ML19305B816

LER 80-003/03L-0:on 800206,while Performing Procedure Qos 1000-3,RHR to Suppression Chamber Dump Valve,Mo 1-1001- 36A,circuit Breaker Tripped Out.Caused by Burned Out 480/120-volt Transformer in Circuit Breaker Cabinet

ML19305B816
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	03/06/1980
From:	Dunesia Clark COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML19305B812	List: ML19305B811 ML19305B816
References
LER-80-003-03L-03, NUDOCS 8003200410
Download: ML19305B816 (3)

Text

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NRC FCRM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION oA W- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: l l l (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 l l l 6

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7 8 60 NUMBER 63 75 DATE EVt!NT DESCRIPTION AND PROB ABLE CONSEQUENCES h l012l l While performing the LPC I Motor Operated Valve Operabil i ty Test , procedure 0.0S 1000-3,1 l o 13 l l the RHR to suppression chamber dump valve, M0 1-1001-36^, circuit breaker tripped l

[O14l l out. The test was performed to comply with Technical Specification 4.5.A.l.d. The l

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[6'Ts"l l valve failed in the closed position, which is the normal operating position The l 4

F5'Ti1 I upstream isolation valve. M0-1-1001-34A, was fully operable to provide isolation of thq l0171 l primary containment had it been necessary. l l 0 l8 l l l 7 8 9 80

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40 44 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h lilO11 The 480/120 V control power transformer in the valve circuit breaker cabinet was l 11 11 1 I found burned out. No apparent cause for the failed transformer could be found. The l

, 2 l transformer was replaced and the valve was operated three times satisfactorily. l 11131 l l 1 4 1 1 7 8 9 80

$A  % POWER OTHER STATUS DIS O RY DISCOVERY OESCRIPTION m LE_j@ l 0 [ 9 l 8 l@l NA l l B [gl Routine Test l

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1. LER HUMBER: LER/R0 80-03/03L-0 ll. L1CENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company

• Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station Ill. FACILITY NAME: Unit One IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-254 V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On February 6,1980, while performing the LPCI Motor Operated Valve Operability Test, procedure Q05 1000-3, the RHR to suppression chamber dump valve, M0-1-1001-36A, circuit breaker tripped out. The test was performed to comply with the surveillance requirements spceified in Technical Specification 4.5.A.I.d.

The valve was in the normally closed position, and would have been used only for testing the RHR loop and for containment cooling. A work request was written to inspect the valve operator and circuit breaker.

There have been no previous occurrences with problems similar to this failure.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The probable consequences of this occurrence cre minimal.

The valve failed in the closed position, 'd..ch is d.e normal operating position. The valve is u" ? wr testing the "A" RHR loop and for suppression chamber es 01.1g. The valve could have been manually operated if the valve was needed. The upstream isolation valve, M0 1-1001-34A, was fully operable to provide isolation of the primary containment had it been necessary. The "B" Containment Cooling loop was also available for use, if needed. Safe operation of the reactor was not affected as a result of this occurrence.

Vll. CAUSE:

The cause of this occurrence is attributed to equipment failure.

The 480/120 V control power transformer in the valve circuit breaker cabinet was found burned out. The control power transformer is fed from the incoming 480 vol t line, and supplies 120 volt power through the control switches to operate the motor contactors. No apparent cause for the failed transformer could be found.

The transformer was a General Electric 480/120 vol t dry-type i transformer, type #9T56Yl805, KVA .150.

l

D Vill. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was 50, .crify that the valve was in the closed position. The electrical maintenance department replaced the transformer and the valve was operated three times satisfactorily. Since this is the first time the control power transformer has failed, no further corrective action was deemed necessary.

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