ML16262A037

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2016-07 Final Operating Test
ML16262A037
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 07/18/2016
From: Vincent Gaddy
Operations Branch IV
To:
References
Download: ML16262A037 (291)


Text

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary Rev. 1 Facility: CPNPP Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination:

July 20 1 6 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:

NRC Administrative Topic (See Note)

Type Code* Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations (RA1) D ,R 2.1.2 3 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation

. (4.3) JPM: Calculate BOL Boration for Long Term Use

. (R O 1 307 D) Conduct of Operations (RA2) M ,R 2.1.43 Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes, such as reactor coolant temperature, secondary plant, fuel depletion etc.

(4.1) JPM: Determine Reactivity Effects When Starting Positive Displacement Charging Pump. (RO1310E) Equipment Control (RA3) D ,R 2.2.1 Ability to perform pre

-startup procedures including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity. (4.5) JPM: Perform a 1/M Plot and Predict Critical Conditions. (RO1003A) Radiation Control (RA4) D,R 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions. (3.

5) JPM: Determine Entry Conditions for Radiation Area Clearance. (RWT056 B) Emergency Procedures/Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary Rev. 1

  • Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs;

< 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1) (P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

R A1 The applicant will calculate BOL Boration for long term use per SOP

-104A, Reactor Makeup and Chemical Control System, Attachment 2, BOL Boration for Long-Term Use. Critical steps include determining Reactor Coolant System corrected boron, gallons of Reactor Makeup Water to offset boron, and potentiometer settings for the Chemical and Volume Control System. This is a direct from bank JPM. (K/A 2.1.2 3 - IR 4.3) R A2 The applicant is presented with information pertaining to the boron concentration in the suction piping to the Positive Displacement Charging Pump and the Reactor Coolant System. The applicant will use SOP

-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System to determine the reactivity effects of the planned evolution.

The critical steps will be to calculate the change in RCS boron concentration and RCS temperature

. The JPM is modified from a previous version by changing the RCS boron concentration and the concentration in the PDP suction line. The prior version was a resulting boration. The modified version is a resulting dilution. This is a modified JPM. (K/A 2.1.43

- IR 4.1) R A3 The applicant will perform a 1/M plot for a Reactor Startup per IPO

-002A, Plant Startup From Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation The critical steps include the critical steps include calculating and plotting 1/M, predicting critical conditions, and identifying action for criticality above the power dependent insertion limit. This is a direct from bank JPM. (K/A 2.2.1

- IR 4.5) R A4 The applicant will determine the radiological requirements for implementing a Clearance in a Radiological Controlled Area per STA

-656, Radiation Work Control, RPI

-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting, and RPI

-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits. Critical tasks include identifying Dose Monitoring Requirements, Protective Clothing Requirements, highest contamination level, and highest dose rate. This is a direct from bank JPM. (K/A 2.2.37

- IR 3.5)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D)

Rev. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC RA1 Task # RO 1307 K/A # 2.1.23 4.3 / 4.4 Title: Calculate BOL Boration for Long Term Use Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

X Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

Alternate Path

Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 startup is in progress following a refueling outage Reactor Coolant System boron concentration is 16 00 ppm Boric Acid Storage Tank boron concentration is 7249 ppm Boron-10 Weight Fraction is 0.173367 Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

CALCULATE Beginning

-Of-Life Boration values per SOP

-104A, Reactor Make-up and Chemical Control System, Attachment 2, BOL Boration for Long-Term Use RECORD information on Attachment 2, BOL Boration for Long

-Term Use page 1 Task Standard:

Utilizing SOP

-104A, Attachment 2 calculated Reactor Coolant System Corrected Boron, Gallons of Reactor Makeup Water To Offset Boron in Blender Pipe During Normal Volume Control Tank Makeup, Boron Gallons for a Manual Blend, Boric Acid Pot Setting for a Manual Blend, Boric Acid Pot Setting for AUTO Makeup, Gallons of Reactor Makeup Water to Offset Boron in Blender Pipe When Returning Makeup System to Automatic.

(SEE KEY) Re f. Materials:

SOP-104A, Reactor Make

-up and Chemical Control System, Rev. 15

-2. Validation Time:

15 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D)

Rev. 2 CLASSROOM SETUP Handout: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

SOP-104A, Reactor Make

-up and Chemical Control System Attachment 2, BOL Boration for Long

-Term Use Page 1 (labeled Procedure 1)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D)

Rev. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note

The following steps are from SOP-104A, Attachment 2 page 1 Examiner Note
Refer to answer key for calculated values Perform Step:

1 1.0 RECORD Reference Data as follows: RCS Boron

__________

BAT Boron

__________

B10 WT Fraction

__________

Performance Standard: ENTERED data on Attachment 2 at Step 1.0 Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step

2 2.A CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

RCS Corrected Boron:

Performance Standard: CALCULATED 1512 to 1513. [allowable error based on rounding after first calculation and then performing second calculation]

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D)

Rev. 2 Perform Step:

3 2.B CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

Gallons of RMUW to offset boron in Blender Pipe during normal VCT makeup:

Performance Standard: CALCULATED 132 to 133 gallons. [allowable error based on rounding carried from Step 2 and those performed in this step]

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

4 2.C CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

Boron gallons for a Manual Blend:

Performance Standard: CALCULATED 10 to 11 gallons. [allowable error based on rounding]

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

5 2.D CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

Boric Acid Pot Setting for a Manual Blend:

Performance Standard: CALCULATED 4.69 +/- 0.1. [allowable error based on rounding and accuracy of Pot settings]

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D)

Rev. 2 Perform Step:

6 2.E CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

Boric Acid Pot Setting for AUTO Makeup:

Performance Standard: CALCULATED 6.62 +/- 0.1. [allowable error based on rounding and accuracy of Pot settings]

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

7 2.F CALCULATE volumes in pot settings as follows:

Gallons of RMUW to offset boron in Blender Pipe when returning Makeup System to Automatic:

Performance Standard: CALCULATED 86 to 87 gallons. [allowable error based on rounding carried from Step 2 and those performed in this step]

Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA1 (RO1307D)

Rev. 0 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 startup is in progress following a refueling outage Reactor Coolant System boron concentration is 1600 ppm Boric Acid Storage Tank boron concentration is 7249 ppm Boron-10 Weight Fraction is 0.173367 Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

CALCULATE Beginning

-Of-Life Boration values per SOP

-104A, Reactor Make

-up and Chemical Control System, Attachment 2, BOL Boration for Long

-Term Use RECORD information on Attachment 2, BOL Boration for L ong-Term Use page 1

ATTACHMENT 2PAGE 1 OF 7BOL BORATION FOR LONG TERM USECPNPP SYSTEM OPERATING PROCEDURE MANUALUNIT 1PROCEDURE NO.SOP-104AREACTOR MAKE-UP AND CHEMICAL CONTROL SYSTEMREVISION NO. 15PAGE 75 OF 82lCONTINUOUS USEThis attachment describes the steps to periodically add boron to the RCS at BOL while keeping thesystem aligned in the BORATE mode. Instructions are provided to address refilling the VCT due to normal losses as well as if an RCS leak were to occur. NOTE:This attachment assumes prior automatic operation. Therefore, B-10 Corrected RCSBoron Concentration must be < 1600 ppm to use this attachment. 1.0RECORD Reference Data as follows:

Q! RCS Boron

! BAT Boron

! B10 Wt Fraction 2.0CALCULATE volumes and pot settings as follows:A.RCS Corrected Boron:

RCS PPM X B-10 Wt Fraction = 0.1834 RCS (c) PPM BORONCorrectedB.Gallons of RMUW to offset boron in Blender Pipe for Normal VCT Makeup:

BAT PPM X 35 GAL - 35 GAL = RCS(c) BORON BORON 1-FY-111B, RMUW Gallons to Offset Boron in Blender PipeC.Boron gallons for a Manual Blend:50 Total Gallons X RCS(c)

= BAT PPM 1-FY-110B, Boron Gallons for Manual BlendD.Boric Acid Pot Setting for a Manual Blend:90 Total Flowrate X RCS(c)

= 4 BAT PPM 1-FK-110, BA Pot Setting for

Manual Blend E. Boric Acid Pot Setting for AUTO Makeup:127 Total Flowrate X RCS(c)

= 4 BAT PPM 1-FK-110, BA Pot Setting forAuto MakeupF.Gallons of RMUW to offset boron in Blender Pipe when returning Makeup System to Automatic: BAT PPM X 22.8 GAL - 22.8 GAL = RCS(c) BORON BORON 1-FY-111B, RMUW Gallons toOffset Boron in Blender Pipewhen returning to Automatic Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 (RO1310E)

REV. 1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC RA2 Task # RO 1310 K/A # 2.1.43 4.1 / 4.3 Title: Determine Reactivity Effects When Starting Positive Displacement Charging Pump Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

X Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

Alternate Path:

Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is 100% power The Positive Displacement Charging Pump must be placed in service per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System The last time the Positive Displacement Charging Pump was run the Reactor Coolant System Boron concentration was 2 5 ppm Current Reactor Coolant System Boron concentration is 1 222 ppm Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following

CALCULATE a Reactivity Evaluation for starting the Positive Displacement Charging Pump per SOP

-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Step s 5.3.1.C REPORT findings to the Unit Supervisor Task Standard:

Utilizing SOP-103A, calculate d the change in boron concentration and resultant change in temperature when placing the Positive Displacement Pump in service

. Re f. Materials:

SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System , Rev. 18-1 5. Reactivity Briefing Sheet for 1 222 ppm Reactor Coolant System conditions.

Validation Time:

10 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 (RO1310E)

REV. 1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handout: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

SOP-103A , Chemical and Volume Control System, Step 5.3.1.C

. (labeled Procedure

1) 90.4 EFPD Reactivity Briefing Sheet. (labeled Handout 1 Rev. 0)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 (RO1310E)

REV. 1 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note

The following steps are from SOP-103A, Step 5.3.1

. Perform Step: 1 5.3.1.C.1) + calculation DETERMINE the change in RCS Boron concentration which will occur due to the PDP run

Change in RCS Boron Concentration due to PDP run Performance Standard: CALCULATE D Change in RCS Boron Concentration
( 2 5 ppm PDP - 1 222 -1.53 to -1.54 ppm Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 5.3.1.C.2).a) + calculation IF in MODE 1 or 2 THEN PERFOM the following:

DETERMINE the impact of water in the PDP piping on reactivity by the performing the following calculation:

-1.53 ppm From the Reactivity Briefing Sheet, obtain the following information:

ITC _____ pcm/º F HFP Differential Boron Worth _____ pcm/ppm Performance Standard: DETERMINED the following from the Reactivity Briefing Sheet:

- 10.9 pcm/ºF - 7.0 pcm/ppm Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 5.3.1.C.2).a) + calculation Calculate: ITC / HFP Differential Boron Worth

ºF Performance Standard: CALCULATE D change in ppm /

ºF: - 10.9 pcm/ ºF / - 7.0 pcm/ 1.5 to 1.6 ppm/ºF Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 (RO1310E)

REV. 1 Examiner Note

R ound iAVE may occur. Perform Step: 4 5.3.1.C.2).a) + calculation Calculate: AVE (-1) ppm / ppm / ºF Performance Standard: CALCULATE D change in TAVE as follows:

AVE (-ºF (-1)(-1.53 ppm) / 1.56 ppm/ 0.9 to 1.1 ºF Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 5.3.1.C.2).b) IF AVE calculated above is >

0.5 ºF , THEN NOTIFY the Unit Supervisor and discuss contingency actions.

Performance Standard: DETERMINE D TAVE calculated is greater than 0.5 ºF and NOTIFIED Unit Supervisor

. Terminating Cue: This JPM is complete. Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA2 (RO1310E)

REV. 1 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is 100% power The Positive Displacement Charging Pump must be placed in service per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System The last time the Positive Displacement Charging Pump was run the Reactor Coolant System Boron concentration was 25 ppm Current Reactor Coolant System Boron concentration is 1222 ppm Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

CALCULATE a Reactivity Evaluation for starting the Positive Displacement Charging Pump per SOP

-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Steps 5.3.1.C REPORT findings to the Unit Supervisor

Valid for approximately 7 days.Calculations based on core design values, and assume:Burnup = MWD/MTU EFPDPower = RTPBoron = ppm B10 Conc = w/o Control Bank D = stepsReactivity affects of Control Bank DHFP Diff Worth @ 215.0 steps = pcm / stepHFP Integral Rod Worth for CBD Step Positions:Reactivity affects of BoronHFP Diff Boron Worth @ 1222 ppm = pcm / ppm1-FK-110 Pot Setting for Blended Flow @ 1222 ppm = (Assuming BAT concentration of 7447.0 ppm)Reactivity affects of Powe rPower Coefficient of Reactivity = pcm / % RTPDilution to equal 1% Power Increase = gallons RMUWBoration to equal 1% Power Decrease = gallons boric acidReactivity affects of RCS TemperatureTemperature Coefficient of Reactivity (ITC) = pcm / FBoration to equal 1F Temperature Decrease = gallons boric acid Dilution to equal 1F Temperature Increase = gallons RMUWLoad Reduction equal to 1F Tave Increase = MWe11.05.21-7.0-0.916.6 175Steps205-18.2pcm-61.4 21187.8-11.895.218.0-10.9-9.6206-16.6-15.1Steps-88.6170-103.1195-37.4190-48.9 185-10.8209-12.2 0.0-0.8 210-1.9-1.1-5.4208-1.4214-6.3207-2.4Stepspcm 2152250.0Stepspcm218-3.1 224 223 220 219 222 2210.183400-7.3212-8.4217-3.8216-4.5 213 215 1222Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Stable Operation4000.090.4 100 BOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLY 180from assumed inputs.Burnup in the BOL rangeNOTE: Re-create the Briefing Sheetif current values significantly differpcm200-27.1-74.7-13.6 Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC RA3 Task # RO 1003 K/A # 2.2.1 4.5 / 4.4 Title: Perform a 1/M Plot and Predict Critical Conditions Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

X Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions

Unit 2 is performing a Reactor Startup per IPO

-002 B , Plant Startup from Hot Standby Boron is at the Estimated Critical Boron Concentration o f 1220 ppm Shutdown Control Rod Banks are fully withdrawn Critical Rod Height is predicted to be CBD a t 78 steps The Full Out Position (FOP) is 225 steps Control Rods have been withdrawn four times in increments of 50 steps The Unit Supervisor wants to re

-perform the Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation and re

-plot the points on a 1/M Data Sheet to re

-verify Predicted Critical Rod Height Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

PERFORM the Inverse Count Rate Ratio (ICRR) Calculation per for each of the four rod withdrawal readings shown on IPO

-002 B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Steps 3.3.E and 3.3.F PLOT the points on the 1/M Data Sheet per IPO-002 B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Step 3.3.G DETERMINE the ECC (Predicted Critical Rod Height

) for each of the four rod withdrawals and record on the 1/M Data Sheet per IPO-002 B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Steps 3.4 and 3.

5 RECORD any required action(s) based on 1/M Data obtain ed below: ____________________________________________

____________________________________________

____________________________________________

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1 Task Standard:

Utilizing IPO

-002 B , calculate d Inverse Count Rate Ratios , perform ed a 1/M Plot using data provided on Attachment 2 , determine d estimated critical rod position for each the four rod withdrawals, determined criticality predicted below Rod Insertion Limit and recorded insert all Control Banks to the CBO position. Re f. Materials:

IPO-002 B , Plant Startup from Hot Standby , Rev. 10-37. ERX-1 5-00 1, COLR for CPNPP Unit 2 Cycle 1 6, Figure 2, Rod Bank Insertion Limits Versus Thermal Power, Rev. 0.

Validation Time:

15 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handout s: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

IPO-002 B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby (labeled Procedure 1)

COMPLETE Attachment 2 th r ough four sets of data IPO-002 B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby Step 5.2.10 (labeled Procedure

2) COLR for CPNPP Unit 2 Cycle 16 Figure 2 Rod Bank Insertion Limits Versus Thermal Power (labeled Handout 1)

Required Materials

Straight edge or ruler Calculator

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note:

The following steps are from IPO

-002 B, Attachment 2.

Perform Step: 1 Calculate Inverse Count Rate Ratio calculation for Control Bank A at 50 steps and plot on 1/M Data Sheet. Performance Standard: CALCULATE D Inverse Count Rate Ratio for Control Bank A at 50 steps , PLOTTED on 1/M Data Sheet

, and RECORDED Data

RECORD an average Count Rate of 55. CALCULATE ICRR = 1/M = 50/5 5 = 0.9 1 +/- 0.0 1. RECORD ICRR = 0.91 +/- 0.01. PLOT points for CBA @ 0 steps and CBA @ 50 steps. DRAW a line from 1.00 to 0.9 1 that INTERSECTS with CBD at 190 +/- 100 steps. LOG an Estimated Critical Condition between CBD at 155 and 225 steps. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Calculate Inverse Count Rate Ratio calculation for Control Bank A at 100 steps and plot on 1/M Data Sheet.

Performance Standard: CALCULATED Inverse Count Rate Ratio for Control Bank A at 100 steps, PLOTTED on 1/M Data Sheet

, and RECORDED Data

RECORD an average Count Rate of 6 5. CALCULATE ICRR = 1/M = 50/

6 5 = 0.77 +/- 0.01. RECORD ICRR = 0.77 +/- 0.01. PLOT points for CBA @ 50 steps and CBA @ 100 steps. DRAW a line from 0.91 to 0.77 that INTERSECTS with CBD at 10 +/- 50 steps. LOG an Estimated Critical Condition between C B C at 1 0 0 and CBD at 35 steps. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1 Perform Step: 3 Calculate Inverse Count Rate Ratio calculation for Control Bank B at 35 steps and plot on 1/M Data Sheet.

Performance Standard: CALCULATED Inverse Count Rate Ratio for Control Bank B at 35 steps, PLOTTED on 1/M Data Sheet, and RECORDED Data:

RECORD an average Count Rate of

88. CALCULATE ICRR = 1/M = 50/

88 = 0.57 +/- 0.01. RECORD ICRR = 0.57 +/- 0.01. PLOT points for CB A @ 100 steps and CB B @ 35 steps. DRAW a line from 0.77 to 0.57 that INTERSECTS with CBC at 55 +/- 30 steps. LOG an Estimated Critical Condition between CBC at 40 and 90 steps. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Calculate Inverse Count Rate Ratio calculation for Control Bank B at 85 steps and plot on 1/M Data Sheet.

Performance Standard: CALCULATED Inverse Count Rate Ratio for Control Bank B at 85 steps, PLOTTED on 1/M Data Sheet, and RECORDED Data:

RECORD an average Count Rate of 333. CALCULATE ICRR = 1/M = 50/333 =

0.15 +/- 0.01. RECORD ICRR = 0.15 +/- 0.01.

PLOT points for CBB @ 35 steps and CBB @ 85 steps.

DRAW a line from 0.57 to 0.15 that INTERSECTS with CB B at 95 +/- 25 steps. LOG an Estimated Critical Condition between CB B at 80 and 110 steps. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1 Examiner Note:

The following Performance Standard is from IPO-002 B, Step 5.2.10, 4 th bullet. Perform Step:

5 RECORD any required action based on 1/M Data obtained on Attachment 2, Page 3 of 4 and/or the JPM Cue Sheet

. Performance Standard: DETERMINED Estimated Critical Condition occurs below the Rod Insertion Limit (CBC @ 49 steps) within the next reactivity addition and RECORDED the following on the JPM Cue Sheet

INSERT all Control Bank Rods to the CBO position (critical)

. Terminating Cue:

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA3 (RO1003A) REV. 1 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is performing a Reactor Startup per IPO

-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby Boron is at the Estimated Critical Boron Concentration of 1220 ppm Shutdown Control Rod Banks are fully withdrawn Critical Rod Height is predicted to be CBD at 78 steps The Full Out Position (FOP) is 225 steps Control Rods have been withdrawn four times in increments of 50 steps The Unit Supervisor wants to re

-perform the Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation and re

-plot the points on a 1/M Data Sheet to re

-verify Predicted Critical Rod Height Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

PERFORM the Inverse Count Rate Ratio (ICRR) Calculation per for each of the four rod withdrawal readings shown on IPO

-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Steps 3.3.E and 3.3.F PLOT the points on the 1/M Data Sheet per IPO

-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Step 3.3.G DETERMINE the ECC (Predicted Critical Rod Height) for each of the four rod withdrawals and record on the 1/M Data Sheet per IPO

-002B, Plant Startup from Hot Standby, Attachment 2, Inverse Count Rate Ratio Calculation Steps 3.4 and 3.5 RECORD any required action(s) based on 1/M Data obtained below:

____________________________________________

____________________________________________

____________________________________________

ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 1 OF 4 INVERSE COUNT RATE RATIO CALCULATION CPSESINTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUALUNIT 2 PROCEDURE NO.

IPO-002BPLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBYREVISION NO. 10PAGE 64 OF 83 NOTE:This calculation is not required when Core Performance Engineering is performing ICRR calculations per NUC-111.1.0PREREQUISITES

!The scalar timer is available for use in the manual mode per SOP-703.

OR!IF the scalar timer is out-of-service, THEN Nuclear Instrument indication shall be used.2.0LIMITATIONS2.1Rod withdrawal increments should be performed at approximately 50 steps. The Shift Manager mayauthorize withdrawal of rods at any other increment less than 50 steps as the Reactor approaches criticality.3.0INSTRUCTIONS3.1The following steps describe the method for determining the baseline reference count values.

NOTE:When count rate is greater than 50 counts/sec, a 10 second counting interval should be used. Ifcount rate is less than or equal to 50 counts/sec, then a 30 second counting interval should be used.

Once initiated, the same counting interval should be used throughout the ICRR.A.Obtain ten separate reference counts for each Source Range channel and record values on the ICRR worksheet.BFor each Source Range channel, compute the average count from the 10 reference counts on the ICRR worksheet.

3.2 Mark the graph for the rod heights at + / - 500 pcm (if using OPT-308-1) or for the Expected Criticality Range (if using OPT-308-2).

ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 2 OF 4 INVERSE COUNT RATE RATIO CALCULATION CPSESINTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUALUNIT 2 PROCEDURE NO.

IPO-002BPLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBYREVISION NO. 10PAGE 65 OF 833.3The following steps describe the method used in determining the Inverse Count Rate Ratio (ICRR).A.After obtaining the Shift Manager's permission, withdraw the Control Rods a maximum of 50 steps.

The Shift Manager may authorize withdrawals of less than 50 steps.B.Monitor Source Range indication on recorder 2-NR-0045 to determine when the Source Range channels have stabilized.C.Obtain three separate integral count measurements for each Source Range channel using the counting interval determined in Step 3.1.D.Ensure audible Source Range counts is returned to service after completion of counting measurements.E.Calculate the average of these counts for each Source Range channel on the ICRR worksheet.F.Perform the following calculation and record the result on the ICRR worksheet.ICRR=Source Range Channel Reference Counts Source Range Channel Average CountsG.Plot the ICRR values at the appropriate rod position on graph paper similar to the one attached.3.4Perform a linear extrapolation of the ICRR plot, using the last two data points, to the point at which theextrapolation intersects the horizontal axis. This point defines the rod position at which criticality is estimated.3.5List rod position estimation on the ICRR worksheet.

3.6Continue to perform Steps 3.3 thru 3.5 until either of the following occurs:A.The Reactor is critical ORB.The Shift Manager terminates ICRR data collection.

ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 3 OF 4 INVERSE COUNT RATE RATIO CALCULATION CPSESINTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUALUNIT 2 PROCEDURE NO.

IPO-002BPLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBYREVISION NO. 10PAGE 66 OF 83N-31N-32AVEAVEICRRICRRBANKATSTEPSECCBANK STEPECC BANK STEPREFERENCEN-31COUNTSN-32AVE AVEN-31N-32AVE AVEICRRICRRBANKATSTEPSECC BANK STEPECCBANK STEPN-31N-32 AVE AVEICRRICRRBANKATSTEPSECC BANKSTEP ECCBANK STEPN-31N-32AVEAVE ICRRICRRBANKATSTEPSECCBANK STEPECCBANK STEPN-31N-32AVEAVE ICRRICRRBANKATSTEPSECCBANK STEPECCBANK STEP INVERSE COUNT RATE RATIO Estimated Critical Condition:Bank at steps Boron Concentration ppm Completed by Date Time ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 4 OF 4 INVERSE COUNT RATE RATIO CALCULATION CPSESINTEGRATED PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUALUNIT 2 PROCEDURE NO.

IPO-002BPLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBYREVISION NO. 10PAGE 67 OF 83 1/M DATA SHEET IC R R 1.0.9.8.7.6.5.4.3.2.1 0 0100200300400500565 01 00 50207035850555105155205GP 'A'G P 'C'GP 'B'G P 'D'01 00 50 15020025030035040045050055060 0

COLR for CPNPP Unit 2 Cycle 16 FIGURE 2 ROD BANK INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL POWER NOTES:1.Fully withdrawn shall be the condition where control rods are at a position within the interval of 218 and 231 steps withdrawn, inclusive.2.Control Bank A shall be fully withdrawn.

0 20 40 60 80100120140160180 2002202400102030405060708090100 ROD BANK POSITION (steps withdrawn)

PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER BANK C (79.6,218)

(25.3,218)

(0,164)(0,49)(31,0)(100,146)BANK B BANK D 11 ERX-15-001, Rev. 0 Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC R A4 Task # RWT056B K/A # 2.3.7 3.5 / 3.6 Title: Determine Entry Conditions for Radiation Area Clearanc e Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

X Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

Alternate Path:

Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

A Clearance is required to remove 1

-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1

-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service Tags need to be hung on 1

-7168, LWPS RCDT 1

-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1

-7167, LWPS RCD T 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL The valves are located in Safeguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A) Initiating Cue:

The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

DETERMINE the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room DETERMINE the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area IDENTIFY the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Task Standard:

Utilizing the General Access Permit, Survey Map, and Valve Locator Guide, determined the Dose Monitoring Requirements, Protective Clothing Requirements, highest contamination level and highest area dose rate where tagging is to be performed. Re f. Materials: RPI-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting, Rev.

57-1. RPI-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits, Rev. 3

5. Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev. 810

' Room 77A. Survey Map for U

-1 SG 810' Pipe Penetration Area Train B Room 1-077A. 4/4/16 CPNPP General Area Permit 201 6001 1, Routine Maintenance, Rev.

02. Validation Time:

2 0 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2 Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2 CLASSROOM SETUP Handouts: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

Survey Map for U-1 SG 810 Pipe Pen Area Train B Room 1-077A (labeled Handout

1) CPNPP General Area Permit 201 6 00 11, Tours and inspections for all groups Activities for Operations, Chemistry, NOS, and RP. For entry into elevated dose rates (labeled Handout 2)

Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev.

810 Room 77A (labeled Handout 3)

MAKE the following references available in the classroom

RPI-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting (labeled Procedure 1)

RPI-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits (labeled Procedure 2)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note

Provide the examinee with copy of JPM Cue Sheet

. Perform Step: 1 Determine location of 1-7168 and 1

-7167 with respect to Survey Map

. Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

LOCATE D 1-7168 and 1

-7167 using Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev. 810

' Room 77N (77A)

. COMPARE D the location to the Survey Map. DETERMINE D 1-7168 and 1

-7167 are located inside a Radiation Area and the area is contaminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Determine the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room

. Performance Standard: DETERMINE D the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room per the General Access Permit

TLD. Alarming Dosimeter. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Determine the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area

. Performance Standard: DETERMINE D the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area per the General Access Permit

Deluxe coveralls Booties Hood and hard hat cover Cotton liners Rubber gloves Rubber Overshoes Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Identify the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room

. Performance Standard: IDENTIFIED the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room is < 100 0 dpm/100 cm

2. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2 Perform Step: 5 Identify the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room.

Performance Standard: IDENTIFIED the highest area dose rate at 8 mR/hr. Terminating Cue

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM RA4 (RWT056B) REV. 2 INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given the following conditions:

A Clearance is required to remove 1

-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service Tags need to be hung on 1

-7168, LWPS RCDT 1

-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1

-7167, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL The valves are located in Safeguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A)

INITIATING CUE: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

DETERMINE the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room DETERMINE the Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area IDENTIFY the highest contamination level in dpm/100

cm 2 for the room IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

Minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area: _____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

Highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room: _____________________________________________________

Highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room

_____________________________________________________

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions: A Clearance is required to remove 1-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service Tags need to be hung on 1-7168, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1-7167, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL The valves are located in Sa feguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A)

INITIATING CUE:

The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following: DETERMINE the Dose Monitori ng Requirements to enter the room DETERMINE the Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area IDENTIFY the highest contam ination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room: _____________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

Minimum Protective Cl othing Requirements to enter the valve area:

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

Highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room: _____________________________________________________

Highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room: _____________________________________________________

&'!"#(

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  • '(*'(6-#6(-
  1. (C(C

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F'3-'3-*' &

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary Rev. 1 Facility: CPNPP Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination:

July 20 1 6 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number:

NRC Administrative Topic (See Note)

Type Code* Describe activity to be performed Conduct of Operations (SA1) N ,R 2.1.26 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperatures, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen)

. (3.6) JPM: Determine Electrical Safe Work Practices Requirements

. (SO 1028) Conduct of Operations (SA2) N ,R 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines or limitations associated with reactivity management.

(4.6) JPM: Determine Reactivity Management Severity and Notifications

. (SO1017 B) Equipment Control (SA3) D ,R 2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status. (4.3) JPM: Determine Fire Compensatory Measures for an Emergent Condition. (SO10 48) Radiation Control (SA4) D,R 2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions. (3.6

) 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator. (4.1) JPM: Determine Entry Conditions for Radiation Area Clearance and Reporting Requirements. (SO1112B) Emergency Procedures/Plan (SA5) D , R 2.4.4 1 Knowledge of emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (4.6) JPM: Classify an Emergency Plan Event. (SO1136I)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Task Summary Rev. 1 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs;

< 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1) (P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

SA1 The applicant is presented with a task to determine as the Unit Supervisor, the Personnel Protective Equipment and Safety Boundaries for emergent work of racking the Rx trip breaker from disconnect to remove in accordance with STA-124, Electrical Safe Work Practices

. The critical steps will be to identify the Hazard/Risk Category, Clothing requirements and Boundaries. In addition, the applicant will be required to determine if their position has approval authority for the task. This is a new JPM.

(K/A 2.1.26

- IR 3.6) SA2 The applicant is presented with a plant transient event and response. As Unit Supervisor, the applicant is required to take necessary actions for a reactivity management event in accordance with STA

-102, Reactivity Management Program. The critical steps will be to make a determination of the Severity Level and determine the written and verbal notifications.

This is a new JPM. (K/A 2.1.37

- IR 4.6) SA3 The applicant will evaluate a Fire Protection Impairment per STA

-738, Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Impairments. The critical steps are to determine Fire Watch Implementation and other Compensatory Measures

. This is a direct from bank JPM. (K/A 2.2.14

- IR 4.3) SA4 The applicant will determine the radiological requirements for implementing a Clearance in a Radiological Controlled Area per STA

-656, Radiation Work Control, RPI

-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting, RPI-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits and STA

-501, N onroutine Reporting. Critical steps include identifying Dose Monitoring Requirements, Protective Clothing Requirements, highest contamination level, highest dose rate and determination of proper oral and written notifications due to an overexposure event.

This is a direct from bank JPM. (K/A 2.3.7

- IR 3.6 & K/A 2.4.30

- IR 4.1) SA5 The applicant will determine the appropriate Emergency Plan Classification in accordance with EPP

-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation. The critical step will be the determination of the correct classification. This is a direct from bank JPM. (K/A 2.4.41

- IR 4.6)

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA 1 (SO102 8) REV. 1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA 1 Task # SO 102 8 K/A # 2.1.26 3.6 Title: Determine Electrical Safe Work Practices Requirements Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

X Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

TCX-ESPDTS-01TA, Unit 2 TRAIN A REACTOR TRIP BREAKER RTA is required to be racked from 'Disconnect' to 'Remove' in support of breaker removal. Initiating Cue:

The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-124, Electrical Safe Work Practices:

Hazard Risk Category: ___________________________________

Minimum ATPV in cal/cm 2 of FRC: __________________________

Flash Boundary: ________________________________________

Prohibited Boundary: ________________________

_____________

Arc-rated face shield with balaclava or arc flash suit hood required:

YES NO Ear canal hearing protection required:

YES NO Insulated tools required:

YES NO Task Standard:

Utilizing STA

-124, determined the Hazard Risk Category, Minimum ATPV, Flash Boundary, Prohibited Boundary and face protection, ear canal and insulated tool requirements

. Re f. Materials:

STA-124 , Electrical Safe Work Practices, Rev. 2

-1 2 Validation Time:

15 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA 1 (SO102 8) REV. 1 Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA 1 (SO102 8) REV. 1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handout: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

STA-124 , Electrical Safe Work Practices

. (labeled Procedure 1)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA 1 (SO102 8) REV. 1 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Perform Step: 1 DETERMINE Hazard Risk Category

. Performance Standard: DETERMINED STA

-124 Attachment 8.A, Hazard Risk Category

- 2. Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13 4 th item, Task column number in parentheses is Hazard Risk Category.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 DETERMINE Minimum ATPV in cal/cm2 of FRC

. Performance Standard: DETERMINED STA

-124 Attachment 8A, Minimum ATPV in cal/cm2 of FRC - 8 cal/cm 2. Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13 4 th item, Clothing Minimum Requirements Column.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 DETERMINE Flash Boundary.

Performance Standard: DETERMINED STA

-124 Attachment 8.A, Flash Boundary

- 4 ft. Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13, Boundaries Section at top of page.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 DETERMINE Prohibited Boundary.

Performance Standard: DETERMINED STA

-124 Attachment 8.A, Prohibited Boundary - 1 in. Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13, Boundaries Section at top of page.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 DETERMINE Arc-rated face shield with balaclava or arc flash suit hood required. Performance Standard: DETERMINED that a n Arc-rated face shield with balaclava or arc flash suit hood required is Required. Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13 4 th item, Clothing Minimum Requirements Column. Circled YES. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA 1 (SO102 8) REV. 1 Perform Step:

6 DETERMINE Ear canal hearing protection required

. Performance Standard: DETERMINED that Ear canal hearing protection is required. Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13 4 th item, Task column Note 11, which is on Page 4 of 13. Circled YES Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

7 DETERMINE Insulated tools required

. Performance Standard: DETERMINED that Insulated tools are not required

. Attachment 8A Page 7 of 13 4 th item, Insulated Tools column. Circled NO Terminating Cue:

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA 1 (SO102 8) REV. 1 Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

TCX-ESPDTS-01TA, Unit 2 TRAIN A REACTOR TRIP BREAKER RTA is required to be racked from 'Disconnect' to 'Remove' in support of breaker removal. Initiating Cue:

The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-124, Electrical Safe Work Practices:

1. Hazard Risk Category:

___________________________________

2. Minimum ATPV in cal/cm 2 of FRC: _________________________
3. Flash Boundary:

________________________________________

4. Prohibited Boundary:

____________________________________

5. Arc-rated face shield with balaclava or arc flash suit hood required:

YES NO 6. Ear canal hearing protection required:

YES NO 7. Insulated tools required:

YES NO

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA1 (SO1028) REV. 0 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions: TCX-ESPDTS-01TA, Unit 2 TRAIN A REACTOR TRIP BREAKER RTA is required to be racked from 'Disconnect' to 'Remove' in support of breaker removal.

Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-124, Electrical Safe Work Practices: 1. Hazard Risk Category: ___________________________________ 2. Minimum ATPV in cal/cm 2 of FRC: _________________________ 3. Flash Boundary: ________________________________________ 4. Prohibited Boundary: ____________________________________ 5. Arc-rated face shield with balaclava or arc flash suit hood required: YES NO 6. Ear canal hearing protection required: YES NO 7. Insulated tools required: YES NO

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA 2 (SO10 17B) REV. 1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA 2 Task # SO 10 17 K/A # 2.1.26 3.6 Title: Determine Reactivity Management Severity and Notifications Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

X Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

Alternate Path:

Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

A trip of Heater Drain Pump 1

-01 occurred Control Rods stabilized below the Rod Insertion Limit Boration was initiated in accordance with ABN

-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction and the 10000.0 MWD/MTU Reactivity Briefing Sheet The Reactor Operator made an error when performing the boration and set 1-FY-110B, BA BATCH FLO to 17.5 gallons As a result of the error the Control Rods were not restored above the Rod Insertion Limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Initiating Cue:

The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-102, Reactivity Management Program

1. Event Significance Level
___________________________________
2. Required Notifications
________________

_____________________

______________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________

_____________________________

_________ ______________________________________

3. Is a PERC required:

YES NO 4. Is a QERC required: YES NO Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA 2 (SO10 17B) REV. 1 Task Standard:

Utilizing STA

-1 02, determined that a Significance Level 2 event has occurred, that the Shift Operations Manager, Director, Operations and the Reactivity Management Champion are required to be notified, that a PERC is required and that a QERC is not required.

Re f. Materials:

STA-1 02 , Reactivity Management Program, Rev. 6-2 ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Rev. 14

-19 Validation Time:

15 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA 2 (SO10 17B) REV. 1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handout: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

STA-1 02 , Reactivity Management Program

. (labeled Procedure 1)

Reactivity Briefing Sheet for 10000.0 MWD/MTU.

(labeled Handout 1)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA 2 (SO10 17B) REV. 1 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Perform Step: 1 DETERMINE Event Significance Level

. Performance Standard: DETERMINED STA

-1 02 Attachment 8.

B , Significance Level

- 2. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 DETERMINE Required Notifications

. Performance Standard: DETERMINED STA

-1 02 Attachment 8.A, Required Notifications

- Shift Operations Manager, Director, Operations and Reactivity Management Champion Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 DETERMINE PERC Required

. PERC is a Plant Event Review Committee.

Performance Standard: DETERMINED STA

-1 02 Attachment 8.A, PERC - Required Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 DETERMINE QERC Required. QERC is a Quick Event Review Checklist.

Performance Standard: DETERMINED STA

-1 02 Attachment 8.A, QERC - NOT Required Terminating Cue:

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA 2 (SO10 17B) REV. 1 Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

A trip of Heater Drain Pump 1

-01 occurred Control Rods stabilized below the Rod Insertion Limit Boration was initiated in accordance with ABN

-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction and the 10000.0 MWD/MTU Reactivity Briefing Sheet The Reactor Operator made an error when performing the boration and set 1-FY-110B, BA BATCH FLO to 17.5 gallons As a result of the error the Control Rods were not restored above the Rod Insertion Limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Initiating Cue:

The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-102, Reactivity Management Program:

1. Event Significance Level: ___________________________________
2. Required Notifications
_____________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________

3. Is a PERC required:

YES NO 4. Is a QERC required: YES NO

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA2 (SO1017B) REV. 0 Initial Conditions: Given the following conditions: A trip of Heater Drain Pump 1-01 occurred Control Rods stabilized below the Rod Insertion Limit Boration was initiated in accordance with ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction and the 10000.0 MWD/MTU Reactivity Briefing Sheet The Reactor Operator made an error when performing the boration and set 1-FY-110B, BA BATCH FLO to 17.5 gallons As a result of the error the Control Rods were not restored above the Rod Insertion Limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Initiating Cue: The Shift Manager directs you to DETERMINE the following in accordance with STA-102, Reactivity Management Program: 1. Event Significance Level: ___________________________________ 2. Required Notifications: _____________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________ 3. Is a PERC required: YES NO 4. Is a QERC required: YES NO

Valid for approximately 7 days.Calculations based on core design values, and assume:Burnup = MWD/MTU EFPDPower = RTPBoron = ppm B10 Conc = w/o Control Bank D = stepsReactivity affects of Control Bank DHFP Diff Worth @ 215.0 steps = pcm / stepHFP Integral Rod Worth for CBD Step Positions:Reactivity affects of BoronHFP Diff Boron Worth @ 924 ppm = pcm / ppm1-FK-110 Pot Setting for Blended Flow @ 924 ppm = (Assuming BAT concentration of 7447.0 ppm)Reactivity affects of Powe rPower Coefficient of Reactivity = pcm / % RTPDilution to equal 1% Power Increase = gallons RMUWBoration to equal 1% Power Decrease = gallons boric acidReactivity affects of RCS TemperatureTemperature Coefficient of Reactivity (ITC) = pcm / FBoration to equal 1F Temperature Decrease = gallons boric acid Dilution to equal 1F Temperature Increase = gallons RMUWLoad Reduction equal to 1F Tave Increase = MWe15.03.94-7.4-1.426.5 175Steps205-29.1pcm-91.4 211194.5-15.1152.320.7-19.3-15.4206-26.6-24.1Steps-125.3170-142.0195-58.2190-74.6 185-17.4209-19.5 0.0-1.2 210-3.1-1.7-8.7208-2.3214-10.2207-3.9Stepspcm 2152250.0Stepspcm218-4.9 224 223 220 219 222 2210.183400-11.8212-13.6217-6.1216-7.3 213 215 924Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Stable Operation10000.0225.9 100 MOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLY 180from assumed inputs.Burnup in the MOL rangeNOTE: Re-create the Briefing Sheetif current values significantly differpcm200-42.8-108.4-21.8 Note: Do not perform these calculations following a Runback. For a Runback, borateper the Reactivity Briefing Sheets as soon as possible.This computer generated form may be substituted for Attachment 1 of NUC-117Contact Core Performance (817-432-0134) if possible to discuss the plan.UnitDate / Time:A.1 Boration Volume gallonsIndicate source (listed in order of preference)BEACON by Core Performance (obtain if time permits)Reactivity Briefing Sheets from the Boration Matrix CHORE output (under 'Tools' ->'Power Change Rx Calc IPO-003 ATT 3')

IPO-003A Attachment 3 Manual Calculation A.2Current Turbine Load Setpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. MWeA.3Final Turbine Load Setpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MWe(200 MWE if plant shutdown planned)A.4Total Turbine Ramp Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . minutes(Do not include calculation prep and Pre-Job Brief times)Calculations:B.1Load Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MWe= A.2 - A.3B.2Load Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. MWe/min= B.1 / A.4B.3Total Boration Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . minutesIdeally, start time should be 5 minutes BEFORE load change is initiated. If time does not allow, start time should be same as the load change start time.Ideally, end time should be 15minutes BEFORE load change is complete

.B.4Boration Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. gpm= A.1 / B.3 B.51-FK-110 Pot Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. turns= B.4 / 4(N/A for Batch Boration)

Load Reduction Calculation Worksheet Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Runback to 900 MWe MOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLYBasic Control Strategy:A) A boration of 155 gallons should be initated soon after the runback. This will ensure rods are above RIL within 45 minutes and will likely be needed to restore Target AFD.

B) As rods are withdrawn due to boration, begin dilution when AFD reaches the Target value to maintain Target AFD. Total Dilution Estimate is 1200 gallons.NOTE: Contact Core Performance Engineering following any Runback for additional support.

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 0 20 40 60 80100 120-10123456789101112CBD (steps)Power (% RTP)TimePower and CBD PositionPowerControl Bank DRIL at 74% RTP = 91 steps on CBD.

870 875 880 885 890 895 900-12-10-8 4-2 0 2-10123456789101112Boron (ppm)AFD (%)TimeAxial Flux Difference and Boron AFDBoronBorate as required to keep CBD above RIL, and AFD within limits Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Runback to 800 MWe MOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLYBasic Control Strategy:A) A boration of 175 gallons should be initated soon after the runback. This will ensure rods are above RIL within 45 minutes and will likely be needed to restore Target AFD.

B) As rods are withdrawn due to boration, begin dilution when AFD reaches the Target value to maintain Target AFD. Total Dilution Estimate is 1500 gallons.NOTE: Contact Core Performance Engineering following any Runback for additional support.

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 0 20 40 60 80100 120-10123456789101112CBD (steps)Power (% RTP)TimePower and CBD PositionPowerControl Bank DRIL at 67% RTP = 76 steps on CBD.

870 875 880 885 890 895 900-12-10-8 4-2 0 2-10123456789101112Boron (ppm)AFD (%)TimeAxial Flux Difference and Boron AFDBoronBorate as required to keep CBD above RIL, and AFD within limits Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Runback to 700 MWe MOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLYBasic Control Strategy:A) A boration of 200 gallons should be initated soon after the runback. This will ensure rods are above RIL within 45 minutes and will likely be needed to restore Target AFD.

B) As rods are withdrawn due to boration, begin dilution when AFD reaches the Target value to maintain Target AFD. Total Dilution Estimate is 2000 gallons.NOTE: Contact Core Performance Engineering following any Runback for additional support.

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 0 20 40 60 80100 120-10123456789101112CBD (steps)Power (% RTP)TimePower and CBD PositionPowerControl Bank DRIL at 59% RTP = 59 steps on CBD.

870 875 880 885 890 895 900 905-12 8

-6

-4

-2 0 2-10123456789101112 Boron (ppm)AFD (%)TimeAxial Flux Difference and Boron AFDBoronBorate as required to keep CBD above RIL, and AFD within limits Reactivity Briefing Sheet for Downpower Boration Matrix MOL PROJECTIONS - SIMULATOR USE ONLYThe boration/dilution estimates are based on BEACON predictions for maintaining Incore Axial Offset.With deep rod insertion, it is expected AFD indications (based on Excore Detectors) will be less than the Incorevalue by ~2-4%. In this case, no immediate action is needed to restore AFD, but contact Core Performance.Borate at a rate sufficient to allow ~15 minutes of mixing before the final power level is reached.Contact Core Performance as soon as possible when planning ANY downpower for additional support.Assumed Initial ConditionsPower100% RTPCBD Position215stepsRCS Boron 864ppm (anticipated boron at middle of validity range)30 Minute Ramp Down Boration Estimates900 MWe800 MWe700 MWe50% RTP(~74% RTP)(~67% RTP)(~59% RTP)Final CBD Position 172 steps161 steps148 steps123 stepsTotal Boration 304 gal384 gal481 gal561 galFollowup Dilution (1st hour)1102 gal1409 gal1792 gal2435 galAve Dilution Rate (1st hour)18.4 gpm23.5 gpm29.9 gpm40.6 gpm 2 Hour Ramp Down Boration Estimates900 MWe800 MWe700 MWe50% RTP(~74% RTP)(~67% RTP)(~59% RTP)Final CBD Position 172 steps158 steps142 steps101 stepsTotal Boration 191 gal232 gal286 gal258 galFollowup Dilution (1st hour)771 gal1017 gal1292 gal1641 galAve Dilution Rate (1st hour)12.9 gpm17 gpm21.5 gpm27.4 gpm1 Hour Rapid Shutdown (Ramp to 20% on Target AFD, 30 minute hold, trip)20% RTPFinal CBD Position 79.2 stepsTotal Boration 698 galCBD Position 107.4 steps2.8 %After 30 minutes, no dilution (withdrawing rods to control power), holding at 20% RTPDilution in first hour to support maintaining reduced power, while holding Incore AFD on Target:Notes: Highlighted values: Max boration rate during downpower may be unable to maintain Target AFD. Restore and hold Target AFD as soon as possible following the Downpower.Dilution in first hour to support maintaining reduced power, while holding Incore AFD on Target:Incore AFD Notes:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA3 Task # SO 1048 K/A # 2.2.14 3.9 / 4.3 Title: Determine Fire Compensatory Measures for an Emergent Condition Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

X Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

Alternate Path:

Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

FIR-303-1, Halon Fire Suppression System Inspection Sheet has been completed.

Based on the FIR

-303-1 a Fire Protection Impairment must be initiated using STA-738-2, Fire Protection System/Equipment Impairment Form

. Initiating Cue:

The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

INITIATE the STA-738-2, Fire Protection System/Equipment Impairment Form in accordance with STA-738, Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Impairments and COMPLETE as follows:

RECORD the following information in the **IMPAIRED FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT** section:

AFFECTED LOCATION

. RECORD the following information in the **COMPENSATORY MEASURE REVIEW/AUTHORIZATION** section:

CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH required. CHECK if required.

ROVING FIRE WATCH route change required. CHECK if required. Circle YES or NO.

ROVING FIRE WATCH with OPERABLE detection route change required. CHECK if required. Circle YES or NO.

NONE REQUIRED. CHECK if none required.

AFFECTS FIRE BRIGADE STRATEGY. CHECK if strategy affected. Circle YES or NO.

INSTRUCTIONS/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. ENTER additional action and specific information if required.

Task Standard:

Utilizing STA

-738, determined Fire Impairment Compensatory Measures for a disabled Halon Syste m and determined that Fire Brigade Strategy was affected in accordance with the Answer Key

.

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1 Re f. Materials:

STA-738, Fire Protection Systems / Equipment Impairments, Rev.

7-1. STA-738-2, Fire Protection System / Equipment Impairment Form, Rev.

