IR 05000369/2024003

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Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2024003 and 05000370/2024003
ML24303A001
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  
Issue date: 11/04/2024
From: Robert Williams
Division of Operating Reactors
To: Pigott E
Duke Energy Carolinas
References
IR 2024003
Download: ML24303A001 (1)
v • d • e


Text

SUBJECT:

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2024003 AND 05000370/2024003

Dear Edward Pigott:

On September 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at McGuire Nuclear Station. On October 31, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Two of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at McGuire Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at McGuire Nuclear Station.

November 4, 2024 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Robert E. Williams, Jr., Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000369 and 05000370 License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers:

05000369 and 05000370

License Numbers:

NPF-9 and NPF-17

Report Numbers:

05000369/2024003 and 05000370/2024003

Enterprise Identifier:

I-2024-003-0023

Licensee:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Facility:

McGuire Nuclear Station

Location:

Huntersville, North Carolina

Inspection Dates:

July 1, 2024, to September 30, 2024

Inspectors:

C. Safouri, Senior Resident Inspector

F. Young, Resident Inspector

P. Boguszewski, Senior Resident Inspector

P. Carman, Senior Project Engineer

J. Diaz-Velez, Senior Health Physicist

S. Downey, Senior Reactor Inspector

C. Even, Senior Project Engineer

A. Hutto, Senior Project Engineer

B. Kellner, Senior Health Physicist

D. Neal, Health Physicist

Approved By:

Robert E. Williams, Jr., Chief

Projects Branch 1

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at McGuire Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Implement Procedure Resulted in Inadvertent De-energization of Safety-Related Equipment and Yellow Shutdown Risk Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000370/2024003-01 Open/Closed

[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.13 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 was identified when the licensee failed to implement an instruction procedure for the startup, shutdown, and changing modes of operation for control room heating and ventilation and onsite electrical alternating current (AC) system, as referenced in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations)," Revision 2, dated February 1978, Appendix A, Item 3.p and 3.s(2)(b). Specifically, while Unit 2 was in cold shutdown, the licensee failed to implement operating procedure OP/0/A/6450/011A, Swapping VC/YC Between Units," when an incorrect breaker was operated while attempting to transfer power supplies to the train B control area ventilation and chilled water (VC/YC) system from Unit 2 to Unit 1.

Failure to Implement Procedure for Refueling Preparations Resulted in a Reactor Cavity Seal Leak Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000370/2024003-02 Open/Closed

[H.9] - Training 71111.20 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1 was identified when the licensee failed to implement a maintenance procedure for activities involving preparations for refueling and refueling equipment operation, as referenced in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations)," Revision 2, dated February 1978, Appendix A, Item 2.k. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly implement refueling preparation procedure MP/0/A/7650/145,

Mechanical Vessel/Cavity Seal Installation/Removal, while installing the Unit 2 reactor cavity seal. As a result, a reactor/refueling cavity leak occurred on September 5, 2024, which required the licensee to reduce reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory and enter an unplanned elevated (yellow) shutdown risk condition.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at or near 100 percent RTP. On September 1, 2024, the unit was shut down for a scheduled refueling outage (M2R29). The unit was returned to 100 percent RTP on September 23, 2024, and remained at or near 100 percent RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk-significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 1 radiation monitoring system process and area monitors, on August 26, 2024
(2) Unit 2 train B spent fuel pool cooling system following planned maintenance, on August 30, 2024
(3) Unit 2 residual heat removal system during lowered inventory, on September 4, 2024

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 nuclear service water (RN) system, on September 20, 2024

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Unit 1 train A and train B diesel generator (D/G) rooms during maintenance work window, on July 17, 2024
(2) Auxiliary building shared equipment area on the 733 feet elevation and mechanical penetration rooms, on July 26, 2024
(3) Unit 2 reactor building upper containment area, on September 18, 2024
(4) Unit 2 reactor building lower containment area, on September 18, 2024
(5) Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pump room, on September 24, 2024

71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) Unit 1 train A D/G cooling water heat exchanger, on July 16, 2024

===71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities in Unit 2 during refueling outage M2R29 from September 9, to September 13, 2024.

PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities (IP Section 03.01)===

Main article: IP 71111.08

The inspectors verified that the following nondestructive examination and welding activities were performed appropriately:

(1) Liquid Penetrant Examination
  • Weld NI2FW89-2, valve to pipe weld, ASME Class 1; This included a review of the associated welding activities Ultrasonic Examination
  • 3" alternate charging line on cold leg 2D nozzle 4-5, ASME Class 1
  • Weld NI2FW89-2, valve to pipe weld, ASME Class 1; This included a review of the associated welding activities Visual Examination

Activities (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors verified that the licensee conducted the following vessel upper head penetration inspections and addressed any identified defects appropriately:

(1)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees boric acid control program performance, which included the following activities:

(1) Boric acid walkdown - September 10, 2024 Review of the following boric acid evaluations (by nuclear condition report (NCR)number):

===02461299

  • 02461675
  • 02463790 Review of the following corrective actions performed for evidence of boric acid leaks that were identified (by NCR number):
  • 02461299
  • 02463787
  • 02467457
  • 02488914
  • 02505732
  • 02527294

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

=

Main article: IP 02461
(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 downpower for refueling outage M2R29, on August 31, 2024.
(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 control rod drop timing and reactor startup near the end of refueling outage M2R29, on September 21, 2024.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) NCR 02521555, emergency supplemental power supply diesel generator #2 breaker failure to close, on August 21, 2024
(2) NCR 02429236, Unit 1 standby makeup pump isolation valve, 1NV-849AC, failure to open, on September 6, 2024

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Implementation of risk-informed completion time and equipment protection plan for scheduled maintenance on Unit 1 train A D/G, on July 15, 2024
(2) Emergent work on Unit 2 rod control urgent failure alarm resolution, on August 19, 2024
(3) NCR 02527468, Unit 2 unplanned loss of electrical bus 2ELXB during outage activities, on September 3, 2024
(4) Equipment protection plan during Unit 2 higher risk plant operating state during lowered inventory and yellow risk associated with key safety functions of decay heat removal and inventory control, on September 4, 2024

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) NCR 02522849, Unit 2 train A RN strainer differential pressure indication failure, on July 22, 2024
(2) NCR 02524470, Unit 2 train B D/G building ventilation damper failed test requirement, on August 7, 2024
(3) NCR 02525956, Unit 2 urgent rod control failure alarm on power cabinet 2SCDE, on August 19, 2024
(4) NCR 02519611, Unit 1 train A RN strainer differential pressure transmitter, 1RNPT5000, exceeding environmental qualified life, on August 23, 2024
(5) NCR 02526647, Unit 1 train A D/G battery charger failure, on August 27, 2024
(6) NCR 02527468, Unit 2 unplanned loss of electrical bus 2ELXB during outage activities, on September 3, 2024

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Procedure revision request 02513466 for PT/2/A/4600/105, "Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Drop Timing Using Digital Rod Position Indication (DRPI) System,"

Revision 10, on August 8, 2024

(2) Engineering change 418932, Unit 2 train B component cooling water pump #1 motor stator rewind, on September 9, 2024

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 2 refueling outage (M2R29) activities from September 1, 2024, to September 22, 2024.

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)

(1) Work order (WO) 20600602, maintenance functional testing for Unit 1 train A D/G battery bank during battery replacement, on July 18, 2024
(2) PT/1/A/4350/002A, "Diesel Generator 1A Operability Test," following two-year inspection of Unit 1 train A D/G, on July 23, 2024
(3) WO 20645121, lube oil to Unit 2 train A D/G engine, 2LDP5120, replacement and calibration, on July 23, 2024
(4) WO 20628290, Unit 1 train A centrifugal charging pump preventative maintenance window, on July 24, 2024
(5) PT/2/A/4350/026C, "Auxiliary Shutdown Panel Verification for #2 CA Pump Controls,"

and PT/2/A/4252/003B, "CA Train B Valve Stroke Timing - Quarterly Turbine Driven Pump Flowpath," following periodic component inspection and replacement on Unit 2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, on July 30, 2024

(6) Portions of PT/2/A/4600/001, "Rod Cluster Control Assembly (RCCA) Movement Test," following troubleshoot and repair of rod control power cabinet 2SCDE, on August 23, 2024
(7) PT/2/A/4401/001B, "KC Train 2B Performance Test," following replacement of Unit 2 train B component cooling water pump #1 motor, on September 15, 2024
(8) PT/2/A/4209/012A, "2A NV Pump Head Curve Performance Test and Acceptance Testing of Various NV/NI Check Valves," following internals replacement of Unit 2 train B centrifugal charging pump discharge check valve, 2NV-231, on September 16, 2024
(9) PT/2/A/4350/004A, "2A D/G Periodic and Load Sequencer Test," following troubleshoot and repair for Unit 2 train A D/G failing to reach 4160V within the accepted time limit, on September 19, 2024

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

(1) PT/2/A/4350/036A, "D/G 2A 24 Hour Run," on July 22, 2024
(2) PT/0/A/4250/037, "Main Steam Safety Valve Setpoint Test Using Set Pressure Verification Device," for Unit 2 loop D steam generator code safety relief valves, on August 27, 2024
(3) PT/2/A/4200/009B, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Test Train B,"

