ML20080E010
| ML20080E010 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1983 |
| From: | SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP. (FORMERLY |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8402090306 | |
| Download: ML20080E010 (145) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. - _ . 4 PRfiLIM MARY DRAFT
-- Failure Modes trd Effects Analysis for the Oconee 1 Nuclear Power Station Makeup andIPurificnion Systern t
Prepared for the Instrumentation and Controls Division Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Division U C Science Applicatiens, Inc. Sy3tems AnLlysis Divisicn [ coteber 3, 1963 I l i o
-1 8402090306 831003 PDR P
ADOCK 0500026] l - ---
l l l l l PRELIMIRARY DRAFT Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the Oconee 1 Nuclear Power Station Makeup and Purification System I Prepared for the Instrumentation and Controls Division Union Carbide Corporation, Nuclear Division by Science Applications, Inc. Systems Analysis Divisior, f October 3, 1983 e L w -- -
,. . -~ . , , , .
- y. ,_s-,
)
1 I l TABI.E OF COETENTS Section Eggg
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Task Statement 1.2 Summary 13 Scope 2.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 Makeup ar.d Purification System Overview 2.2 Subsystem Descriptions 2.2.1 Letdown Coolers to Three-Way Valva 2.2.2 RC Pump Teal Water Return 2.2.3 Letdown Storage Tank, Inlet Filters, aw; HPI Pumps 2.2.4 RC Pump Seal Injection 2.2.5 Reactor Coolant Makeup 2.2.6 RC Bleed, Boron Recovery and Chemical Addition 23 Support Systems 3.0 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis . 31 Technical Approach 32 System Level Results 33 Subsystem Level Resulta 331 Letdown Coolers to Three-Way valve 332 RC Pump Seal Water Return 3 3,3 Letdown Storage Tank, Inlet Filters, and EFI Pumps 3.3 4 RC Pump Seal Injection 335 Reactor Coolant Makeup 336 BC Bleed, Boron Recovery and Chemical Adi'. tion 4.0
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS
5.0 REFERENCES
APPENDICES A B C D E F w 9 6= L s
,- ~ , - - - - - -
1.0 INTRODUCTION
(To be included in next draft.)
\
I I I f O 9 e f r I s r I
l 1 l l 2.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 Makeup and Purification System Overview The Makeup and Purification System consists of the piping and process equip-ment required to remove, process and replace reactor coolant at the flowrates required to maintain constant Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Coolant Volume. l The major functions performed by the Makeup and Purification Systeri, are:
- 1. Letdown Control: Controlled removal of reactor coolant from the RCS and reduction of coolant temperature and pressure at a preset flowrate.
- 2. Purification: Removal of impurities from the reactor coolant ,
I using boric acid saturated ion exchange resina. 3 Coolant Processing and Chemical Addition: Recovery of concen-trated boric acid and domineralized water from letdown reactor coolant; supply of domineralized (boric acid free) water and concentrated boric acid to adjust reactor coolant boric acid ' concentrations; and supply of lithium hydroxide to increase reactor coolent pH. i _ 4. Reactor Coolant Pump (RC Pump) Seal Return: Collection, filtering and cooling of coolant flowing past the RC Pump abaft 3, face seals.
- 5. RC Pump Seal Injection: Injection and filtering of processed letdown coolant to the RC pumps' shaft seals at a constant flowrate.
- 6. Reactor Coolant Makeup: Injection of process letdown coolant to the ACS at a flowrate controlled to maintain constant reactor coolant volume.
1
. I l
l 4 l
~ v $ - - y. - w.., , , . . . _,,
~
4 d i In addition to the neraal functions performed by the Makeup and Purifications System, port
- ons of the system are used to provide emergency injection of coolant folicwing design basis plant accidents.
The major eqaipment and process flows within the Makeup and Purification System are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. For the purposes to this study, the overall system has been divided into six subsyste9s, which are indicated in Figures 1 and 2 f.nd described in the following section, i 2.2 Subsystem Descriptions The Makeup and Purification System was divided into six subsystems as shown in
' Figures 1 and 2. This section presents a brief functional description of each subsystem including any assumptions which were required to define the various operating nodes of the system. Descriptions are based on material in the Oconee FSAR (Reference 1); specific FSAR reference drawings for the subsystems are as follows:
Subsystem 1.0 Letdown Coolers to Three-Way Yalve (Letdown Subsystem) Figure 9-2A', Figure 9 3-2 (Sheet 4); Subsystem 2.0 RC Pump Seal Water Return (Seal Return Subsystec) C gure 9 3-2 (Sheets 1 and 4); Subsystem 3 0 Letdown Storage Tank, Inlet Filters, and HPI Pumps l 'm (HPI Pump Subsystem) Figure 9 3-2 (Sheet 4); Subsystem 4.0 RC Pump Seal Injection (Seal Injection Subsystem) Figure 9 3-2 (Sheets 1 and 4); Subsystem 5.0 Reactor Coolant Makeup i (Makeup Subsystem) Figure 9.3-2 (Sheets 1 and 4);
' Reference 2 l l
l
- . l I
l
. , i
, . ~ ...-..
s
, . . e, ym . o . , m . - .., . .-,. . , r . . _ _ =._l ,. . 5 ,, 4 ,
] ;. y y,, 3/
/ _ \ ' # e ai Ni 0
i1 # I3j -. ,- . . . . . . , ,
,83 si ll l 4 MI - p e ->4- I 4, s 8
aa a e
,I L_ _pm 9 3,_
= .;., ..- 1 L , . , ~ ~ -
l .,'t vf 2 d _ ,v,
- i<p!,,,, : -,
( . ec,e.,r.v
... . . ... n.~..
=.. _
~ .... - ~. ,
~.. ... w est~ ..~_*_._ .
i l.
\
-- l--e >-- _. s I l 8
" ti e , :t1
'O." l 8 --**-
- s v) . >< - e l
,>8 _ _.y l,e-y ,
.v m i_. , - . . _ , ' . ._,. t g ..j
- e e l' a':,.* 4- -s- D
' l ,
s e-- Is- ..,.,, -.
;[,,
,.g.;,p, ,a l'
.g,c..,-...._ ,
s
. ~. ' t 2 . e. . .
- _,____._i...
-~ - - - - .
a e,.es, e s._ . _.__ _ __ . . . _ . . . _ . j
- l. ,
g
, m
- / .na m:+* -. s o rce m . *~~ s .e es' . . _ _
. / . ,., .
'+ "- *
.. 'x . . . . . .
m
, ;- - - e.,. >< .= ,. .ia._ . _ f . . . . . . _ i ___ . . , , . , i
,, m .
i t I p' /_ .- m.
- O~
-O ., :: f' e
, .+
7 *. .g .. : + s,- .
-e.Q), s- 6_ .
c = = ...
+ u.,. - . ~ -
.i / , ,,
"y
.....e.,.,..... n .e. o I a.-sse...a.nreed e t*J ,- -
- LA a
- . -_ a . I -
,j;*,, g,;.--/
- . _e t_a..==uw
'\.
, -.-..__ _.;. ._._./
Xil { ,(13 /
. e
-bn , 'l'F..-:, / _.
I* ._.' _ _, S, , _, . . , N, ~*..** t ._
;-l
~~i.*
- a
- p. *-*. u
.,l . ,
m
)._ g s<
,,,,, ,m ,
Figure 1. Makeup and Purification System Flow Sheet, Subsystems 1.0 - 5.0
M e H* l 1 -. t s : SI*
,tt X,, t.
s;.
. sts
~
,A s.
g %- W g e
. .~-
i it g
. 4: U I e i s*g'
+ g ,-
*, i. . i e ,
li ll . 4 % ' 4 m [!* ;n g,, ) c I e = a
.. i l i_ = q. - , .:
4.,; m
- i s rn,: / ; 5,
~
14 aug ~ ' j i I
; v i. t
- c. *q t -u, [l' 1 -
- - sm.
5 ' (- .5 .k "I v4*- ;! i 3
' ,a 6
i r--
- v
< t 4 tr4 =---- a e-;,!~ i r- ,
i e i ij; f g i: C, f;
- gg s
!.-[ gI *;: i e.
L f , ,; C a' s .-.o* -> kN i h ;h ' ll-s
& I it
*?
*6i O
?
u 4 4
,i
- ce i
}tv'"ty I
Q x I i
- m v
I'*f ! - l % I 7 4
" a L,a d / '
t it *\ . l3 ug
'I 4.dv-s I Y
-' t*
, 'a / li Q .t
-/
v 43
!jts % th 'e * -4 u l O kj k$ a s^ l NI r>
! A
{] v.*h, -ei i u e ,. .= j g l l l '$ ^ 3, W !l " s i I j g W }, I , ';,x gf-W . ', r Jh ::,. j .* 3
.o y $
= 4 f m *
T I u je' a g- ,, I, I f.I M!q( ) \/~'" ~ :< . Mr
- i i
' u
, i 4: e
- n
- x u)
GII 't ll
*' [ h '
bN * ' :.
@ cM '
j' wv.; \ ((t @
.L,-{
,4
- ( .i. s,- f -
l y .
.w 4
g y m u o , @ I i
- l. -,u I ._u. l *
- C* .3
. . . .or * -
^'-
g ; T * ' Dy ( 6 7 1; #
.& .. .k N""" ",, ! g e
g; h 9 I ,e b 3 ft Sf%
- i. i I
in 0".* Q.~ e m T i c . = . . # -
.: g II g
+%- d '
- l 4 1' i '. s a
- L_ i i s t go I e- . k e,
{
- t
)
i *1? I 4 w ![ lik I s L e~e.Sh t '
* - = r. l. ,, cb. b' N
(. , 2, 3 -
. ! G a
a I
; _ _. . .j i
- w e
n n ( tt.
% i:
a
' *g *4 las e..gi> .
$ t. .t O
-- ~
-. w
A and seal water cooling in the circulation loop of seal water through the reactor coolant pumps. This subsystem also is used to remove heat added by 1 the operating HPI pump. I ... A set of four return lines, one from the No. 1 face seal on each RC pump, I normally collects the seal return flow into a common return header. Another I set of four return lines, normally closed, collects the seal flow past the No. 2 face seal on each RC pump into the common return header when the leakage rate past the No.1 face seal on any operating pump is less than one gpm (normal flow is approximately three gpm per pump).
'The reacter coolant pump . seal return header is an outflow line which pene-trates the Reactor Building. The header has an electric motor-operated isolation valve inside the Reactor Building and a pneumatic valve outside which are automatically closed by an engineered safeguards signal. The seal return filter and coolers are outside the Reactor Building.
I The seal return filter is installed in the seal return line upstream of the seal return ecolers to remove particulate matter. A bypass is installed to permit servicing during ope.-'ation. i The seal return coolers are sized to remove the heat added by the operating HPI pumps and the heat picked up in passage through the reactor coolant pump seals. Beat from these coolers is rejected to the Recirculated Cooling Water l (RCW) System. Two coolers are provided in parallel and one is normally in operation. The flow from the seal return coolars discharges directly to the inlet header of the Letdown Storage Tank. i i 2.2.3 Latdmm Steran* ?="k- 7"1*t Filta"s- ="d HPI Pumna i This subsystem consists of two makeup filters, the letdown storage tank (LST), i three HPI pumps, pump discharge manifold, and other associated - piping. The system collects the seal return and letdown flows from the RCS for the normal operation of the HPI pumps and discharges it to the RC pump seal and makeup . 1 subsystems. l l l O
- - - . _ - , _ . , , _ _ , - , - - , - - - _ . , - - - . . - , . - . ,.,-c.- ..-,.w.. ,ry, r-y. , .e,. .--
, r-
i The LST serves as a receiver for letdown, seal return, chemical addition, and system makeup. The tank also acccamodates temporary changes in system coolant l volune. All flows except seal return pass through one of the makeup filters before entering the LST. One filter is normally in operation and one is i j spare. The LST is continuously charged with hydroget for RCS oxygen control. , During ntrmal operation of the RCS, one high pressure injection pump continuously supplies high pressure water from the letdown storage tank to the seals of each of the reactor coolant pumps and to a makeup line connection to the Loop A reactor cold legs. Three hiFh-pressure injection pumps are provided, each capable of supplying the required reactor codant pump seal and
=akeup flow. One is normally in operation while another is in standby status to be used as needed. *he third pump is used only for emergercy injection.
2.2.4 RC P m See m **en This subsysten distributes seal injection water to the reactor coolant pumps. It consists of the seal injection header from the HPI pump discharge manifold, two RC pump seal filters, four individual injection lines (one to each RC pu=p), tnd associated piping and instrumentation. Seal injection flow is filtered prior to entering the individual se al inj ection lines. One filter is normally in operation and one is spare. In addition, a bypass around both filters is available to permit maintenance during subsystem operation. A flow control valve in the seal injection header to the pump seals auto-natically maincains the desired total injection flow to the seals. Manually pre-set throttle valves in each pump seal injection line provide a capability to balance the seal injection flow rates. A portion of the water supplied to the seals enters the RCS. The remainder returns to the letdown storage tank after passing through the seal return subsystem. The four individual injection lines penetrate the Reactor Building. These 11nts each contain a stop-check valve inside and outside the Reactor Building 6
l i
~
for Reactor Building isolation. 2.2.5 *enetor coa 1=nt Makeun
- The reactor coolant makeup subsystem is desi5ned to accommodate makeup requirements during normal operation, design reactor coolant system transients, and Reactor Coolant System cocidowr. The subsystem consists of a makeup header off the HPI pump discharge manifold, a flow' control loop, tw'o main reactor inlets to the Loop A cold legs, and additional paths from the flow control loop feeding a small amount raf flow to the reactor cold le g inlet nozzles and the pressurizer spray line.
Normal makeup flow is delivered to the two reactor cold legs of Loop A.
- During normal orsration, makeup flow is diverted around the emergency HPI flow path through a flow control loop. A pneumatically operated control valve on the loop throttles the makeup flow to the two reactor cold le6s. The flow path off the main flow control loop is assumed to provide a cinimum flow bypass to minimize temperature changes in the reactor cold leg ialet nozzles and the pressurizer spray line.
2.2.6 RC Bleed. Beren Reecserv. nna chemical Addition This subsystem serves three functions:
- 1. Intermittent letdown of reactor coolant to a holdup tank and replacement with domineralized water or continuous operation of a deborating demineralizer;
- 2. Recovery cf boron and purification of reactor coolant for reuse in the plant; 3 Chemical addition to add boric acid to reactor coolant for reactivity control, lithium hydroxide for pH control, hydrazine for oxygen control during shutdown, and caustic for resin re6eneration in the demineralizers and chemistry control in the boron recovery operation.
i
. I Major ccarponents in this subsysytes are shown in Figure 2.
k 6
.RC Bleed Holdun nc Blee'd Holdup is used for the collection and storage of reactor coolant.
The coolant is received from the letdown line both as a result of reactor coolant expansion during startup and for boric acid concentration rcduction i during startup and normal operation. It is either conveyed to the coolant bleed holdup tank for storage or passed through a deborating dominera11zer for boric acid removal and returned as unborated makeup to the makeup line. It was assumed that one deborating domineralizer is in operation, one is regenerated and available in stand-by, and a third is being regenerated at any time. A spray nozzle in the coolant bleed tanks on th'e inlet line allows some of the gases to be released. Recirculating the tank allows further stripping
~
action to occur. Deminera.11 zed water can also be returned to the makeup line j , from the demineralized water holdup tank. Coolant from the bleed holdup tank is pumped to boron recovery for processing. 4 The coolant bleed holdup tank and the concentrated boric acid storage tank are vented to the gaseous waste vent header to provide for filling and emptying without overpressurization or causing a vacuum to exist. In addition, each tank is equipped with a relief valve and a vacuum breaker. Pressurized nitrogen can be supplied to each t=-2 to allow purging, Instruments and controls for operation of this system are located in the control room. Instruments and controls for the coolant bleed holdup tanks and' pumps, demineralized water holdup tank and pump, and the concentrated boric acid storage tank and pump are duplicated on local auxiliary control boards. I Der en Recovemr Bcron recovery is operated on a batch basis and is sited to process all of the reactor coolant bled from the RCS operating on an 8-hour per day basis. The system receives coolant from the bleed holdup tank through the coolant bleed evaporator demineralizers (one in operation; one available in stand-by) into the feed tank which is sized to hold sufficient feed for about five hours of i evaporator operation. The coolant is then pumped into the evaporator by the evaporator feed pump which naintains a level in the evaporator while the s 4
, , . . ,,, ,. -. ,, .n., . . , - - - - .
recirculating pump recirculates the coolant until the temperature is stabi-lined. The distillate is returned to the feed tank until the distillate is of the desired quality for pumping to the condensate test tanks. The evaporator concentrate is sampled and normally pumped to the concentrated boric acid storage tanks at apcroximately 8700 ppm boron. The evaporator concentrate can be allowed to increase to 26000 pps boron and pumped to the drumming station for ultimate disposal as solid waste. Ch*= 4 e a' Additten The cN31 cal addition portion of this system delivers the necessary chemicals to other systems as required. Boric acid is provided to the spent fuel pool, borated water stcrase tank, letdown storage tank, and core flooding tanks as
, makeup for leakage or to change the concentration of boric acid in the associated systems. Sodium hydroxide (caustic) is added to the waste evaporator feed tank during evaporator operation and to the deborating demineralizer during demineraliner resin regeneration.
A single boric acid mix tank is provided as a source of concentrated boric acid solution. The volume of the tank provides sufficient boric acid solution to increase the reactor coolant system bcron concentration to that required for cold shutdowr. Tank heaters and electrically beat traced transfer lines maintain the fluid temperature above that required to assure solubility of the boric acid. Three beric acid pumps c.re provided to transfer the concentrated boric acid solution from the boric acid tank to the borated water storage tank (BWST), makeup filters, spent fuel storage pool, or the core flooding tanks. One high pressure pump supplies boric acid to the core flooding tanks. The two low pressure pumps supply boric acid to other tanks, systems, and locations. The caustic mix tank is used to prepare solution which neutralises the feed to the waste evaporator. It also supplies sodium hydroxide to the deborating demineraliner for regeneration. The caustic pump transfers sodium hydroxide frct2 the caustic mix tank to the intended destination. l
Lithium hydroxide is mixed and added to the RCS from the lithium hydroxide tank. The lithium hydroxide pump transfers lithium hydroxide from the LiOH tank to the letdown line upstream of the makeup filters. 1 A 55-gallon drum supplies hydrazine to the Reactor Coolant System; the hydrazine is used to scavenge dissolved oxygen, primarily following a reactor shutdown. The hydrazine pump transfers to the letdown line upstream of the makeup filters. 2.3 support systems (To be included in next draft). d a ?
30 FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALISIS a 31 Technical Approach The analysis results documented in this report have been developed using failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) techniques. A FMEA identifies failure modes for components of concern and traces their effects on other components, subsystems, and systems. Emphasis is placed on identifying problems associated with hardware failures. The advantage of the analysis
~
technique is that while it is simple to apply, it provides for an orderly examination of potentially important failure modes throughout a systen. In a FMEA, the impact of potential faults is documented in tables which identify the component being considered, support systems associated with the component (for example, electric power for a motor-operated valve), potential component fault modes due to internal failures and unavailability cf support systems, the impact of the fault on system operation, and potential remedial action if the fault occurs. ArAlysis of the completed tables permits identi-fication of failures which have significant impact on system cperation. Because of the multiplicity of functions provided by the makeus and purifi-cation system, the initial FMEA was performed on a subsystem level. Makeup and purification subsystems are described in Section 2.0. Interfaces to each subsystem, including inlet and outlet links to other subsyg.. ems, support systems, and other reactor plant systems, were carefully deficed during the analysis to permit integration of the subsystem analyses into a single analysis package for the entire system. Faults due to component failures were traced through the linked subsystems to identify the impact of such failures on the entire system. The impact of support system unavailabilities were traced in a similar way, except all subsystem faults due to the unavailability were concurrently tra ed for impact. Certain faults were gaouped to facili-tate analysis. As an example of this, a failed closed state was defined for normally open manual valves. This failure state included faults due tc internal damace, due to plugging and due to inadvertant closure. Similarly, strainer plugging was considered in the same category as plugged lines, i 4 L
l i l l The FMEAs for each subsystem are detailed in Appendices A through F. These appendices describe each component considered in the subsystem analyses, along with appropriate fault documentation, as described above. The subsystem FMEAs were formatted to permit computerized data basing at some future date if desired, for the inventory of components, the failure modes, the interfaces involved, the effects, and the remedial actions available. The impact of the subsystem faults at the subsystem boundaries is summarized in Section 3 3 The integration of the subsystem analysis results into a system-level failure analysis is documented in the following section.
/
32 System Level Results A discussion and summary of system level results is TBD. However, the system level results are completed and detailed in Tables 1 through 8. The system level results include effects from the following eight categories of failures, with a corresponding table for each.
- 1. Pressure Boundary Failures
- 2. Flow Blockages 3 Flow Increases
- 4. Loss of Chemical Addition, Coolant Purification Capability
- 5. Control Instrueentation Malfunctions
- 6. Cooling Water Failures 7 Instru= eat Air Failures
- 8. AC Electric Power Failures 4
Analysis has considered support system failures (items 5 through 8 above) to the extent information was available. 33 Subsystem Level Results Detailed FMEAs of the subsystems described in Section 2.2 were completed and are presented in Appendices A-F. The results of these analyses are summarized in this section. Included are tables for each subsystem which provide a list of the failure effects at the subsystem boundaries along with the failures which can lead to ,those effects, a
, , , - _ . , . _ _ , , . , ., _._4 _, _.
. ~ . , , , ,
TABLE 1. PRESSURE BOUNDARY FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 1. Letdown Subsystem 1.1 In-Containment RC Leak or Small LOCA - Emergency procedures for small Piping decreasing pressurizer LOCA's must be followed. Let-and LD tank levels, down flowpath is isolated and decreasing RCS pressure, the HPI mode of operation and high contaminent initiated automatically at an radiation alarms alert RCS pressure of 1500 psi, the situation.
1.2 LD Cooler Tube RC leak or small LOCA - Emergency procedures for RCS Failure decreasing pressurizer and leaks or small LOCA's must be LD tank levels and high CC followed depending on whether surge tank and radiation the leak rate exceeds the alarms alert operator to capacity of the Makeup System. the situation. Until iso- Automatic isolation of the LD lated, reactor coolant coolers from the RCS will not will pressurize the CC not occur. The operator must
- system resulting in the isolate the LD cooler (s) from
- in-containment CC relief the RCS based on high CC surge valves opening and dis- tank level and pressure. The
, charging to the containment situation may be confused by sump. high containment sump levels and possible radiation alarms
] resulting from the CC relief valve discharge. d A D F P _ . . _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ _ w
3 , , 3
)
3 TABLE 1. PRESSURE BOUNDARY FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 2. 3-Way Valve Valve failure is considered as a flow blockage - See Table 2.
- 3. HPI Pump Subsystem 3.1 Piping Between RC leak outside contain- Emergency procedures for a 3-Way Valve and ment. Leak flowrate will letdown line failure outside LD Tank be limited to a small containment must be followed increase above existing (if they exist) . Operator must flowrate. Local radiation isolate the break and open an alarms, high sump levels alternate flowpath from the and decreasing LD tank BWST to the HPI pumps. Proce-level alert operator to dures covering subsequent the situation. Manual shutdown of the plant without isolation of letdown is letdown must be followed.
r6 quired. In addition, breaks in locations down-stream of check valve HP-7 could result in tha telease of H, which could result in fires or explosions. e 8 D
n - i 3 q s TABLE 1. PRESSURE BOUNDARY FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions i 3.2 Piping Between LD KC Icak outside contain- Operator should trip the l Tank and HPI Pumps ment. Local radiation operating HPI pump if low or alarms,high sump levels, erratic flow persists, isolate decreasing seal injection the leak and provide an and makeup flowrates and operable path for boric acid i possibly decreasing LD tank addition and RC pump seal i level alert operator to the injection. The letdown path i situation. Larger leak to the Bleed Holdup tanks must rates (e.g., >20 gpm), may bo initiated to control result in HPI pump cavi- pressurizer level. tation and reduction in pump flowrate. This will, result in the makeup control valve, HP-12, and seal injection control valve HP-31, opening to compensate, exacer-
, bating the cavitation. This condition could lead to HPI pump damage unless the pump is manually tripped. If the HPI pump is tripped, RC pumps can continue to operate with CC water. In addition, leak paths in these locations may result in the release of H 2
. which could result in fires or explosions.
4 i 0
- 3 TABLE 1. PRESSURE BOUNDARY FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued)
Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 4. RC Pump Seal Return Subsystem 4.1 Piping Between RC Small RC leak outside or Isolate and repair the leak.
Pumps and HPI Pump inside containment. Local If the leak must bc isolated subsystem radiation alarms, high sump prior to shutdown, the flow levels and a decreasing LD past RC pumps 91 seals will tank level alerts operator be terminated, to the situation. 4.2 Seal Return Cooler Small RC leak to RCW System. Isolate the affected cooler Tube Failure Increasing RCW surge tank and divert seal return flow level, high RCW radiation through spare cooler. alarms and decreasing LD tank level alert the operator to the situation.
; 1 TABLE 1. PRESSURE BOUNDARY FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEN (Continued)
Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 5. Makeup Subsystem .
5.1 Piping Between RC leak or high energy Emergency procedures for a high HPI Pumps and line failure outside or energy line break must be RCS Pressure inside containment. Local followed. Operator should trip Boundary Check radiation alarms, high sump the operating HPI pump, if Valves levels, and decreasing LD required isolate the break and Tank and Pressurizer levela provide an operable path for alert operator to situation. boric acid addition and RC pump For piping failures, Oper- seal injection. Depending on ating HPI pump (s) may "run- the break location, RC Pump out". Unless tripped auto- seal injection may not be matically by motor pro- possible, tection devices (if they exist) or by the operator, pump damage could occur. Effect of makeup fluid dis-charge unknown (see High Energy Line Break Analysis).. In addition, breaks in these locations may result in the release of H2 which could result in fires or explosions. l
. m
l ?
}
l l TABLE 1. PRESSURE BOUNDARY FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 6. Seal Injection Subsystem 6.1 Piping Between Makeup RC leak or high energy Emergency procedures for a high Subsystem and RC Pumps line failure outside or energy line break must be inside containment. Low followed. Operator should trip seal injection flowrate the operating IIPI pump, if alarms, local radiation required, isolate the break and alarms, high sump levels, provide an operable path for and decreasing LD Tank and boric acid addition and RC pump Pressurizer levels alert seal injection. Depending on operator to situation. For the break location, RC Pump piping failures, Operating seal injection may not be HPI pump (s) may "run- out". possible.
Unless tripped automatically by motor protection devices (if they exist) or by the operator, pump damage could occur. Effect of makeup fluid discharge unknown (see High i Energy Line Break Analysis). In addition, breaks in these locations may result in the . release of H2 which could result in fires or explosions. 1 e O P 4
TABLE 1. PRESSURE BOUNDARY FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION 37 STEN (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 7. Coolant Processing and Storage Subsystem 7.1 Piping in the coolant Radiation alarms and high operators must isolate break Processing and Storage sump level alert the and take appropriate measures Subsystem operator to the situation. to control flooding or H2 Flooding may be a problem release. BWST can supply RCS due to size of Bleed Holdup boric acid requirements if Tanks (~100,000 gal.). required.
Failure of 132 supply lines may result in fires or explosions. Normal letdown / makeup will be automatically initiated if a low LD Tank level results. O g k N
TABLE 2. FLOW BLOCKAGES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIPICATION SYSTEM Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 1. Letdown Subsystem 1.1- Letdown Path to Reduced letdown from RCS Operator can establish an Connection With results in makeup flow alternate letdown flowpath 3-Way Valve - throttled due to increasing or clear the flow blockage.
Letdown-Makeup pressurizer level. Seal Minimum HPI pump flow recir-Operation or injection results in a culation must be maintained. Operation With continued net injection of Continued operation may Deborating 20 gpm and an alarmed' low require makeup to LD tank Demineralizers LD' tank level. or throttling seal injection flow. l.2 Letdown Path to Increasing level in Operator can establish an Connection with pressurizer results in alternate letdown flowpath 3-Way valve - thrott]ing makeup flow. or clear the flow blockage. Letdown to Bleed Demineralized water or , Minimum HPI pump flow recir-Holdup Tank Operation boric acid flow to LD culation must be maintained. tank will continue Continued operation requires resulting in an alarmed throttling makeup to LD tank high LD tank level. to avoid filling tank. d s a
l . -
- i , ,
i [ TABLE 2. FLOW BLOCKAGES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 2. 3-Way valve 2.1 3-Way Valve Switches Flow to LD tank stops while Operator manually can transfer from Letdown to LD makeup to RCS continues at the 3-Way Valve to direct flow
- Tank to Coolant Pro- previous flowrates. Low to the LD tank, open the by-ceasing and Storage LD tank level is alarmed pass line from the letdown Subsystem and the level signal may line to the makeup filters or automatically transfer provide makeup to the LD tank valve to original position. from the Coolant Storage Sub-Unless an alternate source system. If LD tank level of makeup water to LD tank cannot be maintained, the in provided, the LD tank operator must throttle makeup will be drained possibly flow to the RCS or trip the resulting in damage to the HPI pumps.
operating HPI pumps.
. 2.2 3-Way Valve Switches LD tank level will Return 3-Way Valve to original I
from Letdown to increase and be alarmed position or isolate makeup
; Coolant Processing on high level. flow from Coolant Processing and Storage Sub- Subsystem to LD tank.
system to LD Tank
- 3. HPI Subsystem 3.1 3-Way Valve to Reduced letdown from RCS Operator can establish an Connection With results in makeup flow alternate letdown flowpath Seal Return Line- throttled due to increasing or clear the flow blockage.
Letdown-Makeup pressurizer level. Seal Minimum HPI pump flow recir-Operation or injection results in a culation must be maintained. Operation With continued net injection of Continued operation may Deborating 20 gpm and an alarmed low require throttling seal Demineralizers LD tank level. injection flow. i
@ P
_ _ _ __ . _ . . _ _ . . . - . - _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . ~ . . _ _ . _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _____ _ _. __ _ - . _ . _ . . _ . _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ .
' \ -
r , TABLE 2. FLOW BLOCKAGES 23 THE MAKRUP .BND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions l 3.2 3-Way Valve to Flow to LD tank stops while Operator can establish an Connection with makeup to RCS continues at alternate letdown flowpath to Seal Return Line- previous flowrates. Unless the LD tank or clear the flow Letdown to Bleed an alternate source of blockage. Continued operation Holdup Tank Operation makeup water to LD tank is may require throttling seal provided, the LD tank will injection flowrate. be drained possibly resulting in damage to the operating HPI pumps. 3.3 Seal Return Line Decreasing LD tank level Operator must open a path from to LD Tank and isolated seal return the BWST prior to draining the flow alert operator to the LD tank or trip the operating situation. Failure to HPI pump (s). To prevent establish a flowpath from filling the pressurizer, the the BWST or trip the HPI flow blockage must be removed pumps prior to draining the or a letdown flowpath to the LD tank could result in Bleed Holdup tanks established. HPI pump failure. If the operator trips the HPI pump (s), the RC pumps will be operating without seal injection. Injection from the BWST will result in increasing pressurizer level due to the net 20 gpm seal injection flowrate to the RCS unless a letdown flow-path to the Bleed Ho] dup tank is established. 9
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = - - _ _ _ - _
i 3 TABLE 2. FLOW BLOCKAGES IN THE MAKBUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions 3.4 LD Tank to HPI Low indicated makeup flow- Operator must open path from Pump Suction rate and low seal injection the BWST or trip the operating Piping flowrate alarms alert oper- HPI pumps. To prevent filling l ator to the situation. the pressurizer, the flow Unless the operator trips blockage must be removed or a the operating HPI pump (s) letdown flowpath to the Bleed or establishes a flowpath Holdup tanks established. If from the BWST rapidly, the the operating HPI pump (s) fail, operating HPI pump (s) will the operator must establisn a fail. flowpath through the remaining operable HPI pump (s) for RC pump seal injection and bora-tion of the RCS.
. 3.5 HPI Suction Piping Low indicated makeup flow- Operator must trip the oper-rates and low seal injection ating HPI pump (s). The oper-flowrate alarms alert oper- ator may establish a flowpath ator to the situation. from the BWST through the Unless the operator trips unblocked HPI pump (s) for RC the operating HPI pump (s) pump seal injection and bora-rapidly, the operating HPI tion of the RCS. To prevent pump (s) will fail. filling the pressurizer, the
~
flow blockage must be removed or a letdown flowpath to the Bleed Holdup tank established. 3.6 Operating HPI Lev indicated makeup Operator may isolate letdown Pump (s) Stop finwraten, and low seal flow and start an alternate injection flowrates alert HPI pump after assessing j operator to the situation, the reason for the stoppage. I Continued letdown flow and Letdown flow may then be RC pump seal return flow restored. result in an increasing LD tank level and a decreasing pressurizer level.
. . _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . - . . _ . -_---. __ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _a
t . -s - g , , , TABLE 2. FLOW BLOCKAGES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 4. RC Pumps Seal Return Seal injection flow Operator must establish a flow-Subsystem through the RC Pumpa' 81 path from the 81 or 92 RC seals will cease. The Pumpa' seals to the LD tank, seal injection flow will If the blockage stopped the !!PI be directed through the pump recirculation line, mini-RC Pumps' labyrinth seals mum HPI pump flow must be main-to the RCS. Pump trip tained by increasing letdown may be required if flow flow if required.
through one or both seals cannot be reestablished. In addition, minimum HPI , pump flow must be maintained.
- 5. Makeup Subsystem Operator alerted to the Remove or bypass the flow situation by decreasing blockage using one or more of pressurizer level and the four IIPI lines to the RCS increasing LD tank level. to restore pressurizer level.
Continued operation would If required, reduce letdown slowly drain the pressurizer flow or boric acid /deminera-resulting in a reactor trip. lized water flows to prevent with the pressurizer at an filling the LD tank. Initially low level, the pressurizer may be drained during the subsequent transient.
. e
+ , -
3 i , , TABLE 2. FLOW BLOCKAGES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) s
~
'l s
, Failure Location' .
Effect Remedial Actions
?r . .
.[ q
*/ f
, 6. RC Pumps Seal injection- Seal injection flow to one Restore seal injection.
. Subsyster ,
/ or more RC pumps will cease. Observe RC pump procedures
/ > ' Operator alerted to the for operation without seal situation by seal injtetion injection.
s. t, low. flow alarms. Reactor coolant will pass through
, , the labyrinth seal (thermal 4
, , barrier) where it will be cooled by the CC water
, supplied to the pump. The
< - g, j , lower temperature reactor t> coolant flows through the E '
RC Pumps' seals and back
, to the LD tank.
- 7. Coolant Processing and Storage Subsystem 7.1 Letdown Path Decreasing LD tank level Clear or _ bypass f)ow blockage Through Deborating will result in the auto- and restore deborating Demineralizers matic transfer of the demineralizer operation. .
3-Way Valve to the LD tank. 7.2 Letdown Path From Increasing pressurizer Operator manually can transfer 3-Way Valve to Bleed level will result in 3-Way Valve to the LD tank. Holdup Tank throttled makcup flow-rate to RCS. LD tank level will increase. Pressurizer level will continue to increase due to net RC Pumps' seal 4 injection ficwrate.
i , , i TABLE 2. FLOW BLOCKAGES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
. 7.3 Makeup Path to Decreasing LD tank level Clear or bypass flow blockage LD Tank will result in the auto- and restore letdown flowpath matic transfer of the to Sleed stoldup tanks.
3-Way Valve to the LD. tank. o -
r- , . . , TABLE 3. FLGW INCREASES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 1. Letdown Subsystem 1.1 Letdown Path to Makeup valve to RCS opens Attempt to reduce flowrate or 3-Way valve-Normal in response to decreasing manually isolate.
Letdown-Makeup pressurizer level. LD Operation or tank level may increase. Deborating Single LD cooler operation Demineralizer could result in increased
, Operation letdown fluid temperatures.
If sufficiently high, letdown will be automatically isolated J (see Table 2, Item 1.1). 1.2 Letdown Path to Makeup valve to RCS opens Attempt to reduce letdown 3-Way Valve-Letdown in response to decreasing flowrate. If required, to Bleed Holdup Tank pressurizer level. LD transfer 3-way valve position tank level decreases. to LD tank. 3-way valve will automatically transfer letdown to LD tank if LD ' tank level is sufficiently low. Single LD cooler operation could result in increased letdgwn fluid
- tempe ra tur es. If sufficiently high, letdown will be automatically isolated.
; i .
4 TABLE 3. FLOW INCREASES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 2. 3-Way Valve 2.1 3-Way Valve Switches Flow to LD tank stops while Operator manually can transfer from Letdown to LD makeup to RCS continues at the 3-Way Valve to direct flow Tank to Coolant Pro- previous flowrates. Low to the LD tank, open the by-cessing and Storage LD tank level is alarmed pass line from the letdown Subsystem and the level signal may line to the makeup filters or
, automatically transfer provide makeup to the LD tank valve to original position, from the Coolant Storage Sub-Unless an alternate source system. If LD tank level of makeup water to LD tank cannot be maintained, the l i 1s provided, the LD tank operator must throttle makeup '
will be drained possibly flow to the RCS or trip the resulting in damage to the HPI pumps. operating HPI pumps. 2.2 3-Way Valve Switches LD tank level will Return 3-Way Valve to original from Letdown to increase and be alarmed position or isolate makeup Coolant Processing on high level, flow from Coolant Processing and Storage Sub- Subsystem to LD tank. system to LD Tank
- 3. HPI Pump Subsystem 4
l 3.1 Flowpath to LD Tack Letdown tank level Reduce or isolate flow from from Coolant increases. Excessive boric acid or blead holdup Processing and addition of demineralized tanks. Transfer letdown flow Storage Subsystem water will result in to LD tank if required. control rod insertion and automatic termination of demineralized water flow to LD tank. 3.2 Flowpath to HPI LD tank level will Isolate BWST from HPI pump 4 Pumps from BWST increase, subsystem.
- o. -
TABLE 3. FLOW INCREASES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEN (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 4. Seal Return Subsystem Makeup flow to RCS auto- Observe operating procedures matically increased in for increased seal return flow response to decreased which may be indicative of a .
pressurizer level. damaged RC pump 01 seal.
- 5. Makeup Subsystem Operator alerted to the Attempt to throttle makeup situation by increased flowrate. Increase letdown pressurizer level and flowrate if required to prevent and decreased LD tank filling pressurizer or draining t
level. LD tank.
- 6. RC Pump Seal Injection Increasing pressurizer Attempt to throttle RC pump Subsystem level will result in seal injection flow, automatic throttling of makeup flow to RCS to compensate for increased seal injection.
O P '
TABLE 3. FLOW INCREASES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Location Effect Remedial Actions
- 7. Coolant Processing and ,
Storage Subsystem 7.1 Flowpath to Bleed Makeup valve to RCS Opens Attempt to reduce letdown Holdup Tanks from in response to decreasing flowrste. If required, Letdown subsystem pressurizer level. LD transfer 3-way valve position tank level decreases. to LD tank. 3-way valve will automatically transfer ' letdown to LD tank if LD tank level is sufficiently low. Single LD cooler operation could result in increased letdown fluid temperatures. If sufficiently high, letdown will be automatically isolated. 7.2 Flowpath to HPI Letdown tank level Reduce or isolate flow from Subsystem from increases. Excensive boric acid or bleed holdup Coolant Processing addition of demineralized tanks. Transfer letdown flow and Storage Subsystem water will result in to LD tank if required. ' control rod insertion and autcmatic termination of demineralized water flow to LD tank. e P
. TABLE 4. LOSS OF CHEMICAL ADDITION, COOLANT PURIFICATION CAPABILITY IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Failure Effect Remedial Actions i
- 1. Boric Acid Makeup From None during normal If required for plant shutdown, Concentrated Boric Acid operation. concentrated boric acid may be Tanks to LD Tank Falls added to the LD tank from the botic acid mix tank or lower concentration boric acid may be injected from the BWST to the RCS.
I 2. Demineralized Water Failure to reduce the boric Restore demineralized water Makeup to LD Tank acid concentration of the makeup to LD tank. Fails reactor coolant will result in a slow decrease in core ' power due to decreasing core reactivity.
- 3. Lithium Hydroxide Slow decrease in pH of Monitor pH of reactor coolant.
Addition to LD Tank reactor coolant. If pH Restore lithium hydroxide Fails exceeds specifications, addition to LD tank or shutdown plant shutdown will be plant if required. required.
- 4. Hydrazine Addition to None during plant power Restore hydrazine addition LD Tank Fails operation. Hydrazine is capability.
required in the RCS only during plant shutdown for oxygen concentration reduction (Notes hydrazine is used during power operation for feedvater
. Oxygen control. If feedwater oxygen concentration exceeds specifications, plant shutdown is required.). .
i ' 1 } 4 j ; i TABLE 4. LOSS OF CHENICAL ADDITION, COOLANT PURIFICATION CAPABILITY IN THE NAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEN (Continued) 1 Failure Effect RLmedial Actions
- 5. Hydrogen Supply to LD Slow reduction in hydrogen Monitor oxygen concentration Tank Isolated concentration and increase in reactor coolant. Restore in oxygen concentration in hydrogen addition to LD tank reactor coolant. If oxygen or shutdown plant if required.
concentration exceeds l specification, plant i shutdown is required,
- 6. Purification Slow increase in reactor Monitor reactor coolant Demineralizers coolant impurities. If chemistry. Restore
, Bypassed or Depleted dissolved impurity purification demineralizer concentration of reactor operation or shutdown plant if coolant exceeds required. specifications, plant shutdown may be required.
- 7. Letdown Filters Bypassed Letdown filters and Restore purification purification demineralizers demineralizers and letdown unavailable for removal of filters to operation.
particulates from reactor coolant. RC pump seal protected by seal injection filters. Effects of bypassing purification demineralizers discussed in Item 5. Other effects , unknown. O l i e e
TABLE 4. LOSS OF CHENICAL ADDITION, COOLANT PURIFICATION CAPABILITY IN THE MAKEOP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Effect Remedial Actions
- 8. Seal Injection Filters Filter unavailable for Restore seal injection filters Bypassed removal of particulates to operation.
prior to injection through RC pump seals. Unless , bypassed, purification demineralizers and/or letdown filters can
. remove coolant particulates.
4 1
@ P
1 ! t ; TABLE 5. CONTROL INSTRUNENTATION MALFUNCTIONS IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Failure Effect Remedial Actions
- 1. Spurious ES Signals Letdown and seal return After confirming no emergency (1 or 2 Output Channels) linen isolated, 2 or 3 HPI condition exists, the operator pump injection. mode may bypass the ES system, initiated. RC pumps restore letdown and seal return continue to operate with flow, and return to pressurizer seal injection flow level controlled, single HPI
' directed through the pump makeup operation. labyrinth seals (thermal barrier) unless the RC ~ pumps are manually tripped by the operator.
- 2. Spurious NNI Automatic Control Signals (Circuit Failures) 2.1 High Letdown Fluid Letdown flow isolated. Operator alerted to the Temperature Circuit Makeup flow will be situation by high letdown Isolates Letdown throttled automatically temperature alarm. The Valve HP-5 based on increasing operator can manually restore pressurizer level. letdown flow and repair
. Pressurizer level will temperature circuit, continue to rise slowly and the LD tank level drop due to the net 20 gpm seal injection input (See Table 2, Item 1.1, 1.2). . D G
3 ; TABLE 5. CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTIONS IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Effect Remedial Actions 2.2 Low LD Tank Level, MUEP system operation The operator is alerted to the "CRD Dilution transfers from " Bleed and situation by a spurious low Permit" or the Feed" to normal letdown- level alarm if the LD tank
" Batch Complete" makeup operation.* level transmitter failed low.
Circuits Transfers 3-Way Valve From the Coolant Processing and Storage Subsystem to the LD Tank 2.3 Pressurizer Level Flow increase - makeup See Table 3, Item 5. Control Circuit subsystem. See Table 3, Opens Makeup Item 5. Control Valve (HP-120) 2.4 Pressurizer Level Flow blockage - makeup See Table 2, Item 5. Control Closes subsystem. See Table 2, Makeup Control Item 5. Valve (HP-120) 2.5 RC Seal Injection Seal injection flow ceases Operator slowly restores seal Flow Control and low flow is alarmed. injection flow by manually Circuit Closes RC pump continue to operate opening HP-31 or its bypass Control Valve with reactor coolant cooled valve HP-140. H P-31 in the labyrinth seal, , pa' sing throcch the #1 shaf t ' seal and returning through the seal return subsystem. ,
- Assumes the signal from the 3-Way Valve Operator (HP-14) to the Coolant Processing and Storage Isolation Valve (HP-16) closes the isolation valve. If isolation valve remains open, see Table 3, Item 7.2.
o -
-s , , ,
TABLE 5. CONTROL INSTRUNENTATION MALFUNCTIONS IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Effect Remedial Actions 2.6 RC Seal Injection Small increase in flowrate Operator manually can throttle Flow Control expected. The long term !!P-31. Circuit Opens effects on the RC pumps and Control Valve whether the increased flow HP-31 is sufficient to trip the high seal P alarms is not known.
- 3. Spurious NNI Automatic Control Signals (NNI Power Failures) 3.1 Failure of The makeup control (HP-120) Emergency procedure for loss or Panelboard KI and letdown control valves' KI bus, EP/0/A/lG00/3, must be Power to ICS/NNI controls transfer to manual followed. These actions should with their power supply include taking manual control automatically transferring valve (HP-120) and the turbine to Panelboard KU. The bypass valves and verifying valves will remain in other automatic actions.
position. The seal injection control valve (HP-31) automatic control will continue to function with its power supply automatically transferring to Panelboard KU. A spurious low LD tank signal will result in 3-way valve (HP-14) transferring , letdown flow to the LD tank. Numerous other plant controls, alarms and indicators deenergized (See Section ).
1 ; i 4 L TABLE 5. CONTROL INSTRUNENTATION NALFUNCTIONS IN THE NAREUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEN (Continued) r Failure Effect Remedial Actions 3.2 Failure of Hand E/P transducers for the Operator must follow applicable ' Power to ICS/NNI letdown (HP-7) , makeup procedures for loss or Hand (Branch HX) (HP-120) and RC pump seal Power. These actions should (HP-31) flow control valves includue transferring (or freezing in position. verify 1:ig the transfer) the Power to these transducers power for the makeup, seal may be transferred to injection and turbine bypass Panelboard KU (whether valves to KU, tripping the main this transfer is automatic, feedwater pump and verifying as with loss of KI, or the automatic initiation and manual is unknown). The control of emergency feedwater. 3-Way valve (HP-14) will be switched to transfer letdown flow to the LD tank. Numerous other plant controls, alarms are deenergized (See Section ). , 3.3 Failure of Auto Power Automatic transfer of the Operator must follow .i to ICS/NNI (Branch H) makeup flow control to applicable procedures for loss manual will occur. The of autopower. These actions ? valve (HP-120) will remain should include taking manual in position. Numerous control of makeup flow, other plant controls, tripping the main feedwater alarms and indicators are pumps and verifying the , deenergized (See Section automatic initiation and 4
). control of emergency feedwater and turbine bypass valves.
4 i O P
l TABLE 5. CONTROL INSTRUMENTATION MALPUNCTIONS IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Effect Remedial Actions 3.4 Failure of Hand Automatic control of makeup Operator must follow applicable
. Power Branch HlX valve HP-120 operable. If procedures for loss of HlX to ICS/NNI manual control of valve at power. These actions should ICS Hand Station selected, include transferring tu-bine valve will open or close to bypass valve controls to KU midposition. Numerous other and manually controlling them, (non-letdown /makeim) plant tripping the main feedwater cc.ntrols, alarms and pumps and verifying the indicators are deenergized automatic initiation and (See Section ). control of emergency feedwater.
3.5 Failure of Hand E/P transducers for the Operator must follow applicable Power Branch H2X letdown (HP-7), Makeup procedures for loss or H2X to ICS/NNI (HP-120) and RC pump seal Power. These actions should (HP-31) flow control valves include transferring (or are deenergized resulting verifying the transfer) the in those valves freezing in power for the makeup and seal position. Power to these injection to KU. Operator' transducers to Panelboard should be cautioned to verify KU (whether this transfer operability of indicators he is automatic as with loss uses. of KI, or manual is unknown). The 3-Way Valve i (HP-14) will be switched to transfer letdown flow to the LD tank. Other makeup / letdown alarms and indicators will also be deenergized. E F 4
t , TABLE 5. CONTROL INSTRUNENTATION MALFUNCTIONS IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEN (Continued) Failure Effect Remedial Actions 3.6 Failure of Auto Power ' Automatic transfer of the Operator must follow applicable Branch III to ICS/NNI makeup flow control to procedures for loss ot Hl. manual will occur. The These actions should include valve (IIP-120) will remain taking manual control or makeup in position. Numerous flow, tripping the main other plant controls, feedwater pumps and verifying alarms and indicators are the automatic initiation and deenergized (See Section control of emergency feedwater I
). and turbine bypass valves.
3.7 Failure of Auto Power Numerous RC pump and LD Operator should be cautioned to Branch H2 to ICS/NNI tank alarms spuriously verify operability of alarms annunciate and indicators and indicators used for plant deenergized. Although no control / recovery, automatic controls are affected, if the operator trips the RC pumps, they cannot be restarted due to the spurious low seal injection flow interlock. O W +
=. . _ ,_ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _
3 l TABLE 5. CONTROL INSTRUNENTATION NALFUNCTIONS IN THE NARBUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEN (Continued) Failure Effect Remedial Actions
; 3.8 Power for Selected Indicated high pressurizer Operator is alerted to the l Pressurizer Level level will result in makeup situation by high indicated and Transmitter Fails control valve HP-120 alarmed LD tank level. The (Branch HEX, HEY closing. Pressurizer level operator should be cautioned to or KU) will decrease and LD tank verify the operability of level will increase. In pressurizer level indications addition, if HEX or HEY and alarms. Once the power failed power is selected for failure is identified the the SG startup level operator may select one of the transmitter, low indicated two operable pressurizer level SG startup level will result transmitters for indication and in overfilling the affected control.
SG resulting in an automatic trip of the main feedwater pumps. If KU failed power is selected, the power computer will be lost. i,
- s , 1 TABLE 6. COOLING WATER FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Failure Effect Remedial Actions
- 1. Component Cooling (CC)
System Failures 1.1 Loss of CC Water Increase in letdown fluid Restore CC flow to operating ' to Operating LD temperature resulting in or standby LD cooler and place , Cooler automatic letdown. isolation. In operation. See also Table See Table 2, Letdown 2, Letdown Subsystem. Subsystem. 1.2 Loss of CC (Unit 1) In addition to letdown flow Rostore CC flow to LD cooler isolation, cooling water and other required components, will be lost to RC Pump labyrinth seals and CRDM cooling jackets. RC Pump can continue to operate without CC, however, loss l of CRDM cooling may result 3' In reactor trip. l l 2. Low Pressure Service < , Water (LPSW) System l I Failures 2.1 Loss of LPSW to Motor bearing will overheat Restore LPSW to operating pump Operating HPI Pomp eventually requiring HPI or trip operating HPI pump and Motor Bearings pump trip. Long tets start backup HPI pump. operation would damage bearings. l l l l
TABLE 6. COOLING WATER FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Effect Remedial Ictions 2.2 Loss of LPSW In addition to loss of Depending on the mode of motor bearing cooling for failure, the backup LPSW pump the three HPI pumps, cooling may be started, the HPSW system water to Unit 1 and 2 CC may be used or the cause of coolers (see Item 1), the RC failure (e.g., blocked LPSW pump motor bearing coolers, suction strainers, loss of AC emergency feedwater pump power) may be removed. and turbine coolers, LPI coolers, RB cooling units, etc., will be lost.
- 3. Recirculating Cooling Water (RCW) System Failures 3.1 Loss of RCW to Gradual increase in seal Restore RCW to operating cooler Operating Seal return temperature due to or place standby cooler in Return Cooler heat addition from RC pump operation. If seal return seals and HPI pump. It is coolers' cooling water still not known whether or how unavailable, increased letdown quickly the temperature and isolate IIPI pump could rise to the point recirculation loop if required.
where the HPI pump NPSH is inadequate. S
. E
TABLE 6. COOLING WATER FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Colitinued) Failure Effect Remedial Actions 3.2 Loss of RCW In addition to the above, Follow emergency procedures for cooling water to the main lous of instrument air. feedwater and condensate Restore cooling water and air pumps (drivers) resulting supply to pneumatic valves and in a loss of main feedwater, restore letdown makeup loss of epent fuel pool operation. If air supply cooling, loss of cooling to cannot be restored, manually air compressors plus loss restore makeup to RCS from BWST of cooling to other or makeup tank, provide makeup miscellaneous functions. to LD tank from letdown or Reactor and turbine trip Bleed Holdup / Boric Acid tanks, expected. Loss of air if required, restore letdown to compressor cooling water LD tank or Bleed Holdup tank, result in loss of air and restore seal return to the compressors A, B, and C LD tank. (existance of backup compressors unknown), and assumed isolation of letdown, seal return and makeup flows (see Table 6). Loss of main feedwater will result in automatic switch of emergency feedwater with pneumatic control valves automatically supplied from a backup N2 tank. 5 S
TABLE 7. INSTRUMENT AIR FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Failure Effect Remedial Actions Loss of Instrument Air Pneumatic valves in the Operator must follow emergency 1etdown line, seal return procedure for loss of line, RCS makeup line and instrument air. Manually the makeup line f roni the restore instrument air and/or coolant storage subsystem manually restore letdown, seal closer the seal injection return and makeup flows. control valve opens and pneumatic valves in other systems move to their failure position. Seal injection flow is passed through the RC pump labyrinth seals bypassing the il and 82 shaft seal
. and resulting in an increasing pressurizer level and decreasing LD tank level.
Main feedwater will trip on high SG 1evel (assuming reactor trip following loss of instrument air pressure) and emergency feedwater will be initiated and controlled using backup N2 tanks for pneumatic control valvec. t
- TABLE 8. EFi'ECT OF AC ELECTRIC POWER FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Failure Effect Remedial Actions
- 1. 4160 VAC Bus ITC o Operating HPI pump PIA Start standby HPI pump PIB, Deenergized stops, terminating seal standby LPSW pump B and the injection and makeup to standby RCW puup. If required RCS. Open the letdown isolation valve which may close on high o LPSW pump A stops, letdown temperature. Restore
. reducing cooling water bus ITC to service, flow to Unit 1 and 2 serviced components by 50% including the component coolers. A gradual increase in letdown temperature is expected which may result in automatic isolation of letdown.
o RCW pump D, if in operation, stops, reducing the cooling water flow to Unit 1, 2 and 3 serviced components by 33%. Overall effects of the RCW reduct. ion are not known; the specific impact on the seal return temperature is expected to be minor. w_~ --
- r ,
3 1 e TABLE 8. EFFECT OF AC ELECTRIC POWER FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM 4 (Continued) Failure Effect Remedial Actions 1
. 1. 4160 VAC Bus ITC o One or both HPI discharge Deenergized (cont'd) valves (HP-26, 27) and one or both BWST isolation valves to the HPI pumps (HP-24, 25) ,
may be deenergized and not able to open if powered via bus TC. o The discharge valve from both letdown coolers A and B (HP-3, 4) may be deenergized and not able to close if powered via bus TC. O Air compressor motor B
/ is deenergized and stops if energized via buses XF, XI and TC. The air r supply to serviced components is assumed to be provided by compressors 3 nnd C. . 2. 4160 VAC Bus ITD o Standby HPI pump PIB Restore bus 1TD to service.
Deenergized and standby LPSW pump B (if connected to bus lTD) deenergized and unavailable if required. P
. P
i . i TABLE 8. EFFECT OF AC ELECTRIC POWER FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIPICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Effect Rep.edial Actions
- 2. 4160 VAC Bus ITD o One or both HPI discharge Deenergized (cont'd) valves (HP-26, 27) and i one or both BWST isolation valves to the HPI pumps (HP-24, 25) may be deenergized and not able to open if powered via bus TD.
o The discharge valve from both letdown coolers A and B ( H P-3 , 4 ) may be deenergized and not able to close if powered via bus TD. O Air compressor motor A is deenergized and stops if energized via buses XD, X2 and TD. The air supply to serviced components is assumed to be provided by compressors A and C.
- 3. 4160 VAC Bus ITE o Standby HPI pump PIC Start standby RCW pump if RCW
- Deenergized decnergized and pump A was in service. Restore unavailable if required. bus ITE to service.
If RCW pump A is in service, it will stop, reducing cooling water flow to Unit 1, 2 and 3 serviced components by 334.
TABLE 8. EFFECT OF AC ELECTRIC POWER FAILURES IN Tile MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure Effect Remedial Actions
- 3. 4160 VAC Bus ITE o Compressor Motors A and/
Deenergized (cont'd) or B may be deenergized and stop if powered via backup buses X3 and TE. The ability of compressor C, assumed to be powered from a Unit 2 or 3 bus, to maintain air pressure is unknot'n (see Table 7, Failure of Instrument Air).
- 4. 600 VAC, 208 VAC Buses The distillate pump, low Restore power to the XL buses.
XL Deenergized pressure boric acid pump A, Concentrated boric acid boric acid mix tank requiremen's e can be supplied agitator and heater. via boric acid pump B. deenergized. Effect of this failure on plant power operation expected to be small.
- 5. 600 VAC, 208 VAC Buses The low pressure boric acid Restore power to the XN buses. -
XN Deenergized pump B and the lithium concentrated boric acid hydroxide pump and tank requirements can be supplied agitator deenergized. via boric acid pump A. Effect of this failure Lithium hydroxide can be on plant power operation added using the hydrazine expected to be small. pump. Q
7 , TABLE 8 EFFECT OF AC ELECTRIC POWER FAILURES IN THE MAKEUP AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (Continued) Failure 6ffect Remedial Actions
- 6. 600 VAC Buses XS1, o One or both HPI discharge Restore power to deanergized XS2, X8 or X9 valves (HP-26, 27) and bus.
Deenergized one or both BWST isolation valves to the HPI pumps (HP-24, 25) may be deenergized and not able to open if energized via XS1, XS2, X8 or X9. o The discharge valve from both letdown coolers A and B (HP-3, 4) may be deenergized and not able to close if energized via XS1, XS2, X8 or X9. ,
- 7. 208 VAC Bus XS1 BWST isolation valve to the Restore Bus XS1 to service.
3PI pumps (HP-24) and the HPI pumps A and B HPI discharge valve (HP-26) deenergized and not able to open if required.
- 8. 208 VAC Bus XS2 BWST isolation valve to the Restore Bus XS2 to service.
HPI pumps (HP-25) and the HPI pr'p C HPI discharge 4 valve (HP-27) deenergized and not able to open if required.
. n
l I I M E T S Y s S n o N i O t I c T A A C l I a F i I d R e U m P e R D N A P U E K A M m e E o l rA b H f a . T s d er te N ve or I) ll ni d ao u Se v o )d q Eu c4ne Rn e gn,ar Ui t Lt c rw3df I n e ao ei Ao f hdPz FC f ctHie ( E se( gs R i l ro E d Bel W h nc O etde P honeo Tbadt C I o R T C E L E C A F O T C 2 E S F X F E s u B
. )
8 Cd A E L r e V 'tn B u 8o A l 0c T i 2( t a F 8 j
Brief discussions of the major effects for each subsystem are also included in this section. However, effects such as incorrect process signals, reactor coolant leaks to the reactor building, reactor building isolation failure are generally not included in the discussions. Even though process signals that do not directly control could still potentially induce operator response leading to additional effects, given an incorrect signal, such responses were considered secondary and were generally not discussed further. Effects on isolation capability were also not discussed further since isolation was not considered normal operation and could generally be effected with available backup when required. Reacter coolant leaks are discussed with system-level results and are likewise not discussed further bere. 3 3.1 Letdown Cociars to Three-Wav Valve The major effects at the subsystem interface resulting from various subsystem failures include: reduced, increased, and terminated letdown flow to three-way valve HP-14 (HP-V10); reactor coolant leaks; bypassing of letdown flow around the purification domineralizers; and failure to reduce the temperature of letdown flow from the subsystem. These effecM can be precipitated by such f ailures as an internal component failure, a spurious control signal, or a loss of cooling water to the operating cooler. These effects and their precipitating f aults are listed in Table 9 The most severe effect at the subsystem interface was found to be the termination of letdown flow to three-way valve HP-14 (HP-V10). Reduced letdown flow can result from normally closed manual valves being opened or failing, creating leaks. Reduction in letdown flow can also result from the spurious opening of relief valves downstream of the block orifice. A radiation monitor loop and a boron meter loop bypass the block orifice. If a drain valve in either loop is left open after maintenance, a significant leak could occur when the use of the loops is initiated. A leak in one of these loops would reduce the letdown flow from the subsystem. Another possible failure is the opening of the normally closed control valve HP-9 (1HP-V8) due to internal fault or spurious control signal which would result in letdown flow diverted to Unit 2 rather than the Unit 1 LST. d
I i TABLE 9 FMEA SINSU.RI FOR SUBSY3 TEM 1.0: LETDONE COOLERS TO 3-WAY YALTE HP-14 (HP-Y10) 1 Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes
- 1. Reduced Letdown Flow to a. Internal component failures (normally 3-Way Valve HP-14 (HP-V10) closed manual valves fail open creating icaks or allowing some letdown flow to bypass HP-14 (HP-710); relief valves spuriously open; if control valve HP-9 (1HP-V8) NC fails open, then letdown flow may leak to Unit 2 if HP-12 is being used by Unit 2 and the pressure
~
of Unit 1 letdown flow is greater than that of Unit 2 letdown flow; tube rupture in letdown cooler HP-C1 A or HF-C1B)
- b. Spurious control signal (if spurious signal corresponding to the open position is received by HP-9 (1HP-V8)
NC, then letdown low may leak to Unit 2 if HP-I2 is. being used by Unit 2 and the pressure of Unit 1 letdown flow is greaLer than that of Unit 2 letdown fl.w)
- 2. Increased Letdown Flow to a. Internal component failures (manual or 3-Way Valve HP-14 (HP-710) control valves which are NC fail open resulting in increased letdown flow)
- b. Spurious control signal (if spurious
! signal corresponding to tho open position is received by HP-7 (HP-V5), then increased letdown flow results; if spurious signal corresponcing,to the open position is received by HP-9 (1HP-VB) or HP-11 (1HP-79), then increased letdcwn flow may result from an influx of Unit 2 letdown flow if HP-I2 is being used by Unit 2 and the pressure of Unit 2 letdown flow is greater than that of Unit 1 letdown flow) h e
x s s TABLE 9.; FIEA SERedRY FOR SUBSISTEM 1.0: LEPMua co0LERS TO'3-VAY VALYB BP-14 (BP-110) s (Continued) Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults /Failurs Modes 3 Letdown Flow to 3-way a. Internal component failures (manual or Valve HP-14 (HP-V10) is control valves which are N0 fail closed Terminated obstructing letdown flow; resin beads in purification desineralizar HP-11 melt resulting in flow blockage)
- b. Spurious control signal (if spurious
, ,_ signal ordering closure is received by any one: HP-1 (HP-Y1 A), HP-3 (HP-V2A),
HP-5 (HP-V3), HP-6 (HP-74), or HP-8 s (HP-V7), then letdown flow stops) y .
