IR 05000333/2016008

IR 05000333/2016008; 2/22/2016 to 2/25/2016; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Component Design Bases Inspection (Programs)

ML16078A132
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	03/17/2016
From:	Halter M Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
To:	Brian Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast
References
IR 2016008
Download: ML16078A132 (12)

Text

UNITED STATES rch 17, 2016

SUBJECT:

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - COMPONENT DESIGN BASES (ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION PROGRAM) INSPECTION REPORT 05000333/2016008

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

On February 25, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick). The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 25, 2016, with you and other members of your staff.

NRC inspectors examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

In conducting the inspection, the team examined Entergys implementation of the electrical equipment environmental qualification program required by Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.49 for maintaining the qualified status of equipment during the life of the plant. The inspection involved field walkdowns, examination of selected procedures, calculations and records, and interviews with station personnel.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system, Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Mandy K. Halter, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety

ML16078A132 Non-Sensitive Publicly Available SUNSI Review Sensitive Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS NAME SPindale ABurritt MHalter DATE 3/15/16 3/15/16 3/17/16 Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000333/2016008 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION I==

Docket No: 50-333 License No: DPR-59 Report No: 05000333/2016008 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy)

Facility: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location: Scriba, NY Inspection Period: February 22 - 25, 2016 Inspectors: S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS),

Team Leader D. Orr, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS J. Ayala, Reactor Inspector, DRS Approved By: Mandy K. Halter, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety i Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000333/2016008; 2/22/2016 - 2/25/2016; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant;

Component Design Bases Inspection (Programs).

The report covers the Component Design Bases Inspection (Programs) conducted by a team of three U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process. Cross-cutting aspects associated with findings are determined using IMC 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas.

The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5, dated February 2014.

No findings were identified.

ii

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection (Programs) (IP 71111.21N - 8 samples)

.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process

The inspection team assessed the implementation of Entergys Environmental Qualification (EQ) program, established to meet the requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants. The scope of this rule includes safety-related equipment relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events, non-safety-related equipment whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent safety-related equipment from performing design functions, and certain post-accident monitoring equipment. The team selected risk significant components for review using information contained in the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model for FitzPatrick. Additionally, the team referenced the FitzPatrick Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook in the selection of potential components for review.

The NRC originally verified FitzPatricks EQ program implementation through a series of onsite inspections in the 1980s. The EQ program at that time established measures to ensure EQ through the 40-year operating license period. Since that time, Entergy had renewed FitzPatricks operating licenses for an additional 20 years. The team initially compiled a list of components based on the risk factors previously mentioned. The team then interviewed plant staff, and reviewed procurement, maintenance, and design records. Based on these additional reviews, the team focused the inspection on eight EQ program elements and components. The components that were selected included pump motors, motor-operated valves (MOV), solenoid valves, limit switches and flow/level transmitters located both inside and outside of containment. The team also evaluated the EQ of selected supporting sub-components, including seals and lubricants.

.2 Results of Detailed Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

The inspection was a pilot inspection, conducted as outlined in NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.21N. The team assessed Entergys implementation of the EQ program as required by 10 CFR 50.49. The team evaluated whether Entergy staff properly maintained the EQ of electrical equipment important to safety through plant life (repair, replacement, modification, and plant life extension), established and maintained required EQ documentation records, and implemented an effective corrective action program to identify and correct EQ-related deficiencies and evaluate EQ-related industry operating experience.

This inspection effort included review of EQ program-related procedures, component EQ files, EQ test records, equipment maintenance and operating history, maintenance and operating procedures, vendor documents, design documents, and calculations.

The team also interviewed plant staff knowledgeable with the design, maintenance, and operation of the selected components. Additionally, the team performed physical in-plant walkdowns (where accessible) to verify the installed equipment 1) was consistent with the EQ component documentation files, 2) was installed in their tested configuration, and 3) could be impacted by the failure of surrounding equipment. The team reviewed procurement records and inspected a sample of replacement parts stored in the warehouse to verify EQ parts approved for installation in the plant were properly identified and controlled; and that storage time and environmental conditions did not adversely affect the components qualified life or service life. The team also reviewed Entergys evaluation of applicable operating experience to determine whether industry EQ-related issues were understood and addressed through Entergys corrective action program. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

Component samples selected for this inspection are listed below. Six of the eight components were qualified in accordance with 10 CFR 50.49; and two components, which are original plant equipment, were qualified in accordance with the NRCs Division of Operating Reactors (DOR) Guidelines, as indicated below.

Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) A Inboard Solenoid Valve Cluster Assembly Safety/Relief Valve A Pilot Solenoid Valve Residual Heat Removal System A Pump Motor (DOR)

High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Inboard Isolation Valve 23MOV19 Residual Heat Removal System D Torus Isolation Valve 10MOV13D (DOR)

HPCI/Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Level Transmitter 02-3LT-72A MSIV A Position Indication Limit Switches (Open, Closed, 85% Open)

Residual Heat Removal System A Flow Transmitter 10-FT-109A

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of problems that Entergy had previously identified and entered into the corrective action program. The team reviewed a sample of these issues to verify an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

B Findings No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

On February 25, 2016, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Brian Sullivan, Site Vice President, and other members of Entergy staff. The team reviewed proprietary information, which was returned to Entergy at the end of the inspection.

The team verified that no proprietary information was documented in the report.

ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Entergy Personnel

V. Bacanskas, Director, Chief Engineer

J. Eckman, Senior Design Engineer

M. Hawes, Regulatory Compliance Engineer

A. Lauzon, EQ Engineer

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

None