ML20027C780

From kanterella
Revision as of 18:56, 20 February 2020 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Page Changes to Util 820603 Response to NUREG-0612 Re Control of Heavy Loads.Table cross-ref NUREG-0612 Action Items & Page Changes Encl.Aperture Cards Available in PDR
ML20027C780
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/15/1982
From: Tauber H
DETROIT EDISON CO.
To: Kintner L
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR EF2-60-134, NUDOCS 8210270228
Download: ML20027C780 (62)


Text

m=

Engeeg and Construction MI Edison Ess!=b October 15, 1982 EF2 - 60,134 Mr. L. L. Kintner U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Division of Licensing

Washington, D. C. 20555 ,

Dear Mr. Kintner:

References:

(1) Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 (2) Letter NRC to Detroit Edison,

" Control ^of Heavy Loads at Fermi 2" (NUREG-0612)

(3) Letter Detroit Edison to NRC, " Control _

of Heavy Loads Over or in Proximity to Irradiated Fuel", EF2-57,432, 6/3/82

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads y The Reference 2 NRC letter enclosed a' draft report providing an evaluation of Detroit Edison's response on heavy loads (Reference 3). On, September ~2nd a con-ference call was held between Detroit Edison, your-self, and your consultants from EG&G Idaho on the report. This letter responds to the action items given to Detroit Edison as a consequence of that call.

Resolution of these items is provided by making page changes to our Reference 3 submittal.

The enclosed table gives a cross-reference between the appropriate item in your Reference 2 report, the action item derived based on the conference call, and the page change intended to resolve the comment. Some additional page changes to our report are also enclosed to correct typos and reflect design evolu-tion. The page changes are attached as Enclosure 1.

Should you have any further questions, please contact Mr. L. E. Schuerman, (313) 649-7562.

Sincerely,

/

Enclosures

[

cc: F. Clemenson B. Little T. H..,Stickley 821@270228 821015 ///h Eacli PDR ADOCK 05000341 PDR he'p[

A ,

TABLE 1 Cross-Reference between NRC Reference 2 Report and DECO Page Change to Reference 3 Page of. Comment Based Page Change Reference 2 on 9/2/82 to Reference 3 Applicable- Conference Call Applicable 4 NRC can't verify list of 2.1.1-2, hoists. Commitment is 2.1 3-18 desired that future hoists will meet 0612 7, 8 Anticipated load handling 2.1 3.4, procedures will be written 2.1 3-7, prior to OL. Unanticipated 2.1 3-8, load handling procedures Table 2.1 3.c will be written prior to the handling. The pro-cedures will meet 0612.

8 The alternatives to floor 2.1 3-4, lines should be identified. 2.1 3-4a, It was finally agreed that 2.1 3-7, DECO will 1) paint exclu- 2.1 3-7a sion areas 2) by procedure walk down the load paths See Note 1 to insure they're free of obstruction and 3) for significant loads, will place temporary markers for the load path.

10 NRC desired that training 2.1 3-19 and certification require-ments be more specifically stated for the crane and that appropriate industry standards be met for other devices. Operators should also be trained prior to actual operation.

11 NRC desires to know when 2.1 3-15, DECO plans to respond on 2 3 2-70, Special Lifting Devices 2 3 2-70a, and what will be done if 2 3.2-73 there are problems.

J

"\

Page of Comment Based Page Change Reference 2 on 9/2/82 to Reference 3 Applicable Conference Call Applicable 12 NRC desires statements to 2.1 3-16 be revised to show how special slings and non-controlled construction slings will be prevented from being mixed up. Also, dynamic loads is desired to be addressed.

17 NRC desires that DECO See addendum I address the interim mea- to the table sures (NUREG-0612, Article 5 3) in case all final guidelines of NUREG-0612 can't be imple-mented by fuel load.

Notes:

1. Painted lines are orovided instead of temporary markers as was originally discussed in the phone call.

J

Addendum 1 to Table 1 Interim Measure From Section 5 3 of NUREG-0612 (1) Restriction of Heavy Loads Over'the Fuel Pool As described in Section 2.1 3.f of Reference 3, the Reactor Building Main Crane is single-failure proof.

Section 2.2.4.a describes the load limit application and plant technical specification requirements that prohibit heavy loads, handled by the non-single failure auxiliary hoist, from being handled over the spent fuel pool. All of the protective devices, pro-cedures and technical specifications described in Section 2.2.4.a needed to satisfy this interim action will be implemented prior to fuel load.

(2) Definition of Safe Load Paths This action has been completed as reported under Sections 2.1 3.a and b of Reference 3, and the revised pages to these sections included in the attachments to this letter.

(3) Load Handling Procedures Edison has committed to complete their written proce-dures prior to criticality defined under the attached revisions to Sections 2.1 3.a, b and c of Reference 3 (4) Training and Qualification of Operators The operator training end qualification program as described in the attached revised pages to Section 2.1 3.g, commits to having this program established prior to fuel load with operator training initiated prior to criticality. The intent is to have each operator's training and qualification completed prior to his involvement with any post criticality heavy load handling event.

