ML20008D484

Intervenor Exhibit I-MAG-115,consisting of 890410 Testimony of Sf Mitchell on Behalf of Atty General,Jm Shannon,Town of Hampton (Toh) & Necnp Re Toh/Necnp Ex 2

ML20008D484
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	06/12/1989
From:	Mitchell S KENSINGTON, NH, MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:
References
OL-I-MAG-115, NUDOCS 9003050224
Download: ML20008D484 (7)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ~

NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION

~ Off!CE OF SECRET R

DOCK [llNG & S[RVICE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOA'RD BRANCH Before the Administrative Judges

,

Ivan W. Smith, Chairman -.

Dr.1 Richard F. Cole '

Kenneth A. McCollom  !

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In the Matter of ) Docket.Nos. 50-443-OL'

) 50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY. ) (Off-Site EP)  !

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) .;

)

(Seabrook-Station, Units 1 and 2) ) April 10, 1989 -

)

'x TESTIMONY OF SANDRA FOWLER MITCHELL ON' BEHALF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL-JAMES M. SHANNON, TOWN OF HAMPTON AND NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON~

NUCLEAR POLLUTION REGARDING TOH/NECNP EX. 2 ,

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,c Department of the Attorney General ,

Nuclear Safety Unit )

Public Protection Bureau l One Ashburton Place Boston, Massachusetts.02108 l (617) 727-2200 ,

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9003050224 090612 .

PDR- ADOCK 05000443

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .

NUCLEAR REGULATORY' COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before the Administrative Judges: '

Ivan W. Smith, Chairman i Dr. Richard F. Cole ~

Kenneth'A. McCollom

)

.In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL a

) 50-444-OL- .

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY )

(Off-Site EP)

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. )

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) April 10, 1989

)

TESTIMONY OF SANDRA FOWLER MITCHELL ON BEHALF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON, .

TOWN OF HAMPTON AND NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON l NUCLEAR POLLUTION REGARDING TOH/NECNP EX. 2 1

.Q.l. Please state your name,. occupation and experience, l A.l. My nam.e is Sandra Fowler Mitchell. For the:last three years I.have served as Emergency Management Director for the Town of Kensington, New Hampshire. My responsibilities in this position. include serving as the official representative for the Town regarding the Seabrook Nuclear Power. Plant.

Q.2. Please summarize your testimony? l A.2. In summary, I will provide t4stimony on certain facts' l and conclusions, concerning communications, information exchange, Land the protective action recommendation process for New Hampshire EPZ schools, that were r'evealed to me, as an Intervenor observer, at the Incident Field Office (IFO) during_the Exercise.

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Q.3.: What is the purpose of your testimony?

A 3. ThepurposeofmytestimonyistosupportContenbion TOH/NECNP/EX.-2 (Contention) to this testimony. The' Contention provides, inter alia: ,

TOH/NECNP EX.-2:

The exercise demonstrated that there is no reasonable assurance that adequate measures can and will be taken to protect school children during a ,

radiological emergency at Seabrook.

BASIS:

During the exercise, Applicants and the State of New Hampshire demonstrated an inability to successfully 1

-carry out and integrate protective actions on behalf' l

of the school children in the Seabrook Emergency Planning-Zone'("EPZ")...

I agree with the allegations in the contention. In this testimony, I address only that portion of the Contention involving the New Hampshire EPZ.

'Q.4. Explain the basis for your agreement with the Contention.

A.4. I rely upon my personal observations as an observer'

=a at the Iddident Field Office-(IFO) in Newington, N.H., during

the Exercise on June 28, 1989. As I understand it, the IFO is

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intended to coordinate and direct information between the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the local communities

. 4 concerning plant status, emergency classifications, protective 4

action recommendations (PARS), resource allocation, and other emergency response issues. This information exchange also a

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concerns-New Hampshire EPZ schools, and PAR communications involving these facilities. Between 9 a.m. and 7 p.m. on June.28, 1988, except for short breaks when my position was covered by-another Intervenor observer, I was situated in a hallway at the IFO between two rooms. The left hand room was comprised of agencies such as the Coast Guard and the State Police. On the right-hand side.of the hallway were the local liaisons for the communities within the EPZ.

Generally, under the NHRERP, a local liaison is a-representative for the State who is assigned to one or more EPZ towns, and has responsibility to communicate with the local officials at the EOC in that town regarding emergency information, including PARS. There are 17 towns in the New Hampshire EPZ.

At any one time during the Exercise, there were approximately'15 local liaisons in the approximately 20' x 20' l room.- Each had his own phone, and was.on the phone almost constantly. I was not permitted by the Applicants to enter the room. From the hall, however, I could clearly hear at least 6 of the local liaisons who were seated near the door. Farther back in the to e, I could generally pick up pieces of conversation of most othodilocal q liaisons. During the course of the Exercise on June 28, I had occassion to overhear conversations in both the liaison room'and in the room across the hall in which various State agencies were represented, concerning the school populations in the New Hampshire EPZ. As the announcements came through, such as orally by an IFO official or by speaker phone, I overheard l

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discussions regarding protective actions for school children,

, as well-as-other-emergency information relating to schools. I also had the opportunity to view status boards, on the front wa11Lin both rooms, observe player performance, and the overall

~ communication' process within the IFO during the exercise.  !

-In general, it appeared that, within the IFO, the process of coordinating and exchanging information, including PAR information concerning schools, was often confused and disorganized. Local liaisons, frequently on the telephones, L often did not. appear to attend to announcements made in the l IFO. Throughout the Exercise, messages were passed out in hard L

copy from State agency officials to local liaisons within the IFO, with a request that the messages be reviewed and returned. 1 to the source. I observed, however, that this hard copy i-

! frequently was not fully circulated, and returned, as requested..

Not all liaiso'ns appeared fully informed of current information.

Lee Kimball, first shift supervisor of the-local liaisons,  !

regularly appeared frustrated at his inability-to obtain current j l

, information, such as the number of children still sheltered in i scho'ols, the transportation required for evacuation, and the I i

status.ot local community needs. There appeared to be a =

consistedEBproblem with the timely processing and dissemination

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of information, whether verbally, in hard copy, or on status  !

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boards.. With regard to the New Hampshire EPZ school populations, I observed confusion among IFO Officials involving.

protective action recommendations (PARS) for students. For example, the State provided conflicting messages to local EOCs

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, t as;to'whether or not. parents should pick up their children from schools. In addition, I personally observed the following l circumstances addressed in the Contention:

f At 6:30 p.m., a half hour before-the exercise  ;

ended, it also became apparent that..New Hampshire officials had forgotten that a significant number of children were'still in ~~

school awaiting late dismissal (i.e. those .

children in New Hampshire towns that had been ordered to shelter). Intervenor observors heard conversations between various officials who were unsure how many children were left in the schools and whether they would.be bused or  ?

picked up by their parents. Nine minutes before the scheduled 7 p.m. dismissal,.

Intervenors' heard the IFO call the State EOC and ask what transportation arrangement had been made for these children; the EOC responded that arrangements had been made, but EOC did ~",

not know what they were,

, At the conclusion of Day 1 of the Exercise, therefore State officials were confused over the appropriate PAR for students still sheltering at schools in a number of New [

Hampshire ~EPZ towns, were uncertain as to what PAR had been directed, and were not.even sure of how many children remained.

in the schools. 'In my opinion, therefore,.the Exercise revealed a fundamental problem in the process by which-PARsEare

. formulated, transmitted, und implemented'for New Hampshire students. 'l 6

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