IR 05000272/2011005

IR 05000272-11-005, 05000311-11-005: PSEG Nuclear LLG; 10/01/2011 - 12/31/2011; Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Routine Integrated Inspection Report

ML12037A009
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	02/03/2012
From:	Burritt A L Reactor Projects Branch 3
To:	Joyce T P Public Service Enterprise Group
BURRITT, AL
References
IR-11-005
Download: ML12037A009 (39)

Text

UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION I475 ALLENDALE ROADKING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406.1415February 3, 2012Mr. Thomas P. JoycePresident and Chief Nuclear OfficerPSEG Nuclear LLC - N09P.O. Box 236Hancock's Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 .NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT O5OOO272I2O11OO5 and0500031 1i201 1005

Dear Mr. Joyce:

On December 31 ,2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The enclosedinspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on January 12,2012,with Mr. Carl Fricker and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewedpersonnel.No findings were identified during this inspection.In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules ofPractice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be availableelectronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the PubliclyAvailable Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access andManagement System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site athttp://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).Docket Nos:License Nos:

Enclosure:

cc w/encl:Arthur L. Burritt, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 3Division of Reactor Prolects50-272;50-311DPR-70; DPR-75I nspection Report 0500027 21 20 1 1 005 and 050003 I 1 / 20 1 1 005

w/Attachment:

Supplemental I nformationDistribution via ListServ T. JoyceMr. Thomas P. JoycePresident and Chief Nuclear OfficerPSEG Nuclear LLC - N09P.O. Box 236Hancock's Bridge, NJ 08038SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 -NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT O5OOO272I2O11OO5 ANd0500031 1t2011005

Dear Mr. Joyce:

On December 31 ,2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed aninspection at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The enclosedinspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on January 12,2012,with Mr. Carl Fricker and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and'regulations and with the conditions of your license.The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewedpersonnel.No findings were identified during this inspection.In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules ofPractice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be availableelectronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the PubliclyAvailable Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access andManagement System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site athttp://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/Arthur L. Burritt, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 3Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos: 50-272;50-311License Nos: DPR-70; DPR-75

Enclosure:

lnspection Report 050002721201 1 005 and 0500031 1/201 1005

w/Attachment:

Supplemental I nformationcc w/encl: Distribution via ListServDistribution Mencl. See next pageSUNSI Review Gomplete: ALB (Reviewer's Initials)MLl2037A009DOCUMENT NAME: cIDRP\BRANCH3\Inspection\Reports\lssued\2011 (ROP 12)\SAL1105,docxAfter declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" lt W!!! be releaseo toTo receive a coDv of this document. indicate in the box: 'C"=Coov without attachmenvenclosure "E'=Copy withOFFICE mmtRI/DRPRI/DRPRI/DRPNAMEDSchroeder/ALB forLCline/ALB forABurritUALBDATE02t03 t1202t03 t1202103112COPYthe Public.

T. JoyceDistribution w/encl.W. Dean, RAD. Lew, DRAJ. Tappert, DRPJ. Clifford, DRPC. Miller, DRSP. Wilson, DRSA. Burritt, DRPL. Cline, DRPJ. Krafty, DRP, SRIA. Turilin, DRPC. Williams, DRP, RlK. McKenzie, DRP, OAR. Montgomery, DRPL. Chang, Rl OEDORidsNrrPMSalem ResourceRids NrrDorlLpll -2 ResourceROPreports Resource 1U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket Nos: 50-272,50-311License Nos: DPR-70, DPR-75Report No:Licensee:Facility:050002721201 1 005 and 0500031 1 1201 1005PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG)Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos, 1 and 2Location: P.O. Box 236Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038Dates:October 1, 2011 through December 31,2011Inspectors: D. Schroeder, Senior Resident InspectorP, McKenna, Resident InspectorT. Fish, Senior Operations EngineerJ. Furia, Senior Health PhysicistS. Hammann, Senior Health PhysicistT. Hedigan, Operations EngineerM. Modes, Senior Reactor InspectorD. Orr, Senior Reactor lnspectorS. Pindale, Senior Reactor InspectorJ. Schoppy, Senior Reactor InspectorApproved By: Arthur L. Burritt, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 3Division of Reactor ProjectsEnclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 0500027212011005, 0500031 112011005; 1010112011 - 121311201 1; Salem NuclearGenerating Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Routine lntegrated lnspection Report.The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, and announcedinspections by a regional radiation specialists and reactor engineers. The NRC's program foroverseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.No findings were identified.Enclosure

4

REPORT DETAILS

Summarv of Plant StatusSalem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 (Unit 1) began the period at 100 percent power. OnOctober 2, 2011, plant operators reduced power to 55 percent due to heavy river detritus, andincreased power to 90 percent on October 4. Operators returned Unit 1 to full power onOctober 10, after river conditions stabilized. Unit 1 was shutdown for a refueling outage onOctober 23. The refueling outage ended on November 22 when Unitl was synchronized to thegrid. Unit 1 reached 100 percent power on November 28. On December 5, operators reducedpower to 82 percent because of a main condenser tube leak. Operators returned Unit 1 to 100percent power on December 7. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power for the remainder of theperiod.Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 (Unit 2) began the period at 100 percent power. OnNovember 15, 2011, plant operators reduced power to 73 percent due to a planned 500 KV lineoutage. Operators returned Unit 2 to full power on November 16 after the 500 KV line wasrestored. UniI2 remained at 100 percent power for the remainder of the period.1. REAGTORSAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 1 sample)Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather ConditionsInsoection ScooeThe inspectors performed a review of PSEG's readiness for the onset of seasonal lowtemperatures. The review focused on the service water (SW) intake structure and theauxiliary feedwater (AFW) and primary water storage tanks. The inspectors reviewedthe Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications (TSs),control room logs, and the corrective action program (CAP) to determine whattemperatures or other seasonalweather could challenge these systems, and to ensurePSEG personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges, The inspectorsreviewed station procedures, including PSEG's seasonal weather preparation procedureand applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of theselected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge theoperability of the systems during cold weather conditions. Documents reviewed for eachsection of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment.FindinqsNo findings were identified..1b.Enclosure

1R04 Equipment Aliqnment

.1 Partial Walkdown (71111.04Q - 3 samples)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:Unit 1 (Mode 5) and Unit 2 (Mode 1), 1B, 1C,2A,28, and 2C emergency dieselgenerators (EDGs) while on a single source of oflsite electrical power on October 26Unit 2, 2A,28, and 2C EDGs while on a single source of offsite electrical power onNovember 9Unit 1 and Unit 2, redundant SW trains when 15 and 26 SW pumps were out ofservice (OOS) on November 28The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to thereactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewedapplicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, TSs, work orders,notifications, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains or equipmentin order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of theirintended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessibleportions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment werealigned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition ofthe components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that therewere no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether PSEG staff had properlyidentified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with theappropriate significance characterization.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the 12A component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger (HX)to determine its readiness and availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectorsreviewed the design basis for the component and verified PSEG's commitments to NRCGeneric Letter 89-13. The inspectors reviewed the results of previous inspections of the124 CCW and similar HXs. The inspectors discussed the results of the most recentinspection with engineering staff and reviewed pictures of the as-found and as-leftconditions. The inspectors verified that PSEG initiated appropriate corrective actions foridentified deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the number of tubes pluggedwithin the HX did not exceed the maximum amount allowed.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.1R08 Inservice Inspection (71111.08 - 1 sample)a. Inspection ScopeInservice inspection activities detect precursors to pressure boundary failures in reactorcoolant systems, emergency core cooling systems, risk-significant piping andcomponents, and containment systems. Degradation of pressure retaining componentsin these systems would result in a significant increase in risk. This inspection is intendedto assess the effectiveness of PSEG's program for monitoring degradation of vitalsystem boundaries.Non-destructive Examination and Weldinq ActivitiesThe inspectors observed the physical impediments to implementing the ultrasonicinspection of the 14 hotleg nozzle safe-end located in the "sandbox" enclosure. Theinspectors observed the calibration of the Phased-Array Ultrasonic Equipment prior tothe examination of the nozzle and reviewed the final report, including disposition of anindication discovered during a prior examination of the nozzle. The inspectors reviewedthe qualification of the personnel performing the examination.The inspectors observed the expanded area of inspection of the containment linerboundary and the containment liner in the area of the containment liner to floorintersection. PSEG was implementing an inspection program in conformance with theEnclosure