Section 12.3, associated with safety injection and blackout emergency signals, on September 2, 2024

(4) PT/2/A/4200/009B, "Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Test Train B,"

Section 12.4, associated with blackout event actuation, on September 2, 2024

Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) PT/2/A/4200/001C, "Isolation Valve Leak Rate Test," for penetration M-280 cold leg accumulator sample header, on September 11, 2024

Ice Condenser Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) PT/0/A/4200/018, "Ice Bed Analysis," which verified as-found weights of the Unit 2 ice condenser prior to refueling outage, on August 6, 2024

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) The inspectors evaluated an emergency preparedness drill that consisted of a loss of offsite power, a technical support center emergency response organization turnover, and loss of all AC power, on July 24,

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identifies the magnitude and extent of radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and how the licensee assesses radiological hazards.

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee instructs workers on plant-related radiological hazards and the radiation protection requirements intended to protect workers from those hazards.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors observed/evaluated the following licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material:

(1) Inspectors observed workers exiting the Unit 2 lower containment area.
(2) Inspectors observed technicians surveying materials and tools used in Unit 2 lower containment.
(3) Inspectors reviewed documentation and survey of personal contamination event, PCE 24-002.

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's control of radiological hazards for the following radiological work:

(1) Unit 2 refueling activities in upper containment
(2) Scaffold removal from Unit 2 reactor coolant filter room, room 789, locked high radiation area (LHRA)
(3) Work done on valves in the hot tool room High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following high radiation areas and very high radiation areas (VHRAs):

(1) Unit 2 regenerative heat exchanger room (LHRA).
(2) Unit 2 incore sump room (VHRA).
(3) Unit 2 fuel transfer tube access door, pipe chase (VHRA).
(4) Spent resin sluice pump, room 610 (LHRA).

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP

Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:

(1) U1/U2 auxiliary building ventilation system
(2) U1/U2 control room area ventilation system

Temporary Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following temporary ventilation systems:

(1) HEPA filter ID #750-744

Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices.

Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses.

71124.04 - Occupational Dose Assessment

Source Term Characterization (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated licensee performance as it pertains to radioactive source term characterization.

External Dosimetry (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated how the licensee processes, stores, and uses external dosimetry.

Internal Dosimetry (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following internal dose assessments:

(1) Internal Dose Assessment #545778, 10/16/23 intake event during control rod drive ventilation system duct reassembly
(2) Internal Dose Assessment #464571, 09/15/24 intake event during deep end decontamination
(3) Internal Dose Assessment #530342, in-vitro analysis 09/2022 (baseline and sample)

Special Dosimetric Situations (IP Section 03.04) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following special dosimetric situations:

(1) Declared Pregnant Worker, who declared on 11/08/2023
(2) Multi-Pack Dose Record #703793
(3) Multi-Pack Dose Record #409561

71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (9 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:

(1) Personnel monitoring friskers (Ludlum 177) located throughout the facility and at the radiologically controlled area exit point (SPA) [weekly source check verification completed]
(2) Area radiation monitors at various location in the auxiliary building
(3) Ion chamber dose rate survey meters (Ludlum 9-3) ready for use in the instrument issue area [weekly source check verification completed]
(4) Geiger-Mueller (GM) dose rate survey meters (RadEye G, and Ludlum 3 with hot dog probe) ready for use in the instrument issue area [weekly source check verification completed]
(5) Telescoping GM dose rate survey meters (Teletector) ready for use in the instrument issue area [weekly source check verification completed]
(6) Gooseneck low volume air samplers ready for use in the storage area
(7) Automated smear and sample counting systems (Tennelec APC) located in the counting room
(8) Gamma spectroscopy systems (Ortec Gamma spec detectors) located in the counting room
(9) Tritium sample analysis systems (Perkin-Elmer) located in the counting room

Calibration and Testing Program (IP Section 03.02) (15 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing of the following radiation detection instruments:

(1) Teletector ENRAD ID # 02135 Calibration Date 2/28/2024 and 7/1/2024
(2) Ludlum Model 3 Pancake Frisker ENRAD ID # 02461 Calibration Date 4/11/2024 and 6/4/2024
(3) Ludlum Model 3030P Beta/Alpha Smear Counter ENRAD ID # 03582 Calibration Date 9/20/2022 and 1/3/2024
(4) Ludlum Model 177 Pancake Frisker ENRAD ID # 07196 Calibration Date 1/11/2023 and 1/31/2024
(5) Ludlum Model 3030P Beta/Alpha Smear Counter ENRAD ID # 07822 Calibration Date 6/21/2021 and 6/26/2023
(6) Argos 5 AB Personnel Contamination Monitor ENRAD ID # 07901 Calibration Date 6/27/2023 and 6/25/2024
(7) Ludlum Model 9-3 Ion Chamber Dose Rate Meter ENRAD ID # 11439 Calibration Date 8/8/2023 and 4/17/2024
(8) Cronos 4 Tool & Equipment Monitor ENRAD ID # 12602 Calibration Date 4/20/2023 and 4/17/2024
(9) Cronos 4 Tool & Equipment Monitor ENRAD ID # 12748 Calibration Date 4/20/2023 and 4/17/2024
(10) Rados Fibre XL Hand & Foot Monitor ENRAD ID # 12758 Calibration Date 4/20/2023 and 4/17/2024
(11) Rados Fibre XL Hand & Foot Monitor ENRAD ID # 12759 Calibration Date 4/20/2023 and 4/17/2024
(12) Ludlum Model 177 Pancake Frisker ENRAD ID # 13183 Calibration Date 1/24/2023 and 1/3/2024
(13) Canberra iCAM Continuous Air Monitor ENRAD ID # 13201 Calibration Date 1/19/2023 and 1/16/2024
(14) Canberra GEM-5 Portal Monitor ENRAD ID # 13289 Calibration Date 6/27/2023 and 6/24/2024
(15) Canberra GEM-5 Portal Monitor ENRAD ID # 13290 Calibration Date 6/27/2023 and 6/24/2024 Effluent Monitoring Calibration and Testing Program Sample (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the calibration and maintenance of the following radioactive effluent monitoring and measurement instrumentation:

(1) Low range radioactive liquid release monitor 0-EMF-49 calibration package - WO 20448831, 10/28/2021, and WO 20599055, 4/4/2024
(2) Unit 1 vent stack low range radioactive release monitor 1-EMF-36 calibration package - WO 20429945, 5/25/2021, and WO 20538161, 2/3/2023
(3) Waste gas low range radioactive release monitor 0-EMF-50 calibration package - WO 20456922, 9/9/2021, and WO 20558271, 5/9/2023

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07)===

Main article: IP 71151
(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)

MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)

MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
(2) Unit 2 (July 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)

BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)
(2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2023, through June 30, 2024)

OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)

(1) September 30, 2023, through September 13, 2024 PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample (IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
(1) September 30, 2023, through May 31, 2024

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)

Main article: IP 71152

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) NCR 02519611, Unit 1 train A RN strainer differential pressure transmitter, 1RNPT5000, exceeding environmental qualified life, on August 23, 2024

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)

Main article: IP 71152
(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in Unit 2 train B solid state protection system 48/15VDC power supply preventative maintenance that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Implement Procedure Result in Inadvertent De-energization of Safety-Related Equipment and Yellow Shutdown Risk Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000370/2024003-01 Open/Closed

[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.13 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 was identified when the licensee failed to implement an instruction procedure for the startup, shutdown, and changing modes of operation for control room heating and ventilation and onsite electrical AC system, as referenced in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations)," Revision 2, dated February 1978, Appendix A, Item 3.p and 3.s(2)(b). Specifically, while Unit 2 was in cold shutdown, the licensee failed to implement operating procedure OP/0/A/6450/011A, Swapping VC/YC Between Units," when an incorrect breaker was operated while attempting to transfer power supplies to the train B control area ventilation and chilled water (VC/YC)system from Unit 2 to Unit 1.

Description:

On September 3, 2024, at approximately 0400 with Unit 2 in Mode 5 (cold shutdown) for a refueling outage, plant operators commenced procedure OP/0/A/6450/011A, Swapping VC/YC Between Units, Revision 032, to align power supplies to the train B VC/YC system from Unit 2 to Unit 1 to support outage activities. The procedure includes steps that manipulate the onsite electrical AC power system components as well as the VC/YC system. Procedure OP/0/A/6450/011A, Attachment 6, Section 3.0 step 8.j, directed operators to ensure breakers 1ELXB-4C (2EMXH MBB (alternate) feeder) and 2ELXB-4C (2EMXH MCC (normal) feeder) were open.

While performing step 8.j, non-licensed operators inadvertently opened breaker 2ELXB-4B, 2ELXB normal feeder breaker, while attempting to open 2ELXB-4C, 2EMXH motor control center normal feeder breaker. This error de-energized 2ELXB instead of 2EMXH. 2ELXB is a 600V essential load center that transforms 4160V power from the Unit 2 train B diesel generator or available offsite power circuit to multiple 600V motor control centers (MCCs),which powers various safety-related motors, pumps, and controls. During the event, 2ELXB and multiple downstream 600V MCCs, including 2EMXH (which primarily powers train B VC/YC components), were de-energized for approximately 45 minutes. The power loss impacted Unit 2 train B safety-related equipment; the error did not impact Unit 2 train A equipment.

