched: N/A )

RHR discharge pressure is not of primary operational concern.

RHR flow into the reactor is the primary parameter. monitored.

This is accomplished using the flow indicator and check valve disc . position indication on the injection line. These indications are currently available on the control panels. In the steam condensing mode, heat exchanger steam supply pressure indication is used which is acceptable in that context. This is not a discrepancy. r-TRAINING REQDIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-25 L_

i.

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SIV-04 EP = N/A TITLE: Critical Plant Variable Comparison COMMENT:. Suppression Pool Press (SP/P)/ Reactor Pressure comparison and ERFDS display of SP/P.

Item: Run 6 Ref.: T.J.C./A.C.M. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: Display: Critical Plan Variables

. Component Name: ERFDS ID or Number: 312

-DESCRIPTION:

Comparison between Suppression Pool pressure (PR57-101, PI42-170-

-1) versus Reactor pressure XR42-IR623A (601) and PI42-IR605 (603) requires operacor verbal coordination. In addition, the requirement is 72 psig difference. The nominal range on indications 'is 0-1000 psig, 72 psig is very difficult to determine, hence the need to incorporate SP/P into ERFDS. This

! parameter is improtant in TRIP procedure T-ll6, Step 20.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

i RESOLUTION: (Code: C) (Priority: 2) (Sched: 1st Refuel )

(

Add suppression pool pressure readout on ERFDS display Top Level Display.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: .

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

i i

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-26

O HED ASSESSMENT

, HED No.- SIV-05

.EP = N/A TITLE: Recombiner Ready Lights COMMENT: These lights are yellow on control panels indicating obnormal condition of unit.

. Item: Run 4 Ref.: RF.C Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 601 Center Camponent Name: Isolation ID or Number: 754, 755

,< DESCRIPTION:

.These lights 'are intended to indicate when the recombiner- is ready'for operation. Even though a recombiner is used only in an cmergency condition, a unit ready to operate light should be white.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: '(Code: -A) (Priority: N/A) (Sched: Done -)

Changed color of light to white.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached t,

A-27

L P

HED ASSESSMENT-HED No. SPV-01 EP = N/A TITLE: Rapid Depressurization Procedure COMMENT: Need to reference support procedures in TRIP procedures.  ;

Item: Run 5 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val--

idation 6

IDENTIFICATION: Panel: N/A-Component Name: TRIP Procedures T-il2,. Step EB-ll ID or Number:: N/A DESCRIPTION: j Rapid- depressurization can be_ accomplished by.several systems.

The lineup for some of these systems is not clear. TRIP  !

procedures- should- reference procedure numbers of less used systems in.this mode. ,

, MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority: N/A) (Sched: N/A )

Methods for rapid depressurization are commonly used systems and i I

lineups.. Operators are familiar with them and use them frequently. Procedures become overburdened if too many references are used, particularly in familiar evolutions. This is not a discrepancy.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-28

L

~

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SPV-92 EP = N/A

< TITLE: .SRV Opening Sequence-COMMENT: SRV opening sequence not specified.

9 Item: Run 7 Ref.: R.E.C./A.C.M. Source: Val-idation i~

IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 626 Component Name: Safety relief valve controls

.ID or Number: N/A DESCRIPTION:

TRIP procedure T-191 Step RC/P-9 and note 24 specify using SRV opening sequence. The proper sequence is not specified in the TRIP. procedure or_on-the panel.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

. RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority: 2) (Sched: 5% Power )

List appropriate SRV sequence in procedure and include sequence of-operation on hierarchal labeling.

l TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS: 4 f

Approval Signature: Date: 10/2/84

( ) Additional page (s) attached p

o A-29 W__

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SPV-03 EP = N/A TITLE: CTMT Isolation Procedure COMMENT: Nomenclature should be updated to reflect new panel labels.

Item: T-250 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: T-250 Componen*. Name: Remote Manual Primary Containment Isolations ID or Number: See below.

DESCRIPTION:

Step 4.2.A HV41-109 A,B are now called "Long Path".

Recirc. HV41-133 A,B (Safeguard Fill System to FW) are not named in the procedure.

Step 4.7.B Should list all core spray injection valves, not just A loop.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority:N/A) (Sched: Fuel Load )

Operations will be provided with the manual of standard nomenclature and abbreviations used in the enhanced control room.

Also, a list of names that have been changed substantially from the original control room labeling will be provided. Training will be provided with the manual of standard nomenclature and a description of the enhancement conventions used.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

Provide nomenclature and enhancement convention.

PROCEDURE HEQUIREMENTS:

Provide nomenclature and list of major changes in labels.

