ML19319A730
| ML19319A730 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1977 |
| From: | Bonaca M, Coad R, Nair P BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911280655 | |
| Download: ML19319A730 (75) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. . . Safety Assessment of Steam Generator Tube Leakage At The Oconee Nuclear Station a...g_ NOTICE - THE ATT ACHED FILES ARE OFflCITHEY AL RECORDS H AVE BEEN OF THE DIVISION OF DOCUMENT CONTROL. CH ARGED TO YOU FOR A LIMITED TIME PERIOD AND MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RECORDS F ACILIT Y BRANCH 016. PLE ASE DO NOT SEND DOCUMENTS i REMOV AL OF ANY l CH ARGED OUT THROUGH THE M AIL P AGE (S) FROM DOCUMENT FOR REPRODUCTION MUST l BE REFERRED TO FILE PERSONNEL DE ADLlNE RETURN D ATE . . __ l, j
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#N SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF STEAM GEflERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE AT THE OCONEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION By M. V. BONACA R. B. C0AD P. K. NAIR D. A. NITTI J. W. PEAGRAM W. W. WEAVER ,
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.BABC0CK & WILC0X Power Generation Group i Nuclear Power Generation Division !
P. O. Box 1260
,, Lynchburg, Virginia 24502 l 1
9 Babcock & Wilcox e % e a , _ , _ , _ , , . , ,
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Attached is the report, " Safety Assessment of Steam Generator Tube Leakage at. the Oconee Nuclear Power Statior.". The content of this report addresses itself to the NRC concern expressed in the letter " Request for ,c6 Additional Information: Assessment of the Consequences and Probability of the Concurrent Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) and LOCA and Generator Tube Leaks", received by B&W on 6/6/77. During a phone conversation among B&W, Duke and NRC representatives on 6/6/77, the NRC agreed to limit the scope of their request to those items ; I of immediate concern which relate to the subject of MSLB with tube ruptures.
' Therefore, this report gives special emphasis to the study of MSLB and con- ! current tube failures. This emphasis is justified by the fact that this I occurrence results in the most severe environmental releases at the site boundaries.
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!p ' , SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE AT THE OCONEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION L
1 INTRODUCTION i
! During the past months, the three nuclear units at the Oconee Nuclear Power ; Station have experienced several cracks in steam generator tubes which resulted in primary-to-secondary tube leakage within their once-through steam generators..
i A study of these occurrences has indicated that the main sites of such cracks
; are on _the two rows of tubes which are next to the inspection lane. The ! occasional recurrence of such failures has resulted in this examination of I ;
the possibility and consequences of simultaneous occurrence of a Main Steam I Line Break (MSLB) and major tube fa1 Nres, as well as the possibility and consequences of simultaneous occurrence of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and major tube failures. Special emphasis has been given to the study of MSLB and concurrent tube failures, since this occurrence results in the most severe
; environmental doses.
i
,' The report contains an evaluation of the following:
i 1. The mechanical aspects of the steam generator tube leakage experienced I to date at the Oconee Units.
- 2. The transient response of the nuclear steam system to determine if a steam line break accident with concurrent rupture of previously leaking steam generator tubes will lead to additional fuel damage.
- 3. The radiological consequences of the steam line break as a function of
, the number of steam generator tubes failed.
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- 4. The consequences of a LOCA and concurrent tube ruptures.
- 5. The probabilities of a steam line break, and also of a loss of coolant accident, with concurrent failures of OTSG tubes.
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SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS
- ,i Based on the examination of cracked tubes removed from service, the maximum anticipated effect of a MSLB on a leding 0TSG tube will be to increase the leak area without severance of the tube, such that some flow through the tube.
- would be maintained even after a MSLB. Tubes not leaking prior to the MSLB
, are not expected to fail as a result of the MSLB. In spite of this anticipated--
behavior, analyses have been performed assuming guillotine failure of 1, 3 and 10 tubes in conjunction with the MSLB. These failures result in calculated
. primary to secondary leak rates at the moment of the break of, respectively 48 lbm/sec, 144 lbm/sec and 480 lbm/sec. As a result of the expected behavior of the leaking SG tubes following a MSLB, B&W fully anticipates the leak rate of 480 lbm/see to be representative of the failure of a much larger number of tubes than the ten assumed in the analysis.
The analysis of the MSLB in conjunction with 10 double-ended tube ruptures in the affected steam generator corresponds to the case where, during the period of time following the identification of the first tube leak and endi.ng with the subsequent reactor shutdown, 9 additional tubes develop leaks before the occurrence of the MSLB. Under the effect of the MSLB, these 10 leaking tubes experience enlargement of the crack area, resulting in a combined primary to L secondary initial leak rate which would be some fraction of the assumed 480 lbm/sec. Since the probability of this postulated sequence of events is extremely small, it is concluded that the case of a MSLB and double-ended rupture of 10 tubes analyzed in this report bounds a credible MSLB event with concurrent rupture i , of SG tubes. Therefore, analyses of MSLB and concurrent ruptures of more than 10 tubes have not been performed.
! For all cases, detailed dynamic loop analyses and DNBR calculations indicate 4
l that no fuel is expected to fail due to consideration of concurrent tube i ruptures . Dynamic loop analyses indicate that for all cases, no return to power
! is experienced. For all cases, the core remains covered throughout the transient j and ample emergency injection water is available well beyond the termination of ! the accident. The dose consequences of the double ended failure of up to i 10 steam generator tubes in conjunction with a main steam line accident are less
- than 5% of the 10CFR100 limits.
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j Conservative calculations have shown that the effect of three tube failures in conjunction with a LOCA would have an insignificant effect on the consequences of the LOCA. Furthermore, it is shown that if a realistic calculation of the reflooding phase was performed for the Oconee plants, rupture of 20 or more tubes could be tolerated without affecting the present Oconee LOCA limits. An assessment of the probability of MSLB, and also a LOCA, with concurrent failure
; of steam generator lane tubes has been performed. Due to the sparcity of tube i
failure data, the results were basad on a very conservative model. In spite of
; this conservatism, probabilities of MSLB, or LOCA, with more than three i steam generator lane tube ruptures range between a maximum of 1x10-7 for.
j three tubes (0conee 1) to a minimum of .5x10-25 for 10 tubes (Oconee 2), for
. a 4 day shutdown period (time between identification of first leak and subse-I. quent reactor shutdown).
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*I y Since the dose consequences of the double ended failure of up to 10 steam generator tubes in conjunction with a MSLB accident are less than 5% of the 10CFR100 limits and since the probability of such an event is very small, it can be concluded that the steam generator tube leakage experierrced at Oconee does not create a significant risk to the health and safety of the public and that the Oconee Units can safely operate with one or more leaking steam genera-tor tubes provided that they remain within the limits of Technical Specification 3.1.6 which defines the maximum allowable primary to secondary leakage rate.
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; p fl . BEHAVIOR OF LEAKING STEAM GENERATOR TUBES AFTER A MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK
; Inspection of cracked tubes removed from service has indicated that the initiation of flaws were localized within the tubes. These flaws developed into a through wall crack and subsequently grew larger in the circum-ferential direction. The latter stages of crack propagation clearly
- indicate the presence of a high cycle, low stress fatigue mechanism.
4
- 'r. Behavior of circumferential through wall cracks in tubes depends on the crack length and the type of loading. Short cracks can grow larger eithe.
by fatigue.or by an overload situation. For a constant load, the rate of 4 . fatigue crack growth of small cracks increases with crack length. Once any crack has grown to about 270* around the circumference of the tube, < . the structural constraint required to maintain a " sharp crack tip" is lost. This is due to the fact that the net uncracked ligament yields
, and results in a crack blunting phenomenon. Inconel-600 exhibits consi-i derable yielding at high temperatures. Figure 1 shows the fracture ,
surface of Tube 77-23, which was removed from the generator by pulling through
. the tube sheet. Notice the fatigue growth in service for about 270*. The
-subsequent failure (i.e., between 270' and 360') was caused by a tensile
. overload condition while pulling the tube out of the generator. Here considerable necking has taken place indicating the net section going 1 plastic. Also, the crack blunting effect of the fatigue crack was j visible at points' marked as "END". Figure 2 shows several vertical section > j , views of the necked failure region, shear lip formation and crack blunting. Figure 3 provides closeup views of the three failure modes, i.e., fatigue, i crack blunting and ductile tear (shear lip). Considerable straining was.
!- required to cause the ultimate failure of the tube in the plastic regime.
! The level'of straining required for-failure is not available during a main
! steam line break since axial displacement is limited.
; Under a main steam line break' (MSLB) condition, failure of previously ;
uncracked tubes is not expected because the magnitude of the axial stress
- in these tubes is low. Therefore, the maximum anticipated effect of a I Main Steam Line Break.on the steam generator tubes would be to increase ;
i the leak area of those. tubes leaking prior to the MSLB, without causing l j their severance. Thus, a portion of the flow through these tubes would be maintained even after a Main Steam Line Break. + i
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s 2.0 TRANSIENT ANALYES OF MSLB AND CONCURRENT TUBE LEAKAGE 2.1 Purpose of the Analyses: Analyses have been performed to detennine the effects and consequences of the double ended rupture of a 34 inch main steam line and concurrent leakage due to steam generator tube failures. The purpose of these analyses is:
- 1. to determine the consequences of a main steam line break and con-
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current degrees of tube leakage on the structural integrity of the fuel cladding, in order to assess the levels of primary coolant activity to be assumed for the environmental dose evaluations.
- 2. to describe long term plant response to the main steam line break and concurrent tube leakage and to determine the leak rate through increasing numbers of ruptured tubes as a function of time for the first two hours following the steam line break. The calculated leakage rate forms the basis for the calculation of the two hours radiological consequences at the site boundary.
- 3. to verify conditions under which no return to power is experienced and for which the core will never be uncovered up to the time of termination of the leak.
2.2 Method of Analysis 3 Section 1 of this report shows that, based on the observation of e sting failed specimens, the maximum anticipated effect of a MSLB on a leaking SG tube will be to increase the leak area without severance of the
' tube, such. that some flow through the tube uould be maintained even afte.r a'MSLB. In spite of this evidence which limits the expected leakage-
- flow from each failed tube following a MSLB, the transient analyses were performed assuming guillotine failure of, respectively,1, 3 and 10 tubes
; in conjunction with the MSLB. These failures result in calculated
- primary to secondary leak rates at the moment of the break of, respectively, 48 lbm/sec,144 lbm/sec and 480 lbm/sec. As a result of the expected behavior of the leaking SG tubes following a MSLB, B&W anticipates the leak rate of 480 lbm/see to be representative of the failure of a much larger number of tubes than the ten assumed in these analyses. The analysis of the MSLB in conjunction with 10 guillotine tube ruptures in the affected steam generator corresponds to the case where, during the period of time
'x following the identification of the first tube leak and ending with the , subsequent reactor shutdow, 9 additional tubes develop leaks before the i occurrence of the MSLB. Under the effect of the MSLB, the 10 leaking tubes experience enlargement of the crack area, resulting in a combined primary to secondary initial leak rate which would be some fraction of 480 lbm/sec. Since the probability evaluation of Section 5 shows that the probability of this postulated sequence of. events is extremely small, it is concluded that the case of a MSLB and double-ended rupture of 10 tubes analyzed in this report bounds a credible MSLB event with concurrent rupture of SG tubes. Therefore, analyses of MSLB and concurrent rupture of more than 10 tubes have not been performed.
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.i For all cases analyzed, the loss of secondary coolant due to failure of
.'! the 34" steam line cutside containment causes a decrease in steam pressure,
~l' sI which lowers the secondary saturation temperature and thus increases
{ boiling heat transfer. Increased SG heat flow, accompanied by steam flow through the turbine stop valves and the break, and the lower secondary systen saturation temperature, causes increased primary-to-secondary heat transfer, lowering the RC temperature and pressure. Core protection
' is provided by a reactor trip on variable low pressure.
To determine the consequences of the main steam line break and concurrent '
. primary-to-secondary side leakage on the 1, pKuctural was used. integrity The 68of the fuel node
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clad, a digital computer program, TRAP 2 i model included a detailed description of both the RCS and the steam generator. The model simulates the secondary system valves (with appro-priate flow rates and opening and closing times), including the main feedwater isolation and control valves, auxiliary feedwater valves, and atmospheric dump and safety valves. The TRAP model also includes energy balanfes for tha principal SG components, the entire RCS (core, loops, and SG), and the pressurizer (with both mass and energy transfer). The reactbr kinetics, trip logic and action, and a fuel pin description with Doppler and moderator temperature feedback are also simulated. Three TRAP analyses of the MSLB accident were performed, assuming respec-tively,1, 3 and 10 tube failures. Since minimum DNBR is experienced in all cases during the..first 3 seconds of the transient, the detailed TRAP calculations were extended to 7 seconds into the transient and the The DNBR cal-DNBR calculations culations were performed with perform RADAR \ 9p)up to that predict point or whether in time. not gap activity-( is going to be released by any fuel pins as a consequence of the accident.
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- Since an additional TRAP calsylation performed up to 40 seconds into the i transient, and t' se CRAFT W calculations up to 10 minutes following
; the accident sho :. that no return to power is experienced in all cases i and that the core is never uncovered, no further concern for fuel clad integrity exist beyond the first 7 seconds of the transients.
The TRAP model assembled for these analyses provides a conservative repre-
! sentation of the Oconee plants. Some of the parameters used in the m'adel were varied in the conservative direction to make the results of the analyses applicable to other plants of the same type. Among the conser-vatisms resulting from this approach, were:
- 1. E0L conditions were selected for the SLB analysis, since Doppler and moderator coefficients are most negative at EOL, and since the
., ' - s reactivity insertion due to the RCS cooldown increases with increas-ingly negative reac u
efficient of -3x10 givity coefficients. ak/k/*F was used.AThe moderator temperature Doppler coefficient co-used was
-1.85x10~g ak/k/*F which is conservative for the Oconee plants, i 2. The main feedwater inlet temperature was 30*F colder than at Oconee.
This is a conservative assumption which increases the positive reactivity insertion due to the cooldewn. In spite of this conser-vatism, the reactor was shown to be maintained subcritical in all i cases analyzed assuming a minimum tripped rod worth corresponding
'- to the reactivity required to produce a 1% ak/k subcritical margin at hot shutdown, E0L core conditions with the rod of maximum worth stuck out of the core. Credit for boron injection by the HPI's was L
taken into account while no credit was taken for the boron contribu-L tion from core flood tanks. i d, -
- 3. A pressure sensor delay time of 0.7 seconds was assumed, which is
_. 0.1 seconds slower than the delay time for Oconee. ' t i
/ The TPAP-transient model assumed that the reactor was operating at 100%
powe ar 2568 MWt. However, the transient power traces were normalized to w initial power level at 102% power for the DNBR calculations. Initial core outlet pressure for the DNBR analyses was assumed to be nominal -65 psi to include sensor error and uncertainty, or 2135 psia. Similarly, inlet temperature was assumed to be nominal +2 F corresponding-to an inlet enthalpy of 556.3 BTU / ibm. Continuous operation of the
- RC pumps was assumed during the accident, until the operator initiates-p operation of the decay heat removal system.
In all cases, the reactor was scrammed bi :.ne variable-low pressure trip. In order to obtain results applicable to all three Oconee reactors, the most conservative of the variable low pressure trip equations for the Oconee plants was used for all cases, or 10.79 Tout -4539. For an outlet temperature of about 605*F (trip occurs la all cases in about 1 second from the beginning of the accident and Tout does not change during this t interval of time), the resulting pressure trip setpoint corresponds to a RC pressure of 1949 psig. DNBR dependence on this setpoint is however
; negligible, since the depressurization rate is so fast during this blow-i down phase, that a variation in trip setpoint of 50 psia will change the l trip time by only 150 milliseconds.
The CRAFT-2 model 'shown in Figure 4 was assembled to describe long term
,3 plant response.to the MSLB and concurrent tube leakage through the ; s affected steam generator and to determine the leakage rate through the
(' ruptured tubes as a function of time. To verify the CRAFT-2 8 node l model response to the accident during the first portion of the blowdown
; against a more detailed model of the steam generator, a MSLB with a tube ! rupture was analyzed with the TRAP 68 node model during the first 40 seconds of the blowdown. A comparison with the CRAFT analysis for the I same case showed satisfactory agreement between the predictions of the two models through the whole blowdown phase. The CRAFT model assumed an initial power level of 102% of 2568 Mit, and nominal initial inlet temperat' u re, outlet pressure and core flow. The purpose of the comparison with TRAP during the initial 40 seconds inte the transient was to assure that at the end of the 40 seconds, the CRAFT model would show results similar to TRAP, particularly where system pressure is concerned, since l
the leak rate through the ruptured tubes is proportional to the pressure differential between primary and secondary side of the affected steam generator. Since ~at the end of the' blowdown phase CRAFT predicted
. a primary system pressure of almost 100 psi higher than TRAP, CRAFT was considered to predict a conservative leak rate through the ruptured tubes.
Since all of the Oconee lane tube cracks have been experienced either just below the upper tube sheet or at the 15th support plate elevation, which is 4 feet below the upper tube sheet, every tube failure was simulated in CRAFT by assuming the flow path elevation of the upper end of the broken tube at the tube sheet elevation, and the elevation of the lower end 4 feet below the tube sheet. This is equivalent, in the model, to the removal of 'a four feet length of tube just below the tube sheet elevation. Un-restricted flow through the upper end of the break was assumed while the s .
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flow through the lower end of the broken tube was calculated assuming a q proper friction factor which was provided by the detailed TRAP simulation. l The CRAFT calculation assumed tjpe 7 leak flow path for the upper end o' the broken tubes. Zaloudek flow model with a multiplier of 0.81 was used in the subcooled region. For qualities above 0.2, Moody critical flow rate data with a multiplier of 1.0 were used. For qualities between 0.0 and 0.2, the code interpolates the flow rates between Zaloudek and Moody.
~ In order to account for the friction through the lower end of the broken - tubes, the CRAFT model assumed type 5 flow path for these tub's (momentum equation and critical flow check).
The CRAFT analyses for the MSLB and concurrent rupture of 1, 3 and 10 tubes were performed up to 10 minutes into the transient, when the operator is assumed to recognize the existence of a primary-to-secondary leak in the affected steam generator and takes action to start a con-trolled cooldown of the plant and depressurization of the primary system at a rate consistent with the maximum cooldown rate of 100'F per hour. From this point on, the operator is able to bring the system to DHRS operation quite rapidly, since primary system pressure and temperaturc are already very low at the end of the first 10 ninutes into the tran-sient (see Figures 15,20,27,32,39,44). The analyses show that in all cases the core will not be uncovered, whether or not the operator keeps injection water running. The analyses show that, if needed, injection water is available from the BWST for a long time after accident temination. Furthermore, the RCS pressure after 10 minutes into the transient is so 1cw, that the operator is able to switch-on low pressure injection whenever 3 he needs it; the large flow provided by this system would guarantee sufficient cooling water for any SG tube rupture, even much larger than I the ones analyzed. However, from a release standpoint, it is conservative to assume minimum dilution of the primary coolant. Therefore, the analyses were perfomed assuming that the operator switches off all injection water after 10 minutes into the transient. Table 1 shows the sequence of events assumed in this report fcr all cases analyzed. The transient begins with the concurrent double ended rupture of the steam line and of the steam generator tubes. In all cases, trip on variable low pressure occurs at about:1 second into the transient; at the same time, MFW startup and control valves begin to close. After 700 milliseconds, control rods begin to drop and turbine trip occurs. Turbine stop valves close 500 milliseconds after turbine trip. Auxiliary feedwater
' is actuated by a SG low pressure signal, and it is assumed to start to
- u. flow 15 seconds following reactor trip. Since the auxiliary feedwater pump feeds both SG, and the level in the unaffected SG at the end of blowdowr.
is still high, the CRAFT calculations conservatively assumed that all the available auxiliary feedwater was fed to the affected SG. After main feedwater startup and control valves close at about 18 seconds, it is
- assumed that either the operator will stop main feedwater to both steam generators, or ICS level control is maintained in the SG. Nevertheless ,
the analyses assumed that full auxiliary feedwater flow to the affected steam generator would be actuated and maintained up to 10 minutes following the accident.