When assessing shutdown risk for the inventory control key safety function, the licensee considered the three following flow paths as available for maintaining reactor coolant system inventory:

  • One injection flow path from borated water storage tank and reactor coolant level indication available [first path]
  • One additional injection flow path from borated water storage tank and reactor coolant level indication available [second path]
  • One additional core fill flow path [third path]

This contributed to a minimal overall risk condition (green) prior to the inadvertent breaker operation.

With 2ELXB de-energized, the first path was not impacted as the required components receive power from the train A power path. The second paths reliability was impacted by the de-energization but was determined to be available by the licensee. Specifically, with 2ELXB de-energized, two motor operated valves (MOVs) in the second path lost electrical power, failed in their current position (closed), and were unable to be operated remotely from the main control room. To initiate flow via this path, operators would have to diagnose the impacts of the unplanned de-energization and dispatch operators to manually open the valves locally in the auxiliary building within enough time to respond to a potential loss of inventory event.

The third path was rendered unavailable with 2ELXB de-energized. The combination of existing plant alignments, multiple de-energized train B MOVs, and lack of procedural guidance for initiating core fill flow for the current plant conditions meant that other previously available pumps were not available to mitigate reactor coolant system water loss in a potential loss of inventory event. With the third injection path unavailable, the licensee concluded that Unit 2 shutdown risk transitioned from green, to a higher risk category of yellow.

Corrective Actions: The licensee recognized the error in the main control room based on annunciators received and restored power to 2ELXB and the downstream MCCs in approximately 45 minutes. The licensee also implemented short-term and long-term corrective actions to address the operational performance gaps and evaluate proficiency prior to task performance.

Corrective Action Reference: NCR 02527468

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to operate the onsite emergency AC power system in accordance with licensee procedure OP/0/A/6450/011A as required by TS 5.4.1 and RG 1.33 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, while swapping power supplies for train B VC/YC system from Unit 2 to Unit 1, the licensee opened the incorrect breaker.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the unplanned de-energization of 2ELXB adversely impacted mitigating systems that would respond to a potential loss of inventory event under shutdown plant conditions. This impact was adverse in that one path for core fill was rendered unavailable and another was rendered less reliable due to the need for unplanned manual action during a potential loss of inventory event. Additionally, this condition resulted in an unplanned increase in risk to Unit 2 as evidenced by shutdown risk changing from green to yellow, with 2ELXB de-energized.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The inspectors answered the mitigating systems screening questions in Attachment 1, Exhibit 3. The significance was determined to be of very low safety significance, Green, as the impacted safety function to maintain inventory control was maintained and the adverse impact to redundant equipment was limited to 45 minutes.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, operators did not properly follow licensee expectations for correct component verification and concurrent verification during the improperly performed procedure step.

Enforcement:

Violation: TS 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the following activities referenced in RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. RG 1.33, Appendix A, references a list of, typical safety-related activities that should be covered by written procedures, including, instructions for energizing, filling, venting, draining, startup, shutdown, and changing modes of operation for the following systems:Control Room Heating and Ventilation and Electrical SystemOnsite A.C. system.

The licensee established procedure OP/0/A/6450/011A, Swapping VC/YC Between Units, to implement the requirements for startup, shutdown, and changing modes of operation for control room heating and ventilation and onsite electrical AC systems.

Contrary to the above, on September 3, 2024, the licensee failed to implement instructions for startup, shutdown, and changing modes of operation for control room heating and ventilation and onsite electrical AC systems. Specifically, while swapping power supplies for train B VC/YC system from Unit 2 to Unit 1, the licensee failed to implement OP/0/A/6450/011A, 6, Section 3.0 step 8.j, resulting in the de-energization of load center 2ELXB and unplanned yellow shutdown risk configuration.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Implement Procedure for Refueling Preparations Result in a Reactor Cavity Seal Leak Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000370/2024003-02 Open/Closed

[H.9] - Training 71111.20 A self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1 was identified when the licensee failed to implement a maintenance procedure for activities involving preparations for refueling and refueling equipment operation, as referenced in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operations)," Revision 2, dated February 1978, Appendix A, Item 2.k. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly implement refueling preparation procedure MP/0/A/7650/145, Mechanical Vessel/Cavity Seal Installation/Removal, while installing the Unit 2 reactor cavity seal. As a result, a reactor/refueling cavity leak occurred on September 5, 2024, which required the licensee to reduce reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory and enter an unplanned elevated (yellow) shutdown risk condition.

