ML19329A867

From kanterella
Revision as of 22:47, 31 January 2020 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Final Deficiency Rept Re Lack of Chambers on Lower Guide Lugs & Use of Hand Grinders During Repair of Upper Keyways Contrary to Specified Procedure.Discovered During Initial Out of Level Life of Core Support Assembly
ML19329A867
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/09/1977
From: Roe L
TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19329A861 List:
References
NUDOCS 8001150760
Download: ML19329A867 (2)


Text

. -. .-- .. _

. .c.

g2" l

\b.$3 lEdISOij ,

tk. -

LOwrtt E. not Docket !!o. 50-346 y,,,,,,,,,,,,,

'e .. u . ri. .. . - . ..

  • '** n$ orar March 9, 1977 Serial No. 237 qmm 1

Mr. James C. Keppler D DJ Ecgionni Director, Region III I Office of Inspection and Enforcenent -

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cotedssion n1 I.

g -

799 Roosevelt Road 60137 i

,,_( _.-)

Glen Ellyn, Ill.

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Funct2onal

~ During removal of the reactor vessel internals following Hot Testing (UFT) of the Davis-Eesse Unit 1, the lif ting fixture was in-properly adjusted resulting in an initial out of Icvel lift of_the core support acnembly. Af ter adjustrents te the lif ting fixture, the internals i

it was were renoved. During inspection of the upper keys and keyways, found that this initial out of level lif t and subsequent renoval had resulted in galling of the upper keys and keyways. 1 During post HFr visual inspection of the core support ass,tbly one O) of invee>-

the 24 lover guide blocks was discovered to be 1cose and subsequent tigation showed that the bolt which, together with a dow :1, f astens the block to the core support assembly h J been broken at sose time during HFr.

Visual exanination of the reactor vessel interior shovel that n Icad in chanfer on the 12 lugs located in chn lower part of the vessel called for on drawings, had not been provided.

Additional visual exanination cf the lower guide block.: also showed that the block which had the broken bolt and four (4) other guiic blocks had been in contact with their nating lugs during HFr as evidenced by carking indicatior.i.

i on -both the lug and guide block surfaces.

During cican ut irepair- of the upper . keyways which was to have been done by hand stoning the raised caterizl, a worker contrary t > specific directio..i ,

used a hand grinder on one keyway which resulted in on out of. tolerance 6 keyway gap.

l j

M O o1159w Y' 7  !

l continued. . . .' l 3fXI BAAD' SON AVEMR TOLETO. Ott0 43t',7 THE TOLEDO EDISON COW 9 ED'5CN P.f.2.A 8

IUtR 1G 1. g7 1 .- _. -- .. .- - - _.. - - . -- .

~

'l iiE 101.1 !K) CD1SOi CO'"drt ,

g

=

p .

.} . G. reppler . ISrch 9, 1977

. ~

4 -

All .I thene itcas have been the nubject of an intensive investination by ourt.e 1ves , BT.W and our consultant (fil'h Associat es. Inc.). The possible interrela tionship of these it ens and he pounible relationship of these iteras to the qualification of the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Specimen Holder Tubes have been considered. This investination has also been done to determine proper corrective action where necessary. Two of the above itens have been specifically reported to NRC OIT.E Region 111 as 10CFR 50.SS(e) deficiencies, these being the lack of chamfers on the lower guide lugs as called for on design drawings and the use of hand grindern during repair of the upper keyway contrary t o specified procedures.

Due to the nature and potential ef fect of these related items, a eeeting was held, at our suggestion, with ce=bers of your staf f and NRR staf f ncmbers at the Davis-Besse site on March 1, 1977. As a result of this meeting, additional analysis has been done and full corrective action han been finalized, nese analyses and corrective actions have been documented and are being transmit.ted by attachnents ts this letter and will be re-viewed in greater detail during a necting on this date with nenbers of your staf f and staff cembers of NRR at the Bethesda SRC of fices.

The correction of the deficiencies as described in these attachments prior to operation of the facility, assures that the health and safety of the pub 1c a re not- jeopardized.

m Yours m ry truly, D)

,/ / ~ ' n' g&h / dUn

/ DI 1 ~

Lowell E. Roc 9 ~Q~}

Vice President U _ _ _( _1 Facilities Develop =ent Attachments: Q {,

A. Report on Core Support Asr,edly Insertic / Withdrawal Problers and Guide Block Eolt Failure.

B. Omission of ]cfers en RV 1.ugs. ,,

C. Storage Stand, Distortico of lackjng Clips. .

D. Loose Thercal Sleeve in EPI Noz:.lc.

cc: .

R. S. Boyd, Directer Division of Project Fe_nage c t .

11. S. Nuclear Regulatery C -.Mssic: .

~~~

. r e