7. FIR-303-1, Halon Suppression System Inspection Sheet, Rev. 5.

FPI-505, Electrical & Control Building Unit 1 Cable Spread Room Elevation 807'

-0", Rev. 3

-1. Validation Time:

25 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1 CLASSROOM SETUP Handouts: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

STA-738, Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Impairments

. (labeled Procedure 1)

STA-738-2, Fire Protection System

/ Equipment Impairment Form

. (labeled Form 1)

FPI-505, Electrical & Control building Unit 1 Cable Spread Room Elevation 807'

-0". (labeled Procedure 2)

Completed FIR-303-1, Halon Fire Suppression System Inspection Sheet

. (labeled Handout 1)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note:

The following information is from STA-7 28-2. Perform Step: 1 Enter information for AFFECTED LOCATION

. Performance Standard: ENTER ED the following; BLDG: Electric al Control, ELEV: 807 , ROOM/OTHER: Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room per FPI-505, Electrical & Control Building Unit 1 Cable Spread Room Elevation 807'

-0" Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

2 Determine if CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH is required

. Performance Standard: DETERMINE D that a CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH wa s Required and checked box per STA-738 Attachment 8.A Item (4).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

3 Determine if ROVING FIRE WATCH route change is required. Performance Standard: DETERMINE D that a ROVING FIRE WATCH route change was NOT Required and circles NO as a continuous fire watch and backup suppression equipment within one hour is required per STA

-738 Attachment 8.A Item (4).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

4 Determine if ROVING FIRE WATCH with operable detection route change is required.

Performance Standard: DETERMINED that a ROVING FIRE WATCH with operable detection route change is NOT Required and circles NO as a continuous fire watch and backup suppression equipment within one hour is required per S TA-738 Attachment 8.A Item (4).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

5 Determine if NONE REQUIRED. Performance Standard: DETERMINED that None Required is not correct and left Blank. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1 Perform Step: 6 Determine if AFFECTS FIRE BRIGADE STRATEGY

. Performance Standard: DETERMINED that Fire Brigade Strategy is affected and circled YE S per review of FPI

-505 automatic and manual actions for Halon deployment are affected.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

7 Determine if OTHER compensatory measure information is required.

Performance Standard: DETERMINED that establishing a continuous fire watch and backup suppression equipment within one hour is required per STA-738 Attachment 8.A Item (4).

Terminating Cue:

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA3 (SO1048) REV. 1 Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

FIR-303-1, Halon Fire Suppression System Inspection Sheet has been completed.

Based on the FIR

-303-1 a Fire Protection Impairment must be initiated using STA-738-2, Fire Protection System/Equipment Impairment Form

. Initiating Cue:

The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

INITIATE the STA-738-2, Fire Protection System/Equipment Impairment Form in accordance with STA-738, Fire Protection Systems/Equipment Impairments and COMPLETE as follows:

RECORD the following information in the **IMPAIRED FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT** section:

AFFECTED LOCATION. RECORD the following information in the **COMPENSATORY MEASURE REVIEW/AUTHORIZATION** section:

CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH required. CHECK if required.

ROVING FIRE WATCH route change required. CHECK if required. Circle YES or NO.

ROVING FIRE WATCH with OPERABLE detection route change required. CHECK if required. Circle YES or NO.

NONE REQUIRED. CHECK if none required.

AFFECTS FIRE BRIGADE STRATEGY. CHECK if strategy affected. Circle YES or NO.

INSTRUCTIONS/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. ENTER additional action and specific information if required.

STA-738-2INFORMATION USEPAGE 1 OF 1 lREV. 7lFIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT IMPAIRMENT FORM IMPAIRMENT #

WORK DOCUMENT NUMBER (S)

CLEARANCE/MTO#Completed by Fire Protection

    • IMPAIRED FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT**SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ID Number (i.e., affected valves, system no., etc.)

ISOLATION POINT(S):

DETECTION SYSTEM ID Number ( i.e., panel no., zone, detector)

FIRE PUMP: Electric, G Diesel G ID Number FIRE PROTECTION WATER SUPPLY G ID Number (i.e. tank, loop piv)

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLY G Description/ID Number (i.e. walls, floors, ceilings, penetrations seals, fire doors, fire dampers, radiant energy shield, thermolag, etc.)

OTHER SPECIFY:

AFFECTED LOCATION: BLDG.

ELEV. ROOM/OTHER PERMIT WORK DESCRIPTION:

lREQUESTED BY:

EXT. RWO: DATE:Completed by Fire Protection/Shift Operations (normally performed during the impact review process)

    • COMPENSATORY MEASURE REVIEW/AUTHORIZATION**

SCHEDULED IMPAIRED DATE:

SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE:

____ CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH ROUTE NO.:

l____ ROVING FIRE WATCH (route change required) YES NO ROUTE NO.

____ ROVING FIRE WATCH(with operable detection) (route change required) YES NO ROUTE NO.

____ NONE REQUIRED

____ AFFECTS FIRE BRIGADE STRATEGY? YES NO l____ OTHER INSTRUCTIONS/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AUTHORIZED BY:

DATE: Completed by Fire Protection/Shift Operations (This section should be completed just prior to impairing any fire protection systems/equipment)

    • IMPAIRMENT/COMPENSATORY MEASURES INITIATION**
          • COMPENSATORY MEASURES INITIATED/VERIFIED: YES NO N/A (circle one)
          • BY: DATE: TIME: Completed by FP/Shift Ops.
    • RESTORATION**

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT BACK IN-SERVICE YES NO (circle one)

BY: DATE: TIME:

STA-738-2INFORMATION USEPAGE 1 OF 1 lREV. 7lFIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT IMPAIRMENT FORM IMPAIRMENT #

WORK DOCUMENT NUMBER (S)

CLEARANCE/MTO#Completed by Fire Protection

    • IMPAIRED FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT**SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ID Number (i.e., affected valves, system no., etc.)

ISOLATION POINT(S):

DETECTION SYSTEM ID Number ( i.e., panel no., zone, detector)

FIRE PUMP: Electric, G Diesel G ID Number FIRE PROTECTION WATER SUPPLY G ID Number (i.e. tank, loop piv)

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLY G Description/ID Number (i.e. walls, floors, ceilings, penetrations seals, fire doors, fire dampers, radiant energy shield, thermolag, etc.)

OTHER SPECIFY:

AFFECTED LOCATION: BLDG.

ELEV. ROOM/OTHER PERMIT WORK DESCRIPTION:

lREQUESTED BY:

EXT. RWO: DATE:Completed by Fire Protection/Shift Operations (normally performed during the impact review process)

    • COMPENSATORY MEASURE REVIEW/AUTHORIZATION**

SCHEDULED IMPAIRED DATE:

SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE:

____ CONTINUOUS FIRE WATCH ROUTE NO.:

l____ ROVING FIRE WATCH (route change required) YES NO ROUTE NO.

____ ROVING FIRE WATCH(with operable detection) (route change required) YES NO ROUTE NO.

____ NONE REQUIRED

____ AFFECTS FIRE BRIGADE STRATEGY? YES NO l____ OTHER INSTRUCTIONS/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AUTHORIZED BY:

DATE: Completed by Fire Protection/Shift Operations (This section should be completed just prior to impairing any fire protection systems/equipment)

    • IMPAIRMENT/COMPENSATORY MEASURES INITIATION**
          • COMPENSATORY MEASURES INITIATED/VERIFIED: YES NO N/A (circle one)
          • BY: DATE: TIME: Completed by FP/Shift Ops.
    • RESTORATION**

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT BACK IN-SERVICE YES NO (circle one)

BY: DATE: TIME:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S A4 Task # SO1112 K/A # 2.3.7 3.5 / 3.6 Title: Determine Entry Conditions for Radiation Area Clearanc e And Reporting Requirements Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

X Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

Alternate Path:

Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet 1 Given the following conditions:

A Clearance is required to remove 1

-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1

-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service Tags need to be hung on 1

-7168, LWPS RCDT 1

-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1

-7167, LWPS RCD T 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL The valves are located in Safeguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A) Initiating Cue:

JPM Cue Sheet 1 The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

DETERMINE the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room DETERMINE the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area IDENTIFY the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Initial Conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet 2 Given the following conditions:

The Shift Manager was notified by Radiation Protection that an individual performing maintenance received a Shallow Dose Equivalent (SE) of 275 rads to the skin Initiating Cue:

JPM Cue Sheet 2 The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

Determine Oral and Written Reportability Requirements Oral Reporting Requirement

____________________

Written Reporting Requirement

____________________

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2 Task Standard:

Utilizing the General Access Permit, Survey Map, and Valve Locator Guide, determined the Dose Monitoring Requirements, Protective Clothing Requirements, highest contamination level and highest area dose rate where tagging is to be performed. Utilizing STA

-501, determined Oral and Written Reporting Requirements for an overexposure

. Re f. Materials:

RPI-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting, Rev.

57-1. RPI-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits, Rev. 3

5. Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev. 810

' Room 77A. Survey Map for U

-1 SG 810' Pipe Penetration Area Train B Room 1-077A. 4/14/16. CPNPP General Area Permit 201 6001 1, Routine Maintenance, Rev.

02. STA-501, Nonroutine Reporting, Rev. 21.

Validation Time:

2 0 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2 CLASSROOM SETUP Handouts: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

Survey Map for U-1 SG 810 Pipe Pen Area Train B Room 1-077A (labeled Handout

1) CPNPP General Area Permit 201 6 00 11, Tours and inspections for all groups Activities for Operations, Chemistry, NOS, and RP. For entry into elevated dose rates (labeled Handout 2)

Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev.

810 Room 77A (labeled Handout 3)

STA-501, Nonroutine Reporting (labeled Procedure 3)

MAKE the following references available in the classroom

RPI-602, Radiological Surveillance and Posting (labeled Procedure 1)

RPI-606, Radiation Work and General Access Permits (labeled Procedure 2)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note

Provide the examinee with copy of JPM Cue Sheet
1. Perform Step: 1 Determine location of 1-7168 and 1

-7167 with respect to Survey Map

. Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

LOCATE D 1-7168 and 1

-7167 using Valve Locator Map for Unit 1 Safeguards Building Elev. 810

' Room 77N (77A)

. COMPARE D the location to the Survey Map. DETERMINE D 1-7168 and 1

-7167 are located inside a Radiation Area and the area is contaminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 Determine the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room

. Performance Standard: DETERMINE D the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room per the General Access Permit

TLD. Alarming Dosimeter. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 Determine the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area

. Performance Standard: DETERMINE D the minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area per the General Access Permit

Deluxe coveralls Booties Hood and hard hat cover Cotton liners Rubber gloves Rubber Overshoes Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 Identify the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room

. Performance Standard: IDENTIFIED the highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room is < 100 0 dpm/100 cm

2. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2 Perform Step: 5 Identify the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room.

Performance Standard: IDENTIFIED the highest area dose rate at 8 mR/hr. Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note

Provide the examinee with copy of JPM Cue Sheet 2

. Examiner Note

The following steps are from STA

-501, Attachment 8.D/4

. Perform Step: 6 Attachment 8.D/4 Pages 1 of 12 or 7 of 12 Determine Oral Reporting Requirements per STA

-501. Performance Standard: DETERMINED Oral Reporting Requirements per STA

-501: "Event involving byproduct, source, or special nuclear material that

rad (skin or any one extremity)."

DETERMINDED Immediate notification via Emergency Notification System

. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Attachment 8.D/4 Pages 1 of 12 or 7 of 12 Determine Written Reporting Requirements per STA

-501. Performance Standard: DETERMINED Written Reporting Requirements per STA

-501: "Any incident for which notification is required per 10 CFR 20.2202

" DETERMINDED Written Report within 30 days (LER)

. Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET 1 Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2 INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given the following conditions:

A Clearance is required to remove 1

-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service Tags need to be hung on 1

-7168, LWPS RCDT 1

-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1

-7167, LWPS RCDT 1

-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL The valves are located in Safeguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A)

INITIATING CUE: The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

DETERMINE the Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room DETERMINE the Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area IDENTIFY the highest contamination level in dpm/100

cm 2 for the room IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

Minimum Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area: _____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

Highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room: _____________________________________________________

Highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room

_____________________________________________________

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET 2 Form ES-C-1 Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA4 (SO1112) REV. 2 Initial Conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet 2 Given the following conditions:

The Shift Manager was notified by Radiation Protection that an individual performing maintenance received a Shallow Dose Equivalent (SE) of 275 rads to the skin Initiating Cue:

JPM Cue Sheet 2 The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

Determine Oral and Written Reportability Requirements, if any.

Oral Reporting Requirement

____________________

Written Reporting Requirement

____________________

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET 1 Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions: A Clearance is required to remove 1-LCV-1003, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV from service Tags need to be hung on 1-7168, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV UPSTRM ISOL and 1-7167, LWPS RCDT 1-01 LVL CTRL VLV DNSTRM ISOL The valves are located in Sa feguards Building Elev. 810' NORTH PENETRATION VLV RM / North Side (Room 77A)

INITIATING CUE:

The Work Control Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following: DETERMINE the Dose Monitori ng Requirements to enter the room DETERMINE the Protective Clothing Requirements to enter the valve area IDENTIFY the highest contam ination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room IDENTIFY the highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room Dose Monitoring Requirements to enter the room: _____________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

Minimum Protective Cl othing Requirements to enter the valve area:

__________________________________________

___________ _____________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________

Highest contamination level in dpm/100 cm 2 for the room: _____________________________________________________

Highest area dose rate in mR/hr for the room: _____________________________________________________

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET 2 Form ES-C-1 Initial Conditions:

JPM Cue Sheet 2 Given the following conditions: The Shift Manager was notified by Radiation Protection that an individual performing maintenance received a Shallow Dose Equivalent (SE) of 275 rads to the skin Initiating Cue:

JPM Cue Sheet 2 The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following: Determine Oral and Written Reportability Requirements, if any. Oral Reporting Requirement ____________________ Written Reporting Requirement ____________________

&'!"#(

/.. (

  • '(*'(6-#6(-
  1. (C(C

C9

(

F'3-'3-*' &

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I)

REV.2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC SA5 Task # SO1136 K/A # 2.4.41 2.9 / 4.6 Title: Classify an Emergency Plan Event Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

X Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

Alternate Path:

Plant: Time Critical:

X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

EOS-1.1 B , Safety Injection Termination is in progress following a Main Steam header break downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves The Unit Supervisor implemented ABN

-740B, Control Room Annunciator System and Status Light Malfunction, Section 2.0, Loss of All Control Room Annunciators 10 minutes ago Electrical Maintenance is investigating the tripping of both Annunciator Logic Cabinet breakers ABN-906, Plant Process Computer System Malfunction was just entered due to loss of Plant Computer System alarm capability Initiating Cue:

The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

DETERMINE the Emergency Action Level Event Classification per EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation Task Standard:

Utilizing EPP-201, determine d the Emergency Action Level Event Classification as SS5.1 using the Emergency Action Level Hot, Common, and Cold Classification Charts within 15 minutes

. Re f. Materials:

EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation, Rev.

12. EPP-201, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document, Rev. 0

-1. CPNPP Emergency Action Level Hot, Common, and Cold Classification Charts, Rev. 12 A. Validation Time:

1 0 minutes Time Critical:

15 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I)

REV.2 Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date: CLASSROOM SETUP Handout: MAKE the following available in the classroom:

EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation (labeled Procedure 1)

EPP-201, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases Document (labeled Procedure

2) CPNPP Emergency Action Level Hot, Common, & Cold Classification Charts (labeled Handout 1)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I)

REV.2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note:

The following steps are from CPNPP Emergency Action Levels Hot. Perform Step:

1 DETERMINE the Event Category.

Performance Standard: REFERRED to CPNPP Emergency Action Levels Hot, Common, and Cold and DETERMINE D the following chart is applicable

CPNPP EAL HOT Conditions (RCS > 200°F)

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

2 MATCH plant conditions in the EAL Group /

Category. Performance Standard: IDENTIFIED EAL Group / Category as System Malfunction (S

). Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

3 MATCH plant conditions in the selected EAL Subcategory

. Performance Standard: IDENTIFIED EAL Subcategory as Instrumentation (5

). Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I)

REV.2 Examiner Note:

Candidate should refer to

\ EPP-201, Emergency Action Level Technical Bases document for clarification regarding the event classification. The following notes are from Page 235 of 323.

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I)

REV.2 Perform Step:

4 Classify the event

. Performance Standard: CLASSIFIED the event as a n SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SS5.1

) within 15 minutes

. Terminating Cue

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM SA5 (SO1136I)

REV.2 INITIAL CONDITIONS

Given the following conditions:

EOS-1.1B, Safety Injection Termination is in progress following a Main Steam header break downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves The Unit Supervisor implemented ABN

-740B, Control Room Annunciator System and Status Light Malfunction, Section 2.0, Loss of All Control Room Annunciators 10 minutes ago Electrical Maintenance is investigating the tripping of both Annunciator Logic Cabinet breakers ABN-906, Plant Process Computer System Malfunction was just entered due to loss of Plant Computer System alarm capability

INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following:

DETERMINE the Emergency Action Level Event Classification per EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation EAL Identifier

________________________

THIS JPM IS TIME CRITICAL

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 INITIAL CONDITIONS: Given the following conditions: EOS-1.1B, Safety Injection Termination is in progress following a Main Steam header break downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves The Unit Supervisor implemented ABN-740B, Control Room Annunciator System and Status Light Malfunction, Section 2.0, Loss of All C ontrol Room Annunciators 10 minutes ago Electrical Maintenance is in vestigating the tripping of both Annunciator Logic Cabinet breakers ABN-906, Plant Process Computer System Malfunction was just entered due to loss of Plant Computer System alarm capability

INITIATING CUE: The Shift Manager directs you to PERFORM the following: DETERMINE the Emergency Action Level Event Classification per EPP-201, Assessment of Emergency Action Levels, Emergency Classification, and Plan Activation

EAL Identifier:________________________

THIS JPM IS TIME CRITICAL

HOTCONDITIONS(RCS>200°F)SystemMalfunct.SA1.1(BasesPage205)ACpowercapabilityto6.9KVsafeguardbusesuEA1and uEA2reducedtoasinglepowersourceforgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4)ANDAnyadditionalsinglepowersourcefailurewillresultinlossofallACpowerto6.9KVsafeguardbusesuEA1anduEA2(TableS-3)SG1.1(BasesPage211)NoneNoneFissionProductBarriersFS1.1(BasesPage254)LossofanytwobarriersANDLossorpotentiallossofthirdbarrier(TableF-1)Lossorpotentiallossofanytwobarriers(TableF-1)FA1.1(BasesPage253)AnylossoranypotentiallossofeitherFuelCladorRCS(TableF-1)FU1.1(BasesPage252)AnylossoranypotentiallossofContainment(TableF-1)FG1.1(BasesPage256)SS1.1(BasesPage208)LossofACPowerLossofalloffsiteACpowertosafeguardbusesforgreaterthanorequalto15min.SU1.1(BasesPage202)LossofalloffsiteACpowerto6.9KVsafeguardbuses uEA1anduEA2forgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4)ACpowercapabilitytosafeguardbusesreducedtoasinglepowersourceforgreaterthanorequalto15min.suchthatanyadditionalsinglefailurewouldresultinalossofallACpowertosafeguardbusesLossofalloffsiteandallonsiteACpowertosafeguardbusesforgreaterthanorequalto15min.ProlongedlossofalloffsiteandallonsiteACpowertosafeguardbusesLessthan105VDConall125VDCsafeguardbusesuED1, uED2,uED3anduED4forgreaterthan15min.(Note4)SS2.1(BasesPage216)LossofallvitalDCpowerfor

³15min.AnautomatictripfailedtoshutdownthereactorANDAllmanualactionsdonotshutdownthereactorasindicatedbyreactorpowergreaterthanorequalto5%ANDEITHER:*CSFSTCoreCooling-RED*CSFSTHeatSink-REDSA3.1(BasesPage220)AnautomatictripfailedtoshutdownthereactorANDManualactionstakenatthereactorcontrolconsole(Note6)successfullyshutdownthereactorasindicatedbyreactorpowerlessthan5%SG3.1(BasesPage226)SS3.1(BasesPage224)Automatictripfailstoshutdownthereactorandthe manualactionstakenfromthereactorcontrolconsoleare successfulinshuttingdownthereactorAutomatictripfailstoshutdownthereactorandmanualactionstakenfromthereactorcontrolconsolearenotsuccessfulinshuttingdownthereactorAutomatictripandallmanualactionsfailtoshutdownthereactorandindicationofanextremechallengetotheabilitytocoolthecoreexistsCriticality

&RPSFailureInabilitytoreachrequiredshutdownwithinTechnical SpecificationlimitsSU4.1(BasesPage230)PlantisnotbroughttorequiredoperatingmodewithinTechnicalSpecificationsLCOactionstatementtimeInstr.UnplannedlossofsafetysystemannunciationorindicationintheControlRoomforgreaterthanorequal to15min.SU5.1(BasesPage231)Unplannedlossofapproximately75%(ormore)ofannunciationorindicationassociatedwithsafetysystemsonCB-01throughCB-09andCB-11forgreaterthanorequalto 15min.(Note4)SA5.1(BasesPage233)Unplannedlossofapproximately75%(ormore)ofannunciationorindicationonCB-01throughCB-09andCB-11forgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4)ANDEITHER:*Asignificanttransientisinprogress,TableS-1*CompensatoryindicationsareunavailableUnplannedlossofsafetysystemannunciationorindicationintheControlRoomwitheither(1)asignificanttransientinprogress,or(2)compensatoryindicatorsareunavailableLossofapproximately75%(ormore)ofannunciationorindicationonCB-01throughCB-09andCB-11forgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4)AND Asignificanttransientisinprogress,TableS-1ANDCompensatoryindicationsareunavailableSS5.1(BasesPage235)InabilitytomonitorasignificanttransientinprogressLossofallonsiteoroffsitecommunicationscapabilitiesSU6.1(BasesPage238)LossofallTableS-2onsite(internal)communicationmethodsaffectingtheabilitytoperformroutineoperationsORLossofallTableS-2offsite(external)communicationmethodsaffectingtheabilitytoperformoffsitenotificationsNoneFuelCladDegradationFuelcladdegradationSU7.1(BasesPage240)ReactorcoolantDoseEquivalentI-131specificactivitygreaterthan60µCi/gmORReactorcoolantDoseEquivalentXE-133specificactivity greaterthan500µCi/gmSU7.2(BasesPage242)RCSLeakageRCSleakageSU8.1(BasesPage244)Unidentifiedorpressureboundaryleakagegreaterthan10gpm(Note7)ORIdentifiedleakagegreaterthan25gpmInadvertentcriticalitySU3.1(BasesPage219)LossofalloffsiteandallonsiteACpowerto6.9KVsafe-guardbusesuEA1anduEA2forgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4)LossofalloffsiteandallonsiteACpowerto6.9KVsafeguardbusesuEA1anduEA2ANDEITHER:*Restorationofatleastonesafeguardbuswithin4hoursisnotlikely*CSFSTCoreCooling-REDorORANGEpath12341234123412341234123412343412341234123412123412123412341234 F S 1 3 5 7 8 GENERALEMERGENCY SITEAREAEMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUALEVENTInabilitytoReachorMaintainShutdownConditions 4AnunplannedsustainedpositivestartuprateobservedonnuclearinstrumentationNoneGrossFailedFuelMonitor,FFLu60(u-RE-0406),HighAlarm(RED)Gai-TronicsPage/partysystem(PublicAddressSystem)PlantRadioSystemPABX(PrivateAutomaticBranchExchangeSystem)

PublicTelephoneSystem FederalTelephoneSystem(FTS)TableS-2CommunicationsSystemsSystemOnsite(internal)Offsite(external)