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High pressure injection starts in all cases.about 30 seconds after the accident. The CRAFT analyses were then performed assuming no operator 1 m action until 10 minutes into the transient. By this time, the operator
- has recognized the existence of a leak from the primary to the secondary side of the affected SG by one or more of the following facts:
- 1. ' Alarms on N16 detectors in main steam line
- 2. Area radiation alarms
- 3. Inability to reach a stable pressurizer level, even if he attempts to increase makeup.
- 4. The affected steam generator shows a residual steam pressure, indicating that it is not dry.
- 5. Mismatch in SG levels
- 6. T,y, will continue to decrease even if he attempts to stabilize it.
Thereafter, the operator would normally restart feedwater to the unaffec-ted steam generator, switch off auxiliary feedwater to the affected steam generator, stop all water injection from the core flood tanks (the reactor vessel remains full with water in all cases analyzed), and will start cooldown of the primary side by opening the turbine bypass to the con-densor. While the operator cools down at a maximum rate of 100*F per a hour, he will also proceed to depressurize the primary by spraying into the pressurizer. At 280*F, the operator will shift to decay heat removal system operation, shut off the reactor coolant pumps and depressurize to NPSH requirements for the decay heat pumps. The CRAFT calculations provide the leak rate from the broken SG tubes until 10 minutes into the transient. From this moment to the time when the operator switches to DHRS, the leak rate was conservatively assumed constant and equal to its value at 10 minutes. After switching to DHRS, the calculations indicate that steam will be flowing from the upper end : of the broken tubeg as soon as the liquid mass contained in the hot leg piping from the 90 point of the 180* elbow to the inlet of the steam generator tubes drains out. From this moment until two hours into the transient, constant liquid flow at the value calculated at 10 minutes 1 was assumed from the lower end of the broken tube; and a steaming rate !
.cf 2 lbm/sec, calculated for the 10 tube rupture and conservatively used l
, for the other cases, was assumed from the upper end of the broken tubes. !
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2.3 Results of the DNBR Analysis \ The results of the TRAP. analyses described in 2.2 are shown in Figures 5 l l through 7. Table 1 details the sequence of events. This phase of blow- ' i down is so fast, that the system transient response to the MSt.B and tube l ruptures does not change significantly with the number of ruptured tubes. Figures 5 through 7 show the system transient parameters used for the
-DNBR calculations. As indicated in 2.?. initial system parameters in-cluding sensor errors and uncertainties were.a pewer level of 102% of 2568 MWt, a system pressure of 2135 psia, and an inlet enthalpy of 556.3 BTU /lbm.
Constant full coolant flow rate was assumed throughout the transient.
The SLB with one rupture case was run for 40 seconds into the transient i y to assess potential return to power and to provide a benchmarking case for the CRAFT model. The results of this analysis are shown in Figures 8 and 9. The time-dependent minimum DNB ratio (MDNBR) is shown on Figures 10 through 12 for the respectively, one, three and ten ruptured steam-generator tubes cases. These results were obtained from the transient code RADAR, assuming a hot channel peaking factor equal to 1.5 axial times 1.6 radial. This peaking factor represents a conservative initial condition, since it bounds the core hot channel peaking factor during normal operating conditions for Oconee 1, 2, and 3 all throughout their present cycles of operation. The figures show that the number of ruptured tubes does not affect significantly the DNBR results. Since, for all cases analyzed, MDNBR is always above 1.3 (B&W-2 correlation, verified with COMB 0 in the lower pressure range), it is concluded that a MSLB and concurrent double-ended rupture of up to 10 tubes will not result in additional failed fuel in any of the Oconee reactors. 2.4 Results of the CRAFT Analyses Figure 8 shows the comparison of the CRAFT and the TRAP models during the first 40 seconds of the blowdown. By 40 seconds, the affected SG has blown dry and the For s benchmarking purposes, power the has approached comparisons were performed the decay heatone for only values. case, the MSLB with concurrent rupture of one tube. The figures show a satis-factory agreement between the two models throughout the transient. At 40 seconds, CRAFT predicts higher power and RC pressure than TRAP, which results in a conservative leak rate through the affected tubes. The sequence of events is as described in Table 1 and as discussed in the previous sections. Figures 13 through 24 show the results of the MSLB and 1 tube rupture case. Figures 25 through 36 show the results of the 3 tube ruptures case, and Figures 37 through 48 show the results of the 10 tube ruptures case. After the first 40 seconds of the transient, which have already been discussed, the RC system continues to depressurize and cooldown under the cooling effect of the auxiliary feedwater to the affected SG. The HPI pumps continue to provide flow, and system makeup from the core flood tanks starts at 280, 247, and 171 seconds for, respectively, the 1, 3 and 10 tube rupture cases. The leak rate continues to slowly de-
.s' crease with the decreasing AP between the primary and secondary side of the steam generator.
Figures 23 and 24 show the leak rate through the upper and lower end of the broken tube in the 1 tube rupture case. The figures show that, after about 430 seconds following SLB and tube rupture, the flow through the broken tube starts to increase until 600 seconds. This effect is due to the fact that, at 430 seconds, primary system pressure stops decreasing and becomes constant until 600 seconds. Since the cooling effect is continuing and the enthalpy of the primary water is decreasing, the water
is becoming more and more subcooled. Under these conditions, the Zaloudek
' and Moody correlations for the flow through the broken paths predict an increasingly higher flow rate. At 600 seconds, the flow is only 3 percent below the prediction of the' orifice flow model. Further subcooling is not expected to occur following operator action. Therefore, the leak after 600 seconds was conservatively assumed to be constant and equal to its value at 600 seconds, until the operator switches to DHRS operation.
This point in time was detemined by assuming a steady cooldown rate of 100*F/hr from 600 seconds until an average coolant temperature of 280 F is reached. The subcooling' effect, and the' increasing leak rate, are not observed in the 3 and 10 tube cases since RC pressure continues to decrease in both cases until 10 minutes. In the 3 tubes rupture case, the leak rate after 600 seconds was assumed to be constant and equal to its value at 600 seconds, until the operator switches to DHRS operation (see Tables 1 and 2), after cooling down at a rate of 100*F/hr. Figures 47 and 48 of the 10 tubes rupture case show that in this case the leak rate is such, that at about 500 seconds into the transient, steam forms at the top of the 180* elbow in the hot leg. Figures 38 and 39 show that, at this time, a pressure difference of about 90 psia exist between the core and the primary side of the affected SG. Coolant coming from the hot leg flashes in the elbow of the hot leg. Between 500 and 550 seconds, all the liquid between the elbow and the tube sheet is drained through the upper ends of the broken tubes, and after 550 s seconds, only steam is relieved through the upper tube at a rate of 2 lbm/ t sec. The leak rates at 600 seconds were then assumed to continue up to I 2 hours into the transient. The same effect is expected to occur in the 1 and 3 tube rupture cases at some point into the transient. At the latest, this effect will occur when the operator switches to DHRS operation and switches off the main coolant system pumps, since this action will result in a sizable drop in primary pressure. Therefore, it was assumed for both cases- of 1 and 3 tube rupture that, following the transfer to DHRS operation and following drainage of the water retained above the upper tube sheet, the failed upper tubes will begin to relieve steam. A conservative rate of 2 lbm/sec (as calculated for the 10 tube case) was then assumed up to 2 hours after SLB. A summary of the leak rate from 600 seconds to 2 hours is provided in Table 2. The table shows that the leak flow rates after the first 10 minutes are much higher for the 1 and 3 tube ruptures cases than for the 10 tube ruptures case. This is partially due to the conservative assumptions which were made for the leak rate after 10 minutes in the 1 and 3 tube rupture cases. It should therefore
- 'x be noticed that the integrated leaks after 2 hours in the 1 and 3 tube rupture cases, and the corresponding dose calculations, are probably l affected by an excessive degree of conservatism, the extent of which cannot
- be assessed at present.
The results of these analyses show that a return to power is not experienced for all cares, even when no credit for the baron contribution due to the l ! core flood tanks is taken into account. The core will not be uncovered under any condition analyzed, since in all cases ample injection water is available to exceed the leak rate well beyond the point in time when the leak is teminated. The blowdown data, used for the calculation of the dose consequences, is provided in Section 3 and in Tables 3 through 5.
5
;_ 3. RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MAIN ' STEAM'LINE BREAK WITH CONCURRENT i TUBE RUPTURES
' The radiological consequences associated with the complete severance
} (double-ended rupture)'of one, three, and ten steam generator tubes coincident with a steam line break accident have been calculated using the following assumptions:
- 1. The iodine activities in the reactor coolant and in the secondary
' coolant prior to the steam line break accident are, respectively, 3.5 and 0.1 uCi/g of dose equivalent I-131. These are the maximum equilibrium activity levels allowed by the proposed Technical Speci- l
, fications for the Oconee Nuclear Station.
- 2. No additional fuel cladding failures occur as a result of the steam line break accident with concurrent steam generator tube v1;ptures.
This is based on the transient analysis of the thermal-hydraulic performance of the primary and secondary coolant loops, described in Section 2 of this report, which shows that the Nactor core remains covered at all times during the accident and that the DNBR calculations do not indicate additional failed fuel. , 3. The primary-to-secondary mass flow rates used to calculate the curies .t of iodine entering the secondary system are shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5 (column labelled LEAK RATE). These mass flow rates were obtained from the transient analysis of the thermal-hydraulic performance of the primary and secondary coolant loops, which was described in Section 2 of this report. J
- 4. The primary coolant makeup mass flow rates are shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5 (column labelled DILUTION RATE). These mass flow rates were also obtained from the transient analysis described in Section 2. The makeup mass flow rate has .the net effect of diluting the reactor coolant iodine activity concentration following the accident.
- 5. The effect of the " iodine spike" associated with the accident tran-sient is included in calculating the iodine activity in the reactor coolant. The iodine spiking model used to calculate the reactor coolant iodine activity following the accident transient is presented in Appendix A. The reactor coolant iodine activity following the rupture i
of one, three and ten steam generator tubes is shown respectively l in Tables 3, 4 and 5 (column labelled RC ACTIVITY).
- 6. The curies of iodine entering the secondary system are u;1culated i by integrating the product of the reactor coolant iodine concentration and the primary-to-secondary mass leak rate over the time period of interest
- 7. Of all' the iodine activity entering the secondary system due to the '
assumed tube failures,10% is assumed to be present in the mass of steam released to the environment.
. . _ . . - . - __ - - . . - = . _
- 8. All the iodine activity in 173,300 lbs. of secondary coolant and the iodine activity associated with a constant primary-to-secondary leak rate of 1 gpm (the maximum leak rate permitted per proposed Tech Spec 3.1.6) in the unaffected steam generator are assumed to be released to the environment. The transient analysis of Section 2 shows that
. only 110,000 lbs. of secondary coolant is released to the environnent . following a steam line break. Therefore, the assumption of the release of 173,300 lbs. of secondary coolant is a conservative assumption.
The total of these two releases is 14.2 curies of dose equivalent I-131. The total curies of dose equivalent I-131 released to the environment for a steam line break accident with the rupture of one, three, and ten steam generator tubes are shown, respectively, in Tables 3, 4, and 5 (column labelled TOTAL CURIES OUT). The 14.2 curies of dose equivalent I-131 are conservatively added into the environmental release during the first time step of the calculation. The curies , of dose equivalent I-131 released to the environment during a particular ) time step are also shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5 (column labelled ; DELTA CURIES).
- 9. The site boundary doses are calculated using the zero to two-hour atmospheric dispersion factor at the Oconee Nuclear Station site boundary (1609 m) corresponding to a ground level release, i .e. ,
X/Q of 1.16x10-4 sec/m3 (per FSAR Section 2.3.2). The dose calculational
~
model is consistent with TID-14844. The resulting two-hour thyroid doses at the Oconee Nuclear Station site
, boundary for a steam line break accident with the concurrent rupture of one, three, and ten steam generator tubes are shown below:
Number of SG Total Curies Two-Hour Thyroid Tubes Failed ReleaseC to Dose at Exclusion Following SLB Envi ronment Area Boundary Accident (Dose Equivalent I-131) (REM) 1 223.8 13.3 3 230.3 13.7 10 122.2 7.3 L . . , s. The radiological dose consequences of a steam line break accident with the concurrent rupture of up to ten steam generator tubes are well within the 10CFR100 exposure guidelines (300 rem).
The failure of ten steam generator tubes results in a lower two hour thyroid
'ose than the failure of one or three tubes because of the following reasons:
- 1. The failure of ten steam generator tubes results in a rapid depressurization of the reactor coolant system which leads to lower primary to secondary leak rates later in the transient when the iodine concentration in the reactor coolant is high.
- 2. The leak rates assumed for the failure of one and three steam generator tubes are very conservative during the time period (10-120 min.) when the iodine concentration in the reactor coolant is high.
~
Thus, the one and three tube failure cases result in a higher total mass of reactor coolant and a larger total number of curies of iodine leaking into the secondary system when compared to the ten tube failure case. The relationship of the environmental consequences for the failure of one, three, and ten steam generator tubes can be seen more clearly by comparing Figures 49, 50, and 51. Figure 49 shows that for all three cases the reactor coolant iodine activities are relatively close. It should be noted that all three cases start with the same iodine concentration in the reactor coolant and all have identical iodine addition rates due to the iodine " spike", so the loss of iodine due to the leakage into the secondary system controls the iodine concentration in the coolant. Thus, the failure of ten steam generator tubes has the highest iodine concentration since it has the lowest loss rate (lowest curie
, releases) . Figure 50 shows that the curie release rate to the environment
- usociated with the failure of ten steam generator tubes is initially very nigh due to the large initial leak rate with the failure of ten tubes; but, the curie release rate quickly falls below that release rate for the failure of either one or three tubes due to the rapid depressurization of the reactor coolant system and a correspondingly slower steam generator tube leak rate associated with the failure of ten tubes. Figure 51 shows that the higher sustained steam generator leak rates associated with the failure of one or three steam generator tubes causes the integrated curie release of iodine to overtake the curie release associated with the failure of ten . steam generator tubes after the first thirty minutes of the two-hour release period.
The two-hour whole body dose at the site boundary resulting from a steam line break accident with the concurrent failure of 1, 3, or 10 steam generator tubes is in all cases well below 1 Rem; therefore, it is not a limiting factor for this accident. (The whole-body dose calculations were based on the reactor coolant I activity remaining constant at 311/E pCi per gram, the proposed coolant activity
' - s limit in Technical Specification 3.1.4).
Based on the above calculational results, the radiological dose consequences of. a steam line break accident with the concurrent double-ended rupture of up to ten steam generator tubes are less than 4.7% of the 10CFR100 exposure guidelines. Therefore, the Oconee Nuclear Station Units can safely operate l with one or more leaking steam generator tubes provided that they remain within the limits of Technical Specification 3.1.6, which defines the maximum allowable primary-to-secondary leakage rate, and Technical Specification 3.1.4, which defines the maximum allowable reactor coolant system activity. l .. l
. ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF A LOCA AND CONCURRENT OTSG TUBE FAILURES At present, the FAC Evaluation Models do not require the assumption of steam generator tube failures in the LOCA calculations. Conservative . calculations have been performed which estimate that guillotine breaks of three steam generator tubes would result in minimal impact on peak cladding temperature calculations. The effect of three tube failures on . peak containment pressure would be insignificant.
In the LOCA analysis performed to show compliance of the ECC' systems to 10CFR50.46 for the Oconee plants, no credit was taken for steam flow through the loops during the reflooding phase of the transient. It has been postulated that a loop seal may occur in the pump suction piping that will prevent loop venting. However, calculations performed with the CRAFT code show that no loop seal is present at the end of blowdown. If loop venting was used in the reflooding analysis, flooding rates would increase approximately 70% over the values used to demonstrate compliance to 10CFR50.46. Therefore, if a realistic calculation of the reflooding phase was perfonned for the Oconee plants, it is anticipated that rupture of 20 or more tubes could be tolerated without affecting the present Oconee LOCA limits. m a k i 1
s 5. PROBA8ILITY OF MSLB AND LOCA WITH CONCURRENT STEAM GENERATOR TUBE FAILURES An assessment has been performed of the probabilities of occurrence of a MSLB and of a LOCA with concurrent OTSG tube ruptures during the shut-down period following the first detection of an OTSG tube leak. Section 1 indicates that the occurrence of a MSLB during reactor operation (with-out any tube leak) is not expected to cause any tube to crack and leak. Only tubes which are already leaking prior to the MSLB event will msult in leakage rates after the main event. In light of these conclusions an assessment for the probabilities of MSLB (LOCA) with coincident tube failure during reactor operation has not been perfonned. This conclusion also justifies the position that, in assessing the joint probability of a MSLB (LOCA) and of the concurrent leakage of N tubes (in addition to the first leaker) during the shutdown period, the MSLB (LOCA) and the steam generator tube ruptures may be considered independent events. 5.1 Probabilities of MSLB and LOCA during the Shutdown Period Following Detection of a Leak A survey of the available literature on the subject of SLB Shows that in the entire history of the nuclear industry, only two steam line related breaks have been experienced, both of which involved reaction forces generated by the passage of steam through code safety valves. The acci-dents occurred at Turkey Point #3 and at the H. B. Robinson #2, both of which were traced back to defective equipment. The Oconee plants use a
- s. different design and in addition, when the above failures were reported, Duke Power reinforced their protection against such an occurrence, thereby eliminating this concern. Both of these failures occurred very early in plant life (during hot functional testing for Robinson #2, and after about 6 months of operation for Turkey Point #3), suggesting that they were " burn-in" type failures (the Oconee plants have passed the
" burn-in" stage) .
There have been no other reported steam line related accidents in 1560 reactor-years of operation. Eliminating the two above mentioned failures from the data base, a one side lower confidence limit of 1.47x10-3 per mactor year at:90% confidence is obtained. This number is very conser-vative, primarily due to an insufficient data base. In fact, this con-fidence limit is even higher than the point estimates obtained from including the failure at Turkey Point #3 (6.41x10-4) and from including both failures (1.28x10-3) ' ' ~ N The effect of a seismic event on main steam line integrity has also been considered. The Oconee main steam lines are designed to withstand a ground acceleration of up to 0.lg. It has therefore been assumed that any ground acceleration equal to or greater than 0.1g will cause a main steam line break. From the infonnation concerning the Oconee geological site,
' together with the probability of a seismic event as reported in WASH-1400, it has been calculated that the force-(0.lg ground acceleration) to probability of a seismic cause a main event steam line of sufficient failure is equal to 8.58x10-4 per year (assuming the rectangular distribution in WASH-1400). '
l l i I
1 l Adding of 2.33x10-3this seismic contribution to 1.47x10-3 results in a total probability th Y~ A paper presented by B. Anderson at the Specialist Meeting on the Develop-ment estimates andthe Application of Reliability probability of a main Techniques steam line break at 1.4x10-o to Nuclear Plant This faultsnumber
. Dukeincludes the effect of inspection and detection of possible Powar is initiating an inspection program for main steam lines starting '.ith the next refuelings for Oconee.
The best estimate of the probability of a main steam line break is near the geometric mean of the two values: 2.33x10-3 x 1.4x10-5' = 1.8x10
-4 per reactor year.
