ML051990377
| ML051990377 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 05/18/2004 |
| From: | Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0282 | |
| Download: ML051990377 (2) | |
Text
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DAY 45 PL41 I.
--nTODAY May 18, 2004
- 1 I CONTACT INFORMATION Control Room Emergency-x2911 EMT Pager 6442 Work Control Center - x6703 OCC - x 7190 - Option 1 Lessons Learned - x7190 - Option 2 Plant Status - x7190 - Option 3
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Accomplishments
- Radiography of T-26 Blow Down Tank Piping
- 1X03 Station Transformer Removed from Service
- Internals Lift Rig Returned to Rx Cavity
- IT-280A for 1 MS-2017 A SIG Header Main Steam Stop
- IT-520B, LRPM testing of 1 SI-896A & B
- Ul Train A & B UV, DV, & LV Relays I(
Personnel Last 24 Hours Outage to Safety Date
'1D-Recordable - 0 Recordable - V rz-S Disabling - 0 Disabling -0
- OSHA Recordable - Back strain.
Schedule Focus Areas/Priorities
_)Reactor Head Pen #26 Relief Request Issues
- Setup and Prepare Mockup for Rx Head Pen #26 Grinding
- Work Package to Grind Out Over Lap on Pen #26
- Reactor Head Pen #33 Thermal Sleeve
- 3) Generator 60# Air Test
- 4) 1X03 Transformer H52-20 Breaker (On Hold) 1X03 Trans ormer H52-05 Breaker I) 1MS-2018S/G Header Main Steam Stop a) 1SI-897B Si Test Line Return
- 4) ISI-887 SI Test Line Relief I
I
May 18, 2004 NUCLEAR SAFETY GOAL PERFORMANCE GA Unplanned orangelred paths None Reactor trips (either unit)
None Safeguards actuation (either unit)
None Loss of shutdown cooling None Loss of Rx vessel level control None INDUSTRIAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE Lost time accidents None Personnel Injuries (OSHA recordable)
None RADIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE Radiation exposure (Excludes additional dose from any head or BMI repair s 75 R 5
contingencies)
Personnel contaminations
>5K CPM Radiological events (defined as unplanned uptake w/assigned dose >10 mrem or s1 event dose event based on ED alarms Radmaterial event (defined as any rad event material outside RCA : 100 CPM)
OUTAGE GOALS kCTUAL HUMAN PERFORMANCE GOAL ACTUAL None Security Violations s 12 loggable events 3_ -
None Station human performance dock None 4
resets__
None Rework s 1%
On Goal None SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE
=
Outage Duration None (excludes extensions due to s 30 days Off Goal extended head or BMI inspections)
Mod Implementation 1 00% of Rev 0 On Goal
> 85% schedule None Schedule Compliance compliance with Off Goal outage milestone Emergent work (during s
2% late additions Goa Implementation) s 5% Emergent On Goal Scope Complete 2 95% of On Goal R ev 0 scope 100% of Scheduled i5.334 R Operator Burdens Operator Burdens On Goal complete 10 Post Outage availability 2 150 days of Available at continuous operation a later date 1
BUDGET PERFORMANCE WMthin -2% to 0% of Seriously outage budget Challenged 0
- 5/15/04 Tailgating event: Door 265 #2183 Human Performance Why do it, if It Isn't safe?
The main reason for performing pre-job briefings is to minimize human performance errors. Identification of error-likely situations, and barriers that can prevent errors from occurring increases the safety and effectiveness of job performance.
Pre-job briefs are required for all task assignments and evolutions. Documented briefings are required for high or medium risk in accordance with NP 1.1.7, Managing Work Activity Risk.
Operating Experience OE17438 - Mechanic Injured During Air Operated Valve Maintenance During an outage on Unit 2, a packing leak on a Condensate Booster Pump minimum flow valve was scheduled to be repaired. When mechanical maintenance personnel were disconnecting the air operator from the valve stem, in preparation for repacking, a coupling block was forcible ejected. The mechanic who was holding on to the coupling block received a dislocated thumb, and was struck in the face. The hard hat protected his head and while the safety glasses protected his eyes the force of the blow drove the glasses into the worker's eyebrow, resulting in sutures being needed.
Lessons Learned: Investigation revealed that direction provided in the work order and clearance special instructions section had not been reviewed.
The directions required l&C technicians disconnect the actuator from the valve before the mechanical work was to begin. One of the most significant human factors In this event was the mindset that this was a "simple job."
Safety Snippet Don't block your vision or you could be headed for a collision OE12937-October 2001: Forklift operator at Kewaunee was asked to lift a containment fan coil unit in order that a pallet could be placed underneath it The approach was from an angle, rather than directly from the front due to 4x4's underneath the unit creating a frontal obstruction. The forklift operator maneuvered close to the area, stopped and asked individuals to move. As they began to move, the back end of the forklift swung around, pinning a security officer to a doorframe.