X X

X X X X

X*Electricalloadrejectiongreaterthan25%fullelectricalload*Reactortrip

  • Runbackgreaterthan25%reactorpower*ECCSinjection
  • Reactorpoweroscillationsgreaterthan10%TableS-1SignificantTransientsNoneNoneNonePrimary-to-secondaryleakrategreaterthan10gpmANDUnisolablesteamreleasefromaffectedSGtotheenvironment(BasesPage313)FailureofallvalvesinanyonelinetocloseANDDirectdownstreampathwaytotheenvironmentexistsafterContainmentisolationsignal(BasesPage320)Allofthefollowing:*CoreexitTCsgreaterthan750°F
  • RVLIS11in.aboveplatelightnotlit*Restorationproceduresnoteffectivewithin15min.(BasesPage303)Containmentradiationgreaterthan400R/hrCTEu16ContainmentHRRM(u-RE-6290A),orCTWu17ContainmentHRRM(u-RE-6290B)(BasesPage268)3.TableF-1FissionProductBarrierMatrixContainmentBarrierContainmentpressurerisefollowedbyarapid unexplaineddropinContainmentpressure(BasesPage308)FuelCladdingBarrierReactorCoolantSystemBarrierLossPotentialLossLossCSFSTCoreCooling-ORANGEentryconditionsmetORCSFSTHeatSink-REDentryconditionsmetandheatsinkrequired(BasesPage263)Coolantactivitygreaterthan300µCi/ccI-131DoseEquivalent(BasesPage275)CSFSTCoreCooling-REDentryconditionsmet (BasesPage260)CSFSTRCSIntegrity-REDentryconditionsmetORCSFSTHeatSink-REDentryconditionsmetandheatsink required(BasesPage280)AnyconditionintheopinionoftheEmergencyCoordinatorthatindicates potentiallossoftheFuelCladbarrier(BasesPage278)LossCoreexitTCsgreaterthan750°F(BasesPage267)RVLIS11in.aboveplatelight notlit(BasesPage274)CoreexitTCsgreaterthan1,200°FANDRestorationproceduresnoteffectivewithin15min.(BasesPage301)Containmentradiationgreaterthan4,000R/hrCTEu16ContainmentHRRM(u-RE-6290A),orCTWu17ContainmentHRRM(u-RE-6290B)(BasesPage306)GrossFailedFuelMonitor,(FFLu60)u-RE-0406,radiationgreaterthan3.7E04µCi/cc(BasesPage270)4.CoreexitTCsgreaterthan1,200°F(BasesPage266)RCSleakrategreaterthanthecapacityofonechargingpumpinthe normalchargingmodewithletdown isolated:*PositiveDisplacement:98gpm
  • Centrifugal:150gpm(BasesPage291)AnyconditionintheopinionoftheEmergencyCoordinatorthatindicatespotentiallossoftheRCSbarrier(BasesPage296)ContainmentpressureorsumplevelresponsenotconsistentwithLOCAconditions(BasesPage309)RupturedSGisalsofaultedoutsideofContainment (BasesPage311)AnyconditionintheopinionoftheEmergencyCoordinatorthatindicateslossoftheContainment barrier(BasesPage322)CSFSTContainment-REDentryconditionsmet(BasesPage298)Containmentpressure50psigandrising(BasesPage315)Containmenthydrogenconcentrationgreaterthan4%(BasesPage316)Containmentpressuregreaterthan18psigwith neitherContainmentSpraysystemtrainoperating(BasesPage318)AnyconditionintheopinionoftheEmergencyCoordinatorthatindicatespotentiallossofthe Containmentbarrier(BasesPage323)RupturedSGresultsinanECCS(SI)actuation(BasesPage290)RCSleakrategreaterthanavailablemakeupcapacityas indicatedbyalossofRCS subcooling(lessthanorequal to25°F[55ºF])(BasesPage288)Containmentradiationgreaterthan5R/hrCTEu16ContainmentHRRM(u-RE-6290A),orCTWu17ContainmentHRRM(u-RE-6290B)(BasesPage285)AnyconditionintheopinionoftheEmergencyCoordinator thatindicateslossoftheRCSbarrier(BasesPage295)1.5.2.1.2.3.4.2.3.1.4.1.2.3.1.2.3.4.5.6.1.5.6.7.2.3.4.8.PotentialLossPotentialLossAnyconditionintheopinionoftheEmergencyCoordinatorthatindicates lossoftheFuelCladbarrier(BasesPage277)6.A.CSFSTB.CoreExitT/CsC.RadiationD.InventoryE.OtherF.JudgmentNoneNoneNoneNone NoneNoneNoneNoneNoneNoneNoneNoneNoneSequentialnumberwithinsubcategory/classificationSubcategorynumber(1ifnosubcategory)XXX.XCategory(R,H,E,S,F,C)Emergencyclassification(G,S,A,U)EALIdentifierAnautomatictripfailedtoshutdownthereactorANDManualactionstakenatthereactorcontrolconsole(Note6)donotshutdownthereactorasindicatedbyreactorpowergreaterthanorequalto5%Note4:TheEmergencyCoordinatorshouldnotwaituntiltheapplicabletimehaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdeterminedthattheconditionwilllikelyexceedtheapplicabletime 1Note6:Formanualtrip,theMCBreactortripswitchesanddeenergizinguB3anduB4aretheonlymethodsapplicabletoEALsSA3.1andSS3.1Note7:UseCategoryFEALsforescalationduetoRCSleakageOffsite:*138KVswitchyardcircuit*345KVswitchyardcircuitOnsite:*uEG1*uEG2TableS-3ACPowerSourcesLossofDCPower 2Comm.6NoneNoneNone 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 3Note5:ApplicableonColdConditionChartonly.Revision12AEffectiveDate02/13/2015NoneNoneNoneNoneNoneNoneControlCopy#:________PreparedforLuminantby:OperationsSupportServices,Inc.-www.ossi-net.com 2

RG1.1(BasesPage66)RS1.1(BasesPage60)ValidreadingonanyradiationmonitorsgreaterthanTableR-1column"SAE"forgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note1)RS1.2(BasesPage63)Doseassessmentusingactualmeteorologyindicatesdosesgreaterthan100mRemTEDEor500mRemthyroidCDEatorbeyondtheExclusionAreaBoundaryValidreadingonanyradiationmonitorsgreaterthanTableR-1column"GE"forgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note1)Doseassessmentusingactualmeteorologyindicatesdosesgreaterthan1,000mRemTEDEor5,000mRemthyroidCDEatorbeyondtheExclusionAreaBoundaryRG1.2(BasesPage69)RS1.3(BasesPage64)Fieldsurveyresultsindicateclosedwindowdoseratesgreaterthan1,000mRem/hrexpectedtocontinueforgreaterthanorequalto60min.atorbeyondtheExclusionAreaBoundary(Note1)ORAnalysesoffieldsurveysamplesindicatethyroidCDEgreaterthan5,000mRemfor1hrofinhalationatorbeyondtheExclusionAreaBoundaryRG1.3(BasesPage71)Fieldsurveyresultsindicateclosedwindowdoseratesgreaterthan100mRem/hrexpectedtocontinueforgreater thanorequalto60min.atorbeyondtheExclusionAreaBoundary(Note1)ORAnalysesoffieldsurveysamplesindicatethyroidCDEgreaterthan500mRemfor1hrofinhalationatorbeyond theExclusionAreaBoundaryRU1.1(BasesPage41)ValidreadingonanyLiquidmonitorsgreaterthanTableR-1column"UE"forgreaterthanorequalto60min.(Note2)RU1.2(BasesPage45)ValidreadingonanyGaseousmonitorsgreaterthanTableR-1column"UE"forgreaterthanorequalto60min.(Note2)RA1.1(BasesPage51)ValidreadingonanyLiquidmonitorsgreaterthanTableR-1column"Alert"forgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note2)RA1.2(BasesPage55)ValidreadingonanyGaseousmonitorsgreaterthanTableR-1column"Alert"forgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note2)RA1.3(BasesPage58)Confirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleasesindicateconcentrationsorreleaseratesgreaterthan200timesODCMlimitsforgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note2)RU1.3(BasesPage49)Confirmedsampleanalysesforgaseousorliquidreleasesindicateconcentrationsorreleaseratesgreaterthan2times ODCMlimitsforgreaterthanorequalto60min.(Note2)UnplannedwaterleveldropinareactorrefuelingpathwayasindicatedbyEITHERofthefollowing:*lessthan857ft.3.5in.inspentfuelpoolorfueltransfercanal*lessthan856ft.11in.inrefuelingcavity(407in.abovecoreplate)ANDValidarearadiationmonitorreadingriseonanyofthefollowing:*RFCu10,LRAMWREFUELCAV860(u-RE-6251)*RFCu12,LRAMEREFUELCAV860(u-RE-6253)*SFP001,LRAMSFP2EWALL(X-RE-6272)

  • SFP002,LRAMSFP2NWALL(X-RE-6273)
  • SFP003,LRAMSFP1EWALL(X-RE-6274)
  • SFP004,LRAMSFP1SWALL(X-RE-6275)DamagetoirradiatedfuelORlossofwaterlevelAND AvalidHighalarmonanyofthefollowing:*RFCu10,LRAMWREFUELCAV860(u-RE-6251)*RFCu12,LRAMEREFUELCAV860(u-RE-6253)*CAPu98,CNTMTAIRPIGPART(u-RE-5502)*CAIu99,CNTMTAIRPIGIODINE(u-RE-5566)*CAGu97,CNTMTAIRPIGGAS(u-RE-5503)*FBV088,FBVENTEXH(X-RE-5700)*SFP001,LRAMSFP2EWALL(X-RE-6272)
  • SFP002,LRAMSFP2NWALL(X-RE-6273)*SFP003,LRAMSFP1EWALL(X-RE-6274)*SFP004,LRAMSFP1SWALL(X-RE-6275)RU2.1(BasesPage73)RA2.1(BasesPage77)RA3.1(BasesPage81)RU2.2(BasesPage76)Unplannedvalidarearadiationmonitorreadingrisesbyafactorof1000overnormallevels**Normallevelscanbeconsideredasthehighestreadinginthepast24hoursexcludingthecurrentpeakvalueRA2.2(BasesPage79)Awaterleveldropinthereactorrefuelingcavity,spentfuelpoolorfueltransfercanalthatwillresultinirradiatedfuelbecominguncoveredDoseratesgreaterthan15mRem/hrinareasrequiring continuousoccupancytomaintainplantsafetyfunctions:ControlRoom(X-RE-6281orX-RE-6282)ORCAS(bysurvey)Modes: 1PowerOperationRefuelingDefueled 2Startup 5 6 3 4DEFHotShutdownColdShutdownHotStandbyOnsiteRadConditions

&SpentFuelEventsAnyreleaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivitytotheenvironmentgreaterthan2timestheODCM for60minutesorlongerAnyreleaseofgaseousorliquidradioactivitytotheenvironmentgreaterthan200timestheODCM for15minutesorlongerOffsitedoseresultingfromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivityexceeds100mRemTEDEor 500mRemthyroidCDEfortheactualorprojected durationofthereleaseOffsitedoseresultingfromanactualorimminentreleaseofgaseousradioactivitygreaterthan1000 mRemTEDEor5000mRemthyroidCDEfortheactual orprojecteddurationofthereleaseusingactual meteorologyUnplannedriseinplantradiationlevelsDamagetoirradiatedfuelorlossofwaterlevelthathas resultedorwillresultintheuncoveringofirradiatedfuel outsidethereactorvesselRiseinradiationlevelswithinthefacilitythatimpedes operationofsystemsrequiredtomaintainplantsafety functions56DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF1234Abnorm.RadRelease/RadEffluent R GENERALEMERGENCY SITEAREAEMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUALEVENT 2OffsiteRadConditions 1NoneNoneNoneHS4.1(BasesPage184)

AhostileactionisoccurringorhasoccurredwithintheProtectedAreaasreportedbytheSecurityShiftSupervisorHA1.1(BasesPage154)SeismiceventgreaterthanOBEasindicatedbyannunciator2A-3.1,OBEEXCEEDED,oryellowOBElightonSeismic MonitoringsystempanelANDEarthquakeconfirmedbyanyofthefollowing:*Earthquakefeltinplant*NationalEarthquakeInformationCenter(Note8)

  • ControlRoomindicationofdegradedperformanceofsystemsrequiredforthesafeshutdownoftheplantHG4.1(BasesPage186)

Ahostileactionhasoccurredsuchthatplantpersonnelareunabletooperateequipmentrequiredtomaintainanyofthefollowingsafetyfunctions:*Reactivitycontrol

  • RCSinventory
  • Secondaryheatremoval AhostileactionisoccurringorhasoccurredwithintheOwnerControlledAreaasreportedbytheSecurityShiftSupervisorORAvalidatednotificationfromNRCofanairlinerattackthreat within30min.ofthesiteHU4.1(BasesPage180)

AsecurityconditionthatdoesnotinvolveahostileactionasreportedbytheSecurityShiftSupervisorORAcrediblesite-specificsecuritythreatnotificationORAvalidatednotificationfromNRCprovidinginformationofanaircraftthreatHA4.1(BasesPage182)HU1.1(BasesPage143)Seismiceventidentifiedbyanytwoofthefollowing:*Annunciator2A-2.1,SEISMICMONITORINGSYSTEMACTIVATION,received*Earthquakefeltinplant*NationalEarthquakeInformationCenter(Note8)HU2.1(BasesPage169)Firenotextinguishedwithin15min.ofControlRoomnotificationorverificationofaControlRoomfirealarminanyTableH-1area(Note4)HA2.1(BasesPage173)FireorexplosionresultinginEITHER:*VisibledamagetoanyTableH-1structures*ControlRoomindicationofdegradedperformanceofsystemsrequiredtoestablishormaintainsafeshutdown(Note9)HU3.1(BasesPage175)Toxic,corrosive,asphyxiantorflammablegasesinamountsthathaveorcouldadverselyaffectnormalplantoperationsHA3.1(BasesPage178)AccesstoaVitalAreaisprohibitedduetotoxic,corrosive,asphyxiantorflammablegaseswhichjeopardizeoperationofsystemsrequiredtomaintainsafeoperationsorsafelyshut downthereactor(Note3)NaturalordestructivephenomenaaffectingtheProtectedAreaHU1.2(BasesPage145)TornadostrikingwithintheProtectedAreaboundaryORSustainedhighwindsgreaterthan80mphHU2.2(BasesPage171)ExplosionofsufficientforcetodamagepermanentstructuresorequipmentwithintheProtectedArea(Note9)HU1.4(BasesPage149)TurbinefailureresultingincasingpenetrationordamagetoturbineorgeneratorsealsHU1.3(BasesPage147)Internalfloodingthathasthepotentialtoaffectsafety-relatedequipmentrequiredbyTechnicalSpecificationsforthe currentoperatingmodeintheSafeguardsBuildingor TurbineBuildingNaturalordestructivephenomenaaffectingVitalAreasHA1.2(BasesPage157)Tornadostrikingorsustainedhighwindsgreaterthan80mphresultinginEITHER:*VisibledamagetoanyTableH-1structures*ControlRoomindicationofdegradedperformanceofsystemsrequiredtoestablishormaintainsafeshutdownHA1.6(BasesPage167)VehiclecrashresultinginEITHER:*VisibledamagetoanyTableH-1structures*ControlRoomindicationofdegradedperformanceofsystemsrequiredtoestablishormaintainsafeshutdownHA1.4(BasesPage162)Turbinefailure-generatedprojectilesresultinginEITHER:*VisibledamagetoorpenetrationofanyTableH-1structures*ControlRoomindicationofdegradedperformanceofsystemsrequiredtoestablishormaintainsafeshutdownHA1.3(BasesPage160)InternalfloodingintheSafeguardsBuildingorTurbineBuildingresultinginEITHER:*Anelectricalshockhazardthatprecludesaccesstooperateormonitorsystemsrequiredtoestablishormaintainsafeshutdown*ControlRoomindicationofdegradedperformanceofsystemsrequiredtoestablishormaintainsafeshutdownFirewithintheProtectedAreanotextinguishedwithin15min.ofdetectionorexplosionwithintheProtectedAreaFireorexplosionaffectingtheoperabilityofplantsafetysystemsrequiredtoestablishormaintainsafeshutdownAccesstoaVitalAreaisprohibitedduetotoxic,corrosive,asphyxiantorflammablegaseswhichjeopardizeoperationofoperableequipmentrequiredtomaintainsafe operationsorsafelyshutdownthereactorReleaseoftoxic,corrosive,asphyxiantorflammable gasesdeemeddetrimentaltonormalplantoperationsConfirmedsecurityconditionorthreatwhichindicatesapotentialdegradationinthelevelofsafetyoftheplantHostileactionwithintheOwnerControlledAreaorairborneattackthreatHostileactionwithintheProtectedAreaHostileactionresultinginlossofphysicalcontrolofthefacilityHU6.1(BasesPage191)OtherconditionsexistingthatinthejudgmentoftheEmergencyCoordinatorwarrantdeclarationofaUEOtherconditionsexistwhichinthejudgmentoftheEmergencyCoordinatorindicatethateventsareinprogressor haveoccurredwhichindicateapotentialdegradationofthe levelofsafetyoftheplantorindicateasecuritythreattofacilityprotectionhasbeeninitiated.Noreleasesofradioactivematerialrequiringoffsiteresponseormonitoringareexpectedunlessfurtherdegradationofsafetysystems occursControlRoomevacuationhasbeeninitiatedHA5.1(BasesPage188)ControlRoomevacuationhasbeeninitiatedHS5.1(BasesPage189)ControlRoomevacuationhasbeeninitiatedANDControloftheplantcannotbeestablishedwithin15min.ControlRoomevacuationhasbeeninitiatedandplantcontrolcannotbeestablishedOtherconditionsexistwhichinthejudgmentoftheEmergencyCoordinatorindicatethateventsareinprogress orhaveoccurredwhichinvolveanactualorpotential substantialdegradationofthelevelofsafetyoftheplantora securityeventthatinvolvesprobablelifethreateningriskto sitepersonnelordamagetositeequipmentbecauseofhostileaction

.AnyreleasesareexpectedtobelimitedtosmallfractionsoftheEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevels(1RemTEDEand5RemthyroidCDE).HA6.1(BasesPage193)OtherconditionsexistingthatinthejudgmentoftheEmergencyCoordinatorwarrantdeclarationofanAlertHS6.1(BasesPage195)OtherconditionsexistwhichinthejudgmentoftheEmergencyCoordinatorindicatethateventsareinprogress orhaveoccurredwhichinvolveanactualorlikelymajor failuresofplantfunctionsneededforprotectionofthepublicorhostileactionthatresultsinintentionaldamageormaliciousacts;1)towardsitepersonnelorequipmentthatcouldleadtothelikelyfailureofor;2)thatpreventeffective accesstoequipmentneededfortheprotectionofthepublic.AnyreleasesarenotexpectedtoresultinexposurelevelswhichexceedEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevels(1RemTEDEand5RemthyroidCDE)beyondtheExclusionAreaBoundaryOtherconditionsexistingthatinthejudgmentoftheEmergencyCoordinatorwarrantdeclarationofSiteAreaEmergencyHG6.1(BasesPage197)OtherconditionsexistwhichinthejudgmentoftheEmergencyCoordinatorindicatethateventsareinprogressorhaveoccurredwhichinvolveactualorimminentsubstantialcoredegradationormeltingwithpotentialforlossofcontainmentintegrityorhostileactionthatresultsinanactuallossofphysicalcontrolofthefacility.Releasescanbe reasonablyexpectedtoexceedEPAProtectiveActionGuidelineexposurelevels(1RemTEDEand5RemthyroidCDE)offsiteformorethantheimmediatesiteareaOtherconditionsexistingthatinthejudgmentofthe EmergencyCoordinatorwarrantdeclarationofGeneralEmergencyNoneNone56DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF123456DEF1234Hazards HNaturalorDestructivePhenomenaFireorExplosionControlRoomEvacuationHazardousGasSecurityJudgment 1 2 3 4 5 6ComanchePeakNuclearPowerPlantEmergencyActionLevelMatrixHG4.2(BasesPage187)

AhostileactionhascausedfailureofSpentFuelCoolingsystemsANDImminentfueldamageislikelyforafreshlyoff-loadedreactorcoreinpoolPlantVentPVG384+PVG385PlantVent(WRGM)PVF684+PVF685MainSteamMSLu78MSLu79MSLu80MSLu81LiquidWaste LWE-076ServiceWaterSSWu65SSWu66GaseousLiquid----------1.7E+7µCi/sec27µCi/cc----------------X-RE-5567A+BX-RE-5570A+B u-RE-2325 u-RE-2326 u-RE-2327 u-RE-2328X-RE-5253 u-RE-4269 u-RE-4270TableR-1EffluentMonitorClassificationThresholdsReleasePointMonitorGESAEAlertUE----------1.7E+6µCi/sec2.7µCi/cc--------


1.3E-1µCi/cc8.0E+5µCi/sec10xhighalarmsetpoint200Xhighalarmsetpoint*200Xhighalarmsetpoint1.3E-3µCi/cc8.0E+4µCi/sec2xhighalarmsetpoint2Xhighalarmsetpoint*2Xhighalarmsetpoint*WitheffluentdischargenotisolatedCR/CASRad 3ISFSI ENoneNoneNoneEU1.1(BasesPage248)DamagetoaloadedcaskConfinementBoundaryDamagetoaloadedcaskConfinementBoundary56DEF123456DEF1234HU1.5(BasesPage151)SafeShutdownImpoundmentlevelgreaterthan794.7ft(lake)ORSafeShutdownImpoundmentlevellessthan769.5ft(insidetravelingscreens)HA1.5(BasesPage165)SafeShutdownImpoundmentlevelgreaterthan796.0ft(lake)ORSafeShutdownImpoundmentlevellessthan761.5ft(inside travelingscreens)PreparedforLuminantby:OperationsSupportServices,Inc.-www.ossi-net.comTableH-1StructuresContainingSystemsNeededforSafeShutdown-u-Containment-u-SafeguardsBuilding-X-AuxiliaryBuilding-X-Electrical&ControlBuilding-X-FuelBuilding-X-ServiceWaterIntakeStructure-u-DieselGeneratorBuilding-u-Normalswitchgearrooms-u-CST-u-RWSTHU3.2(BasesPage177)Recommendationbylocal,countyorstateofficialstoevacuateorsheltersitepersonnelbasedonoffsiteeventNote2:TheEmergencyCoordinatorshouldnotwaituntiltheapplicabletimehaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdeterminedthatthereleasedurationhasexceeded,orwilllikelyexceed,theapplicabletime.Intheabsenceofdatatothecontrary,assumethatthereleasedurationhasexceededtheapplicabletimeifanongoingreleaseisdetectedandthereleasestarttimeisunknown.Note1:TheEmergencyCoordinatorshouldnotwaituntiltheapplicabletimehaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdeterminedthattheconditionwilllikelyexceedtheapplicabletimeIfdoseassessmentresultsareavailable,declarationshouldbebasedondoseassessmentinsteadofradiationmonitorvalues(seeEALRS1.2).DonotdelaydeclarationawaitingdoseassessmentNote3:Iftheequipmentinthestatedareawasalreadyinoperable,oroutofservice,beforetheeventoccurred,thenEALHA3.1shouldnotbedeclaredasitwillhavenoadverseimpactontheabilityoftheplanttosafelyoperateorsafelyshutdownbeyondthatalreadyallowedbyTechnicalSpecificationsatthetimeoftheevent.56DEF1234Revision12AEffectiveDate02/13/2015Note8:WebaddressforNationalEarthquakeInformationCenteris:http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/dyfi/archives.phpNote9:Explosionisdefinedasarapid,violent,unconfinedcombustion,orcatastrophicfailureofpressurized/energizedequipmentthatimpartsenergyofsufficientforcetopotentiallydamagepermanentstructures,systems,orcomponents.AsteamlinebreakorsteamexplosionthatdamagessurroundingpermanentstructuresorequipmentwouldbeclassifiedunderthisEAL.NoneNoneNoneControlCopy#:________

Sequentialnumberwithinsubcategory/classificationSubcategorynumber(1ifnosubcategory)XXX.XCategory(R,H,E,S,F,C)Emergencyclassification(G,S,A,U)EALIdentifierLossofDCPower 2NoneNoneNone 6RCSleakageColdSD/RefuelingSystemMalfunct.LossofACPowerACpowercapabilitytosafeguardbusesreducedtoasinglepowersourceforgreaterthanorequalto15min.suchthatanyadditionalsinglefailurewouldresultinalossofallACpowertosafeguardbusesCU1.1(BasesPage85)ACpowercapabilityto6.9KVsafeguardbusesuEA1and uEA2reducedtoasinglepowersourceforgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4)ANDAnyadditionalsinglepowersourcefailurewillresultinlossofallACpowerto6.9KVsafeguardbusesuEA1anduEA2(TableC-5)Lessthan105VDConrequired125VDCsafeguardbuses(uED1,uED2,uED3,uED4)forgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4)CU2.1(BasesPage91)RCSlevellessthan0in.aboveuppercoreplate(top)forgreaterthanorequalto30min.(Note4)ANDAnyContainmentchallengecondition,TableC-4CA3.1(BasesPage104)RCSlevellessthan33.25in.aboveuppercoreplate(top)ORRCSlevelcannotbemonitoredforgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4)withalossofRCSinventoryasindicatedbyanunexplainedlevelriseinanyTableC-1sump/tanklevelCG3.1(BasesPage118)WithContainmentclosurenotestablished,RCSlevellessthan27.25in.aboveuppercoreplate(top)CS3.1(BasesPage108)LossofRCSinventoryLossofRCSinventoryaffectingcoredecayheatremovalcapabilityLossofRCSinventoryaffectingfuelcladintegritywith ContainmentchallengedRCSLevelComm.LossofallonsiteoroffsitecommunicationscapabilitiesCU5.1(BasesPage138)LossofallTableC-2onsite(internal)communicationmethodsaffectingtheabilitytoperformroutineoperationsORLossofallTableC-2offsite(external)communicationmethodsaffectingtheabilitytoperformoffsitenotificationsInadvertentcriticalityCU6.1(BasesPage140)NoneNoneNoneLossofrequiredDCpowerfor

³15min.CA1.1(BasesPage88)LossofalloffsiteandallonsiteACpowerto6.9KVsafeguardbusesuEA1anduEA2forgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4)LossofalloffsiteandallonsiteACpowertosafeguardbusesUnplannedRCSleveldropbelowEITHERofthefollowingforgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4):*ReactorVesselflange(whenthelevelbandisestablishedabovetheflange)*Targetband(whenthelevelbandisestablishedbelowtheflange)CU3.2(BasesPage96)RCSlevelcannotbemonitoredANDLossofRCSinventoryasindicatedbyanunexplainedlevelriseinanyTableC-1sump/tanklevelCU3.3(BasesPage100)WithContainmentclosureestablished,RCSlevellessthan0in.aboveuppercoreplate(top)CS3.2(BasesPage111)RCSlevelcannotbemonitoredforgreaterthanorequalto30min.(Note4)withalossofRCSinventoryindicatedbyanyofthefollowing:*greaterthan20,000R/hronanyofthefollowing:-CTEu16,ContainmentHRRM(u-RE-6290A)-CTWu17,ContainmentHRRM(u-RE-6290B)*Erraticsourcerangemonitorindication