(5) Crane Inspection, Testing and Maintenance Edison has committed to an inspection, testing and maintenance program in accordance with the NUREG-0612 guidelines. Written procedures covering this program will be completed prior to fuel load as explained under Section 2.1 3.e of Reference 3 J

(6) Review of Procedures, Equipment and Personnel Qualification for Critical Load Handling over the Reactor

1. . Written Procedures Written procedures covering the handling of criti-cal loads over the reactor will include explicit instructions on rigging and movement of loads as described in Section 2.1 3.b and c of Reference 3 These procedures will be completed prior to criticality to meet this interim action.

2.& 3. Visual inspection of cranes, slings and lifting devices, and appropriate repair and replacement of defective components A complete visual inspection of the reactor building crane, and those slings and lifting devi-ces used for reactor reassembly will be performed prior to reactor assembly after the initial fuel load .

Any detected flaws or defects will be corrected before any heavy load handling is attempted where these identified deficiencies could potentially cause a load drop.

4. Operator Qualification A formal training and qualification program for crane and hoist operators will be established prior to fuel load. All post criticality heavy load hoisting functions in close proximity to cri-tical system or spent fuel will be handled only by operators trained and qualified under this program. See Section 2.1 3.g of Reference 3 (revised pages attached to this letter).

l l

h i

Table 2.1.1 OVERHEAD HOISTS CAPABLE OF HANDLING LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL OR SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM COMPONENTS Holst Identification Holst Hoist Number Type Capacity Location Reactor Bldg Crain Main Hoist T3100E002 (1) 125 Ton RB-5th F1.

Reactor Bldg Crane Aux. Holst T3100E002 (1) 5 Ton RB-Sth F1.

N&S Torus Hatch Hoists T3100E032&3 (2) 5 Tn/Ea RB-1st Fl.

HPCI Hoist T3100E030 (2) 12 Ton AB-1st F1.

RCIC Holst T3100E031 (2) 10 Ton RB-1st F1.

RHR Pumps-Div.I Basement Holst T3100E024 (2) 16 Ton RB-Basement RHR Pumps-Div.II Basement Holst T3100F025 (2) 16 Ton RB-Basement RHR Pumps-Div.I 1st Floor Holst T3100E026 (2) 16 Ton RB-1st F1.

RHR Pumps-Div.II 1st Floor Hoist T3100E027 (2) 16 Ton RB-1st F1.

N&S Reciro. Pump Hoists T3100E015A&16A (2) 25 Tn/Ea RB-1st F1.

MG Sets, N, C. & S Hoists T3100E035, 6&7 (2) 12 Tn/Ea RB-4th F1.

MG Set Fluid Drive N&S Hoist T3100E038&9 (2) 20 Tn/Ea RB-4th F1.

CRD Repair Holst T3100E019 (2) 3 Ton RB-3rd F1.

Core Spray Div. I Hoist T3100E028 (2) 16 Ton RB-1st Fl.

Core Spray Div. II Holst T3100E029 (2) 16 Ton RB-1st F1.

Diesel Gen. Div. I N&S Holst" (2) 2 Tn/Ea RHR-Gr. F1.

Diesel Gen. Div. II N&S Holst* (2) 2 Tn/Ea RHR-Gr. F1.

Diesel Gen. Motor Control i Cent. Div. I N&S Hoists * / (2) 4 Tn/Ea RHR-Up. Fl.

Diesel Gen. Motor Control Cent. Div. I" (2) 4 Tn/Ea RHR-Up. Fl.

Ventilation Equip. Rm. Holst" (2) 8 Ton AB-5th F1.

Rofueling Platform Monorail Hoist F1500E006 (2) } Ton RB-Sth F1.

Refueling Platform Aux. Holst F1500E005 (2) } Ton RB-Sth F1.

Refueling Platform Main Holst F1500E004 (2) 1 Ton RB-Sth F1.

Refueling Platofrm Hand Winch F1100E021 (2) 1 Ton RB-Sth F1.

CRD Handling Cart Service Crane F1100E022 (2) 1 Ton RB-3rd F1.

New Fuel Transfer Holst F1100E023 (2) 1 Ton RB-Sth F1.

Fuel Channeling Crane F1100E024 (3) 250 Lb. RB-Sth F1.

Fuel Pool Jib Crane F1100E021 1 Ton RB-5th F1. (1)

NE Equipment Hatch Holst* (2) 12 Ton RB-1st F1.

(1) Overhead Traveling Crane RB-Reactor Building (2) Monorail Hoist AB-Auxiliary Buildin (3) Portable Hydraulic Floor Crane RHR-RHR Building (1)

  • These hoists have not yet been specified for purchase, although the trolley support for these hoist locations has been installed. The specified design of these hoists will include conformance with ANSI (1)

B30.16 criteria for " Overhead Hoists".

(1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1.1-2

Table 2.1.2 OVERHEAD HOISTS EXEMPT FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS BECAUSE THEY CANNOT HANDLE HEAVY LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL OR SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM COMPONENTS A. Hoists incapable of handling heavy-loads over 2000 lbs.

