ML19312C851

From kanterella
Revision as of 08:45, 1 February 2020 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
AO-270/75-18:on 750825,loss of Required Overlap Between Operating Control Rod Groups.Caused by Dropping Group 7 Rods & Withdrawing Group 6.Power Supplies Examined & No Problems Identified.Required Overlap Immediately re-established
ML19312C851
Person / Time
Site: Oconee Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/08/1975
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19312C847 List:
References
NUDOCS 8001130005
Download: ML19312C851 (2)


Text

.

9 DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEC UNIT 2 ijeport No.: A0-270/15-18

_lje po r t Dqtel September 8, 1975 Occurrence Dat e: August 25, 1975 racilityi Oconec Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Loss of required overlap between operating control rod groups Conditions Prior to occurrence: Unit at 95 percent full power Description of Occurrence:

On August 25, 1975, while the unit was operating at 95 percent full pover with control rod Group 7 at approxitately 18 percent withdrawn, the Group 7 rods dropped into the core. 'Ihe Integrated Cor.t rol System (T CS) ir.:-

mediately withdrew Group 6 to 100 percent withdrawn position to maintain power level. The dropping,of the Group 7 control rods, followed by the withdrawal of the Group 6 centrol rc.ds by the ICS, resulted in the loss of the required 25 1 5 percent overlap between the operating control rod groups. The Control Operator immediately placed the Control Rod Drive System in manual control and resequerced Groups 6 and 7 to establish the required overlap. The 25 5 percent overlap requitecent was not met during a period of approximately five rainutes.

Designation of Apparent Cause of C currence:

The apparent cause of this occurrence was the dropping of Group 7 control rods and subsequent withdrawal of Group 6 by the ICS. The Control Rod Drive System and Group 7 power supply were e::atined to determine the cause of the Group 7 rod drop, and no problems were identified.

Analysis of Occurrence:

The regulating control rod group sequence is such that when a group is either less than 25 percent withdrawn or above 75 percent' withdrawn, two adjacent regulating groups are operated in overlapped fashion since the reactivity worth of a group is low at the upper and lower part of the group. Technical Specification 3.5.2.5b specifies an overlap of 25 5 percent between two operating groups. Ucwever, there is no core safety significance associated with the mininum overlap requirement, rather the l ccacern is for an overlap greater than 30 percent. Following the Group 7 l rod drop, the overlap becar.e 0 percent until the r2 quired overlap was l reestablished after five minutes. This reductirn in overlap did not l j create any unsafe conditions, and no core protection limits were approached. i This incident did not affect the health and safety of the public. 1 b l 80013gonog

-__c. _. . . _ _ . . - - -_

_ _ . . _ _ . . . - _ . _ _ - . - . - _ - . - . . . _ . . _ . _ . ~.

4 j , .i

- 2-l i

Correetiver Actlon:_

I i The 2515 percent overlap was in=ediately reestablished by reali;ning t control rod Groups 6 and 7 to appropriate positions.

I 1

1 e

i 4

e k

I l

e r

e 9

S 4

e I

d e

1 I

i 1

__ _ . _ _ . _ _ _. - _ . . _ _ _ . . . , , . , . _ _ _ , .. - _ . . _ , _ _ _ . _ , . . , _ , .