ML19317D985
| ML19317D985 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 10/21/1975 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317D981 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912100662 | |
| Download: ML19317D985 (1) | |
Text
_
Regulato;y 999,7 7l, /
DUKE POWER COMPANY v(g C NEE WIT 1 p
yh.
4 Report No.:
A0-269/75-12 g '.1 1
Report Date: October 21, 1975 4
Occurrence Date: October 7, 1975 Facility:
Oconee Unit 1, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence:
Improper borated water storage tank level Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit at 100 percent full power Description of Occurrence:
On October 7, 1975, while recirculating the Oconee Unit 1 borated water storage tank for purification, a low borated water storage tank (BWST) alarm was received in the control room. An investigation revealed that valve SF-53, suction cross connect between the BWST and the spent fuel pool was open.
Thus, the BWST was being drained to the spent fuel pool.
Valve SF-53 was shut, stopping the decrease of BWST level at 45 feet. A reactor shutdown was commenced and continued until BWST level was restored to the Technical Specification limit of 46 feet.
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
The apparent cause of this occurrence was the use of an out-of-date procedure on October 5, 1975 while placing the spent fuel pool in recirculation. The old procedure required valve SF-53 to be left open.
Thus, when the BWST was i
placed in recirculation on October 7, 1975, a path was provided for the BWST l
to drain to the spent fuel pool.
Analysis of Occurrence:
l Oconee Technical Specifications require that a minimum level of 46 feet of l
water be maintained in the borated water storage tank. This will provide l
a supply of emergency core cooling and reactor building spray water in the I
event of a loss-of-coolant accident.
In this incident, the BWST level decreased only to 45 feet; therefore, sufficient borated water would still have been available in the unlikely event a loss-of-coolant accident had occurred.
It is concluded that the health and safety of the public was not affected.
Corrective Action:
The operator involved has been counseled as to the proper t.se of procedures and of the necessity for comparing all procedures to the ccntrol copy prior I
to use.
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