Rated Holst Holst Capacity Location Fuel Channeling Crane 250 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth F1. l (1)

Refueling Platform Monorail Holst 1000_1bs. Reactor Bldg.-5th F1.

Refueling Platform Aux. Hoist 1000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth Fl.

Refueling Platform Main Holst 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th Fl.

Refueling Platform Hand Winch 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th Fl.

Fuel Pool Jib Crane 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth Fl.

CRD Handling Cart Service Crane 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-3rd Fl.

New Fuel Transfer Holst 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth F1.

B. Hoists incapable of handling loads over safety shutdown system components.

Floor Drain Sump Cover Holst (2) 5 Ton /ea. Reactor Bldg-Sub Base. (1)

Equipment Drain Sump Cover 5 Ton /ea. Reactor Bldg-Sub Base.

Hoists (2)

All cranes and hoists located in the following buildings that do not contain safety equipment needed for safe unit shutdown.

- Turbine Building

- Radwaste Building

- Office Service Building

- Auxiliary Boiler Building

- General Service Water Building

- Circulating Water Pump House

- Warehouse No. 19 (1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1.2-2

Figure 1 shows the laydown location for major components during a reactor refueling. Figure 2 is a composite drawing showing the floor area exposed to all heavy loads handled during refueling, and movement of the Spent Fuel Cask prior to and after refueling.

Figures 3 through 11 show the load travel path for each heavy load lift performed during refueling. Figure 3 shows the load path for the movement of the reactor pressure vessel service platform and support tracks from their permanent storage location just north of the equipment hatch during normal operation to temporary place-ment just east of the stud tensioner. Figure 4 shows the load paths for movements of the six Reactor Shield Plugs.

After all of the Reactor Shield Plugs have been moved, the Reacter Pressure Vessel Service Platform is moved back to its new storage location and is placed on top of the Shield Plugs that have also been moved into this location. Figure 5 depicts the load travel paths of the Storage Pool Slot-Plugs to and from the southeast quadrant of the refueling floor. Figure 6 shows the load travel paths of the Fuel Pool Slot Plugs to and from the northwest corner of the refueling floor, the equipment pool and fuel pool gate tra-vel paths within the pools, and the refueling bridge travel path from just west of the drywell. After all of the remo-(1) vable plugs have been placed into their laydown location, the Head Strongback is then attached to the Reactor Building Crane Main Hoist and the Drywell Head. Figure 7 shows the (1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-2

The systematic placemsnt of heavy loads handled for refueling was determined by the refueling procedure sequence of events and the travel limitations of the Reactor Building Crane, with consideration for safety system components located below the fueling floor.

Because of the high strength integrity of the fueling floor-(fifth floor) due to its heavily reinforced, 24-inch thick construction, very little added strength is achieved along the building column lines. However, travel paths along these column lines have been established where it is practicable, to keep the travel and placement as simple as possible, so as not to con-fuse operators and supervisors. The established travel paths (shown in Figures 3-12) will be included in spe-cific maintenance procedures developed prior to criti-cality with the exception of the procedure for the spent fuel cask which will be developed prior to handling after criticality. An initial step in the procedures will require the person responsible for per- (1) forming the lift to verify the safe load path is free of obstructions that would interfere with the movement of the load. Because of the high strength integrity of the fueling floor at all locations and the separation of redundant safety systems located below the fueling floor, deviations from the travel paths shown in Figure 3 through 12 do not notably increase the consequences (1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-4

of any potential accidents as long as these deviations do not traverse over the Reactor, Fuel Storage Pool and Equipment Hatch areas. Therefore, the placement of painted travel path lines for all heavy loads offers 4

very little advantage and could cause confusion.

However, painted barrier lines and signs will be established around the Reactor, Fuel Pool, and Equipment Hatch areas. Additionally, painted travel paths will (1) be provided for the five P::.jor loads handled over the 5th floor deck. These include the Reactor Shield Plugs, Reactor Vessel Head, Drywell Head, Spent Fuel i Cask and the Equipment Storage Pool Slot Plugs.

i 1

(1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-4a i

_ _ . - , _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ - . . _ _ _ . _, . . ~ .- _ _ . _ . , _ _ . _ _ _ ,

2.1 3.b A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if any, for deviation from these paths.

RESPONSE: Prior to handling heavy loads over or near spent fuel or safe shutdown equipment, load paths shall be iden-tified in specific maintenance procedures or in an attachment to the maintenance order / work package required to perform the particular maintenance task.

Procedures which control the operation of plant hoists and lifting devices shall establish the guidelines required for the identification and approval of any heavy load paths not identified in specific maintenance procedures. When heavy loads are being handled by the (1)

Reactor Building Overhead Crane or portable hoists, the load paths will be verified as free of obstructions prior to initial movement of the load. Additionally, an individual other than the crane operator will moni-tor the movement of the load along the travel path.

These requirements will be included in the procedure for controlling operation of the Reactor Building Crane (No. 32.000.07) and in the procedure for operation of portable hoists (No. 32.000.12).

(1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-7

When heavy loads are being handled by use of monorail hoists, the load path will be verified as being free of obstructions by the operator prior to initial movement of the load. This requirement will be included in the procedure for the operation of monorail hoists (No.