- s. c. Loss of cooling water flow to the operating cooler (HP-C1 A or HP-C1B) will result in increased letdown temperature and subsequent termination of letdown
' flow due to automatic closure of HP-5
( HP-V3) s 4. Reactor coolant Leaks a. Internal component failures (mar.ual or control valves which are NC fail open creating 1aaks; tube rupture in letdown cooler HP-C1A or HP-C1B)
- b. Spurious control signal (if spurious signal corresponding to the open position is recGred by HP-9 (1HP-V8),
then letdown flow any leak to Unit 2 if HP-12 is being used by Unit 2 and the pressure of Unit 1 letdown flow is greater than that of Unit 2 letdown flow
- 5. Chemistry of Letdown Flow a. Valve HP-13 (HP-V6) NC fails open due to to 3-Way Valve HP-14 internal fault or spurious control (HP-V10) is Altered signal and allows the letdown flow to
's bypass puriti m ion domineralizer HP-11 and proceed directly to 3-way ~
valve HP-14 (HP-V10)
- 6. Increase in Temperature a. Loss of cooling water flow to the of Letdown Flow to 3-Way , ., operating letdown cooler (HP-C1A or Valve HP-14 (HP-V10) HP-C1B)
~
4. 2
*( i a 4
.j s w 4
- ,,- .- , - - - . .---.-+v-.& ,e-.-r . --, - . - - . . - , , - - >rc. , - . - --
l TABLE 9 FMBA SWSIARY FOR SUBSYSTEM 1.0: IXdXNG COOLERS TO 3-WAY TALYE BP-14 (BB-Y10) (Continued)
~
Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitatir.2 Faults / Failure Modes l l
- 7. Incorrect Process Signals a. Internal component failures in to I&C System and Control transmitters Roca
- Letdown Flow b. Loss of power supply to transmitter
- Cooler Discharge Temperature m
ym. e-4 0 m
? 1 Increased letdown fl'cw can result from normally closed manual or control valves such as HP-42 or HP-7 (HP-V5) being opened or failing open. Incressed latdown flow can also occur if a spurious control signal opens HP-7 (HP-VS), HP-9 (1HP-V8), or HP-11 (1HP-79). If such a signal is received by HP-9 (1HP-V8) or HP-11 (1HP-79), the increased letdown flow results from addition of Unit 2 letdown flow. Termination of letdown flow can result from internal component failures and spurious control signals. Normally open manual or control valves can f ail closed obstructing letdown flow, resin beads in purification demineradizer HP-Il can agglomerate and plug resulting in flow blockage, or a main pipe or orifice can plug obstructing flow. Spurious control signal ordering cicsure to HP-1 (HP-V1 A) HP-3 (HP-V2 A) HP-5 (HP-V3), HP-6 (HP-74), or HP-E (HP-77), can also terminate letdown flow. Reactor coolant leaks can occur due to internal valve seal failures, pipe leaks, or a tube rupture in letdown cooler HP-C1 A or HP-C1B. Subsystem failures resulting in bypassing of the purification demineralizers may result in failure to remove RC impurities. If the normally closed valve HP-13 (HP-V6) fails open due to internal fault or spurious control signal. the letdown flow wculd bypass the purification demineralizer. A loss of cooling water to the operating cooler would result in an increase in tenperature of the letdown flow out of the subsystem. High cooler discharge temperature initiates isolation of the discharge upstream of the dominera-lizer, isolating letdown flow. If the temperature interlock failed to close the letdown isolation valve HP-5 (HP-Y3) upon loss of cooling water to the operating cooler, the purification (emineralizer HP-X1 could experience excessive heating causing resin beads to decompose or melt and subsequently block letdown flow. t e
^
I i t 332 RCP seal water naturn Single failures within the real r.sturn subsystem on result in the following effects at the subsystem interfaces: blockage of flow from the RC pump seals; loss of. or reduced flow to the letdown storage tank (LST); and, temperature effects on discharge flow to the LST (high and low). Other effects of sub-system failures include reactor coolant leaks to the RCW or the auxiliary
- building; incorrect process indicators (flow l pressure, temperature signals);
and, lack of system isolation when demanded. Table 10 lists the distinct effects that result from subsyntes failures along with a summary of the precipitating faulta, organized according to the fault source. Different degrees of flow blockage from the RC pump seals can result from subsystem failures. Blockage from a single pump can rasult from valve failures or blockages on one of the return lines from the individual pumps. If a blockage on a seal leak-off line (the normal seal return path) is l detected, the seal bypass lines can be opened. Sinco the bypass lines are i shown to be used only in the event of an existing #1 seal-leak-off blockage (Reference 1), a failure only in a bypass line or header would not result in a change frca the normal operaticg status. (It should be noted that operating I tha. RC pumps with zero flow through the #2 face seals (seal bypass) is not. I common; increased seal wear may be occurring.) i Seal blockage from all four RC pump can result from any blockage in the common seal return header upstream of the LST. Potential failures in this category include: filter plugging; cocler tube blockage; and failed closed reactor building (RB) isolation valves and inline valves such as filter isolation valves, cooler isolation valves, and check valves. In addition to internal faults or inadvertent closure of a valve, loss of instrument air can result in 1.. l the closure of the pneumatic RS isolation valve; a spurious signal from the 'l I&C system can close the other RB isolation valve; and a spurious ES signal can close them both. If detected, blockages associated with the filter or coolers can be bypassed with local action. a
J TABLE 10. FMEA SUDGIARY FOR SUBSY3 TEM 2.0: RCP SEAL VATER RETURN 1 Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes I
- 1. Seal Leak-off Flow From a a. Spurious signal from I&C system closing l Sicgle RC Pump Stopped a motor operated valve or the seal )
leakoff line
- b. Component fault within subsystem such as the motor operated valve or one of the manual isolation valves o:2 a seal
,. leakoff line failing closed (damage, plugging, etc.) or being closed inadvertantly
- 2. Seal Bypass Flow Path a. Component fault within subsystem (a Blocked From a Single check valve or manual valve on a seal RC Pump bypass line failing closed or plugging) 3 Seal Return Bypass Flow a. Loss of control signal from I&C system Path Unavailable to 111 to the motor operated valve on the RC Pumps bypass return header (HP-275)
- b. Loss of electric power to the valve ;
described above, HP-275 '
- c. Component fault within subsystem (internal fault with valve HP-275)
- 4. Seal Return Flow From a. Spurious signal from I&C syste:s or ES
. All RC Pumps Stopped closing one of the two remote isolation valves on the seal return header (HP-20 (HP-V12) and HP-21 (HP-713))
- b. Loss of instrument air fails remote isolation valve closed on seal return header (HP-21 (HP-V13))
- c. Component fault within subsystem (remote isolation valves, manual filter inlet and outlet valves, manual seal return cooler isolation valves or inline check valves failing cloned, plugging, or inadvertantly closed; or filter plugging; or cooler heat exchanger tubes blocked) e
TABLE 10. FMEA SUISt&RI FOR SUBSI3 TEN 2.0: RCP SEAL VATER RETURN (Continued) F.ffects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes
- 5. Higher Temperature a. Component fault within subsystem (seal Discharge to Letdown return cooler internal damage or vapor Storage Tank lock)
- b. Loss of Seal Injection Flow (Subsystem 4.0)
- c. Loss of RCW to seal return cooler
- 6. Lower Temperature a. Loss of flow from HPI pump recirculation Discharge to Letdown line (Subsystem 3 0)
Storage Tank 7 Reduced Seal Return Flow a. Loss of or reduced seal. injection flow to Letdeva Storage Tank (Subsystem 4.0) or HPI pump recirculation (Subsystem 3 0)
- b. Component fault within subsystem (seal return cooler tube rupture, subsystem inline isolation or check valves plugged, or subsystem leaks)
- 8. Loss of Seal Return Flow a. Component fault within subsystem (inline to Letdown Stcrage Tank isolation or check valves downstream cf HPI pump recirculation line failed closed) 9 Reactor Coolant Leak a. Component fault within subsystem (tube to RCW System rupture in seal return cooler)
- 10. Loss of Reactor Coolant a. Component faults within subsystem such
( as Leaks l
- 11. Subsystem Not Isolated a. Loss of control signal from I&C to one '
From Reactor Coolant of the 4 motor operated valves on one . i System When De3anded of the 4 seal laakoff lines !
- b. Loss of electric power to one of the 4 motor operated valves on one of the 4 seal leakoff lines l
l l i I a
l 1
. l l
TABLE 10. FMEA SIRGIARY FOR SUBSISTEN 2.0: RCP 3EAL WATER IRTURE (Continued) Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes
- 11. Subsystem Not Isse J.ed c. Internal damage to one of the 4 actor From Reactor Coolant operated seal leakoff line valves System When Demanded (component fault within the subsystem)
(cont'd)
- 12. Seal Return Flow a. Failure of control signal from I&C l Continues to Letdown system to close isolation valves on Storage Tank When seal return header (HP-20 or HP-21)
Isolation is Demanded
- b. Loss of electric power supply to remote l isolation valves on seal return header l
(HP-20 or HP-21)
- c. Loss of instrument air to remote isolation valve on seal return header (HP-21)
- d. Component fault within subsysten l (remote isolation valves on seal return header failing) 13 Potential Loss of Vent a. Motor operated isolation valve to on RCP Vent Seals Standpipe Fill (HP-276) fails open
, due to internal fault
- b. HP-276 opens on spurious signal froa
; I&C system i 14. Incorrect Process Signal a. Electric power supply to transmitters to I&C System and fails t Control Roon l
- Saal Leak-off Line b. Component fault within subsystem such j Pressures as instrument connection leaks or
- Seal Bypass Line internal transmitter failures Pressures )
, ._ - Seal Leak-off Line Flows 1
i l
-__ v--
Failures which result in reduced flow to the LST include loss of seal injection flow (flow input from the RC Pump Seal Injection subsystem); loss of HPI pump recirculation flow (input from the HPI Pump subsystem); and component faults within the subsystem, such as cooler tube rupture, leaks, or the inline flow blockages that also result in RC pump seal blockage. Failures which result in complete loss of flow to the LST are limited to closure failures (blockages, inadvertent closure, etc.) of inline isolation and check valves downstream of the HPI pump recirculation line inlet (just upstream of the seal return coolers). Temperature variations in the seal return discharge to the LST can result from faults internal and external to the subsystem. High discharge temperature can
- result from internal cooler damage, vapor lock in the cooler, or loss of RCW.
Loss of flow from the HPI pump recirculation line (Subsystem 3 0) to the system and through the cooler results in reduced flow and somewhat lower seal return discharge temperature to the LST. 333 Letdevn Sterare T=Mr. Tnlet Filters. and HPI Pmnns Failures in this subsystem pri.marily affect output flow to RC makeup system and RC pump seal injection. Inlet flow can also be blocked from the seal return subsystem if the check valve to the LST plugs or fails closed. Component faults within the subsystem can also result in reduced H2 concen-tration in the reactor coolant .c.dceup. Table 11 summarizes resulting failure effects for this subsystem. Affects on discharge flow from the subsystem to RC makeup and seal injection include immediate loss of flow, reduced flow, and eventual loss of available makeup. Failures that result, in loss of available makeup in the LST can lead to loss of NPSH to the HPI pumps.(if the LST empties while feeding the HPI pumps) and consequential pump damage or failure. These failures include I blockages upstream of the LST (inline valves failed or inadvertently closed, makeup filter plugged as well as 1; is of instrument air or a spurious I&C signal closing the makeup filter inlet valve), and loss of inlet flow to the subsystem from letdown, seal return, or RC Bleed. If detected, most of the l l l l l j e L
~
1 i I l l TABLE 11. FMEA SWGl&RY FOR SDBST3 TEM 3.0: LETDOWE STORAGE TAIK (LST) M MT FILTERS, AND EPI FUMPS - Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes
- 1. Reduction and Eventual a. Component fault within suDaystem Loss of Available Makeup including various valves upstream of
, in the Letdown Storage the Letdown Storage Tank (LST) (and l Tank the filter) plugging, failing closed, f .~ or being inadvertantly closed
- b. Loss of inst.rument air to the pneumatic
'~ iaolation valve HP-18 (HP-729B) upstream of the LST and filter
- c. Spurious signal from the I&C system closing HP-18
- d. Loss of inlet flow from Subsystem 1.0
, (RC Letdown)
- 2. Incorrect Process Signal (s) a. Tranmaitter failure or instrument to I&C System and Control connection leak (component fault within e Room subsystem)
- Filter Pressure Drop
- LST Level b. Loss of electric power supply to
- LST Pressure tranamitter 3 Reduction in a. H2 supply valve blocked or LST vent Concentration .n Reactor failed closed (component fault within
, Coolant subsystem)
~
- b. Incorrect operator response (LST tank overfilling) to faulted LST tank level indication
- 4. Loss of Flow to RC Makeup a. Component fault within the subsystes l snd'RC Pump Seals such as valve failures'that cause line blockage to or from the operating HPI pump; or failure of the operating pump, either from internal faults or damage from blockage induced deadheading of the pump or loss of pump NPSH
- b. Spurious sigral from the I&C system causing the actor operated valves on
' the operating pump suction or discharge to close, or I&C control signal failure to the operating pump L
6
. . , -- - , ~ . .n,
TABLE 11. FMEA SUNIARY FOR SUB3Y3 TEM 3 0: LETD0lfE STORAGE TAEK (LST) IELET FILTERS, AED BPI PUMP 3 (Continued)
~
Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes
- 4. Loss of Flow to RC Makeup c. Loss of electric power supply to the and RC Pump Seals (cont'd) operating HPI pump
, d. Incorrect operator response to faulted LST tank level indication, resulting in decreasing LST level and eventual HPI pump damage S. Reduced Flow to Either a. HPI pump discharge check valve failure the RC Pump Seals or RC allowing backflow and flow diversion
- Makeup through a nonoperating HPI pump, or system leaks (component fault within subsystem) ,
~
- 6. Loss of Flow to Either a. Inadvertant closure or valve failure the RC Pump Seals or RC of the motor operated isolation valve Makeup on the HPI pump discharge manifold (HP-119 (HP-735A)) (component fault within subsystem)
- b. Spurious signal from the I&C system causing HP-119 to close
- 7. Flow Blocked From Seal a. Inlet check valve to LST failure due
' ' i Return (Subsystem 2.0) to plugging or damage (internal t component failure)
- b. Incorrect operator response (LST tank overfilling) to faulted LST tank level indication 4
blockages can be bypassed from tne control room. However, the blockages that restrict flow into the LST cannot be bype.ssed during steady state operatiom Failures which result in immediate loss of RC makeup and seal injection include: valve failures on the suction or discharge of the operating BPI pump; and pump failures (both due to internal damage, loss of low pressure service water, and loss of power supply). The precipitating valve failures can occur due to internal faults or due to a spurious I&C signal to certain motor-operated valves on the pump manifold. Flow can be lost to only the RC makeup header or only to seal injection as a result of similar valve failures on the HPI punp discharge manifold (internal faults, inadvertent closure,
~ spurious I&C signals). In most cases the system can be realigned with alter-nate valving and/or an alternate HPI pump to restore flow. However, there is potential for loss of NPSB and damage in bringing the alternate pump onstream if sequencing and alignment are not correct.
Some reduction in subsystem discharge flow can result from a failed check valve (loss of backflow prevention) on the discharge of a nonoperating HPI pump. This f ailure mode would allow recirculation back through the non- , operating pump and the operating pump suction, resulting in reduction of actual discharge flow. Deviations in RCS chemistry quality can occur as a result of two internal subsystem faults as well as loss of inlet flows from the Chemical Addition . Systen. Internally the H2 supply valve to the LST tank can fail closed, cutting off the H2 supply; and the vent valve on the LST can fail closed, allowing potential accumulation of non-H2 noncondensible gases in the LST and reduction of H2 mass transfer to the reactor coolant. Incorrect level indication in the LST due to tracamitter failure, connection leaks, or loss of power to the transmitter, could lead an operator to take faulty remedial action This could result in overfilling the LST, which could reduce or stop H2 addition, or allowing the LST level to drop, which could result in loss of NPSH to the HPI pumps and ultimate loss of subsystem dis-
. l e
l l 1 l charge flow to makeup and seal injection as discussed above. , 3.3 4 3C > = Seal Tniection l The major effect of single failures within the seal injection subsystem is l l loss of or reduced seal flow to the RC pumps. Othea effects include increased 1 seal injection flow to a single pump and incorrect process signals (pressure 1 and flow) transmitted to the I&C system and the control room. Table 12 summarizes resulting failure effects for this subsystem organized according to the source of the failure. Sabsystem failures can result in loss of seal injection flow to all four RC
' pumps, loss of flow to only a single pump, increased flow to a single pump, and reduced flow to all four pumps. Loss of seal flow to all four punps can result from blockages in the inlet header (inline valves failed or inadver-tantly closed, filters plugged, or orifice plugged) or loss of inlet flow to the system from the HPI pumps. Inline blockage from f ail.ure of the header flow control valve failing closed can result from an I&L signal failure, in addition to an internal fault. If detected, blockages Lssociated with the filter path or the control valve can be bypassed, but no bypass exists in the
' event of failure of the inlet block valve. Reduced flow to all four pumps can result from partial failures of inline components, sys:;em leaks, and I&C-fault-induced failures of the header flow control valve. i Component faults in one cf the four individual injection lines can result in ', loss of seal injection to a single RC pump. Each line has a throttle VSlve, and a flow measuring nozzle. and check valves that could potentially fail I closed or plug. If one of the throttle valves fails open, increased flow to a single RC pump can result. 335 Henctor' coolant Makeue Single failures in the RC makeup subsystem can impact normal makeup flow to the cold legs, cooling flow to the cold leg inlet nozzles and pressurizer spray lines, and inlet flow rate from the letdown storage tack in Subsyster 3 0 Table 13 aummarizes the failure effects for this subsystem organized 6 m s
l . l TARLE 12. FMEA 3DIglARY FOR SUBSYSTEN 4.0: RC PUMP SEAL IEJECTION Effects at Subeystem Interface P ecipitating Faults / Failure Modes
- 1. Seal Injection Flow to a. Component faults within subsystem RC Pumps Stopped (.aangal valves, or control valve on inlet header failing closed, plugging, i
or inadvertantly closed, filter or orifice plugging)
- b. Loss of instrument air potentially failing header flow control valve closed
- c. Loss of control signal from 1FT-75
) potentially failing header control j valve closed
, d. Loss of electric power supply potentially failing header control-valve closed Loss of flow from HPI pumps e.
(Subsystem 3 0)
- 2. Seal Injection Flow to a. Component faults within subsystem a Single RC Pamp Stopped (manual throttle 'talves, check valves, and isolation valves in individual RC injection lines failing closed, plugging, or inadvertantly closed) 3 Seal Injection Flow to a. Component faults within subsystem a Single RC Pump Higher (manual throttle valve (s) on individual Than Setpoint RC injection lines fail open or are inadvertantly opened)
- 4. Reduced Seal Injection a. Component faults within subsystem as in Flow to RC Pumps 1.a. above bat limited to partial closures and plugging. Also system leaks downstream of the control valve
- b. Loss of electric power supply to seal injection flow control 3er A
- c. I&C signal failure to header flow I control valve J
L a
= ~ _
r__-... ,_ _ , _- , _. _ .._. . - . - . . , . _ . . . . - ,_ .
l l l TABLE 12, FMEA 3DIGl&RY FOR SUBSISTEN 4.0. I RC PUllP SEAL IEJECTI(M (Continued) Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes l I S. Incorrect Process Signal a. Component faults within subsystem such to I&C System and Control as instrument connection leaks and ) Room internal transmitter failures 1
- Filter Drop Pressure
- Injection Header Flow b. Loss of electric power supply to
- Injection Line Flows transmitter e
O [ V
=
W b d l a l
. l
,. . . . , _ . ---. ~ .- -
TAhLE 13 PMEA SmetARY FOR SUBSISTEN 5.0: REACTOR COOLANT (RC) MAKEUP Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes ,
- 1. Loss of Makeup Flow to a. Component fault within subsystem Reactor (subsystem inlet header block valve failed closed)
- b. Loss of flow input from HPI pumps (Subsystem 3 0)
- 2. Loss of Bypass Flow to a. Component fault within subsystem One or Two Reactor Cold (inline manual valve or throttle valve Leg Inlet Nozzles on one of the two minimum flow loops fails closed from plugging or damage)
- b. Loss of flow input from HPI pumps (Subsystem 3 0) 3 Loss of Bypass Flow to a. Component fault within subsystem Pressurizer Spray Line (manual valves upstream of Pressurizer Spray Line tee fail closed from plugging or damage)
- b. Loss of flow input from HPI pumps (Subsystem 3 0)
- 4. Reduced Makeup Flow to a. Component fault within subsystem Reactor (flow control valve (HP-120) or manual isolation valves on main flow control loop fail closed)
- b. Instrument air system failure causes the flow control valve on the reain flow control loop (HP-120) to fail closed
- c. Control signal fault from the I&C system causes HP-120 to close down
- d. Reduced flow input from HPI pumps (Subsystem 3 0)
- 5. Temporary Decreased Flow a. Component fault within subsystem to Pressurizer Spray Line (control valve (HP-120) in normal flow path, or ES valve (HP-26) fail open, diverting flow from spray line) l l
I i
TABLE 13 FMEA SUN 1ARY FOR SUBSYSTEM 5.0:
- REACTOR C0(L4WT (RC) MAKEUP (Cottinued)
Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating "2ults/ Failure Modes
- 5. Temporary Decreased Flow b. Instrument air system failure causes to Pressurizer Spray Line the normal path flow control valve (cont'd) (HP-120) to fail open
- c. Control signal fault from I&C causes HP-120 of ES valva (HP-26) to open up 6.
~
Excess Makeup Flow to RCS, a. Component fault within subsystes Drop in Letdown Storage (motor operated valve (HP-26) on HPI Tank Level, Potential emergency flow path fails open or is Loss of HPI Pump NPSH, inadvertantly opened; or the flow Increased Pressurizer control valve (HP-120) on the makeup Level flow path fails open)
- b. Instrument air system failure causes the flow control valve (HP-120) on the makeup flow path to fail open e
- c. I&C system fault causes HP-120 to open spuriously
- d. Spurious signal from the I&C system or ES causes the motor operated valve (HP-26) on the HPI emergency flow path to open 7 Excess Flow to One of a. Component fault within subsystem Two Reactor Cold Leg Inlet (aanual throttle valve 'n one of two Nozzles, and Potential bypass flow loops fails open)
Drop in Letdown Storage
, Tank Level
- 8. Excess Flow to Pressurizer a. Component fault within subsystem Spray Line (manual throttle valve on minimum flow loop upstream of pressurizer spray
. line fails ope.;)
9 Flow Imbalance Between a. Component fault within subsystem the Two Reactor Cold Legs (orifice or check valve on one of two (Most Flow to One and reactor inlets plugged or failed Little to the Other) closed) l i
~
_ _ _ . - _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-- _ _--. . - , , . _ . . r -
. m 3 .e,
TABLE 13 FMEA SUMARY FOR SUBSISTEN 5.0: REACTOR COOLANT (EC) MAKIUP (Coatinued) Effects at Subsystem Interface
~
Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes
- 10. Incorrect Process a. Component fault within subsystem Signal (s) to I&C System (transmitter failure or instrument {
and Control Room connection leak) j
- Makeup Header Flow
- Bypass Line Flows b. Loss of electric power supply to transmitter O
J'* 4 l l l e L e 6 O
l P according to the source of the failure. ; Failure effects on the normal makeup flow to the cold leg include: loss of flow, reduction in flow, increased flow, and flow imbalance between the two cold leg inlets. Loss of input flow from the HPI pumps (Subsystem 3 0) and failure of the block valve on the inlet header (plugging, damage, inadvertant closure, etc.) will result in total loss of makeup flow. In addition, single downstream bicckages in the main flow path can stop normal makeup tiow, but some flow will continue to the RCS via the minimum flow bypass loop to the I cold leg inlet nozzles and the pressurizer spray line. These blockages could . - potentially msult from failures associated with tts flow control valve, block j iralves, and inline check valve. Failures in the instrument air system or I&C system. in addition to internal damage, could fault the flow control valve. However, both a remote ope ated and local bypass around the flow control valve are available to resume flow. increced flow tnrough the normal makeup path can result from either the flow control valve or the normally closed motor operated ES valve failing open. In addition to internal faults, the control valve can fail open due to an instru-ment air system fault and a conwol signal fault, and the ES valve can open on a spurious ES or I&C signal. (' Failures which 2 sault in flow imbalance between the two reactor cold legs are limited to component faults within the subsystem. These include i blockages associated with the check valve or flow orifice on one of the cold
- leg inlets.
I Failure effects on the bypass flow paths to the cold leg inlet nozzles and the 4 pressurizer spray line include loss of flow and excess flow to one of the inlet nozzles. Loss of flow to both nozzles and the spray lice can result from failure of the inlet block valve to the minimum flow bypass loop and the j I inlet block valve to the subsystem. Loss of flow to one nozzle can result-from failure of either the throttle valve or the block valve on either cooling ! ficw line. Loss of flow to the pressurizer spray line which branches off one e t I e i
.- ..,,,m . . , . , .,m.-,,~ v e. m ,e-#.
1 l of the cooling flow lines can likewise result from line blockages upstream of the spray line inlet. Excess flow to one nozzle and possibly the spray line can result from the throttle valve on one of the lines failing open. Like-wise, a temporary reduction in flow in these lines can result from open-valve-failures in the normal makeup flow path, diverting flev away ft'on the minimum flow bypass loop. Instrument air system and I&C system faults, in addition to internal faults, could produce this effect through inadvertant opening of the flow control valve or the ES valve. Excass flow rate through the subsystem via failed open valves could also potentially result in drop in the letdown storage tank level and possible loss of NPSH to the HPI pumps (Subsystem 3 0) and increased level in the pressurizer. 3 3.6 y Bleed. Beren Recoyen. and ch-ical Addition The major effect of failures in this subsystem is loss of demineralized water return to the reactor coolant system upstream of the makeup filters. Other effects include loss of RC bleed holdup and transfer capability, Ipss of chemical addition capabilities including bcric acid addition, loss of boron recovery capability, and loss of deboration capability. These effects are summarized in Table 14 and discussed below. Failures which result in loss of demineralized water return to the reactor coolant system include electric power supply failure to the transfer pump, transfer pump failure, and failures in any one of several manual isolation or control valves. Failures in control valves HP-15 and HP-16, either from centrol signal failures or internal valve failures, can also result in loss of return flow. Since this system is operated on demand only, failure to supply the holdup tank with demimeralized water or allowing the tank to remain empty can result in no demineralized water available when required. However, the valve configuration would allow makeup from the bleed holdup tank (although it - would not have been through the boron recovery cycle) or makeup from the Unit 2 demineralized water or bleed holdup tanks. , \ L
1 1 TABLE 14. FMEA SUB9tARY FOR mmttvMTEM 6.0: PC BLEED, BORON RECOVERY, AED CBENICAL ADDITION I Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes 6.1 Chemical Addition:
- 1. No N 2H 4 Available to a. N2 blanket systeg fails isolation Makeup Filters
- b. Manual control.1 solation valves fail closed
- c. Check valves fail to prevent backflow
- d. Hydrazine drum empties and not replaced.
Leaks frce. the tank will eventually lead to the same effect
- 1. Alternate Flow Path a. Electric power supply to hydrazine pump Through Lithium fails
- Hydroxide Pump Required
- b. Hydrazine pump fails
- c. Manual isolation valves fail closed r
3 No LiOH Available a. Domineralized water supply to mix tank to Makeup Filters fails
- b. Lithium hydroxide tank empties and not refilled. Leaks from the tank will eventually lead to same effect
- c. Manual isolation valves fail closed
- 4. Decreased L10H Avail- a. Sampling, waste lines downstream of tank i able to Makeup Filters fail open
- 5. Incorrect LiCH Concen- e. Manual isolation valve DW-121 fails open tration Available to and dilutas LiOH in tank; fails closed Makeup Filters and results in concentrated LiOH in tank.
- 6. Alternate Flow Path a. Electric power supply to lithium Ihrough Hydrazine Pump bydroxide pump fails Required
- b. Lithium hydroxide pump fails
- c. Manual isolation valves fail closed 1
i w - - - n - a ,.,p. -- - , -
)
l TABLE 14. FMEA SUMARY FOR SUBSISTEM 6.0: , , BC BLEED, B0805 RECOVERY, AND CHEMICAL ADDITION ) (Continued) , l Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes 7 No Caustic Available to a. Demineralized water supply to mix tank LPI Pumps, RC Bleed fails Evaporator Feed Tank, Deborating Demineralizers b. Manual isolation valves fail closed
- c. Causic mix tank emptics and not refilled. Leaks from the tank will eventually lead to same effect
- d. Electric power supply to caustic pump fails
- e. Caustic pump fails
- 8. Decreased Caustic Avail- a. Sampling, waste lines downstream of tank able to LPI Pumps, RC fail open Bleed Evaporator Feed Tank, Deborating Domineralizers
- 9. Incorrect Caustic Concen- a. Manual isolation valve DW-120 tails
, tration Available to LPI open and dilutes ,austic in tank; fails Pumps, RC Bleed Evaporator closed and results in concentrated Feed Tank, Deborating caustic in tank Demineralizers 6.2 Boric Acid Addition:
- 1. No Boric Acid Available a. Flows from boron recovery and boric acid to Makeup Filters. BWST mix tank fail and concentrated boric Filters, BWST acid storage tank empties and not refilled. Leaks from tank will eventually lead to same effect.
- b. Manual isolation valves and manual control valve CS-62 fail closed
- c. Electric power supply to concentrated boric r.cid transfer pump fails l
- d. Concentrated boric acid transfer pump fails i
I m
TABLE 14. FMEA SUIGIARI FOR SUBSISTEN 6.0: RC BLEED, BORON RECOVERI, AED CBENICAL ADDITION (Continued) l 1 Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes
- 1. No Eoric Acid Avsilable e. Electric power supply to trace heating to Makeap Filters. BWST or trace heating fails leading to Filters, BWST (cont'd) plugged lines
- 2. No Boric Acid Flow Avail- a. Electric power supply to HP boric acid able to Core Flood Tank pump fails
- b. HP boric acid pump fails
- c. Manual isolation valves fail closed
~
3 Decreased Boric Acid a. Drain, sample lines downstream of Flow Available to storage tank fail open Makeup Filters, BWST
- 4. Boron Recovery or Adequate a. Demineralized water supply to boric acid Concentrated Boric Acid mix tank fails Storage Tank Inventory Required as Beric Acid b. Manual isolation valves fail closed Source (Internal Sub-system Effect Only) c. Manual isolation valve DW-118 fails open and dilutes boric acid in mix tank; fails closed and results in concentrated boric acid in mix tank
- d. . Electric power supply to mix tank heater or mix tank heater fails leading to plugged lines
- e. Mix tank empties and not refilled.
Leaks from tank will eventually lead to same effect
- 5. Incorrect Process Para- a. Electric power supplies to transmitters metsrs to I&C System and fail Control Room
- Boric Acid Mix Tank b. Transmitter signal connection leaks Level, Temperature
- LP Boric Acid Pump c. Transmitters fail Discharge Pressure
- Concentrated Boric Acid Storage Tank Level i 1
m
l 1 I i TABLE 14. FMEA SUIStARY FOR SUBSYSTEM 6.0:
'RC SLEED, BORON RECOVERI, AND CEEMICAL ADDITION (Continued) .
i Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes 6.3 RC Bleed Holdup Tanks and Transfer Pumps:
- 1. No Domineralized Water a. Manual isolation and control valves fail to Makeup Filters closed
- b. Domineralized water supply to domineralized water holdup tank fails
- c. N2 blanket to domineralized water holdup tank fails resulting in tank unavail-ability
- d. Domineralized water holdup tank empties and not refilled. Leaks frcat tank will eventually lead to same effect
- e. Electric p wer supply to bleed transfer pump fails
- f. RC bleed transfer pump fails
- g. Check valves fail to prevent backflw
]
- h. Control valves HP-15 or HP-16 fail closed (control signal, instrument air supply, electric pwer supply, valve failure)
- i. Control valves HP-15 or HP-16 fail open allowing backflw from letdown line J. Electric power supply to trace heating or trace heating fails leading to plugged lines
- 1. No Demineralized Water k. Flow orifices plug to Makeup Filters (cont'd)
- 2. Decreased Domineralized a. Waste, drain, or sample lines downsteam ;
Water to Makeup Filters of holdup tank fail open 3 Increased Demineralized a. Control valves HP-15 and HP-16 fail Water to Makeup Filters open (control signal fails to close valve or spurious signal to open valve) l __ , .- ..,---,,m. ,e.__ - ,, , - , . _ _ __mm.,,.. %y ,, n.---, a w, ,,, - v. r,
TABLE 14. FMEA SDIB(ARY FOR SUBSYSTEN 6.0: BC BLEED, BOR05 RECUTERY, AED CHEMICAL ADDITION - (Continued) Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes
- 4. Alternate Flow Path a. RC bleed flow free letdewn fails Through Unit 2 Bleed Holdup Tank Required b. Manual isolation and control valves fail closed
- c. N2 blanket to bleed holdup tank fails l resulting in tank unavailability
- d. RC bleed holdup tank empties and not refilled. Leaks from tank will eventually lead to same effect
- e. Electric power supply to trace heatirg or trace heating fails leading to c-plugged lines .
- f. Waste, drain, sample li.'es downstream of holdup tank fail open
- g. Electric power supply to bleed transfer pump fails
- h. RC bleed transfer pump fails
- 1. Flow orifice plugs J. Check valves fail to prevent backflow
- 5. Incorrect Process a. Electric power supply to transmitters Parameters to I&C System fail and Control Room
- RC Bleed Holdup Tank b. Transmitter connection leaks Level J - RC Bleed Flow c. Transmitter fails
- Demineralized Water Holdup Tank Level
-- - Domineralized Wcter Flow ,
L s
=
-e*
TABLE 14. FMEA SulttARI FOR SUBSISTEN 6.0: EC BLEED, BORGE RECOTERY, AED CHEMICAL ADDITION (Continued) ! Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes 6.4 Boron Recovery:
- 1. Alternate Flow Path a. Manual isolation valves fail closed Through Second E7aporator Demineralizer Required b. Domineralizer resin fill fails (Internal Subsysten Effect Only) c. Demineralizer tank or tank vents leak
- 2. RC Bleed Evaporator Feed a. Electric power supply to trace heating Tank Required to be Full or trace heating fails leading to at Beginning of Boron plugged lines Recovery Cycle (Internal Subsystem Effect only) b. RC bleed flow from holdup tank fails
- c. Evaporator distillate, distillate cooler flows fail .