Description:

During Unit 2 refueling outage (M2R29) activities, the licensee used maintenance procedure MP/0/A/7650/145, "Mechanical Vessel/Cavity Seal Installation/Removal," to install the reactor cavity seal to support reactor cavity fill and fuel movement activities.

On September 5, 2024, the licensee identified an approximate 36 gallons per minute reactor cavity inventory leak at the reactor cavity seal, which was detected by the control room after receiving the incore instrument room sump high level alarm and subsequent local field verification. In response, operators entered abnormal operating procedure AP/2/A/5500/40, "Loss of Refueling Cavity Level," and maintained refueling cavity level within the control band using normal charging and letdown. However, to correct the seal leakage, the licensee reduced RCS inventory to lowered inventory, which is at or below the reactor vessel flange, which transitioned shutdown risk from green to an unplanned yellow risk.

After the licensee drained the cavity, they confirmed that the reactor cavity seal was installed incorrectly. Maintenance procedure MP/0/A/7650/145, steps 7.4.11.a, 7.4.11.c, and 7.4.31.a state the following:

NOTE: The mark "ID" designates the side of T-seal which shall face toward Rx Vessel.

7.4.11.a: Examine ends of seal for the mark "ID".

7.4.11.c: Lay T-Seal segments along Rx Vessel flange AND verify the thick arm of the T-Seal faces the Rx Vessel.

7.4.31.a: Perform the following... Using a 0.10 inch feeler gauge, verify feeler gauge will NOT insert beyond 3/8 inch into ANY of the FIVE splice joints along outside diameter of Vessel/Cavity Seal The licensee initiated a prompt investigation response team and determined that maintenance personnel did not correctly perform steps 7.4.11.c and 7.4.31.a. Procedure MP/0/A/7650/145 is designated as a continuous use procedure, which required the licensee to perform steps as written per AD-HU-ALL-0004, "Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence." The inspectors determined MP/0/A/7650/145 was not implemented properly by responsible maintenance personnel to ensure the installation of the reactor cavity seal did not result in a leak, which could have prevented the station from entering an unplanned elevated shutdown risk condition during the refueling outage.

Corrective Actions: The direct cause of the loss of refueling cavity inventory event was corrected by draining to lowered inventory and reinstalling the reactor cavity seal correctly in accordance with MP/0/A/7650/145. The licensee implemented several interim actions for reactor maintenance personnel, such as requiring documented pre-job briefing, documentation and peer check of qualification verification, and enhanced supervisor/superintendent engagement. Additionally, the licensee initiated an action to evaluate the scope of outage activities that require a qualification in reactor maintenance.

Corrective Action References: NCR 02527860

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to implement a maintenance procedure for preparations for refueling and refueling equipment operation, specifically reactor cavity seal installation, in accordance with MP/0/A/7650/145, steps 7.4.11.c and 7.4.31.a, as required by TS 5.4.1, RG 1.33, was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, because the licensee failed to correctly implement refueling preparation procedures for reactor cavity seal installation, a reactor cavity leak occurred on September 5, 2024, which required the licensee to reduce RCS inventory and enter an unplanned yellow shutdown risk condition to reinstall the seal.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. Since the performance deficiency is associated with the precursor for a Loss of Inventory (LOI) Event and a Loss of Level Control Event, the inspectors screened the finding using the appropriate questions in Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 2, "Initiating Events Screen Questions." The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because while the leakage resulted in the licensee lowering reactor coolant inventory due to the leak location, the LOI event would have been self-terminating at the reactor flange (above reduced inventory level) and would not have resulted in the loss of decay heat removal.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.9 - Training: The organization provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. The licensee's prompt investigation response team discovered that the technicians performing the reactor cavity seal installation task were not qualified because they did not complete the reactor cavity seal qualification. As part of job preparation, supervision and technicians are expected to verify all training and qualifications for a given task are satisfied prior to job execution.

Enforcement:

Violation: TS 5.4.1 requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the following activities referenced in RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. RG 1.33, Appendix A, Item 2.k references "Preparation for Refueling and Refueling Equipment Operation."

The licensee established procedure MP/0/A/7650/145, "Mechanical Vessel/Cavity Seal Installation/Removal," to implement the requirements for preparing equipment to support refueling.

