IR 05000369/2024002

Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2024002 and 05000370/2024002

ML24200A199
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	07/24/2024
From:	Eric Stamm NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1
To:	Pigott E Duke Energy Carolinas
References
IR 2024002
Download: ML24200A199 (16)

Text

SUBJECT:

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2024002 AND 05000370/2024002

Dear Edward Pigott:

On June 30, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at McGuire Nuclear Station. On July 23, 2024, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at McGuire Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at McGuire Nuclear Station.July 24, 2024 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, Eric J. Stamm, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000369 and 05000370 License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000369 and 05000370

License Numbers: NPF-9 and NPF-17

Report Numbers: 05000369/2024002 and 05000370/2024002

Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station

Location: Huntersville, North Carolina

Inspection Dates: April 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024

Inspectors: C. Safouri, Senior Resident Inspector F. Young, Resident Inspector P. Carman, Senior Project Engineer A. Goldau, Operations Engineer A. Hutto, Senior Project Engineer M. Meeks, Senior Operations Engineer

Approved By: Eric J. Stamm, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at McGuire Nuclear Station, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Inappropriate Procedure Resulted in Electrical Failure of 1B1 KC Pump Motor Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.7] - 71111.12 Systems NCV 05000369/2024002-01 Documentation Closed A self-revealed green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of technical specification (TS) 5.4.1.a was identified for the licensees failure to establish an appropriate procedure during maintenance on the Unit 1 train B component cooling water pump #1 (1B1 KC pump) motor, in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), dated February 1978. Specifically, licensee procedure IP/0/A/3190/040, Taping Motor Lead Splices, revision 017, did not contain appropriate instructions for splicing, insulating, and stowing of the 1B1 KC pump electrical cable connection which resulted in an electrical short and trip of the motor.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000369/2024001-01 Unexpected Motor Trip when 71111.12 Closed 1B1 KC Pump Motor Lead Shorted to Electrical Connection Box

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal hot temperatures for the following systems:

• Containment lower compartment ventilation system

• Standby nuclear service water pond

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Offsite power paths of the main power distribution system to Unit 1 and Unit 2 in the high voltage switchyard, on April 17, 2024

(2) Unit 1 refueling water storage tank and alignment of suction lines to emergency core cooling systems, on May 22, 2024

(3) Control area heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 shared control room, on June 10, 2024

(4) Unit 1 train B diesel generator (D/G), on June 27, 2024

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Units 1 and 2 shared equipment area of the auxiliary building on 716 foot elevation, on April 25, 2024

(2) Unit 1 safety-related emergency switchgear and associated HVAC rooms, on May 10, 2024

(3) Unit 1 D/G rooms, on June 11, 2024

(4) Units 1 and 2 shared cable spreading rooms in the auxiliary and service buildings, on June 14, 2024

(5) Units 1 and 2 shared equipment area of auxiliary building 750 foot elevation, on June 21, 2024

Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill conducted in the Unit 2 main turbine oil tank area, on April 11, 2024.

71111.11B - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Requalification Program (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations and biennial written examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), "Requalification Requirements," of the NRC's "Operator's Licenses." The inspector performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating examinations, the crew simulator operating examinations, and the biennial written examinations in accordance with IP 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance." These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.03, "Requalification Examination Results," of IP 71111.11.

(1) Biennial Requalification Written Examinations

The inspectors evaluated the quality of the licensed operator biennial requalification written examination administered on June 6, 2024.

Annual Requalification Operating Tests

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees annual requalification operating test.

Administration of an Annual Requalification Operating Test

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the facility licensee in administering requalification operating tests required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2) and that the facility licensee is effectively evaluating their licensed operators for mastery of training objectives.

Requalification Examination Security

The inspectors evaluated the ability of the facility licensee to safeguard examination material, such that the examination is not compromised.

Remedial Training and Re-examinations

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of remedial training conducted by the licensee, and reviewed the adequacy of re-examinations for licensed operators who did not pass a required requalification examination.

Operator License Conditions

The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for ensuring that licensed operators meet the conditions of their licenses.

