IR 05000369/2016009

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NRC Team Inspection Report 05000369/2016009 and 05000370/2016009
ML16243A298
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/30/2016
From: Masters A
Reactor Projects Branch 7
To: Capps S
Duke Energy Carolinas
References
IR 2016009
Download: ML16243A298 (14)


Text

UNITED STATES ust 30, 2016

SUBJECT:

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2016009 AND 05000370/2016009

Dear Mr. Capps:

On July 28, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 28, 2016, with you and other members of your staff. A re-exit was conducted with Mr. G. Murphy via telephone on August 19, 2016, to discuss the final results of the inspection.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to the implementation of mitigation strategies and spent fuel pool instrumentation orders (EA-12-049 and EA-12-051) and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans, your compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved examination of selected procedures and records, observation of activities, and interviews with station personnel.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Anthony D. Masters, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-369, 50-370 License No.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Enclosure:

IR 05000369/2016009, 05000370/2016009 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket No.: 50-369, 50-370 License No.: NPF-9, NPF-17 Report No.: 05000369/2016001, 05000370/2016001 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: July 25 - 28, 2016 Inspectors: J. Hanna, Senior Reactor Analyst (Team Leader)

R. Rodriguez, Senior Project Engineer A. Hutto, Senior Resident Inspector R. Alexander, RIV Senior Project Engineer Approved by: Anthony D. Masters, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000369/2016009 and 05000370/2016009; 7/25/2016 - 7/28/2016; McGuire Nuclear

Station, Units 1 and 2; Temporary Instruction 2515/191, Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans issued December 23, 2015.

The inspection covered a one week inspection by one senior reactor analyst, one senior resident inspector and two senior project engineers. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

None

Licensee-Identified Violations

None

REPORT DETAILS

4. Other Activities

4OA5 Other Activities (TI 2515/191)

The objective of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2015/191 Inspection of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans is to verify that licensees have adequately implemented the mitigation strategies as described in the licensees Final Integrated Plan (ADAMS ML15343A010) and the NRCs plant safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No. ML16104A078) and to verify that the licensees installed reliable water-level measurement instrumentation in their spent fuel pools. The purpose of this TI is also to verify the licensees have implemented Emergency Preparedness (EP) enhancements as described in their site-specific submittals and NRC safety assessments, including multi-unit dose assessment capability and enhancements to ensure that staffing is sufficient and communications can be maintained during such an event.

The inspection verifies that plans for complying with NRC Orders EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (ADAMS Accession No. ML12229A174) and EA-12-051, Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A044) are in place and are being implemented by the licensee. Additionally, the inspection verifies implementation of staffing and communications information provided in response to the March 12, 2012 request for information letter and multiunit dose assessment information provided per COMSECY-13-0010, Schedule and Plans for Tier 2 Order on Emergency Preparedness for Japan Lessons Learned, dated March 27, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12339A262).

The team discussed the plans and strategies with plant staff, reviewed documentation, and where appropriate, performed plant walk downs to verify that the strategies could be implemented as stated in the licensees submittals and the NRC staff prepared safety evaluation. For most strategies, this included verification that the strategy was feasible, procedures and/or guidance had been developed, training had been provided to plant staff, and required equipment had been identified and staged. Specific details of the teams inspection activities are described in the following sections.

1. Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design Basis External Events

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensees established guidelines and implementing procedures for the beyond-design basis mitigation strategies. The team assessed how the licensee coordinated and documented the interface/transition between existing off-normal and Emergency Operating Procedures with the newly developed mitigation strategies. The team selected a number of mitigation strategies and conducted plant walk downs with licensed operators and responsible plant staff to assess: the adequacy and completeness of the procedures; familiarity of operators with the procedure objectives and specific guidance; staging and compatibility of equipment; and the practicality of the operator actions prescribed by the procedures, consistent with the postulated scenarios.