Contrary to the above, on September 5, 2024, the licensee failed to implement the procedure for preparations for refueling and refueling equipment operation while installing the Unit 2 reactor cavity seal. Specifically, the licensee failed to implement procedure MP/0/A/7650/145, steps 7.4.11.c and 7.4.31.a, resulting in a reactor cavity inventory leak which required draining of the RCS inventory below the reactor flange for repairs.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

  • On September 12, 2024, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to Brent Bare, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
  • On September 26, 2024, the inspectors presented the occupational radiation protection baseline inspection results to Brent Bare, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
  • On October 31, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Edward Pigott, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Nuclear Condition

Report

2527646

MCFD-2554-02.00

Flow Diagram of Chemical & Volume Control System (NV)

71111.04

Drawings

MCFD-2561-01.00

Flow Diagram of Residual Heat Removal System (ND)

Calculations

MCC-1223.24-00-

0072

RN/KD Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging Analysis

MP/0/7650/101

Diesel Generator Cooling Water (KD) HX Maintenance

PT/1/A/4200/039

Venting of RN System Following Maintenance

Procedures

PT/1/A/4350/032A

1A KD Heat Exchanger RN DP Test

71111.07A

Work Orders

20644814

PT-24-001

Liquid Penetrant Examination of Weld 2NC2FW16-1

09/08/2024

PT-24-002

Liquid Penetrant Examination of Weld 2NC2FW16-3

09/08/2024

PT-24-004

Liquid Penetrant Examination of 2MCA-ND-5311

09/09/2024

UT-23-004

Ultrasonic Examination of 2NI2FW89-2

2/27/2023

UT-24-002

Ultrasonic Examination of Cold Leg Nozzle 4-5

09/08/2024

UT-24-005

Ultrasonic Examination of Weld 2NC2FW16-1

09/08/2024

UT-24-007

Ultrasonic Examination of Weld 2NC2FW16-3

09/08/2024

VT-024-031

Visual Examination of RV Closure Head

09/09/2024

NDE Reports

VT-24-026

Bare Metal Visual Examination of 2-RPV-BMI-NOZZLES

09/04/2024

71111.08P

Work Orders

Work Orders (by

number)

20170038

71111.11Q

Procedures

PT/2/A/4600/105

RCCA Drop Timing Using DRPI System

Corrective Action

Documents

Nuclear Condition

Reports

2429236, 02520732, 02521555

71111.12

Work Orders

20553978

Defense in Depth Data Sheet: Mode 5 - Lowered Inventory

(HRPOS Begins)

09/03/2024

71111.13

Miscellaneous

AD-OP-ALL-0210

Operational Risk Management Plan - Unit 2 Control Rod

Urgent Alarm Repair

08/20/2024

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

AD-OP-ALL-0212

Risk Informed Completion Time Program Calculations

AD-WC-ALL-0420

Shutdown Risk Management

AD-WC-MNS-

20

Shutdown Risk Management

AP/2/A/5500/14

Rod Control Malfunction

Procedures

IP/0/B/3211/026

Rod Control System Troubleshooting

Work Orders

20682357

Procedures

PT/2/A/4400/001

N

Halon 1301 System Periodic Test

20680595, 20682357, 20683571

71111.15

Work Orders

Work Requests

272410, 20257008, 20273816

51-9300797

Duke-McGuire Component Cooling Water (KC) Pump Motor

Stator Replacement Winding EQ Summary and

Equivalency

Engineering

Evaluations

51-9308424

Supplemental Analysis for Environmental Qualification of

McGuire KC Motor Stators with IPS Insulation to IEEE 323-

1974Property "IEEE" (as page type) with input value "IEEE 323-</br></br>1974" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process. and IEEE 334-1974

Miscellaneous

MCM 1318.22-

0019.001

Comp Cooling Pump Mtr Data Sheet SO 81F32006

EQMM-1393.01-

G04-00

Environmental Qualification Maintenance Manual -

Equipment Type: Motors, Manufacturer: Westinghouse,

Model/Series: See Page 3

NGD-N-0005

Repair And Reconditioning Specification for Low And

Medium Voltage AC Motors with Form Coil and Random

Wound Design

71111.18

Procedures

PT/1/A/4600/105

RCCA Drop Timing Using DRPI System

Corrective Action

Documents

Nuclear Condition

Reports

2525956, 02523688, 02529197, 02528389, 02462795

MCFD-2609-02.00

Flow Diagram of Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System

(LD)