- d. Manual isolation valves fail 3 No Temperature Control a. Cooling water supply to distillate of Distillate Returned cooler fails to Evaporator Feed Tank, Condensate Test Tank t. Loss or degraded heat transfer capability in disti]
(Demineralized Water)
- 4. No or Decreased a. Cooler tubes blocked or tube rupture Distillate Flow to leading to decreased flow or coolant Condensate Test Tanks release to distillate (Demineralized Water)
- b. Distillate cooler leaks
- c. Evaporator distillate flow fails; see effects 5 and 6
- 5. Boron Recovery Stops; a. Evaporator concentrate flow returned to Concentrated Boric Acid feed tank or evaporator Storage Tanks Required to be Full (Internal b. Evaporator feed tank empties and not Subsystem Effect Only) refilled. Leaks frcza tank, including ve=" and relief valves failed open, will eu asily lead to same effect
- c. Manual isolation valves fail closed L
e
t TABLE 14. FHEA mnesanY FOR SUBSY3TBt 6.0: BC BLEED, BORGE RECOVERY, AED CIIEMICAL ADDITION (Continued)
- Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes
- 5. Boron Recovery Stops; d. Electric power supply to evaporator feed Concentrated Boric Acid pump or concentrate pump fails Storage Tanks Required to be Full (Internal e. Evaporator feed pump or concentrate Subsystem Effrat Only) pump fails
- f. Control valves CT-24 or CT-40 fail to operate (instrument air, control signal valve failure)
- g. Waste, drain, sample lines downstream of feed tank or evaporator fail open
- h. Steam supply to evaporator fails
- 1. Loss of heat transfer capability in evaporator
- j. Evaporator empties and .not refilled.
Leaks from evaporator will eventually lead to same effect
- k. Electric power supply to trace heating, or evaporator heating fails leading to
- plugged lines
- 6. Boron Recovery Rate a. Electric power supply to trace heating, Decreases; Concentrated trace heating, or evaporator heating Boric Acid Storage Tank fails leading to plugged lines Required to be Full (Internal Subsystem b. Evaporator tubes blocked or tube rupture Effect only) leading to decreased flow or steam release to vapor space
- c. Concentrate cooler leaks 7 No Temperature Control a. Cooling water supply to concentrate of Concentrate Returned cooler fails to Boric Acid Storage j
Tanks (Internal Sub- b. Loss or degraded heat transfer system Effect Only) capability in concentrate cooler
- c. Temperature transmitter control signal to cooling water control valve fails i
{ i l TABLE 14. PMEA SulttARY FOR SUBSISTilM 6.0: SC BLEED, BORON RECOFERY, AED CREKICAL ADDITION i (Continued) {l l Effects at Subsystem Interface Precipitating Faults / Failure Modes l l 6.5 Deborating Demineralizer: !
- 1. No RC Heturn to Makeup a. RC bleed flow from 3-way valve fails Filters
- b. Manual isolation valves fail closed
- c. Control valve HP-16 fails closed (instrument air, control signal. valve failure)
- d. Check valve fails to prevent backflow
- 2. Deboration Stops; Alter- a. Resin in domineralizer naturates or was nate Flow Path Through not regenerated as required due to
.- Second Demiceralizer failure to provide caustic.
Required 3 No RC Return to Makeup a. Manual isolation, control valves fail Filters; Altercate Flew closed Path Through Second i Domineralizer Required b. Tank empties. Leaks from tank; l including vent and relief valves failed l I open, will eventually lead to same effect. l
- c. Electric pcwer supply to trace heating, trace heating fails leading to plugged lines f
- 4. Decreased Return Flow a. Waste, drain, sample lines fail open to Makeup Filters; Alter-nate Flow Path Through b. Dominera11zer tank leaks Second Demineralizer Required l'
e
- . - _ . - _ - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _Q
l Loss of bleed holdup and transfer capability can result form valve failures, plugs in lines due to loss of trace heating, and unavailability of the holdup tank. However, valve configuration would allow bleed flow to the domineral-ized water holdup tank or the Unit 2 bleed or domineralized water holdup t* *a . Electric power supply failure or transfer pump failure can result in loss of flow to boron recovery which alto leads unavailability of the holdup tank for subsequent bleed and makeup eycles. . Addition of hydrazine and lithium hydroxide to the reactor coolant is also a ! pe r-dem and-operatio n. Failure to supply either chemical can result from
- manual isolation, control, or check valve failures; or allowing either tank to I 're.nain empty. Yalve configuration woule allow pumping either chemical to its destination through the other chemical pump; however, if both chemicals are required simultaneously, failure of either pump results in unavailability of that chemical.
Failure to provide caustic to the LPI pumps, RC bleed evaporator, and deborating domineralizers can result from isolation valve failures, clectric power supply and pump failures, or allowing the mix tank to remain empty. No remedial action within the subsystem is available to compensate for loss of caustic either within the subsystem or at the interfaces. Loss of concentrated boric acid to the makeup filters and the BWST can result i from allowing the concentrated boric acid storage tank to empty, various manual isolation or control valve failures, electric power supply or transfer pump failures, or plugs in lines due to trace heating failures. Two sources of concentrated boric acid are available: a boric acid mix tank and the concentrate from boron recovery. In the event of failure of one source, the other would be available to supply boric acid requirements. The valve configuration would also allow boric acid addition from the Unit 2 concen-trated boric acid storage tank. , Failures in the boron recovery operation result in no concentrate flow to the concentrated boric acid storage tank. Component failures include various
. , , , .- .n - - , -
a -
.~.n , -, , - , ,
pumps and manual valve:2, either of two control valves, the evaporator, feed storage tank, and trace heating. Support system failures such as steam supply and electric power can also result in boron recovery failure. Racirculation paths can be established so that concentrated boric acid is returned either to the evaporator or the evaporator feed tank rather than the storag6 tank. Failure of the deboration capability in the on-line deborating domineralizer results from various manual is'lation'and o control valve failures, failure of caustic flow for regenerating the resin, and plugs in lines due to trace heating failures. These failures result in the requirement that a second demineralizer is available. Flow can also be diverted to the bleed holdup tank with makeup provided from the demineralized water holdup tank.
~
f e r i
. k i
e !I \ J 1 A .. g 9
. - . . - - e . - - , - .-
l 1 1 4.0 SUI 9tARI AND COBCLUSIDES (To be included in the next draft.) ame 5 9 Y 4 s 9 9 O e 4
5.0 REFERENCES
i (
- 1. 1982 2erision Oconee Nuclear Station, Final Safety Analysis Reports, Revision 18.
- 2. Oconee Nuclear Station, Final Safety Analysis Reports, Revision 18.
3 Plant Electrical Distribution Systen Drawings 0701, 0702, 0703, 0704, and 0705
- 4. ICS Instruction Manual f
i 4 i a 4 4 9 L
l . - , APPENDII A i-FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SUBSISTEM 1.0 LEIDOWN COOLERS TO THREE-WAY VALVE I t i e O h 4
- 2. 4 r r e e s e v v e 32 ee n .ia o dl l l i 99 et it p no e e r
- t s tl e ao e v v t ee t y ee eerd ee n C en s c rr A s tl ru EI s A
l o en e eu u I t e ef eo Te T ri rt le iigg tS e df ie f tB - et sel ot tF l n hdsn PLtP R CA sel er di g oe ee ee re ow tB aA eh et uelh ol ew nePen esRe se of e n so t o - SS ei h p p ot sp FI BW l o l e T O O C B c R n e , , , .de g n n e e dr n dr ) I cn l l ee w eard de ee w en i w a w o C D ) ) ct na o l4 nt uoeef e s sI cne ct na o l4 nt ue ed t e es I. Pine ne e m r ee y0 y0 aw f1it) e net ew f1it) r - Nret D ost vd al al t d - t e4l ehe t d t a8 al a eh s t eel n wf mf rgi nP nl 2 e .it p rgi nPnt 2 pelt pt y e c n werl aav 3P 3F onul pill o wHeeV eo t r eI e ,o enut wNecV e pill o ee - sy) ee cm ,o n e eud ) U N slfide tFl pew slfld e lP l 3t eW
}
e l meyO o( to( eoon wt vt N P s rC eo ot vl r t e sc f ouwV eaI t 4 t eowel el e ell s()NeuC 3 oa ecvel aie ell e( ee R elT. o s r. C rwPpht ra p C e ya etd . - w 1 d w de or vut3Vt spore t er po f e sf v eJP o eo I. ehfd ul r - - caut uhfdul vwt3f nH r - e( oA ut R b r ue ol r d e o( N lPt* fNefNaA Pt ott ey) oPF ehr easa0sHNt c ott ey) oPde tI r _ St a t t ers
,t 4
e eel seiCs nI sl rswl ee fl e ( o4 eeot el rlb e k cA raw 1 Cs onpr3 easa0sNe ee rr 9i eeoP ePb e 5 d C eeu k e tl a l eew1h vno c. vvawv m ol rol rrl eme enpr3 iv5pCell t vw WoNoll t e8 olPe d eed eep Ftl - L l ?l emc Ftl os o t l a m4hfNl h eaoNnaPoP Cip heeoNnopurlf Ci e o t vtt st e e f atttt( uvNtDaDw f ettSt( ev(beeI eB w
) t S L e f L I I l f f
- e r r tt P t l e e o- tl o-R a e l l w nr w nP
! ( i t o o o .nb o ,nN t
d e o o lA a lae I e r C c fI ce fl ee s C v C v P o w n a nal n al N l o ed dt wPl a wPl e m l t e t e oNLvn oBCvn B e f Lt Lt d - e d - e t c s t rPf p t rPfp t s n ou ou eeNio eeWio t L y w t r t r ll ll A s o T t t ordo ords b u d ws ws doeet doeei f t ob ob eClt eClt A S + l o l a t oa) t oe)
'tk f f anolA cnol A W -
a e A a eeCol ueCol i d e nI nl rt of rt of 3 h el wC wC tLof - t e o- o- e r tLat - O i vC dP dP bot ep d s d P T W dR tN t R otLb( bot eR e e e atLb( g R L L g e e n g e m l o _ a a r e C _ t n w e a o Ef r t P a D S e e M cd r l T ae f v e o i r R. 8 rl t r t e eo n t o d t v e
- n o
- o r o nn V C l
B M M II E T S e r t e
- 3 8
l l o n n f 5 e t e e o 3 d h o ho P t et e wt yr e l ul s wttl t e 0 l a l u du e eeu eeiw 1 l oa a l oua eul o i etf df e edf odip t n f e l b e e ros a el ol oa t y edt ee sed elj ee t o d edn r l n er n u orn orl r ti r ti et P N dne eet et
+ ot e qt ue uvc npn t n r l en leqnl ee ~ eoi tI o t rI l eue p
r e p e a F S P F 1 3 2 3 4 e
, l s d b e )
e 9uv O eos2ol 2 N s nee 3Do3 ( r ol v- v -) e eClPg P9 3 t l n eNnrN5 - n o e yv i e 3 P) e o ll edt s - n e C lll sut aP eae N1: l e W et p n cmwhelh t - e w srnceocd lP e o ioaul sun aR C d MNHS(ISa t( t e L 4 2 9 1 1 9 1 1 F F
e 2 e d n nes c 4 32 o) n e we ,3t
- et a i r oed 99 t o l5 e2 e t r 4 1 s eo ebeeC tt t tl -
.e t p es ,7- t e Ca a et eC? p rr A e 4) a e - lrwe t lil _
uu e 2)F l t Plt or eg t BN c) e Wi gt . efepe lS e Pi 8t T Pt( er tOaetrig s
! li FF t n -
Rf tl e euIlla e ei di eP 4 ( ep r-_ t CllCt wntl eR eF - o-_ ed oe - seeei eh sB sNP ee t ; l nPcvP el elt eA sS mt o( o(N nr s; oaWeeNbfbou PP IW i l C l o o s o C N p I f o. a , gan n gns n r r en l u nd w a w o new n w do de d t o y d o it o it o o e e i ytifo) i r lLd v de lLd w d e ne ne ul et ov0 u p o t o t v o t o t v er er lb me ooe etlllt yd
, o el coe lyd el eun eun fiol n39
- 1 l f
. .l v etll ,l a rt w rt w st oo e ,l b e lb e t . v eao eao nsuet o P-m td m n
e t s oep ws iil f )td
- e. oyenetwe ,ill f ai) nrd pe
- o. oytiet nrd iet r
e poatttB c e ( e r se odo niCeoi,nwf sni ai- di iCeoirp snt pe e nwnw d r y e sf ev top u rp gnl 3F e--- v oP u gnt3F nwTnml
, o- - i e tdm io nel tdn t eioie4 er l ugfrf l
ml8 t e er e b r nrNt enol N-; rNt enet l u
. s ue op asiieo( - p Nt esit eo(l nmtl nui eet eo t n e P t
) st c rratt nt r;slt nt d aint eN da d a reeel ei 4 re ;et eg uwaiuwnt ert w v er e tl eel prul mw8 eel ;rsl ew1 edtl edtl 4 soimsaia sel o ,oe se sp
. t u s A st omcsero - st o-spud .dv n t eeoeeeoelP eao: eeseiP eeorc - rt nort no eeo eoe emst e. teel reee ee ro i e l vCtS rttfNl wCtl r i t f N yl et yl ct et rl1l v t e n a a a e et e n r U W M o f M l l c s ( t e
) e w w 3 O e s o I o l d
st e l lS C CI n d nn
- o f H. fI - - o f5e oi n-C P 4 P P ot m s n n- N R hd P s hdd wP wP seneMe
( e e oN oH r r isir l igee st e t d t r d t r e e nWn egsv ued no m nNnn t s ee l o l o w w ee P
- y leel ll o o d o .snol il o i o r d o
.si d n N
s o o c C t eet cvd t eene b d o d o errl nl srrI o u eC eC ad nd s S t ee l uuuenao I uu r e L n cn ae tcn uo d e tt tt tt sl e daaelt)t r daanl ttd e i rt rt Ln e Ln errret3n errao t h tL tL ts fv e eee spp3el - c me9 o nee r e epp3t r t i bo s b o ee oe r sme t oF emm n a W- W ot ot ep r ep eeoTueNe cttTat(l reeTo n n e e n cttTc n U u W S i I 3 o t l r s a e e n w e ig o t P n e S t g o ed l c nn m C ee o i r : i re f v r et m rl - t _l
. ot s u e eo t c oay c d t v
- w a - e ,C W S -
e v o aa C l e C
- M ll a
L e r r y s u e t t u n n f t i eoo t s e o a - r P tt d e eo w tt l 3 n htt ht yr stg y l eul e w eu l w eiw t e s eea s a - ua p nua nul o i s bpl N i df o sl s t edf p edip p b l o neu a n e nl y odl odee o i o e ea pn l ea eli c ne rf
- e. t d e orn orl r o o ore v ti r ti et f of o ist t P M o ue uvc owo tn et eqee l n l
r leqt en l enl el cae uru l i u l ri le roe sf dtd e p a o e P S F P L R 1 2 3 4 t 2 n
) w C o N d
- ( t4 el 2 LC) t - t gPi
- n P) aNC e Nt -
n t o p eTi v - t rP eeN m lF rl o eN eor poo C V( oC( 3 4 1 8 1 1 P
l l l
- v. .. -
v 8 c em 5 89 [= ,c -
- - :r l:u n*- 22n- e, _,:4.-a .
it . : at :1. *:
._g{I 8:s!:~sl .. 7;
- t=.y:a_, ,
- m u..
kl.Ill21 g_ 3 __. l_.:: s .
-a q :1
,l e. s s2i_t,
.. .J2:
o _ . _a _s u 3 u _a a. _s . i _a . g . r i .e . 8
- ; a 2 : E:s. g L::E Eag!..E
. g - I.11:=! .s 25: e -
8 : . rs * . .:.1 aga 8 . r
- y 1.:- g z r= r: 2g 2. t.r=j}g g s n if,s
** g'I'.
- 5888" - 858 8 5 -*555
- i. ==
'.8'g 2 :.,
n :le ga.E 8 I:** 28*I 2-. n . _1 :s * : s
- . . '5 .:eg }a .::5 1: - 8 8,. E u
' 3_3
- - : s .:
- As. a :: 3
,=, _=a2_;l2.v i
iggI::_r_g _ s=
- g==.
8: s :s..
+ -
4:: -iris e n 8,1: . is s_: sees - :- :s 8 1:8 1s 35 :: -=
- :it=.mes v.
t g33 as-
- -t
- i. : -
- = :
3 - =. :. . a. 8
- g .n . g s j _6 .:. . . .1. ,,. s _ ! s s :.s=.gg:g.5.es 1:-v- .!.
. t u. g . t. y .s =. .m .t.
~
d =
~
- y v E I :: :: k a j 3 I
. _a :
_a
- I
- 2 : ': _I
.j ': .j ':
. T : d. i .1- 5 k : gs
. A sc sc g
_! j i
. 2 6
T-s: - s .. ud g $ j5 1 [t* bt I$ A h5 a 3 & R Ie 5 I
. sr vr 8 21 : : .i :: 3 s 2 . :si 3 ! u.a L 8 s. nL gu I g i 31 C o l l ]:.
u
- :: : $E:-
4 4: s z a z
- 1. .
., 3 2
I : -
.1_:
- e > I s I
- I
- h5
. k h b5
. ; a a t
s: avs 1: sv: 8 rtG- "ts 4-O:_gg'
- ia = :' ,
. i _g = :-
u l Iu: _.I 28 nu s
. .a,.
e $ $ " e s n.
3 , seteronee Droutage: F3et Figure 9 3-2
' F3&B Figure 9-2A t.9 SUBSISTWI 1.BTDnue C00LRa3 TO 3-Wat TALTE BF-8% ( AP-fle) (Continued) reteettet Fellure Itodo lamediate Effeets Inter face At Suberstes Benedfel Action Ceeponent stode Issolved Withle Subsystee Int er f ace Withis Smeegetes I.t.6 Telee NF-3 (NO) 4. Falle to elese when Electria Feuer Frevente toolation of If NP-CI A hem espertenced Bone
. (NP-V2A) reestred dee to MS-Cla e tube rupture, DP-l (cont'd) unevellebility of (RF-fl A) hee been elooed.
. power en bus 18I329 and RF-CIB la to be used, then en DC leek to the CC3 afetse will secur. If Automette elosere ,
NP-CI A hee esportenced e el Mr.$ less of eceting water and (RP-T))! NF-Cla . ht-t (HP-fla) eennot te eenoot be eloeed, them letdeve tecleted matti fluid temperature mill power to will ineresse end NP-S restored on bus (HP-t]) will elose IEIS21 terminating letdown flow to NP-84 (NF-TIO)
- 5. Fette to olose when Engtseered Prevente tooletion of If NP-CI A kee espertenced mano regelred due to 3ereguards MF-CIA e tube rupture, itP-1 fellere of E3 Proteettre (NF-fla) her been etened, etsnel System and NP-CtB to to be used, (E3F3) them en DC leek to the 8:CU systee util occur. If Auteestle elesure WP-CI A hee esperteneed e of NP-S loss of ee.ollag meter (NF-tjlg NP-Cl4 and HP-1 (NF-fl A) er.anet connet be be eloesd, then letdeun toelsted natil fluid tempos eture will F3 alsnel le increase and NP-5 Elt-T)) restored util elese terminating 19tdeum flow to RP-It t ur-vie) 1.1.7 Telve RF-4 440) 1. Falle sloped due to Bone some Cic e RF-2
( F,- 729) laterne! fault , stIP-TID) to divert letdown flow through pr-CIA
- 2. Spurtteely closed Control Signal mone mone open NP-4 (ur-rza)
- ) . Fests to etene when -
Frevente t out .tless er If RF CtB hee esperjeaced genes NF-CIS required due to NP-CtB e tube rupture then en eennot be internet fault RC leek to the CCW Soolated vatti system util occur WP-4 (NF-925) le repaired 4 Falle to elose whee fleetrie Power Feevente isolation of If NP CIs has espertenood semes NF-Cle required due to RF-C 1 B e tube rupture, then en connet be unevellebility of DC leek to the CCW Soolsted until power en bum IEIS29 system etit occer power le restored on bue IEIS21 @ P
- 1. . - = ; .- -
-~
' :;- : -. 8t 43: -
- ,; e : -
i g . _,' i- t c, .,zi
- 7:1 .
v.:J1.:. i _g := 4-:_
.::i.
tea-:2 tsca:1. lg 4-.1:.JI:t as gg
- , a ..l. .:g:::
. :_ .I;-
._ 3 4e n-2..
i.n:g:.:j-5:=t..a..
. :4:.. g.
1
=~ . o & u : o r 2: . . ..
- z. 2 tru er:
; ::Et ,
es t-re t-
- re e-E. ,2 g --
-a -
-m g
. :s.= 1:
* -i 85;
-n !:n-se:
-t
,=3 3 :: :: :- e_ 8:4 8 :. _e_ :8.
- 4: -
s -e --e -=g:;::4rt -
--e yt:-
.: viz, i r- gt: :_ gt: .,,3 1
j '
!"vi {i!
;i:
ji:ge,c,i
;i: ge=2 s
a : . I:::,. i : i i j , : ::r i e ::'- n s , : : __
- _r
~
!a 8 e i i ?!:yg1 c,3i- il:gg:I*c, k
- s : : :: :4 1-r
- 4 g
g g
- pag
= [:"i. :: ":r:
_g ! IA:~II
=
reg.g=!2 E
. sc
- e i ; - - -
!, .,]24-
,_ : :.1, g:-:: ,j1._:3-:,
a 3 3, a a a .- 9_ .. R
. : 1 i
- . s -
23: a a : :, 1 ::
. s:::
1:::- * -
- E
. 3:
33
}:: E j
l : a l
} i:s c
l 3 - f.: . . - ! a-a
- {. _
1
- 5. .:
- 3. ::
- ::n :: 3:: :- ::: =- ::=y I- =
- =t ::- i- -- -
38:
==..
- j ::
i.
- . .p=
e g 22,23 al:l]i:j: a i--
- .7 1,2 .: - .-
=: = E:_ = :
- E.: : .i : .t: i :. .:E i s.
a : : a a ; ; a .1 a
- !? -
, i ":n. t ass e _l .= :- .
.= -
8 --- a .: o 24g es_ j s.la.:! lt= :s 24 5 S e h a
~~ .
3 , s
) 1 s I ;
Reference Drevings: F3et Figure 9.3-2
, FSAR Figure 9-24 1.0 3853131sMs 8*TDouN Contata TO 3-Wat 94LIN NP-14 (NF-Tle) (Continued)
Potential Failure Mode tenedsete Effects laterface at Subsystem A*eedtel action Component Mode involved Within Subsystem Interface N$ thin Subsystem 1.2.2 Talve WP-5 (NO) 6. felle to alces when Engineered Failure of one of tv. Nene, if WP-6 (NF-94) Close NP-6 (NF-93) required due to se*eguards redundant containment successfully eloses. (cont'd) unevettability of (HP-94) and
. Proteettre toelation selves, Nigh Otherutee, high restore Ng E3 alsnel Protes temperature letdown flow temperature letdown flow stenet. If (ESPS) to purittoetton posolbly cousing flow purifteetion Jenineraliser la blechase if reels tende reatne desaged, unobstructed. Increened in NP-Il melt woe etendby letdown fluid toeperature deelneraliser may result in melting the reeln bende in NP-Il and thus blocking flow 1.2 3 Velve NP-6 (NO) 8. Fette elosed dwo to -
Letdown flow to Furifteetten Letdown flow to 3-way valve stilise NP-7 (NF-74) Internal fault deelnereitner le NP-14 (NF-fle) is (NF-95) for obstructed unless NP-42 or termine*ed unless NP4 2 letdows NP-7 (NF-V5) Se open nr NP-7 (HP-95) is open throttling
- 2. Spuriously elosed Control Signal Letdown flow to purifteetion Letdove fl9v to 3-way volve Open NP-6 (NF-94) deafnereltser le NP-I4 (HP-fl0) le or NP-7 (NF-95) obetracted unteer) HP-42 or terminated unless NP-42 .
' NP-7 (NF-95) is OPen or HP-7 (NF-95) le opem 3 Fette to close when -- Letdown flow to block If WP-$ (HP-T)) has felled Close NP-4 required due to ortties le unobetructed to olose end the htdova (NF-VT) to internal fault flew has not bees oceled, proteet then temperature et perifteetion letdown flow to NP-84 deelneraliser (NF-flop ut!! eentlaue NP-It to Secrease and resin beads in NP-It may melt eeusing flow blo-bege
- 4. Falle to eloes when Instrument Air Letdown flow to bloch . If WP-$ (NF-93) bee f ailed Close N7-8 required due to ortfiee to unobstructed to close and the letdown (NF-97) to unevettability of flow has not been cooled, protect
' instrument ole thee temperetwee of purifteetion (assumed) letdown flow to NP-14 desimerel2ser (NF-flo) will contlaue NP I13 restore to increase and resta instrument air boede in NP-Il may melt eeusing flow bloctase 1.2.4 Wlook Oriftee 1. Fette plugaed -- Letdown flow to purif teetion Letdown flew to 3-way valve stilise NP-7 deelneraliser to NP-14 (HP-TIO) te ( N-T5) for obstructed if l'P-42 and teretnoted if NP-42 and letdown flom NP-7 (NF-TS) are eloeed NP-7 (NF-95) are elosed throttttas d 1.2.5 Flow Treneettter 1. Internet fault Plaat Isotre- None Ineerrect informetson Isolete end , FT-29 resulte in sentotten seat to plant operaters repair incorrrat algnel
- 2. Fette .mo to Electrio Power None Incorrect information Nestore electrie lose of power sent to plant ecoratore power i
f P
- v. g . s g: , - , r:
21 ~
- 51 -
i _1.: 5 -1 a 11 s_ 3 5s ii
~ie m s g, at.:ll:1
, _ E:l l ssi:
i
- 2 s _a 11 v e, -
4 - cc :. a sc i, as =ng eg. 51 f= Eg
=ss-: :-
art 1 3e 3:
]!
1 jile
- 1 E
o In: o
!* & nig:El i.f E
ji:}=it
- {!=!s t
. : : - m r
- it E .: : . 2 i.
, -a s, , =: , a a .;se .
; r 2. _ c c , .as -
1:-t ., : :
. } . =.
- -- - =. .
_=_ _as.:. : _a
. : .s - sa essa ..za
- . ,. :- : _j .a 3si sm .,
.e.n..z
- c.,s as
- : : s 2. :.
si s: sei- 2: 4 :: :. : -2 3:. -:
. _:ss .-
- - s:s ce;= .:s =1,:s: :1: sis::1:: .st: ::s- gs::: s es
.._ :_: ::: ::: at :- =
1 v- e . a se :4 ame:. :. g:e=3. 4=ss
.}_c
. 3. s
, a _3 i s:v =As ::a g:: Ae g A _g. g 3: 3:g
- As! a s : : :
A 42e:::
. - = 2 : .
4 x : r -
- 3.1 _3:s = .a .: -t - _a i i
]
c: s- g:_ ag - v ic
- . i.c. -
8 8 cg: : _r - t:::
.s3 .. m tj ts -
; 3- , c!
e , g us .. 2. :: 1 . js 3: d
=2. it: 8
- si
~ si
.s 2:g -:
*:2 3.1
=
s-c s= .: c .2
- 1 .2: s .:_ si
- _2 sea
- 1 jy.1:v j;,e 3: : it at -
e 8 sE: 8 e -
.! =. :. :-= -=1g
=
]=s1 :
r- = s . et 2: ,:
. -a s la : et
~
. : a a !a ! s s I e - , e a a :p, i
i 2 s feh: [ It i : ii 3 i 3 2 si i 1 I 1
- - - =
= 2 .s .2 g
- 2. 2.
. : zg
- g f E - 3
,s J 3 . ja-, -
3 2.:fs!:.Is i I : .: .i:s ,3 e E 1. 1=: as- - s :- g_ 2.- : .- ~ f E _ 24 .'s l g
- i i ii i ii
- s
- s-is a21_1mIi))l rs :
i sjlil
- s. _s _ _s _.r.i_.a:- __s 3 c. , .1 I
1 I
; a 4 A a ; a 4 l
i E
- _E E
- y E S 3 n L. L c
L
. L. - L.
. . e eC . 55
- : : :L --
o : es : }} 4 4 4 4 4 4 l l
/ ..
8 __ ~
d
~ ,. .. .
A: .: .- a- : _ 44
. ::,; 2:
1::)[:.:,:.[:.3,
== -
- t e _, c . . .:
se A
.3:
3.z 1De r L.3 ::.
. ::j:reit::=
.e e~ ment i:s p:j::::3.g::::
4
= 3e
- :s -
-r : : -
. 2 :..- 1 :
I hi:g -
!=
i:.a.
- .= :: .
4 _3 :. =_:=
- c ss =::
- s ce-c : ,, . ..:
. : . :- I .22 --
a :
- 14: :4 ::s:: .Ae 3.68 g i : . a .
3 3 i 8 1 : g _. c-1: el 1: 4
- j .g . ,
1 :: :! :::
. 31 : .. I. c::
- 2 :., : g::
3 s li! i:li
.i gli g g
g e
- i.
G = : i , 2:8
- a
- 22: 3 8 -
E :. ::.. :: : ::
. :: i=s : I : : II . I ::
id c C c .i- : :-. . a :
- h) , :p: -
=3 -
K , ., L. :
- :::::: - -L
- 2::::: - ::.
E :
- - gi y .: 1:.. 8::.I 3 .:
- - 3
- 8y
!se : :g t
l: =:_g;-:h::.g .
- _:l1:l:.
y:_ o - S & e S $ k 5 8 I k:
, 1. p
.v. -
I r
- att g-u a a. c cc: as
~.
?
_ . _7 .". L
-n < ,.
~
1 , sererence Drawings: F3an Figure 9 3-2 F3As Figure 9-24 f.e sN u tsfan: 1.ETDONb CtMBe? TO 3-Net 94LtB NP-94 (NF-fle) (Continued) Potenti.i Peuere f.w. l die;. ffoote I ntrface At Subsystem Remedial Aetton Component Mode gavelved Within Subsystem Interface Within Subsystee l.3 7 Talve MP-le6 (NC) 3. Falle open due to Catlet of moduced letdown flow to Bedwood letdown flow to Close NP-$7 internal faup Letdove purifloatten deelneraliser 3-way votre NP-84 Filter NP-Fl4 (NF-fl0). ( Letdown rice bypasses NP-Fi and
, NPalt (MP-fl0))
9.3.8 Talve NPatti (NC) 1. Falle open due to Esset of Nedueed letdown flow to seduced letdove flow to close HP-$7 internet fault Letdown purifteetton domineraliser 3-way volve NP-14 Ffiter NP-FIA (NP-TIO). (Letdown flow bypeseen NP-Il and WP-l> (NF-flo)) 1.3.9 Valve NP-33 (NC) 1. Felle spee due to -- Letdown flow bypasses Letdown flow cheelstry None (Mr 86) toternal revlt the purificattom etter?d deelnerettsort letdown flow cheelstry altered
- 2. Sportously opened Control signal Letdown flow bypeases Latdown flow chemistry Close NP-33
.. the purifteattom altered ( NP.IG )
deelneralisert letdove flev ebentetry altered
- 3. l'alle to open whom -- Portficatloa deelneraliser Letdown flow to 3-e ey valvo Open NP-9 requieed due to NP-Il bypeos unavailable NP-14 (NP-fl0) le (INP- M ) and internal fault if required teretnoted if NP-Il is NP-ll (INP-99) plugged and see NP-I2 ff evellebte
- 4. Potential fatture to Instrument ifr Purifteettee dentnereltzer Letdeve flow to 3-way valve postore opea due to NP-Il bypeas unavailable NP-14 (NF-fl0) le instrument ears meevallebt!!ty of if required terminated if NP-Il le spee NP-9 1natrument air plegged (lNP-M) and (see amed) NP-II (INP-791 and see NP-12 ff evetlebte
. l.3 10 Talve NP-8 (NO) 1. Falle elesed due to -- Letdown flow through Letdove flow to 3-way valve Dree NP-9 (NF-TT) internet towlt purifteetion deelneraliser NP-It (NF-fl0) le (INP-M) and
+
NP.II le obstructed tersinsted NP-ll (IMP-F9) and ettlise purtfleetime deelneraliser NP-I2 Sf not being need by ,
. Natt 2
- 2. Spuriously elesed Control signat Letdove flow through Letdove flow to 3-mey salve Open WP-9 portftcetten dsmineraliser FF-It (MP-TIO) le (INP- M ) and NP-Il la abstriseted terminated NP.ll (INP T9) and utillae purification deeinoraliser NP-32 if not betag mood by Nott 2 e e
7.
"* I "6 *
^ =1 k
O O I .
- c.i e c.i 8 4 =8 s al :; ;
4 ar= ,e- eta ::= . e :s r - _ _ . , 4- ==g s r- :xT en cc :. =
=3- .
-{
- = y gg
- m. ))
! j!!
sr.
=*g:=s ji!siri$2c g2
.pr*j ar,==i v8 il sj :gE!sI:l]43EE
!i : r =4 I"
e
- 1 a
8 8
- =
.: A-os
- - 1.t.e 4-c 1.t.e 4
. J.a. os
- e. 1-e g :: : : a a.
