ML20046B484

LER 93-006-00:on 930703,auxiliary Feedwater Signal Inadvertently Actuated Due to Personnel Error.Equipment Reset to Normal Lineup & Fuses Removed for Reinstallation Prior to Reactor startup.W/930730 Ltr

ML20046B484
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	07/30/1993
From:	William Cahill, Flores R, Walker R TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-93-006-01, LER-93-6-1, TXX-93268, NUDOCS 9308040273
Download: ML20046B484 (5)

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Log # TXX-93268 Z C File # 10200 TUELECTRIC Ref. # 10C F R50. 73 ( a )( 2 )( i v )

July 30, 1993 William J. Cahill, Jr.

Group Voce PreuJent

u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: b c m...c c,' 0 0,, t r oi Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES) - UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-446 MANUAL OR AUTOMATIC ACTUATION OF ANY ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 93-006-00 Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 93-006-00 for Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station Unit 2. " Personnel Error Leading to Inadvertent Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal" Sincerely, W '

f William J. Cahill, Jr.

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By: M

• Roger D. Walker Manager of Regulatory Affairs for Nuclear Production OB:tg Enclosure cc: Mr. J. L. Milhoan, Region IV Mr. L. A. Yandell, Region IV Resident Inspectors, CPSES (2) i 1

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' Enclosure to TXX-93268 hhC, FORM 366 V $. NVCLLAR hEGULA10hv COMMI590N APfHOVLD OMb NO.3tbO-0104 EXPlRES: 4/30/92 E STIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLE CTION REQUE ST: 50.0 HRS. F ORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) RE PORT S M AN AGE MENT BRANCH (P-530), U S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHfNGTON DC. 20555 AND TO THE PAPE RWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150'0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND DVDGET, WASHINGTON. DC. 20503.

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COMANCHE PEAK-UNIT 2 0l510l0l0l4l4l6 $! 1 or 4 PERSONELL ERROR LEADING TO INADVERTE..T AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SIGNAL 3..,u... s us or e s.,o,, o.,. a , o,,,.=,,,in.., m M or.m o., s. ...r s._. m - M on,n o., 4. . . . . . , _ oom., ,,--.

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I At 1340, on July 3, 1993, CPSES Unit 2 was in Mode 3 Hot Standby and preparing for a Unit 2 reactor startup. The fuses which allow for an Engineered Safety Feature  !

(ESF) auto start of the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were reinstalled. Since both main feedwater pumps had not been reset from the trip condition, the removal of the fuses caused an ESF signal. The corrective actions were to reset the equipment to normal lineup and remove the fuses, pending installation when required. Cognizant personnel were made aware of the oversight.

Enclosure to TXX-93268 NRC Foam 3664 UA huctI AA RIOstATORv cOMMISSiOh APPROVLD OMB NO 3150 0104 EXPlRES: 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) IESETiO8""E"ECI"7N RE UE ST: 5. RS. WAR TEXT CONTINUATION ^ "'

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010 2 OF 4 I. DESCRIPTION OF THE REPORTABLE EVENT A. REPORTABLE EVENT CLASSIFICATION An event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

B. PLANT OPERATING CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE EVENT On July 3, 1993, at 1340 CDT, Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) Unit 2 was in Mode 3, Hot Standby.

C. STATUS OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, OR COMPONENTS THAT WERE INOPERABLE AT THE START OF THE EVENT AND THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT There were no inoperable structures, systems or components that contributed to the event.

D. HARRATIVE

SUMMARY

OF THE EVENT, INCLUDING DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES On July 3, 1993, at 1335 CDT, CPSES Unit 2 was in Mode 3 in preparation for Unit 2 reactor startup. The Unit Supervisor (utility, licensed),

after reviewing the bubble chart from Integrated Plant Operating procedure (IPO)-002B, " Plant Startup from Hot Standby", determined that the Auxiliary Feedwater auto start fuses should be installed (since entry into Mode 2 was going to occur within the next hour).

The Unit Supervisor (US) instructed the Balance of Plant (BOP) Reactor Operator (RO) (utility, licensed) to reinstalled the fuses as required by IPO-002B step 5.1.30. The US and the B0P RO overlooked the caution statement written above the procedure step 5.1.30 (i.e., between the text of step 5.1.29 and 5.1.30). The caution statement states in part that at least one Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) (EIIS:(P)(SJ)) shall be reset prior to replacing the fuses to avoid an ESF actuation. The fuses were installed by the BOP RO. Since both MFPs were in the tripped condition, an ESF actuation signal occurred.

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Enclosure to TXX-93268 ksc F06M M6A u.s. NUCLEAR st GuLA106f COMM;55 ION APW10VED OMb NO.3150-0104 EXP RES: 4/30/92 LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) IJld%I5?ON""E8!"Ec7k"'!r7u?s'r ' s8 o"En's "?!"wItn's TEXT CONTINUATION MEEEN ]

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010 3 or 4 l 1..,u ....<. , ,w.- .u.- sace- usu.,on E. THE METHOD OF DISCOVERY OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE, OR PROCEDURAL OR PERSONNEL ERROR The BOP RO who installed the fuses noted the auto start signal was in due j to the MFPs which were in the trip position.

II. COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURES A. FAILED COMPONENT INFORMATION Not applicable - there were no component failures associated with this event.

B. FAILURE MODE, MECHANISM, AND EFFECT OF EACH FAILED COMPONENT Not applicable - there were no component failures associated with this event. ,

C. CAUSE OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM FAILURE Not applicable - there were no component failures associated with this event, )

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D. SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS THAT WERE AFFECTED BY FAILURES OF COMPONENTS WITH MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS Not applicable - there were no component failures associated with this event.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT I

A. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES THAT OCCURRED Both Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) (EIIS:(P)(BA)) pumps were already in operation. The AFW discharge valves tripped to auto and opened to a full 1 position. Steam Generator blowdown and sampling lines were isolated, and I the Condensate Storage Tank discharge valve to main condenser closed.

B. DURATION OF SAFETY SYSTEM TRAIN IN0PERABILITY There was no safety system train inoperability that resulted from this event.

En61osure to TXX-93268 uc ,c,w ma v.s. uvcu*s swwou comss oN AWRO ED 8 NO O0104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) IEEENON""EEEc7"N"'!Eu"ESTJ sEo"Els "?!"w'AR COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE To THE RECORDS AND TEXT CONTINUATlON  %$u"JS tor "^"^#"ss"IN.W.,TNofoPtte.

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C. SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EVENT A loss of normal feedwater resulting from pump failure, valve malfunction, or loss of offsite power leads to a reduction in the capability of the secondary system to remove heat generated in the I reactor core. These events are analyzed in section 15.2.7 of the CPSES l Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) which uses conservative assumptions  ;

in the analysis to minimize the energy removal capability of the i Auxiliary Feedwater system.

'1 The July 3, 1993 event occurred with the reactor shutdown. All systems <

and components functioned as designed. The event is bounded by the FSAR accident analysis which assumes an initial power level of 102 percent and ,

the worst single failure in the Auxiliary Feedwater system, for a loss of I feedwater event. )

IV. CAUSE OF THE EVENT The US and the BOP RO overlooked the caution statement while performing the required procedure step.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The plant equipment was reset to normal lineup and the fuses were removed for reinstallation prior to reactor startup. Operations Department management reemphasized to the US and BOP RO management's expectation concerning procedural usage. TU Electric's evaluation regarding the adequacy of the procedure did not identify any additional matters of concern.

VI. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS There have been no previous similar events at CPSES relating to resetting MFWPs during startup of the reactor.

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