  • UnexplainedlevelriseinanyTableC-1sump/tanklevelCS3.3(BasesPage114)RCSTemp.UnplannedeventresultsinRCStemperaturegreaterthan200°F(Note5)CU4.1(BasesPage129)UnplannedlossofdecayheatremovalcapabilitywithirradiatedfuelintheReactorVesselLossofallRCStemperatureandRCSlevelindicationforgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4)CU4.2(BasesPage131)CA4.1(BasesPage134)AnunplannedeventresultsinEITHER:*RCStemperaturegreaterthan200°F(Note5)forgreaterthanTableC-3duration*RCSpressurerisegreaterthan10psigduetoalossofRCScooling(thisconditionisnotapplicableinsolidplantconditions)InabilitytomaintainplantincoldshutdownNoneCOLDCONDITIONS(RCS

££200°F)56*ContainmentSump1*ContainmentSump2

  • CCWSurgeTankA
  • CCWSurgeTankB
  • PRT
  • RCDTTableC-1Sumps/Tanks56TableC-3RCSReheatDurationThresholdsIntact(butNOTreducedinventory

)60min.*20min.**IfanRCSheatremovalsystemisinoperationwithinthistimeframeandRCStemperatureisbeingreduced,theEALisnotapplicable0min.RCSStatusContainmentClosureStatusDurationEstablishedNOTestablishedN/ANotintactORreducedinventory5656DEF5656DEF56 C 3 4 5Anunplanned ,sustainedpositivestartuprateobservedonnuclearinstrumentation 1 GENERALEMERGENCY SITEAREAEMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUALEVENTInadvertentCriticality 656ReactorVesselFlangeBottomofHotleg6in.<BottomofHotlegTopofCorePlateEWRPlantEl.834ft.0.50in.33.25in.27.25in.825ft.9.25in.0.00in.ReactorVesselThresholdValuesEAL(s)CU3.2CA3.1CS3.1CS3.2CG3.1132.50in.823ft.0.00in.825ft.3.25in.RCSleakage56RCSlevelcannotbemonitoredforgreaterthanorequalto30min.(Note4)withalossofRCSinventoryindicatedbyanyofthefollowing:*greaterthan20,000R/hronanyofthefollowing:-CTEu16,ContainmentHRRM(u-RE-6290A)-CTWu17,ContainmentHRRM(u-RE-6290B)*Erraticsourcerangemonitorindication

  • UnexplainedlevelriseinanyTableC-1sump/tanklevelANDAnyContainmentchallengecondition,TableC-4CG3.2(BasesPage122)TableC-4ContainmentChallengeConditions
  • Containmentclosurenotestablished*Containmenthydrogenconcentrationgreaterthan4%
  • UnplannedpressurerisethatcanbreachtheContainmentbarrierCU3.1(BasesPage94)RCSleakageresultsintheinabilitytomaintainorrestoreEITHERofthefollowingforgreaterthanorequalto15min.(Note4):*Pressurizerlevelgreaterthan17%*Abovethelowendofthetargetlevelcontrolband(Ifpressurizerlevelwasintentionallyloweredlessthan17%)5Offsite:*138KVswitchyardcircuit*345KVswitchyardcircuitOnsite:*uEG1*uEG2TableC-5ACPowerSourcesNote4:TheEmergencyCoordinatorshouldnotwaituntiltheapplicabletimehaselapsed,butshoulddeclaretheeventassoonasitisdeterminedthattheconditionwilllikelyexceedtheapplicabletimeNote5:BeginmonitoringhotconditionEALsconcurrentlyGai-TronicsPage/partysystem(PublicAddressSystem)

PlantRadioSystemPABX(PrivateAutomaticBranchExchangeSystem)

PublicTelephoneSystem FederalTelephoneSystem(FTS)TableC-2CommunicationsSystemsSystemOnsite(internal)Offsite(external)

X X X X X X X56Revision12AEffectiveDate02/13/2015NoneNoneNoneNoneNoneNonePreparedforLuminantby:OperationsSupportServices,Inc.-www.ossi-net.comControlCopy#:________

ES-301 Control Room / In

-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 1 of 4CPNPP 2016 NRC ES

-301-2 RO & SRO SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE REV. 3.DOCX Facility: CPNPP Units 1 and 2 Date of Examination:

Ju ly 2 0 1 6 Exam Level: RO SRO(I) SRO (U) Operating Test Number:

NRC Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO

-I); (2 or 3 for SRO

-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code*

Safety Function S-1 00 3 - Dropped Control Rod (RO10 24 A) Respond to Control Rod Misalignment M ,S 1 S-2 010 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (RO1205) PORV Block Valve Operability Test A, D ,S 3 S-3 002 - Reactor Coolant System (RO1412 C) Respond to a Shutdown Loss of Coolant L,M, S 4P S-4 045 - Main Turbine Generator System (RO31

13) Perform Pre

-Startup Turbine Trip Checks A,L,N,S 4S S-5 026 - Containment Spray System (RO2002 C) Transfer Containment Spray to Recirculation with Cavitation A, D,EN,L ,S 5 S-6 064 - Emergency Diesel Generator System (RO4215B) Restore Safeguards Bus 1EA1 to Offsite Power A, D, P, S 6 S-7 015 - Nuclear Instrumentation System (RO1820)

Respond to a Power Range Channel Malfunction D, S 7 S-8 0 67 - Plant Fire On

-site (RO 4405) Respond to Fire in the Safeguards Building D ,S 8 In-Plant Systems

@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO

-I); (3 or 2 for SRO

-U) P-1 004 - Chemical and Volume Control (AO5202A) Perform Local Actions to Restart the Positive Displacement Pump A, D , E ,R 2 P-2 0 55 - Loss of All AC Power (RO4217H) Perform Attachment 2A DC Load Shedding N,E,L 6 P-3 068 - Control Room Evacuation (AO5115B) Emergency Borate from the Remote Shutdown Panel D,E,L,R 8 ES-301 Control Room / In

-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 2 of 4CPNPP 2016 NRC ES

-301-2 RO & SRO SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE REV. 3.DOCX

@ All RO and SRO

-I control room (and in

-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO

-U systems must serve different safety functions; in

-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO

-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in

-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)

(P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 < 9 / < 8 / < 4 > 1 / > 1 / > 1 - / - / > 1(control room system)

> 1 / > 1 / > 1 > 2 / > 2 / > 1 < 3 < 3 / < 2 (randomly selected) > 1 / > 1 / > 1 NRC JPM Examination Summary Description S-1 Control Rod H

-8 which is part of Control Bank D is misaligned from its bank. Control Rod H

-8 is at 204 steps as indicated on DRPI and Control Bank D indicates 216 steps. The applicant is provided ABN

-712, Rod Control System Malfunction and is required to realign Control Rod H

-8 using the DRPI Method. The critical steps include selecting the proper bank, withdrawing the entire bank to a known position, deselecting the non

-misaligned rods from moving, aligning Control Rod H

-8, resetting the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm, returning the entire bank to its pre

-malfunction position and restoring the Control Rod system for continued operation.

This is a modified from bank JPM as a recent procedural change added the directions which are to be used for clearing the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm if present and which this JPM now exercises. This JPM is

under the Control Rod Drive System

- Reactivity Control Safety Function.

(K/A 003.AA1.02

- IR 3.6 / 3.4) S-2 The applicant will be provided with OPT

-109A, PORV Block Valve Test and will be required to perform the Operability Test. This is an Alternate Path JPM because when PORV Block Valve 1/1

-8000B is reopened as part of the test, the PORV partially opens requiring the applicant to take action to isolate the open PORV. The critical steps include closing each PORV Block Valve, performing the stroke test of each PORV and restoring the original configuration. An additional critical step of isolating the stuck open PORV follows the malfunction. PORV Block Valves are provided to isolate a PORV if excessive leakage develops and are discussed in FSAR 15.4.13.2.

This is a direct from bank JPM under the Pressurizer Pressure Control System - Reactor Pressure Control Safety Function.

(K/A 0 10.A4.0 3 - IR 4.0 / 3.8)

ES-301 Control Room / In

-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 3 of 4CPNPP 2016 NRC ES

-301-2 RO & SRO SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE REV. 3.DOCX S-3 The applicant will respond to a lowering Pressurizer level with the Residual Heat Removal System in service per ABN

-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant, Section 2.0, Shutdown Loss of Coolant. This is a modified JPM under the Residual Heat Removal System

- Primary System Heat Removal from Reactor Core Safety Function.

The modification consists of a different plant configuration as the Initial Conditions which do not require performance of an Alternate Path.

(K/A 025.AA1.02

- IR 3.8 / 3.9)

S-4 The applicant will use OPT-410 A , Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks to perform the task. This is an Alternate Path JPM as the Turbine speed will increase above the allowable procedural guidance while the HP Stop Valves are opening. This speed increase requires that the turbine be tripped in accordance with OPT-410A. The critical steps will include resetting the turbine trip, latching the turbine, opening the HP Stop Valves and tripping the turbine when speed increases. This is a new JPM under the Main Turbine Generator System

- Heat Removal from Reactor Core Secondary Systems Safety Function.

(K/A 0 45.A 4.0 1 - IR 3.1 / 2.9) S-5 Following a LBLOCA, the applicant will transfer the Containment Spray System from the Injection mode to Recirculation in accordance with EOS

-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. This is an Alternate Path JPM as the applicant will not be able to open the containment sump valves to the Train B Containment Spray Pumps. This will require the applicant to secure Train B.

Critical steps will include transferring Train A suction to the containment sump and securing both Train B pumps when suction cannot be realigned. Transferring Containment Spray to Recirculation Mode is considered a Time Significant Action. STI

-214.01, Control of Timed Operator Actions, TSA

-2.8 requires Containment Spray transferred to Recirculation Mode within 70 seconds of RWST level reaching 6%. This Time Significant Action is performed to avoid the requirement to secure Containment Spray Pumps due to losing suction supply when RWST level reaches 0%.

This is a direct from bank JPM under the Containment Spray Syste m - Containment Integrity Safety Function.

(K/A 0 26.A4.0 1 - IR 4.5 / 4.3) S-6 The applicant will restore Offsite Power to 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 from Transformer XST1 in accordance with SOP

-609A, Diesel Generator System, Section 5.7, Transferring From DG Supplying Alone to Normal or Alternate Supply. The alternate path occurs when a lowering frequency requires separating the Emergency Diesel Generator from the grid. This is a bank JPM, previously used on the 2014 NRC operating test, under the Emergency Diesel Generator System

- Electrical Safety Function. (K/A 064.A4.07

- IR 3.4 / 3.4)

S-7 Following a Power Range Instrument failure. The applicant is required to perform the actions of ABN

-703, Power Range Instrument Malfunction

. Critical steps include several repositions on the NI Detector cabinets to defeat the failed instrument, defeating the N

-16 Channel on CB

-05 and the TAVE channel on CB

-07. This is a direct from bank JPM under the Nuclear Instrumentation System

- Instrumentation Safety Function.

(K/A 0 1 5.A2.01 - IR 3.5 / 3.9)

ES-301 Control Room / In

-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Page 4 of 4CPNPP 2016 NRC ES

-301-2 RO & SRO SYSTEM JPM OUTLINE REV. 3.DOCX S-8 A fire has been identified in the Safeguards Building. The applicant is directed to respond to the fire in accordance with ABN

-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building.

Critical steps include performing an emergency start of Diesel Generator 1

-02, performing CVCS realignments and starting CCP 1

-02. Comanche Peak has commitments within ABN

-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building, to maintain CCP suction due to possible Gas Intrusion as noted in SOER 97

-01, Loss of HP Injection & Charging from Gas Intrusion.

This is a direct from bank JPM under the Plant Fire On

-site - Plant Service Systems Safety Function. (K/A 0 67.A A2.16 - IR 3.3 / 4.0) P-1 Following a loss of instrument air, the applicant is required to reset control air to the Positive Displacement Charging Pump in accordance with ABN

-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction and restore the PDP to operation in accordance with SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System.

This JPM is Alternate Path as the Stuffing Box Coolant Tank level is out of specification during the pump restart and requires filling. Critical steps include resetting the air to the hydraulic speed changer, repositioning the fill valve to the coolant tank and opening the pump discharge valve. This is a direct from bank JPM under the Chemical and Volume Control System - Reactivity Control System Inventory Control Safety Function. (K/A 0 0 4.A 4.0 8 - IR 3.8 / 3.4) P-2 During a complete loss of All AC Power, the applicant is required to perform ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power Attachment 2A which is Initial DC Load Shed. Critical steps include performing several operations on Distribution Panels to properly align equipment from Unit 2 where possible and shed loads where required. This is a new JPM as DC Load Shedding has been redeveloped following BDBEE considerations.

(K/A 055.EA1.04 3.5/3.9)

P-3 During a Control Room evacuation due to a security threat, the applicant is required to take action to place the plant in control of the operators from outside the control room.

Actions will be performed using ABN

-905 B , Loss of Control Room Habitability. The critical steps include transferring control of equipment from the Control Room to the Hot Shutdown Panel, starting a Boric Acid Transfer Pump and opening the emergency borate valve. This is a direct from bank JPM under the Control Room Evacuation System - Plant Service Systems Safety Function.

(K/A 06 8.AA1.11 - IR 3.9 / 4.1)

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-1 (RO1024 A) REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-1 Task # RO1024 K/A # 003.AA1.02 3.6 / 3.4 SF-1 Title: Respond to Control Rod Misalignment Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

X Alternate Path:

Plant: Time Critical:

CUE THE EXAMINEE Provide the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cue to the Examinee. Any special conditions or instructions should be contained on this sheet Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Control Rod H8 is at 2 0 4 steps as indicated on DRPI, all other rods in Control Bank D indicate 2 1 6 steps Demand counters for Control Bank D are indicating 215 steps All necessary verifications, repairs, and determinations have been made in accordance with ABN

-712 Technical Specification s have been referenced A n NEO is standing by at the P/A Converter AUTO/MANUAL Selector Switch Control Rod H8 has been misaligned for 15 minutes Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

REALIGN Control Rod H8 with Control Bank D at the normal withdrawal rate per ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section 3.3, Dropped or Misaligned Rod in MODE 1 or 2, STARTING at Step 1 4 DESIRED DRPI light for Step 15 is 2 22 Steps Task Standard:

Realign ed Control Rod H8 with Control Bank D, positioned Control Bank D to 216 Steps as indicated on DRPI, cleared the Control Rod Urgent Failure Alarm and returned Control Rod Bank Select to Manual.

Re f. Materials:

ABN-712 , Rod Control System Malfunction Rev. 10-16. Validation Time:

1 5 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-1 (RO1024 A) REV. 2 SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC-33 When contacted, EXECUTE remote function RDR03, P/A Converter to MANUAL.

OR INITIALIZE to IC-18 or any at power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

EXECUTE the following malfunction s: RD13H8, Control Bank D Rod H8 @ 202 Steps PLACE Simulator in RUN PLACE 1/1-RBSS, Control Rod Bank Select in MANUAL DELETE malfunction RD13H8, Control Bank D Rod H8 @ 202 steps PLACE Simulator in FREEZE When contacted, EXECUTE remote function RDR03, P/A Converter to MANUAL Handouts:

PROVIDE the Applicant with a copy of:

ABN-712, Rod Control System Malfunction , Section 3.3, Dropped or Misaligned Rod in MODE 1 or 2, appropriately marked through Step 13 (Labeled Procedure 1)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-1 (RO1024 A) REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note

The following steps are from ABN-712, Section 3.3.

Perform Step

1 3.3.14 Transfer 1/

u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT to affected bank.

Performance Standard: ROTATE D 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT to Bank CBD position. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

2 3.3.15.a & 1 st line Record positions for affected Rod:

Affected Rod (DRPI) _____

Performance Standard: RECORD ED Rod H8 DRPI at 204 Steps. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

3 3.3.15.a & 2 nd line Record positions for affected Rod:

Bank (DRPI) _____

Performance Standard: RECORD ED Bank CBD DRPI at 21 6 Steps. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-1 (RO1024 A) REV. 2 Perform Step:

4 3.3.15.a & 3 rd line Record positions for affected Rod:

Group 1 step counter _____

Performance Standard: OBSERVE D 1-SC-CBD1, CTRL BANK D GROUP 1 and RECORD ED at 21 5 Steps. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

5 3.3.15.a & 4 th line Record positions for affected Rod:

Group 2 step counter

_____ Performance Standard: OBSERVE D 1-SC-CBD2, CTRL BANK D GROUP 2 and RECORD ED at 21 5 Steps. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 3.3.15.b If restoring a Control Bank rod, Then Locally POSITION and MAINTAIN P/A Converter Auto

-Manual selector switch (SFGD 832 Rm 1

-096) - MANUAL Performance Standard: CONTACTED NEO to place P/A Convertor in MANUAL Simulator Operator: When contacted, Insert Malfunction RDR03 Examiner Cue

Report as NEO that the P/A Converter is in Manual Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note
DRPI ROD DEV reflashes on each outward rod movement Perform Step: 7 3.3.15.c Move affected group outward to the desired DRPI Light.

Performance Standard: PLAC ED 1/1-FLRM, CONTROL ROD MOTION CTRL in OUT position until DRPI light s for Bank D indicated 222 Steps. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-1 (RO1024 A) REV. 2 Perform Step:

8 3.3.15.d Place all lift coil disconnect switches for affected bank, groups 1 AND 2, EXCEPT for affected rod to the UP (disconnected) position.

Performance Standard: At rear of Control Board, PLACE D Lift Coil Disconnect Switches for Rods D4, M12, D12, and M4 in ROD DISCONNECTED (up) position. Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Cue

Inform applicant that other operators will adjust turbine load as required.

Perform Step:

9 3.3.15.e.1) & all bullets Maintain Tave within 2°F of Tref by controlling the following as necessary:

Turbine Power/Steam Dumps/Boration/Dilution Performance Standard: MONITOR ED TAVE. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

10 3.3.15.e.2) Verify that only affected Rod is moving.

Performance Standard: VERIFIED that only Rod H8 is moving.

Comment: Step SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

11 3.3.15.e.3) Ensure last movement of affected rod is in same direction as last movement of affected group.

Performance Standard: ENSURE D last movement of Control Rod H8 is in same direction as last movement of Control Bank CBD as entire bank was moved outward

. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-1 (RO1024 A) REV. 2 Examiner Note

DRPI ROD DEV will clear when rod H

-8 is withdrawn Perform Step:

12 3.3.15.f WITHDRAW the affected rod in controlled increments until aligned with its group by DRPI indication.

Performance Standard: PLAC E D 1/1-FLRM, CONTROL ROD MOTION CTRL in OUT position until DRPI light for Rod H8 indicate d 2 22 Steps. Examiner Cue

If applicant begins withdrawing in small increments, Inform applicant the US direct withdrawing rods in one or more steps to desired position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 13 3.3.15.g Place all lift coil disconnect switches to the DOWN (connected) position.

Performance Standard: At rear of Control Board, PLACE D Lift Coil Disconnect Switches for Rods D4, M12, D12, and M4 in ROD CONNECTED (down) position. Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Cue: If applicant questions if 'cause of alarm has been corrected' refer applicant to Initial Conditions.

Perform Step: 14 3.3.15.h VERIFY Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm

- CLEAR. Performance Standard: OBSERVED 1

-ALB-6D, Window 1.6, CONTROL ROD CTRL URGENT FAIL is LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 15 3.3.15.h & RNO a VERIFY Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm

- CLEAR. Clear the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm as follows:

Ensure only lift reg white light on designated circuit card in affected cabinet (See ALB

-6D 1.6 logic diagram)

- LIT Performance Standard: Contacted NEO to determine if the only white light LIT is the LIFT REG light. Examiner Cue:

Report as NEO that a single white LIFT REG light is LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 7 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-1 (RO1024 A) REV. 2 Perform Step: 16 3.3.15.h & RNO b VERIFY Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm

- CLEAR. Clear the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm as follows:

DEPRESS 1/1

-RCAR, CONTROL ROD CTRL ALARM RESET Performance Standard: DEPRESSED 1/1-RCAR, CONTROL ROD CTRL ALARM RESET Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 17 3.3.15.h & RNO c VERIFY Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm

- CLEAR. Clear the Rod Control Urgent Failure alarm as follows:

Ensure ALL white lights on designated circuit card in affected cabinet (See ALB-6D 1.6 logic diagram)

- DARK Performance Standard: Contacted NEO to determine if all white lights are Dark Examiner Cue:

Report as NEO that All white lights are Dark Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 1 8 3.3.15.i RESTORE affected bank to the DRPI position recorded in step 15a.

Performance Standard: PLAC ED 1/1-FLRM, CONTROL ROD MOTION CTRL in IN position until DRPI light s for Bank D indicated 216 Steps. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 1 9 3.3.15.j RESET affected bank demand step counters to the values recorded in Step 15a. Performance Standard: ADJUSTED 1

-SC-CBD1 and 1

-SC-CBD2 to 215 steps.

Examiner Note

If applicant depresses Reset (RS) button, there is no adverse impact other than waiting to reset value to 215 steps.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 8 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-1 (RO1024 A) REV. 2 Perform Step:

20 3.3.15.k If operated in step 15b, Then PLACE P/A Converter Auto

-Manual selector switch

- AUTO Performance Standard: CONTACTED NEO to place P/A Convertor in AUTO Simulator Operator: When contacted, MODIFY RDR03, to AUTO Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

21 3.3.15.l PLACE 1/u-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT to MANUAL. Performance Standard: ROTATED 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT to MANUAL position. Terminating Cue

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 9 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-1 (RO1024 A) REV. 2 Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 10 of 10 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-1 (RO1024 A) REV. 2 Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Control Rod H8 is at 204 steps as indicated on DRPI, all other rods in Control Bank D indicate 216 steps Demand counters for Control Bank D are indicating 215 steps All necessary verifications, repairs, and determinations have been made in accordance with ABN-712 Technical Specifications have been referenced An NEO is standing by at the P/A Converter AUTO/MANUAL Selector Switch Control Rod H8 has been misaligned for 15 minutes Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

REALIGN Control Rod H8 with Control Bank D at the normal withdrawal rate per ABN

-712, Rod Control System Malfunction, Section 3.3, Dropped or Misaligned Rod in MODE 1 or 2, STARTING at Step 14 DESIRED DRPI light for Step 15 is 222 Steps

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-2 (RO1205) REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-2 Task # RO 1205 K/A # 010.A4.03 4.0 / 3.8 SF-3 Title: PORV Block Valve Operability Test Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

X Alternate Path:

X Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 1 at 100% power Surveillance on the PORV Block Valves is required All Prerequisites have been met Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

PERFORM the PORV Block Valve Operability Test per OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test for both Block Valves RECORD data on OPT

-109A-1, PORV Block Valve Data Sheet Task Standard:

Performed the PORV Block Valve Operability Test through Step 8.2.3 per OPT-109A and Closed the PORV Block Valve upon failure of PORV 1-PCV-456 prior to a reactor trip. Re f. Materials:

OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test, Rev. 1

1. OPT-109A-1, PORV Block Valve Data Sheet, Rev. 1
3. ALM-0053A, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4

- PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE, Rev. 7-2. Validation Time:

10 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-2 (RO1205) REV. 2 SIMULATOR SETUP BOOTH OPERATOR: INITIALIZE to IC-3 4 OR Load any at power IC A ND PERFORM the following:

VERIFY both PRZR Block Valves are OPEN ENSURE ALM-0053A, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4

- PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE is CLEA R EXECUTE malfunction RX16 B, PRZR PORV 456 fails 30% open when 1/1

-8000 B, PRZR PORV Block Valve is reopened at Step 8.2.3.

use the following conditional command to initiate the malfunction:

{DIRCV8000B.Value=2} IMF RX16B f:30 d:13 Handouts:

INITIALLY PROVIDE the applicant with: OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test (Labeled Procedure 1)

OPT-109A-1, PORV Block Valve Data Sheet (Labeled Form 1)

Provide a copy of ALM-0053A, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4

- PORV 455A/456 NOT CLOSE when the applicant references the ALM for the above listed annunciator.

(Labeled Procedure 2)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-2 (RO1205) REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note

The following steps are from OPT-109A , Section 8.0. Perform Step:

1 8.1.1 Stroke test of 1

-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

ENSURE 1/1

-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN.