32.000.08). Since the travel path associated with a monorail is fixed, additional effort is not required to monitor load travel for deviation from the specified path.

If the need should arise to deviate from a load path identified in a specific maintenance procedure, a pro-cedural change will be required. Plant administra-(1) tive procedure entitled " Procedure Preparation, Review, Approval, Change, Revision, Cancellation and Distribution" (No. 12.000.07) describes in detail the procedure revision process. Procedures which control the operation of plant hoists and lifting devices shall establish the process for deviation from any heavy load paths previously identified in an attachment to the maintenance order or work package.

(1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-7a

2.1 3.c A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device, and verification that handling of such load is governed by a written proce-dure containing, as a minimum, the information iden-tified in NUREG-0612, Secion 5.1.1(2).

RESPONSE: The attached Table 2.1 3.c provides a list of heavy loads that will be carried by each crane along with any designated lifting devices. In order to control future heavy loads to be handled over or near spent fuel or required safe shutdown equipment, the procedures governing the operation of the Reactor Building Crane, Monorails, and Portable Hoists will require the guide-lines of NUREG-0612 be invoked by either specific main- (1) tenance procedures or by attachment to maintenance orders / work packages prior to movement of heavy loads in these areas.

Of the seventeen (17) procedures listed in Table 2.1 3.c, sixteen (16) have been written and approved; however, some revisions are needed to incorporate addi-tional commitments contained in this revision.

(1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-8

Table 2.1 3.c TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS OVERHEAD HOIST; REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST AREA; REACTOR BUILDING FIFTH FLOOR LOAD LOAD WEIGHT LIFTING DEVICE WRITTEN PROCEDURE

, 1. Drywell Head 67 Ton Head Strongback Maintenance Proce- (1)

(T2301A001A) (F1300E009) dure No. 35.000.81

2. Reactor Shield 100 Ton /Ea 3-Leg Sling, + Maintenance Proce-Plugs (6) dure No. 35.000.80 3 Reactor Pressure 6 Ton Service Platform Maintenance Proce-Vessel Service Plat- Lifting Device dure No. 35 000.74 form (F1300E010) (CEX-33240A)
4. Vessel Head Insulation 5 Ton Spreader Beam, + Maintenance Proce-(B1151H001) dure No. 35.000.121
5. Reactor Pressure 81 Ton Head Strongback Maintenance Proce-Vessel Head (F1300E009) dure No. 35.000.83
6. Reactor Pressure 5 Ton Connects directly Maintenance Proce-Vessel Head to Main Holst dure No. 35.000.83 Strongback Hook (F1300E009) 7 Storage Pool Slot 43 Ton /Ea 2-Leg Sling, + Maintenance Proce-Plugs (4) dure No. 35 000.115
8. Fuel Pool Slot Plugs 9 Ton /Ea 1-Leg Sling, + Maintenance Proce-(4) dure No. 35.000.113 9 Stud Tensioner 6 Ton Connects directly Maintenance Proce-(F1300E007) to Main Holst Hook dure No. 35 000.82
10. Steam Dryer 42 Ton Dryer / Separator Maintenance Proce-(B1107D041) Sling (F1300E008) dure No. 35 000.84
11. Steam Separator 73 Ton Dryer / Separator Maintenance Proce-(B1112D002) Sling (F1300E008) dure No. 35.000.85
12. Storage Pool Gate 14 Ton 2-Leg Sling, + Maintenance Proce-dure No. 35 000.116
13. Fuel Pool Gates 4.3 Ton & 2-Leg Sling, + Maintenance Proce-(A & B) 2 5 Ton dure No. 35.000.89

+ Not Yet Purchased

'(1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-9

Table 2.1 3.c (Cont'd)

LOAD LOAD WEIGHT LIFTING DEVICE WRITTEN PROCEDURE

14. Crane load Block 5 Ton None
15. Spent Fuel Cask 100 Ton Redundant Cask Main'enance t Proce-(F1600E001) Slings dure No. #
16. Concrete Floor 5 Ton 4-Leg Sling, + Maintenance Proce-Hatch (El-10 column location) dure No. #
17. RWCU Demin Floor 14 Ton 4-Leg Sling, + Maintenance Proce-Plug dure No. #
18. Equipment Hatch Plugs 17 Ton 4-Leg Sling, + Maintenance Proce-dure No. 35 000.117
19. Debris Shipping Cask # + Maintenance Proce-dure No. #
20. Fuel Storage Racks # + Maintenance Proce-dure No. #

l

21. Refueling Bridge 14 Ton 4-Leg Sling, + Maintenance Proce-(T2502D001) dure No. 35 000.87
22. Dryer / Separator 2.4 Ton Attaches directly Maintenance Proce-Sling (F1300E008) to Main Hook dure No. 35 000.84

, and 85

23. Vessel Head Insula- 1.2 Ton Attaches directly Maintenance Proce- (1) tion Spreader Beam to Main Hook dure No. 35.000.121 TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS OVERHEAD HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING AUXILIARY HOIST (5 TON)