This value yields the following probabilities as a function of shutdown period: __. 4 Shutdown Period Probabiitty of MSLB 8 hr. 7 ! 1 day 2.19x10 7 4 days 6.57x10 0 2.63x10~ ( l For the LOCA event, the value of 1.0x10'4 per reactor year from the WASH-1400 report has been assumed. probabilities as a function of shutdown period:This value yields the following Shutdown Period Probability of LOCA 8 hr. 1.22x10-7 1 day 4 days 3.66x10-7 1.46x10-6 5.2 Probability of Lane Tube Failures During the Shutdown Period Following _ Detection of a Tube Leak
~-( A study of the series of failures by the leak mode in the Oconee steam generators, sumarized in Tables 6, 7 and 8, indicates that the main 1
site inspection 'of such lane.failures is on the two rows of tubes which are Of all such tubes at the Oconee site,1.06% have next to the-failed. For the remaining (non-lane) tubes, only 0.00325% have failed. This as the observation populationhas shifted the attention to the inspection lane tubes of interest. address failures of tubes in the inspection lane.All probabilities provided by this a The probabilistic study i has assumed that exactly one " leaker" has been detected for the particular steam generator and it then provides the probability of ha - and combines this with the independent event probability for a main steam line break arid for a LOCA. (1) Liverpool, April,1974
-17
' To estimate the probability of a given number of " leakers" occurs ing during the specific time period of interest, it is first nenssary to , obtain a probabilistic model for time-to-failure of the tubes in the inspection lane and then to apply this probability value in another grobability model to estimate the probability of exactly ~ "n" additional
, leakers" during the specific time period of interest.
l The methodology of the detennination of the probability of having a tube
~
fail during the specific time period is described in a report entitled 1
" Theory and Applications of Hazard Plotting for Censored Failure Data",
written by W. B. Nelson and published as General Electric report TIS-69-C-378 in October,1969. The title of the report exactly describes what the methodology allows one to do. In the case of the Oconee steam gene-rators, this involved an approach of the fnllowing nature for each steam generator, (although the results are stated as applicable to each gene-rator, only three such approaches were made). The data available for each unit was collapsed into a single generator for the unit. In other words, all " leakers" for Oconee 1 were assumed to have occurred in the rows adjacent to the inspection lane, and all in one steam generator. The total population was conservatively assumed to be only the lane tubes of one steam generator. The results were then assumed applicable to each generator for the unit involved. Tables 6, 7, and 8 detail the data used in the steam generator study for Oconee s Units 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The first column identifies the steam generator, the second gives the row-tube location, and then the date. A yes in the column " lane" means that the tube is in an inspection lane. A yes in the leaker colunut indicates that the particular tube failed in the mode under consideration. A a in this column indicates that the tube was stabilized or plugged or taken out of service for other reasons. These non-failed or " suspended" items enter indirectly into the probability study. The colum headed by "EFPD" is the cumulative service effective full power days at which the failure or suspension occurred. This is the time-parameter for the probabilistic model of time-to-failure, for the tube failures. The method described in the cited report by Nelson combines graphical and analytical _ methods to generate probabilities. The data from Tables . 6, 7, and 8 were used individually to arrive at the probability model used for each. The general graphical method is the same for each and , procecds as follows. Data is tabulated in chronological failure order i x and identified as failed or suspended. ! A reverse rank value is assigr..d to each data item. This value is the nunber of items surviving immediately prior to the event. For the lane tubes, this value ranges from 126 down as far as required. The hazard
- value is the inverse of the reverse rank for a failed tube. Suspended items are not given hazard values. A cumulative hazard value is estab-lished for each failure by sunning the hazard values through that failure. The problem is then to establish a suitable probability model by plotting the time parameter (ordinate) versus cumulative hazard on
l
'h especially' developed graph paper called hazard plotting paper. This paper is available for distributions which include the normal, log ,
normal, Weibull, extreme value, and exponential, ! t The objective is to obtain a straight line plot, because the paper is !
' constructed to linearize the cumulative hazard function. By this !
criterion, a distribution is considered appropriate. In the case of Oconee 1, the probability distribution which seemed most applicable .is the log normal distribution. The probability plot is shown in Figure 52. l This is the situation which contains the most information of all three ' units. Even here, the sparcity of data spotlights the concern that should be felt. The models should not be expected to be fixed. As new data is available, update efforts, which may include selection of different probability models, should be considered. Statist M lly, it would be unwise to use a model which currently seems valid for long range (in tenns of EFPD values) predictions. This concern with the applicability of this model to perform predictions beyond the present situation is highlighted by the observation that, if the model of Figure 1 for Oconee ' I were extrapolated to predict the number of tube failures beyond the present day, it would predict unreasonably large nunters. Future exper-ience will confirm the excessive conservatism of such a prediction. In the case of Oconee 2 and 3, even less data was on hand. The Weibull m. probability model was chosen because it is rufficiently general. In each situation, the probability estimates beyond approximately 200 or so EFPD beyond current service experience should not be extrapolated. Additionally, only one failed tube due to the mode of interest has occurred in Oconee 2. It was assumed, then, that an additional failure occurred recently when Unit 2 shut down for refueling. This is a further conservative input to the analysis. Figure 53 shows the probability plots for Oconee 2 and Oconee 3. The graphs provide estimates of the parameters of the probability distributions through the usual methods associated with probability plotting techniques. Through the use of the parameters, the analytical fanns for the distributions can then be used l to establish conditional probabilities for events of the type " Probability of a failure occurring in time x+dx, given that a failure did not occur l ' before x." This is the probability of failure for any given tube. At time x, there are approximately 115-125 tubes which could be considered as candidates. The calculated conditional probability is then used as the probability of " success" for the binomial probability model, which
, is then used to generate the probability of a range of failed tubes.
Tables 9 through 17 show the resulting conbined probabilities of MSLB l - and concurrent additional "k" tubes, up to k=10, for Oconee 1, 2, and 3 and for three different shutdown periods, 8 hours,1 day and 4 days (indicated at the top of each table as .33,1.0 and 4.0 days), i Tables 18 through 26 show the same information for the LOCA and concurrent l tube leaks. The combined probabilities have been calculated for 800, 900, and 1000 EFPD. However, as it has been previously stated, the model should not be used for long range predictions. Therefore, the probability values at 800-900 EFPD are the ones that should be used for the present assessment.
-19 ' ~
m. the probabilitier of a MSLB and of "l+2" and "l+9" tubes failing, which correspond to the 3 and 10 tube failure cases analyzed in the
' previous sections, are given in Tables 11,14 and 17 for a shutdown Oconee 1, 2 and 3. At 900 EFPD, period the Oco of 4 EPFD for, respectively,7 for the 3 tubes rupture case, and 2.7x10 ge for 1 model the 10predicts 3.7x10-tube case. At 800 EFPD, the Oconee 2 model predicts 1.1x10-9 for 3 tubes, and 9.6x10-25 for 10 tubes. At 800 EFPD, the Oconee 3 model predicts 4.4x10-9 for 3 tubes, and 5.0x10-23 for 10 tubes.
Probabilities of a LOCA and concurrent tube failures are shown in Tables 18 through 26. The text has already evidenced the extreme conservatism that the lack of data has forced into this probabilistic assessment. It is therefore reasonable to expect that, if more information were available, the pmbabilities shown above would be substantially decreased. In spite of the extensive conservatism, the analysis shows that the probability of SLB (LOCA) and concurrent rupture of more than 5 tubes is so small that these events can be considered incredible. 2
~
's, e
TABLE 1 TIME SEOUENCE OF EVENTS Time, Seconds 1 Tube 3 Tubes 10 Tubes MSLB & Tube Failure 0.0 0.0 0.0 Reactor Trip Initiates 1.122 1.048 1.006 Main Feedwater Startup and Control 1.122 1.048 1.006 Valves Start to Close Control Rods Begin to Drop 1.822 1.748 1.706
~~'
Turbine Stop Valves Closed 2.322 2.248 2.206 s( Auxiliary Feedwater Initiated to 16.122 16.048 16.006 Affected Steam Generator HIP Actuation 29.35 27.9 27.5 Startup and Control MFW 35.0 35.0 35.0 Terminated Flood Tank Initiation 280.0 247.0 1 71 .0 Operator Takes Control of HPI 600.0 600.0 600.0 and Aux. Feedwater to the OTSG's and Begins Cooldown at 100*F/hr. With Unaffected
. Steam Generator Operator Stops Main RC. Pumps 6300.0 5050.0 2500.0 and Switches on DiiRS Mode i
^&
Table 2 Total Primarv-To-Secondarv Leak Rate Following Oeerator Action At 10 Minutes Total Leak Flow Time,sec. Rate, ib/sec. Rupture of one tube 600.0 20.7 6300.0 20.7 6301.0 6.2 7200.0 6.2 Rupture of 3 tubes 600.0 27.7 5050.0 27.7 5051.0 5.2 7200.0 5.2 Rupture of 10 tubes 600.0 6.7 7200.0 6.7 e 6 e 4 _a y - ,-.
m s #
)
Table 3 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STEAM LINE BREAK ACCIDENT WITl! THE RUPTURE OF ONE STEAH CENERATOR TU TIME - LE AK R ATE DILUTION RATE RC ttASS RC ACTIVITY
' DELTA CURIES TOTAL CU9IES OUT hINUTES LBS/SEC LOS/SEC LGS HICROC PER GRAH CURIES CURIES
- 0. .48000E+12 .27650E+02 .52276Et06 .35000E+01 c. O.
.10300E+00 .4 0400E + 02 . 2 765 0 f.+ 0 2 .52266E+06 .35296E+01 .11670E+00 .4 0 3 00 E
- 02
.42288E-01 .14242E+C2
- 0. .52264E+06 .35340E+01 .65331E-02 .14249E+02
.2333CE+00 .35100E+02 0. .52237E+G6 .35693E+01
.33330E+00 .37500E+02 .42917E-01 .14292E+02 0, .52215E+06 .359'M E *01 .36102E-01 . 14328EeC2
.51670E+C0 .31700E+C2 'O. .521772+06 .36%
.53330E+00 * +01 .64353E-Ci .14392E+C2
.31600Et02 .99400C+02 .52179E+06 .36651E+01 . 5 735 4 E-0 2 .14398E+02
.83330E+00 .21300E+02 .10200C+01 .52313E+06 .38696E*01 .89217E-01
.11167E+01 .20000E+02. .14457E+02
.16300E+03 .52452E+06 .40624E*01 .72198E-C1 .145 5 9E + 0 2
.46667E+01 .159 0 0 E + 02 .11010E+03 .54339E+06 .64612E+01 .10437E+01
.48333E+01 .156 0 3E + 02
.157 0 0 E t 3 2 .2467CE+03 .54502E+06 .65670E*01 .67828E-01 .156 71E + C2
.500COE+C1 .15500E+02 .17500E+03 .54697E+06 .66726E*01'
.51667E+01 .15300E+02
.68441E-01 .15739E+02
.19590E+03 .54667E+36 .67779E*01 .68971E-61 .15808E+C2
.56667E+C1 .14700E+02 .20190E+03 .55419E+06 .70929E+C1 .20774E+00
.7C00CE*01 . 2 6016E + C2
.13100E+02 .21160E+03 .56962E+06 .79260E+01 .55667 +00 .16573E+C2
.73333E+01 .13900E+02 .11330E+03 .5726C E+0 6 .81294E+01
.750C3E+01 .15039E+00 .16723E+C2
.14 4 3 0 E + 0 2 .18390E*03 .57395E+06 .82305E+01 80904E-01 .16804E+C2
.100CGE+02 .20730E+02 .12350E+03 .59437E+06 . 9 7318E +01 .16069E+01 .18411E + 02
.10 017 E + 0 2 ~.20700E*02 0. .59441E+36 .97415E+01 .14737E-C1
.33750E+02 .20700E+02 0. .18426E+C2
.56493E+06 .22886E+C2 .29229E*02 .47655E*02
.5750CE+02 .2 0 700 E + 02 0. .53544E+06 .30801E+02
.8125CE+C2' .20700Et02
.50435E+02 '.98C90E+C2
- 0. .5C594E+06 .35171E+02 .57353E*02 .15544E+03
.105 00 E + 0 3 .20700E+02 0. .47644E+06 .37142E+02 .56515E+02
.13502E+C3 .62000E+01 0. .2119EE+03
.47643E+06 . 3 7144 E + 0 2 .31106E-01 . 21199E + 03
.12000E+03 .62000E+01 0. .47085E+06 .3 8470E+0 2 .11807E+02'
.22379E+03 (7)
D
A
^
)
Table 4 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR STEAM LINE IIREAK ACCIDENT WL1 I Tile RUPTUlm OF TilREE STEAM GENER DILCTION R ATE RC HASS RC ACTIVITY DELTA CURIES TOT AL CURIES OUT TIME LE AK R ATE ............ ................ LES/SEC LOS HICROC PER GRAH CURIES CURIES HINUTES LBS/SEC
.27650E+02 .52276E*06 .350CCE+01 0. O.
G. .14400E+03
.333CDE-01 .12770E+03 .27650E+02 .52255E+06 .35214E*01 .43230E-01 .142 4 3E + C2
.833c0E-01 .12720E+03 .2 7650E+ 02 - .5222SE+06 .35536E*01 .61733E-01 ~.143 0 5E + 02
.12380E+G3 .27650E+02 .52215E+06 .35643E*01 .20609E-01 .1432EE*G2
.103 00 E + c o .14346E+G2
.11670E+00 .12030E+03 0. .52204E+06 .35751E+01 .20163E-01
.5213SE*06 .36400C+C1 .11028E*C0, .14456E+G2
.21670E+00 .99700E*"2 0.
.1474CE+02
.48330E+00 .10250E+03 0. .51976E+06 .38134E*C1 .28374E+00
{ 3 .516?GE+C0 .9790GE*02 0. .51956E+06 .3835CE+G1 .37675E-01 .14 7 7 7E + C2
.95600E+C2 .99450E+02 .51952E*06 .38457E+01 .18247E-01 .14796E+02 6 3 .53330E+00
.39545E*01 .16082E*G0 .14957E+02 7 CC C OE + 0 0 .713CCE+02 .10 2 0 0 E + 0 3 .51969E*06
.750CCE+00 .6 810C E + 0 2 .1C200E+03 .51978E+06 .39873E*01 .42013E-01 .1499 9E + 0 2
.57700E+02 .1C400E*03 .52119E+06 .43707E+0i .46646E*00 .15465E+02
.13333E+01 *
.24603E*01 .17925E+CZ
.41167E*C1 .48100C+02 .11000E+03 .53022E+06 .61774E*G1 9 y .53074E+06 .62082E+01 .56841E-01 .17982E+02
.41567E*01 .47900E+32 .33330E+03 47300E+02 .15480E+03 .53273E+C6 .63107E+01 .in987E*00 15172E*02 hP._) .43333E*01
.20910E*03 .53410E*06 .64130E*01 19175E*00 .18 3 6 4E + 0 2
.4500CE+G1 .46700E+02 .20234E+02
.61667E*01 .41000E+02 .22240E+03 .55129E+06 .74338E+01 .19198E+01
{C Q-2_
.100COE+02 .27700EtC2 .25790E+03 .59862E*06 .97262E+01 .43837E*01 .24667E+C2
.59872E*06 .97357E*Ci .19570E-01 ' .246 37E + 02 C- -j .1C017E+C2 .2 7 7 00 E + 0 2 0.
.52497E+02 Ch;2 .23333E*C2 .2 77 00E + 02 0. .56828E+06 .19705E*02 .27811E+02 46667E*C2 .277G0E+02 0. .53781E*06 .26315E+G2 .45362E*02 .97859E+02
.277CDE+02 .50734E+06 .30423E+02 .52626E+02 .15049E*03
.653CCE+02 0.
.20641E+03 II .84167E*02 .27700E+02 0. .47549E*06 .32764E+02 .55925E+C2 *
.52000E+01 .47547E+06 .32766E+02 .29017E-01 .20644E+C3
.84123E+02 0.
.23891E+02 .23033E+03
.120GOE*03 .52000E*01 0. .46430E*06 .3 792 8E+0 2 i
m . O) y-Q J .) EM c=3) Table 5 wa g] RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES 11)R STEAM LINE BREAK ACCIDENT WITl! Tile RUPTURE OF TEN STEAM CENERATOR TULLES 35o N-TIHE LE AK R ATE DILUTION RATE RC HASS RC. ACTIVITY DELTA CURIES TOTAL CURIES CUT MINUTES L OS/SEC L8S/SEC LOS
. HICROC PER GRAM CURIES CURIES
- 0. -
48000E+03 .27650E+02 .52276E+06 .35050E+01 0. C.