7American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code Section Xl Subsection lWE. Aspreviously reported, inspectors observed the areas subjected to ultrasonic examinationof the containment liner after removal of interior surface insulating panels. Theinspectors observed the prior inspection areas which had been remediated andrecoated. The additional panels removed during this outage allowed the inspectors toobserve an additional area of the as-found condition of the liner surface and compare itto the previous results.For component replacement work, the inspectors reviewed the replacement of afeedwater elbow due to flow-assisted-corrosion. The inspectors observed the location ofthe feedwater elbow in containment, and reviewed the replacement program andacceptance radiographs, The inspectors also reviewed the pre-service examination byPhased Array Ultrasonic Testing, including the calibration record and qualification ofpersonnel performing the examination.Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration lnspection ActivitiesNo inspections were performed by PSEG.Boric Acid Corrosion Control lnspection ActivitiesThe inspectors reviewed the photographic evidence of boric acid leaks and comparedthe evidence with the engineering evaluations, Also, the inspectors verified thatdegraded or non-conforming conditions are identified properly in PSEG's CAP.The inspectors observed the condition of pressurized components during a walk-down ofcontainment, interviewed the program manager, and independently reviewed theresolution of corrective actions taken as a consequence of the initial boric acid programwalkdowns.Steam Generator Tube lnspection ActivitiesNo inspections were performed by PSEG.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.1R1 1 Licensed Operator Requalification Proqram.1 Requalification Activities Review bv Resident Staff (71111 . 1 1 Q - 1 sample)a. lnspection ScopeThe inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training on November 30, 2011,which included a fire in the turbine building that caused a loss of 125VDC control powerto a vital bus, a loss of all circulating water, and a loss of secondary heat sink. Theinspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verifiedcompletion of risk significant operator actions, including the use of abnormal andemergency operating procedures. The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectivenesslEnclosure b.a.8of communications, implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plantconditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. Theinspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made bythe shift manager and the technical specification action statements entered by the shifttechnical advisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew andtraining staff to identify and document crew performance problems.FindinqsNo findings were identified.In-Office Review bv Reqional Specialist (71111.118 - 1 sample)lnspection ScopeThe following inspection activities were performed using NUREG-1021, "OperatorLicensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9, Supplement 1,f nspection Procedure Attachment71111.1 1, "Licensed Operator RequalificationProgram," Appendix A, "Checklist for Evaluating Facility Testing Material," and AppendixB, "Suggested Interview Topics."A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspectionreports, PSEG's CAP, and the most recent NRC plant issues matrix, The inspectorsalso reviewed specific events from PSEG's CAP that indicated possible trainingdeficiencies, to verify that they had been appropriately addressed. The senior residentinspector was also consulted for insights regarding licensed operators' performance.These reviews did not detect any operational events that were indicative of possibletraining deficiencies.The operating tests for the week of August 22,2011, were reviewed for quality andperformance.On October 31, 2011, the results of the annual operating tests for 201 1 were reviewed todetermine if pass/fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1021,"Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9,Supplement 1, and NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix l, "Operator RequalificationHuman Performance Significance Determination Process," (The comprehensive writtenexaminations were not administered this year,) The review verified the following:. Crew pass rate was greater than 80 percent. (Pass rate was 100 percent.). Individual pass rate on the dynamic simulator test was greater than 80 percent.(Pass rate was 100 percent.)r lndividual pass rate on the job performance measures (JPMs) of the operating examwas greater than 80 percent. (Pass rate was 97 percent.). More than 75 percent of the individuals passed all portions of the exam. (97 percentof the individuals passed all portions of the operating examination.)Observations were made of the dynamic simulator exams and JPMs administered duringthe week of August 22,2011. These observations included facility evaluations of crewEnclosure 9and individual performance during the dynamic simulator exams and individualperformance of five JPMs.A sample of records for requalification training attendance, license renewal, licensereactivation, maintenance of license proficiency, and medical examinations werereviewed for compliance with license conditions and NRC regulations.The remediation plan for an operator who failed the 2010 comprehensive written examwas reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the remedial training.Operators, instructors, and training/operations management were interviewed forfeedback on their training program and the quality of training received.Simulator performance and fidelity were reviewed for conformance to the reference plantcontrol room.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.

1R15 10the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectorsselected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safetycornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that PSEGpersonnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 60.65(aX4) and that theassessments were accurate and complete, When PSEG performed emergent work, theinspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk.The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results ofthe assessment with the station's probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions wereconsistent with the risk assessment, The inspectors also reviewed the TS requirementsand inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify riskanalysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.o Unit 1 and Unit 2, Control air ventilation in maintenance mode on October 17e Unit 2, Single source of offsite power during switchyard maintenance on October 26o Unit 2, Planned maintenance on 21 residual heat removal (RHR) pump, 21component cooling water (CCW) pump, 23 charging pump and 2l chiller with anextended maintenance period on 26 SW pump on December 1. Unit 2, 4 SW bay,25 containment fan cooler unit (CFCU), 22 chiller, 22 componentcooling heat exchanger (CCHX), and 22 CCW pump out of service for plannedmaintenance on December 12FindinqsNo findings were identified.Operabilitv Determinations and Functionalitv Assessments (71111.15 - 8 samples)a. lnspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:. 23 Chiller condenser recirculation pump not rotatingr 1B EDG manual voltage regulator degraded. SW system during 2011 grassing seasono 1A EDG secondary fuel oil filter alignment concern. SW motor operated butterfly valves high bearing frictionr CFCU motor cooler access plate non-conforming bolting. 28 VDC battery chargers non-conforming high voltage cardso 22 AFW steam generator inlet check valve (22AF23) required mechanical agitationto seatThe inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associatedcomponents and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of theoperability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified andthe subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognizedincrease in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria inthe appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to PSEG's evaluations to determinewhether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measureswere required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measuresEnclosure

11in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by PSEG. Theinspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitationsassociated with the evaluations.b. FindinssNo findings were identified,1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 1 sample).1 Permanent Modificationsa. lnspection SceeThe inspectors evaluated a modification to installthe 13 AFW pump turbine latch statusalarm, implemented by design change package 80102588, Auxiliary Feedwater PumpSteam Turbine Latch Status Alarm. The inspectors verified that the design bases,licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected system was not degraded bythe modification. ln addition, the inspectors reviewed modification documentsassociated with the upgrade and design change, including the design change package,the control room alarm response procedure, and the 50.59 screening review,FindinosNo findings were identified.Post-Maintenance Testinq (71111.19 - 7 samples)lnspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listedbelow to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability andfunctional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that theprocedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by themaintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent withthe information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and thatthe procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors alsowitnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequatelydemonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.. WO 30193555, 11SW127 outlet valve for 11 CCHX following planned maintenanceand inspections on October 31,2011. WO 30195333, 1B EDG following planned maintenance and inspections onNovember 3,2011o WO 30193149, 1A EDG following planned maintenance and inspections onNovember 8,2011. WO 30105272,13 turbine-driven AFW pump following planned maintenance onNovember 18,2011o WO 50133444, Rod drop timing test following refueling activities on November 18,2011Enclosure a.12. WO 60082194, 21CC16, outlet valve for 21 RHR HX following thermal overloadmaintenance on December 2,2011. WO 3Q177738, 1 1MS46 supply line check valve for 13 turbine-driven AFW pumpfollowing replacement of valve internals on November 29,2011The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test resultsadequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.1 R20 Refuelinq and Other Outaoe Activities (71111

.20 - 1 sample)lnsoection ScooeThe inspectors reviewed the station's work schedule and outage risk plan for the Unit 1maintenance and refueling outage (1R21), which was conducted October 23 throughNovember 22, 2Q11. The inspectors reviewed PSEG's development and implementationof outage plans and schedules to verify that risk, industry experience, previous site-specific problems, and defense-in-depth were considered. During the outage, theinspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitoredcontrols associated with the following outage activities:. Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth,commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance withthe applicable TSs when taking equipment OOSo lmplementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hungand that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associatedwork or testingr Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperatureinstruments to provide accurate indication and instrument error accountingo Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure thatTSs were meto Monitoring of decay heat removal operationsr lmpact of outage work on the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel poolcooling systemr Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternativemeans for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory losso Activities that could affect reactivity. Maintenance of secondary containment as required by TSsr Refueling activities, including fuel handling and fuel receipt inspectionsr Fatigue managementr Reactor start-up and plant heat-up activitiesr ldentification and resolution of problems related to refueling outage activitiesFindinosNo findings were identified.b.1Enclosure

131R22 Surveillance Testino (71111'22 - 3 samples)a. Inspection ScoPeThe inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data ofselected risk-significant S'SCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR'and pSEG procedure requirements, The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteriawere clear, tests demonsirated operational readiness and were consistent with designdocumentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and accuracyfor the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites ..were satisfieJ. upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test resultssupported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. Theinspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:. 51. OP-ST.SSp-006, Engineered Safety Features Containment lsolation ValvesPhase "B" (Main steam and core Spray) Test on October 27,2011. S1.Op,ST.bJ-0020, Periodic Leakage Test-Reactor Coolant lsolation Valves onNovember 17,2011. 51.OP-ST.AF-0003, Inservice Testing ' 13 AFW Pump on December 21b. FindinqsNo findings were identified'2. RADIATION SAFEWCornerstone: Radiation Safety - Public and Occupational2RS1 Radioloqical Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)a. Inspection ScopeDuring the period of October 31,2011, through November 4,2011, the inspectorsreviewed PSEG performance indicators (Pls) for the Occupation Exposure cornerstonefor follow-up. The inspectors reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits'The inspectors reviewed reports of operational occurrences related to occupationalradiation safety since the last inspection'The inspectors reviewed PSEG's procedures and records to verify that the radiationdetection instrumentation was used at its typical sensitivity level based on appropriatecounting parameters.The inspectors selected two sealed sources from PSEG's inventory records thatpresented the greatest radiological risk. The inspectors verified that sources areaccounted for and had been verified to be intact.The inspectors verified that any transactions involving nationally tracked sources werereported in accordance with 10 CFR 20'2207 .Enclosure 14During tours of the facility and review of ongoing work, the inspectors evaluated ambientradiological conditions and verified that existing conditions were consistent with postedsurveys, radiation work permits (RWPs), and worker briefings, as applicable.During job performance observations, the inspectors verified the adequacy ofradiological controls, such as required suryeys, radiation protection job coverage, andcontamination controls. The inspectors evaluated PSEG's means of using electronicpersonnel dosimeters in high noise areas as high radiation area (HRA) monitoringdevices.The inspectors verified that radiation monitoring devices were placed on the individual'sbody consistent with the method that PSEG was employing to monitor dose fromexternal radiation sources. The inspectors verified that the dosimeter was placed in thelocation of highest expected dose or that PSEG was properly employing an NRC-approved method of determining effective dose equivalent.For high-radiation work areas with significant dose rate gradients (a factor of five ormore), the inspectors reviewed the application of dosimetry to effectively monitorexposure to personnel.The inspectors reviewed RWPs for work within airborne radioactivity areas with thepotentialfor individual worker internal exposures. The inspectors evaluated airborneradioactive controls and monitoring, including potentials for significant airbornecontamination, For these selected airborne radioactive material areas, the inspectorsverified barrier integrity and temporary high-efficiency particulate air ventilation systemoperation.The inspectors examined PSEG's physical and programmatic controls for highlyactivated or contaminated materials stored within spent fuel and other storage pools.The inspectors verified that appropriate controls were in place to preclude inadvertentremoval of these materials from the pool.The inspectors conducted selective inspections of posting and physical controls forHRAs and very HRAs, to the extent necessary to verify conformance with theOccupational Safety Pls.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.2RS2 OccupationalAs Low as Reasonablf Achievable (ALARA) Planninq and Controls(71124.02)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors verified that problems associated with ALARA planning and controlswere being identified by PSEG at an appropriate threshold and were properly addressedfor resolution in their CAP.Enclosure

2RS3 15b.a.FindinosNo findings were identified.In-Plant Airborne Radioactivitv Control and Mitiqation