AREA: REACTOR BULDING FIFTH FLOOR LOAD LOAD WEIGHT LIFTING DEVICE WRITTEN PROCFDURE

1. Maintenance Tools 5 Ton #, + Maintenance Proce-dure No. 32.000.07 (1)
2. Lifting Fixtures 5 Ton #, + Maintenance Proce-dure No. 32.000.07 3 New Fuel Vault Plugs 21 Ton 4-Leg Sling, + Maintenance Proce-dure No. 35 000.118 1 0 To Be Determined Later
+ Not Yet Purchased (1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-10

Table 2.1 3.c (Cont'd)

TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS LOAD LOAD WEIGHT LIFTING DEVICE WRITTEN PROCEDURE OVERHEAD HOIST: CORE SPRAY DIVISION 1 AND 2 HOISTS (2 16-TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR

1. Core Spray First 8} Ton a, + Maintenance Proce-Floor Hatch (2) dure No. 32.000.08
2. Core Spray Basement 8} Ton #, + Maintenance Proce-Floor Hatch (2) dure No. 32.000.08 ,
3. Core Spray Pump Ton #, + Maintenance Proce-Motors (4) dure No. 32.000.08 E2101000A-D OVERHEAD HOIST: NE EQUIPMENT DOOR HOIST (12 TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR NE Equipment Door 11 3 Ton * ' Maintenance Proce- (11 T2301A001B dure No. 35 000.11 OVERHEAD HOIST: DIESEL GENERATOR MOTOR CONTROL CENTER DIVISION 1 AND 2 (4 4-TON)

AREA: RHR BUILDING UPPER FLOOR

  1. # #, + Maintenance Proce-dure No. 32.000.08 OVERHEAD HOIST: DIESEL GENERATOR NORTH AND SOUTH DIVISION 1 AND 2 HOISTS (4 2-TON)

AREA: RHR BUILDING GRADE FLOOR Diesel Generator # #, + Maintenance Proce-Components (i.e. dure No. 32.000.08 cylinders, cylinder liners)

OVERHEAD HOIST: VENTILATION EQUIPMENT HOIST (8-TON)

AREA: AUXILIARY BUILDING

  1. # #, + Maintenance Proce-dure No. 32.000.08 0 To Be Determined Later

+ Not Yet Purchased (1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-14

2.1 3.d Verification that lifting devices identified in 2.1 3.c.

above, comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, or ANSI B30 9-1971 as appropriate. For lifting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1(4) or 5.1.1(5), are not met, describe any proposed alternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability.

RESPONSE: To date, there are only three lifting devices provided for the handling of heavy loads that would fall within the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, as defined in NUREG-0612. These are the RPV Head Strongback, the Dryer / Separator lifting device, and the Vessel Head Insulation Spreader Beam. A design review by General Electric finds that the RPV Head Strongback and Dryer /

Separator lifting device do meet the design strength criteria of Section 3 2 of ANSI N14.6-1978, taking into account the combined static and dynamic load forces.

However, certain components in these lifting devices do not meet the additional strength criteria of Section (1) 6.2 for single failure proof systems. Although General Electric recommendations do not find it practical to modify all of these components to meet this criteria, i this is still being reviewed by Edison. Action 4

determined by this review on any possible modifications or additional analyses will be initiated prior to fuel load and will be completed prior to the use of these devices after initial criticality.

(1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-15

i. The Vessel Head Insulation Spreader Beam is being i designed to achieve compliance with the ANSI N14.6 strength criteria for combined static and dynamic (1) load forces. The Spent Fuel Cask handling system is accepted as single-failure-proof and is addressed in detail in the Enrico Fermi FSAR, Section 9 1.4.2.1.

4 4

i i

i l

n l

(1) Revised 10/10/82 l 2.1 3-15a

i All other special lifting devices and slings will be purchased to ensure that the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 and ANSI B30 9-1971 are satisfied. Existing slings used for construction will not be retained for handling of heavy loads around critical equipment after the plant is operational.

The requirements of the stress design factor will include the maximum static and dynamic loads as defined by NUREG-0612. Any single-failure-proof handling systems will also meet the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6.

All slings that fall within the concerns of NUREG-0612 will be clearly marked to identify their qualification for that application. This includes a load rating (1) accounting for static and dynamic loads for hoist speeds up to 30 ft/ min for these slings, as well as any information which might restrict certain specific slings to specific hoist / load applications.

2.1 3.e Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance. Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives.

, RESPONSE: For the Reactor Building Crane, Main and Auxiliary Hoists, crane inspection, testing, and Maintenance Pro-cedures will comply with the guidelines in ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2. Should any deviations from this standard be required, they will be equivalent to (1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-16

the requiremsnts of ANSI B30.2-1976. The requiremsnts of this standard will be incorporated into the Reactor Building Crane General Maintenance Procedures Nos.

35.000.120 and 34.000.43 These procedures will be (1) written prior to fuel load.

For all other overhead hoists listed in Table 2.1.1, inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures will comply with ANSI B30.16-1973, Chapters 1.2 and 2.2.

2.1 3.f Verification that crane design complies with the guide-lines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapters 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where spe-cific compliance with these standards is not provided.