Approval Signature: Date: 10/22/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-30

4 HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SPV-04 EP = N/A TITLE: Drywell Outboard Isolation Valves

' COMMENT:- . Numbers in procedure do not agree with panel numbers.

Item: T-259 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation

- IDENTIFICATION: Panel: 10C-681 Component Name: Drywell Chill Water ID or Number: .HV87-129 A,B HV87-121 A,B DESCRIPTION:

As described above.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION . (Code: A) (Priority: N/A) (Sched: Fuel Load )

Operations will be provided with the manual of standard nomenclature and abbreviations used in the enhanced control room. i Also, a. list of names that have been changed substsntiallt from the original control; room labeling will be .ro-4ded> Training

. will be.provided with the manual of standard ~ -la e e and a description of the enhancement conventions uscd, TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

Provide nomenclature and enhancement convention.

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Provide nomenclature and list of major changes in labels.

Approval Signatures Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-31

HED ASSESSMENT HED No.. SPV-05 EP = N/A TITLE: Suppression Pool-to CST Procedure

~~

COMMENT: Procedure T-230 should be updated with new panel names.

i

! Item: T-230 Ref.: R.E.C. Source: Val-idation

. IDENTIFICATION: Panel: See procedure.

Component Name: N/A L ID or Number: See procedure.

DESCRIPTION:

l Same as above.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:-

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) (Priority: N/A) (Sched: Fuel Load- )

LOperations will be provided with the manual of standard nomenclature and abbreviations used in the enhanced control' room.

Also, a list of names that have been changed substantially from

-the original control room labeling'will be provided. Training will. Le provided-with the manual ot standard nomenclature and a description of the" enhancement conventions used.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

Provide nomenclature and enhancement convention.

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Provide nomenclature and list of major changes in labels.

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84 )

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-32

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SPV-06 EP = N/A TITLE: Procedure /EREDS Correlation COMMENT: ERFDS should be appropriately referenced within

, procedures to indicate display formats as backups.

Item: Run 10 Ref.: A.C.M. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: N/A Component Name: ERFDS ID or Number: N/A DESCRIPTION:

The TRIPS provide plots of various parameters to determine " safe

&' unsafe" regions. The parameter values must be determined from panel instrumentation. ERFDS provides the same plots via CRT displays, These displays are not referenced within the procedure and would be valuable to'the ACO to confirm actual readings.

Appropriate ERFDS display numbers should be referenced in the TRIPS.

MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A ) (Priority: 2) (Sched: w/ERFDS turn-over)

Include EREDS plot identification number in TRIP appropriately as referenced.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

s.

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84

( ) Additional page (s) attached A-33

l~ ,

1 s

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SPV-07.

EP = N/A TITLE:- T-200 Series Procedures COMMENT: Inconsistencies between panel ID numbers / nomenclature-

_ and. procedures valve numbers / nomenclature.

~

i Item: T-200 series Ref.: A.C.M. Source: Val-idation IDENTIFICATION: Panel: N/A Camponent Name: See attached.

ID or Number: See attached. P DESCRIPTION:.

See attached..

1 MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: -(Code: A) (Priority: 2 ) (Sched: 1st Refuel )

. Make all procedure nomenclature and identification numbering consistent with CRDR Improvement Design.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: ,

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

'.i Approval Signature: Date: 10/3/84 (2) Additional page(s) attached d

s

) ..

A-34

HED SPV-07 Attachment Page 1 DESCRIPTION:

T-221

.HS41-186/187- is HV41-lF084/IF085 on mockup.

HS57-183 is SV57-183 & 191 on mockup

~HS51-179A/B is HV51-179A on mockup

'HS57-133 is SV57-133 on mockup-HS43-119 is HV43-119 on mockup HS57-132 is SV57-132/134/150 on mockup HS57-181 isLSV57-181 on mockup HS51-180A/B is HV51-180A/B on mockup HS43-120 is HV43-120 on mockup HS57-187 is SV57-184/185/186/190/195 on mockup HS57-153 is SV57-141/142/143/144/145/159 on mockup T-243' Containment' Spray in procedure should be DRYWELL SPRAY Inter-tie in procedure should be CROSS-TIE Full' Flow Bypass in procedure should be FULL FLOW TEST

~

T-231 Intertie in procedure should be CROSS-TIE Full.FlowLTest Valve in procedure is Suppression Pool Cooling B -

correct nomenclature to be determined T-233 Step 4.4 " Drain valves HV-51-IF049 and IF040 are indicated as

~" INBOARD & OUTBOARD" on mockup.

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HED SPV-07 Attachment Page 2 PROCEDURE / MOCKUP

.T-241 HV-51-lF015A,B-Shutdown Cooling Injection is Shutdown Outboard HV-51-lF017A,B,C,D LPCI Injection is LPCI Outboard-HV-52-lF037 Core' Spray-Isolation is Inboard-HV-52-lF005 Core Spray Isolation is Outboard -

HV-55-lF006 HPCI Isolation is Injection HV-49-lF013 RCIC Isolation is Feed

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HV-55-lF007 HPCI Isolation is Discharge HV-49-lF012 RCIC Loop Isolation is Discharge HV-52-lF004A,B4 Core Spray Isolation is Discharge HV-51-lF003A,B RHR Htx Outlet is Outboard (note: Further

investigation indicated mockup was incorrect, actual control panel reads " OUTLET")

6

_.-__a ._.a.- .-____ .__ _ - _ - - - _ _ _ - - . _ - _ _ _ - - - - - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ - - . _ - . - _ _ - ~ - - _ - _ _ _ _ - - --__a,.J

HED ASSESSMENT HED No. SPl-01 EP = 6

' TITLE: Procedural Instrumentation References COMMENT: Procedures do not provide locations of instrumentation.

Item: N/A Ref.: E4.12 Source: SCRS IDENTIFICATION:- Panel: N/A Component Name: Procedures ID or Number: N/A

-DESCRIPTION:

Procedures involving _the operation of infrequently used controls do not specify the physical location of the control. This could lead'to difficulties in time sensitive situations.

MIIIDATING CONSIDERATIONS:

LAdditional. textual-matter in procedures or additional matrixing on the -boards would confuse and clutter both procedures ~and board.

RESOLUTION:' (Code: A) (Priority: N/A) (Sched: N/A -)

Procedures- as written' direct operators to the appropriate panel.

This in ~ conjunction with the hierarchal labeling- aids the operator in timely response. This is not discrepancy.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

-Approval Signature: Date: 10/11/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-35

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s HED ASSESSMENT ~

HED No. SPl-02 EP = 6

-TITLE:. Procedure Reference Material

_ COMMENT: Procedures require use of additional reference material.

9 Item: N/A Ref.: E4.19 Source: SCRS IDENTIFICATION: Panel: N/A Component Name: Procedures ID or Number: N/A DESCRIPTION:'

Trip procedures refer to specific standard procedures to complete an operation, but'do not describe the procedure. Operators must get a copy of the procedure - it-is not included in the trip.

4 MITIGATING CONSIDERATIONS:

RESOLUTION: (Code: A) . (Priority: N/A) (Sched: N/A )

As a result of_the TRIP procedure flow diagram format, which is designed to not overburden the procedure or operators, and the fact -that the TRIPS are designed to result in a stabilized plant status, procedure referencing refers to those operations

  • . conducted subseque,nt to the TRIPS. All referenced procedures are resident _in the control room. This is not a discrepancy.

. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS:

PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS:

Approval Signature: Date: 10/11/84

( ) Additional page(s) attached A-36

e f

APPENDIX B DATA COLLECTION FORMS O

CRITIQUE CHECKLIST Procedure #

a t' For the following statements indicate whether they were satisfac-tory (SAT) or a problem (PROB) in this procedure. Comment at the end of the checklist on any statements marked as a problem:

SAT / PROB

1. Control room manning provides timely coverage of controls and displays.
2. Control and display arrangements minimize operator movement.
3. Required controls and displays are in the primary work area.
4. Controls and displays: .
a. Clearly and easily identifiable,
b. Related functions grouped together.
c. Easy to relate groups of displays with related groups of controls.
d. Functions are clearly related between panels,
e. Feedback from display should be apparent for a deliberate control movement.
5. Display scales:
a. Consistent with precision and accuracy needed, a
b. Cover ranges needed,
c. Easy to read.
d. Readings d'o not have to be converted.
e. Easy to make comparative readings.
6. Mimics and syr.nols aid in finding controls.
7. Procedures:
a. Easy to follow.
b. Branch instructions clear.
c. Action requirements clear and with adequate detail.

B-1

d. Next step is clearly indicated, no dead ends.
e. Terminology consistent with panels and- CRT displays.
f. Cautions and notes provided where needed.

- 8. CRT displays:

a. Easy to find desired information.
h. Needed information clearly presented, not

. confusing.

c. Activated screen area should not exceed 25%

total screen area.

d. No mental translation of' data into other unit or numerical basis necessary.

COMMENTS:

F F

B-2

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