Inspection ScopeThe inspectors verified that PSEG provided respiratory protective devices such thatoccupational doses are ALAM. As available, the inspectors selected work activitieswhere respiratory protection devices were used to limit the intake of radioactivematerials, and verified that PSEG performed an evaluation concluding that furtherengineering controls were not practical and that the use of respirators was ALAM. Theinspectors verified that PSEG had established means to verify that the level of protectionprovided by the respiratory protection devices during use was at least as good as thatassumed in PSEG's work controls and dose assessment.The inspectors verified that respiratory protection devices used to limit the intake ofradioactive materials were certified by the National lnstitute for Occupational Safety andHealth/Mine Safety and Health Administration (NIOSH/MSHA) or had been approved bythe NRC. The inspectors selected work activities where respiratory protection deviceswere used and verified that the devices were used consistent with their NIOSH/MSHAcertification.The inspectors reviewed records of air testing for supplied-air devices and self-containedbreathing apparatus (SCBA) bottles. The inspectors verified that air used in thesedevices met or exceeded Grade D quality. The inspectors verified that plant breathingair supply systems met the minimum pressure and airflow requirements for the devicesin use.The inspectors selected individuals qualified to use respiratory protection devices, andverified that they had been deemed fit to use the device(s) by a physician.The inspectors selected individuals assigned to wear a respiratory protection device andobserved them donning, removing, and functionally checking the device as appropriate.The inspectors verified that these individuals knew how to safely use the device and howto properly respond to any device malfunction or unusual occurrence. The inspectorsreviewed training curricula for users of the devices.The inspectors chose respiratory protection devices staged and ready for use in theplant or stocked for issuance for use. The inspectors observed the physical condition ofthe device components and reviewed records of routine inspection for each. Theinspectors selected a sampling of the devices and reviewed records of maintenance onthe vital components. The inspectors verified that onsite personnel assigned to repairvital components had received vendor-provided training.Based on the FSAR, TSs, and emergency operating procedure requirements, theinspectors reviewed the status and surveillance records of SCBAs staged in-plant foruse during emergencies, The inspectors observed PSEG's capability for refilling andEnclosure 16transporting SCBA air bottles to and from the control room and operations supportcenter during emergency conditions.The inspectors selected individuals on control room shift crews and individuals fromdesignated departments currently assigned emergency duties and determined thatcontrol room operators and other emergency response and radiation protectionpersonnel were trained and qualified in the use of SCBAS. The inspectors determinedthat personnel assigned to refill bottles were trained and qualified for that task.The inspectors verified that appropriate mask sizes and types were available for use.The inspectors selected on-shift operators and verified that they had no facial hair thatwould interfere with the sealing of the mask to the face. The inspectors also verified thatvision correction did not penetrate the face seal.The inspectors reviewed the past two years of maintenance records for SCBA units usedto support operator activities during accident conditions and designated as "ready forservice." The inspectors verified that any maintenance or repairs on an SCBA unit's vitalcomponents were performed by an individual, or individuals, certified by themanufacturer of the device to perform the work. The inspectors reviewed the onsitemaintenance procedures governing vital component work, and identified anyinconsistencies with the SCBA manufacturer's recommended practices, For thoseSCBAs designated as "ready for seryice," the inspectors ensured that the required,periodic air cylinder hydrostatic testing was documented and up to date, and the retestair cylinder markings required by the U.S. Department of Transportation were in place.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.2RS5 Radiation Monitorinq lnstrumentation (71124.05)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed PSEG staff performance as they demonstrated source checksfor various types of portable survey instruments. The inspectors determined that high-range instruments are source checked on all appropriate scales.The inspectors walked down area radiation monitors and continuous air monitors todetermine whether they are appropriately positioned relative to the radiation source(s) orarea(s)they are intended to monitor.The inspectors selected personnel contamination monitors, portal monitors, and smallarticle monitors and verified that the periodic source checks were performed inaccordance with the manufacturer's recommendations and PSEG procedures.The inspectors reviewed the methods and sources used to perform whole body counter(WBC) functional checks before daily use of the instrument. The inspectors determinedthat check sources were appropriate and align with the plant's isotopic mix.Enclosure 17The inspectors reviewed WBC calibration reports completed since the last inspection toverify that calibration sources were representative of the plant source term and thatappropriate calibration phantoms were used.The inspectors selected samples of each type of instruments used on site, and verifiedthat the alarm setpoint values were reasonable under the circumstances to ensure thatlicensed material is not released from the site. The inspectors reviewed calibrationdocumentation for each instrument selected above and discussed the calibrationmethods with PSEG to determine consistency with the manufacturer'srecommendations.The inspectors reviewed calibration documentation for at least one of each type ofinstrument. For portable survey instruments and area radiation monitors, the inspectorsreviewed detector measurement geometry and calibration methods, and had PSEGdemonstrate use of its instrument calibrator.The inspectors selected portable survey instruments that did not meet acceptancecriteria during calibration or source checks and verified that PSEG had taken appropriatecorrective action for instruments found significantly out of calibration. The inspectorsverified that PSEG had evaluated the possible consequences of instrument use sincethe last successful calibration or source check.The inspectors reviewed the current output values for PSEG's portable survey andambient air monitor instrument calibrator units. The inspectors verified that PSEGperiodically measured calibrator output over the range of the instruments used throughmeasurements by ion chamber/electrometer.The inspectors verified that the measuring devices had been calibrated by a facility usingNational Institute of Standards and Technology traceable sources and that correctionfactors for these measuring devices were properly applied by PSEG in its outputverification.The inspectors reviewed PSEG's 10 CFR Part 61 , "Licensing Requirements for LandDisposal of Radioactive Waste," source term to determine if the calibration sources usedwere representative of the types and energies of radiation encountered in the plant,b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.2RS8 Radioactive Solid Waste Processinq and Radioactive Material Handlinq. Storaoe. andTransportation (7 I 124.08)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the solid radioactive waste system description in the FSAR, theProcess Control Program (PCP), and the recent radiological effluent release report forinformation on the types, amounts, and processing of radioactive waste disposed.Enclosure 18The inspectors reviewed the scope of any quality assurance (QA) audits in this areasince the last inspection to gain insights into PSEG's performance and inform the "smartsampling" inspection planning.The inspectors selected areas where containers of radioactive waste were stored, andverified that the containers were labeled in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1904, "LabelingContainers," or controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1905, "Exemptions to LabelingRequirements," as appropriate.The inspectors verified that the radioactive materials storage areas were controlled andposted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20, "Standards forProtection against Radiation." For materials stored or used in the controlled orunrestricted areas, the inspectors verified that they were secured against unauthorizedremoval and controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1801, "Security of StoredMaterial," and 10 CFR 20.1802, "Control of Material Not in Storage," as appropriate.The inspectors verified that PSEG had established a process for monitoring the impactof long{erm storage (e.9., buildup of any gases produced by waste decomposition,chemical reactions, container deformation, loss of container integrity, or re-release offree-flowing water) sufficient to identify potential unmonitored, unplanned releases ornon-conformance with waste disposal requirements, The inspectors selected containersof stored radioactive materials and verified that there were no signs of swelling, leakage,and deformation.The inspectors selected liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems, andwalked down accessible portions of systems to verify and assess that the current systemconfiguration and operation agreed with the descriptions in the FSAR, offsite dosecalculation manual (ODCM), and the PCP.The inspectors selected radioactive waste processing equipment that was notoperational and/or was abandoned in place, and verified that PSEG had establishedadministrative and/or physical controls to ensure that the equipment would not contributeto an unmonitored release path and/or affect operating systems or be a source ofunnecessary personnelexposure. The inspectors verified that PSEG had reviewed thesafety significance of systems and equipment abandoned in place in accordance with 10CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments."The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of any changes made to the radioactive wasteprocessing systems since the last inspection. The inspectors verified that changes fromwhat is described in the FSAR were reviewed and documented in accordance with 10CFR 50.59, as appropriate.The inspectors selected processes for transferring radioactive waste resin and/or sludgedischarges into shipping/disposal containers, The inspectors verified that the wastestream mixing, sampling procedures, and methodology for waste concentrationaveraging were consistent with the PCP, and provided representative samples of thewaste product for the purposes of waste classification as described in 10 CFR 61.55,"Waste Classification."Enclosure 19For those systems that provide tank recirculation, the inspectors verified that the tankrecirculation procedure provides sufficient mixing.The inspectors verified that PSEG's PCP correctly described the current methods andprocedures for dewatering and waste,The inspectors selected radioactive waste streams, and verified that PSEG'sradiochemical sample analysis results were sufficient to support radioactive wastecharacterization as required by 10 CFR Part 61, "Licensing Requirements for LandDisposal of Radioactive Waste." The inspectors verified that PSEG's Llse of scalingfactors and calculations, to account for difficult-to-measure radionuclides, wastechnically sound and based on current 10 CFR Part 61 analyses.For the waste streams selected above, the inspectors verified that changes to plantoperational parameters were taken into account to (1) maintain the validity of the wastestream composition data between the annual or biennial sample analysis update, and (2)verify that waste shipments continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 61 .The inspectors verified that PSEG had established and maintained an adequate QAprogram to ensure compliance with the waste classification and characterizationrequirements of 10 CFR 61.55 and 10 CFR 61.56, "Waste Characteristics."The inspectors observed shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding,vehicle checks, emergency instructions, disposal manifest, shipping papers provided tothe driver, and PSEG verification of shipment readiness, The inspectors verified that therequirements of any applicable transport cask certificate of compliance had been met.The inspectors verified that the receiving licensee was authorized to receive theshipment packages.The inspectors observed radiation workers during the conduct of radioactive wasteprocessing and radioactive material shipment preparation and receipt activities. Theinspectors determined that the shippers were knowledgeable of the shipping regulationsand that shipping personnel demonstrated adequate skills to accomplish the packagepreparation requirements for public transport with respect to PSEG's response to NRCBulletin 79-19, "Packaging of Low-Level Radioactive Waste for Transport and Burial,"dated August 10,1979, and 49 CFR Part 172,"Hazardous Materials Table, SpecialProvisions, Hazardous Materials Communication, Emergency Response lnformation,Training Requirements, and Security Plans," Subpart H, "Training." The inspectorsverified that PSEG's training program provided training to personnel responsible for theconduct of radioactive waste processing and radioactive material shipment preparationactivities.The inspectors selected non-excepted package shipment records and verified that theshipping documents indicated the proper shipper name; emergency responseinformation and a ?4-hour contact telephone number; accurate curie content and volumeof material; and appropriate waste classification, transport index, and UN number. Theinspectors verified that the shipment placarding was consistent with the information inthe shipping documentation.Enclosure 20The inspectors verified that problems associated with radioactive waste processing,handling, storage, and transportation were being identified by PSEG at an appropriatethreshold, were properly characterized, and were properly addressed for resolution intheir CAP. The inspectors verified the appropriateness of the corrective actions for aselected sample of problems documented by PSEG that involved radioactive wasteprocessing, handling, storage, and transportation.The inspectors reviewed the results of selected audits performed since the lastinspection of this program and evaluated the adequacy of PSEG's corrective actions forissues identified during those audits.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.4.

4OA1 Performance lndicator (Pl) Verification

.1 Mitioatino Svstems Performance lndex (4 samples)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals of the Mitigating Systems Performance Indexfor the following systems for the period of October 1,2010 through September 30,2011:r Unit 1 High pressure injection systemsr Unit 2 High pressure injection systemse Unit 1 Emergency AC powero Unit 2 Emergency AC powerTo determine the accuracy of the Pl data reported during those periods, the inspectorsused definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02,"Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6. The inspectorsalso reviewed PSEG CAP records, control room operators' logs, the site operatinghistory database, and key Pl records to validate the accuracy of the submittals.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2 Occupational Radiation Safetv Cornerstone (1 sample)a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed a listing of PSEG action reports for issues related to theoccupational radiation safety Pl, which measures non-conformances with HRAs greaterthan one Roentgen/hour (FVhr) and unplanned personnel exposures greater than 100millirem (mrem) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE), 5 rem skin dose equivalent(SDE), 1

.5 rem lens dose equivalent (LDE), or 100 mrem to the unborn child,Enclosure

21.3a.The inspectors determined if any of these Pl events involved dose rates >25 Ri./hr at 30centimeters or >500 R/hr at one meter. lf so, the inspectors determined what barriershad failed and if there were any barriers left to prevent personnel access. Forunintended exposures >100 mrem TEDE (or >5 rem SDE or >1.5 rem LDE), theinspectors determined if there were any overexposures or substantial potential foroverexposure. The inspectors determined that no Pl events for the occupationalradiation safety cornerstone had occurred during the assessment period.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Public Radiation Safetv Cornerstone (1 sample)Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed a listing of PSEG action reports for the issues related to thepublic radiation safety Pl, which measures radiological effluent release occurrences persite that exceed 1.5 mrem/quarter (qtr)whole body or 5 mrem/qtr organ dose for liquideffluents; or 5 millirads (mrads)/qtr gamma air dose, 10 mrads/qtr beta air dose; or 7

.5 mrems/qtr organ doses from lodine-131 , lodine-133, Hydrogen-3, and particulates forgaseouse effluents. The inspectors determined that no Pl events for the public radiationsafety cornerstone had occurred during the assessment period.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Problem ldentification and Resolution (71152 - 2 annual samples; 1 trend sample)Routine Review of Problem ldentification and Resolution ActivitiesInspection ScopeAs required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Problem ldentification and Resolution," theinspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plantstatus reviews to verify that PSEG entered issues into the CAP at an appropriatethreshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified andaddressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitiveequipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectorsperformed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attendeddaily management review committee meetings.FindinosNo findings were identified.b.4c.42.1a.b.Enclosure

22,2Semi-annual Trend SampleInspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by InspectionProcedure 71152, "Problem ldentification and Resolution," to identify trends that mightindicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectorsincluded repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by PSEGoutside of the CAP, such as trend reports, Pls, major equipment problem lists, systemhealth reports, maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance or CAP backlogs. Theinspectors also reviewed PSEG's CAP database for the six month period of June 1,201 1 through November 30, 2011 to assess condition reports written on equipmentproblems, and human performance issues, as well as individual issues identified duringthe NRCs daily condition report review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed thequarterly trend report for the third quarter of 2Q11 to verify that PSEG personnel wereappropriately evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordance with applicableprocedures.Findinqs and ObservationsNo findings were identified.The inspectors noted a negative trend in the reliability and availability of the circulatingwater pumps and traveling screens. During the review period, there have been multipleinstances of entries by the plant operators into abnormal procedures following theremoval of two or more circulating water pumps from service. Reactor power wasreduced several times to comply with procedure requirements that prevent excessiveheat load on the main condenser while operating with reduced cooling capacityassociated with reduced circulating water flow. River detritus levels were elevatedfollowing Hurricane lrene, increasing the wear and challenging the reliability of thetraveling water screens.During the fall refuel outage of Unit 1, a design change was enacted in an effort toimprove the circulating water screen differential level indication, by installing radar typeof level indicators. The design change that installed the new level indicators caused anissue that affected the circulating water screens, which depend on the differential levelcircuitry for speed control and protection. There was degradation of circulating waterscreen baskets caused by slow reaction of the new differential level monitors, whichcontributed to unavailability of circulating water screens. PSEG has a team dedicated tothe improvement of the circulating water system and associated traveling water screens,Installation of extended screen wash discharge piping is being installed to reduce therecirculation of detritus on the circulating water screens. Upgrades to this system will bemonitored during and after the completion of these projects.b.Enclosure

.323 Annual Sample: Review of the Operator Workaround ProqramInspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the existing operator workarounds,operator burdens, existing operator aids and disabled alarms, and open main controlroom deficiencies to identify any effect on emergency operating procedure operatoractions, and any impact on possible initiating events and mitigating systems. Theinspectors evaluated whether station personnel had identified, assessed, and reviewedoperator workarounds as specified in Salem procedure OP-AA-102-103, "OperatorWorkaround Program."The inspectors reviewed PSEG's process to identify, prioritize, and resolve main controlroom distractions to minimize operator burdens. The inspectors reviewed the systemused to track these operator workarounds and recent PSEG self-assessments of theprogram. The inspectors also toured the control room and discussed the currentoperator workarounds with the operators to ensure the items were being addressed on aschedule consistent with their relative safety significance.Findinqs and ObservationsNo findings were identified.The inspectors identified some minor inconsistencies between the operators burdenprogram and operator workaround program procedures. These included inconsistenciesin the use of terms such as "burdens," "challenges," and "concerns." In addition, thecodes used to identify operator burdens in the computerized work management systemwere not consistent with the codes identified in procedure OP-AA-102-103-1001 ,"Operator Burdens Program." Finally, although there were no open workarounds foreither unit, the operator burdens list generated from the work management systemincorrectly characterized one of the items as an operator workaround. The inspectorsconfirmed that the identified tracking deficiencies in the operator burden and workaround programs did not affect emergency operating procedure operator actions, oradversely affect the objectives of the initiating events and mitigating systemscornerstones; and therefore determined that the issues were minor. The inspectorsdiscussed these items with Operations management, who informed the inspectors of thestatus of an ongoing self-assessmenUimprovement effort associated with the operatorburdens program. The minor discrepancies identified by the inspectors are planned tobe considered in PSEG's ongoing self-assessment effort.Annual Sample: Process Radiation Monitorinq Svstem ReliabilityInspection ScopeThe inspectors performed an in-depth review of PSEG's review, analysis, and correctiveactions associated with several notifications regarding reliability issues of the processradiation monitors (PRMs) installed in Salem Units 1 and 2. The inspection specificallyincluded a review of all TS or ODCM limiting condition for operation entries beginningwith October 2Q10 and in-depth evaluations of the following issues:b..4Enclosure

24. Repetitive Unit 1 containment air particulate detector (APD) paper drive failures. Repetitive Unit 2 steam generator blowdown (SGBD) PRM scintillation detectorfailureso Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW PRM reliability issues with corrosion, fouling, and airentrainment. Unit 1 and Unit 2 main steam line (MSL) post accident PRM spiking issueThe inspectors assessed PSEG's problem identification threshold, cause analyses,extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timelinessof corrective actions to determine whether PSEG was appropriately identifying,characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether theplanned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared theactions taken to the requirements of PSEG's CAP and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Inaddition, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and interviewed engineeringpersonnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions.FindinosNo findings were identified.PSEG determined the apparent cause of each specific PRM issue listed above andappropriately implemented the maintenance rule program evaluation criteria as well astimely and long term corrective actions:. The Unit 1 containment APD issues were related to poor maintenance practices andprocedure quality issues. PSEG trained maintenance technicians, revisedmaintenance procedures to address the specific paper drive failure, and initiated adesign change modification to a paper drive model that was less susceptible to thespecific failure mechanism.The Unit 2 SGBD PRM detector failures were identified through laboratory testing tobe related to corrosion of the detector. Specifically, the internal nickel coating of thealuminum casing was damaged during shipment and the aluminum reacted with theinternal elements of the scintillation detector. PSEG contacted the vendor and theycommitted to removing the detector from its casing and packing it separately prior toshipment. PSEG also accelerated surveillance testing of the Unit 2 SGBD PRMs toverify the issue was resolved and no further corrosion issues existed.The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW PRM long term reliability issues were caused by improperselection of materials for the SW environment, air entrainment introduced fromcirculating water at the main condenser water boxes, and SW detritus and silt,PSEG was not successful at resolving each of these issues for the installed PRMsand the long term solution intended is a PRM that that uses a proximity radiationmonitor inserted into the SW outfall. Interim compensatory sampling is performeduntilthe permanent plant modification is installed and operational. The inspectorsverified PSEG intended to install the SW PRM modification in the near future.The Unit 1 and Unit 2 MSL PRM spiking issues were caused by calibrationmethodology and procedure instructions. During calibrations, maintenancetechnicians measured the background to offset or subtract from the instrument alarmsetpoint using a reading from the installed MSL PRM. This reading was susceptibleto instrument drift affected by ambient temperature. As ambient temperatureincreased, the instrument reading could increase as much as 3 mrem/hr for theEnclosure 25temperature swings within the installed plant areas. lf the nominal 10 mrem/hr alarmsetpoint was established during the winter months, a small background would bedetermined and a low offset would be subtracted from the alarm setpoint duringcalibration. Subsequently during the summer months, the PRM may spike above itsestablished setpoint as the instrument drifts due to the temperature effects.Likewise, if the instrument were calibrated in the summer, a nonconservative largebackground offset would be subtracted from the instrument alarm setpoint. PSEGverified with the vendor that background measurement using an external radiationmonitoring instrument was an acceptable calibration methodology and wouldeliminate the temperature error introduced during calibration. PSEG revised itscalibration procedures. PSEG also completed a technical evaluation of the MSLPRM operability and determined that all MSL PRMs remained operable as calibratedwith the previous methodology and for the temperatures at which they werecalibrated.The inspectors determined PSEG's response to all reviewed PRM issues werecommensurate with the safety significance, timely, and included appropriatecompensatory and corrective actions. The inspectors determined that the actions takento improve reliability of the PRM system were appropriate.4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - 2 samples).1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000272/201 1-004-0, 1 1 Component CoolingWater Pump Inoperable For Greater Than Allowed By Technical SpecificationsOn August 22,2011, during the performance of rounds, an equipment operator foundone of the two outboard pedestal mounting bolts for the 11 CCW pump dislodged andthe other outboard mounting bolt was backed out approximately 1 inch. At 0217, the 1 1CCW pump was declared inoperable and Technical Specification Action Statement(TSAS) 3.7.3.1was entered. The 11 CCW pump was in service at the time of discovery,The pump was stopped and the 12 CCW pump placed in service. The 11 CCW pumppedestal bolts were replaced and torqued. The 11 CCW pump was retestedsatisfactory. The pump was returned to operable status on August 23,2011, at 0057hours and TSAS 3.7.3.1 exited.The cause of the loose bolting was the original vendor supplied pedestal bolting was notadequately torqued during factory assembly of the 11 CCW pump and pedestal. Oncetorqued properly the bolts should have remained captured due to adequate bolt stretchand preload. Corrective actions include replacement and torque of the 11 CCW pumppedestal bolts, a walkdown of the similar type pumps (CCW, Containment Spray, andSpent Fuel Cooling), and the validation of pedestal bolts torque values for theContainment Spray, Spent Fuel Cooling, and the remaining CCW pumps. Theinspectors completed a review of this LER and verified a violation of TS 3.7.3.1,Component Cooling Water System. The inspectors determined that this was a minorviolation because a single pump of a three pump system was inoperable for seismicqualification only, and did not impact the availability of the pump for non-seismic events.This LER is closed.Enclosure 26.2 (Closed) LER 0500031 1/201 1-005-1, Completion of Plant Shutdown in Accordance withTechnical Specification 3.0.3At 8:38 PM on July 14, 2011 , during the performance of the Salem Unit 2 EmergencyCore Cooling System fill and vent monthly surveillance test, a leakage path wasidentified from the Boron Injection Tank (BlT) relief valve 2SJ10 piping. Investigationdetermined that the leakage was approximately 15 gallons per minute' due to lifting ofthe 2SJ10 relief valve. Upon closure of the BIT inlet valve 2SJ4 to isolate the flowthrough the relief valve, a through wall socket weld crack developed on the 2SJ10 reliefvalve inlet piping. The BIT is part of the flow path of the high head safety injectionsystem. Without the high head safety injection flow path operable, TS 3.0.3 wasentered.The 2SJ10 relief valve lifting was the result of missed opportunities to correct acomponent design application deficiency. The socket weld cracking was determined bylaboratory analysis to be caused by a combination of fatigue and transgranular stresscorrosion cracking. The affected 2SJ10 piping has been replaced with a new straightrun of pipe and the relief valve internals were replaced, PSEG plans to issue a designchange to resolve 1l2SJ10 operating margin, eliminate unnecessary non-isolatablesocket welds in the BIT system and replace the remaining non-isolatable socket welds inthe BIT system with low carbon weld filler and install a stiffener on the 2SJ10 relief valvepiping. The inspectors completed a review of this LER and identified no additionalviolations of regulatory requirements. Two violations associated with this issue werepreviously documented in NRC Inspection Report 0500031112011004 as Green findings.This LER is closed.4OA5 Other Activities.1 Temporarv Instruction 2515/179. "Verification of Licensee Response to NRCRequirement for lnventories of Materials Tracked in the National Source TrackinoSvstem (NSTS) Pursuant to 10 CFR 20.2207"a. Inspection ScopeThe inspectors verified the information listed on PSEG's inventory record by performinga physical inventory, at PSEG's facility, and visually identified each item listed on theirinventory.During the physical inventory, the inspectors examined the physical condition of devicesand/or containers containing nationally tracked sources; evaluated the effectiveness ofPSEG's procedures for secure storage and handling of nationally tracked sources;discussed PSEG maintenance of devices containing nationally tracked sources,including leak rate tests and verified that PSEG is performing maintenance as required;and determined that the posting and labeling of nationally tracked sources wasadequate.The inspectors reviewed PSEG records documenting transactions of subject sources,and compared these records with the data from PSEG's NSTS inventory. Theinspectors evaluated the effectiveness of PSEG procedures for updating inventoryrecords.Enclosure 27b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2 Seismic Restraints in an Independent Spent Fuel Storaqe Installation (lSFSl) Campaion(60855,1)a. lnspection ScopeThe inspection scope was limited to Salem's use of seismic restraints in an independentspent fuel storage installation (lSFSl) campaign. During July and August 2011, Salemconducted a campaign loading spent fuel assemblies into casks for their lSFSl. Duringthis loading campaign, Salem used seismic restraints, which had not been used in priorloading campaigns. The seismic restraints were used during the stack-up evolution inwhich the HI-TRAC, with the multi-purpose canister (MPC) inside, is placed on top of theHI-STORM and the MPC is lowered from the HI-TRAC into the HI-STORM. Theinspectors interviewed the ISFSI project manager, cask vendor representative, membersof the radiation protection staff, and contract employees performing the stack-upevolution. The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing and observed the use of theseismic restraints during the stack-up evolution. The inspectors also observed membersof the radiation protection staff providing job coverage for the dry cask loadingcampaign. The inspectors reviewed the procedure, which includes the use of seismicrestraints, as well as the 10 CFR 72.48 screening determination for the seismicrestraints. NRC engineers reviewed the seismic calculations and Holtec Internationaldrawings that were submitted August 1, August 22, September 21, and October 29,2011.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.4OAO Meetinqs, Includinq ExitThe inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C. Fricker and other members ofPSEG management at the conclusion of the inspection on January 12,2012. Theinspectors asked PSEG whether any materials examined during the inspection wereproprietary. No proprietary information was identified.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

C. Fricker, Site Vice President

L. Wagner, Plant Manager

J. Kandasamy, Regulatory Affairs Manager

R. Wegner, Maintenance Director

L. Rajkowski, Engineering Director

J. Garecht, Operations Director

H. Berrick, Regulatory Assurance

B. Thomas, Regulatory Assurance

T. Giles, lSl Program Manager

S. Taylor, Radiation Protection Manager

M. Straubmuller, Outage Manager

J. Sears, Work Management Director

M. Oliveri, NDE Manager

C. Covik, Boric Acid Program Manager

J. Carney, Operations Training Manager

E. Powell, Operations Services Manager

D. Boyle, Salem Maintenance Rule Coordinator

A. Johnson, Senior Manager Design Engineering

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed0500027212011-004-0 LER 11 Component Cooling Water PumpInoperable for Greater Than Allowed ByTechnical Specifications (Section 4OA3. 1 )0500031112011-005-1 LER Completion of Plant Shutdown inAccordance with Technical Specification3.0,3 (Section 4OA3.2)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

In addition to the documents identified in the body of this report, the inspectors reviewed thefollowing documents and records:

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather ProtectionProceduresSC.MD-GP .ZZ-0001, Station Preparations for Winter - Mechanical, Revision 7SC.MD-GP.ZZ-0178, Station Preparation for Winter - Electrical, Revision 19SC.OP-AB .ZZ-0001, Adverse Environmental Conditions, Revision 1 4Attachment

A-2SC.OP-PT.ZZ-0002, Station Preparations for Seasonal Conditions, Revision 1 1SH.FP-TI.FP-0001, Freeze Prevention and Winter Readiness of Fire Protection Systems,Revision 4WC-AA-107, Seasonal Readiness, Revision 11Notifications (NRC identified)20463019

20529311

20529409

20529415

20529624 2052964220529726

20530597

20531988

20532150

20534447 2053359220533596 20539069.Orders30203121

70105856 70125429Other DocumentsSVP-2011-012, Salem Winter Seasonal Readiness Affirmation, dated 11101110

Section 1R04: Equipment AlisnmentProceduresS1.OP-ST.SW-0001, Service Water Pump Operation, Revision 26S1.OP-ST.SW-0005, Service Water System Operation, Revision 38S1.OP-ST.SW-0013, Service Water Valve Verification Modes

1-4, Revision 1Drawinos205242Notifications20361858

20520716

20524882

20536478

20536484 2053649520537003

20537161

20537164 20537223Orders30079324 30193555Other DocumentsWork Clearance Documents

4302350,

4305861 ,

4306754,4306759, & 4307563

Section 1R05: Fire ProtectionProceduresFRS-Il-411, Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, Reactor Plant Auxiliary Equipment Area,Elevations: 45'& 55', Revision 2FRS-Il-441, Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, Relay and Battery Rooms, and Corridor,Elevation: 100', Revision 7FRS-Il-511, Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, Electrical Penetration Area, Elevation: 78',Revision 5FRS-Il-611, Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, Reactor Containment, Elevations: 78', 100'&130'. Revision 5Attachment

A-3

==Section 1R07: Heat Sink PerformanceProcedures31.OP-PT.SW-0017, 12 Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Heat Transfer Performance DataCollection, Revision 17Orders301 71 368Section 1R08: Inservice InspectionProceduresER-AR-331, Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Program, Revision 5ER-AP-331-1002, Boric Acid Corrosion Control ldentification, Screening, and Evaluation,Revision 6Notifications20530740

20531523 20529905Orders80104802 80092195Other DocumentsDocument 51-9139945-000, Salem Unit 1==

SG Condition Monitoring for 1 R20 and FinalOperational Assessment for Cycles 21 and 22

==Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProsramProcedures2-EOP-FRHS-1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Revision 242-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety lnjection, Revision 2852.OP-AB.FIRE-0001, Control Room Fire Response, Revision 752.OP-AB.STM-0001, Excessive Steam Flow, Revision 9TQ-AA-106, Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Revision 20Notifications20435850

20450171

20501518

20444054

20474548 20488212Other DocumentsESG-1103, Simulator Training Scenario - Segment 4==

OBE, Revision 0Licensed Operator Requalification Training ProgramLicensed Operator Training Simulator Training PracticesSimulator Scenario Based Testing and Documentation

Section 1Rl2: Maintenance EffectivenessProceduresS1.OP-SO.DG-0001, 1A Diesel Generator Operation, Revision 3452.OP-SO.DG-0001, 2A Diesel Generator Operation, Revision 3651.OP-ST,DG-0001, 1A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test, Revision 43Attachment

A-4S1.OP-ST.DG-0002, 1B Diesel Generator Surveillance Test, Revision 44S1.OP-ST.DG-0003, 1C Diesel Generator Surveillance Test, Revision 4532.OP-ST.DG-0001, 2A Diesel Generator Surveillance Test, Revision 4752.OP-ST.DG-0002, 2B Diesel Generator Surveillance Test, Revision 4652.OP-ST.DG-0003, 2C Diesel Generator Surveillance Test, Revision 49S1.M-ST.DG-0002, 1B Diesel Generator Surveillance Test Acceptance Criteria, Revision 5ER-AA-310, lmplementation of the Maintenance Rule, Revision 7ER-AA-310-1005, Maintenance Rule - Dispositioning Between (a)(1) and (a)(2), Revision 7ER-M-310-1007, Periodic (aX3) Assessment, Revision 5Notifications20337561

20425383

20444345

20449862

20452755 2045730220457340

20457425

20491696

20492505

20493983 2049553420496347

20498238

20500748

20504858

20505236 2052073820529543

20530322

20537053 20537321Orders30123649

30131373

30169829

30173774

30176058 3017681830182235

30186101

30194465

30194466

3019491 1 3019525730194911

30198861

30201699

30201589

30201699 3021261460073802

60099172

70095498

70100648 70125412Other Documents70095498, Salem Maintenance Rule 2009 (aX3) Periodic Evaluation, dated 712910970125412, Salem Maintenance Rule 2011 (a)(3) Periodic Evaluation, dated

613011151 & S2 Maintenance Rule PSFF Database, dated

4129192 -

1011211131 & 52 EDG Failuresl2) Valid Tests (Cumulative) Trend, dated

711110 - 1111111S1 & 52 EDG Failures/25 Valid Starts (Cumulative) Trend, dated

711110 -

111111131 & 52 EDG Unavailability (Cumulative) Trend, dated

711110 -

111111151 DG - Diesel Generators MRule Checkbook, November

201151 DG - Diesel Generators System Health Report, Q3-201152 DG - Diesel Generators MRule Checkbook, November 2011S2 DG - Diesel Generators System Health Report, Q3-2011Salem Maintenance Rule Status & Projections, dated 1211111VTD 301 103, Installation, Operation, Maintenance for Diesel Generator Package Model #18-251, Revision 42Work Control Documents

4295012,

4306610, 4309165

==Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emersent Work GontrolOther DocumentsSalem Unit 2, Operators Risk Report, dated

1012612011 and 1211212011Salem Generating Station Plan of the Day, dated 12112/2A11Salem Unit 1, Operators Risk Report, dated 1011712011Section 1Rl5: Operabilitv EvaluationsProcedures31.OP-SO.DG-0001, 1A Diesel Generator Operation, Revision 34S1.OP-SO.SW-0005, Service Water System Operation, Revision 3952.OP-PT.AF-0002, Auxiliary Feedwater Backleakage, Revision 9Attachment==

2.OP-ST,AF-0005, Inservice Testing Auxiliary Feedwater Valves Modes 4-6, Revision 18S2.OP-ST.AF-0006, lnservice Testing Auxiliary Feedwater Valves, Revision 9S2.OP-SO.28-0001 , 2A28VDC Charger Operation, Revision 7S2,OP-SO.28-0004, 24 28VDC Bus Operation, Revision 1252.OP-SO.CH-0001, Chilled Water System Operation, Revision 30SC.MD-ST.28D-0001 , Preventative Maintenance and 18 Month Surveillance of 28 Volt StationBattery Chargers, Revision 17Drawinqs205336Notifications20496252

20499971

20500324

20500696

20502127 2050238120502408

20510374

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20520193

20525560 2052938020530216

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20536802 2053680320537027Orders70115963 7Q119793

70120968

70127128

70129717 7013021870131172

70131517 80101415Other DocumentsOperability Evaluation # 11-034S-C-SJ-MEE-1978, Required Mission Times for Salem ECCS Pumps During RecirculationPhase, Revision 0S-C-SW-MDC-1350, Service Water Mode Ops Analysis, Revision 8Technical Evaluation 80105209-0010, Evaluation of High DP Across Tricentric Butterfly Valves\ffD

134262, Chilled Water Pumps, Revision 15VTD

301103, Installation, Operation, Maintenance for Diesel Generator Package Model #18-251, Revision 42

==Section 1Rl8: Plant ModificationsProceduresS1.OP-AR.ZZ-Q014, Auxitiary Annunciator - Alarm List, Revision2TOther DocumentsDesign Change Package

80102588, No. 13/23 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Steam Turbine LatchStatus Alarm50.59 Screening,==

DCP 80102588Section 1 Rl9: Post-Maintenance TestinsProceduresMA-AA-716-012, Post Maintenance Testing, Revision 18SC.MD-PM.DG-0004, Emergency Diesel Generator Preventative Maintenance, Revision 14SC.MD-PM.DG-0019, Diesel Engine Overhaul, Revision 38SC.MD-PM.DG-0032, Periodic Diesel Engine Inspection Maintenance, Revision 18SC.MD-PT.DG-0001, Diesel Engine Jacket Water Pressure Test, Revision 2SH.MD-GP .ZZ-0240, System Pressure Test at Normal Operating Pressure and Temperature,Revision 10Attachment

A-6S1.OP-ST.AF-0003, Inservice Testing - 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, Revision 41S1.OP-ST.DG-0002, 1B Diesel Generator Surveillance Test, Revision 44S1.IC-ST.RCS-0003, Rod Control System and lRPl Integrated Test (No Eprom Burn),Revision 8S1.RA-ST.AF-0003, Inservice Testing 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Acceptance Criteria,Revision 2252.OP-ST.CC-0004, Inservice Testing Component Cooling Valves, Revision 1452.OP-ST.RHR-0003, Inservice Testing Residual Heat Removal Flowpath Valves, Revision 532.RA-ST.RHR-0003, Inseryice Testing Residual Heat Removal Flowpath Valves AcceptanceCriteria, Revision 7Drawinqs205236 205242Notifications (.NRC ldentified )20398529

20533363

20532117 20539790.Orders30152030

30105272

30177738

30193171

30193149 3019355560081250

60082226

60090625 6009s627

60098360 7013053230193212

30171820

60094082

30199364

30199373 3019356330193554

30199371

30195333

60080946

30192749 5013344470088066Other DocumentsOperability Evaluation, 1B EDG Manual Voltage Regulator Malfunction

Section 1R20: Refuelinq and Other Outaoe AclivitiesNotifications20531 160Orders70130222Other DocumentsOP-SA-108-1 1

4-1001, Form 2, Sequence of Events Checklist, and Attachment 3, Post TripReview - Planned Reactor Trip, dated 10123120111R21 Outage Risk AssessmentORAM Contingency Plan (1R21 Refueling Outage), RCS at mid'loop post-refueling

Section 1R22: Surveillance TestinsProceduresS1.OP-ST,SSP-0006, Engineered Safety Features Containment lsolation Phase "8",Revision 11S1.OP-ST.AF-0003, Inservice Testing - 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, Revision 41S1.OP-ST.SJ-0020, Periodic Leakage Test -

RCS Pressure lsolation Valves, Revision 20S1.OP-ST.SJ-0014, Intermediate Head Cold Leg Throttling Valve Flow Balance Verification,Revision 23Attachment

A-7S1.M-ST.AF-0003, lnservice Testing 13 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Acceptance Criteria,Revision 22Notifications20530322

20476650

20481082

20505378 20486426Orders30217004

50131585 50145582

==Section 2RS8: Radioactive So_!!d Waste Processins and Radioactive Material Handlins.Storaqe. and TransportationProceduresRW-M-100, Process Control Program for Radioactive Wastes, Revision 8Notifications20397026

20438985

20460855 20471775Other DocumentsNuclear Training Center Lesson Plan==

NRP9902RMATC-01, NRC Bulletin 79-19 and 49 CFRSubpart H Required Periodic TrainingCheck-ln Self-Assessment Report 7

0123615, Radioactive Waste ShippingTeledyne Brown Engineering Report of Analysis/Certificate of Conformance for: U-1 spent resinstorage tank; liquid waste processing resin; DAW smear composite; U-2 spent resinstorage tankRadioactive Material Shipments: 11-09, 11-67,11-68, 11-85, and 11-115Section 4OA1 : Performance Indicator VerificationNotifications20480587

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20518856

20520519 2052145820525079 20525664Orders70128332Other DocumentsSalem Units 1 and 2, Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System,3Q12011Salem Units 1 and 2, Mitigating Systems Performance lndex, High Pressure lnjection System,3Q12011Salem 1 Narrative Log, 51EDG, dated

101112010 - 1211312011Salem 1 Narrative Log, 51CVC, dated

101112010 - 1211312011Salem 1 Narrative Log, 51SJ, dated

101112010 - 1211312011Safem 2 Narrative Log, S2EDG, dated

101112010 - 1211312011Salem 2 Narrative Log, S2CVC, dated

101112010 - 1211312011Salem 2 Narrative Log, S2SJ, dated

101112010 - 1211312011Attachment

A-8

Section 4OA2: ldentification and Resolution of ProblemsProcedures51.IC-PM.RM-0002, 1R11A, 1R12A, 1R128 Containment Process Radiation Monitors, Rev. 24S1.IC-CC.RM-0078, 1R46A Main Steam Line 12 Process Radiation Monitor, Rev. 1351.IC-CC.RM-0079, 1R468 Main Steam Line 14 Process Radiation Monitor, Rev. 1451.IC-CC.RM-0080, 1R46C Main Steam Line 11 Process Radiation Monitor, Rev. 1151.IC-CC.RM-0081, 1R46D Main Steam Line 13 Process Radiation Monitor, Rev. 1252.f

C-CC.RM-0078, 2R46A Main Steam Line 22 Process Radiation Monitor, Rev, 1432.IC-CC.RM-0079, 2R468 Main Steam Line 24 Process Radiation Monitor, Rev. 1352.lC-CC.RM-0080, 2R46C Main Steam Line 21 Process Radiation Monitor, Rev. 1452,lC-CC.RM-0081, 2R46D Main Steam Line 23 Process Radiation Monitor, Rev. 16OP-AA-102-103, Operator Workaround Program, Revision 2OP-AA-1 02-103-1001, Operator Burdens Program, Revision 0Notifications (.NRC ldentified)20256680

20263645

20290445

20393943

20414899 2044014520449249

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20530554 2053613920536280

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20537322 2053864820539012.Orders30198010 5012838560093580 6009814470117950 7012041170128703 7013173360073599

60090828

60093102 6009354870106037

70112000

70112749 7011760970124281

70124459

70124724 7012821780057595Other DocumentsQuarterly Operator Burden Assessment, Salem Unit 1 2011 - Third QuarterQuarterly Operator Burden Assessment, Salem Unit 2 2011 - Third QuarterOperations Concerns List (Plan of the Day Handout), dated 1112112011Operator Challenges List, dated 1112112011Salem Maintenance Rule/EPIX Programs Status Report, Third Quarter 2Q11Salem SG Program, Health Report Evaluation, Third Quarter 2011Salem Thermal Performance (TP) Program Status Report, Third Quarter 2011Salem Inservice Inspection Program (lSl/ClSl/SPT/Snubbers) Status Report, Third Quarter2011Salem IST Program Status Report, Attachment 7, Program Health Reports, Third Quarter 2011Salem Top 10 Equipment lssues Report, dated 61212011Salem Exception Report, Current Equipment Assessments, dated 1211512011Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring System Health Reports Q1-201 1, Q2-2011 , and Q3-201 1Unit 1 Radiation Monitoring System Health Reports Q1-201 1, Q2-2011 , and Q3-201 1Attachment

A-9Maplewood Testing Services Report No. 79776, Failure Analysis of 2R19 Radiation MonitorDetector, Salem Generating Station Unit No.2, dated 02123111

Section 4OA5: Other ActivitiesProceduresSC.DE-TS,ZZ-4201,

PSEG, Salem Structural Design CriteriaSC.MD-FR.DCS-0007, Stack-Up and Transfer of a Loaded

MPCLS-M-105-1001 ,72.48 Review Cover Sheet Form, Revision 0LS-AA-105-1002, 72.48 Applicability Review Form, Revision 0IS-AA-105-1003, 72.48 Screening Form, Revision 0Other DocumentsHoltec International Drawing Package 1D,4131Holtec International, Response to Request for Technical Information, Prolect Number 2090Holtec International, Structural Analysis of Salem Seismic RestraintAttachmenl

ADAMSAFWALARAAPDBITCAPccCCHXccwCFCUCFREDGFSARHRAHXISFSIJPMLDELERMPCMSLMSHANIOSHNRCNSTSODCMoosPARSPCPPIPRMPSEGQARHRRWPSCBASDESGBDSSCSWTEDETSTSASUFSARWBCA-10

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Agency-wide Documents Access and Management SystemAuxiliary FeedwaterAs Low As Reasonably AchievableAir Particulate DetectorBoron Injection TankCorrective Action ProgramComponent CoolingComponent Cooling Heat ExchangerComponent Cooling WaterContainment Fan Cooler UnitCode of Federal RegulationEmergency Diesel GeneratorFinal Safety Analysis ReportHigh Radiation AreaHeat ExchangerIndependent Spent Fuel Storage InstallationJob Performance MeasureLens Dose EquivalentLicensee Event ReportMulti-Purpose CanisterMain Steam LineMine Safety and Health AdministrationNational Institute for Occupational Safety and HealthNuclear Regulatory CommissionNational Source Tracking SystemOffsite Dose Calculation ManualOut-of-ServicePublicly Available RecordsProcess Control ProgramPerformance lndicatorProcess Radiation MonitorPublic Service Enterprise Group Nuclear

LLCQ [[uality AssuranceResidual Heat RemovalRadiation Work PermitSelf-Contained Breathing ApparatusSkin Dose EquivalentSteam Generator BlowdownStructure, System, and ComponentService WaterTotal Effective Dose EquivalentTech nica I SpecificationsTechnical Specification Action StatementUpdated Final Safety Analysis ReportWhole Body CounterAttachment]]