RESPONSE: The reactor building main crane is the only single-failure-proof crane at the plant site. The Enrico Fermi 2 Atomic Power Station FSAR, Section 9 1.4.2.1, describes the single failure proof design features incorporated in the 125 ton crane.

i The Fermi 2 Reactor Building Crane was designed under the EOCI #61 " Specifications for Electric Traveling Cranes".

However, additional, upgraded criteria included in the later CMAA #70-1976 specification was already a l

part of the manufacturer's design practices. The following identifies these criteria and provides the I (1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-17 l

results of Edison's analysis verifying the Formi 2 crane's conformance with this criteria.

For all other overhead hoists listed in Table 2.1.1, CMAA #70 and ANSI B30.2 are not the applicable stan-dards for these hoists. ANSI B30.16-1973 is the appli-cable standard. The recirculating pump hoists design does conform to this standard. The remaining hoists, which are not yet purchased, have been specified to conform to ANSI B30.16.

These hoists and any other future cranes or hoists that fall within the concerns of NUREG-0612 will meet the (1) design guidelines of NUREG-0612.

a (1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-18

2.1 3.g Exceptions, if any, taken to NSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification, and conduct.

RESPONSE: Operator training, qualification, and conduct will be in compliance with the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976 for operation of overhead, traveling cranes. Operators of various types of cranes will be trained and qualified to the appropriate standard for the specific s type of equipment to be used. Records of personnel (1)

~

- training and qualification will be retained. This training program will be administered by the' Nuclear Operations Training Group. The training program

.i will be implemented prior to fuel load and those indi-viduals operating cranes / hoists will be qualified prior to involvement with any post-criticality heavy load handling event.

l.

l

~

(1) Revised 10/10/82 2.1 3-19

TABLE 2.2.1 HOISTS OPERATING OVER SPENT FUEL OR THE REACTOR VESSEL Holst Rated Number Holst Typ_e Capacity T3100E002 Reactor Bldg. Crane Traveling Overhead 125 Ton Main Holst Aux. Hoist Hoists 5 Ton #

F1500E004 Refueling Platform Traveling Overhead 2000 lbs.

Main Hoist F1500E005 Refueling Platform Hoists 1000 lbs.

Aux Holst F1500E006 Refueling Platform Traveling Monorail 1000 lbs.

Monorail Holst Hoists Refueling Platform Hand winch Fixed Manual Winch 2000 lbs.

F1100E020 Channel Handling Boom Boom Trolley Holst 200 lbs.

F1100E021 Fuel Pool Jib Crane Boom Holst 2000 lbs.

F1100E023 New Fuel Transfer Holst Traveling Poom Holst 2000 lbs.

F1160E024 Fuel Channeling Crane Portable Floor Crane 250 lbs. (1) 0 Restricted to 1500 lbs. when traveling over spent fuel.

(1) Revised 10/10/82 2.2.1-2

TABLE 2.2.2 OVERHEAD HOISTS EXEMPT FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS N Y CANNOT HANDLE HEAVY LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL OR THE REACTOR VESSEL A. Hoists Incapable of Handling Heavy Loa.ds Over 2000 lbs.

Rated Holst Holst Capacity Location Refueling Platform Monorail Hoist 1000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth F1.

Refueling Platform Aux. Hoist 1000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth F1.

Refueling Platform Main Holst 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th F1.

Refueling Platform Hand Winch 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th F1.

Fuel Pool Jib Crane 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th F1.

Channel Handling Boom Holst 200 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th F1.

New Fuel Transfer Holst 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth F1.

Fuel Channeling Crane 250 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth F1. (1)

(1) Revised 10/10/82 2.2.2-2

( )

TABLI: 2.3.2 v'

ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 IIEAVY LO?.D IIANDLTNG: LOAD /ARPA 1P!:'ACT MATHIX

!!OIST: REACTOR BUILDINc, CRANE MAIN llOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION DUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING .

IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE D ALONG DUILDING CCORDINATE LINE AREA PROM COORDINATE LINE 13 TO 15_1/3 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO _ _

LOADS sal'ETY RSI.ATED llAZARD

' SAFETY R U I.A*.*E D  !!siZ Ai'D l FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPME?N dLIM.

CATEccay acr:.w tu

1. Drywell IIead Subbasement 1. Div 1 RIIR b,e T2301A001A 540' - 0" Piping (1) 1(67 'Ibn) 2. Div 1 EECW b,e Piping
3. Torus c,e Basement 1. Div 1 EECW b,e 562' - o" Piping
2. Div 1 RIIR b,e Piping
3. RCIC Turbine b,c,e E>:hau s t Piping
4. IIPCI Turbine b,c,e Exhaust Piping
5. Div 1 Ri!R b,o Service Watcr Piping ,

(1) REVISED 10- 10-82 2.3.2-2

rm TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO PERMI UNIT 2 !!EAVY LOAD !!ANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX b)

IIOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN !!OIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG DUILDING COORDINATE LINE B ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 13 TO 15 h, FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED IIAZARD SAFETY RELATED IIAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

CATECOP.Y .C.*.TECOR'I

1. Drywell !!ead Basement Div 1 Cable b,e #

T2301A001A 562' - 0" Trays *

(67 . Ton) .