Control Room Simulator

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the facility licensees control room simulator in modeling the actual plant, and for meeting the requirements contained in 10 CFR 55.46.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 1 generator full load reactive limits verification test, on April 9, 2024, and Unit 2 rod cluster control assembly bank repositioning and movement test, on April 29, 2024.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (4 Samples)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated annual requalification operating testing, on May 28, 2024

(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated annual requalification operating testing, on June 11, 2024

(3) The inspectors observed and evaluated annual requalification operating testing, on June 18, 2024

(4) The inspectors observed and evaluated annual requalification operating testing, on June 25, 2024

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Nuclear condition report (NCR) 02496771, Unit 1 loop B cold leg accumulator outflow following safety injection piping pressurization test, on April 1, 2024

(2) NCR 02503248, Unit 1 train B D/G protective relay failed to calibrate, on June 12, 2024

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Equipment protection plan for shared 120V power panelboard, EKB, inspection preventive maintenance, on April 8, 2024

(2) Equipment projection plan associated with Unit 2 ventilation unit condensate drain tank level detector inoperability, on April 15, 2024

(3) Emergent work and equipment protection plan for Unit 2 train B auxiliary building filtered ventilation exhaust fan inboard bearing failure, on May 3, 2024

(4) Emergent work and equipment protection plan for Unit 2 train A generator seal oil vapor extractor trip, on May 21, 2024

(5) Unit 2 train A nuclear service water availability during strainer motor, 2RNMR0001, preventive maintenance, on May 22, 2024

(6) Heavy lift evolution of an abandoned chiller system above/near Unit 2 train A component cooling water discharge header, on May 23, 2024

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) NCR 02509869, Unit 2 switchgear room air handler outlet damper stuck open with air handler secured, on April 5, 2024

(2) Impacts to containment operability by work order (WO) 20657426, which consisted of tube plugging on Unit 2 'D' lower containment air handling unit, on May 1, 2024

(3) NCR 02515063, Unit 2 train B D/G building ventilation system auxiliary blower failure, on May 6, 2024

(4) NCR 02518715, Unit 2 primary sampling system isolation valve, 2NM-37, leakage, on June 21, 2024

(5) NCR 02520294, Unit 1 train B upper range reactor vessel level indication out of service for an extended time, on June 26, 2024

(6) Work request 20267162, Unit 1 train A motor driven auxiliary feedwater (CA) pump panel link B-17 unable to be tightened, on June 27, 2024

(7) NCR 02515702, Unit 2 turbine driven CA pump governor drive oil level low, on June 27, 2024

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering change 423705, Nordberg D/G jacket water coupling gasket safety classification

71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk

The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:

Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

(1) WO 02179024, functional retest of various Unit 1 control valves following replacement of control relay, 1RNRL1ATC22 FA, on April 24, 2024

(2) WO 20632937, functional retest of Unit 1 and Unit 2 train B control room area chiller following annual inspection, on May 29, 2024

(3) WO 20632159, functional retest of safe shutdown diesel generator following fuel injector replacement, on June 12, 2024

(4) WO 20663447, functional retest of Unit 2 train B safety injection pump following pump breaker and motor preventive maintenance, on June 25, 2024

Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1) PT/2/A/4350/002A, "Diesel Generator 2A Operability Test," on April 16, 2024

(2) PT/0/A/4200/002, "Standby Shutdown Facility Operability Test," on May 24, 2024

(3) PT/2/A/4350/017B, "2B D/G Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Performance Test," on May 28, 2024

Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) PT/1/A/4252/001A, "1A CA Pump Performance Test," on May 23, 2024

(2) PT/1/A/4252/002A, CA Valve Stroke Timing - Quarterly 1A Motor Driven Pump Flowpath, on May 24,

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)

MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)

(2) Unit 2 (April 1, 2023, through March 31, 2024)

===71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)===

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issue:

(1) NCR 02449543, missing design documentation for diverse and flexible coping strategies (FLEX) pump relief valve setpoints, on May 20,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Inappropriate Procedure Resulted in Electrical Failure of 1B1 KC Pump Motor Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.7] - 71111.12 Systems NCV 05000369/2024002-01 Documentation Closed A self-revealed green finding and associated NCV of TS 5.4.1.a was identified for the licensees failure to establish an appropriate procedure during maintenance on the Unit 1 train B component cooling water pump #1 (1B1 KC pump) motor, in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), dated February 1978. Specifically, licensee procedure IP/0/A/3190/040, Taping Motor Lead Splices, revision 017, did not contain appropriate instructions for splicing, insulating, and stowing of the 1B1 KC pump electrical cable connection which resulted in an electrical short and trip of the motor.

Description:

On October 3, 2020, 1B1 KC pump motor leads were spliced and insulated with electrical tape during planned motor replacement using licensee procedure IP/0/A/3190/040, Taping Motor Lead Splices, revision 017. Portions of Section 7.4 included the following steps for taping of connections greater than 600 volts (V):

7.4: (CAUTION) If bolt is too long, it could wear against insulating material and short connection.