Performance Standard: DETERMINE D 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

2 8.1.2 Stroke test of 1

-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

CLOSE 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Performance Standard: PLACE D 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE (critical)

OBSERVE D green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical) CIRCLED CLOSED on Form OPT

-109A-1 at Step 8.1.2 (NOT critical) Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

3 8.1.3 Stroke test of 1

-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

OPEN 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Performance Standard: PLACED 1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in OPEN (critical) OBSERVED red OPEN light LIT (NOT critical) CIRCLED OPEN on Form OPT

-109A-1 at Step 8.1.3 (NOT critical) Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

4 8.2.1 Stroke test of 1

-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

ENSURE 1/1

-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN.

Performance Standard: DETERMINE D 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV is OPEN Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-2 (RO1205) REV. 2 Perform Step:

5 8.2.2 Stroke test of 1

-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

CLOSE 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Performance Standard: PLACED 1/1-8000 B , PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE (critical) OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical) CIRCLED CLOSED on Form OPT

-109A-1 at Step 8.2.2 (NOT critical) Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

6 8.2.3 Stroke test of 1

-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV:

OPEN 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV (RECORD).

Performance Standard: PLACE D 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in OPEN (critical)

OBSERVE D red OPEN light LIT (NOT critical)

CIRCLED OPEN on Form OPT

-109A-1 at Step 8.2.3 (NOT critical)

Comment: SAT UNSAT SIMULATOR OPERATOR NOTE: When 1/1-8000B is reopened, EXECUTE malfunction RX16 B at 30%. Ensure the conditional inserted the malfunction.

{DIRCV8000B.Value=2} IMF RX16B f:30 d:13 Perform Step:

7 Acknowledge annunciator 1

-ALB-5C, Window 1.4

- PORV 455 A/456 NOT CLOSE.

Performance Standard: ACKNOWLEDGE D annunciator 5C, Window 1.4

- PORV 455 A/456 NOT CLOSE and RECOGNIZE D PORV 456 is OPEN Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-2 (RO1205) REV. 2 Examiner Note

The following steps represent the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Examiner Note

The applicant may recognize the failure and take action prior to referencing the ALM.

Examiner Note

The following steps are from ALM-0053A, 1-ALB-5C, Window 1.4.

Provide a copy to the examinee when they reach for the control board copy Perform Step:

8 1 Determine affected PORV.

Performance Standard: DETERMINE D affected PORV is 1/1-PCV-456 Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

9 2 & 2.A Monitor pressurizer pressure

. If one channel is indicating >

60 psig difference between the remaining operable channels, go to ABN

-705. Performance Standard: DETERMINE D all Pressurizer pressure indications are reading approximately the same value Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note

1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV will be stuck in mid-position. Perform Step:

10 2, 2.B, & 2 nd bullet Monitor pressurizer pressure.

If reactor is in Mode 1, 2 or 3 with pressurizer pressure <

2335 psig, Then close affected PORV.

1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV Performance Standard: PLACE D 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV in CLOSE and OBSERVE D red OPEN and green CLOSE lights both LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-2 (RO1205) REV. 2 Perform Step: 11 3 With reactor in Mode 4, 5 or 6, Then refer to TDM

-301A to determine RCS pressure and temperature limits.

Performance Standard: DETERMINED Reactor is in MODE 1 Examiner Note

Examinee determines step is N/A

. Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note

As the applicant has already determined the leaking PORV it is not anticipated that this step will be performed but considered N/A by the applicant.

Perform Step:

1 2 4, 4.A, & 1st bullet Verify pressurizer or RCS wide range pressure stabilizes

. I F pressure continues to decrease due to PORV leakage, THEN close both PORV block valves AND determine affected PORV

. 1/1-8000 A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV Performance Standard: PLACE D 1/1-8000 A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE OBSERVE D green CLOSE light LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note

A Low Pressurizer Pressure automatic Reactor Trip is generated at 1880 psig. Procedural guidance contained in ALM

-0052A is to manually trip the Reactor if pressure cannot be maintained above 2150 psig.

Perform Step: 13 4, 4.A, & 2 nd bullet Verify pressurizer or RCS wide range pressure stabilizes.

I F pressure continues to decrease due to PORV leakage, THEN close both PORV block valves AND determine affected PORV.

1/1-8000A, PRZR PORV BLK VLV 1/1-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV Performance Standard: PLACED 1/1

-8000B, PRZR PORV BLK VLV in CLOSE prior to a reactor trip (critical) OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (non-critical) Terminating Cue

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-2 (RO1205) REV. 2 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 1 at 100% power Surveillance on the PORV Block Valves is required All Prerequisites have been met Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

PERFORM the PORV Block Valve Operability Test per OPT-109A, PORV Block Valve Test for both Block Valves RECORD data on OPT

-109A-1, PORV Block Valve Data Sheet

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-3 (RO1412C)

REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-3 Task # RO1412 K/A # 02 5.AA1.02 3.8 / 3.9 SF-4-P Title: Respond to a Shutdown Loss of Coolant Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

X Alternate Path: Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 4 with the following conditions:

RHR Train B is in service RHR Train A is in ECCS standby with 1/1

-8701A and 1/1

-8702A, RHRP 1 HL RECIRC ISOL VLVs CLOSED and De

-energized CCP 1-02, SIP 1-01 and SIP 1

-02 breakers have been racked out to comply with LCO 3.4.12 A Loss of Coolant Accident has occurred ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant is being implemented Positive Displacement Charging Pump has been started Pressurizer Level is still lowering Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM ABN-1 08 , Shutdown Loss of Coolant , starting at Step 2.3.8.b , Check RCS Status, with the Pressurizer Level NOT stable or increasing Task Standard:

In accordance with ABN

-108, opened 1/1

-8835, placed 1/1

-APRH2 in pull-out, closed 1/1

-8702B and opened a CCP SI ISOL VLV to provide injection to the RCS from a CCP

. Re f. Materials:

ABN-108 , Shutdown Loss of Coolant , Rev. 4-5 Validation Time:

10 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-3 (RO1412C)

REV. 2 Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date: SIMULATOR SETUP SIMULATOR OPERATOR: INITIALIZE to IC-40 ENSURE "480V MCC BREAKER LOCKED OFF" Circles ON 1/1

-8701A and 1/1

-8702A ENSURE "480V MCC BREAKER LOCKED OFF" Circles OFF 1/1

-8701B and 1/1

-8702B START TREND GTGC MODE 4 for current plant condition

or any MODE 4 Initial Condition and then PERFORM the following:

ENSURE Train B RHR Systems in service ENSURE "480V MCC BREAKER LOCKED OFF" Circles ON 1/1

-8701A and 1/1

-8702A ENSURE "480V MCC BREAKER LOCKED OFF" Circles OFF 1/1

-8701B and 1/1

-8702B START TREND GTGC MODE 4 for current plant condition PERFORM the 1st seven steps of ABN-108 Place PDP in service Place CCP 1

-02 and SIP Breakers in Rackout INSERT malfunction RC17A at 600 gpm to lower RCS level and allow Cold Calibrated PRZR level to lower to 50% then FREEZE the Simulator

PERFORM the following after each JPM: REMOVE the key from 1/1

-8835, SI to CL 1

-4 INJ ISOL VLV and RETURN to Key Locker Handout: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant with initials as appropriate through Step 2.3.8.b Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-3 (RO1412C)

REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Simulator Operator: When examinee is ready, PLACE Simulator in RUN.

Simulator Operator: INSERT remote function CVR17 for CCP 1

-02 Breaker (Key 1)

SIR01 for SI Pump 1

-01 Breaker (Key 2)

or SIR02 for SI Pump 1

-02 Breaker (Key 3) as directed by the applicant Perform Step: 1 Step 8 RNO 1)

Dispatch operators to rack in the breaker to affected units non

-operating CCP OR ONE safety injection pump.

Performance Standard: DISPATCHED operator to rack in breaker for one pump Examiner Cue

The [Whichever breaker was requested] is racked in.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note

Examinee will obtain key from Key Locker

. Perform Step:

2 Step 8 RNO 2)

Ensure 1/u-8835, SI TO CL 1

-4 INJ ISOL VLV, OPEN

. Performance Standard: INSERT ED key in switch and TURN ED to ON position then PLACE D 1/1-8835, SI TO CL 1

-4 INJ ISOL VLV in OPEN (Critical)

OBSERVE D red OPEN light illuminated (NOT Critical)

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note

The next two steps may be performed in any order Perform Step:

3 Step 8 RNO 3)

Stop both RHR pumps AND place HSs in PULL

-OUT: 1/u-APRH1, RHRP 1 Performance Standard: PLACE D 1/1-APRH1, RHRP 1

, in PULL-OUT and OBSERVE D the green and red pump light s dark Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-3 (RO1412C)

REV. 2 Perform Step: 4 Step 8 RNO 3)

Stop both RHR pumps AND place HSs in PULL

-OUT: 1/u-APRH 2, RHRP 2 Performance Standard: PLACE D 1/1-APRH 2, RHRP 2 , in PULL-OUT and OBSERVED the green and red pump lights dark Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

5 Step 8 RNO 4)

Close 1/u-8701A, RHRP 1 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV AND 1/

u-8702B, RHRP 2 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV

. Performance Standard: OBSERVED 1/1-8701A, RHRP 1 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV in CLOSE and DE-ENERGIZED Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Step 8 RNO 4)

Close 1/u-8701A, RHRP 1 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV AND 1/

u-8702B, RHRP 2 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV

. Performance Standard: PLACE D 1/1-8702B, RHRP 2 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVED green CLOSE light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

7 Step 8 RNO 5)

Identify AND Isolate Leak per Attachment 7, while continuing this procedure.

Performance Standard: IDENTIFY and ISOLATE Leak per Attachment 7, RCS Leak Identification and Isolation.

Examiner Cue

Another operator will perform Attachment 7, RCS Leak Identification and Isolation.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

8 Step 8 RNO 6)

GO TO Step 11.

Performance Standard: PLACEKEPT to Step 11. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-3 (RO1412C)

REV. 2 Perform Step:

9 Step 11 Verify RWST level

- GREATER THAN 33%: u-LI-932, RWST LVL CHAN III u-LI-933, RWST LVL CHAN IV Performance Standard: DETERMINE D RWST level greater than 33% by OBSERVING 1

-LI-932, RWST LVL CHAN III and 1

-LI-933, RWST LVL CHAN IV.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 1 0 Step 12.a Verify ONE CCP - RUNNING. Performance Standard: DETERMINE D CCP 1-01 was RUNNING. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 1 1 Step 12.b STOP 1/u-APPD, PDP.

Performance Standard: PLACED 1/1-APPD, PDP handswitch in STOP and OBSERVED Green Pump light LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 1 2 Step 12.c 1st bullet Verify CCP suction aligned from RWST:

1/u-LCV-112D RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV

- OPEN Performance Standard: VERIFIED 1/1-LCV-112D RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in OPEN and OBSERVE D red OPEN light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 1 3 Step 12.c 2 nd bullet Verify CCP suction aligned from RWST:

1/u-LCV-112E RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV

- OPEN Performance Standard: VERIFIED 1/1-LCV-112E RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in OPEN and OBSERVE D red OPEN light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-3 (RO1412C)

REV. 2 Perform Step: 1 4 Step 12.c 3 rd bullet Verify CCP suction aligned from RWST:

1/u-LCV-112B, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV

- CLOSED Performance Standard: VERIFIED 1/1-LCV-112B, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVE D green CLOSE light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 1 5 Step 12.c 4 th bullet Verify CCP suction aligned from RWST:

1/u-LCV-112C, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV

- CLOSED Performance Standard: VERIFIED 1/1-LCV-112C, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in CLOSE and OBSERVE D green CLOSE light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 1 6 Step 12.d Verify the following valves closed:

u-ZL-8220, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT VENT VLV - CLOSED u-ZL-8221, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT VENT VLV

- CLOSED 1/u-8210A, H2/N2 SPLY VLV

- CLOSED 1/u-8210B, H2/N2 SPLY VLV

- CLOSED 1/u-8202A, VENT VLV

- CLOSED 1/u-8202B, VENT VLV

- CLOSED Performance Standard: VERIFIED the following valves closed:

1-ZL-8220, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT VENT VLV

- Green light LIT 1-ZL-8221, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT VENT VLV

- Green light LIT 1/1-8210A, H2/N2 SPLY VLV

- Green light LIT 1/1-8210B, H2/N2 SPLY VLV

- Green light LIT 1/1-8202A, VENT VLV - Green light LIT 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV

- Green light LIT Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 7 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-3 (RO1412C)

REV. 2 Examiner Note

Performance of either Step 17 or Step 18 is critical to establish an injection path Examiner Note
The next two steps may be performed in any order Perform Step: 1 7 Step 12.e 1st bullet Align CCP injection
1/u-8801A, CCP SI ISOL VLV

- OPEN Performance Standard: PLACE D 1/1-8801A, CCP SI ISOL VLV in OPEN and OBSERVE D red OPEN light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

18 Step 12.e 2 nd bullet Align CCP injection

1/u-8801B, CCP SI ISOL VLV

- OPEN Performance Standard: PLACE D 1/1-8801B, CCP SI ISOL VLV in OPEN and OBSERVE D red OPEN light illuminated.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

19 Verify ECCS flow:

u-FI-917, CCP SI FLO Performance Standard: OBSERVE D flow indication on 1

-FI-917, CCP SI FLO

. Terminating Cue

This JPM is complete. Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 8 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-3 (RO1412C)

REV. 2 Initial Conditions

Unit 1 is in MODE 4 with the following conditions:

RHR Train B is in service RHR Train A is in ECCS standby with 1/1-8701A and 1/1-8702A, RHRP 1 HL RECIRC ISOL VLV s CLOSED and De

-energized CCP 1-02, SIP 1-01 and SIP 1

-02 breakers have been racked out to comply with LCO 3.4.12 A Loss of Coolant Accident has occurred ABN-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant is being implemented Positive Displacement Charging Pump has been started Pressurizer Level is still lowering Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM ABN

-108, Shutdown Loss of Coolant, starting at Step 2.3.8.b, Check RCS Status, with the Pressurizer Level NOT stable or increasing

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-4 (RO 3113) REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-4 Task # RO 3113 K/A # 045.A4

.01 3.1 / 2.9 SF-4P Title: Perform Pre

-Startup Turbine Trip Checks Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

X Alternate Path: X Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 3 Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

Perform OPT

-410A, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks Task Standard:

In accordance with OPT-410A , latched the Turbine, commenced opening the HP and LP stop valves and then tripped the Turbine prior to the HP stop valves obtaining the full open position

. Re f. Materials:

OPT-410A, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks. Rev. 9

- 4. OPT-410A-1, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks Data Sheet. Rev. 0 Validation Time:

10 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-4 (RO 3113) REV. 2 SIMULATOR SETUP Simulator OPERATOR: INITIALIZE to IC-37 or Initialize to IC

-6 and insert the following:

Insert HP Control Valve leakage

{LOTCZL2414A_2.Value=1} IMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT1 f:600 d:53 r:60

{LOTCZL2414A_2.Value=1} IMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT2 f:600 d:53 r:60

{LOTCZL2414A_2.Value=1} IMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT3 f:600 d:53 r:60

Modify Control Valve Leakage when Turbine tripped

{DITCTCTRP.Value=1} MMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT1 f:194 r:60

{DITCTCTRP.Value=1} MMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT2 f:194 r:60

{DITCTCTRP.Value=1} MMF AOTC_JC01DA001_NT3 f:194 r:60 Handout: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

OPT-410A , Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks (Labeled Procedure 1

) OPT-410A-1, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks Data Sheet (Labeled Form 1)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-4 (RO 3113) REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note

The following steps are from OPT-410A, Section 8.0.

Perform Step:

1 Step 8.1 & 8.1.1 Latch the turbine as follows:

On the TG Control Display, ensure the turbine is tripped, "Turbine Trip" Bar Red. Performance Standard: DETERMINED that Turbine Trip bar was red.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 8.1 & 8.1.2 Latch the turbine as follows:

Verify the following light indications on CB

-04, 1-TSLB-3 are on: 1.7 - TURB TRIP FLUID LO 1

-63AST 1 2.7 - TURB TRIP FLUID LO 1

-63AST 2 3.7 - TURB TRIP FLUID LO 1

-63AST 3 Performance Standard: VERIFIED on 1

-TSLB-3 that windows 1.7, 2.7 and 3.7 are LIT.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 8.1, 8.1.3 & 8.1.3A Latch the turbine as follows:

On the TG Control Display in the "Start

-Up" Section, reset the Turbine Trip as follows.

A. Click the Turbine Latch Subgroup Controller to bring up the "Osd" Performance Standard: OPENED the Turbine Latch Subgroup Controller Osd.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-4 (RO 3113) REV. 2 Perform Step: 4 8.1, 8.1.3 & 8.1.3B Latch the turbine as follows:

On the TG Control Display in the "Start

-Up" Section, reset the Turbine Trip as follows.

B. IF the Turbine Latch Subgroup Controller is OFF (green/grey), THEN Click "0/1" then Execute to turn ON (green/red) the Controller.

Performance Standard: CLICKED the "0/1" and Execute. Subgroup Controller indicated ON (green/red).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 8.1, 8.1.3 & 8.1.3C Latch the turbine as follows:

On the TG Control Display in the "Start

-Up" Section, reset the Turbine Trip as follows. C. On the TG Control Display in the Speed Control Section, verify Speed Target Controller lower or equal to actual speed.

Performance Standard: VERIFIED speed target (134 RPM) is lower than actual speed (194 RPM). Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 8.1, 8.1.3 & 8.1.3D Latch the turbine as follows:

On the TG Control Display in the "Start

-Up" Section, reset the Turbine Trip as follows.

D. In the "Osd" click "1" then Execute to start the Latching of the Turbine. Performance Standard: CLICKED the "1" and Execute. Subgroup controller indicated blinking red. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-4 (RO 3113) REV. 2 Perform Step:

7 8.1, 8.1.4 & 1 st bullet Latch the turbine as follows:

Verify the following parameters:

On the TG Display, verify the turbine trip is reset, "Turbine Trip" Bar white.

Performance Standard: VERIFIED Turbine Trip Bar white.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 8.1, 8.1.4 & 2 nd bullet Latch the turbine as follows:

Verify the following parameters:

1-PI-6559, TURB L/O PRESS

- greater than 25 PSIG Performance Standard: VERIFIED Turbine Lube Oil Pressure is approximately 42 psig

. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 8.1, 8.1.4 & 3 rd bullet Latch the turbine as follows:

Verify the following parameters:

1-PI-6561, EHC FLUID PRESS

- greater than 114 PSIG Performance Standard: VERIFIED EHC Fluid Pressure is approximately 170 psig

. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 8.1, 8.1.4 & 4 th bullet Latch the turbine as follows:

Verify the following parameters:

1-PI-6566, HP EHC FLUID PRESS

- approximately 455 PSIG Performance Standard: VERIFIED HP EHC Fluid Pressure is approximately 525 psig

. Examiner Cue

If the applicant questions whether the HP EHC Fluid Pressure is close enough to 455 psig to continue; Provide the following cue:

'The Unit Supervisor directs you to continue with the Turbine Trip Checks.' Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-4 (RO 3113) REV. 2 Perform Step:

11 8.2 Verify the following light indications on CB

-04, 1-TSLB-3 are on: 1.6 - MSL 1 HP STOP VLV 4 CLOSE UV-2428A 2.6 - MSL 2 HP STOP VLV 1 CLOSE UV

-2429A 3.6 - MSL 3 HP STOP VLV 3 CLOSE UV

-2430A 4.6 - MSL 4 HP STOP VLV 2 CLOSE UV

-2431A Performance Standard: VERIFIED on 1

-TSLB-3 that windows 1.6, 2.6, 3.6 and 4.6 are LIT.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 12

8.3 Verify

HP stop valves are closed on CB

-10: 1-ZL-2429A, HPT STOP VLV 1 1-ZL-2431A, HPT STOP VLV 2 1-ZL-2430A, HPT STOP VLV 3 1-ZL-2428A, HPT STOP VLV 4 Performance Standard: VERIFIED on CB

-10 that Green light LIT and Red light DARK for each valve. Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note

The following steps represent the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Examiner Note

The turbine speed will continue to increase to greater than 100 RPM above the original turning gear speed requiring a Turbine Trip. Perform Step: 13 8.4 On the TG Control Display in the "Start

-Up" Section, turn ON the "Open Stop Valves" Subloop Controller to open the HP and LP stop valves.

Performance Standard: CLICKED the "0/1" and Execute. Subgroup controller turned red. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 7 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-4 (RO 3113) REV. 2 Perform Step:

14 5.1 & Caution The normal turning gear speed for the turbine may increase when the turbine stop valves are open due to some leakage through the control valves. The turbine RPM should not be allowed to increase more than 100 RPM above the original turning gear speed. If the speed continues to increase, the turbine should be tripped and the conditions should be evaluated.

Performance Standard: DEPRESSED 1

-TTSW Pushbutton on CB-10 prior to ALL HP Stop Valves obtaining Full Open status on CB

-10, Red light LIT and Green light DARK

. Terminating Cue

This JPM is complete. Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 8 of 8 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-4 (RO 3113) REV. 2 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 3 Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

Perform OPT

-410A, Pre-Startup Turbine Trip Checks

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-5 (RO2002C)

REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-5 Task # RO2002 K/A # 026.A4.01 4.5 / 4.3 SF-5 Title: Transfer Containment Spray From Injection to Recirculation Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

X Alternate Path

X Plant: Time Critical:

X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

A Large Break LOCA has occurred and Containment Spray has actuated The Emergency Core Cooling System has been aligned for Cold Leg Recirculation per EOS

-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculati on Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level is 7% and lowering Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

When RWST level reaches 6%, Perform EOS

-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation Attachment 1.H, Containment Spray Switchover Criterion Task Standard:

Utilizing EOS-1.3A, transferred Containment Spray Train A from the Injection Mode to the Recirculation Mode from the Containment Sumps. Stopped Train B Containment Spray Pumps when alignment to the Containment Sump could not be performed. Closed RWST to Containment Spray Train A pumps within 70 seconds. Ref. Materials:

EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Rev. 9

-0. STI-214.01, Control of Timed Operator Actions, Rev. 0

-5. Validation Time:

3 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes Time Critical Time:

70 seconds Completion Time:

________ seconds Comments:

Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-5 (RO2002C)

REV. 2 SIMULATOR SETUP SIMULATOR OPERATOR: INITIALIZE to IC #3 8 or any Post LOCA with RHR Swapover completed IC and PERFORM the following:

INSERT Malfunction CS05B to fail 1-HS-4783 in CLOSE position.

If IC #38 is not available, RESET to any at power IC and PERFORM the following:

INSERT malfunction RC08A2 (or equivalent Large Break LOCA).

PLACE Simulator in RUN.

REDUCE AFW Flow to all SGs.

RESET SI, SIS, Containment and Isolation Phases A & B and Containment Spray.

STOP both Emergency Diesel Generators. STOP all Reactor Coolant Pumps.

When RWST level reaches LO

-LO level, TRANSFER ECCS to Cold Leg Recirculation by performing Steps 1

-3 of EOS-1.3A. INSERT MalfunctionCS05B to fail 1-HS-4783 in CLOSE position.

FREEZE simulator when RWST level is 7%.

Handout: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

EOS-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation

. Attachment 1.H, Containment Spray Switchover Criterion.

(labeled Procedure 1)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-5 (RO2002C)

REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note

The following steps are from EOS-1.3, Attachment 1.H

. Examiner Note

CUE the Simulator Operator to PLACE the Simulator in RUN

. Perform Step:

1 4.a. Check RWST level

- LESS THAN 6%. Performance Standard: OBSERVE D 1-LI-930, RWST LVL CHAN I or 1-LI-931, RWST LVL CHAN II and VERIFY level is less than 6

%. Comment: SAT UNSAT Once RWST level less than 6%.

Time Critical START TIME:

Examiner Note

Steps 2 and 3 may be performed in any order.

Perform Step: 2 4.b.1) & 1 st bullet Realign Containment Spray System as follows:

Open CNTMT SMP TO CSP 1 & 3 SUCT ISOL VLVs:

1-HS-4782 Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACE D 1-HS-4782, CNTMT SMP TO CSP 1 & 3 SUCT ISOL VLV to OPEN (critical). OBSERVE D red OPEN light LIT (NOT critical

). Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 3 4.b.1) & 2 nd bullet Realign Containment Spray System as follows:

Open CNTMT SMP TO CSP 2 & 4 SUCT ISOL VLVs:

1-HS-478 3 Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACE D 1-HS-4783 , CNTMT SMP TO CSP 2 & 4 SUCT ISOL VLV to OPEN.

OBSERVE D green CLOSE light LIT. (Fails to Open)

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-5 (RO2002C)

REV. 2 Examiner Note: The following step represent s the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Perform Step: 4 4.b.1) RNO IF CNTMT SMP TO CSP VLV(s) can NOT be open ed , THEN Place affected CSPs in PULL

-OUT. Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACE D 1-HS-4766, CSP 2 in PULLOUT (critical). OBSERVE D red FAN light LIT (NOT critical). PLACE D 1-HS-4767 , CSP 4 in PULLOUT (critical). OBSERVED red FAN light LIT (NOT critical). Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note

Perform Steps 5 and 6 may be performed in any order.

