IR 05000333/2016003

Integrated Inspection Report 05000333/2016003

ML16315A342
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	11/10/2016
From:	Arthur Burritt NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5
To:	Brian Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast
Burritt A
References
IR 2016003
Download: ML16315A342 (33)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:ber 10, 2016

SUBJECT:

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2016003

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

On September 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick). On October 20, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, /RA/ Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000333/2016003 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION I== Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59 Report No. 05000333/2016003 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy) Facility: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location: Scriba, NY Dates: July 1, 2016, through September 30, 2016 Inspectors: E. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector B. Sienel, Resident Inspector S. Barr, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector R. Rolph, Health Physicist Approved by: Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

Inspection Report 05000333/2016003; 07/01/2016 - 09/30/2016; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear

Power Plant (FitzPatrick); Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. The inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated August 1, 2016. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

A self-revealing Green finding (FIN) was identified for Entergy staffs failure to properly implement the requirements of EN-DC-324, Preventive Maintenance Program, Revision 16, to ensure proper preventive maintenance (PM) was implemented for non-safety-related 4KV transformer 71T-5. Specifically, Action Request (AR) 127566, PM change request to perform inspection, cleaning, and electrical testing of 4KV transformer 71T-5 was retired without a review by engineering as required by the PM program. As a result, transformer 71T-5 remained in service beyond its effective life without proper condition monitoring and maintenance, leading to its failure and a reactor scram on June 24, 2016.

Entergy staff developed corrective actions to address the failure which included replacement of the transformer and re-establishing the condition monitoring and PM task. Entergy also performed an extent of condition review that confirmed the PM to clean, inspect, and test similar non-safety-related dry-type transformers was still active and performed within its required frequency.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Specifically, Entergy staff failed to ensure an adequate PM was in place for transformer 71T-5. The PM to ensure adequate cleaning and testing was cancelled in 2011, and transformer 71T-5 ultimately failed on June 24, 2016, resulting in a manual reactor scram. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because although the performance deficiency caused a reactor scram, it did not result in the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. The inspectors did not assign a cross-cutting aspect to this finding because it is not indicative of current licensee performance. Specifically, the performance deficiency was determined to have occurred in 2011, the guidance in EN-DC-324 is clear regarding the PM change process, and no additional failures to follow the process have resulted in significant reactor transients. (Section 4OA3)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

FitzPatrick began the inspection period shut down due to a forced outage associated with a reactor scram on June 24, 2016. On July 6, operators commenced a reactor startup and achieved criticality. On July 7, operators synchronized the turbine-generator to the electrical grid.

On July 8, operators achieved 84 percent power, and subsequently reduced power to 64 percent following the identification of an oil sheen on Lake Ontario. Following resolution of the oil sheen, operators restored power to 84 percent. Maximum power was limited to 84 percent due to repairs associated with a condensate booster pump. On July 28, operators reduced reactor power to 75 percent to perform condenser waterbox cleaning and a rod pattern adjustment. The unit was restored to 84 percent power on July 29. On August 19, following repairs to the condensate booster pump, operators raised reactor power to 93 percent. The reduced power of 93 percent was the maximum power achievable due to fuel depletion as FitzPatrick is at the end of this operating cycle. The maximum power will continue to decrease (coast down) until the refueling outage which is planned for the first quarter of 2017. On August 21, FitzPatrick experienced an unexpected trip of the A reactor water recirculation (RWR) pump and a 44 percent runback of the B RWR pump. Operators maintained power at 44 percent following the transient. On August 22, operators raised reactor power to 51 percent following restoration of the B RWR pump to full speed. On August 24, power was again reduced to 44 percent when operators experienced a runback of the B RWR pump during feedwater (FW) system calibration. Operators restored power to 49 percent following troubleshooting of the B RWR runback on August 25. On August 26, following repairs to the A RWR system, operators began power ascension concurrently with post-maintenance testing of the RWR system. On August 28, reactor power was restored to 91 percent and coastdown to the refueling outage continued. On September 14, 2016, FitzPatrick experienced a trip of the B FW pump, and runback of the RWR system to 54 percent. On September 21, operators restored reactor power to approximately 83 percent following repairs to the B FW pump. FitzPatrick coasted down to 80 percent power by the end of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

==1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdown

==

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: B control room emergency ventilation air system (CREVAS) during planned A CREVAS maintenance on August 16, 2016 A residual heat removal (RHR) system during planned B RHR maintenance on August 23, 2016 A standby liquid control (SLC) system during planned B SLC maintenance on August 24, 2016 High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system during emergent reactor core isolation cooling system maintenance on September 13, 2016 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), technical specifications (TSs), work orders (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies.

The inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed for each section of this report are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

From August 23 - August 31, 2016, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the HPCI system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, drawings, surveillance tests, equipment lineup check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hanger and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the system to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors confirmed that systems and components were aligned correctly, free from interference from temporary services or isolation boundaries, environmentally qualified, and protected from external threats. The inspectors also examined the material condition of the components for degradation and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related CRs to ensure Entergy personnel appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection