ML050840535
| ML050840535 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/2004 |
| From: | Nuclear Management Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0282 | |
| Download: ML050840535 (2) | |
Text
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Committed to Nuclear Excemvnce 9 ODA
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11 Point Beach Refueling 17F Outage Edition PO1 ERM ELUDWE L4
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April 14, 2004 Nuclear Protected Train ':- Accomplishments & Challenges:
. or Equipment:
- a ORT 15 Fuel Transfer System Checkout Unit 1 A and B Steam Generator Nozzle Dam Panpl.c I Schedule Focus Areas/Priorities Personnel Last 24 Outage to Safety Hours Date .
- Activities Required to Exit Yellow SSA Conditions I Recordable - 0 Recordable - 0 o Troubleshoot & Repair Z-13 Polar Crane Disabling - 0 Disabling - 0 o BRCP MotorMove o Reactor Vessel Head Stud Rack Removal o Reactor Vessel Head Lift No OSHA Recordable Iniuries.
I IFURI1EY XCEL-LEfflEE IOT BEFNCH - UIR28
-_ OUTAGE NUCLEAR SAFETY GOAL ACTUAL HUMAN PERFORMANCE GOAL ACTUAL PERFORMANCE - GOLCTA Unplanned orange/red paths None None Security Violations :5 12 loggable events I Station human performance clock l None Vet Cnetrol Reactor trips (either unit) None None resetsUnder Eval Safeguards actuation (either unit) None None Rework [ 1% <1%
Loss of shutdown cooling None None SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE l_ -_l_l Outage Duration Loss of Rx vessel level control - None None (excludes extensions due to l 30 days Challenged extended head or BMI Inspections) l _lI INDUSTRIAL SAFETY Mod Implementation 100% of Rev 0 On goal PERFORMANCE
> 85% schedule Lost time accidents None None Schedule Compliance compliance with Challenged
_____outage milestone Emergent work (during l 2% late additions On Goal Personnel injuries (OSHA recordable) None None implementation) 5 5% Emergent l______ }
RADIOLOGICAL PERFORMANCE Scope Complete~Ž95% of On Goal
- Rev 0 scope Radiation exposure (Excludes additional 100% of Scheduled dose from any head or BMI repair s 75 R 22.946 R Operator Burdens Operator Burdens On Goal contingencies)
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- s18wl Post Outage availability Ž150 days of Available at Personnel contaminations >5K CPM 5 I continuous operation a later date Radiological events (defined as unplanned uptake w/assigned dose >10 mrem or - 1 event - BUDGETPERFORMANCE Within -2%
outage to 0%of budget Challenged dose event based on ED alarms Radmaterial event (defined as any rad <1 event 0 material outside RCA 2 100 CPM) I
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In 6 ,, .. . . April 14, 2004-Message from Outage Director Portal Monitor Alarm Event On April 12, an event occurred due to improper use of a portal monitor. A person using the portal monitor when exiting at the gatehouse caused a "procedure error" alarm and then continued to exit the site without properly repeating the use of the portal monitor. A procedure error alarm occurs if you exit the portal monitor prior to completion of the three second count time. The security personnel were unable to stop the individual prior to exiting the gatehouse and could not determine the identity of the person who caused the procedure error alarm.
The consequence of not properly using the portal monitors is the increased potential for spread of radioactive material offsite and to the public. Although this potential is fairly low, it is always present and is why we must use the portal monitors correctly as our last line of defense.
So how can all of us help to prevent this type of event from happening? The answer is to follow the correct procedure for use of the portal monitors (HP 1.1 1). If you cause an alarm, whether it is a procedure error alarm or an actual contamination alarm, stop and wait for security (at the gatehouse) or RP (at the RCA exit) to respond and assist you. If you notice the person just in front of you has caused an alarm, call them back to repeat use of the portal monitor.
Another way we can prevent this type of event is to prevent procedure error alarms from occurring. Since we have switched to the stand and count operation of the portal monitors, the primary cause of the procedure error alarm is when people move their heads to look up at the electronic display at the completion of the counting period. The device used in the portal monitor to sense if a person is present is very sensitive to motion, especially for tall people and those wearing hats. The best way to prevent the procedure error alarm is to keep your head perfectly still while using the portal monitor.
Here are some other ways to avoid "procedure error" alarms when using the portal monitors in the stand & count mode:
- 1. If you are wearing any type of hat including a hardhat, remove it and carry it with you through the portal monitor (this applies to the portal monitors at the gatehouse).
- 2. If you have a backpack, large lunch box, shoulder bag etc., please carry this item in front of you into the portal monitor.
If you have the item on your back or at your side, the item may cause an alarm as you exit the monitor due to the monitor sensing an item entering the frame as you exit.
- 3. When you stand in the monitor, please remain still and observe the LED display. It will tell you when the count is complete. If you move your head or lean forward or backwards it will sense the count being incomplete and cause an alarm.
- 4. Try not to anticipate the completion of the count because if you leave early you may cause an alarm.
Safety Snippet Improper storing can be more than annoying What are those yellow cabinets for? Remember to properly store all flammable chemicals in fire cabinets. These should be in properly labeled containers and the storage capacity of the cabinet should never be exceeded.
Human Performance CONTACT INFORMATION Validate Assumptions: CAP 51222, Unit 2 RHR Pump Control Room Emergency - x2911 Started on Mini-Recirc versus on the RWST EMT Pager 6442 The Operator started the RHR pump with the RWST suction valve shut as a result of a perceived time pressure to Work Control Center - x6703 accomplish a task. Significant contributors include poor OCC - x 7190- Option 1 procedure usage and inadequate peer checking due to weak prejob briefing of the supervisor joining the task at the last Lessons Learned - x7190 - Option 2 minute. Proper verification would have prevented this event.
Plant Status - x7190 - Option 3
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