Perform Step: 5 4.b.2) & 1 st bullet Close RWST TO CSP 1 & 3 SUCT VLVs:

1-HS-475 8 Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACED 1-HS-4758, RWST TO CSP 1 & 3 SUCT VLV to CLOSE (critical). OBSERVE D green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical

). Comment: SAT UNSAT Once 1-HV-4758 is Fully Closed.

Time Critical ST OP TIME: Perform Step: 6 4.b.2) & 2 nd bullet Close RWST TO CSP 2 & 4 SUCT VLVs:

1-HS-475 9 Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACED 1-HS-4759, RWST TO CSP 2 & 4 SUCT VLV to CLOSE. OBSERVE D green CLOSE light LIT. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-5 (RO2002C)

REV. 2 Perform Step: 7 4.b.3) Verify containment spray flows.

Performance Standard: OBSERVE D Containment Spray flows on: 1-FI-4772-1 , CSP 1 DISCH FLO at ~3600 GPM.

1-FI-4772-2 , CSP 3 DISCH FLO at ~3600 GPM.

1-FI-477 3-1 , CSP 2 DISCH FLO at 0 GPM.

1-FI-477 3-2 , CSP 4 DISCH FLO at 0 GPM.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 4.b.3) RNO 3) A)

IF containment spray train(s) NOT providing spray flow, THEN perform the following:

Place affected CS HX OUT VLV(s) in PULL

-OUT. Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACE D 1-HS-4777, CS HX 2 OUT VLV to PULLOUT OBSERVE D all lights OFF Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 9 4.b.3) RNO 3) B)

IF containment spray train(s) NOT providing spray flow, THEN perform the following:

Notify Plant Staff of containment spray train(s) condition

. Performance Standard: CONSULT ED Plant Staff to determine contingency actions.

Examiner Cue:

Another operator will consult with Plant Staff. The Unit Supervisor directs you to continue with the procedure.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 4.b.4) IF containment spray pumps have been stopped due to RWST level, THEN perform the following:

Performance Standard: DETERMINED Containment Spray Pumps were NOT stopped due to low RWST Level.

Terminating Cue:

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 6 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-5 (RO2002C)

REV. 2 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions:

A Large Break LOCA has occurred and Containment Spray has actuated The Emergency Core Cooling System has been aligned for Cold Leg Recirculation per EOS

-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level is 7% and lowering Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

When RWST level reaches 6%, Perform EOS

-1.3A, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation Attachment 1.H, Containment Spray Switchover Criterion THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-6 (RO4215C)

REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-6 Task # RO4215 K/A # 064.A4.07 3.4 / 3.4 SF-6 Title: Restore Safeguards Bus 1EA1 to Offsite Power Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

X Alternate Path:

X Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-01 is supplying the 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 due to post-work testing of the EDG Power from Transformer XST1 is available to the 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 Transformer XST2 is NOT available Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

RESTORE Offsite Power to 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 from Transformer XST1 per SOP-609A, Diesel Generator System , Section 5.7, Transferring From DG Supplying Alone to Normal or Alternate Supply

. Task Standard:

Utilizing SOP

-609A, restore d Offsite Power to 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 from Transformer XST1 and open ed the Train A EDG Output Breaker prior to receiving 1-ALB-10B Window 2.8 DG 1 TRBL alarm

. Required Materials:

SOP-609A , Diesel Generator System, Rev. 21-1 2. Validation Time:

10 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-6 (RO4215C)

REV. 2 SIMULATOR SETUP SIMULATOR OPERATOR: INITIALIZE to IC #3 9 or any at power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

LOAD the EDG per SOP

-609A, Section 5.6 , Supplying 6.9 KV SFGD Busses with DG Alone. EXECUTE remote function EDR13, 480 VAC MCC Undervoltage Load Shedding Fuses to REMOVE (if Step 5.7.I is reached, the fuses will be reinstalled).

OPEN both Offsite Power Breakers CS-1EA1-1 and CS-1EA1-2 for Bus 1EA1. PLACE CS-1EA1-1, Incoming Breaker 1EA1 in PULLOUT and HANG a Red Tag. ENSURE EDG and Safeguards Bus voltages are NOT matched prior to SNAP of IC.

When the 1EA1

-2 Feeder Breaker is CLOSED at Step 5.7.E, EXECUTE malfunction ED09, Grid Frequency Disturbance at 57.9 Hertz and 120 second ramp

{DIED1EA12.iivPanel=3} IMF ED09 f:57.9 r:12 0.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR NOTE: After each JPM, VERIFY the Synchroscope Key Switch is moved to a different position.

Handout: PROVIDE the applicant with a copy of:

SOP-609A, Diesel Generator System

. Section 5.7, Transferring From DG Supplying Alone to Normal or Alternate Supply. (labeled Procedure 1)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-6 (RO4215C)

REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note

The following steps are from SOP-609A , Section 5.7. Perform Step:

1 5.7.A & 2 nd bullet TURN the synchroscope for the selected breaker ON. SS-1EA1-2 BKR 1EA1-2 SYNCHROSCOPE Performance Standard: PLACE D SS-1EA1-2, BKR 1EA1

-2 SYNCHROSCOPE to ON and OBSERVE D the synchroscope move approximately to the 12 o'clock position. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step

2 5.7.B Using the DG VOLT CTRL, ADJUST running voltage to match incoming voltage. Performance Standard: ADJUST ED 90-1EG1, DG 1 VOLT CTRL to RAISE or LOWER DG Output Voltage to MATCH Running Volts (V-RUN) with Incoming Volts (V-IN) and OBSERVE D Running Volts MATCHED with Incoming Volts

. Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note

Synchroscope speed is not considered critical, however, it must be moving in the SLOW direction.

Perform Step:

3 5.7.C Using DG SPD CTRL , ADJUST the speed so that the synchroscope is moving 2 to 4 RPM in the SLOW direction.

Performance Standard: ADJUST ED 65-1EG1 , DG 1 SPD CTRL to RAISE or LOWER Diesel Generator speed so that synchroscope is moving 2 to 4 RPM in the SLOW direction.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-6 (RO4215C)

REV. 2 Perform Step: 4 5.7.D & 1 st bullet IF Grid induced load, voltage, OR frequency fluctuations occur while the DG is synchronized to the bus, THEN OPEN the DG Output Breaker:

CS-1EG1, DG 1 BKR 1EG1 Performance Standard: OBSERVED Note before Step 5.7.D.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

5 5.7.E & 2 nd bullet CLOSE the feeder breaker when the synchroscope is slightly before the 12 o'clock position AND moving 2 to 4 RPM in the SLOW direction. CS-1 EA1-2 INCOMING BKR 1 EA1-2 Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACED CS-1EA1-2, INCOMING BKR 1EA1

-2, in CLOSE when synchroscope is at 12 o'clock (critical). OBSERVED red CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical

). Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-6 (RO4215C)

REV. 2 Examiner Note

The following steps represent the Alternate Path of this JPM.

Simulator Operator: VERIFY malfunction ED09, Grid Frequency Fluctuation at 57.9 Hz over 120 seconds has initiated.

Perform Step:

6 Acknowledge annunciator alarm 1-ALB-10B, Window 3.5 - 6.9 KV BUS 1EA1 / 1EA2 PARALLELED.

Performance Standard: ACKNOWLEDGE D annunciator alarm 1-ALB-10B, Window 3.5 - 6.9 KV BUS 1EA1 / 1EA2 PARALLELED.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

7 5.7.F RAISE DG load to 0.5 MW as necessary, to prevent a reverse power trip using DG SPD CTRL handswitch

. Performance Standard: OBSERVED load on W-1EG1, DG 1 MEGAWATTS at approximately 1 MWe. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

8 5.7.G TURN OFF the synchroscope for the selected breaker. Performance Standard: PLACE D SS-1 EA 1-2, BKR 1EA1-2 SYNCHROSCOPE in OFF. Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note

This step may be performed if frequency degradation has not yet been identified.

Perform Step:

9 5.7.H MAINTAIN 0

-500 KVAR out by adjusting the selected DG VOLT CTRL handswitch

. Performance Standard: ADJUSTED 90-1EG1, DG 1 VOLT CTRL to RAISE or LOWER DG Output Voltage to MAINTAIN 0

-500 KVAR. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-6 (RO4215C)

REV. 2 Examiner Note

This is Continuous Action Step 5.7.D to avoid excessive loading.

Perform Step: 10 5.7.D NOTE OBSERVE Emergency Diesel Generator 1

-01 MWe frequency lowering uncontrollably and OPEN the output breaker.

Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

OPENED CS-1EG1, DG 1 BKR 1EG1 prior to receiving 1-ALB-10B Window 2.8 DG 1 TRBL alarm (critical). OBSERVED green TRIP light LIT (NOT critical

). Terminating Cue

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-6 (RO4215C)

REV. 2 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1

-01 is supplying the 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 due to post

-work testing of the EDG Power from Transformer XST1 is available to the 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 Transformer XST2 is NOT available Initiating Cue: The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

RESTORE Offsite Power to 6.9 kV Safeguards Bus 1EA1 from Transformer XST1 per SOP-609A, Diesel Generator System, Section 5.7, Transferring From DG Supplying Alone to Normal or Alternate Supply.

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-7 (RO1820) REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-7 Task # RO1 820 K/A # 0 15.A2.01 3.5 / 3.9 SF-7 Title: Respond to a Power Range Channel Malfunction Examinee (Print):

Testing Method:

Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

X Alternate Path:

Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power Power Range Instrument N

-44 has failed low Rod control is in MANUAL Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to continue performing ABN

-703, Power Range Instrument Malfunction, START at Step 2.3.3 Task Standard:

Defeat ed failed power range channel N44 utilizing ABN-703, Power Range Instrument Malfunction

. Re f. Materials:

ABN-703 , Power Range Instrumentation Malfunction

. Rev. 9-0 Validation Time:

5 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-7 (RO1820) REV. 2 SIMULATOR SETUP SIMULATOR OPERATOR: INITIALIZE to IC-35. OR INITIALIZE to any at power Initial Condition and PERFORM the following:

EXECUTE malfunction NI06E, PR N-44 Channel Failure to 0%

ENSURE rod control is in MANUAL SIMULATOR OPERATOR NOTE: After each JPM, VERIFY the following:

1/1-JS-411E, N16 PWR CHAN DEFEAT (CB

-05) is NOT in Loop 4 position 1-TS-412T, Tave CHAN DEFEAT (CB

-07) is NOT in Loop 4 position 1/1-TS-411E, 1-TR-411 CHAN SELECT N16 Record er IS in Loop 4 position Handout: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of ABN-703, Power Range Instrumentation Malfunction , appropriately marked through Step 2.3.2

. (Labeled as Procedure 1)

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-7 (RO1820) REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note:

The following steps are from ABN-703 , Step 2.3.3. Perform Step: 1 2.3.3.a Perform the following for failed channel:

At DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer, select ROD STOP BYPASS switch to failed channel.

Performance Standard: SELECTED Rod Stop Bypass switch to BYPASS PRN44.

Examiner Cue:

Another operator will acknowledge alarms.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 2 2.3.3.b Perform the following for failed channel:

At COMPARATOR AND RATE drawer, select COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT switch to failed channel.

Performance Standard: SELECTED Comparator Channel Defeat switch to N44.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

3 2.3.3.c Perform the following for failed channel:

At DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer, select UPPER SECTION switch to failed channel.

Performance Standard: SELECTED Upper Section switch to PRN44.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

4 2.3.3.d Perform the following for failed channel:

At DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer, select LOWER SECTION switch to failed channel.

Performance Standard: SELECTED Lower Section switch to PRN44.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-7 (RO1820) REV. 2 Perform Step:

5 2.3.3.e Perform the following for failed channel:

At DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR drawer, select POWER MISMATCH BYPASS switch to failed channel.

Performance Standard: SELECTED Power Mismatch Bypass switch to BYPASS PRN44.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

6 2.3.3.f Perform the following for failed channel: At POWER RANGE A drawer, select RATE MODE switch momentarily to RESET for failed channel.

Performance Standard: SELECTED Rate Mode switch momentarily to RESET for N44.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

7 2.3.3.g & 1st bullet Perform the following for failed channel:

Select the following switches to loop corresponding to failed channel:

1/u-JS-411E, N16 PWR CHAN DEFEAT (CB

-05) Performance Standard: PLACED 1/1-JS-411E, N16 PWR CHAN DEFEAT in Loop 4 position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 2.3.3.g & 2nd bullet Perform the following for failed channel:

Select the following switches to loop corresponding to failed channel:

u-TS-412T, Tave CHAN DEFEAT (CB

-07) Performance Standard: PLACED 1-TS-412T, Tave CHAN DEFEAT in Loop 4 position.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

9 2.3.4 & bullet Ensure N16 Recorder selected to

- OPERABLE CHANNEL:

1/u-TS-411E, u-TR-411 CHAN SELECT Performance Standard: SELECTED 1/1

-TS-411E, 1-TR-411 CHAN SELECT N16 Recorder Loop 1, Loop 2, or Loop 3

. Terminating Cue:

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-7 (RO1820) REV. 2 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power Power Range Instrument N

-44 has failed low Rod control is in MANUAL Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor directs you to continue performing ABN

-703, Power Range Instrument Malfunction, START at Step 2.3.3

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-8 (RO4405) REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC S-8 Task # RO4405 K/A # 06 7.AA2.16 3.3 / 4.0 SF-8 Title: Respond to a Fire in the Safeguards Building Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

Classroom:

Actual Performance:

X Simulator:

X Alternate Path

Plant: Time Critical:

READ TO THE EXAMINEE Provide the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cue to the Examinee. Any special conditions or instructions should be contained on this sheet.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

ABN-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building, is in progress Other operators are performing ABN

-804A, Attachments 5 and 6, which include isolation of Letdown flow Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

RESPOND to a fire in the Safeguards Building per ABN

-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building, Section 5.0, Fire Affecting Safeguards Building Fire Area 1SD START at Step 5.3.6 Task Standard:

Utilizing ABN

-804A, responded to a fire in the Safeguards Building, started the Train B Emergency Diesel Generator, transferred Charging Pump suction to the RWST and started the Train B Centrifugal Charging Pump

. Re f. Materials:

ABN-804A, Respond to a Fire in the Safeguards Building

. Rev. 6-2 Validation Time:

10 minutes Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-8 (RO4405) REV. 2 SIMULATOR SETUP SIMULATOR OPERATOR: INITIALIZE to IC-3 6 Or Initialize to IC

-18 and PERFORM the following:

ALARM ON for the se Safeguards Fire Protection Panel annunciators:

AFP09_16 for Window 4.2

- 810' SWGR RM TRN A AFP09_17 for Window 5.2

- 810' SWGR RM TRN A WTR FLO 1/1-PCV-455A, PRZR PORV in CLOSE 1/1-PCV-456, PRZR PORV in CLOSE Place the following malfunctions on a conditional for CS

-1DG2E in START with a 3 minute delay EBR112, 1ED1

-1/9/BKR [BOP ARR 1, 1

-CR-03] EBR113, 1ED1

-1/10/BKR [1

-TC-19,22,26] EBR115, 1ED1

-1/14/BKR [1

-TC-07,10] EBR116, 1ED1

-1/17/BKR [1-TC-13,16]

Handout: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

ABN-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building

. Section 5.0, Fire Affecting Safeguards Building Fire Area 1SD appropriately marked through Step 5.3.5

. (labeled Procedure 1)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-8 (RO4405) REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note: The following is from ABN-804A , and Section 5.0, Step 5.3.6

. Examiner Cue

If an automatic or manual reactor trip occurs during the performance of the procedure inform the examinee that another operator will perform the actions of EOP

-0.0A and that they are to continue with ABN

-804A. Perform Step:

1 5.3.6 Perform an emergency start on Trn B Diesel Generator

C S-1DG2E, DG 2 EMER STOP/ START - START Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACED CS-1DG2E, DG 2 EMER STOP/ START switch in START (Critical). OBSERVED V-1EG2, DG 2 VOLTS at ~6900 Volts (NOT critical).

OBSERVED F

-1EG2, DG 2 FREQ at 60 Hertz (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step

2 5.3.7 Place 1/1-APRH 1, RHRP 1

- PULL OUT Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACED 1/1

-APRH 1, RHRP 1 in PULLOUT (Critical). OBSERVED pump light s DARK (NOT critical)

. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

3 5.3.8 CLOSE 1/1-8812A, RWST TO RHRP 1 SUCT VLV Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACED 1/1-8812A, RWST TO RHRP 1 SUCT VLV in CLOSE (Critical). OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical)

. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-8 (RO4405) REV. 2 Perform Step:

4 5.3.9 CLOSE 1/1-8100, RCP SEAL WTR RET ISOL VLV Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACED 1/1-8100, RCP SEAL WTR RET ISOL VLV in CLOSE (Critical). OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical)

. Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 5.3.10.a Transfer Charging Pump suction to the RWST :

IF charging pump performance indicates possible cavitation, THEN stop charging pump until below valves manually repositioned.

Performance Standard: OBSERVED 1

-PI-120A, CHRG HDR PRESS and 1

-FI-121A, CHRG FLO and DETERMINED that pump does not indicate cavitation and MARKED step as N/A.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note:

Either 1/1-LCV-112D OR 1/1-LCV-112E can be opened. Perform Step:

6 5.3.10.b Transfer Charging Pump suction to the RWST :

Ensure 1/1-LCV-112D OR 1/1-LCV-112E, RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV - OPEN. Performance Standard: PERFORMED ONE of the following:

PLACED 1/1-LCV-112D, RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in OPEN (Critical). OBSERVED red OPEN light LIT (NOT critical).

OR PLACED 1/1-LCV-112E, RWST TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in OPEN (Critical). OBSERVED red OPEN light LIT (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-8 (RO4405) REV. 2 Examiner Note:

Both 1/1-LCV-112B AND 1/1-LCV-112 C must be closed.

Perform Step:

7 5.3.10.c Transfer Charging Pump suction to the RWST :

Ensure 1/1-LCV-112B AND 1/1-LCV-112C, VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV - CLOSED. Performance Standard: PERFORMED BOTH of the following:

PLACED 1/1-LCV-112B , VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in CLOSE (Critical). OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical).

AND PLACED 1/1-LCV-112C , VCT TO CHRG PMP SUCT VLV in CLOSE (Critical). OBSERVED green CLOSE light LIT (NOT critical).

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

8 5.3.10.d Transfer Charging Pump suction to the RWST :

Verify 1-ZL-8220 AND 1-ZL-8221, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT VENT VLV - CLOSED. Performance Standard: OBSERVED 1-ZL-8220 and 1-ZL-8221, CHRG PMP SUCT HI POINT VENT VLV s green CLOSE lights LIT.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

9 5.3.10.e Transfer Charging Pump suction to the RWST :

Ensure 1/1-8202A AND 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV

- CLOSED. Performance Standard: VERIFIED 1/1-8202A and 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV s in CLOSE and OBSERVED green CLOSE lights LIT.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-8 (RO4405) REV. 2 Perform Step:

10 5.3.11 Ensure 1/1

-APCH2, CCP 2

- RUNNING. Performance Standard: PERFORMED the following:

PLACED 1/1-APCH2, CCP 2 in START (Critical). OBSERVED red PUMP and FAN lights LIT (NOT critical

). Terminating Cue

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM S

-8 (RO4405) REV. 2 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions:

ABN-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building, is in progress Other operators are performing ABN

-804A, Attachments 5 and 6, which include isolation of Letdown flow Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

RESPOND to a fire in the Safeguards Building per ABN

-804A, Response to a Fire in the Safeguards Building, Section 5.0, Fire Affecting Safeguards Building Fire Area 1SD START at Step 5.3.6

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-1 (AO5202 A) (U1) REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC P-1 (U1) Task # AO5202 K/A # 00 4.A 4.0 8 3.8 / 3.4 SF-2 Title: Perform Local Actions to Restart the Positive Displacement Pump Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

X Classroom:

Actual Performance:

Simulator:

Alternate Path:

X Plant: X RCA: X READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The crew is performing ABN

-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction Restart of th e Positive Displacement Charging Pump (PDP) is required to establish Charging flow Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

RESET control air to the Unit 1 PDP Fluid Drive per ABN-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction, Step 3.3.4.n RESTORE the Unit 1 PDP to operation per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 5.3.1, Positive Displacement Pump Startup, Starting at Step 5.3.1

.D Task Standard:

Reset the PDP hydraulic speed changer

, fill ed the Unit 1 PDP stuffing Box coolant tank and opened the PDP discharge valve

. Re f. Materials:

ABN-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction

. Rev. 13-0 SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System

. Rev. 18-1 5 Validation Time:

15 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign): Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-1 (AO5202 A) (U1) REV. 2 Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-1 (AO5202 A) (U1) REV. 2 PLANT SETUP Handouts: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

ABN-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction , Completed through Step 3.3.4.n (labeled Procedure 1)

SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Sections 2.5 and 5.3.1

through Step 5.3.1.C (labeled Procedure 2)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-1 (AO5202 A) (U1) REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note:

Remind examinee to simulate all actions.

The following step is from ABN-301, Section 3.0

. Perform Step: 1 3.3.4 n Reset air to PDP hydraulic speed changer by pushing the brass button on the P/A Converter

. Performance Standard: DEPRESS ED the control air RESET button located atop the Positive Displacement Pump Fluid Drive in the PDP Room

. (PDP Pump Speed Control Reset) Examiner Cue:

The 1-01 PDP Hydraulic Speed Changer is RESET. Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note:

The following steps are from SOP

-103A, Section 5.3.1

. Examiner Note:

The following steps represent the Alternate Path when the Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is out of specification

. Perform Step:

2 5.3.1 D IF Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is low, THEN FILL per the following steps:

Performance Standard: OBSERVE D Stuffing Box Coolant Tank sight glass level.

Examiner Cue:

The sight glass is EMPTY. If applicant enquires about the alarm status on the Boron Recycle System Panel, Inform applicant that Window 3.3

- POS DISPLACEMENT CHARGING PUMP COOLANT UNIT 1 LO LEVEL is in Alarm Examiner Cue:

DO NOT provide this cue until operator demonstrates that the tank must be filled. Another operator will monitor sight glass level as the tank is filled.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-1 (AO5202 A) (U1) REV. 2 Examiner Note:

The Fill Valve is located in the Charging Pump Remote Operator Room (822') directly north of chemical mixing tank on east wall

. The operator should turn the valve in the counter clockwise direction, and there will be flow noise, stem nut should be raised from initial position after operator turns counter clockwise.

Perform Step:

3 5.3.1 D 1)

IF Stuffing Box Coolant Tank is low, THEN fill per the following steps:

Slowly crack OPEN 1 CS-0119, PD PMP 1-01 STUFFING BOX COOL TK MU ISOL VLV, until desired fill rate is achieved

. Examiner Cue:

The valve is found with stem nut all the way down.

Performance Standard: Slowly turned 1 CS-0119 in the counterclockwise (OPEN) direction until desired fill rate was achieved.

Examiner Cue:

The valve is turning and flow noise is audible.

After the operator has demonstrated that the valve is open, report The NEO at the PDP stuffing box sight glass reports, "The sight glass is at the desired level

." Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

4 5.3.1 D 2)

WHEN the desired tank level has been established, THEN CLOSE 1 CS-0119 , PD PMP 1-01 STUFFING BOX COOL TK MU ISOL VLV

. Performance Standard: Turned valve in the clockwise (CLOSE D) direction , when level REPORTED in the Stuffing Box Coolant Tank, until stem nut is down and valve will not turn

. Examiner Cue:

1CS-0119 stem nut is down and the valve will no longer turn in the clockwise direction, flow noise is no longer heard

. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-1 (AO5202 A) (U1) REV. 2 Examiner Note:

The remote operator is located in the Charging Pump Remote Operator Room (822'). Unit 1 covers are blue and Unit 2 covers are yellow. This valve is normally OPEN; down in the hole where the remote operator is inserted is a valve position indicator that will indicate OPEN.

Examiner Note:

The following steps represent the Alternate Path when the discharge valve is closed. Perform Step: 5 5.3.1 E Ensure 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER, is OPEN.

Examiner Cue:

Once the operator has lifted the cover, report that the indicator indicates CLOSE. Performance Standard: In the Charging Pump Remote Operator Room

, PERFORM ED the following:

REMOVE D the blue cover for 1-8388-RO, PD CHRG PMP 1-01 DISCH VLV RMT OPER

. OBSERVE D valve position indicator and DETERMINE D valve CLOSE. LOCATE D a Remote Operator hand tool for 1-8388-RO. PLACE D hand tool on 1-8388-RO and TURN ED in OPEN (counter clockwise) direction.

Examiner Cue:

If the operator turns the valve (counter clockwise)

, Report the valve has rotated and will no longer move, the indicator indicates OPEN.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note

These valve s are operated from the control room.