.333CCE-01 .40820E+03 .2 765 0 E + 0 2 .52193E+C6 .35172E+01 .14124E*00
.10300E+00 . 3 6310 E + 0 3
.14341E+02
. 2765 0 E+ 0 2 .52050E+06 .35532E+01 .24878E*U0 .14590E+02 *
.11670E*00 .33520E+03 3. .52016Ee06 .35624E+C1 .57341E-C1
.18330E+00 .1464 7E + C2
.38640E+03 0. .51872E+06 .359J/E*31 .238352400, , 014 8 8 6E + 02
.3833GE+00 .33800E*G3 3. .51437E.06 .37067E+01
.51670E+00 .31700E+03
.73969E*JO . .15625E*02
- 0. .51175E+06 .37798E*C1 .46995E*00 .16095E*02
.53330E+00 *
.31400E+03 .937d OE*02 .51149E+C6 .37849E+31
.13333E+01 .1878CE+03
.57963E-01 .16153E+C2
.10680E*03 .50440E*06 .4245CE*G1 .23640E+C1
.18513E+C2
.3 CC 03 E+ 01- .15900E+03 3 031 C E + 0 3 .50756E+06 .52179E*01 .43282E*C1
.33333E.01 .15300E+03 .22441C+C2
. 2 31 '* 0 E + 0 3 .5097dE+06 '.5406CE*01 '.98500E*00 .23826E + C2 '
.7CG00E+C1 ' . 8 9800E
- 02 .2954CE+03 .54102E+06 .75003E+01 83333E+Ci .7 83 00E
- 02
'.10085E+02 .33912E*02
.30330E+G3 .55824E*06 .823G9E*01 .35331E*01 .37445E+C2
.8500CE+01 .59800E+02 .15930E+03 .55987E*G6 .83216E+01
.90000E+C1 .5190SE+32 .397C5E*00 .37842E*02
.23950E+03 .56417E*06 85983E+01 .99165E*C0 .38833E+C2 91667E*01 .74000E+01 .23950E+03 .56627E*06
.97500E+0i
.69000E*01
. 6693 6E
- 01 .18453E*00 .39018E+C2
.23960E+03 .57441E+C6 .90379E*01 .'16185 E *0 0 '.39180E+02
.1 C0 0 0 E
- 0 2 * .67000E+01 .20170E+03 .57761E+06 .91841E+01
.1C017E*02 .67000E+01 .68441E-01 .3924d2602
- 0. .57771C+06 .91940C+01 .46473E-02 .39253E+C2 320CCE+02 . 6 70 00 E
- 01 0. .56887E*06
.54000E+02 .21$64E*C2 .85385E*01 '.47791E+C2
.67003E*01 0. .56003E+06 .30376E+C2
.76000E+02 .6700CE*01 .15391E+02 .63183E+C2'
- 0. .55118E+06 .3 60 01E* 0 2 .18743E*02
- 92000E+02
. .67000E*01 0. .54234E+06 .39627E+C2
.81926E*02'
.12000E+03 '0. .20049E*02 .10197E+03
. 6. 70 0 0 E + 01 .53350E+06 .41868E+02 . 2o2 01E
- 0 2 .12218E+03
TABLE 6 OCONEE I
, m U '
MAJOR S.G. TUBE HISTORY (LEAXS AND SEVERE EDDY CURRENT INDICATIONS) Gen. Location Date Lane Leaker EFPD 1-A 77-17 10/31/76 Yes Yes 748 1-A 77-18 10/31/76 Yes No 748 1-B 4-109 12/8/76 No Yes 752 1-B 113-110 12/8/76 No No 752 1-B 75-18 12/8/76 Yes Yes 752 1-B 75-12 1/15/77 Yes Yes 776 1-B 81-128 1/15/77 No No 776 1-B 32-13 3/1/77 No Yes 801 1-B 33-14 3/1/77 No No 801 1-B 77-25 3/1/77 Yes No 801 1-B 2-7 3/1/77 No No 801 1-B 2-8 3/1/77 No No 801 1-B 101-4 3/22/77 No No 809 1-B 77-22 3/22/77 Yes Yes. 809 - 1-B 77-3 3/22/77 Yes No 809 1-B 77-5 3/22/77 Yes No
' 809 1-B 77-8 3/22/77 Yes No 809 1-B 77-21 3/22/77 Yes No 809 1-B 77-15 5/7/77 Yes Yes 840 1-B 17-5 5/7/77 No No 840 *m o
e D s
TABLE 7 OCONEE 2
- [T MAJOR S.G. TUBE HISTORY (LEAKS AND SEVERE EDDY CURRENT INDICATIONS)
Gen. Location Date Lane Leaker EFPD
, 2-A - - - -
2-B 77-23 12/4/76 Yes Yes 570. 2-B 77-27 12/4/76 Yes No 570. 2-3 124-42 12/4/76 No No 570. 2-B 118-52 12/4/76 No No 570. 2-B 75-5 8/77 Yes No 2-B 75-9 6/77 Yes No 2-B 112-29 6/77 No No
' e a
e e
-w.-y -
p
TABLE 8
- x OCONEE III MAJOR S.G. TUBE HISTORY (LEAKS AND SEVERE EDDY CURRENT INDICATIONS)
Gen. Location Date Lane Leaker EFPD 3-B 77-11 7/76 Yes Yes 427 3-B 77-19 2/14/77 Yes Yes 565 3-B 75-2 2/14/77 Yes No 565 3-B 78-1 6/11/77 No Yes 668 9 % 8 J-4 m o D l r
PROB 0F SINGLE TUBE FAILING WITHIN .3'EFPD HA VING SURVIVED 800.000 ErPD IS .0001779583;- EFPO k SHUTDOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F HSLB IOTAL PROBABILITY '
-- 8 6 0 . 1- -- . 333 --- - .20 224 94 993 69 GE-01 -- . 219 0 0 0E - . 4 4292 596 0 6917E- 0 8 - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -
800. 2 .333 .2069907333799E-03 .219000E-06 . 4 53 30 925 2 7923 E-10 800. 3 .333 .1403L06664428E-05 . 219000E-06 . 3 0 66 01153 017 8 E-12
.800. 4 .333 .7039538016h55E-08 . 219 0 0 0 E -0 6 .15416 57 28 40 3 SE-14 - 8 0 0 .--- -- . 3 3 3 - . 2 8 0 6 6 4 6 914 0 8 3 E - . 219 0 0 0 E -0 6 .6146550595285E - - - - - - " - - - - - - - - - - -
800. 6 .333 .9241769C63841E-13 .219G0GE-G6 .2023945401034E-19
.800. 7 .333 .2584909606152E-15 .219000E-06 .5660946376522E-22 800. 8 .333 .6268699832081E-18 .219000E-06 .137 2 8 43 49 03 8 0 E-2 4
- 6 0 0 r-- . 3 3 3 - .13 3 d 919 G6 0 5 2 3E-2 0 - . 219 0 0 0 E -0 6 - . 2 9 3 2 2 29 313 314 E-2 7 -- ---- - - - - - 860. 10 .333 .2549961979836E-23 . 219 0 0 0 E-0 6 . 5 58 44111514 2 4 E- 3 0 I PROS OF SINGLE TUBE FAILING WITHIN .3 EFPb. HA VING SURVIVED 900.000 EFPD IS .0005520956
.--EF P D--K SH L'TOO W N PR O B OF ' K-- E X A C T LY -- PROB 0F - NS LB - TOTAL PR OB A B IL I TY ----- - -- - -- - - - - - - -
900. 1 .333 .6010226197612E-01 .219000E-06 .1316238 2210 3 8 E-0 7 900. 2 .333 .190903G479214E-02 . 2190 0 0 E -0 6 . 4180 7 72 5 6 87 0 2 E-0 9 900 3 .333 .4C07288954821E-04 . 219 0 0 0 E -0 6 .8775954035096E-11 .- 9 0 3.- -- - . 333- . 62 5 3 5 0 2 27192 9E-0 6 .219000E .1369515623035E-12 - - - - - - - - - - . 900. 5 .333 7737943079881E-08 .219000E-06 .1694 6 07 8 3988 4 E-14 900. 6 .333 .7907723211107E-10 .219000E-06 .17 317 89 6 514 41 E-16 i 960. 7 .333 .6864364002628E-12 .219000E-06 .15 0 32 94 2132 8 0 E-18 - 9006 8 -- . 3 3 3 - . 516 64 3 5 5 560 61E-14 . 219 0 0 0 E-0 6 -- .11314 48 2 5 5 3 2 8E-2 0 - - - - - - -- --- 9CJ. 9- .333 .3424730985044E-16 .219000E-06 .7500153357086E-23
'900. 1C .333 .2024251366688E-18 . 219 0 0 G E - 0 6 .4433106059937E-25 PROB- 0F- SINGLE- TUBE- F AILING WITHIN- - .3 EFPD. -H A VING SURVI VED 1000.000- EF P D --I S-- . 0010988154
.EFPD K SHUTDOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 6F HSLB TOTAL FR CB A B IL IT Y
, 1003. 1 .333 .1123242023965Et00 . 219 5 0 G E-0 6 . 2 4598 975 725 83 E-0 7 3 1000. 2 .333 .7104661695220E-02 .219000E-06 .1555919355332E-08 m10 0 0 .- 3 -- -- . 3 3 3 - . 2969813753 5 7 5E . 2190 0 0 E-06 .6503885616436E-10 - ! 1000. 4 .333 .9228898743829E-05 . 219 0 0 0 E -0 6 . 2 0 21126 8 0 37 7 0 E-11 4 1000, 5 .333 .2274050548707E-06 .219000E-06 . 4 980165 7214 97 E-13 1J50. 6 .333 .4627794411739E-08 .219000E-06 .1013485962684E-14 -1000. 7-- . 333- . 799964 8729 281E-10 .219000E-06 .1751921319789E - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - j 1060. 8 .333 .1198973661714E-11 . 219 0 0 C E - 0 6 .2625749693401E-18
, 1000. 9 .333 .1582679961329E-13 . 219 0 0 0 E -0 6 .3466065649241E-20 1000. 10 .333 .1862855190080E-15 .219000E-06 .4079648786622E-22 TABLE 9
....~ 000 NEE I - PROBABILITY OF HSLB AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES - ~ ~ " ~ ' - - ~ " - " - ' ~ ~ - ~ ~ - ' "
I g 4 % J . v 1 __...-..a_.......__._,. .. . . . . _. ._.. ._ .. . .... _ _ . . .. .._ PR0d 0F SINGLE TU3E FAILING WITHIN 1.0 EFPD HAVING SURVIVED 800 000 EFFD IS . 00053635450:
. EF P O K SHUT 00HN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F MSLB YOTAL PROBABILITY -
1.000 " .5849449420105E-01--:.657000E .3843088269009E-07 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- 803. 8 0 0 .-" 1- 2 -" .1. 0 0 0 ' .1804960755829E-02 .657000E-06. .11858 59 2165 79 E-0 8 800. 3 1.000 .3680749734291E-04 .657000E-06 .2418252575429E-10 -
300.. 4 1.000 .5580c70302844E-06 . 65 7 0 0 0 E -0 6 . 3 66610618 8969 E-12
" 5 0 0 . " -" 5 - - - 1. 0 0 0 - .6707684359218E-08 .657000E . 4 4 0 69 4 8 62 4 0 0 6E -- - " - - - - " - - - - - - -
800. 6 1.000 .6659310660599E-10 .657000E-06 . 4 37516710 4014 E-16 . 8C0. 7 1.000 .5615764015119E-12 .657000E-06 .3689556957933E-18 800. 8 1.000 .4106107257988E-14 .657000E-06 .2697712468498E-20 ' 8 0 0.--- 9 " -- 1. 0 0 0 - 4 26 4 4 213174 57 4E-16 -- . 6 5 7 0 0 0 E-0 6 - .17 372 48 0 55695 E-22 -- - - - - - 800. 10 -1.000 .1518326498071E-18 .657c00E-06 .9975405092327E-25 PROD OF SINGLE TUDE FAILING WITHIN 1.0 EFPO HAVING SURVIVED 900.000 EFPD IS .0016601797T
- EFPD-"--K SHUYDOWN PROS 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F HSLB IOTAL PROBABILITY - - - - - ~ - ' ----- -
900. 1 1.000 .iSS3E46521924EtJO .657000E-06 .10 4 518616 49 0 4 E-0 6 900 2 1.000 .1521152840648E-01 .657000E-06 . 9 9939 7416 30 5 8 E-0 8 9ea. 3 1.000 .9612429657501E-03 .657000E-06 .6 3153 6628497 8E-0 9 900.-- 4 -- 1. 0 0 0 - ~. 4515 7 34 003 63 5E-0 4 .6 570 0 0 E-06 .296683724J388E-10 ' "-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 900. 5 1.C30 .1682104977026E-J5 .657000E-06 .1105142969906E-li 900 6 1.000 .5174895086464E-07 .657000E-06 . 3 3999 0607180 7E-13 900. 7 1.000 .1352299601249E-08 .657000E-06 .8884608380206E-15 ',.900.- 8-- 1. 0 00 -- ~. 3 0 639 81623 365E-10 .6 57 00 0 E-0 6 -- .2C13035926551E-16 - - - - - - - - - - - 90C. 9 1.000 .6114263168548E-12 .6570CDE-06 .4017C7J901736E-13 , 900. 10 1.000 .1087939213251E-13 .657000E-06 .7147760631057E-20 8.--...... .. . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . - . - . _ i ? -- -- -- FR06 0F- SINGL E TUBE F AIL ING WITHIN 1.0 EFPD. H AVING SURVIVED 1000.000- EFPD--IS - . 003 29871696~ ' lEFP0 K SHUT 00WH PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB OF HSLB TOTAL PROBABILITY
- 1 00 1- 1.vCD .2616857265318E+00 .65700GE-06 .1719275223314E-06
- 1300. 2 1.000 .4979983641918E-01 .657000E-06 .3271849252740E-07
!1500.- - 3 --i . 0 3 0 -- ~. 6 2 6 31317 76 215E-0 2 -.657000E-06 4114 8 77 5 7697 3 E- 0 8 - ----- - --- --- - - - i1300. 4 1.000 .5855351273751E-03 .657000E-06 .'38472942868552-09 !10GO. 5 1.0J0 .4 3 412 3 2 952 94 5g-0 4 .657000E-06 .2 8522 22 9G 00 85E-10 11000. 6 1.000 .2658091078592c-05 .657000E-06 .1746365838635E-11
- 10 0 0. --- 7 --1. 0 0 0 -- .13 8 24 3 4 4 23 515E-0 6 .657000E-06 .9082594162491E-13 -- -- - - -- - -- - ~ ~ -
11300. 8 1.00G .6233918023284E-08 .657000E-06 . 4 0956 84141297 E-14 1000. 9 1.000 .2475838827639E-09 .65700DE-06 .162 662610 9759E-15 l1000. ,_10, , _ _ 1.000
, .8767710142290E ,11
.657000E-06 .5760385563485E-17 , _, , _ ,
j TABLE 10
. . _ . _ . . . . . . _ . __ OCONEE 1 - PROBABILITY OF MSLB AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES , , , , , ,, ,, . ___
. 1
^
, h i ,-
. _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - . . . . - . . . _ . . = . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . - . ... _- . . . . .
PR03 0F SINGLE TUBE F AILING WITHIN 4.0 EFPD HAVING SURVIVED 800 000 EFPO IS. .0021904783. EFPD K SHUTOOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F HSLB YOTAL PROBABILITY 8007., 1 ---- 4. 0 0 0 - .19 745 8 5166 63 3Et 0 0-- --. 2 62 80 0 E-0 5 -- . 51892 09817911E-0 6 - - 800. 2 4.G00 .2492499200819E-01 .262800E-05 .6550287899753E-07 800. 3 4.000 .2079265449957E-02 .262800E-05 .5464309602437E-08 800 4 4.000 .1289495117797E-03 .262800E-05 .3388793169571E-09 800. 5-- - 4.000 . 6 341018 69129 7E-0 5 -- . 2 62 8 0 0 E-0 5 - .166 6419 7120 r3E --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - 800. 6 4.030 .2575265884298E-36 .262800E-05 .6767798743936E-12 800. 7 4.000 8883989417907E-08 .262800E-05 .2334712419026E-13
~800. 8 4.000 .2657271G51735E-09 .262800E-05 .6983308323959E-15 800. 9 4. 0 0 0 - . 7 0 0 016 7 23 0 8 7 6E - .2 62 80 0 E-0 5 - .103 9643 94 B2 7 4 E-16 -- ---
800. 1G 4.000 .164430927217CE-12 .262800E-05 . 4 3212 44 76 7263 E-18 PROB 0F SINGLE TUBE F AILING WITHIN 4.0 EFPD, HAVING SURVIVE 0 900.000 EFPD IS .0067106485 -EFPO -K-SHUTOOWN -PROB 0F-K EXACTLY- -PROB 0F MSLB TOTAL PROB ABILITY -- ---- - - - - - - - - - - - - 960. 1 4.000 .3588699906821E+00 .262800E-05 .9431103355125E-06 900. 2 4.000 .1394099284661E*00 .262800E-05 .366369292008BE-06 900. 3 4.000 .3579035591488E-01 .262800E-05 .9405705534430E-07 9 0 0 . - - 4. 0 0 0- .68 3 0 8 25 415 5 06E-0 2 - .262800E-05 .1795140919195E-07 -- - - - - - - - - - - - - 900. 5 4.000 .1033736664857E-02 .262800E-05 . 2 71665995 52 4 5E-0 8 900. 6 4.000 .1292G23357124E-33 .262800E-05 3395437382521E-09 900. 7 4.000 . 13716829G5413E-04 .262800E-05 . 3 60 47 82 67 54 25E-10 900. 8 4. 0 0 0 - .12626 3 8284 595E-0 5 -- . 2 62 80 0 E-0 5 - .3 318 213 411917E-11 --r---- =-- - - - - - - - 900. 9 4.000 .1023643930672E-06 .262800E-05 . 2690136249807E-12 900. 10 4.0G3 .7399824328535E-08 .262800E-05 .1944673833539E-13 PROS- OF-SINGLE--TUBE--F AILING WITHIN - - 4.0 - EFPD -H AVING SURVIVED -1000.000 EF PO -I S .0132347518 EFPO K SHUTOOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F MSLB YOTAL PROB ABIL IT Y 10QO. 1 4.000 .3317157528408E+0J .262800E-05 . 8 7174 8998 465 7E-0 6 10u0. 2 4.000 .2558208265770E+00 .262800E-05 .6722971322444E-06 -- 10 0 0 . - - 4. 0 0 0 - .130 36314465 75E+ 00 .262800E-05 . 3 42 64 69 0416 0 0 E-0 6 - - - - - - - ---- ------ idGO. 4 4.000 .4940169618657E-01 .262800E-05 .1298276575783E-06 1G00. 5 4.000 .1484197978631E-01 .262800E-05 .3900472287841E-07 1JGO. 6 4.000 .3682693040779E-02 .262800E-05 . 9 67 8117 311167E- 0 8
-10 0 0 .-- 7 ---- 4. 0 0 0 --- . 7 7 617 9 4195 4 8 9E-0 3 - - .262800E-05 .2039799514575E-08 --- ----~ ---- =-
1000. 8 4.000 .1418406102532E-03 .262800E-05 . 3 7 2 75 712 37 4 54 E-0 9 10G0. 9 4.000 .2282883736173E-04 .262800E-05 . 5 999418 4 5 d 6 63 E-10 1000. 1G 4.000- 3276193382153E-05 .262800E-05 .8609836208298E-11 TABLE 11 OCONEE I - PROBABILITY OF HSLB AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES ,, , ,, _ _ , , _ _
1, _ _ .n. _ _ _ . - - . - . - . . . . . . . - . . . - . . - .
/ ) ,
l l. ~ PROB 0F-SINGLE TU3E-FAILING WITHIN .3 EFPD - HA VING SURVI ED 8 00 ~. 0 0 0" EFP D-IS- . 00 0 0 28277 87 EFPD k SHUTOOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F HSLB IOT A L PROB ABIL TY
- 8GQ. 1 .333 .2467837470690E-02 . 219 0 0 0E-0 6 .5404558656248E-09 800. 2 .333 .302763272683GE-35 .2190G0E-06 .6630509341242E-12 .
- 800 3-- . 3 33-- 6 24 55 8 0 81972 3 5E-0 8 - . 219 00 0 E-0 6- . 5 378214 57 372 4E-15 803. 4 .333 .1481537596872E-11 .219000E-06 .3244564092583E-18 860.. 5 .333 .7000158473234E-15 .219G00E-06 .iSS2743152894E-21 300. 6 .333 .28d3637213881E-18 .2190COE-06 .6139959358433E-25 18 0 3.-- -- . 3 3 3 - r 9 4 213 4 7 6 015 8 0 E-22 -" 2190 . 0 0 E-0 6 -- . 2 0 6 32 73 0 614 71E-2 8 8G0. 8 .333 .2746326345324E-25 .219000E-06 .601444868180SE-32 -
. 188: 18 :iii "2nitT,181stli:53 1 :1138881:82 :linttlib2ui:13 FROB 0F SINGLE TUGE F AILING WITHIN .3 EFPD. HAVING SURVIVED 900.000 EFPD.IS .00062399693
-EF PO ----K" HUT 00 HN PROB 0F K EXACTLY- PROB 0F HSLB -TOTAL PROBADILITY --- - - - - - ---- - - - - -
900. 1 .333 .2919134069951E-32 .219000E-06 .6 3928 97 220290 E-0 9
- 90Q. 2 .333 .4238139229432E-05 . 219 0 0 0 E-0 6 . .9281515630931g 1512 96u. 3 .333 .4068188002260E-08 .219000E-06 .8909322815618--
-- 9 ^ 0.- 4---- .333- .2 9 0 4 3 8 2 345 60 2E-11 -- . 219 0 0 0 E-0 6 -- . 6 3 60 5 90 9 7 62 7 0 E -
900. 5 .333 .1544870G56386E-14 . 2190 0 0 E -0 6 .3602261821220E-21 - 900. 6 .333 .7697186500671E-18 .219000E-06 .16 85 6 8215 79 6 3E-2 4 900. 7 .333 3063960760178E-21 .219000E-06 .6703497361287E-28
-- 9 2 0 ."--- 8 ~ r3 33'- .10 5 5 92 C 98J 345E .21900GE-06 . 2 312 4 64 63 44 8 9E- 31 "---- -
900. 9 .333 .3209663950361E-28 .219000E-06 . 7 0 29157 0 22127 E-3 5 900. 10 .333 .8703697958008E-32 . 219 0 0 0 E -0 6 .1906107946694E-38 PROB 0F SINGLE TU3E FAILING WITHIN .3 EFPD HAVING SURVIVE 0 1000.000 EFPD IS .0000278982( EF PD K SHUTDOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F HSLB YOTAL PROB A BIL IT Y
.g ; , 1. _ __. ... 3 3 3 -"- T3 3 9 210 9 7115 7 4 E- 0 2 -- . 219 0 0 0 E -0 6 . 7 4 2 8712 5 3 962 8 E-0 9 ---
1000. 2 .333 .57255027556SSE-05 .219000E-06 .1253883849610E-11 10Q3. 3' .333 .6389428G27370E-08 . 2190 0 G E-0 6 .1399283338709E-14 lauS. 4 .333 . 5 3 G 3191569 82 8 E-11 . 219 0 0 0 E -06 .1161397792393E-17 10 0 0 W---S - - . 3 33 . 34 9170 610 0 762E . 2190 0 0 E-06 . 7 64 68 28 713832E-21--- 1323. 6 .333 .1899593418356E-17 .219000E-06 .4160105426090E-24 13 5 . 7 .333 .873231415843CE-21 . 219 0 0 0 E-0 6 .1923324877369E-27 13:G. 8 .333 .35221284G6367E-24 .219000E-06 .771345349582SE-31
*1CCO. 9 .333 .1244674780441E .219000E-06 .2725835943327E-34 1000. 10 .333 .3923943058410E-31 . 219 0 0 0 E -0 6 .8593426704483E _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . . .
TABLE 12 OCONEE II - PROBABILITY OF MSLB AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES
~ _.. _ , . _ . -
j l EFPD PRO 9-OF-SINGLE- TUBE f AILING WITH-IN-- - 1. 0-EFP0 - H A VING ' SURVIVE 0-- -8 00. 0 0 0 -EFPD -IS-- s-00 0 06 0 86 865 K SHUTDOWN PR08 0F K EXACTLY PROS OF HSLB IOTAL PROBABILITY 800. 1 1.000 .7371484968758C-02 .657000E-06 . 4 8430 65 62447 4E-0 8 800. 2 1.000- .2714755988487E-04 .657000E-06 .1783594684436E-10
- 8 0 0 .- 1.000 . 6 61314 8 74 018 5E-0 7--- . 6 5 7 0 0 0 E-0 6 - . 4 3 4 28 67 7 2 2 3 01 E -- - - --
800 4 1 000 .1197067508039E-09 .657000E-06 . 7 8 64 7 33 52 7 817 E-16 800. 5. 1.000 .1719693646539E-12 .657000E-06 .1129 8 38 7 2 57 7 6E-18 8C0. 6 1.000 .2041296725820E-15 .657000E-06 .1341131948863E-21 l---8 0 0 6 7 1.000- .2 05914 310 0 54 5E-18 .6 5700 0 E-G 6 - .1352 8 570170 58E-24 ----- = -- --" - " - - 800, 8 1.000 .1801834189254E-21 .65700GE-06 800.- .1183805062340E-27 9 1 000 .1389305023397E-24 .657000E-06 .9127734003720E-31 800. 10 1 000
. 95 564 4 7 7660 87E-2 3 .657000E-06 .6278586182319E-34 PROS OF SINGLE TU3E FAILING WITHIN 1.0 EFPD H AVING SURVIVED 900.000 EFPD IS .0000720272C
'-EFPD- k- SHUTDOWN-PROB CF K EXACTLY - - PROB OF HSLB f0TAL FROBABILITY --- - - - " - - - - --- " 9G0. 1 1.000 . 87110 62856 951E-0 2 .657000E-06 . 5 72 31682 97017 E-0 8
.900.
900. 3 2 1.000 .3796246349291E-04 .657000E-06 .2494133851484E-10 1.000 .1093810892063E-06 .657000E-06 . 718 63 37 5 6 0 6 57E-13 r900. 4----1. 0 0 0 . 2 3 4 3 99 714 7 84 4 E-0 9- . 65 7 0 0 0 E-0 6 - - .15 4 0 0 06126133E-15 ------ -- - - - - " 900. 5 1.000 .3984712085232E-12 .657000E-06 .2617955839997E-18 900. 900. 6 7 1.000 .5597053052608E-15 .657000E-06 . 3 67 72 63 8 5 55 6 3E-21
- 1.000 .6681088702745E-18 .657000E-06 .4389475277703E-24
--900. 8 1.000 .6918038207795E .657000E-06 . 4 5 4 51511 C 252.t E-2 7 - - - - ------- - - - - - - - - - " -
9C3. 9 1.C00 .6312089719512E-24 .657000E-06 . 4147 0 4294 5719 E-3 0 900. 10 1.000 .5137826942946E-27 .657000E-06 .3375552301515E-33 PROS OF SINGLE TUBE FAILING WITHIN 1.0 EFP'D HAVING SURVIVED 1000.000 EFPD IS .00008373225 iEFPO k SHUTDOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F HSLB IOTAL PROBABILITY M10 0 0 .-- -i . 0 0 0 .1011235219421E-01 .657000E-06 . 6 64 3 815 3 915 95 E- 0 8 ~ - ---- ~ - - ' 1000. 2 1.000 .5123145537141E-04 .657000E-06 .33659066179CEE-10 '1900. 3 4 1.000 .1716033716544E-06 .657000E-06 .1127434151769E-12 1300. 1.000 .4275057087743E-09 .657000E-06 .2808712506647E-15
-10006 -5 1. 0 3 0 . 8 4 4 3 567 016541 E-12 .657000E .5550703529867E-18 - - - - - --
10CO. 6 1.000 .1379579704301E-14 .657u00E-06 .9363838657259E-21 1000. 7 1.000 .191441*071039E-17 .657000E-06 .1257770044672E-23 1000. 8 1.000 .23044?9573352E-20 .657000E-06
-1000. 9 --- - 1. 0 0 0 - #- .1514043079692E-26
. 2 4 4 4 3 5 5 319 9 7 2 E- 2 3 .657000E-06 -1605941445221E-29 ----- --------- - - - -
" 1000. 1C 1.000 .2312980184588E-26 .657000E-06 .1519627983946E-32 i TABLE 13 j OCONEE II - PROBABILITY OF HSLB AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES 1 1
. s s
j
--- ----- PROB 0F- SINGLE TUGE F AILING WITHIN EF PD 4.0 EFPD, HAVING SURVIVE 9- 8 00. 0 0 0 - EFPO -I S . 00024410522 X SHUTOOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROS OF HSLB TOTAL PROBABILITY 803. 1 4.003 .2891396127910E-01 .262800E-05 . 7 59 85 890 2 414 6 E-0 7 -
804. 2 4.000 .4271162486875E-03 .262800E-05 .11224 615 01551E-0 8 --- 8 0 0T- 4.000 .417147 0 8 067 67 E-05 . 262 8 0 0 E-0 5 - .10 962 6252 8018E-10 300. 4 4.000 .3030116333487E-07 .262800E-05 .7963145724404E-13 800.. 5 4.000 .174bC40966693E-G9 .262860E-05 . 4 5 8 8 5 95 66 04 6 9 E-15 800 6 4.000 .8313275330547E-12 .
--8 G 0.--7--- 4. 0 0 0 --- . 3 3 6 3 6 8 4 3 7 0 7 74E-14 -- . 2 6 2 8 0 0 E-0 5 -- ..2184728756868E-17'
.262800E-05 500. 8 4.000 8 8 397 625 2639 4E-2 0 - -- --
.118 0 6 0 9 3 39 292E-16 .262800E-05 .3102641343659E-22 800 9 4.000 .3651334999762E-19 .262860E-05 .9595708379375E 25 SCO. 10- 4.000 .1007426213974E-21 .26280GE-05 .2647516090322E-27 PROB 0F SINGLE TU3E FAILING WITHIN 4.0 EFPD, HAVING SURVIVED 900.000 EFPO'IS 0002S87641:
-EFPD -K SHUTDOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY - PROB 0F HSLB TOTAL PR084BILITY - -
= --
900 1 4.00D .3401938061435E-01 .262800E-05 .8940293225458E-07 900. 2 4.000 .5944982017463E-33 . 2 62 8 00 E-3 5 .15623 41274189E-0 8 9CO. 3 4.000 .686S775230726E-05 .262800E-05 .1805114130635E-10 -- 9 C G .- 4. G 0 0-- . 59 0 2 4 8 7 G5 S37 8E-0 7 -- .2 628 0 0 E -0 5 - . i S51173 593942E-12 - - - 930. 5 4.000 .4023609407805E-09 .262800E-05 .1057404552371E-14 9 3. 6 4.000 .22E6309371781E-11 9.2 7 4.003 .1084795593367E-13
.262800E-05 .5955861329039E-17
--9 0 0 . 8-- - 4. 000
.262800E-05 .2850842819369E-19 9 . 4 5 04 2 7122943EE-16 -- ~ . 262 80 0E-0 5 -- .1183722 4 79095E-21 -
900. 4.000 .1647994069295E-18 .262800E-05 .4330928414107E-24 900. 10 4.000 .5379016250867E-21 .262800E-05 .1413605470728E-26 FRCB 0F ' SI NG L E TUGE FAILING WITHIN 4.0 EFPD HA VING SURVIVEE EFPD K SHUTOOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F HSLD IOTAL PR09 ABILITY 1000.000 EFPD IS . 00033560515 1000. - 1 4. 0 0 0 - . 39 314199 39 676E - . 2 62 80 0 E-0 5 .10 3 317716 0147 E-0 6 - 10C0. 2 4.J00 .79a5078790881E-03 .262800E-05 . 2 0 984 78 70624 3E-0 8 10 1G- '9.. " . 4 3 4.000 .1072293299613E-04 .262800E-05 4.GGG .1073964209545E-J6
- 13 0 0. -- 5 -- - 4. 0 0 0- -- . 84 8518 5 7 80 82 9E . 262 8 0 0 E-0 5 .2 8179 867913 82k 12 10
. 2 62 80 0 E-0 5 .2814493942684 1030. 6 4.000 .5554824751644E-11 - . 2 2299 06 8 2 32 0 2E 1CGO. 7 4.000 .3093328921396E-13
.262800E-05 .1459807944732E-16
- 1. C 3 . 8 4.000 .1491375330011E-15
.262800E-05 .81213844C5428E-19
.262800E-05 . 3 919 3 34 3 672 70 E-21 -
-10C0. 9- -4.000 .6341962822937E-18 - .262800E .16 666 67 82 98 6 8 E-2 3 -- 1000. 10 4.000 .2405894229118E-20 .262800E-05 . 6 3226 S0 03 4122E-26 TABLE 14 OCONEE II - PROBABILITY OF MSLB AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES _ _ og e,. gs,
c'
) .
1 PROB -OF SINGLE-TUBE--F AILIN'G WITHIN---- .3 - EFPD3 H AVING - SURVIVE 0 - -830.000- EFPC -IS- .00304079614 EFPD K SHUTDOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F MSLB s07AL PR03 ABILITY 800. 1 .333 .4952619553773E-02 . 219 0 0 0 E-3 6 .1084622597653E-08 800. 2 .333 .1222438941924E-04 .219000E-06 .2677138693273E-ii ---"
- 800-. 3 --- . 333 - .-199 4913 318165E-07--- . 219 0 0 0 E-0 6 - . 4 36 8 8 55 7 979 21E 800. 4 .333 .2421295794180E-10 . 2190 0 G E-0 6 .5 3026324 86616E-17 5 .333 .2331292134891E-13 .2190CCE-;6 . 510 55 24 6698 8 2E-20 8Q0.
Sus. 6 333 .1854676451040E-16 .219000E-06 . 4 0 617 37 36 6G 36E -2 3 -- - - - - - - - - '-800. 7 .333 .12 5 39 0 5925 84 0E-19 -- .219 0 0 0E-0 6 -- . 2 74 60 512 315 3 6E-26 ~ - - - -- 800. 8 .333 .7353763455677E-23 . 219 0 0 0 E -0 6 .1610472586319E-29 800. 9 .333 .3800220932529E-26 .219003E-06 .8322475519754E-33
.8G3. 1G .333 .1751959801773E-29 . 219 0 0 0 E-0 6 .3836788123090E-36 PROB 0F SINGLE TUaE FAILING WITHIN .3 EFPD HAVING SURVIVE 0 900.000 EFPD IS - ---
.00004827821
~~~
PROD OF HSLB IOTAL PROB AB IL ITY ,TFPD- K-SHUTDOWN PROB 0F- K EX ACTLY 900. 1 .333 .5855633397668E-02 . 219 0 0 0 E-0 6 .1282382431706E-08 900. 2 .333 .1710414856323E-04 .219000E-06 . 3 745 8 04 7895 39 E-11 900. 3 .333 .3303190780431E-07 .219000E-06 . 7 2339 80 575156E-14 -
-9 0 0'. 4 .333' . 4 7 4 4 5 2 6 0 3 4 4 9 9 E- 10 '--- . 219 0 0 0 E -0 6 - .1039050162504E-16 --- -- - - - - - -
9CO. 5 .333 .54C6012472398E-13 .219000E-06 .1183915547538E-19 903. 6 .333 .5G89602452122E-16 . 219 0 0 3 E -C 6 .1114621822392E-22 9G0. 7 .333 .4G72077327398E-19 .219000E-06 .8917840429151E - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-- 9 0 0 . 8 -- . 3 3 3 - . 2 8 2615 5645 55 8 E-22 -- . 219 0 0 0 E-0 6 -~ . 618 92 74 6 744 9 2E-2 9 -
900. 9 .333 .1724345743347E-25 . 219 0 0 0 E-06 .3 /850 73 392852E-32 900. 10 .333 .9429339533034E-29 . 2190 0 0 E-0 6 .2065023292709E-35 PROB 0F SI NGL E TU3E FAILING WITHIN .3 EFPD HAVING SURVIVE 0 1000.000 EFPD IS .G0005612692 EFPD K SHUTDOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F MSLB IOTAL PR03 AGILITY - - - - - --
.1489447156378E-08 " - - - -1000. 1- --- . 3 3 3 - . 68 01135 369 G 7 2E-0 2 - . 21900 C E-0 6 1000. 2 .333 .2309576845791E-04 . 219 0 0 0 E-G 6 .5 0 579 68 2 343 0 9E-11 1000. 3 .333 .5185468871357E-07 .219000E-06 .1135616547210E-13 1940. 4 .333 .8659057524741E-10 .21900GE-06 .1896331701585E-16 - - - -1000e 5- . 3 33- .114 7 0 3 917 5 84 2E-12 . 219 0 G O E-0 6- .251201328307BE-19 - - - - -
s' 1003. 6 .333 .12554762G3923E-15 .219000E-06 .2749490137098E-22 ' 1000. 7 .333 .1167788133973E-18 .21900CE-06 .2557453455945E-25 1000. 8 .333 .9422530124819E-22 .21900CE-C6 .2063532333801E-28 -- - - - - ---
-1000. 9 r3 33- .-66 992 3 94 3 0 4 7 3E-2 5 --" . 219 0 0 0 E-0 6 .1467131968140E-31 - -- -
1000. 10 .333 .4249125578862E-28 .219000E-G6 .9 30 55 75 712122E-35 , TABLE 15 . . _ . . _ _ _ . . - - _ _ _ . . . _ .
~~ OCONEE III - PROBABILITY OF MSLB AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES i
~
/' j l.
_ _ . . ~ . _ _ _ _ . -- t PROS OF~ SINGLE "TU3E' F AILING WITHIN 1.0 EFPD - HAVING SURVIVE 0- 800.000 EFPD-IS .0001224564. EF P0 K SHUTOOWN PR03 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F MSLB IOTAL PR08 ABILITY 800. 1 1.000 .1471993959154E-01 ~.657000E-06 9671000311644E-08 600. 2 1.000 .109J677485h71E-03 .65700GE-06 .7165751379547E-10
--600 3' 1.000- .534 3075184 890E .657 0 00E-06 .3 5104 00 3964 73E-12
800. 4 1.000 .1946763528053E-08 .657000E-06 - .1279023637931E-14 800. 5 1.000 .5626782785312E-11 .657000E-06 .3696796289950E-17 . 800. 6 1.000 .1343784747309E-13 .65700CE-06 .8828665789820E.20
-- 8 0 0. --7 -- 1. 0 0 0 '- . 2 7 2 72 4 7 814 210 E . 6 5 7 0 0 0 E -0 6 - .1791801813936E 600. 8 1.000 .4801394620617E-19 .657000E-06 .3154516265745E-25 800. 9 1.000 .7448429119336E-22 .657000E-06 . 4 8936179314 04 E-2 8
_ 8_G_0. 1G 1.000 .1030808707u03E-24 .657000E-06 . 6 7 7 2413 210267 E -31 PROS OF SINGLE TU3E F AILING WITHIN 1.0 EFPD HAVING SURVIVED 900.000 EFPD IS' .0001449345(
"EF PD---- K-~ SHU TO O WN P ROB 0F K EXACTLY - PRO 8 0F MSLB IOTAL PROBABILITY - - - - - - - - - - -
900. 1 1.000 .1737106160G51E-01 .65700GE-06 .11412 78 74 /154E-0 7 900. 2 1.000 .1523093473560E-q3 .657000E .10006724121295-09 r 900. 3 1.300 .882940362aS54E u6
.. g g ) , ._.. g .__' 1, ; g g._.~. 3 8 0 6 8 2 7192 8 6 3 E-3 8 - . 6.657000E-06 5 7 0 0 c E-0 6 .5 8 0 091818 3960c-12 '
. 2 5 010 85 4 6 5711 E- 14 ---
9G0 5 1.000 .13G2026993347E-10 .657000E-06 .8554317346291E-17 900. 6 1.000 .3679589929187E-13 .657000E-06 . 2 4174 90 58 34 76E-19 9CO. 7 1.000 .8836986528249E-16 . 657000E-06 .58059001490602-22
-9 0 0. - 8 --- 1. 0 0 3"- .18 41013 0561 G 4E-18 -- . 6 5 70 0 0 E-0 6 -- .120 9545 5 7 786 C E-2 4 --
900. 9 1.000 .3379590125393E-21 .657000E-06 .2220390712383E-27 900. 10 1.000 ,.5534613500847E-24 .657000E-06 .3636241070056E-30 PROS OF SINGLE TU3E FAILItJG WITHIN 1.0 EFPO HAVING SURVIVE [ 1000.000 EFPO IS .0001684517' EFPD K SHUT 00 Hit PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F HSLB IOTAL PROBABILITY
-10b0. 1- 1. 0 3 3- .201364 2546569E-01 .6 570 G C E-0 6 -' .13229 63153G 96E-0 7- --
1G00. 2 1.C30 .2052515354545E-03 .657000E-06 .1348502587936E-09 1000. 3 1.050 .1383232126440E-05 .657000E-06 .9087835070710E-12 1000. 4 1.0]O .6933151628260E-08 .657000E-06 .4555080619767E-14 "10 3 G i- T. 0 0 0- .2756711782247E-10 .6570 0GE .181115964 3936E 1053. 6 1.000 .9356797029055E-13 .65700GE-06 . 5 95 0315 64 80 89E-19 - 1003. 7 1.000 .2525618117134E-15 . 6 57 0 G G E-0 6 .1661302102957E-21 1000. 8 1.000 .6124364550965E-ia .657000E-06 . 4 0 2 3510 40 99 84E-24
~1000. ~9 -1.000 .13069252924G 7E-20 .65700 0E-0 6 .85 864 99171112E 10G0. 16 1.000 .2488157498385E-23 .657000E-06 .163471947 64 39 E-29 -
. .e .
TABLE 16
---- OCONEE III - PROBABILITY OF MSLB AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES -- -
I f- _
PROS-OF-SINGLE-TUSE-F AILING WITHIN----4. ~H L A PROB VING -SURVIVED ABILI TY - -800.0 00 EFPD -IS -- .000 4910 487 EF PO K SHUTDOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F0MSLB -EFPD,OTA ~ T 800. 1 4.000 .5645124496896E-01 .262800E-05 .1483538 7177 84 E-06 - 800. 2 4.000 .1677902799780E-02 .262800E-05 .4409528557821E-08
-- 800 3 --- - 4. 0 0 0 .3 2 973 4 7279 83 9E-0 4-- . 2c 2 8 0 0 E-0 5 - - . 8 6654 28 651417E-10 ---- - - - - -
8G0. 4 4.000 .4819362119595E-06 .262800E-05 .1266528365C3LE-11 800. 5 4 000 .55877821G5637E-08 .262800E-05 .146 84 6913 73 61 E-13 - 800. 6- 4.000 .5353181565569E-10 - .262800E-05 .1406816115432E - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- 8 0 0 .- 7 ----4. 0 0 0 .4358226757873E .26280GE-0 5 .1145341991969E-17 ' ~ " - "
800 8 4.000 .3077907585534E-14 .262800E-05 .8088741134785E-20 - 800 9 4.000 .1915383834269E-16 .262800E-05 .5 0 3 36 28 7164 59g-22 800 . 10 4.000 .1063340024G11E-18 .262800E-05 .2794457583102:-24
, . . . . - - . . _ . . . . _ . _ _ . i FROB OF SINGLE TUBE FAILING WITHIN 4.0 EFPD HAVING SURVIVED 900.000 EF00 IS .0005808727
- -fFPD---K SHUTDOWN PROB 0F -K EXACTLY - PROB 0F HSLB YOTAL PR OB AB IL I TY ~ ~ ~ - - -
900. 1 4.000. .6605522904667E-01 .262800E-05 .1735931419347E-06 4 900. 2 4.000 .2322715074931E-02 .262800E-OS .6104095216919E-08 900. 3 4.000 .5399944436104E-04 .262800E-05 .1419105397808E-09 900. i --- 4 . 0 0 0 - .9337048663165E-06 . 2 6 2 8 0 0 E - 0 5 - - . 2 4 5 3 7 7 618 8 6 S C E-l i - -- -- --- -- -- - ----- - - -"- 930. 3 4.003 .1283722343789E-07 .262800E-05 3365738319476E-13 900. 6 4.000 .1451519781730E-09 .262800E-05 . 3 814 5 93 38 63 3 7 E-15 - 9C3. 7 4.000 .1398029286388E-11 .262800E-05 .3 674C 20 964627E-17 - 900 6 - --4.000 .1168039376394E .262800E-05 [
.3069607481163E-19 - - -- - - - - - - - - " - - - - -
, 900. 9 4.00C .8599103709552E-16 .262800E-05 .2259844454870E-21 i 1 900. 10 4.000 .5647613808548E-18 .262800E-05 .1484192908886E-23 . t PROB 0F SINGLE TUBE FAILING WITHIN 4.0 EFPD HAVING SUP. VIVE 0 1000.000 EFPD IS .0006750811
. EFPD K SHUTOOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY . PROB 0F HSLO IOTAL PROBADILITY ;.-10 0 0.-" - 4. 0 0 0 -- . 75 897 6 7 25 8 49 3E-01 ' .262800E-05 .1994 5 9J 8 35532E-0 6 -
1000. 2 4.000 .3101938G3413GE-02 . 2 62 80 0 E-0 5 .8151893153692E-08 1.60 3 4.000 .8381898433955E-04 .262800E-05 . 2 20 27 62 90 844 3E-0 9 1000. 4 4.000 .1684529608891E-05 .26280GE-05 . 4 42 6943 812166 E -11
- 1000. 5 4. 0 3 0 - .-2685 5913954 0 CE-0 7 . 26280 0 E-0 5 -- . 7 0 577 3418 7112E-13 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10G0. 6 4.000 .3537723064111E-09 .262800E-05 '.9297136212483E-15
- ' 1GGG. 7 4.000 .3960345423929E-11 .262800E-05 .10 4 0 7 78 7 7 74 0 8E-16 1G00. 8 4.000 .3845831083336E-13 .262SGOE-05 . i G 10 6 844 0 37 01E -18
- --10 0 3 .--9 -- 4. 0 0 0 . 3 2 908 0 26015 78E .2 62 80 0 E-0 5 . 8 64 8 2 29 2369 4 6E-21 - - - -
- ~ ~ - - - - - - -
1000. 10 4.000 .2512057409120E-17 .262800E-05 .6601686871166E-23 .
.- . . . . . . . - . .J.-.-....
( ,. TABLE 17 .
OCONEE III - PROBABILITY OF HSLB AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES -
I i
~
~
' ~
- ~ '.,,.
)
...L..._.
PEOR OF SINGLE TU BE FATLING WITHIN .3 EFPO HAVING SURVIVED 800.000 EFP0 IS .00017795832 FFP0 K. SHUTD06eN PROB 0F K EX ACTLY PROB 0F HSLB IOTAL PROBABILTTY 800 .. 1 .333._. 20 2249 4993 690E-01 .12?u o 0E-0 6 .. 2467441424 35 8 E-0 8 . . . . . . . . . _ _ _ . _ .~.
.2525284421948E-10 800. 2 .333 .
.2 0699 07 33 3799E-0 3 .122000F-06 *
- 800. 3 333 .14 0 0 00 6664 9? nE- 05 .122 0 0 0E-0 6 .170 8 0 06 4 2 32 04E-12 8 00. 4 .333 70 345 3 8016 855E- 0 8 .122000F-06 8588227792327E-15 .
800. 5._ .333_. 28 066 4 6914 08 3E-10 . . 122 0 0 0E-0 6 __ . 3 4 24105 8110 72E-17.___. .. . 800 -6 .333 .9241769063841E-13 .122000E-06 .1127494698293E-19 8 00 7 .333 .2584909606152E-15 .122000E-06 3153586565916E-22 800 8 .333 .62 68699832 081E- 18 .122000E-06 .7647806147325E-25 _. 8 0 0...... 9...__ ,3 3 3_ 13 J 8 91906 0 5 2 3E-2 0 122 0 0 0E-0 6 .- .1633 4 79 62 03 5 7E- 27 __.- _.. 800. 10 .333 .25 4 996197 9 836E-2 3 .122000E-06 . 3110950 50 44 46E-3 0 a. PROB OF SINGLE TUOF FAILING WITHIN .3 EFPD. HA VING SURVIVED 900.000 EFPO IS .00055209565 PROB 0F HSLR TOTAL PR0348ILITY
. E F PO .- . - K -S HUT 00 WM R R00 O F K EXACTLY .7 332 4 68 62 8611E-0 8
~ 900..- 1 333 6 010 ? ? 6197 612 E- 01 .122000E-06 9 00 . 2 .333 .1909130479214E-02 .122000E-06 .2329014855624E-09 900 3 333 . 4 0 0 7 2 8 8954 821E-0 4 .122000E-06 4888887635989E-11 625 3 9 0227192 9r-0 6 -- .122 0 0 0 E-06 . .. 7 62926514?4 81E .13
- _ 900. 4 .333 900 5 .313 .7737943079881E-08 .122000E-06 .9440281117164E-15 900. 6 .333 .7907723211107E-10 .122 0 0 0 E-0 6 . 9 647 412 67 012 8E- 17 900. 7 .333 6864364002628F-12 .122000E-06 . 8 37 4515 7 0 86 81E-19
. 9 0 0. _ _ 8 . . . 3 3 3. -. .. 516 6 4359 5 6 061E-14. ... . 122 0 0 0E-0 6 _ . 6 3 0 3 0 45 0 7 53 4 4 E- 21. .. _. __ . . _ . . . . . . _ _ . . . . _ _ _ . .
900. 9 .333 . 3 42 4 7 T0 9 85 04 4E-16 .127000F-06 4178167 62 35 82 E-2 3 9 00. 10 .333 . 20 2 4 25136668 8E-18 .122000E-06 .2469584197773E-25 .
- _ ___ _ -DTIHEX= .- . 3 3.. . . . . . . . _ - _ _ . _ . . - . . . . . _ . . . _ . . . . . -
- . . .. PROB 0F SINGLE TUBF FAILING WITHIN . 3 EFPD. H AVING SURVIVED 1000.00 0 EFPD. IS .. 0 01098 8154:
PROD OF MSLR TOTAL FROB A DTLTTY EFPS K SHUTOOWN PROR OF K EXACTLY .1370353898882E-07 ! 1000. 1 .333 .1123242023965E+00 .122000E-06
. 8 66 76 786 0 04 81E- 09 1000. 2 333 . 710 4 6616 95 22 0E- 0 2 .1?2000E-3 ~- .. 333 .. 29698137 53575E-0 3.. . 1220 0 0E 0 6 . . . 31125924 62316915 618 8E- 10 _. . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . __
1000. .122000E-06 5 ? 0 8 22E- 11 1000. 4 .333 . 9 22 8 8 9 874 3 82 9E- 0 5 1000. 5 .333 . 2 27 40 50 5 4 870 7E-0 6 .122000F-06 . 2 774 33 8 89 5 0 81 E- 13 1000. 6 333 4 6 P7 7 9441173 9E-0 8 .122000E-06 .564590353641?E-15 ' 1000. 7 -. .333 . 799 964 87 2 9 281E-10 .. 122 0 0 0E-0 6 . 9 75 95 61690151 E-17 . . . _ _ . . . . . .. .. .. 1000 8 .333 .1198973661714E-11 .122000E-06 .1462746404543E-18 . 10 0J . 9 333 .158 26 7 99 61329E-13 .122000E-06 .1930867621951E-20
.2272681059214E-22 ; 1000 10 .333 .186 28 55190 0 8 0E-15 .122000E-06 TABLE 18 OCONEE I - PROBABILITY OF LOCA AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES .. .__. ._ _. _.._.._. _. _,
PROB 0F SINGLE TUBE FAILING WITHIN 1.0 EFPD. HAVING SURVIVED 800.000 EFPD IS . 0065363545 EFPD K SHUTDOWN PROR OF K FX ACTLY
. G 0 0. . . 1..-. 1. 0 0 0. .._. 58 4 9 4 4 94 2 010 SE-01.PRoa 3 OF HSLR IOTAL PROBABILITY 66 0 0 0E-0 6 ___. 214 0 8 98 'e 8 7 7 5 9E- 07 800. 2 1.000 .18 0 4 96 07 55 8 ? 9E- 0 2 .366000E-06 .6606156366333E-09 .
800. 3 1.000 . 3 6d O 74 97 34 291 E-0 4 .366000E-06 .134 7154 4 0 2 751 E-10 800. 4 1.000 . 558 0 0 7 0 3 0 2 84 4 E-0 6 .3 66 0 0 0F -0 6 . 2 0 4 23 05 73 0 841 F-
- 800, 5 1.000 6
.670 768435 9218c-0 8_.-. 366 0 0 0 E-0 6 ._. 2455 012 47 54 74E 12 14 __ _. -
800. 1.000 6659 310660 599E-10 .3 66 0 0 0E-06 7
.2437307701770d-16
' 800. 1.000 . 5615 7 6 4015119E-12 .T66000E-06 . 2 0 553 69 629533E-18 800 8 1.000 . 410 610 729 7 9 8 8E-14 .366000E- .1507835256424E-20
- -- 8 0 0, 9 -- 1.000 - .26 44 213174 5 74F-16.-. .. 3 66 0 0 06 0 60 6 . . . 9 6 7 7 8 26 218 9 4 0E-2 3..--- - . . . . .
800. 10 1.000 .1518 32 64 98 071E-18 .366000E-06 . 55570 74 98 2 94 0E-25 4 PROR OF SINGLE TURE FAILING WITHIN 1.0 EF P D'. HAVING SURVIVFD 900.000 EFPD IS . 001E601797 t EF PD --. --- K - SHU T DOWN -PR OR OF K EXACTLY . PROB 0F HSLB ..TOI A L PR03 ABILITY 900.- . . _ . . 1 1.000 .15 90 44 65 2192 4E+ 0 0 .366000E-06 .5822499270240E-07 9 00. ? 1.000 .15 ? 115 29 4 0 64 RE- 01 . 3 66 0 0 0E-0 6 . 5 56 74193 967 72 E- 0 8 9 00. 3 1.000 .6 ;124 2965 75 01E- 0 3 . 3 66 0 0 0F-0 6 . 3 518143 25 4 645E- 09 i -- 9 0 0..- --4---- 1. 0 0 0 - . 4 615 7 3 4 0 0 3 63 G E- 0 4 . 3 66 0 0 0 E-0 6 .... 165 2 7 55 64 53 3 0 E 9 00 5 1.000 .16 8210 4 97 7 0 2 6E-0 5 .366000E-06 .6156504215914E-12 1 900. 6 1.000 .517 4 3 95 0 86 4 64E- 0 7 .366000E-06 .18 94 0116 016 46E- 13
; 9 00. 7 1.000 .13 5 22 9 96 0124 9E- 0 8 .366000E-06 .4949416540571E-15 900. 8 1.0 00 -. . 3 06 39 816?3 365E-10 .3 66 0 0 0 E-0 6. -- .1121417 2 7 4152 E- 16 ___
, 900. 9 1.000 . 6114 263169 54 8E- 12 .366000E-06 . 2 23 78 20 3196 89 E-18 900. 10 1.000 .10 8 793 9213 251E-13 .366000E-06 .3981857520498E-20 1 PR3B 0F SINGt.E TU8E F AILING WITHIN iEFPD 1. 0 EFPD. H A VING SURVIVED 1000.00 0 EFPD IS. . 0032987169 K SHUTOOWN PROB 0F V FXACTLY PROB 0F HSLO TO T A L FP03 ABILITY 1000. 1 1.000 .2616957?65318E*00 .366000E-06 . 95 776 07 5 91065 E- 07 i 1000. 2 1.000 . 4 97 99 9 3641918 E- 01 .366000E-06 .18 226 74 0129 4?E- 0 7 1000. 3 1.000 .6263131776215E-02 .366000E-06 . 2 2923 06 2 3 00 95 E- 0 8 - 1000 4 1.000 .5855851273751E-03 .366000E-06 . 214 3E 41566193 E- 09 1000. 5 1.000 .4 3 4128 29 52 94 5r- 0 4 .3 660 0 0E-0 6 .1588903560778E-10 1000, 6 1 000 . 266 8 0910 78 59 ?c-0 5 .366000E-06 .9728613347645F-12 1000. 7 1.000 .138 ?4 3 44 2 3 515E-0 6 . 366000E-06 . 5 05 97 0999 0 064E-13 1000 8 1.000 .6233918023284E-08 .36600GE-06 .2281611996522E-14 z.._____-- _.____ ._
;1000 9 1.000 .24 76 A 3 88 27 63 92-0 9 . 3 66 0 0 0E-0 6 10 . 9 0 615 7010 9157E-16 ;1000. 1.000 .87 6771014229 0E- 11 .366000E-06 . 3 2049819120 78E-17 j TABLE 19 OCONEE I - PROBABILITY OF LOCA AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES
{ --- .3 ;_. _ _- _-_ _ ;---- _-- _ _
gm s s e e n s a s s s s u s s mh s w . i s n w. s v. = > n a m
- m m e n . u s a m o r * > n n a n a m a n a m a m m a r u n n * *
- _.
- ^
; ,}
_._. . l. . EFPD PROB 0F SINGLE TUBE FATLING WITHIN 4.0 EFPD HAVING SURVIVED 800.000 EFPD IS .00219047831 K SHUT 00WN PROB 0F K FXACTLY PR09 0F HSL9 YOTAL PRORABILITY
- 8 0 0 .-._.1 .4.000
.19 7 4 58 5166 6 33E+ 0 0 . .. 1464 0 0F-0 5__ . 2 890 79 2 68 3 95 0E-0 6*
800. 2 4.000 . 24 9 24 992 0 0 819E-01 .146400E-05 .._.__ _ . . . _ - . . 800. 3 4.000 .2079265449957E-02 .3649018829999E-07 . . . . . _ . 4 .146400F-05 .3044044618737E-08 800. 4.000 .1289495117797E-03 .146400E-05 .3887820852455F-09
- 800.. 5 - - 4.000 800. 6 4.000 ..2575265884298E-06 6 3 410186 9129 7 E-0 5 -. ._.14 64 0 0E-0 5 :_. .. 9 2 83 2 513 6 4 0 5 8E- 11 800 7 4.000
.146400E-05 . 3 77 0189 25 4 613 E-12 800 8 033 98 9417 90 7 E-0 8 .146400E-05 .1300616050782E-13 8 4.000 . 2 65 72 710 5173 5 E- 0 9 .146400E-05
- 8 0 0 .--- .9 __ 4 . 0 0 0 . 3 8 90244 81974 0E- 15
- 800. 10 4.000 . 70 0 016 72J 0 87 6E- 11 _ _. 146 4 0 0 E-0 5 . ... 10 2 4 8 2 4 4 8 2 6 0 0E- 16.._.-
.16 44 3 0 92 7217 0E-12 .146400E-05 . 24 07268 7744 57E-18
'EFPD PROB 0F SINGLE TilBE FAILING WITHIN 4. 0 EFPD, H AVI.NG S URVIVED 900.000 EFP6 IS .0067106485: K SHUTDOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY . PROD OF HSLB .. TOT A L PR03A01LITY . 9 00. 1 4.000 .3588699906821Et00 .14 6 4 0 0E-0 5 . 5 253 856 6635 85E- 06 4 9 00. 2 4.000 .1394099284661E+00 .1464 0 0E-0 5 9 01 . 3 4.000 . 2 0 4 09 6135 2 7 43E- 06
. 3 6 79 0 3 55 914 8 8E- 01 .14 64 0 0 E-0 5 .5 2397 0810 5938 E-07 900. 4 --- 4.000 _. 68308?S415506E-02 900. 5 4.000 .10 33 7 3 666 4 85 7E- 0 2
...146400E-05.__. 1000032840830F-07. ___ __ ___
9 00. 6
.146400E-05 .1513390 4 7 73 51 E- 0 8 4.000 .12 92 0 2 3 35712 4E- 0 3 .146400E-05 .18 915 2219 48 29 E- 09 900. 7 4.000 .1371682905413E-04 .146400E-05 900. 8 4.000 .. 1262638284595E-05 . 2 0 0 814 3 7 73524E-10 9 .146400E-05 .1848502448648E-11 900. 4.000 .1023643930672E-06 .146400E-05 .1498614714504E-12 900 . 10 4.000 .739982 432 853 5E-0 8 .1464 0 0E-05 .108 3 33 4 2 81697E- 13 FFP0 PROB 0F SINGLE TUBE FAILING WITHIN 4. 0 EFPD, H AVItlG S URVIVED 1000.000 EFPD IS . 01323475181 K SHUTOOWN PROB 0F K FXACTLY PR03 0F HSLB TOTAL PR03 AB ILITY
-1003 1 4.000 . 3 31715 7 5 ~) a 4 0 8 E+ 0 0 .146400E-05
'1000. 2 4.000 .255 820 8265 77 0Et 0 0 . 4 856 318 6 215 90E- 06
- 1000 . 3
.1464 0 0E-0 5 3 745215 9n 1088E-06 4.000
_1000 4 4.000 ..13 49403 016 8 314 4 6655 77 E-9618 5E01+ 0 0 - _.14 64 0 0 F-0 5 ._ .19 08 8 0 9 2 3 7 7 8 6E- 0 6 ___.__ _.
.146400F-05 .7232408321714F-07 ___ _.._ . _ ... ___. _.
1000. 5 4.000 .1484197978631E-01 .146400E-05
- .10 D 9. 6 4.000 . 36 8269 3 04 0 77 9E-0 2 .146400E-05
.2172865840715E-07 1000 7 -- _.4. 0 0 0. .5 3914 62 6117 01E- 08 1030. 8 4.000 ..14184 77617 09 610 419 25 53 48 2E-0 9E-033 ..- . 14 64 00 E-0 5. . .- .113 o32 66 7 02 20E- 0 8 _ _ _ _
1000. 9
.146400E-05 .2076546534107E-09 4.000 . 22 8 28 83 73 617 3 F- 0 4 .146400F-05 . 3 3421417 8 975 7E-10 1000. 10 4.000 . 327619338 215 3E-0 5 .146400E-05 . 4 7963471114 72E-11 TABLE 20 - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ^ ~ ' - ~ ' ~ - ~
OCONEE I - PROBABILITY OF LOCA AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES
( ,
~~ ' )
PROR OF SINGLE TUBE FAILING WITHIN .3 EFPD, HAVING SURVIVED 800.000 EFPD IS .00002027781
}FPO K SHUTDOWN PROB 0F K Ex ACTLY PROR OF HSLB TOTAL PR03A8ILITY .
8 00 1 .333 . 246 7 83 74 7 0 69 0E- 0 2 .122000E-06 3010758703480E-09 8 0 0.. . 2- - :. 33 3. . 33 27 63 27 2 6 83 0 F- 0 5 ._ 1220 0 0r-0 6.. - . 3 693 7 0s 23 30 20 E-12 ._. _ _ . . 800 - 3 .333 .24 55 8 0 8197 2 35E-0 8 .122000E-06 . 2 996 08 3 0 0 4 5 41E-15 800. 4 333 .14 815 3 79 96 87 2E-11 .122000F-06 .1807474 0607 0 4F-18 800 5 .333 .709 01584 73 23 4 F-15 .122000E-06 . 8 64 9984 6 8 73 5 2E-22
-800 6 .333 . 2 8 0 3 63 7 213 8 81 E- 18-__. 122 0 0 0E -0 6 _-.. 3 4 2 0 4 33 9 8 0 4 97E- 25 _ _.
800. 7 .333- .9421347601580E-22 .122 0 0 0E-0 6 .1149403257988E-28 800. 8 .333 . 27 463 ? 63 4 5 324E-2 5 .122000E-06 . 3 360 514 79 0 777E-32 800 9 . 70 5 416 7168 06 9r-2 9 .1220006-06 8606075338960E-36
'8006.--10-- _- 333 333 41616 4 2 4 6 0 6 65 8E-3 2 . -- .122 0 0 0E- 0 6 _. 19 7 20 3 6 0 4 8 0 85E-3 9 --._.__.__. .__ . . . . _ . . .
PROB.0F. SINGLE. TU9E F AIL ING WI THIN .3 EFPO. H A VING SURVIVED 900.000 EFPD. IS. [8 88 02399691 [FP9 K SHUTDOWN PROR OF M EX4CTLY PROB 0F HSL3 TOTAL PROBABILITY 900 1 .333 . 2 91913 4 0 6 9 951E-0 2 .122 0 0 0E-0 6 . 3 5613 40 0 0 3 9 97E-0 9 900. 2 .333 .42 38134 229 432E-0 5 .122000E-06 . 517 0 5 24 68 9 3 7 7E-9 0 0 ..... 3 =-- . 3 3 3 .4 0 6 818 8 0 0 2 26 0F-0 8. ._. 122 0 0 0 E-0 6.._ . 49 6318 4 3 9 95 156PE_ 12 . . _ . _ . 900 .333 4 . 290 4 3 823 45 60 2E-11 .12?PsLE-06 . 354 3 342 9182 87E-18
- 900. 5 .333 .164 4 8 7 0 0 56 3 M 6E- 14 . *J2000E-06 .2 0 0 67 314 62 05 0E- 21 900. 6 .333 . 769 718 65 0 0 6 71 E-18 .122 0 0 0 E-0 6 .9390558140251E-25 -
900, 7 - -- --- . 3 3 3 . M 6 0 9 6 0 7 6 017 8E-21.- .122 0 0 0 E -0 6.___. 3 7 3 4 3 63 3 9 30 4 5E- 2 8 .. _ _ . . _ _ . . . 900. 8 .333 . iuS5 92 098 0 34 5E-2 4 .122000F-06 .12 88222 3 0 7797E-31 900. 9 .333 . 3 2 0 9 66 39 5 0 361E- 2 8 .122000E-06 .3 915 7 8610 3651E-35 , 900. 10 .333 . 87 0 3 697958 0 0 8E-32 .122000E-06 .1061850089026E-38 3 . _ _ _ _ . . . . . - . __ . PROB 0F SINGLE TUqE FAILING WITHIN .3 FFDD. HA VING SURVIVE 0 1000.000 EFPD IS .00002789821 FPD K SHUT 00HN PR03 0F K FXACTLY PR09 0F HSL3 . TOTA L PR09 ABILITY ... _..___.._.. _.... _ .. . i000. 1 .333 . 3 39 2109711574E-0 2 .122000E-06 . 413 8 3 69 7 09 7 47E- 0 9.. 000. 2 .333 . 57 2G G n 2 755 6 8 5 E- 05 .122000E-J6 .6985105T76823E-12 20 00 . 3 .333 . 6 3 89 42 80 2 7 37 0E-0 8 .122000E-06 . 7 795 0 943 9 82 8cE-15 . . d0 03. 4 .333 .5303191569828E-11 .122000E-06 .6469887245296E-18 _. . . . . .. . 000. 5 333 . 3 4917 0 610 0 76 2E-14 .122000E-06 .4259877183048E-21
, 0 00. 6 .333 .1899993418396E-17 .122 0 0 0 E-0 6 .2317501652890E-24 i 000 7 .333 87 3 2 314168 4 3 0E- 21 .122 0 0 0 F-0 6 .1071441255886E-27 i800. 8 -- . 333 .35 2212 84 06 067E-2 4 . 122000E-06 .4 296992 3 5 84 0S E-31.. --.. . - - - . . . . .
800. 9 .333 .12 4 4674 7 8 0 441 E-2 7 .122000E-06 .15185017136 34E-34 0 00. 10 .333 .3 92 3943 0 58 410E-31 .122000E-06 . 4 7 8.72 05 744 05 0 E-3 8
, TABLE 21 -
l @$DM HB _-- 12F2WRTMtT6UUUV9WUWiTQ fWL5BTrete - . -__ - - - - - - - - - - - - - . _
r !
)
e PROB 0F SINGLE TuDE FAILING WITiTN 1. 0 EF PD, HAVING SURVIVED 800.000 EFPD IS .0000608606 EFP9 K SHOT 00HN PROD OF K FX ACTLY PR03 0F NSL1 TOTAL PR O9 A 91L I T Y .
- ( 800. 1 1.000 .7 3 71r n te968 7G 8F-0 2 .. 3660008~-06 .. . 2 69 796349 8565E-0 8.
e 800. 2 1.000 . 2714 7559 8 8 fe 8 7E-0 4 366000E-06 4936006917864E-11
- e. 800. 3 1.000 . 661014 87 4 018 6E-0 7 .366000E-06 .2419314438903E-13 u 800. 4 1.000 1197 0675 08 03 9E- 09 .366000E-06 .4 381267 07 94 23E- 16
.-- 8 00.~ .__5-- 1. 0 0 0 -.1719 69 36 4 6 53 9E-12. . . 3 66 0 0 0E- 0 6 . . 6294 0 78 74 6 3 34E _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . .
800. 6 1.000 .204129 6725 82 0E '15 . 3 66 0 0 0 E-0 6 .7471145016500E-22
-. 8 00.-. 7 .. _-.1. 0 0 0 ---. 2 05 914 310 0 54 5E-18 . . . 3 66 0 0 0 F-0 6 .... 7 53 64 63 Tie 7 9 96E-25 - __ = _ . . _ _ _ .
800. 8 1.000 .1801834189254F-21 .366000E-06 .6594713132668E-28 () 8 00. 9 1.000 .1349305023397E-24 .366000F-06 .5 0 84 8553 85634E-31 800. 10 1.000 .95 564 4 77660 87E-2 4 .3660 0 0E-06 . 3 8,9 7 659 88 2 3 8 8E-3 4 CB 1.0 EFPD. H A VING SURVIVED 900.000 EFPD IS .0C00720272
- PROD OF STNGLE TUDE FATLING WITHIN '
i ---- E FP3 -- X..S HU T 00 HN . P R0 0 0 F K rXAC"LY .PR03 0F MSL9 . TOTAL PR00 ADIlliY . _ - - 900. 1 1.000 . 871106 285 6951F-0 2 .366000E-06 .3188249005644E-08 () 900. 2 1.000 . 3 79 6 2 4 F 3 t. 9 291 F- 0 4 .366000E-06 .13 894 2616 38 4 0E- 10 900. 3 1.000 .10 93 s t 0 892 06 3F-0 6 .366000E-06 .4003347864952E-13
.-.- 9 0 0 . 4 1.000 .2 3f4 399 71'4 7 8t t E- 0 9 -. 3 66 0 0 0 E -0 6 --.8 5 79 0 2 35 61109t- 16 e
' ' 900. 5 1.000 . 39 8 4 7120 85 2 32E-12 .366000E-06 .145 8 4 04 62 3195E- 18 () *- 900. 6 1.000 .5597053352608E-1G .36 000E-06 . 2 0re 85214172 54E-21
- 900. 7 .
1.000 6681088702745E-18 366000E-06 .2445278465205E-24 - 9 00..__8 _. .1. 0 0 0---. 69180182 0 7 7 958- 21 _ . 3 66 0 0 0 F-0 6 ... 2532001984053E-27 - - - - _ . . _ . . - . _ . . _ . . _ . - . .. . 900. 9 1.000 . 6312 0 n 9719 512E- 2 4 .366000E-06 . 2 310 2 24 8 3 73 41 E- 3 0 () 900. 10 1.000 .51378209r2946E-27e .366000E-06 .18 8 0 4 fe 4 6 61118 E-33
~
i PROD OF SINGLE TUDE FAILING Hi iilN 1.0 EFPD HAVING SURVIVED 1000.000 EFPD IS .0000837323 (3 EFPD K SFUT06WN PROD OF M E X ACTLY PROD OF HSLO YOTAL P9 04 ABIL I TY
- - 10 0 0 . . ._1. . . 1. 0 00 - -- .10112 3 5219 4 21 E- 01. . .366000E-06 . . 3.18 701120 90 30 80E-08 7 5 0 7126 65 qr,E-10 1000. 2* 1.000 . 512 314'5G 3 718.1 E- 0 4 .366000E-06 i 1000. 3 1.000 .171613 3716 r,4 4E. g g . 366000E-06 . 6 2 8 05 8 3 4 0 2 55 0E- 13 1000. 4 1.000 . 4 2 7 50 5 7 0 87.~4 3E-0 9 .366000E-06 .156'e 6 70 8 9 8118 E -15 l () ' . - 1000. 5 1.000 .64486670165410-12 . 3 660 0 0 E-0 6 . 3 09 2175 5 2 8 0 54E- 18. __ ._ . . . . . . _ . . _ . . . . .
1000. 6 1.000 .1379579704 301E-14 366000E-06 .5 04 92 61717 74 3E-21
.1914 414 0 710 3 9E- 17 . 3 660 0 0d-0 6 .7 0 067555 0 00 02E- 24
- ()'
4 1000. 1000. 7 8 1.000 1.000 .2304479573352E-20 .366000E-06 .8434395238467E-27 l ' 1000. 9 1.000 .244435G319972E-23 .366000E-06 .89t6340471097E-30 1000. 10 1.006 .2312980184088E-26 .366000E-06 .8465507473761E-33 i C) . TABLE 22 OCONEE II - PROBABILITY OF LOCA AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES
(- ,C
- s / /
I PROB 0F SINGLE TURE FAILING JITHIN 4.0 EFPD. HAVING SURVIVED '8'0 0. 00 0 EFPD- IS 000244105 O' EFPO K SHUTDOWN PR09 nF K EXACTLY PR09 0F HSL9 TOTAL PR03 ABILITY 8 00. 1 4.000 . 2 8413 9612 7 910 E- 01 .18e 64 0 nE-0 5 . 4 2 T 3 0 03 9312 60 E- 07 ' 800. 2 4.000 . 4 2 7116 24 8 6 8 7 5E- 0 3 .146400E-05 . 6 25 2 9818 8 0 7 85 E- 0 9 - - . - - . . . - - .- -. 800. 3 4.000 41718.70806767E-05 .1e6400E-06 .6107033261106E-11 -
@ 800. 4 4.000 . 3 0 30116 33 } 48 7E- 0 7 .146te00E-05 .44 360 90 312225E- 13 800, 5 4,000 .17 4 6 0 4 0 96 0 64 3E- 0 9 .146400E-05 .2556203975239E-15 800. 6 4.000 . 8 313 7753 3 0 54 7E- 12 .146400F-05 .1217 0 615 0 8 3 92E - 17 ._ -_ - __. . . ... _. ..
800. 7 4.000 . 33 63 684 3 7 0 77 e.E-14 .1464 0 0E-0 5 .4924433918813E-20
@l1 800. 8 4.000 .118 06 09 3 3 929 2E-16 .146800E-05 .1728412072723E-22 800. 9 4.000 .3651334999762E-19 .14 6 te 0 0 E-0 5 .53455544396526-25 _ _ _ _ . . . . . . -
L -- 8 0 0 . ----- 4. 0 0 0- - .10 0 7 42 6213 9 7 4 E-21-. . . - .14 6 r 0 0 E - 0 5 . . . 14 7 4 8 719 7 7 2 5 7E- 2 7~-- . -- . - .--- ... O'
!- . PROB-OF STNGLE TUDE FAILING WI THIN 4.0 EFPD. II A VIllG SURVIVED 900.000.EFP0 IS -- .000288764
! EFPD K SHUTDOWN PR08 0F K EYACTLY PR03 0F. HSL9 TOTAL PROBASILITY (y 900. 1 4.000 . 34 019 38 0 6143 8E-01 .1464 0 0E-0 5 . 4 9 9 0 4 37 3219 45E- 07 900. 2 4.000 .59449820178 63E-03 .146400E-05 . $ 7 0 34 53 673 5 66E- 0 9 9 0 0 ..--- 3 4. 0 0 0 .- . 686 8 77 52 3 0 72 6F-0 5.. . 14 64 0 0E-0 5 '-. 10 0 55 86 693 7 78E-10 . - - - . . . . _ _ _ . . .
900. 4 4.000 . 59 0 248 70 58 37 8E-0 7 .146400E-05 . 8 6412 410 53465E- 13 , r 9 0 0 . --- 4. 0 0 0 --. 8e 0 2 3 6 0 9'. 0 7 9 0 5 E-0 9 . a- 18.6 4 0 0E -0 5. - . 5 8 9 0 5 6417 30 2 7 E- 15. -- -..__...- ....-. ....-_.... 900. 6 4.000 .2266309371781E-11 .14 68. 0 0E - 0 5 . 3 317876 92 02 87E-17 +
- ts 900. 7 4.000 .10 8 4 79 559 3 36 7E-13 .146400E-05 .1588140748690E-19
- 900. 8 4.000 . 4 5 0 4 27122 9 t:3 2E- 16 . i t 64 00 E-05 .6594253079d88E-22 t---- . 9 0 0 . -- 9 ,4. 0 0 0 .164 7 99 fe 06 9295E-18..-- .14b te 0 0 E-0 5 .- . 2 412 6 63 317 4 4 AE- 2 4.---.. --._ ._ _ .-. _ _ _ . . _
e 900. 10 4.000 . 53 79 01625 0 86 7E- 21 .146400E-05 .7 874873 79127 0E-27 -
- Og
- g. _ . .- .00033560515
. PROB 0F SINGLE Tune FAILING WITHIN r . 0 EFPD. H AVIHG SURVIVED e 1000.000 EF,PD .IS
,-Q' EFD9 K SHUT 00HN PR09 0F M E X ACTLY PR39 0F PSL7 TOTAL PR04 A91L ITY ' . 10 00. 1 4.000 . 3 9314199 3 96 7 6E- 01 .18.68 0 0 E- 0 9 . 5 75G59 3 7 916 85 E-07 1000.--- 2 4. 0 0 0 - . 79 05 0 7 87 9 0 681 E-0 3 c-.. 146 4 0 0E-0 5 -- . 116 9015 5 3 8 9 85 E- 0 8 2.__ _ _ - . _ - - - . - _ . . l l-- 10 00. 3 .4.000 .10 7 2 29 3? 99613E-0 4 .146400E-05 .1S69837390613E-10 'Ofi 1000. 4 4.000 .1070964209545E-06 .t46400E-05 .1567891602774E-12
' 1000. 5 4.000 . 8 48 51457 00 82 9E-0 9 .146400E-05 .1242231198313E-14
.- 1000. - 6. -.4. 0 0 0 . 555 8.8 24 7G 104 4E-11 . .18 64.0 0 E-0 5 . . 813 2 2 6 3 8. 3 6 te 0 6F- 17.. ,--- .. .-.. - - - _ - _ - . _ - - - . .
i 1000. 7 4.000 . 3 09 0 32 A9 2139 6E-13 .1464 0 0E-0 5 . 4 52 4 24154 0 923E- 19 'O' 1000. 8 4.000 .14 9137 513 0 011 E- 15 .1464 0 0E-0 5 . 218 3 3 73 4 8 313 7E-21 1000. 9 4.000 63419628 2 2 93 7F- 18 .146400E-05 .9284633572780E-24 , 100J. 10 - - 4.000 . 24 0 589 8 22911 BE-2 0 .18 6te 0 DE-0 G . . 3 5 2 2 2 2 91514 2 9E- 2 6 . --. _ _ .-- -- .-. . .. . - - _ .. _. -_ - ! TABLE 23 OCONEE II - PROBABII.1TY OF LOCA AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES ,
%) -
i , -;
.O
.(y
! .----- PROR - O F S ING LF-T U BE- FA T L IN G. W I T,H IN .- .3.EFPD. HAVING SURVIVFD 800.000 EFPD IS -.e_ . 0 0 0 04 0 79 61 EFPD K SHUTDOWN PROB 0F K EXACTLY PROB 0F '1SL9 TOTAL PROBABILITY
()!! 8 00 . 800. 2 1 333
.333
. 49 5 261955 3 7 7 3 E-0 2
.122 2 43 89819 2 4E-0 4
.122 0 0 0E -0 6 ~ . 6 04 2189 8134 0 7E- 09
.122 0 0 0E -0 6 .1491374 0 665 72E-11
- t 8 0 0 . . . --- 3 . 333--.1994 913318165E-07..-. 122 0 00E-0 6 . 2 re 33 7 91818e 3 67 E-14 . . - . . . . . . . . - - - . 800. 4 .333 . 24 2129 5 79 418 0 E-10 .122000E-06 . 2 9 53 9 77 914 918E- 17 ()* 800. 5 .333 . 23 312 9213 r: 391 E- 13 .122 0 n 0 6 -0 6 .2844173560391L-20 ~ 800. 6 .333 .1854 6764510re 0E-16 .122000L-06 .2262703007564L-23 i -- 8 0 0 . .-- 7 .333 .12 5 3 9 0 5 9 2 5 88 0 E- 19 .--- . 1 22 0 0 0 F -0 6 .---- .15 2 9 7 6 3 6 9 9 7 6 0 E - Z b . . . ------- ..- ~.--- . --- . .-.. . - - l 8 00. 8 333 .7353763455677E-23 .122 0 0 0E -0 6 . 8 9715 02 4 4 4 3 34 E-3 0
- C)! 8 00. 9 .333 . 38 00 2 20 93252 9E-2 6 .122 0 0 0E- 0 6 . 4 6162 6te 9 01416E-33 800. 10 .333 .17519598 0177 3E-2 9 .122000E-06 .213 73 d8 82 07 72E-36 l
O PROS OF STNGL E THRE FATL ING HIT 9IN . 3 FF PD . HAVING SURVIVED 900 000 EFPD IS .000048278;
-- EF PO -- - K S HU T0 0HN - Pron 0 F K EX A CTI.Y .- PROB nF HSLR TOTAL PROBABILITY . .. . ..
900. 1 .333 . 5 85 5 63 33 97 66 8E- 0 2 .122000E-06 .7143865601282E-09 . () 9 00. 2 .333 .1710414856323E-04 .122 0 0 0E-0 6 .208670403800RE-11 900. 3 .333 . 3 3 0 319 0 7 80 431 E-0 7 .122000E-06 .4 02 98 88 7 2 22 33 E-ite
-- 900. - 4 -
.333 -- . 4 7 4 4 5 260 3 4 499E-10. -. 122 0 0 0 E-0 6 .5788315973767E-17 -_. .
900. 5 .333 .54 06012re 723932-13 .122000F-06 .6595328620990E-20 .
' () ' 900. 6 .333 .5 0 8 96 0 24 5 2122E-16 .122 0 0 0E-0 6 .6209308782274E-23 900. 7 .333 . 4 0 7 2 0 7 73 2 7 39 8E- 19 .122000E-06 .4967929371491F-26
.- 9 00. 8 - . 3 33 --- .2 8 2615 56 4 555 8 E- 2 2 .122000E-06 . 3 4 4 790 5 4 3 96 71 F-2 9 .
900. 9 . 3 53 .17283r5743347E-25 e .122 0 0 0E -0 6 .2108579693301E-32
- () 900. 10 .333 .94 293 3 95 33 03 4E-2 9
.122000E-06 .1150378272651E-35 ,
HA VING SilRVIVEE 1000.000 EFPO IS .000056126
~) ( FFP0 PROB 0F SINGLE TUBE FATLING HTTHIN K SHUTOOWN PROD OF K EX ACTLY
.3 EFP0 PRO 8 OF HSLn Y0T AL PROBAnILITY 1000. 1 .333 68 0113 5369 0 7 2F-0 2 .122000E-06 .8 297 375 85 28 83E-09 -. _. . -
1000. 2 .333 .23 095768 45 791E-0 4 .122000E-06 . 2 8176 80 93 4181E- 11
- (y 1000. 3 .333 . 5185 4 6 88 7135 7E-0 7 * .122000E-06 . 63 2 62 65 6 96 7 8r, E- 14
~
1000. 4 .333 . 865 9 0 5 75 2 4 78 1E- 10 .122000E-06 .1066403961613E-16 10 0 0 .--- - - .333 - .11 r e7 0 3 917 5 84 2E-12 .122 0 0 0E-0 6 .13 9 93 86 3 9 614 0 E - . - --. . - . . 1000.- 6 .333 .12 554 7h2 03 92 3E-15 .122000E-06 .1531679437105E-22 - ! () 1000. 7 .333 .1167788133973E-18 .122 0 0 0E -0 6 .1424700098746E-25 ' 10 00. .94225 3 0124 819E-2 2 .122000E-06 .1149547525679E-28 i 8 .333
- - - 1000. - 97 . 331 -- . 66 992 3 9te 3 0 47 3E-2 5 .122000E-06 . 817 30 F3 9 3 210 5 E-32 - - -
1000. 10 .333
.4 24 912 55 7 8 86 2E-2 8 .122000E-06 .5183928022278E-35 10
- ()-
l . ---- - - TABLE 24 ------ - - - - - - - 8
'0 OCONEE III - PROBABILITY OF LOCA AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES
-- -- - n. . . . . .
