ML19317F060

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
AO-287/75-12:on 751028,reactor Bldg Air Sampling Line Inlet Valve 3PR-7 Failed to Close During Engineered Safeguards Actuation Testing.Caused by Personnel Error.Breaker Closed & Valve Tested for Operability
ML19317F060
Person / Time
Site: Oconee Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/10/1975
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19317F053 List:
References
NUDOCS 8001080752
Download: ML19317F060 (1)


Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

}'

=..w

.m 6

DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 3

' Report No.: A0-287/75-12 Report Date: November 10, 1975 Occurrence Date: October 28, 1975 Facility: Oconee Unit 3, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Containment isolation valve discovered inoperable i

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100% full power Description of Occurrence:

On October 28, 1975, periodic Engineered Safeguards actuation testing was being performed on Oconee Unit 3.

During this testing, attempts to close valve 3PR-7, the Reactor Building air sampling line inlet valve, failed.

It was discovered that the valve's electrical breaker had been left open and, consequently, the valve was inoperable.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Review of all logs and valve maintenance histories indicated that the valve had not been involved in any test or maintenance activity since periodic actuation testing on September 19,-1975.

Therefore, there was no reason the electrical breaker should have been lef t open leaving the valve in an inoperable mode.

This occurrence then, was apparently caused by a personnel error by which the valve breaker had inadvertently been left open.

Analysis of Event:

Valve 3PR-7 is a Reactor Building containment isolation valv; ased to isolate the Reactor Building sample line in the event containment is required.

This incident resulted in one of two redundant Reactor Building valves being in-operable.

The valve 3PR-8, located downstream in the sampling line was operable and would have closed if containment integrity had been necessary. Therefore, it is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.

Corrective Action:

The electrical breaker was immediately closed and the valve tested to assure its operability.

It is felt that present surveillance testing procedures are sufficient to discover errors of 'this type.

80010807

. -