7.4.3: If bolt is too long, then cut to size with appropriate tool.

7.4.4: Remove any sharp edges.

7.4.18.a: Fill voids, cover all rough edges and sharp corners around bolting hardware and lugs with high voltage tapetacky side out to provide smooth base taping surface for subsequent taping.

7.4.18.b: Terminations greater than or equal to 4.16kV but less than or equal to 6.9kV, wrap entire connection with minimum of four half-lapped layers of high voltage insulating tapetacky side out 7.4.18.c: Apply 2 half-lapped layers of silicon rubber cover tapeover entire insulated connection.

7.4.18.d: Install motor termination lead box cover or switchgear cover as applicable.

Following motor installation, the 1B1 KC pump was retested and placed into service for use for approximately three years with no noted evidence of degradation of the electrical insulation.

On November 28, 2023, the licensee performed a regularly scheduled inspection on the 1B1 KC pump motor and electrical junction box with no deficiencies noted. During this inspection, maintenance personnel accessed the junction box and removed, inspected, and returned the existing motor lead connections to the junction box. No discrepancies associated with the cable splice or electrical insulation were noted during the inspection by the licensee. After completing the inspection, 1B1 KC pump was successfully started and secured for retest, running for approximately five minutes. On December 8, 2023, beginning at 9:45 p.m., 1B1 KC pump was in service for approximately 90 minutes to complete a quarterly inservice test and no discrepancies were noted.

On December 10, 2023, at 9:48 p.m., the 1B1 KC pump motor was started and placed into service. Approximately five minutes later, the associated breaker tripped on overcurrent. Field operators observed smoke coming from the 1B1 KC pump motor electrical junction box. The licensee declared the pump inoperable. This pump start was the third start following the electrical inspection on November 28, 2023, after about 95 minutes of cumulative pump operation. The licensee completed necessary repairs and restored the 1B1 KC pump to operable status on December 12, 2023, at 3:45 a.m., within the required action time of TS 3.7.6 condition A for one component cooing water train being inoperable.

During subsequent repairs and investigation, the licensee discovered that one phase of the motor leads had shorted to the electrical junction box. The bolted splice connection between the incoming power cable and motor leads failed when a path to ground existed through insulating high voltage electrical tape around the splices connection nut to the junction box.

While performing procedure IP/0/A/3190/040 in 2020, licensee personnel marked steps 7.4.3 and 7.4.4 as not applicable (N/A). Based on photos of the failed connection, the inspectors did not note excessive bolt length or sharp edges as the connection nut had been permanently deformed by the electrical short. In the licensees cause investigation, step 7.4.18.a was identified as completed, because a base layer of tape had been applied tacky side out. However, the licensees investigation noted that a more adequate layer of electrical padding, in the form of insulative electrical tape, building up around the connection was warranted. Unlike subsequent steps, step 7.4.18.a did not specify an amount of electrical tape that should be installed to provide a base layer for subsequent application. The licensees cause investigation also identified that the motor leads were excessive in length and may have led to the tape on the cable splice contacting and degrading on the electrical junction box when vibrations were introduced during pump starts or operation.

IP/0/A/3190/040 contained no steps, cautions, or restrictions regarding length of cables enclosed in the electrical junction box volume. The licensees investigation determined that the combination of minimal base layer tape application, excessive motor lead length, and vibration of the insulated connection against the junction box from normal pump operation degraded the connections electrical insulation and shorted the 1B1 KC pump.

The inspectors reviewed the available information and the licensees cause investigation regarding the 1B1 KC pump electrical failure. The inspectors determined that the most reasonable cause of the failure was a combination of factors established during the motor replacement in 2020 that were not revealed until after the motor was placed in service in 2023 after licensee personnel removed, inspected, and repositioned the motor leads inside the junction box.

Corrective Actions: The licensee completed necessary repairs and restored the 1B1 KC pump to operable status. The licensee also revised IP/0/A/3190/040 to address procedural gaps in electrical insulating tape application and motor lead length.