- Oi ______ ___________ --. _
,-w,._
)
S' D-k-_; . -_.-..PROR. 0F SINGLE TU RE F A T L ING WIT HIN 1.0 EFPD, HAVING SURVIVED. 800.000..EEPD IS _ 00012245647 e FFPD K SHUT 00HH PROD OF K rXACTLY PROR OF HSL9 TOTAL PROGADILITY 3 800. 1 1.000 .1471993959154E-01 .366000E-06 . 5 38 74 9 7 89 05 05E- 0 8
? .800. .2 1.000 .1090677485471E-03 .3 A6 0 0 0E- 0 6 .3991879596825E-10
_ . -. . 8 0 0 . .. 3 1. 0 0 0 .... .53 43 0 7518 4 89 0E-0 6 .. 366000E-06 .19 5 55 65 5176 7 0 E- 12. _ _.._ _ .. . .. . - . _ . . . .. 800. 4 .1.000 .194 6 76 35 2 8 06 3E-0 8 .3 66 0 0 0E-0 6 . 7125154 512 6 75 E- 15 - ) 800. 5 1.090 .56 26 7.9 27 a5 312F- 11 .366003E-06 .2059402499424E-17 800. 6 1.000 .1343784747309E-13 .366000E-06 . 4 9182 5717 5151 E-2 0
.-800.. 7 . 1. 00 0 . . 272 72 4 7814 210E-16 . 3(.6 0 0 0 E-0 6 .._.998172?000010E-23 _ ___ _ ..._.._ __._ ___.. .. .
800. 8 1.000 .44 0119 462 0 617 E- 19 . 3 66 0 0 0F.-0 6 .175 7310 4 31146E- 25 ) 800. 9 1.000 . 7 44 8 42 9119 3 3 6E- 2 2 366000E-06 . 2 7 26125 0 5 76 77E- 2 8 800. 10 1.000 .1030808707803E-24 .366000E-06 .3772759870560E-31 PRO B' 0F SINGLE YUDE FAILING WITHIN 1.0 EFPD, HA VIllG S URVI VED 900.000 EFPD IS .110014490450
- EFPD - K SHUTUOWN PR00 0F K FXACTLY PR09 0F HSL9 TOTAL PRO 3 30!L ITY .
900. 1 1.000 .17 't710 616 0 051E- 01 .366000E-06 .6357808545788E-08 .. ... b 9 00 . 2 1.000 .15 ? 3 09 3 4 73 56 0E- 0 3 .366000E-06 . 5 5745 22113 2 3 tE- 10 900. 3 1.000 . 8829 40 362 8 554E-0 6 .366000E-06 . 3 2315 6172 80 51E- 12 900. 4 - 1. 0 0 0 - -- .38 068 2719 28 63F-0 8 .366000E-06 .139 3299 75 25 8 8E- 14 . _ _ . - . 900. 5 1.000 .1302026993347E-10 .366000E-06 .4 76 5418 795651E- 17 ) 900. 900. 6 7 1.000 1.000
. 36 799 8 99 ?918 7F- 13 8 83 69 865 2 824 9E- 16
.366000E-36
.366000E-06
.134 6 7 29 914 0 82E- 19
.3234337069339E-22 900. 8 1.000 .18 410130 6610 4 E-18 .366000E-06 . . 6 7 3 810 7 7 8 5 3 3 9 E - 2 5 ... _. .. _ _ . _ . . . . _.. _ _ _ . . .. .
9 00. 9 1.000 .3379590125393E-21 .366000E-06 .1236929 9 85 9 94 E-2 7 ) 900. 10 . 000 .5534613500847E-24 .J66000E-06 .2025668541310E-30 3 PROB 0F SING 1.E TURE FATL IllG WITHIN 1.0 EFPD, llAVING SURVIVED 1000.000 EFPD IS 400016845173
. FFPD K SHUTOOWN Pron OF K EX ACILY PR00 0F HSLO TOTAL PR0940!LITY l 1000.-. 1.-. 1.000 . . 201364 25 4 696 4F- 01 . 366000F-06 -.7369931720444E-08 __... . ...._._
i 1000. 2 1.000 .205 251535 454 5E-0 3 . 3 660 0 0 E-0 6 . 7 5122 0619 76 3 3 E- 10 10 00. 3 1 000 .138 3 ? 3 2126 44 0E-0 5 .366000E-96 .5062621582770E-12 D, 1000. 4 1.000 . 69131516 2 8 26 0E- 0 8 .366000E-06 .2537533495943E-14 1000. ~. 5. ---1. 0 0 0 .... . 2 75 6 7117 8 22 4 7E-10. . 3 6F 0 0 0 E-0 6 .._ .10 0 89 56 512 3 0 2E- 16 . _ _ . . _ . ._.
. 1000. 6 1.000 .9 0 5 6 7970 29 055E- 13 .366000E-06 .3314787712634E-19
- 3. 1000. 7 1.000 . 2 52 86181 1713 4E- 15 .366000E-06 . 9 25 4 742 3 3 8 710E-22 1000. 8 1.0J0 . 6124 06 455 0 965E- 18 .366000E-06 .2241407625653E-24
. 1000. 9 ---.1. 0 0 0 -.. . 13 0 69 2529 2 4 0 7E-20 .. 366000E-06 . 4 7833465 702 0 8E- 27. . .._ .. _ _ _ . . _ . .
- 1000. 10 1.000 .2488157498385E-23 .366000E-06 . 910 6656 4 440 90 E-3 0 M , .
6 TABLE 25 . OCONEE Ill - PROBABILITY OF LOCA AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES C Y--_________;_________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
j . . , . . g
, 's ')
D l ._ . . . . . . _ . _ _ _ . . _ . . . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . . . . . . .. . . . _ _ . _ . . . . . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . . . _ . . . _ . _ .
- g. .
PROB 0F SINGLE TUDF FATL THG WI THIN . 8e . 0 FFPD, il AVING SUR VIVFD 800.000 EFPD__IS_ _ .0004910487; EFPD K SHUT 00HN Pron OF K EXACTLY PR04 0F HSLR TOTAL PR03 A DILI T Y
.1464 0 0F-0 5 . 8 2 6 48,62 2 6 3 4 55 E- 0 7 g 800.
8 00 . 1 2 4.000
'4.000'
.5645124'96896E-01
.167 7 9 0 2 7 99 78 0F-0 2 .18.6 4 0 0 E-0 5 . 2 45 64 4 96 9 887 8E- 0 8 800. 3 4.000 . 3297347? 7983 9E-0 4 .1 8. h t 00E-05 . 4 82 7316 te 176 8te F-10 _ - . . . _ . . . . . _ . . -
800. 4 4.000 . . f 819 36 2119595E-0 6 .146400E-05 . 7 05554414 30 88E- 12 g' 800. 5 4.000 . 55 8 7 7 9 210 563 7E- 0 8 .18 64 0 0E-3 5 . 818 0513 0 0 265 3E- 14 800. 6 4.000 . 53 2 31815 65 569E- 10 .146400E-05 .7837057811993E-16 800. 7 4.000 .4 35 8 2 2 A 7 5 7 87 3E- 12 .ir6400F-US e . 6 3 8 0 4 4 3 9 7 3 5 2 6 E - 18 . - . ~_ _. - . . ... . ..___. .. . .
.800. 8 4.000 .3 0 7 7 90 75 85 53 tee- 14 .18.6 4 0 0 E - 0 5 45060557052??E-20
- g. 800. 9 4.000 .1915 38 38 34 2 69F-16 .14 64 0 0E -0 5 .2804121933170E-22 800. 10 4.000 . i O 63 34 00 28 011E-18 .146400E-05 .1556 729 79515 2E- 24 P RO B' 0 F S ING LE T l18E FAILIllG HIT 1TN 4.0 FFPD HA VING StJRVIVE0 900.000 EFPD IS . ,0 0058 08 T 2 7; EFPO K SHUT 00HH PROH OF '< F1(ACTLY PROR OF ttSL H IOTAL PROG A!!! L I T Y 930. 1 4.000 .6605522904667E-01 .146400E-05 . 9 6 7 0 'e 85 5 3 ? 4 33 E-07 900. 2 4.000 . 2 3 2 2 715 0 7:e 9315- 0 2 . t r 68. 0 0E-0 5 . 3 4 0 08 58.8 696 99E- 0 8 3 900 3 4.000 . 5 39 9 9te 44 3 610 4 E-0 4 e
.14b400E-05 .7905518654456E-10 I- 900. 4 4.000 . 93 3 7 04 866 316 5E-0 6 . 146t00F-0G . .136 698. 3 9 2 8.2 8 7 E . _ . - . . . . _ _ . _ . . . .
400. 5 4.000 .12 8 0 7 2 2 3's 3 78 M- 0 7 .14 6te 0 0E-0 5 . 3 8 78 97 7511106E- 13 gl e 900. 6 4.000 .14515197 8173 0F-0 9 .18 64 0 0E-0 5 . 2125 0 2te9 6 0 8 5 3E- 15 900. 7 4.000 .13 9 8 0 2 92 fl 6 3 8 8E-11 .18,6 8. 0 0 E- 0 5 . 2 08 6718e 8 7 52 72E- 17 900. -. 8 -- 4.000.-.. 1168039376394r-13 .14 6 8. 0 0 E -0 5 .1710 0 09 6 4 7 0'e 0 E- 19. . . _ _ . . . . . . . _ . . . . . . . . . 9 00 . 9 4.000 .85 9910 37 09 55 2E- 16 .146400E-05 .12 5 89 0S 7 83 0 7 8E-21 g, 9 00. 10 4.000 .5647613808548E-13 .18 68 00E-0 5 .8268106615714E-24
.. ..__._...t. .. f...._ _ _ _ . . ._,
g' PROB 0F SINGLF Til0F FAIL ING HITHIN 4.0 EFPD. H A VItlG SilRVIVE9 1000.000 EFPD IS .00067508111 EFP0 K SHUT 00llM PR09 0F K FX ACT LY PRn1 0F flSL1 TOTAL PROSA9ILITY 10 00.. 1 -. 4 . 0 0 0 .-. 7 5 8 9 76 7 2 8. 8 8. 9 3 C-01 .18.6 8 0 0 E- 0 5 . 11111819?r68.3F-06 . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ . . 1000. 2 4.000 .31019 30 0 3 te 13 0E-0 2 .146400E-05. .4541237281966F-08 . g 1000. 3 fe.000 . 8 3 81 19 8te 3 3 955 E- 0 4 .146400E-05 .12 2 71099 3 0 7 31E- 09 1000. te te . 0 0 0 .168 t.52 960 8 fl91E- 05 .18 04 0 0E-0 5 . 2 4 6 61513 4 7te 17 E-11 . 10 0 0.-- 5 -- 4. 00 0 - . 26 R5 59139 G 4 0 0 E-0 7 - .14 64 0 0 F-0 5 . 3 9 317 05 8 0 28 66F-13 . . . _ - _ __.. 1000. 6 4.dao . 35 37 7 2 3 06 8 111 L-0 9 .146te00E-05 . 5179 226 5 6 5 85 8E- 15 . g.' 1000. 7 4.000 . 39 60 3 4 54 2 3 9? 9E-11 .146400E-05 . 5 79 7945 70 06 3 2E-17 10 00. 8 4.000 . 3 84 5 n 310 8 3 33 6E- 13 .1468. 0 0 E-0 5 .5630296706004E-19
- 1000. 9 -- 4. 0 00 - . 32 90 8 0 26 015 7 8E - .18.68 0 0 E-0 5 . . 8 81 7 7 3 5 0 0 8 710 E _ _ _ . . __.. _ . . . . . . . . _ . . . . .
1000. 10 4.000 . 2512 0 57 4 0 912 0E-17 .146400E-05 .3677652046951E-23 0 O. TABLE 26 L_,_ _,, _ OCONEE III - PR0ldDILITY OF LOCA AND K+1 TUBE RUPTURES . O
.h _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ . _ _ _ - _
,im
\ ,'
REFERENCES
~
- 1. TRAP 2 - Fortran Program for Digital Simulation of the Transient Behavior of the OTSG and Associated Reactor Coolant System, BAW-10128 Babcock &
Wilcox, August, 1976.
- 2. RADAR - Reactor Thermal and Hydraulic Analysis During Reactor Flow Coast-down, BAW-10069A, Rev. 2, Babcock & Wilcox, April,1973.
- 3. CRAFT 2 - Fortran Program for Digital Simulation of a Multinode Reactor Plant During Loss of Coolant, BAW-10092, Rev. 2, Babcock & Wilcox, April, 1975.
4'. J. J. DiNunno, et.al., Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites, TID-14844, Division of Licensing and Regulation, AEC, March 23,1962. e 9 a
?
gy d
1 l l 1 i l l INSERVICE FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH (CRACKBLUNTING) 7 EMD
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. END FIGURE 2 Figure 1. Photomacrograph Showing the Upper Fracture Surface af Tube 77-23 l
l
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VIEW 0F OUTSIDE SURFACE l l l l l r l 1
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z .: n+-9 ?,;-L a x-VIEW OF INSIDE SURFACE N7X Figure 2 Photomacrographs Showing " Lower Level" Propagation of the Crack in Tube 77-23
_ _ , , _y y SHEAR LIP (0 UTER) i.
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STRIATIONS .
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9 l t';' . A ..f6. . . . . ~ .. .. .. . . g . J' ' VIEW 0F FAILURE MODE CHANGES ~ 34X
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SHEAR LIP (INNER)
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r_,. h, Vt EW 0F CRACK BLUNTING ~ 70X Figure 3. SEM Fractographs Showing Details of Failure Mode Changes in Tube 77-23
CRAFT NODl!4G DIAGRAM FOR I.!SLB AND TUBE RUPTURES CFT (/ e A h e . s _ _
~
e @
~
3 4 2 7 5 g 6 2 1 - 8 1 g G e -- Q FW FW h n!
,n (j I n
c:t HPI g d g HAKE-UP Q NODE NO. IDENTIFICAT10N PATH NO. IDENTIFICATION I COLD LEG DISCHARGE PIPING l CORE DOWNCOMER 2,4 HOT LEG PIPl!IG LOWER PLENU!! 3,5 COLD LEGS PlPlHG & RC PUMPS 2,5 HOT LEG PIPING FROM SO' 0F. THE 180* 6 VENT VALVES ELB0W TO THE INLET OF THE S.G. PRIMARY SIDE OF S.G. 7 SURGE LINE
- COLD LEGS SUCTION PIPINC 8,9 UPPER AND LOWER ENDS CF LEAK PATH I CORE, CORE BYPASS, UPPER PLENUM, 10 2 MPI 3
UPPER HEAD, RV OUTLET PLENUM. RV QUTLET N0ZZLE, HOT LEG PlPING !! SLB LEAK PATH FROM RV TO 20' 0F THE 180 ELBOW IN H.L. 12 2 LPl 13 NORMAL MAKE-UP 4 PRESSURIZER 14 P/TH FROM UNAFFECTED 6 SECONDARY SIDE OF AFFECTED S.G.
~
S.G. THROUGH STEAA GEN. (- 15 FEEDWATER TO AFFECTED 7 SECONDARY SIDE OF U:1 AFFECTED 3.G. S.G. 16 FECDWATER TO UNAFFECTE$ 8 ATMOSPHERE S.G. l'ig. ire '. i
OCONEE 34" STEAf41.lf4E BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAllii,1ENT p i AND CONCURRENT RUPTURE OF 1 S.G. TUBE 120 5 tieutron 100 w, s l Power 80 60 T 40 20 Y 0 120 5 Tnermal , Power 100 80 N N 60 % w 40 %
^
20 0 System 2100 j lN 3 Pressure 1900 [ N (psia) 1700 -
\ q 1500 N_
1300 560 , , Care 1 ~ 550 " l Inlet Er.tnal py 540 (Btu /ID) 530 520 , 7.0
- 1. 0 2. 0 3.0 4. 0 5. 0 6. 0 Time (sec) s Figure 5 1 l
i
,,~
m occuEE 34" SIEAI' ggg gutstBE 00RTAtu'iEM ,
,.140 0080uRRENT RW M 0F 3 S G TUBES 120
\00 5 Heutron go Power 60
\
40 k 20
\ i I '
O 120 100 5 Inermal g9 % Power N 60 4g N_ n q 20 0 system 2100 Pressure (psia) 1900 -
\
1700 1500 - p --
~ ~
1300 -
.. . ~~ 550 i i Core I Inlet Entnalpy 540 (Btu /lu) 530 '
. 520 t.0 2. 0 30 ' 5. 0 60 ' M Time (sec) e Figure 6
DCONEE 34" STEA!A LINE Br.EAK OUTSIDE CONTAIN'JENT AND CONCURRENT RUPTURE OF 10 S.G. TUBES
, ^s
, 120 t Neutron 80 Power 60
.\
40 20 w 0 120 1 100 - 5 Tnermal Power 80 A m 40 % 20 A. 0 2100 N System Pressure 1900 - (
\'s 1700 (psis) 1500
~ .
1300 560 g
' s. Cor ~
550 ~% Inlet N w Entnalpy 540 i (8tu/ID) 530 520 1.0 2. 0 3.0 4.0 5. 0 6. 0 7.0
; Time (sec)
Figure 7 i
-- - ,- --- -v-,*-,-e-- -ww .- ,-=
OCONEE 34" STElf,i Lite CREAK OUTSIDE C0t1TAllGENT m At:0 CONCURRENT RUPTURE OF 1 S.G. TUBE 100 , 60 . Total Power, - f, 60 i 5 of Rated
)
CRAFT k 20 -
/- TRAP 0
' ' ' ' ' ' ' i 2500 RCS Pressure, 2000 IN CRAFT (psia) ,
"N TRAP
~~
1000
,'----- ~~
500 0
. . ~
Pressure of 1200 Secondary 1000
/
f , Side of 800 Unaffected TRAP 600 - S.G. (psia) 400 - 200
' ' ' ' ' ' ' l 0
5 Pressure of Secondary Side 800 of Affected 600 - y TRAP S.G. (psia) -
' ' % ~ --
400 N s N 200 Q t f I t i 1 1 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
'~'
Time (sec)
.rigure 8
\ ? )
OCONEE 34" STEAM LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINUENT AND CONCURRENT RUPTURE OF l S.G. TUBE 55 - -- 50 .r 45 l-40 - 35 - Affected - 30 m Steam f # Generator Froth 25 20 o . Level (Ft.) ~ 10 5l - i . . . . . . . . L. . . . . . 0 2 4 0 8 10 12 14 10 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 30 38 40 Time (sec)
DNBR ANAL.YSIS OF OCONEE 34" STEAM LINE BREAK QUTSIDE CONTAIN:.ENT AND CONCURRENT RUPTURE 1 S.G. TUBE 4.0 - 3.8 -
- 3. 6
- 3. 4 -
- 3. 2 -
, 3. 0 -
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- 1. 8 1.6 -
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N 1.2 - 1.0 O 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 G. 0 7.0
~
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fabcock&Wilcox (, APPENDIX A This section discusses an iodine spiking correlation used by B4W. The information is proprietary and has been deleted ja from this report.
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