ML052030129
| ML052030129 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/2004 |
| From: | Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0282 | |
| Download: ML052030129 (2) | |
Text
. TOD A I
CONTACT INFORMATION Control Room Emergency-x2911 EMT Pager 6442 Work Control Center - x6703 OCC -x 7190- Option I Lessons Learned - x7190 - Option 2 Plant Status - x7190 - Option 3 Accomplishments
- Nozzle Dam Removal
- Upper Cavity Decon
- 'B' S/G Primary Manway Installation
- Cavity Seal Ring Removal Schedule Focus AreaslPriorities
- Reactor Head Penetration #26 Relief Request Issues I
- 'A'S/G Primary Manway Installation
- Exit Midloop and Reduced Inventory Orange Path
- Commence Reactor Head Assembly P
Personnel Last 24 Hours Outage to Safety ___________Date Recordable - 0 Recordable - 1*
Disabling -0 Disabling - 0
- OSHA Recordable - Back strain.
} JLast 24Hours Outage to Date Iniormation intt srecord was deleted ALARA ' [ 3.119 77.202 R inaccordance wvth UtF eedom of Informabon Dose as of the end of Day 50 Act exem plb 91 kV-af)
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May 25, 2004 OUTAGE GOALS NUCLEAR SAFETY GOAL ACTUAL HUMAN PERFORMANCE GOAL ACTUAL PERFORMANCE l__ATA_
Unplanned orange/red paths None None Security Violations s 12 loggable events 3 Reactor trips (either unit) None I Station human performance dock None 4 resets Safeguards actuation (either unit) None None Rework s 1% On Goal Loss of shutdown cooling None None SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE Outage Duration Loss of Rx vessel level control None None (excludes extensions due to s 30 days Off Goal extended head or BMI inspections)
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY Mod Implementation 100% of Rev 0 On Goal PERFORMANCE
> 85% schedule Lost time accidents None None Schedule Compliance compliance with Off Goal outage milestone Personnel injuries (OSHA recordable) None I Emergent work (during s 20A late additions On Goal Implementation) s 5%Emergent OnGoal RADIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE Scope Complete k 95% of On Goal Rev 0 scope _____
Radiation exposure (Excludes additional 100% of Scheduled dose from any head or BMI repair s 92 R 77.202 R Operator Burdens Operator Burdens On Goal contingencies) complete Personnel contaminations >5K CPM 10 Post Outage availability 2 150 days of Available at continuous operation a later date Radiological events (defined as unplanned uptake wfassigned dose >10 mrem or -1 event 1 BUDGETBUGTPROM PERFORMANCE NEoutageWithin -2%budgetto 0% of Seriously Challenged dose event based on ED alarms Radmaterial event (defined as any rad :i event 0 material outside RCA 2 100 CPM) _ event_0 Human Performance Operating Experience OE1 1315 - Unplanned Intemal Contamination During Reactor Cavity Decon Who does job observations? Everyone! Supervisors and managers normally perform formal job observations, but On Wednesday, March 29, 2000, at 0815 (all times are approximate), with the reactor coolant system level just below the reactor vessel flange and anyone can perform an informal job observation. Each the reactor head suspended approximately two feet above the flange, two one of use probably does this daily through things like ComEd Radiation Protection Technicians (RPTs) entered the reactor cavity co-worker coaching. It could be when we are giving OJT to survey and begin cleaning the vessel flange. At 0845, a Maintenance or watching TPE, it could be when we are performing a Supervisor and QC inspector inspected the flange for cleanliness. At 0915, the reactor head was set on the flange and two laborers entered the cavity peer check, or maybe it was when a co-worker asked us to decon the lower walls. At 0920, vessel level began to be reduced for to help them perform a task. Job observations are always subsequent maintenance work. Other personnel entered the cavity to being performed at PBNP. They can be performed remove equipment and begin pressure-washing portions of the cavity. At anywhere and are done everywhere to help improve the 1000, after the completion of one rinse of the upper portion of the cavity, the RP Supervisor (RPS) contacted the station ALARA analyst to report entire PBNP organization. that the rinse did not appear to be reducing dose rates, and that dose rates following the first rinse were approximately twice normal. At 1020, the two RPTs exited the cavity due to reaching 80% of their RWP-allowed daily exposure. At 1030, the ALARA analyst notified the Radiation Protection Safety Snippet Manager (RPM) about higher than expected dose rates after the first rinse.
At 1045, the RPS and the RPM discussed the potential reasons for the Peer checks - do we use them? higher than expected dose rates, Including reduced vessel level and high remaining contamination levels. It was subsequently decided to observe December 1997, Byron: An electrician was taken to the the effects of further draining and decon efforts to determine the cause. At hospital for treatment of second-degree burns on his hand 1115, the RPS became aware that the two RPTs had experienced internal and flash bums to his eyes as a result of a mishap. He contamination. Over the next 30 minutes, others were reported as having external or Internal contaminations. At 1150, the RPS contacted the RPM was one of three electricians assisting a system engineer and stopped work in the cavity based on the contamination events and the during a battery discharge test on a new battery bank unknown conditions. Evaluation of the potential cause was discussed at when he accidentally shorted across the battery with one the Senior Management level. A recovery plan was developed and work in of the cables used to connect the battery to a resistor and around the area was resumed approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> later. Off site ComEd Generation Support Radiation Protection personnel were brought bank. An investigation showed that the electricians and In to assist and provide recommendations.
the system engineer had not verified the correct cable Lessons Learned: The root cause of this event was failure to configuration. Also, the injured electrician was not perform adequate surveys to characterize the radiological wearing low voltage gloves and had rolled up the sleeves conditions before allowing work to be performed, due to a lack of of the long-sleeve shrt he was required to wear for this management reinforcement of standards, a mindset based on job. What PPE do we wear during battery work? historical data, and Improper focus on completing work.