Corrective Action References: NCR 02497331

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to provide appropriate instruction to install, splice, and insulate motor leads for 1B1 KC motor maintenance, as required by TS 5.4.1.a and RG 1.33 was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the lack of instruction in procedure IP/0/A/3190/040 made the motor connection of the 1B1 KC pump susceptible to failure from routine pump operation and planned inspections, which resulted in unplanned inoperability of the 1B1 KC pump.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened the significance of the finding using Mitigating Systems Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609 Appendix A and determined that a detailed risk evaluation was required because the condition involved the loss of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) function of one train of a multi-train TS system for greater than its TS allowed outage time. A detailed risk evaluation was performed by a regional Senior Reactor Analyst using SAPHIRE version 8.2.10 and McGuire Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model version 8.82. A conditional analysis was performed for Unit 1 using an exposure period of two weeks. No credit was provided in the analysis for post-failure repair or recovery of equipment impacted by the performance deficiency. Because the internal events estimated risk was greater than E-07, the analysis also considered additional risk contributions from SPAR model external events and fire and internal flooding risk insights from the licensees PRA model. The dominant SPAR model sequences involved a loss of the A train vital bus followed by the failure of a pressurizer power-operated relief valve to reclose accompanied by an operator failure to initiate containment spray. The risk of the finding was mitigated by the relatively short period of time between the introduction of the degraded condition on November 28, 2023, and the failure of the pump motor and completion of repairs on December 12, 2023. The analysis determined that the estimated increase in core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) was less than 1E-06/year for delta-CDF and less than 1E-07/year for delta-LERF, representing a finding of very low safety significance (Green) for Unit 1.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.7 - Documentation: The organization creates and maintains complete, accurate and up-to-date documentation. For example, plant activities are governed by comprehensive, high-quality, programs, processes, and procedures. Specifically, in this case, the licensees procedure used during the 1B1 KC pump maintenance did not contain sufficiently detailed instructions to complete the maintenance activity.

Enforcement:

Violation: TS 5.4.1.a requires in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained for the applicable procedures recommended in RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. RG 1.33, Section 9 of Appendix A states that, Maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.

Licensee maintenance procedure, IP/0/A/3190/040, Taping Motor Lead Splices, provides instructions for splicing, insulating, and stowing motor leads for safety-related motors.

Contrary to the above, since at least May 18, 2020, procedure IP/0/A/3190/040, revision 017, used by the licensee to perform maintenance on a safety-related motor, was not appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the procedure was not sufficiently detailed to perform cable splice activities, including electrical insulating tape application, during the 1B1 KC pump motor maintenance, which led to the 1B1 KC pump motor trip on December 10, 2023.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

The disposition of this finding and associated violation closes URI 05000369/2024001-01.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On June 6, 2024, the inspectors presented the licensed operator requalification inspection results to Edward Pigott and other members of the licensee staff.

• On July 23, 2024, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Edward Pigott and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Miscellaneous Certification for Summer Peak Period 04/29/2024

5007152 2024 Raw Water Temperature Action Register 05/02/2024

Procedures AD-WC-ALL-0230 Seasonal Readiness 2

71111.04 Procedures OP/1/A/6350/002 Diesel Generator 140

71111.11Q Procedures PT/0/A/4150/041 RCCA Bank Repositioning 60

PT/1/B/4350/001C Generator Reactive Limits Verification Test 7

PT/2/A/4600/001 RCCA Movement Test 51

71111.12 Procedures AD-EG-ALL-1210 Maintenance Rule Program 5

71111.13 Corrective Action Nuclear Condition 02514924

Documents Report

Miscellaneous AD-MN-ALL-0019 Troubleshooting Plan for 2A LG Vapor Extractor 05/21/2024

AD-OP-ALL-0210 Conditional Vulnerability Preparation Plan for 2A LG Vapor 05/21/2024

Extractor Troubleshooting

OPS-2-24-RN-Operations Tagging: 2RNST0001

2RNST0001-0431

Procedures MCS-1574.RN-00- Design Basis Specification for the RN System 64

0001

OP/2/A/6400/006 Nuclear Service Water System 196

OP/2/B/6300/004 Generator Seal Oil System 52

Work Orders 20598846

Work Request 20268213

71111.15 Calculations MCC 1381.05-00- Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) Pump, Motor and Turbine Oil 2

0342 Leak Calculation

Drawings MCID-1499-NC.20- Instrument Detail Reactor Vessel Level 5

Work Orders Work Request 20265812

71111.24 Procedures PT/0/A/4200/002 Standby Shutdown Facility Operability Test 72

71152A Engineering 423285 FLEX low pressure and medium pressure pump relief valve 03/13/2024

Changes setpoints and misc EDB record corrections

Procedures FG/0/A/FLEX/FSG-FLEX Raw Water Distribution 1

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

FG/0/A/FLEX/FSG-FLEX Raw Water Distribution 2

OP/0/B/6400/002D FLEX Hale Pump (Low Pressure) Operation 9

OP/0/B/6400/023 FLEX Hale Pump (Medium Pressure) Operation 3

OP/0/B/6400/023 FLEX Hale Pump (Medium Pressure) Operation 4

13