The team verified that a preventive maintenance program had been established for the FLEX portable equipment and that periodic equipment inventories were in place and being conducted. Additionally, the team examined the introductory and planned periodic/refresher training provided to the Operations and Security staffs most likely to be tasked with implementation of the FLEX mitigation strategies. The team also reviewed the introductory and planned periodic training provided to the Emergency Response Organization personnel. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented appropriate elements of the FLEX strategy as described in the plant specific submittal(s) and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-049. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:

  • developed and issued FLEX Support Guidelines (FSG) to implement the FLEX strategies for postulated external events
  • integrated their FSGs into their existing plant procedures such that entry into and departure from the FSGs are clear when using existing plant procedures.
  • protected FLEX equipment from site-specific hazards.
  • developed and implemented adequate testing and maintenance of FLEX equipment to ensure their availability and capability.
  • trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency in the mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.
  • developed means to ensure that the necessary off-site FLEX equipment will be available from off-site locations.

The inspectors verified that noncompliances with current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings identified.

2. Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensees newly installed spent fuel pool instrumentation.

Specifically, the inspectors verified the sensors were installed as described in the plant specific submittals and the associated safety evaluation and that the cabling for the power supplies and the indications for each channel are physically and electrically separated. Additionally, environmental conditions and accessibility of the instruments were evaluated. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Assessment Based on samples selected for review, the inspectors determined that the licensee satisfactorily installed and established control of the SFP instrumentation as described in the plant specific submittal(s) and the associated safety evaluation and determined that the licensee is generally in compliance with NRC Order EA-12-051. The inspectors verified that the licensee satisfactorily:

  • installed the SFP instrumentation sensors, cabling and power supplies to provide physical and electrical separation as described in the plant specific submittal(s) and safety evaluation.
  • installed the SFP instrumentation display in the location, environmental conditions and accessibility as described in the plant specific submittal(s)
  • trained their staff to assure personnel proficiency with the maintenance, testing, and use of the SFP instrumentation.

The inspectors verified that noncompliances with current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings identified.

3. Staffing and Communication Request for Information

a. Inspection Scope

Through discussions with plant staff, review of documentation and plant walk downs, the team verified that the licensee has implemented required changes to staffing, communications equipment and facilities to support an ELAP scenario as described in the licensees staffing assessment and the NRC safety assessment. The team also verified that the licensee has implemented dose assessment (including releases from spent fuel pools) capability using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach as described in the licensees dose assessment submittal. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Assessment The inspectors reviewed information provided in the licensees multi-unit dose submittal and in response to the NRCs March 12, 2012, request for information letter and verified that the licensee satisfactorily implemented enhancements pertaining to Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 9.3 response to a large scale natural emergency event that results in an extended loss of all ac power to the site and impedes access to the site.

The inspectors verified the following:

  • Licensee satisfactorily implemented required staffing change(s) to support an ELAP scenario.
  • EP communications equipment and facilities are sufficient for dealing with an ELAP scenario.
  • Implemented dose assessment capabilities (including releases from spent fuel pools)using the licensees site-specific dose assessment software and approach.

The inspectors verified that noncompliances with current licensing requirements, and other issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

c. Findings

No findings identified.

4OA6 Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 28, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results Mr. S. Capps and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection. A re-exit was conducted with Mr. G. Murphy via telephone on August 19, 2016, to discuss the final results of the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

K. Barrow, Site Services
J. Bradley, Duke Fukushima Response
T. Byrne, Duke Fleet Regulatory Affairs
S. Capps, Site Vice President - McGuire
B. Casey, Power Engineering
D. Davies, Catawba Fukushima Response
P. Guill, Duke Fukushima Response
M. Hunt, Civil Design Engineering
W. Killette, Operations Training
B. Little, Operations
R. Lytton, Mechanical Design Engineering
G. Murphy, Regulatory Affairs
K. Murray, Emergency Preparedness
B. Meyer, Mechanical Design Engineering
R. Pope, Operations
B. Price, Catawba Fukushima Response
T. Rollins, Operations
J. Thomas, Duke Fukushima Response
M. Weiner, Operations Procedures

NRC personnel

T. Brown, Project Manager, Orders Management Branch, Japan Lessons Learned Directorate
R. Cureton, Resident Inspector, Branch 1, Division of Reactor Projects
M. Shams, Deputy Director, Japan Lessons Learned Directorate

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Opened and Closed

None

Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED