ML052030129
| ML052030129 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/2004 |
| From: | Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0282 | |
| Download: ML052030129 (2) | |
Text
.
TOD A I
P CONTACT INFORMATION Control Room Emergency-x2911 EMT Pager 6442 Work Control Center - x6703 OCC -x 7190- Option I Lessons Learned - x7190 - Option 2 Plant Status - x7190 - Option 3 Accomplishments Nozzle Dam Removal Move 1 P-1 B RCP Motor to Pump Cubicle Upper Cavity Decon
'B' S/G Primary Manway Installation Cavity Seal Ring Removal Schedule Focus AreaslPriorities Reactor Head Penetration #26 Relief Request Issues I
- 'A' S/G Primary Manway Installation Exit Midloop and Reduced Inventory Orange Path Commence Reactor Head Assembly Personnel Last 24 Hours Outage to Safety
___________Date Recordable - 0 Recordable -1*
Disabling -0 Disabling -0
- OSHA Recordable - Back strain.
} J Last 24Hours Outage to Date ALARA
' [
3.119 77.202 R Dose as of the end of Day 50 Iniormation in tt s record was deleted in accordance wvth Ut F eedom of Informabon Act exem plb 91 kV-af)
, Z, -
'-4.
,
__O
May 25, 2004 OUTAGE GOALS NUCLEAR SAFETY GOAL ACTUAL PERFORMANCE l__ATA_
Unplanned orange/red paths None None Reactor trips (either unit)
None I
Safeguards actuation (either unit)
None None Loss of shutdown cooling None None Loss of Rx vessel level control None None INDUSTRIAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE Lost time accidents None None Personnel injuries (OSHA recordable)
None I
RADIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE Radiation exposure (Excludes additional dose from any head or BMI repair s 92 R 77.202 R contingencies)
Personnel contaminations
>5K CPM 10 Radiological events (defined as unplanned uptake wfassigned dose >10 mrem or
-1 event 1
dose event based on ED alarms Radmaterial event (defined as any rad
- i event 0
material outside RCA 2 100 CPM) event_0 HUMAN PERFORMANCE GOAL ACTUAL Security Violations s
12 loggable events 3
Station human performance dock None 4
resets Rework s 1%
On Goal SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE Outage Duration (excludes extensions due to s 30 days Off Goal extended head or BMI inspections)
Mod Implementation 100% of Rev 0 On Goal
> 85% schedule Schedule Compliance compliance with Off Goal outage milestone Emergent work (during s 20A late additions On Goal Implementation) s 5% Emergent OnGoal Scope Complete k 95% of On Goal Rev 0 scope 100% of Scheduled Operator Burdens Operator Burdens On Goal complete Post Outage availability 2 150 days of Available at continuous operation a later date BUDGET PERFORMANCE Within -2% to 0% of Seriously BUGTPROM NEoutage budget Challenged Human Performance Who does job observations? Everyone! Supervisors and managers normally perform formal job observations, but anyone can perform an informal job observation. Each one of use probably does this daily through things like co-worker coaching. It could be when we are giving OJT or watching TPE, it could be when we are performing a peer check, or maybe it was when a co-worker asked us to help them perform a task. Job observations are always being performed at PBNP. They can be performed anywhere and are done everywhere to help improve the entire PBNP organization.
Safety Snippet Peer checks - do we use them?
December 1997, Byron: An electrician was taken to the hospital for treatment of second-degree burns on his hand and flash bums to his eyes as a result of a mishap. He was one of three electricians assisting a system engineer during a battery discharge test on a new battery bank when he accidentally shorted across the battery with one of the cables used to connect the battery to a resistor bank. An investigation showed that the electricians and the system engineer had not verified the correct cable configuration. Also, the injured electrician was not wearing low voltage gloves and had rolled up the sleeves of the long-sleeve shrt he was required to wear for this job. What PPE do we wear during battery work?
Operating Experience OE1 1315 - Unplanned Intemal Contamination During Reactor Cavity Decon On Wednesday, March 29, 2000, at 0815 (all times are approximate), with the reactor coolant system level just below the reactor vessel flange and the reactor head suspended approximately two feet above the flange, two ComEd Radiation Protection Technicians (RPTs) entered the reactor cavity to survey and begin cleaning the vessel flange. At 0845, a Maintenance Supervisor and QC inspector inspected the flange for cleanliness. At 0915, the reactor head was set on the flange and two laborers entered the cavity to decon the lower walls. At 0920, vessel level began to be reduced for subsequent maintenance work. Other personnel entered the cavity to remove equipment and begin pressure-washing portions of the cavity. At 1000, after the completion of one rinse of the upper portion of the cavity, the RP Supervisor (RPS) contacted the station ALARA analyst to report that the rinse did not appear to be reducing dose rates, and that dose rates following the first rinse were approximately twice normal. At 1020, the two RPTs exited the cavity due to reaching 80% of their RWP-allowed daily exposure. At 1030, the ALARA analyst notified the Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) about higher than expected dose rates after the first rinse.
At 1045, the RPS and the RPM discussed the potential reasons for the higher than expected dose rates, Including reduced vessel level and high remaining contamination levels. It was subsequently decided to observe the effects of further draining and decon efforts to determine the cause. At 1115, the RPS became aware that the two RPTs had experienced internal contamination. Over the next 30 minutes, others were reported as having external or Internal contaminations. At 1150, the RPS contacted the RPM and stopped work in the cavity based on the contamination events and the unknown conditions. Evaluation of the potential cause was discussed at the Senior Management level. A recovery plan was developed and work in and around the area was resumed approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> later. Off site ComEd Generation Support Radiation Protection personnel were brought In to assist and provide recommendations.
Lessons Learned: The root cause of this event was failure to perform adequate surveys to characterize the radiological conditions before allowing work to be performed, due to a lack of management reinforcement of standards, a mindset based on historical data, and Improper focus on completing work.