- :: :: :: it: ::: ac: sc:
i 3:s .g:: s1 :~s : cei_ cey
.._ 1.= 1.:
i - ] . :- _:em:4 e :- 2 6.g : 3 :.. : _3 :. l t 5
- 3a 4 34 3. :t :
gs: - g:: l a = k k :: : i ;3 .: h*
;I .:
k-
. 2 3 - . 122 3. -
t ] - g: ::
- f.i -y3
~-:: -
- .=ky ~::.~ s := t :
- 22. :: 22:
e s 23 g4! n J:2s. .
.3.:: .
-s: c.- 2 .
-.=:2 -
8 g : -:: 3 :::= p: :- : 1 :.sc 2= 8 s- : :_.:_-- _ c: p:
.=-
cc:
.c. ::,:s :.: lj=.,sc
- = l s :. :
a t _ _:. 1 e s -ni::l ci-2
-a 2
_t=
- 3. it 1
= 1:!:lt.p- 4 8: g12!_e
=
,2 :i4s:
tenj a 3 - 7 1-I , r, 5 e R . :T 1 % 1 i i i
,F. ] _T _: : a g
5 E: E:- E n b 2
***: 4=: 1- T - :
$= ?'
3323 :: u 21 -y s s - g8 -
. 8 r
=E:=. :x:E::: : = =1 -
i
- : : : : k
. .B -
.E - 6 7 g: . .X i ::
- i 1
I-s n
==- f -
kg. e :-- e- =
$ : .3 2It et ::
e = = = 4 A A 4 a , a a ; b e e i . ..
4 7. en- ! 38 m-_ : e :- m gk
- 2 . _ : -
- :. k m.
s6~r 18 rg k
- mgas : am
- t m :-
at _-
- 2 -
I::smg.i sag.g: en- ~. : , gre - - 1 sagig
== :. ..g =. g< = In:s 21
- sil!s:iite,r!! !:g:s IIsE .
j n !Is sj i==!I!:z,, 3.5
. )) . 3 3 o o IE o o E :
- 1 s 1 a _ .- :. :.
E AE I sE :-I
- lk -
e se
=t
- il 5
55 4:
.:s
. J.4 is T"l g
T1 4 E1 3 :: :: sm: I m: ** 2*
. g . :- se 3: ::4 :: y:e se
- : gas gA_g j
g e _ _ e :
- ja
.=l- ja-
.:1- : :
s- - -
- .s :.: . .
i _
] .-8 -
8
~~*:
._ ~ ~ -:._ . _g
*: .g g_=
= 3
! I_-
t_4 k:E--:--
,=- 4_
4
= :
- 2= 2: 2 8?==s .::::- 81 :=.3ts --l*81*t3_
j: 2 38 *.
- = ::=
= =
8::: ===
- 1,.3.
s: t: 1_. = 13. .~ i .:=l .:*g. .:! .:* :t.tI:n: s- -
- ~ 2- - - -
e --
~
- - :p-!:: -
1 3. :_v=st:g1:!s=::s_: 7
=
s 1=in e e att
=
=
t 1 =1 1:ls i m 2 2 -
- 2 3 1 5 a >
!g E
4.
- q l I
I s e l i R 1. .a a 3 5 .
=
i = . v . . is.s :. ,
- g. , 2. 5 a.
- _ - =2 -
; 2 .! , :~ ,
s 2,_
,e
-.g=:- .: 1 f._ 1: -
.:n :
- =l en
.:: i:s 1
; 4 I s : ::. a it
- I=: .1 z: g_n_: :s : g-s m r_v ;_ i g__
_2 , a. a. R 3. a N E a.- f. 7 s't [ 23] o _ It 4 4 J J d l l 4
.n .m. - -,
r - - - y. + t wt
1 l r APPEIDIZ B FAILURE HODES AND DTECTS ANALYS.d I SUBSYSTDi 2.0: RC PUMP SEAL VATER RETURN S B 4 l l
. l l
2 e g ,
- ) e) f 34 nem n s5 e e e v
l d n) i s n o ot . , wel e n n svav e ee e7 , eel 9d n i s e e r p2 l rl i i st e
.t(
esrs td ea t y cs l l e al el e y - l ea l l t o l eee t n ) r b tb t w ose v bF l n wcn t n eao blt eeeeys ab u i si eop os s)l N eod ooodeod sfl i t pt rt re uI g s sr i s sr-t n 5a t( o e pl eo e e () sea yt uat i s lS e y dee7v a ost st ost pd e st sbet odd ei et - el t eps2 ee l ec eeeel sc yeee eae t s nl Ft f n ca .ce ;rp pt sv v e rovs mt oe pFa e di cp ep op e e bwvt cl nwt et oe l el f oolf elf olt eoeoeesot B e ah eh st ae ser;es t e e e r yN ; ne saf tl af sef nrae nerl vl umh SS ei f r
-f e ifeb(
t ev p love cevoove e p eevs ttf o(jea l f F( RN I i S a N O c p C o I s a l t l e , e , a , e , n a e a i w a n g n ig n ig
.de et ee eh d
eeek d d d d ee ek d r i s s s re rc rc e
- e rc l D d f oe f ir oef oet t t foe e enreen rad d l r l ra e a l r td e en ra wba o wbewbot l l wba lgn c se u u u l o i e l s o e o l a n l pa l pel pee o o l pa a e es ee em neenemnem f m f m fm t t t fm s r
t s so et cel oet o rpoun ue um fpcfpot t t fpe us wem ot o e ye rsareorso i e f of oo o o f o l no f sf prrpyrpyr oCr oCroCrn n n oCr f yr e b r e e s D D - D S S S D s S ue t lt lt l k l k l k l sC mC mC k l t l St n cCocCoeCo eeo eeeeeoeD e3 eB eeo cCo eS reA rs& r el r el rel rt t t el r e& r s tI rIt rIt rRt l gt l gtl gt ae se se l gt rIt oooeoeooo n nr nr nn nnre A r ns y e ye ne r n t e et lio asc li rli eer sr sr lio eoo
. e s cet nest c n e eseesebf e e u bf u
bf u eso e ct c a f S f I I I S S S S S S l E e t a
- 3 i d
e e e e e m r lg l l r s m e n g n g lg o e I m t s i n n t . u e e e i e i s i c T e d e d d e a E t s r ns e e e R y i a ne ne i n i n t a t a t ns r s e i e S E b u f.c dI t dl i dl i t e l o l o dl i f o e e e e o o e T A S e pf pf pf t t t pf s st t t pf pf t.f W n os c c oo oo eot t t t pf eo st en L i l e e e t - t - - o o o t - l a 4 h t l o t f f f sk e sk e ek e m n n sk l g i l s e f e ue we weol w w e l o S W ee w ee l o m o o l ol l ol l l e l o o vl e F C N S N N F F F F F l F i F %o y r u: B _ I; e w I T ~ . +. o - S s+h e n P T e ed e e t i t l eF S B ce yew st e e iI ae p 3 r U f v Sem S 3 S e rl eo -
= CEF t o C
C t cW eA
+
0 d t v 4 6 4 l o an 1 1 1 F
, 2 M li e
r n d , n a o e o
. l t e o r de d
- s l t r t a e t t eg t u1 u s tr t l se e F e n t t e r t w i o et uk gt aer e a a
ua en om l o e n
. t n er - r du erreomt emr a e o f e t s u y e t e t ee cd c - - l t :
c. rn t eo ue p s l t df e eeeee nt !t d e dt n d , eg e s ) t ei t r n nt lhort i. l mi l n s e F n t t e n e ee la w s e l o ii t s t d C e t oacow ol td t n ol a a o ag e e o B m l tt et o a re ere fet af e fett f g) e F M e p sn eo eeegse n
/ uk l r s n n l e . uk t re eeure eg v o et eoeu el e re t e nuaouf si dl l n vl u . ei vl ua vpt t e
, sl a adf cdo n
os ae si l edel t l adf l{e ot l a r l n e a e e e m l T I C I F T t V f I t
- o
- # T . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9 2 3 I 2 3 4 5 6 1 3 (
) ) ,,.
)
s s)))) e - ( , - ( e (4DCD n r n e3))) o) ,,, e , ,46 11 - )02 dv4444 i e7%11 t0211 - i s22 elT99V tat2222m0126 t22 - - L ( - - t a - - - - t - TT rTT aTFPPF l1 - - - - eTTFF f f eFF r NNNR o/PPPP nFFII t o tI1 enIIIt pe(((( e2NNNN nII a_ et l( e , , -
- ri , , Ol ,,,, r , ,3 5 k em91 E0260 l s5299 T95ll
. e ss12 r t' 2323 ee0395 12ff
- e. ee - - ot2222 uv2222 w-t eeTT t o- - - - nl - - - - ofTTT rrFF osPPFP aePFFP lFFFF
- C l FT1I l f INNNN MVNNNN F11II - e e S - 6 1 2 3 4 . 1 1 1 1 9 2 2 2 2 2
2 ,
- )
34 nen m s dl t ot ,e na . , . s_ , . , 9d n is r ee act e r e e .e e e e r t y e l y osf ) l e v e sa es l l l l l e uI Ab u w o p lbb eee tl uoyg e(j rn b i ao t w i b t n l b ta_;_d _o b l t s b i tb ai t w n_ op g lS y eai s e .p s e a _t e : s - s i s a el sst eia raddd cw y srt se- u sr- sr ;sr _ y Ft e ie di rp op cll ;_ptt ct o _ i ol nl at eoe cl aa ep _el
.rp op epm eie cap et oe ;rs sp
_ h el - ee-ei ea
. et
.ce ;rp
_el _ae _op R e _ ep- ep _cp A h eh t u ss at s eeueb ae t u s re ea eer;pe_i at ee- se u 3S mt ei o f ei- rsosa r es r- r - r_tss F( RN B f e f f e f f f e I I B I I D i I I t s
, e g ! l l n ed ad ad t
u nn ga nn ga nn ga e y e e l l h g l d a hs t D r a nd a nd isC A i sC S isC E t n e t n l aC n& l aC l eC gn ai ps t ai n4 nR e ign a eI eI eI s re gI s gI e sI e ia r r c n e s s e s s uo st uostuo rst wa o g n we o i soesoaaoa oi cl c e we mwee t r t r t r r t e sc ot oot c s es es n ed cedcede l s i fo r l m fo w w u e ya l sol e a reareoreo odl odl odl f sf f yrf pr pt rpt rpt r r u r l eol eol eo e b r s o oI d sf ft rft rfl r R ue t lt t t t s s tt tt tt St eCacCo l tiltllttl ednt adp tt ntl ntt n n e& re8 r cmoceocear esresres peec p& m ceoceocee tI rRt r1t rnt rnt rnt yk uee yk u escescese rn rn s b cpft b cp rn t c e a r oeecoo ct eot c n nr n n ormoroore ra ct oct cet e ranran llCet ebS o f a s llc abD o rad rad rad ornernorn ct aet act a f n n s e e e n n n f I I I I I S s S I I I E :
)
)
e F d t e C e l D u / d s y s n e 1 s d s i m , r a a a t m o p r n I l a t y e p y o t o m t o , s b t c C e o m 9 ( e a t s T e g e e y 4 r n gd n lgd r N s ( f ae i r ne f B, b u ) o t p u isp p o 5 sp d S u e o o e f B s t c t c o st t t 'e t t at st t t e e L on c c r, s c s on c c i l e e e ee o l a e e 3 3 h f f o o l f f t e ft t e l f f 7 t f e f e l e f f e f a p t o f f T e e laoo 4 E l c wl et wj e e 3 o o ee ol s ol N N a S m e s o l o l e e e l N F N F S W M
% e t
2 r e r . ec B eC r F wt 4 eC C B oI f w1 v4 P f o F
, roI e eys t eye eys t
cd ae il e e il e ie f v rpt t pn e r pt il e rpt t pe T rl cuy L. t pe S t d e eo t v eSS - l a euv eSS - - - - - - cup 5 b nn l E a J R leTs
. l teo Ii S E e
S e t r P n 0 u e o e n t u s a u e
, , o 2 t dr e e t t
d r a dd e + w de d i o e e t r F t w uo ul l a W h e e n t w e hl l a pag l o eg s a c e el l a tf t pp l n ar e no eo l n l m f oma n l n uo hp er ea ok n ar p e t f e e lcd t t e uf oo ra el t O p t c mf oo fA rr et de , t# d t c eb a e , o c f e rn neos t t s e e t e l , n t e t t e l l t ld l e t n eI l t o d es t o d e cs t e ag en ag e t t o t eo F o eo ttt e m eo ltt f g)f e f g) m ttt et r M rl a l s uk rl u l u . v a . uk e e r oo aeu nua o ra r eeu el eee el e ra seurew l e ct adf l C t e sl oo ct nua v pt v r vpt tsI o nuaouo n r n adf l( ol p l( e adfcdp I T y n r a a a n r n l I I T T T V I T I l
. . a . . . . . . . .
2 3 e 5 2 3 1 2 1 1 2. 3 r
) p o
s ) ( s ( . r ( . e , .t i1 6 ) s , , eo) ,,. r02 t02l1 e11 ( )02 )62 t e5884 t11 t 22 - - e s22 s67 t m6677 t - - i - - TT n ( - - (22 e12222 lTT mTTFF i rTT e- - l1 - - - eFF sFF11 L ePP vPP o/FFPP sII t n e nII a r
. ,) e et lII lNW a s2iNNN I(
l n,, a n
,,35d s rt , , v , , , .,. r91 o T91l1't e p ue91 )9 l s4703 T01 12l1 ss12 k66 p w- - n ee6677 m oTTTTo B y sn - -
eaTT c22 e - - uv2222 nl - - - - w-11 oTT o lFFFTo rrPP hPP aePPPP lFF C FII1I( l FTII CNN MVNNNN a F3I e 4 S 1 2 3 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 f
$ N: E: * **
g-1 :: a- _3 [
!= l=
*: ' r:
r a, t { 1 1, 1
- .lI:
i-s c: :. I -
.I .
== az -:
f2.3., 1:12 3
--. .I .: .I . .E .E- .I .I s .I v .
- .I =: . z .
-r = =- =- =- =- -
gi .gs is =- == - em c cm
- - , : g: :
2 . g 4i g18g I. re- 1.E.34.a,r 3o e; r, - - c: cgcac ::c- c- cE..j L: L: L: * - g - Et E *8. i. cE gll.
- - := := := =
ag g ca i c .: .: .: 8
.- . . .;t..- .= .- .-
I.eI*I 35
- - $. ,!i I t . ,I II e Il
,, I,,l l[ l[$..I$.li$.$.f e $. $.[ $.[jf
- : tx tv := - x := :x - -x:2 1.1 . su 3x:x
. : A A A 2 3 : a A 3 3 3 & & & . A
- " R. E.
- scksch
]= i l
- 1. It g =.] =.
E
-1 , i :..,g=..a I I
gl c c c g5 [I . y g. j,- t i.: 1:
- =c =c : : s - - :g :g :
x z
- g :g c
a c c a r rs r:-rix ::s =e a cc i i
= .: = . 3 . . .
h' :g k k g k - 1 k k k- I I t11I2]:5I.:
- g : 2: 2-: -
I
. . .. :.: .., - : :. : t t.-t. . . : :
l 5 5: A: 5: .?,
}
}:
4 a I .it=tilijl1 Ia . 4 4 3
. , . e , .
s x t
, . .l i . }. - . < l 3
, . .- sta : : 8 -
3 .. : g si
- 22 :::=
c -
- je-I .
i : x - a e ! .m an= . s a j .: - . s. - - -
, - - - o e '
- k. :-
=1 .!! .
n i ::g:is:m.i. 1-a.a s i: :: 2 2 2
- - 1: : ::
I: - 4: : .3 . -1 32 :l .:. :: ::: -. .i.: .-4s 1 ,:sts t : i : 1 1: :38:n; -
- 4:.v: -
- .2: - -
- rt.s.2 2
- I
- !::gsgt: :.!
.81. ,.
2-
-: --: g-2.
i :.
--: 1t-1-1i
- 1 ::1:-
f::E
.. ::::4: 2!d.u.
ama
- .- : : :::1 ::::1 : :-: -::1 Es:t
. . ::2. -.-. 2..--- .c ::::t::::::::
. . -, 2.-.2 . .
- 2. . . .
3J A 4 a a 4 5
- 4 4 aiJ A a A A a =. : i
. .- .cc e . .
k TIS Ta
- g- e k !*O *
- . : =. 1':: .
3:e g=ni.s- : :t g:it ::= E ::. :-
- n ::s 8 : n a - -se
- a-. a--.3.:
=
- -a- : n- se J,
7 7
~ &,
~
n n 7
- n u u u o
6 m w
( . 4 _
-) e t t ) ) ) ) d _
34 ee et e s a_ srn 0re t i e t r ea 9d t s r e e 0 ee 0ee re es k es l el d g e 2tl 2tt red c re edo n eeaa em r t r ee Ab a p m l v a l v e srt e tt srie It os pI eeeo r l mt eereer pl eset a taepa nl r _ _ egfm eBf s s( e( 4 o(
) e hs efe d u il pt g
ut e v s e( e( ) ) rt ee lS s - p dt p dt nre nrnrrarat moir pnt r i s a e0 e0 yens yens ioe i tteeiel ecar oes Ft in r s2 bv ies l e di i i - s2 i - ira bvue l eo l oe lt al peeet ettil e e egkeseere t
.s at pere eot A e eh a tF e lf nert earl v ce eeenvmeooreeaproe A h SS mt p iR n i3 p eveI eve ( l es l tsrol eet rfrrt apfm ei e t o t e p s a e e F( SW D p N u s O o T T T s
e s s C C g Dd Bd ot n l et mn eus ek t l t e e t ee t l a ma ena t e l a t e 4 t t p t p t p t p ese ev u it nit eet aet s e r e e t oe et t as er eo mr ee er ee l. T es es %dt ee d D r mg eee r r r P e e cl e fd e ea d sn fd ff fd I rr rr 2. u c n wp uo r ee r e - eF fo f o 2do n e ep d v es e we w- we n et e t e et il et ev e ; eu o wd wd t. r r ee l e ft l s f vol s ovf ld l f '-r l dh oe ee ?
,sk e ye s e r e fe r
f e sd l c l c e noarn f e of n nv pt n. a n n rtht e f u d f u d leet t D b r ee re e ip re ud cre s re re re t re re ct e St t m tt t eud cftt upd teup me upd teup me u pd teupe mem i er or eerey g n ree t t eu rp ee e eo ee rera e ti A rs f rl rpr rpp rppm mp vp e er tC l o ff e e oa m p twt e t e e:t o tCt tCt tCt r t u t u sC nt aD at rat aB s ads e3et ap ap eWue e We eS e e e e e e e e f f s S S S s. s S B B w w e e es r r r r r
) t s el e nl r e e o o o o d
e ef e efe t 1 u t d t t t t l d 4 d d d d e t ne t t ae e e e e a e p ere e ere c _ e e c t e t n p l um t t ee u _ u u u e t n o e et e et d ^ d d d e I e t s oee e eoe e e e e t e C e t re r t t re r r r r o ( r c t w gtf eg stf u w s v v s e ne rn e e e e e e . r r l i edei ed l o R A b e
*fn d meld ei dlea se f l
f l f l f l f t - W u l i ,taet l i ,ta s a n a a se e - T S r udt eududt r r r E u r r e - B n t b ee bebee dea d de od t e ud t e ud t e ed t e ud t e r s i e rat rrarat ep op ep op ep f s h r er uerer rp rp rp rp rp o 7 t t gttt gt gt o e e e a d 4 i W t s eeceseoeo tt tt tt tt tt sL 9 o mdarededn e o as e es e as as ae eA M R e e e e. L t B S S s S S i a s 3 p 3 E c
- . e e t e e cd t ta ee s
y o r e T f v el - S . V S e ee - - C - T J o t. re v 3 & . 2 t 6 R
=
ea l f Il 4 - B
! _ er A
s e e e , , d
; s s s dd dd e 2 t e
d ee e s es ee dg et t4 l a p g ss ea r me e e e os os en l r uws ei t eeeed d l e eo l e ns, ee d eet *o d tdd ee h t ee r 4 rt r d d t e g e e ee i i
- s. ,m s .
e t n li en ed l nt euou t qt q ld e , td t u ege t nl ed u r e e l l ee t eie l o n e t i e e1 t o d ao eon arerf ea os l p ag hb c l i eo fttf er f f g) f s) fgk) n s a P t eeae l d e m n n . e . r ec eeb vuevme 4 seee e h th eI e el c e el uc. f l dfl ot la et w vpt l( e vpt l( e t l v pt t t u e a a e l( se et b T T a a i a r u T T T T f T e 9 T
- 4. 5 6 7 1 3 1 1 1 2
d ) e s t t ae rv) e n , e0 ( r e, e a e el3 l t7 e t2 S t t2 l t7 . r ) pa1 OT9 t7 e - o e 5 Ce a no7 etP m o lP7 Bl l t onP rr2 uh reb ue r u C oN - s P goo-orc n e t oH) tl(d te T P- N0
) tt) e s t n I)R sC(P n et o
nr r e s t a uh4 't Dr 5 Rr(9 t( , t nB o p s ee1 ee7 e t ee47 erI e e ee 2n o tt v - allP tt s2 tk e uv77 ruCr alt et m sl - - et - o C e noPc PtB( eiaN e i e P-SFTW ei noFP I pePp SFT( SF t eVI s N ORNS a e 2 3 4 5 s 1 2 4 4 4 4 5 5
< 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 W
s , - Beferomeo Israulage: FSat Figwe 13-2 (Sheets I and 4) 2.8 3GBST3fMs BCF SEAL WATSB BETWGB (Coat t aued) Fotential Feature leode leeediate Effects laterfeee at Subsysten Benedten aettee Component Modo lavolved Within Suberatee laterfees Withlm Subsystem 2.5.2 operettas RC Seal 3. Lose of 3Cu PCW Syntes i.ees of seen return ecossne Nagh temperatore discherge selve se opere Retura Cooler (high eester discharge te Setemse eterage tent, cooler if DCU Ny-C1B (or temperature) high temperature readjng to evellette to Spare Rf-Cla) em TT-45 or TT-46 It (leeet (eest'd) metten)
- 4. 1.oes of heet trezeter .. k Je er seen retura poettag Nigh temperstwo discharge leeiste effected espebtitty eue te (high oooter discherge to letdeve eterese tent, easier and internal damage toeperature) high temperature reedteg volve in opere on 77-45 or TT-46 (leeel setten)
- 5. Topor lock to soster Redvetion la seen retera High toeperature #fecharge lactate affected ecolems cepeelty (>fgh to letdeus eterage tent, eeeler and
+eeler ese*erge high temperature readens velve se opere souperature) en TT-45 or TT-46 (teoel setten) 2.5.3 Cooler Discharge t. Talve fatte elese,e _
3 eat retura flow redueed or Seat return flow to letdeve Repete at Needer Check Talve (plugging, desseed, stopped storose tank reduced or ete.) N9-109 stepped, seat return flee free all BC pumpe redueed er stopped
- 2. Talve felle to Seal vetor se offset during steady No effect durias steady se immedlete prevent beckflow Coopere, state elece preneures et state almee pressures at setton
, t otdours settet interfeoes are outlet interfeese are aseeeeery, S erene Tonk, Jouer thee ecolor lever s'han eeeler repair teekewy discharge line pressure dieeberge line preneure courseest filt er( s)
Dinaheesc 2.6 System Irlot Floust 2.6.9 Seal Injection 1. Lees of flow tSet lejeetson Seal return flow free BCS Slightly hetter diseasrae pese Flow (Syboyotem botter then morsel seal flew to letdeus storage 4.0), BC rature tank P*epe 2.6.2 NPI Pump t. Imse of flow Brl Pumpa Bedueed flow through seal peduced flow and moeestet Bone Seetreeletion (Suberetee retura soelere eeeler discherge thes 3 0) morsel to letdeus storage tank 27 System Piplagt 2 7.9 Tents Drotas, I. Systea lesba I.een of reactor coolant I.ese of reester coolant, toelate lenke end Piping, lastrument elightly reduced flow repelr se Commeettees, ete. to letdown storage tank needed O *
=+ _ _ _ _ _ _
I APPEEDII C FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SUBSYSTDI 3 0: LEDOWN STORAGE TANK, INLET FILTERS, AND HPI PUMPS b
' s . ,
3 , Beforence Dreutres F3an Figure 9 3-2 (sheet I) 3 0 aensisT8Ms LETDOWN ST0 east 78st (IJT), IRLET FILTERS, ase RFl*rgMrs Potential fritthm Mode leasediate Effects Intar*ece At Subspeles Resedte! Aotton Ceepenent Blode levolted Withis Subeystem laterfees Withia Suesystem 31 Letdema (Metemp) Filters (2): 3.1.9 Pasueette Operated 1. talve falle elesea Instr m et H e Lees of flow to LST free Seduetten and eventuel Statsse opere Inlet talve(s) (easumed valve le letdeum, ehesteel lose of evellebte filter, opee NF-17 (NF-9298), str%te-open) addittee, and eyetes esbesp to LST volve locally, NP-10 (NF-T290) sekeup bypeos to LST, or eutteh te BWST ff LST level se unseeeptably leu
- 2. Telve felle elesee -- Lees of flow to RJT free Reduction and eventuel Utilise opere due to internal letdeus, chootest less of evettable filter, bypese feelt addittoa, and erstes makeup la LST to LST, er enkeep outteh to SW37
- If LST level to enseeeptably lou 3 Talve closea au 14C Systee Loos of flow to LST free seduettoa and eventual Utilise opere
, spurious sign.,3 letdown, ehesteel lose of evellable filter, opes additten, and systee makeup to LST valve Iseetly, omkopp btpose to LST or suiteh to Xif37 f f LST level to unaseeptablF leu
- 4. Velve inadverteetly Leer of flow to LST free seduetten and eventual peopen volve elosed letdeus, cheetoet lose of evettable addition, med systee eekeup la LST enheep
- 5. Talve fatte at A eee lac, tie /. rte cennot toelate filter lor se effect depair ocepoment when required Power Supply, seletenance .
Intere.1 3.1.2 IIsteep Filter F 1. Treaisettler fraluee -- Fotentist for sedetected Ineonee. pressure drop m it s pressure Transmitter IFT-55 d e to internal filier plusains stanal to lac ene drop with local fault control rees gege
- 2. looorrut output R16etrio Famer Poteettet for undetected Incorrect pressure d op Mootter pressure due tw_less cf $ apply, 14C ft!ter plugging signal to ISC and drop with leest posaed control roce sage 3 loetramwnt emaneetten - Doell toes of reeeter Incorroet pressure drop topelr leek g leek emelant and small signal to ISC and reduction in flow to LST sentrol room 333 F11ter(s) 1. Filter plurget ... Letdeus, ehesteel additten, Beduced seventary la LST 9tilise opere IIP-FI A, pr-Fts sud systee enkeup flew and high pressen e drop filter er totuced er stogped signet to ISC free SPT-95 bypees filtere via AP-39 0 >
4 - __ _ _____ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ .
aeference preusases rSan figwe 9 3-2 (Sheet 13 3.e Sus 3tSines LaTeche arosew test (Lst), IELET FILTTNS, Amt Ert PUMP 3 (Continued) retentist rettere node Imm.dtete effecte Interfeee , at Subeyotes tenedtel setten Composest INe levelved hithia suberstem Interfeee vithtm Suespetoe 3 1.4 feenmal Filter 1. Talve sealed eteeed Lees of flow to LST free medvetten and eventual Nttitre opere Discherge Stock (plegates, desaged, letJeum, ebewJes) addition, Rose of evellab.e filier path er
=
Telve(s) Isr-57, etc.) and system weeup makeup in LST bypees filtere NP-SS via NP-39 32 Letdove Storage Tomk 3 2.1 telet Cheok Talve 1. Talve felled elooed Subsistem 2:0 Loom of all flow te LST, Beduetton and eventuel toonttor LST NP-10 poteellet less of BPSN less of evellette fevel, mutteh to Mt! peeps if LST enheur la LST, flow to BUST af LST level to too leu blocked free seat retura leeel te (Suberstem 2.0) emeeceptably leu
- 2. Talve falle to Suberstee 2.0 Bone earles steady state Rees elece ; beek valve peretr eeepenent prevent ber6ffees (Seet Seters) NP-80 in Saboystem 2.0 to a hechop 3 2.2 Tonk Test Globe 9. Talve fatted etee M thenleal Lees of normal LST voet Peteattet reduettee of N, 8kamiter LST Talve WP-80 (plugged, domeded, additten path, buildup er esmeentratten in reeeter pressere and ete.) {3cboyotee noncendenettle geses In eeelant and reduettee la level and p.9) LST, potential redeetten 02soevenging espebtitty repefr in N2 mese tremefer rete toeponent late reset.or content 323 lusauel N g/Ng 1. Talee failed elooed #y Se*h Lees of 52edn'atten to LST 3edeetton in N p Itepair compcmeet Supply /Isoletten (plugged, damaged, .Metoge, eemeentrettea. In resetor Telve 5 188 ete.) ecolset and reduetten In e$enketing 9
02 "*83"8 **P*%IIIII System 3 2.4 Level Trasemitters 1. Treneettter fatture - It' asleeted transmitter Lose of or Sneerroet LST Monitor eith tLT-33Pt. ILT-33P2 due to toternal indteetes leu flow free level indteettee, . redendent
- fault 3-vey velve automettently locorrect signet to trenamitter tremetere Betecum flew 3-may valve laterleek to LST and eperster eey saremit and poteettet for leeresse LST level with redueed N3 oemeentratten V.eed heldup. Pettattel in SC3. Operator response for LST teek everftlling, eey else result in 52 addition bloetage, and deereened letdown flev lower N3 eeneentratten la DC3. If transmitter indioetos high, operator mer deerosse letdown flow and potentially reduce pr3N em NPI puere o
- Beforesee Dreutage: FSet Figure 9.3-2 3.e substsfast: Lafume Grossos litet (13f,, vats? FrLises, ase men rghr3 *(Ceetimmed)
Fotential Festore Itode immedtete Effeete Aatprface at Subeystee Benedlet settee Component sknie levolved hithia Suberates 1sterfees Within Subsystee 3.2.4 Level Transettlers 2. Incorrect output due tjectrie Feuer If releeted transultter Lees of or taeorreet LST Destore power ILT-3)Pt. tLT-33P2 to lose of power Surply IaC dsotestem tem flew free level indseetten, supply or
. (cont'd) to transetitor System 3-wer volse outsvetteetly taearrect signet to monitor with treeefere 4eldc.we flow to 3-may velve laterlock redundant 4%f and ep6.ater may stremit and potential for tramanitter if voeresse LST tevet with teesseed N3 eeeeentrattee en a different bleed heldup. Peteattet in RC3. Operator power meeree for LST tank overfinitas, response mer else reemit 3, edJttles blectose, ta deeressed letdown flow eemeentration end ta lowerIfII,trescattier SC3.
ftdiestos high, operator amp deeresse letdove flow and potentietly reduee BFSN em RFI pware 3 Instruerent conneetten - Smetl less of LST taventory. Loos of or sneerrdet LST Depair ___. -t leek poth treeselttere level indlestion, effected. If esteeted Snoorrect signet to tronomitter ladientee teu 3-mer vatte interlock flow free 3-way vette etreelt and poteettet , outematiently trenerere for reduced II letdows flow to LST and eeneentratten,in DC3, operator any $nereese LST Fperator roepense may levet with bleed holdup. else result in deeressed
*eteettet for LST teak letdown flow everftlltag, By addition H ectege, and Iower N 2 eencontrattee la RCS, If trenomittee ladiestae hlgh, operater may deeresse letdown flow and potentially reduce WPSN en Ott pumpe 3 2.5 Pressure t. Incorreet output A2eetrie revec tie effect Lees of er sneerrect LST Destore power Treassitter IPT-lo ese to le=e of Supply, ISC pressere ladleettom supply power Systee
- 2. Tressettter fatture - Se efyeet Loos of or incorrect LST Depair ecoponent pressure indtoetten 3 Instrument eenneetsen - w at asse of Lsf seventory Lene of er sneerrent LST sereir __.
- t' leet pressure traiteettom 33 IIPI Pump Suetion Needere 3.3.8 stator Operated 9. Telve falls elesed - F.co to RFI pumpe stepped. Ieeediate lose of flow to allan supply free Isolettee Velve less of BFSN to BFI pump BC makeup and RC peep per37 vie ester NP-23 (NF-921) resettlag peselble te sente operated velves pump desage med etige alternate Ht!
pump if required e a
~
l 1 1
' l
?
9 :, 3: : g: e
. y .s . .e .-= '
=1-
- e
=
n g.: .- - -
- =
-:: =
. ::= I[ I[ I[:
2
;: :2 f,gt:: .
- I:s 3:: 31,.= san- s -
[s::1 g 3r [2.3 =::s :Is-k
- :. in .:
- . - st :- -: -3 -:n1-c 2
- 3 :p. :. r l g=.s .r = [ s e agr I1.
. i -
r- t == r aj
]2 l 2. ... g r:1.s g , .i.
- i. .i
-. s.e g-:
a 4:-..I
-- .. a 1 . . 1 - - - -
3 r : : s
- s at I
8 IIg
- Il II o
i i lti imi
-e a-r l i l:5 ga
- ., t tu :- ,a --
x .:v : .! .g.