Drawings

MCID-2499-LD.01

Instrument Detail Diesel Generator Lube Oil Pressure

AD-EG-ALL-1206

Equipment Reliability Classification

IP/0/A/3061/004F

Diesel Generator Battery Maintenance

71111.24

Procedures

IP/0/A/3190/005

Inspection and Testing of Motors

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

IP/2/A/3090/021LD

LD Loop Calibration and Operational Test

MP/0/A/7150/076

Ice Basket Weight Determination

MP/0/A/7600/196

Walwoth/Aloyco Check Valve Corrective Maintenance

PT/0/A/4350/021

Nordberg Diesel Engine 2 Year Periodic Maintenance

PT/0/A/4350/045C

25 VDC Diesel Generator Spare Battery Service Test,

Performance Test or Modified Performance Test

PT/2/A/4209/012A

2A NV Pump Head Curve Performance Test and

Acceptance Testing of Various NV/NI Check Valves

PT/2/A/4209/012B

2B NV Pump Head Curve Performance Test and

Acceptance Testing of Various NV/NI Check Valves

PT/2/A/4350/002A

Diesel Generator 2A Operability Test

24

20659141, 20660649, 20582717, 20631969, 20682357,

20687528, 20685257

Work Orders

Work Requests

273816, 20275395

71114.06

Miscellaneous

Emergency Preparedness Critique Report: MNS Drill 24-03

on 07/24/24

08/20/2024

Corrective Action

Documents

CAP Documents reviewed during inspection: AR's

2456674, 02467087, 02485379, 02490663, 02491242,

2505566, & 02527316

Various

RWP # 2830 Task

Unit-2 Rx Bldg: OPs Perform BTO's & R&R's

RWP# 2800

U-2 Aux. Bldg: All Valve Work (AOVs, MOVs, & General

Valves)

RWP# 2806

U-2 Rx. Bldg. AWAW Valve Work (AOVs, MOVs, & General

Valves)

71124.01

Radiation Work

Permits (RWPs)

RWP# 2902

Unit-2 Rx Bldg / Aux: Misc Surveillance (Management,

Safety tours )

71124.03

Corrective Action

Documents

CAP Documents reviewed during inspection: ARs

2463640, 02479189, 02487517, and 02461274

71124.04

Corrective Action

Documents

CAP Documents reviewed during inspection: ARs

2520477, 02524235, and 02526405

Calculations

MCC-1346.05-00-

0002

Primary Calibration of RD-32 Gaseous Radiation Monitors

71124.05

Calibration

Mirion People Mover WBC System - McGuire Nuclear

08/14/2024

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

Station

McGuire Nuclear Station Gamma Spectroscopy System

23 Calibration Package - Detector #3 and #4

07/26/2023

McGuire Nuclear Station Gamma Spectroscopy System

24 Calibration Package - Detector #3 and #4

07/09/2024

ENRAD # 01564

J.L Shepherd Model 89 Shielded Box Calibrator Calibration

Package

11/28/2023

ENRAD #07513

J.L Shepherd Model 89 Shielded Box Calibrator Calibration

Package

11/28/2023

MCHPS # 27518

McGuire Nuclear Station Tennelec APC Smear & Sample

Counting System 2023 Calibration Package

08/03/2023

Records

MCHPS # 27518

McGuire Nuclear Station Tennelec APC Smear & Sample

Counting System 2023 Calibration Package

08/03/2024

Corrective Action

Documents

CAP Documents reviewed during inspection: AR's

2427731, 02448034, 02453466, 02455820, 02458502,

2492807, 02494072, 02494695, 02496370, 02498277,

2506705, 02506989, 02517664, & 02525142

Various

EC 95739

Remove Radiation Monitors EMF 37 & 40 U1 MOD

(1EMF37 and 1EMF40)

Engineering

Changes

EC95794

Remove Radiation Monitors EMF 37 & 40 U2 MOD

(2EMF37 and 2EMF40)

Miscellaneous

AD-RP-ALL-5002,

McGuire Nuclear Station 10 CFR 61 Review 2024 [Dry

Active Waste (DAW) Characterization]

08/28/2024

71151

Corrective Action

Documents

CR 02456674

Electronic Dosimeter Dose Alarm

Corrective Action

Documents

Nuclear Condition

Report

2519611

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Nuclear Condition

Report

2530455

ODP Reference Guide

AD-EG-ALL-1131

Equipment Data Base

71152A

Procedures

AD-EG-ALL-1612

Environmental Qualification (EQ) Program

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

AD-PI-ALL-0100

Corrective Action Program

MCC-1381.05-00-

0310

Environmental Qualification (EQ) Qualified Life Analysis for

Rosemount Pressure Transmitters

MCM-1210.04-

206.001

Qualification Test Report for Model 1153 Series B Pressure

Transmitters

MCS-1240-.03-00-

0001

McGuire Nuclear Station Plant Environmental Qualification

and Parameters

MCS-1574.RN-00-

0001

Design Basis Specification for the RN System

Work Orders

01947323

Corrective Action

Documents

Nuclear Condition

Report

2504530

71152S

Miscellaneous

MCM 1399.08-

0090.001

SSPS Tech Manual

29

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