IP-009 1C-008 1C-009 (1) IP-011 1C-100 1C-001 1K-004 1C-002 1K-008 IK-032

~

l (1) REVISED 10-10-82 l

  • Sco Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-3

TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 IIEAYY) I.OAD !!ANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX IIOIST: REACTOR DUILDING CRANE MAIN IIOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION -

BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE B ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE-AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 13 TO 15 1/3 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED IIAZARD SAFETY RELATED IIAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.

Can,bORr UnTt.uGRY

1. Drywell IIcad First Floor 1. Div 1 RIIR b,e T2301A001A 583' - 6" Piping

( fon) .

Div 1 Cable Trays

  • e,c

. 2C-089 Second Floor 1. Div 1 Core b,e 613' - 6" Spray Piping

2. Div 1 EECW b,e -

Supply and Return Piping (1) REVISED 10-10-82

  • Sce Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-4

. . . . , - ._. .. , . _ , . . , n. n , , . . , . . . , ,n,

_.c-.-w 4.3. ,t u . .u tu r _ r. u . . a. . . - . o. . : um t .v_ . a..u : wC/A. .,2 ..

1a .p,.C M,, TRI.\.

L s,. sv.s .n 3.un7 s s c,s. . ..a

.- A s . ~ y .-. .J . , L\

, . . ,7 q, E.sts w s IDCATIOt: BUILDII;G: RIZCKG DUILDI :G - FIRST l'ID3R Am a[l %k,,i tu w A'ONG A LI::E FIDI EUILDI::G COO:CINATES E4,, 12-3/4 to D'2, 13-3/4 11SDS TJJOR/ELTIATION SAFl?? RELATED E's2IdC SAFI11T PJ2ATED- FAZARD ECUIDI2:T ELDi!!ATION FIDOR EQUIR" DIP EQUIE E .T l CATACORY FiWATION . CATAGORY I t NE EQUIMIENT DOOR BASD1ENT DISCHARGE LINES FIDI ADS-SRV * -

V22-2071 AND NON- C ADS-SRV V22-2030 l

l 4

  • STILL UNDER REVI W I, 2.3.2-35a (REVISED 10-10-82)

Tho handling of the unloaded Vossel Head Insulation Spreader Beam, which is connected directly to the Reactor Building Crane Main Hook, meets single failure proof criteria during movement of the Spreader Beam from its storage location to the drywell.

Items No. 5 and 6 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Strongback and Reactor Pressure Vessel Head The Reactor Pressure Vessel Head is removed only during cold shutdown conditions and only with its special lifing device, the Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Strong-back. The Torus is not required to maintain cold shut-down and sufficient redundancy exists such that a postulated load drop will not cause the loss of other safety functions. Additionally, load / floor analysis demonstrates that a load drop will not damage any i

safety-related equipment away from the Reactor Vessel, if the RPV Head is not carried more than 4 feet above the floor along its travel path and laydown area.

Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.83 shall include this limitation in its specifications.

The handling of the RPV Head over the Reactor Vessel meets the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 for (1)

single failure proof handling systems, with the following comments:

(1) Revised 10/10/82 l

2 3 2-70 4

1. General Electric has stated that the RPV Head Lifting lugs do meet the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(3). However, Edison review and acceptance of this analysis is still ongoing
2. General Electric, however, has stated that the RPV head strongback lifting device has several components that do not meet the additional design strength criteria of ANSI N14.6, Section 6.2. Although some of these components can be modified to meet this criteria, General Electric recommendations find this to be impractical for all of these components. This is (1) also still under Edison review.

As stated in Section 2.1 3.d, action determined by this review on any possible modifications or additional analyses will be initiated prior to fuel load and will be completed prior to the first post critical use of these devices.

The direct redundant attachment of the Strongback to the Reactor Building Crane Main Hook, has sufficient strength to meet single failure proof guidelines whenever this lifting device is carried unloaded from its storage location to the Drywell area, or RPV Head or Drywell Head Laydown Locations.

(1) Revised 10/10/82 2 3 2-70a

Additionally, safety-related system redundancy preclu-des any system from performing its safety-related func-tion when these loads could possibly be dropped.

General Electric has stated that the strength allow-ances used for the design of the Dryer / Separator lifting device does not allow for adequate strength to meet ANSI N14.6-1978, Section 6.2 criteria for maximum combined static and dynamic load forces during handling of the separator in air. General Electric currently does not recommend any practical method to upgrade this lifting device to meet Section 6.2 additional strength or dual load path criteria.

However, General Electric's findings have not taken (1) into consideration that the separator is underwater while it is handled over the reactor. This is undergoing further review.

Action determined by this review on additional analysis or any practical modifications will be initiated prior to fuel load and will be completed prior to post-criticality handling of the Dryer / Separator.

Item No. 12 Storage Pool Gate Movement of the 14 ton Storage Pool Gate during a refueling outage is from its operating location to a

, location within the Storage Pool, where it will be (1) Revised 10/10/82 2 3 2-73

secured to the side of the pool. ESF systems located below the Storage Pool have sufficient redundancy and separation to preclude the complete loss of a system due to a potential load drop.

Item No. 13 Fuel Pool Gates A & B Movement of the Fuel Pool Gates during a refueling outage is from their operating location to their storage location along the same (south) wall of the Fuel Storage Pool, where the gates are to be secured to the wall. Analysis of the Fuel Pool floor structure finds that it can withstand a potential Fuel Pool Gate drop from a hieght of 17 feet above the Pool Floor.

r 2 3 2-73a

Further analysis is continuing to verify that there will be adequate fuel rack protection against the possibility of a fallen gate toppling against the racks after it has fallen to the pool floor.

Item No. 15 Spent Fuel Cask Handling / hoisting procedures and administrative controls for the Spent Fuel Cask are described in the Enrico Fermi 2 Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.1. The likelihood of a handling system failure for this load has been demonstrated and accepted as being extremely small.

Items No. 16.and 17 Concrete Floor Hatch (Co. El-101 and the RWCU Demineralizer Concrete Floor Plugs The concrete floor hatch located at building coordinates El-10}

will be handled by the auxiliary hoist. The RWCU deminera- (1) lizer concrete floor plugs are outside the coverage area of the Reactor Building Hoists and methods to lift these heavy loads are still under investigation. Additional hoisting equipment and the maintenance procedure covering the use of this equip-ment will be in accordance with the NUREG-0612 guidelines and will be implemented prior to the handling of these plugs after initial operation.

Item No. 18 Equipment Hatch Plugs The Equipment Hatch Plugs will be placed in the immediate vicinity of the Equipment Hatch opening whenever the hatch is to be opened for access. The handling of these plugs is still under study. This study and any potential modifica-tions will be completed prior to the handling of these plugs after initial operation.

2 3 2-74 (1) Revised 10/10/82 i

L. DIESEL GENERATOR HOISTS AND DIESEL GENERATOR MOTOR CONTROL CENTER HOISTS The diesel generator hoists and diesel generator motor control center hoists are used during correc-tive and maintenance procedures on the diesel generators. The accidental dropping of'a diesel engine component will have no effect upon any other system required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.

M. VENTILATION EQUIPMENT HOIST The Ventilation Equipment Hoist is an 8-ton overhead hoist used for corrective and preventive maintenance on various ventilation components.

There is adequate floor strength to withstand an inadvertant load drop up to 10 tons, from the fifth floor to the third floor without impacting critical systems below the third floor. Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.08 will specify this load limit for all lifts except those incurred during

( cold shutdown. Deviations from this specification 1

will require formal approval in accordance with the i procedure described in the response to Section 2.1 3.b.

(

1 1

i l

l 2 3 2-80

N. NE EQUIPMENT HATCH HOIST The Equipment Hatch Holst is a 12-ton monorail hoist used exclusively to move the NE Equipment Hatch to one side of the drywell NE Equipment access opening. This is to be performed during shutdowns whenever large equipment is to be moved to or from the drywell (i.e. N. recirculation pump motor).

The only safety-related equipment located under the monorail travel path of this hoist are the (1) discharge pipes from ADS safety relief valve V22-2071 and NON-ADS safety relief valve V22-2070.

The handling of the NE equipment hatch will not take place whenever the availability of these valves is required for reactor protection.

The methods and written procedures covering the handling of this hatch will be completed prior to post criticality.

(1) Revised 10/10/82 2 3 2-80a

III. RESULTS Results are summarized below:

DESCRIPTION OF HEAVY LOAD WEIGHT OF THICKNESS OF MAXIMUM HEAVY LOAD IMPACTED SLAB DROP HEIGHT Reactor Shield Plugs 100 T/ea 24" 5'-0" Fuel Pool Slot Plugs 9 T/ea 24" 12'-0" Drywell Head 67 Ton 24" 5'-6" (1)

Vessel Head Insulation 5 Ton 24" 12'-0" RPV Head 81 Ton 24" 4'-0" Steam Dryer 42 Ton 42" 12'-0" Steam Separator 73 Ton 42" 9'-0" RPV Strongback 5 Ton 24" 12'-0" RPV Service Platform 6 Ton 24" 12'-0" CRD Transfer Cask 2 Ton 30" 20'-0" Stud Tensioner 6 Ton 24" 12'-0" Fuel Pool Gates 4 3T&2 5T 72" 17'-0" Storage Pool Slot Plugs 43 T/ea 24" 5'-4" Recirculation Pump Holst (outside primary containment) 25 Ton 1'-0" (1) Revised 10/10/82 2 3 2.87

.~..~

^

- ---4__... . . . ._

e

=

DOdUMENT '

PAGE .

'P_U LED 9

ANO. -

NO. OF PAGES ,

O REASON D PAGE LLEGBl.

D wD corerub A1. von er own J 3 D BETIER cop (REQUESTED ON _

GD

. )d.

e(AstiootAnstsoruu m ocor<rao41 non oi e -

FEMED oN APERTURE CARD NO D\G h

%%\o%oWM- G

_ _