ML19291C257

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Suppl to 790718 RO Re Fire Main Sys Rupture.Problem at Facility Not Considered Generic.Piping Was Probably Struck Sharp Blow During Const or Installation of Nearby Conduit Which Contributed to Failure
ML19291C257
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 01/11/1980
From: Werling J
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
References
BVPS:JAW:764, NUDOCS 8001230229
Download: ML19291C257 (2)


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' 5M DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 January 11, 1980 BVPS: JAW:764 r

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Supplement To "Seecial Report - Fire Main Svstem Ruoture" Mr. B. H. Grier, Director of Regulatica United States Nuclear lagulatory Cor: mission Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

The following answers are supple = ental to "Special Report - Fire Main System Rupture dned July 18, 1979.

The specific cause of the engine overheating is that with the Diesel Fire Pump (FP-P-2] at runout, supplying the pipe rupture, the coolers were starved for cooling water.

There is no means during normal operations to measure flow. The operator noted discharge pressure was very low, but did not note a value. The racing for both pumps [FP-P-1,2] is the same: 2500 gpm flow; and 289 ft., 125 psig head. Pu=ps are tested yearly in accordance with the fire insurance carrier (ANI) 150% flow requirements. This flow test is in accordance with the fire protectica handbook guideline.

The largest single system demand is the turbine room sprinkler system.

The design basis of a pump in this system is the turbine room sprinkler system plus two fire hydrants. (Refer to the BVPS FSAR, Section 9.)

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poop 1792 200 5 8001230 2 37

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Mr. B. H. Grier

  • January 11, 1980 BVPS: JAW:764 Page 2 Piping wash-out occurred due to the pipe failure. There was no indication of wash-out prior to this incident. The failure mode of the piping consisted of a longitudinal split that continued in a split that approximated a wave function. The failure appeared to be due to defective piping. Inspection of the surrounding area showed no wash-out of necessary foundation or base material.

Based on visual examination by repair and quality contro'. personnel, we do not feel that we have a generic problem at BVPS, Unit No. 1. It is the opinion of A. C. Mazukna, BVPS Quality Control Supervisor, that the piping was probably struck a sharp blow during construction or installation of nearby conduit which contributed to the failure mode.

Very truly yours, l./

J. A. Werling Superintendent cc: Director Of Management & Program Analysis United States Nuclear Regulatory Commis31oo Washington, D. C. 20555

, D. L. Wigginton, BVPS Licensing Project Manager United States Nuclear Regulatory Coc=1ssion Washington, D. C. 20555 D. A. Beckman, USNRC Inspector, BVPS Unit 1 G. A. Olson, Secretary, Pri=e Movers Committee - EEI 1792 201