! II:g 8:g !
l- : :1 1 :1 si i:8:g
- : 2 2. 4: :ss.
b 3 . IE 15
-8. 1'.1 i 1- i i8. 1?
e: E2?iE2EiE2Ei1 te
~ :
- ]v
- ]us ::-
]vi
- a s erstes:
can:c:==c tenia-2 1 ; - - g 1.1. II.2: I1.2 . f.: i:f. f.: .
' ] .-
- 3 i s x s: :
S x
, 5:i: Sti -
4:{
-- i,r- :: :: ::
s H s y 4 In t.- t-: 1 Igt.. In:. : II II II zl c
. :- t*-
-a,l a-
.g: 4I
=3 m I
.I1 Ig:a -
l e E
- E
-:ses la*L
-int
- L 3.
--[-
- . : 4 :,--[vt: at:
2 c : B e a c = e a 5 a I
- e isi-
- . s s:
g
- e g
anj!. - g Gi.5 :: s a 37 I I i 1 I g C I9 13 - - - 1
% 1
= 2 : 2 a
se j 7 f .g. :
$ $ I E 7 1 f : .3 *
= .: -t
- t a g. < : : :- 2 -
e j .:
-j :
s i
-j 1 :I
- t g
, et 2-
- . : :- : :- :1 :- -
.L g = . . . .
A A 2 4 : A A ; 7:E 31: Y II$y 3 kI$
. sans : nas w
l 5.:. $ : I4 Gs .s.e a S D 9
, m m 9
m e k 6
~
?-
=:
! i 35 i E i i :
i *.- zi. is [:::Jir[:f.ir :I c
;= :- s : s I::
2. 32= a 2,2
. -..=-
arg4=1 m-:e r: 4:! 2
..-r,.
- =.t
==
-=.
m- :t[2-l:t.
=
.2
= .= ; =. =. t g =r.e
,. =.=
2.t i
= ..
I # -
% E
- * * $8Ir a
l g
- x e.: != m>!
Tut 22. 8 ::T%E
.v c: .: t* "
i . su.i
. 2 "8 85 z 8: :.
g: 3:(:tI: v;u;
- :: o2:.:.
c ., 1 i : 2
- t As ; ;
4 c - 2. .*: 4
- 2. . 8 2" ..
,e
.r *
-::l .:. ,
"t : "t *t.: - t- t 1 .: : a t. : R . 9. :: 2R. :. 8131 ':22 :
e *
- cucu g .
i
, ,12" 3.2 -
,1:" 8?LI L:" , 37[
E j {.u j ,: t. I . r t:. a I 2 t [:. , I -
- sul Eti
[ssL6 e.: EE
-- 6 2- -
=
n e- 4t
- I 44[
r4 21.: I 8
= c 8
4 : e r a it.:3
- :e
.2:
sze :::- ee cI gt;
.m. o s:
.2:
.:: $2-I
.l.l es 24 m
2
. s .. arse ers- 2: - gi:::,
d Ia
- 11. =. 2. .s 4 _. ,I s .4 I,5 .
- a. ;
- i 5 C & R- R h : 6 I : *
- I 6
t -
- 3 e,
- er : :
3
- J # *: : t &
. . o A :
I - 18 : E 1 1 1 !a g e & -- E - 4 g . . .
- T 1 1 -
7 TY t- 7? - s' :! I !. " 5) i2 2 -- 2- : :g .: 5 : .- .- .- .- .- ~2-1 "2 4
- 11 041 :I :I ! % 2. :.
3.: f. t
- h .8 .
aj4 4- :.-dl- aj4 :g2* j *-
;mk 3%)6 27) IST IST IST 1:I
- 6 2
I4 J J J
- J k J J J E
- =
- =g
= z 8- :
=
= 3 I 2:= = s =-
= Ie; 8
I:$s - *sii::=.! '5
*ij I
! 5 ".
3:s*- n .: - 2 n 4.4:--n= . I:.!. n4 - 1: I::4 7 k 5 9 9 -
- m ,
C m m m mm m e 9 *
. s
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - _ . _ _ _ - ._ .._ __. __ - _ _ . - _ _ _ ~ -_. _ _ . . . . . _ _ _ _
, . . 3 s .
, i
, 3 .
i t s Reference Drevingos FSet Figure 9 3-2 , (Sheet l) ! 3.0 SWBSTSTBIs LB700d5 A798408 fees (RJUS). 32.37 FIL? gas, AES RPI pu1IPS (Contimund) ; i 4 Potential reta.re Mede Ismedtete Bffects Interfeee at Subeysten Benedial settee C= r-et Itsee Involved Withis Subsystee Interfeee 'Jithtm Subsystem 3.4.2 Spore hPI Pumpe 2. ; ump felle to etert -- No discherge flow frem if pump je dommeded 9t!Itse alternate BP-PtB, NP-PIC due to laternal pump demanded beoeuos of feature utth IIPI pter, (eented) fault operettes pump. no flev repair pump to DC meheup er RC Pump
- eeels. If p.empa are just belns suitehed, me offeet 3.4 3 plecharge Cheek 9. Talve in operettag -, se dioeherge flow through We flow free operettag WPI WLilise wlternate Telve(s) WP-195, pump discherse falle felled valve pump to RC matemp er aC RPI pump SP-900 etened (plugging, pump seele damaged, etc.)
- 2. Talve in etendhy pump - Deehrlow throug*J e Bedeced flow to seal leolste failed discherse felle noenperating opero pump to injeettee and/or enheup cheek valve to prevent beetflow emettee of operating pump (leest setten).
(peteettet NPI pump Hoogter desese) erttleet fleus 3 4.4 Beatromletion 8. Line blocDage due Seal setara Peteettet deseds to NPI pump Potestiel lose of BC makeup Stilsee alternete t me(s) toosefsted te plugged block Caeler !=14t vie peep desciendtag tf eed sent lejoettee IIPI pump (other pite Pueros selve
- r er181 sn f5ed :stes pas d!scherse to rateur eetten Rf-Pla, HP-PSB, 2.0) and emot lajeetles to not evellette fres
, NP-PfC enough for pump operettee outelde the subsystee) 3 4.5 Deseherge sleek 1. Talve in operettas aCP seale, se discherse (Ise through me discharge flow free ettlase alternete r 9elve(s) IIP-tel pump discharge esector te16 fetted volve operettag IIPI pump to IIPI pump , (SP-9344), EP-Ite .falle elesad Leme esees BC pumpe seule er SC (IIP-9348), NP-It4 (plugged, (aeoped, f, 8 and meheep (SP-934C) sta.) Crossovers , a and 3 3 4.6 IInter Operated 1. Telve eleses on 14C System if pump NP-P1A operating, If pump IIP-Pla operating, If operating pump feetation Talve apurisme signet flew to meet injoettee is flow to seel tejeetles to to RP-Pla,
; IIP-115 (RP-935A) stepped. If pump NP-Pse stepped. If pump IIP-P s etert peamp is operettns, flow to le operating, flew to WP P18. If t noreel RC makeup la mermal RC emhoop to operettes pump j stepped stepped to IIP-P13 start HP-Pla or (for unthrottled a
enkeup) opee . volve NP-fl4 Le reeeter islet I.cor a e > , _
2 p r o
- p 3 nem m u m o t t n t
n l e rt ona su p 9 ot i s p u A nSe i o e v e a ae fp I deIl l ti n ,t v l k _ e t y g ,pI ,F epi n e a o l eedk oT l s r cs Ab aam gs- l oi v cn lt
- a p seene dS t af u) u tl u tFp . IPR ntF t P l oo tl m Tl reat tL Tt i ig1 lS e- t)Nr a li aoo o Siflt e e Sud d a rPtl apt bt - op o3v t s c Lt t y b
p s l o L eTe rt in eNrP rMrrhevcrn ruet eae et rul ,ue e t ,eSr e di p a e al v a r o pTdt rw rll Ui se ah eb ostNpetfeutkl nnae0paoe l ol l so t r t o i a tdpSl r oo oebBu t v q sS mt isDol e( uevrLo iiv sf p inuUoo t l t eCre ei f nasBbb T( RW I o t t e o cf e alRor S U u D M _ s N _ s y a o o _ nd t g o .tS gnFI ,te l e oe t n e f8 f gnF t a w no - o no o a t e sg o e a iiPt o iiPt t t et aee e e o s h r ttn ac ttN o s mj srl t t o c D repe wt ac wt rny uo l t repo y w e t e ejel p ejml p d oil n o fd e td m u i c s pnefu peufu a ea l t eo l l ue rdo n e oip
,k e of p e e aem ro f pe nl en n e t e att ga ,k t nnr ya n t aoo r ) ec Atfga s si o t po ib - ti e l aI nm I aI amt w gl t d
e a Pe i re s ren i st u o hC ne* c t r.f s l d ovne B e u n b r ue r .tC aR P
- s
. eRtC eno dns ien t m t cB l ees i
St pod r d Rodr dti ti oi bso a i ee am l m t n p t eel ppape p t eel ect ctB St lt bo l e7 ry s i ppapea rp aTr3 n o tI mwpomp mwpompf r ea fI c rf u tSiW
,c e
t A uoo plt eot ro uoo plt not ep rof e f rh f et oFje osb o Tk e tLuB o q ( e f sl ns epa sP n su sS a e f feins o o op eHi ss oLm ef eo t ort f I f o o. o o o s r f I N s t L L r e E g pi e o o y t
,t ei n t e w i s e
gmP
,tB I e
e fB s o l o r d eoo gnF e s l nf p e strt ne - o wA ese si l op p m a ttb o itrt tth o t o tes e l i n n ,ev t m ee wt ae n erl apw aee s A J m repo ejml p repo wt bh t so fd uuo dl wpu
. e snufu ejml p pnuf u n
o na op o l t ed nkt d o em7 e l1 S t oip e oI p e i t ea eae e 3 f2 B s y
,k ,k t s
ya rw v ml l gL E s anfga alfga e t n eo t po e bn f 1 m s eI nm ef m /in of o T L b u re
- s i Pl- s eaIi nm l
c e ri at pc i st l dl oe nb t nti wa s ott I F S e modr
. aR tC d
r bod r
.tC aR td ee t sn b eo aoss l ey orn d eo ssa n d e sj o nl os osl p t eel e i t pt T ppep p t eel edt n Bt l ou E
i h mwpomp ppapec ri3 fI c eaIb u eot l e 3 L uoo mwpompd e o t v l e t r B t plt eot ra uoo ronf !d oFe j t e .s e du e ,t i T anedee I w plt sot ef srn sP n l Tc fsl ns vfSo tSe f f fsinst o n eMe sNi o d oLt rr rLr
)
I - I I o. e f o T t L R I P RJ , ( y ll t pa 0 0 0 s , pn e T eeur ease 1 6 2 e t r n m m 8 ed se st rnt t e e e yceIl t t t 0 f v s s s 4 rl Sew u y y y 0 e eo - - l ora . s s s 7 0 d o t v nn CEtoF A
- b b b 3 M I u u u Ii S S S s e W r O u ,
D t y e d T t d s e E a et l t e dg L F se n l ) ea on e n . sm
~ !
s l r ee t e oe d ec pt oa l d 4 a r t r oe c 5 en t e T 3 t n tt d v au i e , eg, w o w o w o e e t a t q td ! n l l 1 t d ao nd t e ar sag e !i f f l f 3 o ftt ag 5 F b i e f f n f g) r 8 5 eeul t ua eo vt m ee n ee e el u
- e. o f
o f o tdf vh vd vpt e s s 3 a l s l w t( l( e s s a a e a o e 3 f T T D t L o e L L 2 3 4 1 1 I 1 1 w
) ,
) ) t o
e4 l dv5 e8 eC s tF pu n el3 v5 v5 u n uo r t a9 l3 l3 c et et u aV - a1 a1 1 t e kr t r r t P t - F nl ee e t n esN po() mR n5 f t oa st sw o( o( ct e o e Ot d e dt ll n t 5 t i l rn en af o p r e f t' olt e t8 e1 t1 a1 I n ow t o eI e m 1 l1 ce l St o tosfo oo lo- o- m at Bd e Pl e
. C MIE( et sF e ee Ce ca lu IB t pL BF at s
y 6 8 s 4 T. 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 e
-s4 A l #-mm I
e e b 5: s 3e :*
.. 4.}.."
g-
'j
- n .:[i
%:5g 1
=g
"_ }"5
$ gius
~
F . . 1* 1 3 A *%it 8 8
* :* 2Si A g
E
- 28 IIS a
8 I$ '15 2 3 4 ::t
% ~2 ti8
_a :. a
.i.l
.t
" a
- I -
I - i :.
. 2 I::g l l kt
- 2 z'c d
' A 32"
. ':2 3 : 4 ~: 2 =
g :
- = 1
- b.
5 I- . m 31 3 . 3. 1 I. is I O E E- : ; R 3 t 8 ' O R : 9 n 1 m 1.
.li i..
F 33 2 A .:5 1 . E p e.
~
M
. mm b
t ,
I 1 I I APPEEDII D FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALISIS SUBSISTEM 4.0: RC PUMP SEAL INJECTION I I l l l l l
2 r e r s e d l _
; - ) e t t t t o r) o r) s e e t _
34 ne e s n er en e i ar r n o_ ot n_ : e e , t c e, t o s l r. f e ol 9d i s - n rhh li rhh l i esis u t n t y _ o ett it ett pso it hat aq l ( _ ea cs . p pao fo fa thut e if . r ab _ u opbd n opbd e ,sr fid _ ut u _ c ny ny fo e e) . g tS - _ o ersabt arsabt opd ef sern i s e l eo ds l ee ds ueri i sie Ft l n r r t e t esne t enne ekl out r o di i t t t ek piao el pieo noiee etqt vyee i R o eh a p e p e p e p ti yatt viyatt ooah n a p A h nt tfb ms( lfbme( bft e lb rs SS ei e e e e e o f a e F( BW s D S p v W I v R n e g C l l t r C n D a a e od D t n n n ! e u o g g ig o o eed o e r t i s i s s t t mrn rea t D w u u opm w o e e s cd od noe o e l r r r t e l e gn d l c m f u u u fp f p p f n e d e s e p net d s e t e ne n s n no ao iho ne r e sc ya op i p e r e r e r ot i s ct is rwn u op ip f sf t o p p p t t dna t o e b r ct ce ep ce ep ol ct es R ue es t t t jm jm ti t c j st j e c c et s n ne e e e nu nu eao e ne ip e tI i p r r r ip ip f re f ep f m S m r r r f
, t c
t u ap o o o tC lC aS epy e t u ap c c c e e n n n aB e e o ob o e
- f f
S i I I S S N N s a e d d d e r d t e e e r e e e e p p p p p p e p t c v l l ull
, d o o e t o i d oo e t t t a f erv r> s r s s mf rt N a o roy o
y ne O l w t r r t b uol I m o o e e nst d cct T e l m t t ee n t t C t f e l l g o. ep e fd o W s r i i n1 t nr J y n f f e 4 nah
.r i
N o o f r o t I b i o h hg u h id t g dne gd t eot
- 8. W e e u u os ue cpt e 4 e t stt o o ti o ot ep a 8 n j c one r r ct p rn jot r 3 i n e l ae h h eap h e nt er h i f lf t t f r6 t v i sno 3 t f t of f e e ge P i t e l oe w w opr wr l rie M W a eo o o oo op eesf U e o m o l l o l e P S- s S N F F N F S C
B y l t: p s , p I T mou eiS S e t r t cd st r 3 ae yce n f v Seu 0 3 d e rl eo t v
- CsF l
e- - 0 o nn 1 M II
. 4 e
r n u e o . , t d. u i e d d a de dr t r de de r e eg e e ul eg eg F sa t w e l a oa d se om uo n n in om n os d t l a pp ar t a d oe l e e s od t o fe od e t o cd g i uf c t g e g t n o , oo rn s , g ed e , u td t ei td u t l d l e e i e t s n t i e l t n l e p t d eg ce e t o ag p ao ag P o M o f g) u . eo m rt uk m itt l f g) u . r f n f g) u . e e el e r raaea el e e ee el e t s vpt l( e oo ct t enue st edf vpt l( e t l rp t o rpt t( e f i
~ r e n n r a i o e r e T I I T T F V T D - d s e t N
e . . . . . . . . o . t 3 2 3 1 1 t 1 r f t n n o y o i 6 : C t 1 s ) b e ) - r re y eds n w e ee ef e ee , b ons o o j n a oll2 vi nrr oui t tt ) tsd t aa tt p5 r i ,1 l l lt ,3 aI n et93 F l i eat i s i i e91 e - a eSy3 t a21 e t uT - t sr f Fl 2 - SFt l B1 ll1 - n e t cn eanpr cee oP S er - i oP o t t a ert l gsFN gP eorP FePN i f n e jMo( jPt a nIN nNa lfoN lN , c t i S n i n i e i . i l y r I rt6 I rn S tl e24 t r- l sr, bl s0 e O e p ldl1 ea2 ld n e'e y aee33 ruv19 aeF rt - eeeS vvtP d ae3 j nuv1 n m
- m aeo- aae a enl - - elP ell - anl - I e u eesP eer u paaPP piH 0seiP t Sf inaF
- l C F sRIN Shf F OMTNN OF( 9VFW TN l F a
C C e B B S 1 2 1 2 3 4 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 e e
t-7- _ ,3_ , _e:: . . ,::_- _ se::. . 1 _,: : _: 2.:: : :_2::: -_ :a : gin _ g I_g: _
-i :: _:: -
_ -:=- ::- - -::t:- 4 -
- = _ ::2 8:4
- - 32:, 5A g Istgt.:II: 3.:lls :.:2 8 =
- A. -c. ==_ c,3::_.c,:::_.,3 7e. J : :::
z i__:i.. ..:3,7. s _:.ie
- s. gs :::r.
_,4 g_g c: :33, _:, _g - _: :r
. ,: =::2._3 :::2 :__5 g = .__I m ..-__ .1.g s g ..=.:1.i _g
__:3s:- . s_, .: g 1,2
.2 I. . .r a a
1 . .
. s a _
-r 3 -
= =
. , , g, .: x :. : : :
A .
- I I
- 313%. ._. ._. ._. I I g
jEg! ::t: It 32 - e :: .c, es == :g a
- g
- e: - -
- _g..: E , _- : : _, .
s :: : _g :s ==
"1 0 :c;43 2; t- is . ..
t
. :" 38: At" 3A 1; $ _g L2 %:
3A 1: 2A
-1
-hL -t
= =
- L
= = A 2
- . t ,
- i : :: g
_ _ _ e .
! 4 R:. .: *
- 4 :
- . 2 -3 .% : :
I c.*5 2_* 2 a . 21 f: 2: 1" E E
-::~.lcl. ::1
=
11- 15- . 2: .
- -21 :3 '
g . g 4 TT::
-r: Iz-:
_3: _: I1-3 l2- _: 3
- 51 21 2
. At At 2 2 38 I II E RI AT AT 3 thj3 gI: gCI gc3
- l. -
sc3
. . - 3 k jk k - h ;; 2 ;2 s -
E :
- a17t :.g !?
i g 10# . g tu a==I
-36 jeg:
. ar 34g :: . ::::
lg }
. k%
33 3 A u o c.; I jes2 u 1 k : . t . : . F a 1
~~
~
=
ti to
- }
. }_P os t 1 3:2
. 5 5
2:- 5 55 22S 5 55 5
- 3 : : CS*
..t . ..
2 4,g . . le
- 142 I a J A a a a O :
- s l
- - *% 1
%u %:
l . 3: 3( ug u, r 8: IT C 2 Ok N 7 7 O 7
, O
~
l L s 9
- - - --,,,---r- , -~
]
, in rn 2 ) l s g
-) m 0 ae) t t t t ) t t t 34 ne s 4 een aene ne e t oi n nen ne 9d ot e yt 1 sl o -l el el epsrfl e el e el n
t s t y el o pl m F lt r e
- b nb nb noeo tdt nb ns nb ea os l t
.leps
_ oi oi ot vh et et ol ow ol yaemN ane ps psl st ore pepo pe r uI sb u b u o( uos w sen mn e cevneh a sris msed ms g nl r mdi s : eeao ece oe co u oect oe lS naof roit s as i s Ft e a in i mr ervce t wdfi eo e r rmrs o o rs o ik rl eeswro ebt qt ee ceau rsro e cno rm R e di ednoa djo o i i i iionr o o i A h eh mt t nol ernnl l acfhoii( t s afaf at at h! elfl iafiat af e SS ei a e pi pi e e pi e pue!tfi( e pi pe e e pi n F( RW t R R R R R R R R e o p s e e g C n n R o e ee i adrn ed r w a o o oe op eai l op e n r t l l a t s t th t pe t p e D w a n n e w wi g orr o t o g g g o wt ee wt t e oh osh p es e c m l f e i mie isco eoec ld f e l fp l t l e n f p s f p j e e t s ne d wr wrwr o o np p nun mt nuevmee nu m i n r se op o o o oo o pi opnl op o e ye i p ll llll it i o t i a i l p f sf e b r t o ct f o r f of o r r t s c tC p tCev tC am R ue es tt tt tt ep cRt e e eR e tk cD e eu Sp St n j ne cn nnon jm jes jecc je eo eoeo nu nl nl ee nl fC s tI A i p rc rcrc ip ign igfh ig oR 1 m r r r ne af e n t c l u ap oo ct oooo ct ct lC aR li h lt e as t i so e e n n ast 2 ss st f S n e e e o e o f I I i S S S N S L E
) e d 2 d
e t a ep i u i p e n d o d d r eae n d e i e t ne p p t n m s r ip e l peie l p a o p n aorl n ao o l w t wo i et e o et C m o e ot l ssh r Ss ( e l s l s t ed t s f e f d de pn de N y n r e e ene a en O s o f nn t ti es ti oi cd cl nee) cl I T b u i t o tl ee e ivdR e C t fl f neliR f n E S c e ed ft f o as f o e t stt ee et eit vne J n j c onc jt o t c id ei S i n e nc nr t I h i f l ee lf ncek n nc w t f l of i e f ih t iefeee jf ent i e j o L e wn l A i W l a l oe ao lf ae ou wnehou wn f o c( o E e oi S S o m o e l l l o I, o N S N S F F N F N S P t e y R l P p
, p o.
C mcu 3 B : eiS e ) t r m e cd p st r ts ae m yce t s J F f v u Deu r rl F l o- - T 3 e eo - CEF - - - - E - - b e 1 d o t v nn C 4 u R 1 3 M Ii / S R 1 U e S r a u , l, e c , 0 l d a u i e d l de t dr t r de d w d 4 e eg o e c ol eg e o e F oa T t w e t a me s s s os uo n t n es e e l f o l a l e 4 pp n ar l e p l ek l ed ( t n fe ed o e t e c i o , uf e t o w t n td s e oo t rn ei e , e e ab e o e e a ld t l t e ag t s n t l e t l l l t l l l f t o d o J cs e t o ag e e an a P e f g) u . L eo m itt f g)r f fe f f t a rl uk m l u . v o el e vpt c r oo reaeu t enua el ee e ee e l( e i ct sl edf vpt v l( el v vr l p v s e t n n r a a l l s f c a a a o e I I T T T T T T L j
, n . . . . . .
I I 8. 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 1 l a ) e s n, S ( , o r24 at : o0 p e00 e , i3 s
,,, o , s t1 u t11 t - -
l4 5743 t e4 w n a - F iTT t6 , t - 6 s 4489 t n9 o o lP 8123 ei3 l t mFF ot6 e - - - - lL - F oN C eII r3 - v FPPr o P t e t e R s F n l) e ,, h T)N l a) RRWp onN tO t e eee jep e s l r13 s T e ..., p nrm n l(3 a T00 l( , n4636 l em5 l n e p ee3 u 11 ee57 kt4482 eeu8 IFu F uv1 d w- uv et 1122 I e e nl - aer i v oTT lFF nl46 a a7P
- e/- - -
h2PPFP uvP2 nl - me ! w eo1 C MVM i FII MT8N aeCP elf d C(NNNN MTRN t sFN n s y I 4 1 2 3 S 4 1 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 e o
4
'7 A *
.s 3
*1
- g
. 1
~
2E kt r- g ~5 1 17
=i
- m. .
1.
. .-5 8 en -
-v . .
-T..a -.R.I w.Om T.
3 8: ( , .g,tu..t 3 3. kk % !
%)us 5 *L 4
" 2t 3: 285*
A3
. 3 .: 4.
3
,':::4'T g . 16-
- 3
- 1 ,
E
. g S .
- a .
E A I 6 i , .
= .
3 . 21 5-
. 22 :
2 15 g & -- 3 hm
- R e
33
- A= S R
p T
.i
.. li
. _r ;s 1 .:
- . F' 12
. , 20.1 G
S s e
1 APPENDII E FAILURE MODES AND EFFECS ANALYSIS SUBSYSTEM 5.0: R2 ACTOR COOLANT MAKEUP i l l 1 i l l
} -3 ; i Reference Dreutnges f3AB figure 9 3 2 (sheets t and 4)
5.9 SWe3TSTEM
BEACTOR C00LAST (RC) MatEWp Potential fatture Moes Immedlete Effects Interreos At subsystem Remedf el Action Component Mode involved Within Sul,esotes Interfeee Within subsystem 5.1 Beactor Inlet Line Loop 4 Needers
, 5.9.5 Manuel loolation 1. Talve felle elosed - Makeup flow stopped Loss of normal makeup flou Repair component.
Talve MP-fl0 (plugging, deseged, if required (Pf T218) etc.) provide sakeup flow via Loop B injection path (open looel RP-38 and throttle with remote NP-27) 5.1.2 Flow Transmitter 1. Transettler fatture -- No effect Incorrect flow alsnet on Bepair oosponent IFT-7, TA and TB due to internal one treneeltter fault
- 2. Inocerect outpwt due ISC System. No effect Incorrect flow signal free Restore power to signal fatture Electrio att 3 tresselttero supply Power Supply 3 Instrument connection - Small lose of remotor Incorrect flow signale Sepair oceponent leek ocolant free all 3 transmitters 5.t.) Motor operated 1. Talve opene on IEC System Makeup flow to not Increased makeup flow, Menvally eles.
Telve HP-26 erurious signal throttled increased pressuriser valve (local (RF-T244) level, drop In LST level, sotloo) potential lose of HPI pump NPSN
- 2. Talve opene on ES Makeup flow to not ineressed makeup flow, Manually elone spurious algnet throttled increased pressuriser valve (local level, drop in LST level, motion) potential loss of NPI pump NP3R 3 Talve inadvertently - Makeup flow to not Jacrossed makeup flow, Close valve opened throttled incrossed precepriser level, drop in LST level, potentist loss of NPI pump WPSR
- 4. Talve fatte open - Makeup flow to not increased enkeup flow, Isolate with due to internal throttled nereased pressuriser B."-118 (local fault level, drop in LST level, setten) (will potential loss of HPI stop makeup pump pPsn flow)
(Modes involving failure to open are part of emergency MPI and not included here) 52 Minimum flow Bypeos Loope 5.2.1 Meeust teolettum 1. Talve falle olooed - No flow through minimue Be ecoling flow to Depair - at Talve NP-234 (plugging, damaged, flow teor pressuriser errey line ete.) or eeld les intet postles, no effect on makeup especity a e
. 5 5 8 .g 1 2: 1, y -. 6 : %. -. a m . - 3 *k ".1.,.
.t 8 .845 5 a -
l1 l
- t. s : s c .:3 g : -; rg
[ c:ge: c:t
. -. _I.,-a 3
- r. ... :. t , : :. : : .3. s_: . . 8 f. ,. .
-tasti. t.}
- 4 se : : ::2_: 1 _z. _. = : 2. :=:. :_ : :
- . . I a
_r
- s r t' :
=,,
as -
=- s =
2 _3 : _ _= ch.3 A : : : 8: 7 .t.. . :: W: ! 2 3
- 3. :- I :"_..
28 _ t I ...". .
- I ;*T- ::... :.
_r42- 3.1. 21. ... 3:
'. :g226' 4
- 1: I'l' E' _E7 3:*74 86 -'s 82 8: B y
$=
cscs c5 r: I.:- :x::::g _ t 2: c:
.t Is g c
=
c- c_
- ..,s.
- ::s_
- : :: r:
s
- :I: :
6 6 6 .
=-
- - s_ ** "* *** **
s""g
- ss:*
m' g r e.
'8-I. '8. 'I
- gt: 8 3
I,.. . :..
- E _2.1_: : _E-2-:
- gr._et: , , g :8. -
- - - . . a . . . - - -
3
. . .a.r
-52 %:. k.
,_i
".22
- ~.
= .k
%. g . .. . . g_ .
e - 2 .: :- : .: 8 :. 2 a. .: :- :: 2 . 2:. _
. : : .S.'gc* "6.. 5. : S g
g
.E .
E .t a.,t .-. _..? ::: 1-!,1,s..
- 1. - 1.: -
8% -tas*g8 Ekt- E2:_:.8% Rt 1 1 Ew.
- : 2- c:- cr :
- cg: r e. :!. :< . g c:g,r cg=!.=I i.- :
_v a : :- .e. . t. .:
. - .. ix. ;. It -
=
. =.
R 2 s
.3 E
.. . E2. _: .e .E. 22 _s.t:
.s. :- :, . ...- _
E E E
.2 =
E v kg to R_ 6 8 :: i :, att ::.t
- 3 25 a tt j . kT I A21 I i ! ! I i 1 34#1 g
].
1: E E
.k.
,=6 . ,..
,1 . . . .
.a. ,s. .
s e g 3:
. :. i. .t g.
2 31 ::._- 3 s . m
.n 2-2-
=. _ , . .
z. 2-
=. _ , .
s.
= . s .. :- = = == s .- :
5 ::,:
- 3 g :: ::. e n-:
.st :.- .za. ege e.- g; e.:a n- g:
. e. :
, s.: I: =a: , :32: ::: : ::: :ss -
-1 41:.
.t a 4
.e.
. o T = = . = =
%:a %R 23 SS ';
lC- :*
- I*
1 2'4. 4'a 4 - k' 4"
.u._
.. .. .. 4 -o-I :: :" E 3* _ EA b CU' Es is 23 && C2
*. * ~~
e e e e e
. e* e '?
k
1 l u.- MM .
. . . a. . ..m. .
1 5. .
.. . . . . . ., 8. 8 a. . --
-~ e I
,. a .E . W
?..81 M. . . ., .2 2a..
6-
. .s
. 1. %
.. ,6 1
..-..k 6 . -
m
- 6. ...
6 6
- 8
. 6
- 8.. .~.... . R . .~ '*
- m. ~.6
- ...E1......
*1-*
'I a
.: '*"8*
' ' "5 E "* :"
- T5 k'.. I . .t= 4 : *I .=4=I83.
T E "8.18 E ** :"
- 4 38=. 18. 7. 4 k l1., 2
- n. .d "II.-
6 I 2 4 2" ~. =2
- 2. ~IE "1. :.1 2" 2 6
---=.6..
- l
& E E 4 . E
.a. .
E. B
- .. .u - .E.
3 .I. . .I. ,~ ..
& ..., a. ..
. . a. .e, - - .. -
-a
.a . .-
E .. ,. ..
... . . w. E., .= .= > 8
. .. g. .. g.* ... . 6. . .
8 :CE =cI Oct - 1 0
.t%b1. -
t :a =-.a =. .c..I 208 .
.I. . R.. .. w. a .k 6 .. ..
- a. ,. a,. .. 6.
- m.6 .
..E.
6 m. .. 1 5k. 1 -. -.. 6 .
,= 6, 2
8
..5 -5E.
E
.o. .6-6
.=
.an I 6 .=
.E. .-.. I.- .E.
.6 t . .o.
. 6,. .
. 1. a. .-
. 4. .. . 1 ..,. a 4.n.... %..
.. ,3 . .
6 ,= - T 152 15 15 2321124: 321124 15: 15:
- T .E. '
- r E .- a.
=
. . a a a a a E 4 8
8 8 g - 8 0 a 8-
. 8, 8. .
E l kEE REE kEE 1" 7" .EE .E! ! k ' *.
. s. c c %. c c s. c c 08 E. "cc "cc 3 *
,'I ,
.u , . .,. .,. .. ..
E.
-.g E.
..g .
a.6. . c.8 E .
,1m . 6. ..s m
.a1. . . .A a
.E
. s
. s. .
.cs. .
.f.
. . 3.c6 E . ... . . J,
~ .= E . . E E.6 . 23 23 .. . . .... E. ...
c c i.t c iB EC8
~
X
. t.B. - E.. l 'Eil I 'Ei.lg
;g
. . c a '8 ,.
- - ~ 2. .g %.% 2. .g %.i:
I 6 g-.. 6 ci
- c. ~t.g-l ...u "g g.t.u "g c. .5 1 e . 4. '.
g
. . . s c. c
. a
,.6.
6
. 1 . . -
3 a a E- . t. *. I .o. I u ! ! I f E :" R t e ; .4 *
. i..-.. . T.
I I 3 I*I II - I r . .1 . 6
.E6. . 16
,. ,. .. Y g
- . . F .b 5 S. .ge. i 1 I 22 F' 2 ,
* . . F' 3 .L 2 1, 3 %E. . .2 w t. h6 2 5.
. . 43.
%. i t.
w
.. = ..6 .. . . 3. % .. .. .
2
, ;-- ;. ,s %. .
; ,. 3 ;. ,.. % q
;k .
. 8 i
5" N N E. @ . N . 1
- h. .
. h *
= .E..L .I. .
t t I 3k 2 ..~
.E di
.s . 3.
o h.. E S.. I. E uE 9 6 N N N L
' ~
g! i 3
*1 L '
a- _ 2" c . 1
- 1.-
.: ~ - -
22 .I:.2 .t .I :
. _s ' I
~
t E .:E E a ::
- I :ag.g: e 24 3
- , - _.,- 1.-gs 23
-af e
s:e gig a :: !: !uts,
- 2i. :_-
- $. : :n : :::
*s -U s: -5:
"3. *13: i.1: *:':
% ::: b*2tjat 212:
. C . :
- = .
} :t-i$ 2 s
a i -3m. i. _r i. .t i. _ _ s.
,a! : ar *
. a n: ce cat
- E .. . .: .g a a : 24: :t :_ s 4 e' 1 " **
j2 Ein : y . 0:4.
. 2 _st: :: s'
!i E jins ge=g;li -
. 3 g
5 9
- g
- i : :
t: I 2 2 l 5- :: $ R I "a
- 3, ,.
i 1,f
- i i i
- j c c :
~
1 I a f- : i i 53i
. .i. .i i
; a i.
I: Si
- g:*
_t:
. :t "E -r*:
I
.=a 2: -I
=
. -1 E 2.
er-f u ab$ t C5
=
5- "Eul R s* *
$ .Y c E i ii i i I
l i l l
APPENDII F FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS SUBSYSTEM 6.0: RC BLEED, BORON RECOVERY AND CES:ICAL ADDITION f i l l l l 9
~- 8 .! 1 1
- =. t.-
-. . 6 t.-
6 I I
~
....6 - n...-6.
~
22 8: -
.= = =
.A 8..
,6
,6 *t. ...
o
.6.. . -...
~
-d S "' -
*~ ** **
. - u .2*
.u u.2 .u .6 ...
-ae
'85 as C I~:
c
- : 5 2
7:
- I a
*t .3 E &
Ik.Iu *
*t1u :*G I
I S t .3 *af' .I t I I A. A. A. 2 3 8 a a a 6t
= v if.
E. -
,a E - a.
a -
... . . .o .o. m
~ .
E. .I. . . .
= .= = m.. ,
. . . . . . .. 5. c . !
. . . . a ..6 i
= ..=.=
. . .E . o. 6 6 e. .
6 , . 6. E,. to
.. .-.. k.
.. .- . -s-i
.. I
.. . -6 20 i="j := 3. == ;=
6 . 3: 6 . 6 . -
. . . . . . w
-E *
%*. ~* * :: - s .%.3%a 3. : O. I
. i.i.k. . .a ,. * ~ .2. . :,,'.c
. 1*. I' *
= . c.
. 2.. y 1.
.. .i a
- m
.%.=
= .
..n m
.a
. 5 ...c. 5. k. .t.. .i. . t. ..:6E...
. E
=
=
e I t.
.i =
3 w
.....==e.
=o a I1 . te
=
=
o .= eaIaE. o. ... . .-a3 o 6
= = = .c.
.s .
w = 6 2 o w ..
. R n. .
6
.o. g r . . . .
" g .6 . - .
.i - F E E
3 =, E . 2 . .
* *6 *6 -
'.;: ~t.a :* g
. t E .f. .. -l 3 I.
a .
.ou ..
1.t..
- o 9 =~
.E.e , ,
- n
=
=.
=..
n
.22: %;
a.
. E
.s a
- 6 6
.E.
.E.
a
=
E .k . 2 . 8 Ritt d
. .-... -. ..... =
=
. s .- . ....k - i..
== ** * . s 1 =
e&am a -
=~ .I
. E =* =* m' a g
=* .
.. 4 .o ,g.o .s .E. .
3 E. 2 A & 2 & 2 E a 3 & M 6 o
=
.E. :
ai C . . 6 6
.. - 6 W t%
- 3
. l i :
I I i 21 E I 1:
=~
1 a 1 I l I n . I r - s es E 2 2 :. , t t
. o . 3 .
- o. . .
. i. .
. = = .
, e .. . 6 1 . ..
E . tE - ' '. ] .. . g --
- m. . .
... .t -
- 6-m . g J E $ 3. ' . .t t' .
~
, = ~ *. . . .t 2 .t . .
. I
& A = = 6.
. . . t. -
. . a a a ; 4 : a ; ; A ;
s 4 a c - . . E . I
- 6. . o. .O.
- .. .,e
. 6- . 2 .. .~ 1
. E uh .
3
.o Eu -.
2 s 1 - * ; E =
- *~ - g 1 .
== s-
- E a.3 .. -
u 8 - E. . ga
,i.
m 3 6 s
. E E. C. -.
1
- g x= a g w. u g =.u gu g .u g= -u -
= a- a u
N 88% e .4 p o J J * . J *
- J J .**
J. . w w k
< 4 - ,
3 - 3 i , i 4 Reference Drautngs: FSAR Figure 9.3-1 (Sheet 1) FSAR Figure 9.3-2 (Sheet 3) FSAR Figure 9 3-5 (Sheets 1,3, A4)
6.0 30N3137198
BC DLERS, BORON DECUTEST, AND CNEMICAL ADDITIOS Fotentist Failure sk.dg Innedsete Effeits Interface at Subsystee Remedtel Setion Cceronent Ede Invol ved Within Subsystem Interface Wightm Subsystem 6.1.11 Manual Isolation 1. Velve falls closed -- No Llost No L10H evallable to pone Valve (CA-44) makeup filters - 6.1.12 Manual Isolation t. valves fall elooed -- No LICII None if alternate flow open CA-463 Valve (CA-47, rath evettable crossover to CA-49) pump CA-F4 6.1.13 Lloit Pump (CA-F3) 1. Electrio power Electrie Feuer Fump stops 3 no Lici! None if alternate flow open CA-463 supply falla path available erossover to pump CA-F4 6 2. Fump falle -- No Lloff None if alternate flow Open CA-463 path evallable crossover to pimp CA-F4 6.9.14 Cheek Valve f. Falle to prevent - Feasible beetflow to tank No L10H available to (CA-$l) backflow Close CA-49 if pimp in N t running makeup (11ters 6.1.15 Manuel Isolation 1. Demineralised water Destneraitsed No domineraltted water to No caustic or incorrect concentration Velve (DW-120) supply fatte Water tankg no caustle or caustle concentration checked via incorrect emustle available to LFI pumpe sampling concentrattan available to borna recovery
- 2. Valve falls otomed -
No deminereltsed water No caustle or ineerrect Concentration to tanks no cauntle caustle concentration checked ela or incorrect cauetto avellable to LFI pumps sampling concentration available to boren recovery 3 Valve falls open - tilates caustle in tanks Incorrect caustle Concentration incorrect cauette concentration available checked via concentratten available to LFI pumps sampling to boron res.every 6.1.16 Canette Mts Tank 1. Tank leaks -- Eventual lose of suellon' Eventual loss of caustio pone (CA TI) pressure to pump available to LFI pumps
- 2. Tank empties --
No caustic available to No caustle avellebte to pone boron recovery LFI pumpn 6.1.17 Manual Isolation I. Valves fall closed -- No caustle available to No caustle availstle to None , felves (CA-34, boron recovery LFI pumps CA-35. CA-37) 6.9.18 Caustle Fump 1. Electrie power Electrie Fever Pump stops! no caustle No caustic avellable None (CA-F1) supply falls evallable to boron to LFI pumps recovery *
- 7. Fump falls --
50 caustle meatlable to No canotto available Nonn boren recovery to I.FI pianpa 6.1.19 sampitns, t. Lines fall open -- Decreased enustle available Decreased emuetto evallable None Waste Lines to boron recovery to LF1 pianpa e . .
)
nee 4 4, 3 3, ot i s na na na rs ee srs ee t y oi oi oi t n t n
))1 cs i v iv i v s! ai 13 Ab t s t g t g e!
s u adn adn adn ek ttt lS b g b eee rei re! rei g a tkl tk! t kt eu eu eee in ncp ncp nep cl cl hhh SSs di eem eem eem ap ap eh eha oh e che l n l n e e e e e ((( st n. c s ncn ncs o pu ru n n n n n 125 ei t o e e o o o o o RW C C c R B N b N N N 333 999 k k k k k k k eee r ne r oe r ne r ne r ne r ne r ne rrr odal odol odal odal odal odal od al uuu ggg e etb e etb e etb e etb e etb e etb e etb o ot o iii dbl yt a l yt a l yt a l yt a l yt a l yt a l yt a t t FFF raeldb n aeldb rael db raeldb raeldb raeldb rael eaergl eaergl eaergi t t vt aatl vt aett vt aa eaergl eaergieaergl eaergi tl vt aatl vt a atl vt aatl vt a n o non o RAR at onrvaionrvat onrv AA A m recee,eraceoereceoa al onrv al onrval onrvaione v i i t SSS e t sect t vect t vect raceoeraceoarecea t vect t vect eraceca t v ect s t vect t s t a t e g FFf t e sc narnsonarnsanernss e o o nernssnernssnarnsanarnee o o o e c e t e l e o i ie ie o l e o l l i r ya sf cd ncd nie l ynio cdncd i ynie cdncd l y cdncd nl o i ynio cdncd iynio cdncd iynio cd nce
- y dnenene mdmdl m e b r oereerocreerocreor g ue csot mocaot socaot so t eoreeroeter roerecroarecr ititit s s s n St ba ' enfet b a b a t esett asocswt i
t aocsot t a aocsot t ba ao t b a t l yl yl y i n f e uenfe uen fo uenf e uenf e ueufe uon eseses w t I reeqterveit eqt re eit erv eqt e rc erv it roerv mqt eit eqtrceit er mqt v eitroerv e qt e it v v v a s i r<erv eCeCeC r t eord oneord oneord on eord oneord oneord oneord on l8lSlS D c nbf abi nbfabinbf ebi nbfabinbfabinbfabinbf abi 1 I I d e o o o o o o o o oN o e c o l f p N N N N N N N N f n e
' T E r
I D e o e D t
. g e l w t e o f A a o e o na n n ted s ,
e i t r l t r i er dl g i l f n o o R L o o co A d e r b e dat r b c dnt il n l o t i C d ea eai l f l t t
- I m
a e t i d 'ett r ost edll l el e i os cc smso aro l e o o a t s st t o t es c c e l e aceebk aomet wa r nws v r sa oid e u sfs us sp tk i o i N d trepoll w y ss wrn d t d C e eeda eoo l et c rl ok m ooa n n t s det et rnt etdet et rn b smrnooo a et os l cal n fu op lbt i t I D y bi rf s i a f e N s rooaesroodk l o k ytdt de l r l 3 A b l ebi i rgiobienebit glff n a nn eo deg e gre u lt t t alb t t at t r ea oat m aet st it a v ev T
, S a t anra rocreorocrr enet ct enett ebrsng t aat rt ao et ocrb ltl i sas ayi se i sar dwga o l e r
car aro l e lat e ti tl R n n rnd f rt og e ens t t E T i h l s ek rnnsnl reo occdek oecreoctk sreeasreee r cnl a e r sl st t o l gs l u as us t o rcd l a c cml esa rnc O t encn l encnnot cnan e ytdo oae t e oni o rao C i danooodanoot unora t aont lrsptml o nr b ec orl B W t ict s ep l B o o ti ccslictt i esPas e o v o ea o ct n o N N D l f B E N N I N 5 0 A 0 r r l 3 d e e a e w w n D
, s o o ig R
i F P l e a c S E. cd rr o l B ae ee i r s n f v t r a C rl int a c t e D - - c c d e eo t v mW - e - - - e o - o nn 4 1 l E l E P r E M II B s I e T r S u T l r t p i a e d e t e s f a s n s S w o e k l i l e l p re raa a 0 a dl e o el et e f 6 i el sa a s wl a s e n ll
. t n if oa l e e a r e e t l pf s i pf n e l
ay l a l la k t o t t d a oy f e p oyi o o rl f f il e m il t t i P M ep rp r e rpc e e l m tnp u v v t p eu e t pe s as ss t a k n k n cun esn n e l a l a a D V V l E e a a l o r H T T E C T t 2 3 I 2 3 4 9 P 3 t n n r o o e t i i3 t t t8 i i a1 m d l1 s d o- d n t n A sW ID l a e d ( ek r n i l A n) T 2 o p c ae a e. 7 l A uv i - e m nl rsA v o o aa oiC e C i MT BM( L r o B 1 2 3 2 2 2 2 6 6 6 6 t e
- e 3
u - _ - - . . - - _ . - - . -
~ , - ,
f- , g 3i -.3 , , i i j Reference Drautags: 7383 Figure 9 3 3 (sheet 1) rsas rigure 9 3-2 (Sheet 3)
. FSAR Figure 9.3-5 (. Sheets 1,3,44)
6.0 SunSTSTiet
SC BLEED. Bosnit AscotBST, AND (1NSIICAL ADDITIOE Fotential Failure stode immediate Effects Interface At Subeystem Acmedial Action Component Stode involved Within Subsystem Interface Ulthin Subayates 6.2.4 Temperature 1. Electrie power Electrie rouer No local temperature None gone Transmitter supply fatta indteetton
- 2. Connection leaks Process afanal Incorrect signa? to None None transmitter 3 Transmitter f atje -- No local temperature None None indleation 6.2.5 Manual isolation 1. Talve falle closed -- No bwie meld to none if concentrated None Talve (CA-4) storage tanks borte sold evetlable fr m boron recovery or adequate concentrated borte acid storage tank inventory is evettable 6.2.6 ttiscellaneous 1. Electrie power Electrie Power Sorte seid may erystallises Nome if concentrated Beetore trace tiping supply to trace small potentist for borto acid available heatings unplus heating falls plugging and loss of flow frov boron recovery or lines to concentrated borte meld adequate concentrated storage tanks borto neld storage tank inventory la evallable
- 2. Trace heating faits - Borlo sold may crystalliseg None if concentrated postore traos small potential for borte acid avellable heating: unplus plugging and lose of flow from boren recovery or lines to concentrated borte acid adequate concentrated storage tanks borte acid storage tank inventory is evallebte 6.2 7 gersual locletion 1. valve falls closed -- No borte acid to concen- None Alternate flow Talve (CA-5) trated borte storage path t.hrough tacks alternate flow CA-P2B path evettable available 6.2.8 8.P porto AJtd 1. Electrie power Elsetrie Power Pump stepag no borto meld None Alternate flow Pump (CA-P2A) supply falls to concentrated storage path through tanks; alternate flow CA-F20 path available evallebte
- 2. Pimp falls , -- No borte seld to concen- None Alternate flew trated borte seld storage path thrw.,h tanksg et ternate flow CA-F28 path evettable ave 11eble !
6.2.9 stanual isolation 1. Talve falla closed - No borto ocid to concen- None Alternate flow Velve (CA-7) trated borte meld storage pet.h through tanksg alternate flow re-r2s path avaltable estallable . 6.2.10 Check Talve (C8-35) 9. Felts to prevent - Possible backficu to sin None Close tecletion backflow tank af pump is not volve CA-73 runnimal alternate (!cu atteenste f!ce path availabla path throuA CA-F28 available
. i e en
)
t nem e e e e A. ot vb l wb l vb l wb l 3 i s ea l2oa ea ea t y 6, ll o6ll ll ll
))1 cs 1 fi r fi fl fi 13 s
Ab u
- a tS a a a A ev nCev ev ev ttt eee lS a
C0 t a o t a t e t a
,t eee in I1 a cea v nh a a hhh di nh nh nh eA rt el rt rt rt SsS eh e e e e sC e e e e ea saea ee ea
((( mt n n n n oI n n n n tl p lovt p t p t p ei o o o o l o o o o l l l 325 RN N N N N C p N N p A C a A A 333 999 e e eee r k ne t o et o t t r d l 7 0 T S T 3 d n k rrr odal o e e e e e eu eW eW e a uuu ggg e etb n n n b e l l l t l9 lB lD t t l yt a o o o m b s b b b ba , b a iii Frr db rael i i i doe ak a ak s-t l n ak a , ba . re e a e r gi t t t ert l n l l n s s s t g tt vt aa a se s tf r a al a a l. r l r l r na Bas Ata m at onrv receoa l e l l e a rebe o iat v lot v v at tst 4 ae vt lae vt i ae vt er co 3ss e t vect d d d tl p ad ed ed s (. al e1 al nt Frr t e nernse n n n cbd o o o o c i 1 i os sc e o l i i i eaei a i o d cd o do df d( df c y a sf cf wcd nf e i y e s m eeeeee rlt p nia tl of iill afef ll of i ep i cp i ep siy d s b r oerecr rt rt rt oarr m s s s su au su sct a ue coot aa usunus cvt e e e e e e n e eap n St b a t sysysy anf er erer er ek eh ek m i w tI n f e it mqt e uen ssssss e e e f idcp er t e re t ot o rorc t o rm t a rm t a rm s a rmo lnee ud a s A roerv rCrCrC ine o o o o o o re r t eord on pA pA pA eeor bo bobo bo bo e bo bo eor D e nbfabi I I I msct t t t t t n t t nba N e o o o o o o o o o o o oN o o e O r N t N N N N N N N N N N N c n
' I T
f f e l n n r e e o e e e D t i t g A a p
.,; f.
a L i n t a t a m d i - r a sd gd d e c e u c no sn sn A e i t p a et ea ea
~ C m c d d cs s s I
I a n n e f e n i g i g
. e l m
ed el i o l i t r oe d l i n l n N e o e t e ct l l li o ag ag ose CI os w o t s r l r log b s t g t g t s u a u n t su sr D o n o grs s y ek fi e e yl w yt u N s et s s nn d n d d dt j rporpod A b t ra e iee en i l l i r r c l c il u eot t st r eu c g e e co o lf lre
, s sb s t p br a e m m ab bwda da m T e tt p oiifiif S n edg l cel et e o e e ed el ct oet oe E t ea a esa es snesr i
l o t t t t t es lf an t T O h rt r oao c o rnc rao b n r s r r rtk bt C t i o o o oan i eeg set so i brt l orl so b p b b b ra set eot oob E W t s ct st m tt s b r gl rpl R o o e o o o u o o o o e o o N N R N P N P N N N P B B N s e p 0 r d 3 l e r e r e t e n e e e
. o w o v l rt D P ig P t r e
ds Boa t r E S e laCat E e c e k e eMB rnr L cd i s i n i A /oee B ae r s r a r f v t e eceknanopcl o- _ t t C rl - c c . c - - l B c - t rev oo S o eo - e - . a - - - e - rFTECC
- f. t v l r g l o b na E p !E N E p 8: I IN 5
7 e r 3 u , Y l n e 3 i d d e d l B a e e e p e e l S F s e t t o o o c a d P o t n o o l a l ren k a e rs o asf l e
, 0 i
c el e wll f v e l e el ul td e l e lerrl etl g an m a 6 oa r e l w t n l r pu oa t s s aoofi el l pfn e pf s t o tfpt t e e a o t c ll l el l l e ga tl ra
- t o
d f o yi it ot a e yl rc a k aeyne of P e s ilt rpc tf f il a f neilih b f e t pe o s ac k e rpf t p st e at rpt w ei l st pae t e v cun n v cup l a l esn o a r l a lb a l a l esm u lva a f l v e bycuec y sesh a l r lel a f T E C T F T E P V T N E T t 1 2 3 1 1 1 9 2 1' 1 1 2 3 4 e ik n,, o n o n o . rn ea i6f i i6 l ST t1i a - - t) d t 2 o) a5 i) a - r2 ds lAA oCC r e l 2 c5 A t6 es t eII e v o-eA AP loc n- t a n t l eI o3 ar) l( , et a lC eA l( CC ro2 e ri T) ( tC ) ( tt2 n o l s) em 5 l r( ! s0 l nST p ee1) uv - . ss sn k8 ee o se2 es e - m nl& e ea e - ut nt Dp ov - ee s edD eA m nlA s l nlN o aaCt rr hC aa P u aaC aa oeI C MT1 e PT C( MT MP Mv1 MT CA( 1 2 3 9 5 6 7 8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 _ 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 6 6 f 6 6 6 6 _ I
_ _ _ _ m
, -, - , n
(- , s r n Reference Drawings: Tsaa Figure 9 3-1 (Sheet 1) rsas figure 9 3-2 (sbeet 3)
. rsas risure 9.3-5 (Sheeta 1,3,44)
6.0 858313T5Bt
EC SLEED 3000N S EiNSRT, AND CNEWtICAL ADDITION rotential Failure Itodo lamediate Effects lataerace St Subarates Remedial 4etion Component Dbde levolved Within Subsystem laterface Within Subsystem 6.2.10 Concentrated sorte 5. Tank lanka -- roaalble floodinal eventinal lose of borte alternate flew Acid Storpse Tank eventual leas of acid available to makeup path available (IMD-T22) euetion pressure to filtera, BW3T (cont'd) pump
- 6. Tank empties -- No borte acid No terie seid available Alternate flow to makeup tillera, BWST 3:sth evallable
- 7. Tank went, retter *- Cover gas release to vent None None valves f all open header
- 8. Drata, ansple !!nes -- Decreased borgo acid peeressed borte seid Alternate flow fett open available to makeup path eve 11able filters, BWST 6.2.19 Level Transmitter 1. Electrio g neer Electrio Pouer No local level indientle>n to level indleation to None supp!f 18C erstem
- 2. Connection leaka Frecena Slgaat leecrrect algnal to No level indleation to None transmitter I4C ayatee 3 Transmitte.' falta -- No local level indleation No level indication to None 18C system
- 6.2.20 leanual leolation, 1. valves fait closed -- No borte acid No borte sold available Alternate flois Control Valves to makeep filters, SWST path available (C3-63, CS-64,
. C3-67) 6.2.28 Concentrated Borie 1. Electrio power Electrie Power Pump stopas no borte acto No borte acid available Alternate flow eeid Transfer rump supply falta to makeup filters BWST path available (1WD-P22) 2. Fump falla -- No borte meld No horio acid evallable alternate flew to makeup filters, BWST path available 6.2.22 Manual leolation 1. Talve fails closed - No borte seid No borte seid available Alternate flow valve (C3-60 to makeup filters, BWST path available 6.2.23 Blanuel leolation f. Talves fall closed - 110 borte acid No borte acid available Alternate flow Valves (C3 72, to available to makeup path evallable CS-79) filtera, BWST 6.2.24 Check Talve 1. Falla to prevent -- Posaifele backflow if inamp None if conoontrated Close C3-72 (C3-73) back flow is not running borte acid available ,
from it borte acid pump 6.3 BC Bleed Holdup Tanka and Transfer Pvmps: 6.3.1 Itanual Control l. RC Bleed flow falta AC steed Flow RC bleed boldup tank oculd Nona if alternate flow Alternate bleed Valve (CS-41) emptyg no tapact since path available flow available rest of sobsystem operates only on demand
- 2. Valve falls closed - RC bleed holdup tank could Norun if atternate f!cu Dioed flow can be emptyg no impact since path avellable diverted to rest of subayates 2WD-T214 operates only om demand
. o *
,r
) t
- w s w nes 4 e e v o u o e e e e 4, ot dl eb dl eb a
prf l l - l prf dl eb dl eb dldl eh eb 3, t s lea ea ene ene lea ea eeea l6 t y l lt cutd eutd t lt llll o4
))1 os bi bt a ee a t ee bt bt blbi r-13 Ab u ev a e r:l ael r eel e e e a tS s ev t g lb t g lb ev ev ev ev nC ttt tS t a t e ngb a t e t e t ot a o eee e a a ei n gbal eio a a a cev t
nn nw eee hhh l e dt nw re nw ro rt oset a n ei rt eet eant e nw rc nu re roro el SSS eh e el el e e e e t e m ev t ef ov ei el el el sa ((( nt n tf tf n m n on c s. l ra shI ne tf tf tftf os ei o l l a o a I e l l l l l l25 pW N A A p N N E R R A A A A c 333
, 999 eee rrr
- a. uu w w w o ot o w w w w o
u wo w ggg o o o t t o o c o iii FFF l f l f l f n n on o l f N ( l f l f f l f l f o 8RR e e e t i i e e e e e e e 4AA s t e t e t e t t t t e t e t e t e t et e t e 3SS e al al at e a a al nl al al al al at FFF t e nb nb nb e e c nb a t, nb nb nb nb nb ac ra ra re t t i ra ru ra ra rara re ra et el el tm edmd m el el et el el el ef tt tl tl o enene t i tel l t t t tl t l s b r l e l a e ltl e e l ial e l e a c ue St av e l e av e l e av e ttitit e l pl yl y s s a v a lava av e lave avav a e av a s n f f f eoeses f f r f f f f u tI ih ih ih v v v ih i h ih $h ihih ih e s a t t t eCeCeC t t t t t t t D r t c oa np sap ea np n e l4l4l4 es np ea np ea np ea np eaea npnp ea np
- t. 1 1 1
.S e o o o o o o e o o o o o o o e O f N N l I N N N B N N N N N N N
- c I f n T E e I s s n g r D e l e e t o g w e D t eeet t e 3 e o t o n vfy ol i f A a y urca a t n s s lf y t md cmd y p
,f e i n l t nar er n e o o i o f ol een ae n r m R t d n net e ee t i l l
n a n et a pt a e u a e esep sp f psm p CI m u s sf o do e s ve ert o i o m v o t o c t a e l ar f s t o l aros t o ft o es ay e t sd Ims ye m o nd t v o c f t I gt e pem m t i o tsf o o re es sfsre b ob e e B N I m e rst uea sg n ee pt t e ct e d n t l d n y rl s en s t y rl oea s t oun nso nvn eo i n r i w C t prr noasdasds i l i catl o na cr cal er g f yn og s e i it ynpyea a i ne gfy pf y ro l n
,* D y eep samsee n aer E
S b s u bco n dt oeob mibsl ounue uee l e v e are ev l eedee pt ee n t s t dip a nneo sea wol c It n e mol u pt o n nvo ob fi h n cn ti sdl e 3sdosdr tst e e t eJ fs s sc au d ot at ees t
, S osenf n l tl d ogeen es oes eeo br 7 n t e fpfn fns ti l rgot ipnet e d re t t re prt 0 n nt aoeomoosooer l col e aps! c s i psm e t o et 8 i eeyel u u sed a ena mlt myt al gmye sea wea t nw l o 5
0 h e o a d b s pt yot y pb i s sll sl ra c o rnc reo eag l aise l gisd b ser ene ocr soe bn t b seeu l ae C i W kmmnsooenf enee l orl t muouet nl oun rip eeo ft p paf rl las o eo 8 n$ eoalt ro rovh ct rsl nsd repnse mb si 9 a e o o o n o o p o e u o o I T F N C II I N p D D N F N P I C A O r l r r D e a e e w n w w
. o lg o o D t P P P E e a E. e k c o e t cd e i s i i S ae e r s r r f v e o-l t t t C
e rl eo B - - - c c c c - B d t v 2
- - - o r l e - - - l e - -
t o ae N D P E f
-, 1: s ll
- 9 e 7 r 3 u
, 1 3
t n e e t r l d B 5 F e f e ep e e l e l c a s t 3 i o k l ae f n e n l a e l ree a rrl e l re e 0 i e! el e f et l g p e et v i l o s e rt a wll oa w a n o wt e 6 t n r oaf i l oa r tf e t ,f pfn e pL t l l pf s pw e e e k s t o t g a l a l o h d o k m ne a e p ns eyt t eyn e e f e yl ol o M m ee il t i ili h f il a tf P l e wv rpe m r pt s rpf k lat s l t pe a t pa e s e k p ec by k k k a cun n ces c e v cup l a s n n nv esn e eeh a n l esm l b 2 a a a l o r l r i. a l u a N T T T E C T E T I T E P F 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 9 I 2 1 r r p) e n e t f) u8 d1 t s io'.) s4 i . t24 n8 l 2 m u ns a44 a2 _ o7 a n o e t e on l - - rr e N - n oSS T - v t D e ri eCC D l n dW r a ' DL l( dW a e e1 T l , e1 T) n e( l g .e l s8 e( 5 o t l en el ae4 l k4 _ p Sk e ei t p uv1 Bp c - e e Ca n v e ssp sm ea nl - C u m e3 hC C BT L po Pi WS laaS fTC SF C( 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
= 6 6 6 6 6 6' 6 r
I
) s t h h h h h 4 e a e t nem s t t t t 6, ot dt eb dl eb dl eb de ep da ep ds ep ds ep d a ep da ep
- 3, i s ee ea ea s z s s s s t r ll ll ll i w i u i w i w l w t w
))1 ce bl bl bi l oe l oe l oe l oe l oe t oe I3 Ab a e a all all all alt alt ell e u ev ev ev erfberfb erfberfberfb etfb ttt !S t a t a t a t e at e a t e at e et e e t o a eee e a a a anrl anrl anrt anrl anrl enrt eee hhh l s di nw ro nw ro nwro nl et nl el nl et nl el nl el niet e ret eearsret e ret eret eret e e e e ret e Ss3 eh mt el g n n e el el eeev eeaveeaveeave n n n e9 av
((( t f n tf t f td wetdwa td wetdwetdwen t4we ei l. e o oN l l l l l l o po op o l 125 AW a p N lA A A a A A A N N A 333 999 e eee r rrr de uuu w w w r r r r e o ot o et ggg iii o t o ot o o o e e t e e r t t t sl ti fff l f n n t n l f l f t ae wr tae wr ae wre t s ar ae wre n o n on o tf e Ass 4aa m e t e s e i o ot e t e e t e dt e dt e dt f wet dt i i i t t t rp eu Sss e al t t t at al e1 el el odl el s e a lne Ffr t e nb e e e nt nb s1 mi zi ei si e c o k sc ya ra o e e re ra i( sf if szf if t t i en
- of el tl niml e dt ed ed e el t l el ti l
ap l ap l ap si ol p l ap dneneae md mdm ee d s b r l e nt nt at l a l a ru ru ru l au ru ititlt o g we av i eI sl s av av ee ee ee re ee s s s dt n $t e v y r a a lnke nk lnka l ek nb l yl yl r e i n f wewsue f f t a ana l e esesee sr w a s tI a ih t o lClCiC e o ih t ih t ee e
*: m em e
ul m ee e t e v eCeCeC v v se et
. r t ea f4fSr4 ea ea d o dot do neo do e l4l4l4 ra D
n c e ng o i I o o o I 1 np np o o o t o o t edt v o t n o 1 o o o 1 1 ew e e c
.os f f
N N sI N el N N N N E N N N N N D n f E e l r e o p t e p p f a e y y y u u t n n e r n n r r d d n o o R t. ds e o o e e l l e i i d a e v t i v v o o r v t t e C n u o c t t o o c h c d e o e a r t e t e e e o a e c e e r r ee gt t a t l e o i c l l N s n r l t l r r ey ey rb !f e w d t d a N e d d t t t t ue gor e n n r C t n a l n n n ap ap pl n u d s i l i a o a y o r l a i n o r o r wes wm e ea l idss ss e s a e l a n l t p N a a a w grw c o d d bv ooe i l e gre e b b o istl eo b b ed ed a ol r l e v ev e u l sl zl t n l p a r e ist e d
, S o f tf o o i u i u ou fl enpe r l tl .
t t tt t t l o l o n s ti d s a t m w t e sel eea w w ac r ac r na al ewomn l tt ul ar ge e cml eaa e sr v h o o rnc o o ek ek c b nt pe d c rnc se o l l o reo l l nn nn d l ee e ra o roo et c i f l orl f f l a t a k n evuod ee l orl re s a N o o ct n o o o et e ut e na a seot o o vh o o n cto ew e N N N I N N N D D T F N C n I N p c a e r ! r l p e e d e a w n e w n
, o s o ig e P to i t P s S l e S s e o a k e t cd i a rr n i s e ae r s ee a r s f v t e nt l t e C rl c c t o B - - c c -
s d e eo t v
- l e o r
- - - aN e
- g l
e o - r o ne E F D N E P en p Il e T e r 3 u T l e r e
, S i r d d e d n r B
e F a l u e s e n t a e o s e re ep t ei s k i e o w o t t o k t n l a s rea a l i e l n i rea e e p 0 et e f e r dl e y el el e r i s wtl el s s rl wll o 6 t u oa r e l va e e a oe r n l pf n e l l tf l t s i ,f pfn e t e e p o l l a l l e k t t o t t r t d o e yt t e f ey a k e p ns eyl t e o e il t t f rl f ne e m ee ilt l r P t I c rpe e s ep al l e wv rpe e i t pe s e e np e ll l t pe e e r eun n r v w v be k k k e cum n e t r l ssn o rT a t o l a lea e l a y f n a n a nv o l esm o e r i n
- O E C V T D T N T T T E C T L 1 1 2 3 1 4 t 2 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1
- r r c n d e e o o e ) t t l l , i s 3 t t o) t0) t) i 1 i , s e t r6 a8t a0 l p2 e n ne e t4 l - - l8 au7 ie an i s n - oST o- rd - n t r n o3 eCC oT etD e ri n t a CC l( tC ekN r DL e r r ( , ( fII T
,e n O T l l s2 l n (
. o ae ee7 ee er l el p w w nv uv1 uv Dek e t r m o o al pl - nl t n v aa C o l F l F eso D W t 8 a eS VC ae lev Coa RNT L e fee e S 0 1 2 3 % 5 6 9 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 e e e r; ,
) h h h h h h h nee 4 t t t t t t t a, ot l
e da ep g o da ep da ep d a ep da ep da ep d a ep 3, is e s s o en s s s s a s l6 t y c n i w e t w i w t w i w ! v s w o5
))I t 3 es a 1 el oea i oioe l oe t oe l oe ! ce t oe r-Ab rs1t all rllt elt all alt all eIl alt t 3 s u t g ttt l S ngne arfbt ae ngne arfb e erfb t e a erfb erfb t e et e a er(b t e a erfb t e e nC o
eee a eiurnrl eiurnrl anrl anrl enrl anrl enrl ce eee in rt l el el rtl eiel niei niel nl el nt el nl el v hhh di oapt et aoapt mt a rmt a rmt eret a ret a ret a el Sss eh t enl eawt ent eav eoav eoaveeav eoav eeav e e e sa ((( mt shuadwssheedwa t dwa n n n ov 925 ei SW R e p e ldwatdwe t A l A tdwe l A tdwa l A N o p o N o l
- - C 333
, 999 .
eee s rrr r uuv r de gge r r r r et r r - iii t e e e e e sl e o o o e t t t t ii t t t t t Ffr as ae as ae ao lf as as Ana wre wre wre wre wre a wr n n n w s-A aa rp e o o e e S3s m e dt dt dt dt dt eu dt i i t dt FIT t e el el el el el ne el t t t et ac si si si si mi ik si a a a si if tf tf if tf ma if o e c ya af l ap i ap n ap l ap t ep d em l ap l ml mim ded ed e lif ap s b r ru ru rm ru ru o ru nt nt ut ru a ue ee ee ea ee ee dt ee i sI sjs ee n e i St n lnka lnka nk t a nk ia nk ia sr nk ia r wewsws y y nk l a a w s tI a em e em e em mm sm se mm o o o em r e e e et e lClClC e t d o do do do do ra do fSfAf& do D c t t t t t ew t I I S t N e o o o o o e o o oN o o e c
-O I f
f N N N N N p N N N N n T E e I r N e g w g v e D t e o e e
, f A e s l s l p e s i f i f n n m R L d l o o A e l
r d u C n l aro f l ero f e r e r i i p l e r e s e t t e t o t o t e t i t n n f W T sf s of e a t a l a e o e i m y e y s w a w a w i t i N e rl o rl o w r d d w C t eat eal d d e d n l n og s i j e d e n e i a l n D y ytd ytd z oe s i s n I fi N s ann ann i ns t m e grw k n A b u mea mee l a i i e e i l c l eo cn
, S oog t
d og t r
!l sa r d a r
i f atl tf au br f t pn i pn ep pr e d e a g n c i e i nm oe n e n l tl cel et v i h at g t e sl g iu mp t n i sr t a esa l o o eew eau l g o si m e ae u c rnc b n c t i trep m1 trsp ml do po m d et ra e o rao tes e d l orl B N o o o
- t md u o cw o o ct n o si p p N e o N r N D N N I N P O
N O r r r D e e e l a w w w n
. o o o D
R r P P ig E e e S L cd i o a i i s B ae r r r s f v t t t e C rl c - c - -- - c c D d e eo t v e - - e - - e o - - nn l E l E l. r
, n so I II f F e
B e
- T r
- S u T t e e S t t d d r a e t e e u W
I f c aa f a o o s o k t t t n 0 l a rrl g l e re l raa o e etl w a n et s g c et e r v 6 i t oof wt oa wll e n pt i l u s oa r r t l pf s l pf n e pw e e g a e l p
! o t o t d eyn e f ey l a oyt t ol o o ili h il a e f il t i tf P e p rpt s rp f e rpe m k t pa e e t p t e t pe a ec cue c v cu p f v cun n l a esh a l es m i l esn a lb l
E r a l u r e l o r a T T E r O V E C T F t 2 2 t 1 1 1 5 2 3 1 r n e r o ,) f) e i e3 l t s t24 a1 o) t u a55 e2 e r6 i o l - - rF e t5 m e e o3S T - t n - a v t n SCC D f oS n l n a I( dN l CC e a e l eI r ( r T) n l g l s9, e( O l T 5 p o en ae4 l ae k5 m ct ep uv1 Bp w uv w e - o nl - m o nl e eS t I e a e3 Cu l eae l hC C sF t IVC BP F p T f C( T 4 9 0 8 2 3 - 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
~
~
3 ii
l l l i
. : .I ,
. g - ,
L a - - - : gg
==~. :: 1g* G **
E
, I :. :--
- e e t .
c k
~ " ". ": T.
- "3 -l.-6 8 :::.
... I"21 4
te} 4= _d_4_4 "g2 . .t .t ". .: 2.1. :, a :
. : 1. 4 : . . . 24: .
aac ..
. , , ... 7
... .1 c a c a . . k c E 2 e AAA 444
. ... 1* 12 ghb 6 6 6 :: s 6 :: 6 6 6 6 6 22 : : : 2: *: 2; : : 2
- 2 t 32 * *
! !! !" 2' *. 2: !*'*.
!!. !*. :1 . %. :. !"1.
- g 9.
e
- j.
=*
g .
- =
*:*jj
'3: 1. ": 7. :" **8::- 21:
'"E -
1 % a :* :* :* ** E 1 it 3 I":; Er Ei ai
't g"
. Et*ts.
- li g "
. OR *t Et a:
"t:*
2:32
- % tis
- 1:1.g i
- g -}a k : E-L-* 1
- i. ,.
.: 2 .
...I.: a.:. : f. Ei Is a s .t .: t s*z*
.. ... -g..f.s.t:
< A
,. .I ..a .E.. ..
- 6. ...
... - .u - .o 8
ga . .gz . 4 ... - - g : & R 2 - R 8 - 2 3 2 3 2 2 &
'n-t 9 : 2
- 2 u
i g :
?
e :
. gi
-2 22 I rd 1 g
- 1 7 : : :- :- .:.
'i !
.E 3.. . k b: 82- ***
1 . . 1,2 -1 . 6 .6 ..6 ..6 6 ..6 . g gg g. .- '. - -
- g : *: -: : : -1 -
- -. : I :* E.6 s -
1g := ::::= = i - - -
- 11. 1:
. 2:::
c' e=* c*c =*
-g c* c. s ::.
my e t 3:e e" t- e t et : g gs gxn g; seng i !. I 5. *:: 3:.
. I.
- 2
- 1
.1 .5 ea c25 c2 ct-25 z g e.
555.: a a 3 3. : s. a s a a a ' 1 - E E ; 6 U 3 i 6
$ 28 b2-3 28 28 - 28 9 .
21 cs c: - I . === === .
- E E
-=
27 65-6 07 5: EI 25-1:31:5 1 T65 - : a a1:a taal
. 1 ! i I I I : 1
- } %.
-- a a a m .:
e g . i - E : , : : . , , n=a. g : g . : a g .
- 6 6.;
, . S - t ..:
- I E* 3: &! * * *
- 1 1 :
1 i 2. .- 2. : .. : L :a: z. . .2 : . . : :. : :. la: ..
- - .- . -.-... . g - . . - -
12 3.,t2 .5. It. I .. .-a::
- g 4 : . ": st 22 a -
- :: 3 3 a
g u g u aa t & 2 8 tf.:
- e. $
m J ; ; A 4 J A J A J J J J J A i i %28 . -
- 12
. 28-4
--~ ik at
-e 24 :
. g g
g -
-s g ,
2:8 [ a:6:: .:
- 3: ::a 82- 3::=t 82 8 8 o e_d 8i a:= a:t 1: c c
- c x = = = x :
A. A. A. A. A. A. A. A. Y Y O @ @ Y @ @ 4 . i a L
.6
* . . . . . e 8.g 2 22 E3 R 2 g2 3 2 g2 3
==
a 1 j =t f" j:I I = Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch
- s s 23-dil :. 8:r=
- 8::: . s. a a. s. s. =:_]:, i.
e-1 I 3 .::aao 3 2._3 2 _--y, l g o a . . 3
- 1 :- :-
- 3. 1 31 -
1 3t1 ;6. 777
.11 1 : !.= 2 2
ccc -
. t ::
c e i a a : -
%. c c c "
*k*tI:, %. 2 c
.. 1. C
... ! ** . ::i: *t ". . . . . . g i
--- a 2
= ::
== 1::
- 1.
- ==
- 1
- 3,s 32esg :3s3,s ja es -
a ya 5:: g: -
- s. .= 2, - ,.8 . . . . : := := _= := := :
,5 g.5. g g : .: 2: 2: -: 3: e ia . 2 t'o: 1- 1 !! 1 1 1!! 11 11 : $ $ $ 55 i: :
a a3:gs c 5 n a a :: -2 -: 4 a a a I1 a 31 a 1 j1 i1 a
. g t t c 87 i.- ]'gt_: 2- ..: .:
- 2,yg o g c-
. :_ _:j.e: = 1122 :2 :- at .:__
t=11 2 :: ::: _; eg
- . s 2 -- : -
l : 3
.:.:g2
- .: .: .t_._;!
2.. :: it - - i:!I se_. g e :: -3 3 3 -: : : =- 2 3 ess :::.,si
- = j-! - si. ;a_;2 3 2: = a= === a: = -=s.: l a
a
-- c- c-
- et et c C C-e :rs te- g c c- ..=cs.c12 8 :ti::2,
"}"_: e 2 et : 5:t 1,:_g A e t 1: ga:
l 8
- : 8= 1 . :
s gi. 3 !a 5
- 1::1 :: :
a::n-si a 3sl:es:.:1 a a a es: C::s a a 2:s I _
- = :=
3 j :=
. E' i 23 2R . s 23 2R c _
E . "A "A ."A "A ,A = s :: 2g:2 3: t 2g: 2g: :. - E _ ]
. ji s.
$ 3k: u 3 j[ l- = $:Id 1:31 E .E W
i 5 2 l l ! ! r g . n b . . E = c = . . , , , g : :
; g
=
*
- 6.g. . - 2 T :: L! ! -
a - - i 1* k
*S *g % = ..1:]3
.3 3
st* :_t 4 c = _ .
* = 2 I
a = a 1
- y: s e is "I . -s.
2 i g
. 3 g
3 g 3 f:: 2
- g. 8:.I ::
g%
- 22. :
g j jf : :
- G A A ; ;
u u - - E . 2 * * . . A A A J A J A A : a A ; I E R$ 3 5 : - ia : is i: l.- 1 C TA A 7 a er .: 8 e 1" le != o - 6-j I:.- _1
" g-g. _.
[ u 35 ja
=0 u5 7
25 3 as II a2
- ~ }"at:
{ 7 e 7 o i " *
- e e . . e a
' s 3 ,
Reference Drawings: FSAR Fleure 9 31 (St.eet 1) FSAR F16uro 9 3 2 (Sheet 3) FSAR Figure 9 3-5 (Sheete 1,3,44) 6.0 SURSTST8H DC BLBED. SOBINI SECURRET, AND CasselCAR. ADelTION Potential Failure Mode Immedlete Effects laterface At Suberstem Resedial Action Component Hade involved titthin Subsystem Interface Within Subsystem 6.4.5 Hiseellaneous 1. f.leetrie power Electrie rever porte meld may erystallsses None unless concentrated Restere trace Piping supply falla smali potential for borte acid storage tanks beating 3 unplug
. pluaging est loam of flow are empty lines
- 2. Trace heating falls -- Sorta sold may crystalliseg Wome unlese concentrated postore trace small potential for borte sold storese tanks heatings unplus plugatag ens loss of flow are empty lines 6.4.6 Hanual Isolation 1. Evaperator Evaporator No (Icv to feed tank. Tank None of feed tank to full Establish Talves (CT-16, domineraisser Deelneralisee has 8-hoer espeeltyg boron reetreulation CT-19, CA-88, flew fallag CT-16 Flew recover 7 ut!! enatinue flow from CT-49. CT-36) fatte elosed until lawk to empty evaporator
- 2. Coustle flow falls; Caustle Flow Laceteen labelance in boron Chesteal tabelence in pone CA-88 f a t t e es oned recovery erstem. borte seld to makeup filters, BUST 3 Diattilate flow falleg platillete No flow to feed tank. Tank None if seed tank to full Establish CT-49 fette closed Cooler has 8-hour oernettyg baron roeiroulation Flow recovery will continue flow from until tank to empty evaporator
- 4. Concentrate flow Concentrate Concentrated teorio sett llone unless concentrated Close CT-38 to back to feed tanks Flow returned to feed tanks no borte seid storage tanks force CT-36 falls open boron tecovery are empty concentrate flow to coneontrate cooler
- 5. Talve CT-19 falls -- No flow to feed tank. Tank None if feed tank to full Establish closed has 8-hour espeelty: boron reetreulation recovery will continue flow free until tank is empty evaporator 6.4 7 Cheek Velves 1. Fall to prevent - Fossible backflow to None unless concentrated Close tactation (CT-IO, CT-37, backflow concentrate pump, borte sold storage tanke valves CT-16 CT-17) eveporator desineraliser are empty and CT-19 6.4.8 BC Steed f. Tank leake -- Decreased flow; eventeal None if feed tank la full None traporator Feed lose of suction pressure Tonk (ND-742) to pump. Tank has 8-hour, especityg boron recovery will continue until tank is empty
- 2. Tank empties -- No flev. Baron recovery pone unless concentrated None store untal tank refilled borte acid storage tanks are empty
- 3. Tank went, retter -- Deeressed flow. Tank has pone af feed tank is full None valves fall open 8-hour espaettyg baron recovery util continue until tank is empty 6.4.9 Level Transmitter t. Electrio en=or Electria Power No local level indleation None pone supply falta
- 2. Cnnnection leak Frocess Signal Ineerrect signal to None None tranaaltter 3 Transettler failus e - Ilo local level indicotton None None
peterence Drautors F384 Figure 9 3-3 (Sheet 1)
. F3AR Figure 9 3-2 (Sheet 3)
FSAR Figure 9.3-5 (sheets I,3,44)
6.0 SUBSf37EM
RC bites. DOSUR BECOWsti, 850 CrJ3tICat. ADDITION Fotential Failure stodo lamediate Effects laterface At Subsystee Benedial Aetion Component teode involved Within Suberstem Interface Within Subsystem 6.4.80 Itanual leolation 1. Talves fall closed - Ilo f! w to evaporator feed None unless concentrated Establish Valves (CT-22, . Pep. Reetroulation flow borte meld storate taaks reetreulation CT-23) path can be estabitehed are eepty flow fr:e thrmgh evaporator let evaporator tecon recovery stops 6.4.11 SC Bleed t. Electrie gu=+r Elettrae Feuer pump stopag me (tou to Nome unless concentrated Estab!!sh Evaporator Feed supply falle evaporator. Reetreulation borte sold storage tanks rectrentation rump (WD-F46) flow path can be are empty flow from established through evaporator evaporator but boron recovery stops
- 2. Fump falle ~ No flow to evaporator. None unlesa concentrated Establish pectrentation flow path borte meld storage tanks reetreulation een be estabitrhed through are empty flow fra evaporator tal boron evaporontor ,
recovery stops 6.4.12 Fressure 1. Electrie power Flectrie Feuer so local pressure indseation Wome None Transmitter Falls supply falls
- 2. Conneetion leak Frocess Signal Incorrect signal to None None transmitter
- 3. Transmitter falle -- um local press are indleation pone pone 6.4.83 ftenuet factation f. Valve falls closed -- 90 flow to evaporator. Nome unhees concentrated Establish Valve (CT-24) B*etroulation flow path borte acid storage tanks reelreulation ene be established the, push are empty flow fra evaporator but boron evaporator recovery stope 6.4.14 Control valve 1. Control algnal Control Signal Loss of flow control to pone unlese concentrated Fatablish (CT-24) fatte to open/ Freie evaporator. Could flood borte seid storage tanks reelreulation valve close fvaporator evaporator or allow are empty flow to feed level dryout. Rectreulattoe tank or flow paths to seed tank evaporator or eerporater can be established. Peron recovery etcpa
- 2. lastrument air lastrument Air 1.os of flow control to Lone maless concentrated Establish sultly fa!!s evaterateg . Could flood borte acid storage tanks rectroulett oe evaporotor or allow are empty flow to feed dryout. Seetrculation tank or flow paths to feed tank evaporator or eveparator can le estabitehed. Baron recovery stopa b
e b
Reference provings: FSaa Figure 9 31 (Sheet 1) Fase figure 9.3-2 (sheet 3)
+ FSAR FIEure 9.3-5 (Sheets 1,3 44) 6.0 SuBSf375t SC 31 Etts, 90003 BRCOFSpy, AND CINWIICAL 80917105 rotential Failure atrwle Insediate Effects Interfa99 at Subsystee Remedial Action Component temde involved Within Subsystem Interface Within Subsystem 6.4.14 Control Valve 3 Spurious signal control Slanal tome of flow control to None unless concer.trated Establish (CT-24) to open/ valve Fress evaporetor. Could flood borte note storage tanks reetreutetton (cont'd) .close tvaporator evaporator or allow are empty flow to feed Level dryout. Reelrestattom tank or flow paths to feed tank evaporator or evaporator een be established. Doron recovery stops
- 4. Internal velva - Loss of flev centrol to None unless concentrated Establists fatture evaporator. Could flood borte mese storage tanks rectroulation evaporotor or ellow
- are septy flow to feed dryout. Rec t rcul at ion tank or flow pathe to feed tank etaporotor or evaporator eam tio established, poren recovery store 6.4.95 Cheek Valve 1. Falla to prevent -- poestble backflow if pump None unless concentrated Close control (CT-29) backflou le not runnlag borte acte storage tanke selve CT-28 are repty 6.t.16 Weste Dreta, I. Lines fall open - Deeressed flow to pone unless concentration Establish Sample Lines everecator. Seelrculation borte seid storage tanke rectroutettom flow path can be are empty flow to established through eveporator if evaporater but twron regelred recovery slope 6.4.17 RC pleed I. Ny blanket system N2 Blanket Poestble esploalvo elature None None Evaporator falle foren (WD-Ef t) 2. Steam supply fatta steam kveporator floods. No pene unless concentrated Establish bornn recovery bnrie acid storate tanks recirculation are empty path to feed tank
- 3. Blocked tubes - Deeressed heat trannferg None unleae concentrated Establish decrease in boren borte meld storage tanks reelroulation recovery are reply path to feed tank
- 4. Tube rupture -- Stees released to pone untens concentrated Establish evaporator vapor space; borte acid storage tanks reetreatation decrease in boren era empty path to feed
. recovery tank
- 5. Loan of heat transfer - Evaporator finode. No None unless concentrated Establish capablitty boren recovery borte acid storage tanks rectrou*.ation are empty path to feed tank
- 6. Electrio sewer Electrie pcuer Concentrate heater (*lls: Ik>ne unless concentrated sectore beatert nupply fatta potential pluratng m=' borte sold storage tanks unplus lines lose of flow are empty e =
s ) l see
. 4 i 4, nt en = -
3 lot s t u e rh rh s tt kitk
))4 t y ee t
ahv t e eaacan epaepa
. 13 Ab o u ilual t eed s r t r t ttt !S taepf r n n eee a f hodbod s
eee t r o f siorie hhh in di it b eces wdt owo it o!t e l af! af SSS eh aeI eee e e e bf bl ((( st t rTfrn tl uf n n n s n e e e anoauo ei s u o o o n n n ts ett et 12$ Rw E h o o o o
- - N r m p n N N N N E E s
333 999 s s s y k s s s eee dn dn k dn k k k k rrr ea ea dn dn dn uuu ggg tea a t tt tt tt ea ea tt ea t t iii a a a a a fff re t g reg re re re re t g sRR na er tna na t g na t g na t a nn AAA e co er co er co or er er SSS e nt nt nt co co ce TTT nt nt nt t e sc c os os os es os oe ya c c e c c
- i sf st y o d d d d d s sl ysl y sl y el y sl y
- g b r sct set sot set ue eap espesp sot set 6 6 6 n emp esp emp 2 St m l ml m 2 2 i
v t I n lnee ut neenee l noe m l nee m l nee m 4 4 4 e s ud ut ut ut ut r A re re re re re re D t c aor eoreore eor eor eor 6 6 6 N e nba o nb anb am nba nba nba e e e e e o o n u e c
,O f M N po h M o
N o p o S e e e o o n I T f S S N M E e I r e e t t e e f a a e t t R L i n l l t a d % e t l ll n o pr o pr o pr o l g A e n e o oao
- C m l
o v r r rci lik. r e t I t B i m l e u r o t o wtn1 ope 4 opo4 opo4 mtn) o mt un) o rn t o t rn o t ot s nl a t a s f s d e N I m e y ep ob t e1t c1t c1 t leoc leoc eo c ist n n e t t l coi aer D C t s r e fet op en o s a t eee d ew 4.aeo d l e w 4.aeo d l ew4 l now d o l now do do l now nd n dd ee e trru ut N y s v g e nfl6nfl6nfl6 aace n aace aaco)f s f t e o se ag e f g l) n l) n l) u ar A b u c e st mr l e t r eir f a ef r e f gref6 aref6gref6e et t a rar T S r o l e ao dt y r eoeesoeeaeee t gs t gs gs ist ae 2. st tt ae 2. isteaet et
- 2. ur at r
eee hptk S E n s l u r ara erear t ar(t ar(t cre cra cra tar ( tit t r gr 1. t i tr gr4. t i ttr g r4. t a e* p* del a ma n i o as l ovse cmna6cmna6cmna6r m r. etl t D h r us eoh rpcv eeoheeohe eseh eaeh e e-O t e t e b po t acra d rpcvrpcv rasl rasl rasl rnccernccernccep eseh t en s ahtd i 3 S C i W b nr ep eveee nervh ovioevioovia ranseronseransem oroisoroisoroise he t ease R o v o o tn edveedvcedv n n ct cd( ctn cd( ct ncd(t r l.ie N N E P C I I I n igs c1df e I I O I N D R _ O B r l r e a a l a
. w n v n r D o g o g e F P i T t
E. e S i S a t cd e e W t i ae i s i s g f v r s r s t e e n R' e rl eo - . - - c c - t c c i d t v J - - e o - e o - l o nn l E r l r o o s M Ii P E P
., e C W e T r S
t u l
., 8 R
i a s e W f e e e r S l e t
,s a u el k t ti b l
s t
. 0 l
a c a a p s a re a l a rs k t rf e m ev el e f a a e 6 i f l e rt wl el e f rt t p nn oa l wi l et e n wm r ree p r oa r e e ou o r o pf n e pf a e t a b t d l p o oy o t c t af u o o t t tfo i t ey w y t P M f d r a o r ae il rp t i il i t t t e o o ril all e m rp c i e gl d e p t p u s t p e n lap
, lee f a p
a pea erf ou ee n n n eu n n p u k c I n E v E v E v 3 E o a r t es o n e r loa o o C T E l
. C T C B 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 5
1 2 3 t 2 _.. l r e e v l e o L o r r er C t o re ot re e n dt)) tt ut t e eeId . ai tt a -
- n ai o e oE r T 't rm rm l) l p Brn ea pn es l9 m pn iC eDo ee C
o CvWc BE(( v r ma er t - sD _ ET TT iW _ D( _ 7 6 1 1 9 0 _ 1 4 2 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 1 _ e
I , 1 Deference Draulness F3At figure 9.31 (3heet 1) l ' F3ag Figure 9 3-2 (Sheet 3)
. F3AR ftpure %.3-5 (Sheate 8.3.4%)
6.0 3eB3f';TSE: DC BLESD. 90A03 95009E97, AND CIIIselCat. 8088750s Potenttet Failure Mode Immediate effecto e
.e
/
.'
- Interfees at Subeesten Besediet aettee
, Component Mode Javelved utthin Suberatee Interface Withis Subeystem s
~ 6.4.20 Distillete Cooler' 3 Tebe rupture - Cooling unter roleseed to hone totablish roetr-(WD-C9) diettilatet etIntes feed ouletten path (cont'd) test someentrattee to feed tent .
4 Lees of heat treaefer Deeressed heat treamferg pose Establish reetr. cspebilfly high temperature enlettoo path distillete returned to to feed tank food tant
- 5. Cooler lenke - Decreased sitett!! ate flow Deeressed distaltete setettleh reetr.
avalletale to condeo- selettoo path este test tanks to feed tank
~
' (deafnerettsed veter)
- 6. Inlet flow falle Everoretor se distillete flow to diestalete aestlebte pone plott!!ste to condeneste test tanke (demineralised unter) 6 4.28 Coneentrate t. Electrie power Els etrie Power Fump stopos ne concen2 rete pone unless eencestrated gone (Seelre.) Pump supply felle flw borte acid storage tanke are empty (WD-PG) 2. Pump falle - No eencontrate flou None enteaa eoseentrated None borte send eterage tanks are empty 6.4.22 Check Talve 1. Falle to prevent -- Possible beehrlou if pury None unless easeestrated Close LT-30, (CT-35) beckfice to set running borte seid storage tanks CT-to are emptF 6.4.2) Pressure 9. Electrio pe er Electrie rower Bo leest pressure indteetten None gone Transettter supply falle
- 2. Conneetton leake Procene Signal Incorreet signal to None gone tronomitter 3- Trementtter felle - um local prensure indicotton Nome pone 6.4.24 Manuel leolation 1. Telve felle open -- Concentrate flow Name unlese concentrated (Ipen CT-40 to Velve (CT-48) rectreuteted to borte sold storage tanke divert flou evaporator. No boren are empty through recoveryg poselble concentrate overcretor flooding cooler '
- 2. Telve felle elesed - Poselble flooding of Done Flev een be esseentrate coolerg loco diverted of teeg.erature control in through CT-36 evaporator back to feed tank 6.4.25 Coneestrate L:eeler t. Cooling unter supply Cooling Water Nish temperature borte sold None Close control (WD-7) falls '
returned to eoneentrated valve CT-40 borte acid storage tenho
- 2. Blocked tube -
Deeressed best troerferl bone Close contret high tempenature borte volve CT-40 scid returned to concen-treted borte ocid storage I tanke a e .
-___ __- - p
.m - _
r , . percPeace Draulage FSAA Figure 9.)-l (%eet 3) FSAs figure 9.3-2 (%eet 3)
. rsas figure 9.3-5 (Sheete 3,3,44) .
6.0 Sun 3TSTIBIs BC DLEED. Boats Osteveef, see CassetteL AtelTION Potential Faltare flade lamediate Fffsets laterface at subsystee Demedtel Aettee Component flode levol ved Ulthin Subsystre 1sterface Withte Subsystem 6.4.25 Concentrate Cooler 3 Tube rupture - Coeling water rolessed to mane Coneestrettee een (WD-T) concentrates etIntes be adjusted (cont'd) borle seld eencentratten from berle send ett teek 4 Lees of heat trenefer -- Nigh temperature borte acid Bone Close eoetrol espetslity returned to concentrated valve CT-40 borte eeld storese tanks
- 5. Cooler leaks -
Dooreesed eeneestrate flew None unless eenoemtrated gone borte sold eterage tente are empty
- 6. Inlet flow falle Everuretor No eeeeestrate flow some maless esseentrated Cleme eestre!
Coneestrate borte acid storage tenho selve CT-40 are septy T. Cooling water rentrol Control Slese! No eencestrate flow Ikme malene concestrated Close control volve fatte Frue Comoea- borte eeld storage tanke valve CT-40 trate Cooler era empty Ciecharge Traperature 6.4.26 Tempe rature 1. Electrie guerer Electrie Power No alsnel to ecollag water We algnet to cooling See 6.4.24 ftensmitter supply felle et+tret valve water control valves noe 6.4.24
- 2. Connection leake Process signal Be signal to trenamitter se signet to eoeling See 6.4.2%
water centret selvet see 6.4.24 3 Treaanttter felle - se elemal to cooling water No algnet to coollag See 6.4.24 eestret volve mater control valves see 6.4.24 6.4.27 Control Telve 1. Instrument etr Instrianeet Air Lees of concentrate flow pose malese eoecentrated Close oeollag (CT-40) eupply felle control borte seid storage tasks water eostrol are empty isivel divert eoneentrate flow boet to evaporator througin CT-30 or to food tank througin CT-36
- 2. Contrel signet falla Control SIgne! Lose of eencestrate flou pone unless eencontrated Close coollag to open/elooe Free control borte seld storage tente meter eentrol valve Evaporator are empty velves divert
- Temperature concentrate Trememitter flew book to eveparater through CT-)S er to feed test through CT-36 e >
l I peference proutages fsta figure 9.3-t (sheet I) f:ss flavre 9.3-2 (sheet 3) i fsas figure 9.3-5 (sheeta 1,3,44) ! 6.0 SUBST37131 SC BLfED, 808ml AgCOTERT, AND CNfTflCAL ADDITION 1
. Potenttal failure Mode lanedsete Effects Interface it Subayates Rea dial Sottoe
} Cooperent Mode Involved Within Subersten laterface ulthtm Sube= sten 6.4.27 Contrcl Talve 3 Spurious alsnel to Centrol Signal Loos of concentrate flew mece unlean eencontrated Close eeellas (CT-40) open/elene valve free control borte acid storage tenta uster control (cont'd) Evaporator are empty selve; divert Temperature < t,acen tr a t e fransmitter flew back to evaperator through CT-30 er to feed tank terough CT-36 4 Internal valve -- I.can of eencontrate fle=e None unless borte seld Clone eeeling failure control eterage tanks are empty water eentrol valves divert eenoestrate flew boek to evererster through CT-38 er to feed tank through CT-36 6.5 Deborate 4 centnereltzer 6.5.1 Manual Centrol 1. RC Bleed flew falta SC Bleed flow me flew to deberating No fim to makeup f altera mone Valve demineraliser
- 2. Talve falta elemed -- go flew to deborating Nono if alternate fleu Alternate flow deatneraliser path avellable path available 6.5.2 Manual leolation 1. Talve falla closed - No flew to deborating None if alternate flev Alternate flev Talve deelneraliser path available path available 6.5 3 Deborating 1. Tank leake -- secreased bleed fice mone af alternate riew Alternate flew Deatmaraliser path available path available
- 2. Tank empties - No bleed flev pone if alternate flew Alternate ficu path available path available 3 Tank went, retter -
Decreased bleed ficu Mone if alternate flew Alternate flow valves fall open path available path available 4 Resin naturates - No baron removal free Ihane if alternete flou Alternate flew bleed flow path available path eve 11able
- 5. Cauntle fi m fatta Countle se deelneralamer mone af alternate flew alternate (Ecu regeneration path available path avallebte 6.5.4 Maacellaneous 1. Electrie rmer Electrio Power sorte acid say crystallsses none if alternete tim seatore trece .
PIptng supply to trace small potential for peth avattable heatingg unplus heating falle plugging and loan of ficw linea
- 2. Trace heating falla -- Berte seld say crystalliseg Wome if alternate flow Seatere trace small potential for path evallable heatings unplus plurRing end loss of FIm Itnes 6.5.5 waste Drain, 1. Itnea fall open -- peereanad tleed flew mone if alternate flew alternate flew Sample Linea path avallet,le path availablu 6.5.6 Manual leolation 1. Talvea fall closed - so bleed flow Nome af alternate ricu Alternate flew Talvea path available path evallable
-- .. _ _ . . ~_, . ., . , -
.3 , .
Referenee Drawings: F3as Figure 9.3-1 (Sheet 1) rsas rigure 9.F2 (Sheet 3) FSAR Figure 9.3-5 (3heete 1.),64) 6.0 SOBST3 TEM: ec DLEED. 3080E Recorset, AND CERNICAL 815017I08 rotontial Feature Mode samedtete Etreets Interfees at Subsystee Bemedial aettee Ceeponest Ibde levolved Withis Suberates laterfees Withis Subsystem 6.5 7 Cheet Velve I. Falle to prevent .- Fossible backfirw to None if alternate fine Close menuel (Outlet) book flow deberating deuteerellser path evellable teeletten vette 6.5.0 Check Talve t. Falle to provest - roselble backflow to se tiew to makeup tilters Close Nr.16 (C3-123) boekrinw deberating desinereltzer P _ _ _ _ __.__ _ . - . _ _ _ - _ - - _ . - --}}