Perform Step:

6 5.3.1 F OPEN the following valves:

1/1-8202A, VENT VLV (MCB) 1/1-8202B, VENT VLV (MCB)

Performance Standard: CONTACT ED the Control Room to ENSURE 1/1-8202A and 1/1-8202B, VENT VLVs are OPEN. Terminating Cue: The vent valves are OPEN.

This JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 7 of 7 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-1 (AO5202 A) (U1) REV. 2 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

The crew is performing ABN

-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction Restart of the Positive Displacement Charging Pump (PDP) is required to establish Charging flow Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

RESET control air to the Unit 1 PDP Fluid Drive per ABN

-301, Instrument Air System Malfunction, Step 3.3.4.n RESTORE the Unit 1 PDP to operation per SOP-103A, Chemical and Volume Control System, Section 5.3.1, Positive Displacement Pump Startup, Starting at Step 5.3.1.D

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC P-2 (U1) Task # RO4217 K/A # 055.EA1.04 3.5 / 3.9 SF-6 Title: Perform Attachment 2A DC Load Shedding Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

X Classroom:

Actual Performance:

Simulator:

Alternate Path: Plant: X RCA: READ TO THE EXAMINEE I will explain the Initial Conditions, which steps to simulate or discuss, and provide an Initiating Cue. When you complete the task successfully, the objective for this JPM will be satisfied.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 3 following a Loss of All AC Power Unit 2 is in MODE 3 with 2EA1 energized and 2EA2 de

-energized Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

Perform Unit 1 Initial DC Load Shed in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, Attachment 2 A , Initial DC Load Shed Task Standard:

Completed Section 2 of Attachment 2A, Initial DC Load Shed in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power

. Re f. Materials:

E CA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, Attachment 2A, Rev. 9-0 Validation Time:

20 minutes Time Critical: N/A Completion Time:

________ minutes Comments:

Res u lt: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 PLANT SET U P Handout: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power

. Attachment 2 A , Initial DC Load Shed

. (labeled Procedure 1)

EXAMINER NOTE: Simulate/Discuss actions to obtain and use Key #150. (Key is located in the CPC

- Clearance Processing Center)

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner Note

The following steps are from ECA-0.0 A, Attachment 2 A Perform Step:

1 Note Determine appropriate section of Attachment 2A to perform.

Performance Standard: Determined that Section 2 should be performed.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

2 2a IF 2EA1 is energized and 2EA2 is de

-energized, THEN perform the following:

ECB 792, U1 UPS Corridor South Wall Ensure transfer switch on CPX

-ECDPED-01S, 125 VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL XED1

-1 AUTO TRANSFER SWITCH XED1

-1S in Unit 2 (LOAD CONNECTED TO UNIT 2 LIGHT lit) (Key #150 from Key Locker required).

Examiner Cue

XED1-1S is in the Unit 1 position. LOAD CONNECTED TO UNIT 1 LIGHT is LIT.

Performance Standard: PLACE D XED1-1S in Unit 2.

Examiner Cue

XED1-1S is in the Unit 2 position. LOAD CONNECTED TO UNIT 2 LIGHT is LIT.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 Examiner Note

Perform Steps 3

-25 are bulleted and may be performed in any order. Perform Step: 3 2b 1 st bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 792, U1 UPS Corridor South Wall

[125 VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL XED2

-1] CPX-ECDPED-02 XED2-1/1/BKR, CABLE TERMINATION RACK 1

-TC-02 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED XED2-1/1/BKR, Breaker in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 4 2b 2 nd bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 792, U1 UPS Corridor South Wall XED2-1/3/BKR, CABLE TERMINATION RACK 1

-TC-08 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED XED2-1/3/BKR Breaker in OFF.

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 2b 3 rd bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 792, U1 UPS Corridor South Wall XED2-1/7/BKR, HVAC CONTROL PANEL X

-CV-01 TRAIN B SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED XED2-1/7/BKR Breaker in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 Perform Step: 6 2b 4 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 792, U1 UPS Corridor South Wall XED2-1/8/BKR , CABLE TERMINATION RACK X

-TC-04 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED XED2-1/8/BKR Breaker in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 2b 5 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR North Wall

[125 VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1ED1-1] CP1-ECDPED-01 1ED1-1/6/BKR, TRAIN A SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET 1-SP-01 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1ED1-1/6/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 8 2b 6 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR North Wall 1ED1-1/7/BKR, TRAIN A HVAC CONTROL PANEL X

-CV-0 1 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1ED1-1/7/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 6 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 Perform Step: 9 2b 7 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR North Wall Northeast Corner

[125 VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1ED2

-1] CP1-ECDPED-02 1ED2-1/6/BKR, TRAIN B SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM CABINET 1-SP-01 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1ED2-1/6/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 10 2b 8 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR North Wall Northeast Corner 1ED2-1/7/BKR, TRAIN B HVAC CONTROL PANEL X

-CV-0 1 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1ED2-1/7/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 11 2b 9 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

[118 VAC INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION PANEL (CHAN IV) 1PC4] CP1

-ECDPPC-04 1PC4/6/BKR, SAFEGUARD TEST CABINET (TRAIN B) 1-LTC-01 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1PC4/6/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 7 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 Perform Step: 12 2b 10 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1PC4/7/BKR, SSPS INPUT/LOGIC CABINET 1-SP-01A TRAIN A CHANNEL IV SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1PC4/7/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 13 2b 11 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1PC4/8/BKR, SSPS INPUT/LOGIC CABINET 1-SP-01B TRAIN B CHANNEL IV SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1PC4/8/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 14 2b 12 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1PC4/10/BKR, NSSS AUXILIARY RELAY RACK 2 1

-LAR-01 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1PC4/10/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 15 2b 13 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1PC4/11/BKR, 118 VAC INSTRUMENT FUSE PANEL 1PC4-1 (FU2) SUPPLY BREAKER Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Performance Standard: PLACED 1PC4/11/BKR in OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 8 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 Perform Step: 16 2b 14 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1PC4/13/BKR, UPGRADE PROTECTION CABINET (CH IV) 1-50D SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1PC4/13/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 17 2b 15 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1PC4/14/BKR, PROTECTIVE RELAY RACK CHANNEL IV 1-CR-11 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1PC4/14/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 18 2b 16 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1PC4/18/BKR, ERF TRANSDUCER PANEL 1-LV-17 TRANSDUCER V

-XD/1PC4 INPUT SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1PC4/18/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 19 2b 17 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall

[118 VAC INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION PANEL (CHAN III) 1PC3] CP1

-ECDPPC-03 1 PC3/7/BKR, SSPS INPUT/LOGIC CABINET 1-SP-01A TRAIN A CHANNEL III SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1 PC3/7/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 9 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 Perform Step:

20 2b 18 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1 PC3/8/BKR, SSPS INPUT/LOGIC CABINET 1-SP-01B TRAIN B CHANNEL III SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACE D 1 PC 3/8/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

21 2b 19 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1 PC3/9/BKR, 118 VAC INSTRUMENT FUSE PANEL 1PC3-1 (FU4) SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACE D 1 PC 3/9/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

22 2b 20 th bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1 PC3/10/BKR, PROTECTIVE RELAY RACK CHANNEL III 1-CR-11 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACE D 1 PC3/10/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 23 2b 21 st bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1 PC3/11/BKR, 118 VAC INSTRUMENT FUSE PANEL 1PC3-1 (FU2) SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1 PC3/14/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 10 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 Perform Step:

24 2b 22 nd bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1 PC3/14/BKR, UPGRADE PROTECTION CABINET (CH III) 1-50C SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1 PC3/14/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 25 2b 23 rd bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR East Wall 1 PC3/18/BKR, ERF TRANSDUCER PANEL 1

-LV-16 TRANSDUCER V

-XD/1PC3 INPUT SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1 PC3/18/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue: The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 26 2c ECB 807, U1 CSR South Wall IF XEC1-1/00/BKR-1, 1EC5 TO 118 VAC INSTRUMENT DISTR PANEL XEC1-1 PREFERRED FEEDER BREAKER is ON, THEN perform the following to transfer XEC1

-1 supply to Unit 2.

Examiner Cue

XEC1-1/00/BKR-1 is OFF. Performance Standard: Determined XEC1

-1/00/BKR-1 is O FF. Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 11 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 Examiner Note

Perform Steps 27 and 2 8 are bulleted and may be performed in any order. Perform Step:

27 2d 1 st bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR on South Side of Column, Near West Wall, South of Stairs [118 VAC INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1EC6] CP1-ECDPEC-12 1EC6/5/BKR, CNTMT RECIRCULATING SUMP 1

-02 LEVEL XMTR 1-LT-4781 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1EC6/5/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

28 2d 2 nd bullet Place the following breakers OFF:

ECB 807, U1 CSR West Wall, South of Stairs to Control Room

[118 VAC INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1EC5] CP1

-ECDPEC-11 1EC5/5/BKR, CNTMT RECIRCULATING SUMP 1

-01 LEVEL XMTR 1-LT-4779 SUPPLY BREAKER Performance Standard: PLACED 1EC5/5/BKR in OFF.

Examiner Cue

The breaker is OFF.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step:

29 2e Notify Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete AND DC load shed status. Perform Attachment 2.B when informed by Unit Supervisor that Containment Isolation Phase A and Containment Ventilation Isolation are complete.

Performance Standard: Notified Unit Supervisor that Attachment 2.A Section 2 is complete.

Examiner Cue

The JPM is complete.

Comment: SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 12 of 12 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P-2 (RO4217 H) (U1) Rev. 2 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 3 following a Loss of All AC Power Unit 2 is in MODE 3 with 2EA1 energized and 2EA2 de

-energized Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor directs you to PERFORM the following:

Perform Unit 1 Initial DC Load Shed in accordance with ECA-0.0A, Loss of All AC Power, Attachment 2A, Initial DC Load Shed

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 1 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-3 (RO5115 B) (U 2) REV. 2 Facility: CPNPP JPM # NRC P-3 (U 2) Task #RO 5115 K/A #0 68. AA1.1 1 3.9 / 4.1 SF-8 Title: Emergency Borate from the Remote Shutdown Panel Examinee (Print):

Testing Method: Simulated Performance:

X Classroom:

Actual Performance:

Simulator:

Alternate Path:

Plant: X Time Critical:

RCA: X CUE THE EXAMINEE Provide the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cue to the Examinee. Any special conditions or instructions should be contained on this sheet.

Initial Conditions:

Given the following conditions with Unit 2 at 100% power:

The Control Room was evacuated due to a Security threat Actions of ABN

-905 B, Loss of Control Room Habitability are in progress and have progressed to the point where Plant Cooldown is desired A Reactor Operator is standing by at the Shutdown Transfer Panel All security measures have been satisfied and operation in the area of the Remote Shutdown Panel is allowed Initiating Cue:

The Unit Supervisor DIRECTS you to commence emergency boration to the Unit 2 RCS using Attachment 12 of ABN-905B. Task Standard:

Establish ed emergency boration flow from the Remote Shutdown Panel Re f. Materials:

ABN-905B, Loss of Control Room Habitability , Rev. 4, PCN-1 2. Validation Time:

5 minutes Completion Time: ________ minutes Comments: Result: SAT UNSAT Examiner (Print / Sign):

Date:

Appendix C JPM WORKSHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 2 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-3 (RO5115 B) (U 2) REV. 2 Handout: PROVIDE the examinee with a copy of:

ABN-905B, Loss of Control Room Habitability, Attachment 12, Boration.

(labeled Procedure 1)

All operations for this JPM will be in Unit 2 Safeguards Building, 832' elevation on the Remote Shutdown Panel, an ABA1 key is required to access the panel.

Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 3 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-3 (RO5115 B) (U 2) REV. 2 - Check Mark Denotes Critical Step START TIME:

Examiner CUE:

Shutdown Transfer Panel (STP) switches will be operated by the Extra Reactor Operator. Perform Steps 1

-3 are bulleted and may be performed in any order.

Perform Step: 1 Step 1. 1 st Bullet Transfer the following from CR to HSP:

43/2 - APBA1L, BA XFER PMP 1 CTRL XFER (STP)

Performance Standard: CONTACTED Extra Reactor Operator at STP to have switch transferred.

Examiner Cue:

REPORT 43/2 - APBA1L, BA XFER PMP 1 CTRL XFER switch is broke and cannot be transferred at this time.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note:

When pump is transferred green light on 1/2

-APBA2L, BA XFER PMP 2 (RSP) will be on.

Perform Step: 2 Step 1. 2nd Bullet Transfer the following from CR to HSP:

43/2 - APBA2L, BA XFER PMP 2 CTRL XFER (RSP)

Performance Standard: TURN ED the switch to HSP Examiner Cue:

INDICATE switch is in the HSP position and pump green light is ON Comment: SAT UNSAT Examiner Note:

When valve is transferred green light on 1/2

-8104L, EMER BORATE VLV (RSP) will be on.

Perform Step:

3 Step 1. 3rd Bullet Transfer the following from CR to HSP:

43/2 - 8104L , EMER BORATE VLV CTRL XFER (RSP) Performance Standard: TURN ED the switch to HSP Examiner Cue:

INDICATE switch is in the HSP position and valve green light is ON Comment: SAT UNSAT Appendix C JPM STEPS Form ES-C-1 Page 4 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-3 (RO5115 B) (U 2) REV. 2 Perform Step: 4 Step 2. Start one Boric Acid Transfer Pump: 1/2 - APBA1L, BA XFER PMP 1 (RSP) 1/2 - APBA2L, BA XFER PMP 2 (RSP)

Performance Standard: TURN ED 1/2-APBA2L Handswitch momentarily to START.

Examiner Cue:

INDICATE red light ON, green light OFF for pump started Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 5 Step 3. Open 1/2-8104L, EMER BORATE VLV (RSP).

Performance Standard: TURN ED the switch to OPEN Examiner Cue:

INDICATE red light ON, green light OFF Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 6 Step 6. Monitor 2-F I-183B, EMER BORATE FLO (RSP).

Performance Standard: MONITORED flow on 2-F I-183B. Examiner Cue:

INDICATE flow is 95 gpm for one boric acid pump Comment: SAT UNSAT Perform Step: 7 Notify the Unit 2 Unit Supervisor that emergency boration is in progress from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Performance Standard: NOTIF IE D the Unit 2 Unit Supervisor that emergency boration is in progress from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Examiner Cue: REPORT the Unit Supervisor acknowledges emergency boration in progress from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Comment: SAT UNSAT Terminating Cue:

This JPM is complete.

STOP TIME:

Appendix C JPM CUE SHEET Form ES-C-1 Page 5 of 5 CPNPP 2016 NRC JPM P

-3 (RO5115 B) (U 2) REV. 2 Initial Conditions

Given the following conditions with Unit 2 at 100% power:

The Control Room was evacuated due to a Security threat Actions of ABN

-905B, Loss of Control Room Habitability are in progress and have progressed to the point where Plant Cooldown is desired A Reactor Operator is standing by at the Shutdown Transfer Pan el All security measures have been satisfied and operation in the area of the Remote Shutdown Panel is allowed Initiating Cue

The Unit Supervisor DIRECTS you to commence emergency boration to the Unit 2 RCS using Attachment 12 of ABN

-905B.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

July 2016 NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

53% power MOL

- RCS Boron is 1054 ppm Turnover: 600 MWe due to a B MFP trip.

1-02 MDAFWP in Pull Out (DANGER tagged) with breaker de

-energized for scheduled maintenance.

Restored B MFP following the trip but 1

-PV-2286 was damaged and is DANGER tagged out for repairs.

Hold power per load dispatch.

Critical Tasks: CT-1 Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS

-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response within a maximum of 15 minutes following the loss of DRPI.

CT-2 Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH

-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 RX05A I (RO, SRO)

TS (SRO) PRZR level instrument LT

-459 fails low 2 RX18 I (BOP, SRO) Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT

-508) Fails High 3 R X 0 9A I (RO , BOP, SRO) TS (SRO) Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure (PT

-505A) Fails Low 4 CH03 C (BOP, SRO)

Neutron Detector Well Fan 9 trips on motor overload 5 FW06A C (BOP, SRO) Main Feed Pump A Recirc valve fails open 6 ED02 TS (SRO) Loss of XST1 Transformer 7 ED01 EG06A M (RO,BOP,SRO)

Loss of offsite power Failure of the DG 1-01 to start (air start failure

) 8 Emergency Boration due to loss of DRPI 9 FW09A M (RO,BOP,SRO)

Loss of all AFW TDAFWP Overspeed Trip

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8 Total malfunctions (5

-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1

-2) 6 Abnormal events (2

-4) 2 Major transients (1

-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1

-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2

-3)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC 2 Turnover: The plant is at 600 MW following a B MFP trip. Reactor power is being held stable per instruction of the Load Dispatcher. MDAFWP 1-02 is Danger tagged for planned maintenance. When the B MFP tripped it caused damage to 1

-PV-2286, Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve. The MFP has been restored to operati on but 1-PV-2286 is Danger tagged to complete repairs. Event 1 (Key 1) The first event will be a PRZR level channel (LT-459) failing low. Entry into ABN-706, PRZR Level Instrumentation Malfunction, section 2.0, will be required.

Letdown will isolate, charging will be placed in manual to control PRZR level. Actions will include selecting an operable channel, restoring letdown, and then restoring PRZR level to program and placing controls back in automatic. The SRO will determine the loss of this channel is a TS entry for LCO 3.3.1 , Reactor Trip System Instrumentation; function 9

, Condition M.

Event 2 (Key 2) The next event is Main Feedwater (MFW) Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) will fail high. Entry into ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction Section 5.0, is required. Section 5.0 is designated for Feed Header Pressure Malfunction. Actions include placing the MFW Pump Turbine Master Speed Controller in MANUAL. This controller will remain in MANUAL for the duration of the scenario and require monitoring/adjustment

. If Pressurizer Pressure falls below 2220 psig, the DNB TS 3.4.1 should be entered. Event 3 (Key 3) Once the plant is stabilized, the next event is a Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) will fail low. Crew actions are per ABN

-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0 is required. Section 4.0 is designated for Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure Malfunction. Actions include placing Rod Control in Manual and bypassing the failed Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure channel. The SRO will refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation; Function 18f, Condition T

. Event 4 (Key 4) The next event will be a trip of the running Neutron Detector Well Fan #9. This will alarm 2.1 CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP. The ALM will direct the crew to determine which fan has tripped and start the other fan as required using SOP

-801A, Containment Ventilation System. The crew will place the tripped fan handswitch in Pull Out or Stop as applicable.

Event 5 (Key 5) The next event is MFP

'A' Recirculation Valve , 1-FCV-2289, opening. ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, section 11

.0 will be entered. Since earlier in this scenario the main feedwater header pressure transmitter failed MFP speed control is in manual. Manual speed control is required to restore S/G levels and stabilize the plant. The RO must ensure rods are in auto for this event.

The crew will dispatch an operator to isolate the failed open recirculation valve. Once the failed valve is isolated, the BOP will adjust MFP speed again for the current plant configuration.

Event 6 (Key 6) The next event is a loss of XST1 which is the alternate offsite power source for Unit 1. The ALM will have the crew enter ABN

-601, Response to a 138/345 KV System Malfunction, as well as a TS entry for 3.8.1, Electrical Power Systems, AC Sources

- Operating, Condition A

.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Event 7 (Key 7)

The major event is a loss of all offsite power causing a reactor trip. The crew will enter EOP

-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Coincident with the loss of offsite power DG 1-01 will fail to auto start and cannot be manually started due to an air start failure. This will cause a complete loss of all safeguards train

'A' power. The crew will transition to EOS

-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, to continue with recovery efforts.

Event 8 - CT-1 (Auto) Due to the Loss of Offsite Power, DRPI is lost and per EOP-0.0A and EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, Attachment s 1.A , an Emergency Boration will be required. The crew will then perform CT-1; Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS

-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response.

This will be completed by entering ABN-107, Emergency Boration.

Event 9 (Auto Triggered when 1/1-8104 is placed in open per ABN-107) After the crew has commenced the emergency boration the TDAFWP will trip on Overspeed. This combined with the loss of all Safeguards Train 'A' power as well as the inoperability of MDAFWP 1-02 will place the crew in a loss of heat sink event. The crew will enter FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and actuate SI. The crew will then perform CT

-2, Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH

-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Termination Criteria This scenario is terminated after the crew establishes a bleed and feed path per FRH

-0.1A. One CCP and one SI pump running with both PRZR PORV s open.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Risk Significance Determination Risk Significance Event Guidance Failure of risk important system s prior to Reactor Tr ip Loss of Transformer XST1 FSAR 8.2.1.2.1 - Two independent power sources are available on an immediate basis following a DBA to ensure operation of the vital safety functions. The second offsite power source will no longer be available on loss of XST1.

Risk significant core damage sequence FSAR 15.2.6.3 Loss of Non

-emergency AC power to the station auxiliaries

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink EOS-0.2A, Natural Circulation Cooldown - For Units 1 and 2, the analysis of the natural circulation capability of the RCS has demonstrated that sufficient heat removal capability exists following reactor coolant pump coastdown to prevent fuel or clad damage.

CPNPP Accident Sequence Quantification, R&R

-PN-022 - Loss of secondary heat removal, not related to ventilation failures, accounts for about 9% of CDF.

Risk significant operator actions Initiation of Boration to Add Negative Reactivity to the Core

(TSA 2.14) STI 214.01; ABN

-107, Emergency Boration; WCAP-1687 1-P, Section 6.3.5; TRM Bases 13.1.31

- Within 15 minutes, when local alignment is required to establish boration flow. Boration is initiated within the prescribed time. When local manual control credited, admin controls are utilized to ensure personnel are aware/designated to perform alignment to establish boration flow.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Critical Task Determination Critical Task Safety Significance Cueing Measurable Performance Indicators Performance Feedback Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS

-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response within a maximum of 15 minutes following the loss of DRPI.

Shutdown Margin must be maintained. Since there are NO DRPI lights lit the bases states to borate at least 3600 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water to ensure shutdown margin is maintained. This gallon value corresponds to 2 of the most reactive rods stuck out.

After the loss of offsite power and the failure of the DG 1-01, DRPI will be dark and no CCP will be running. Per attachment 1.A of EO S-0.1 A , ABN-107 will be performed.

Started CCP 1-02, started Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-02 , and opened 1/1

-8104 , EMER BORATE VLV

. Boration flow will be indicated on 1-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO

. Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH

-0.1A , Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Actuating SI will ensure a feed path of cool water to the RCS (core) and isolate the containment to confine any RCS releases from the bleed flow. The bleed flow through both PORVs will ensure that enough cool water will feed from the ECCS flow path to remove sufficient decay heat.

AFW flow will not be indicated on any AFW flow meter. Also no AFW pump s will be running. A RED path showing on CSFST for heat sink. The need for a heat sink as indicated by RCS temperature and pressure. Actuated SI, ensured at least one CCP and SI pump is running with flow indicated providing a feed path for the RCS. Both PRZR PORV s open providing a bleed path for the RCS. Flow indicated on both a CCP and an SI pump. PRZR PORV s open with block valve s open. RCS pressure and temperature lowering.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC

-16 and 2016 NRC Scenario 2. EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND VALUE INITIATING PARAMETER SETUP FWR021 1-02 MDAFWP in Pull Out RACKOUT K0 FWR056 1-PV-2286 Isolated for repairs CLOSED K0 (NOTE) NOTE: See Scenario file on last page for list of event overrides.

7 EG06A 1-01 EDG air start failure FAIL K0 9 Condition FW09A TDAFWP trips on 1/1

-8104 valve opening (60 sec ond delay) TRIP 8104 Open 1 RX05A PRZR level channel LT

-459 fails low 0 % K1 2 RX18 Main Feedwater Header Pressure transmitter fails high 1500 psig K2 3 RX09A Main Turbine First Stage pressure PT

-505A fails low 0 % K3 4 CH03 Neutron Detector well fan 9 trip TRIP K4 5 FW06A A MFP recirc valve fails open OPEN K5 (NOTE) NOTE: See Scenario file on last page for list of event overrides.

6 ED02 Loss of XST1 Transformer FAIL K6 7 ED01 Loss of offsite power FAIL K7 7 EG06A 1-01 EDG air start failure FAIL K0 8 Emergency Borate 9 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 9 Cond. FW09A TDAFWP trips on 1/1

-8104 valve opening (60 second delay)

TRIP 8104 Open 9 EDR74 Reset IAC 1

-02 Breaker CLOSE K11 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC-16 and 2016 NRC Scenario 2 and place in RUN. ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (1054 ppm)

. ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MW e/minute. ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.

ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume

. ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk: - IPO-003A, Power Operations ENSURE TT06 on PWROPS and all points ON

-SCALE ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 167 steps. ENSURE RED tag on MDAFWP 1-02 with handswitch in Pull Out ENSURE RED tag on 1-PV-2286 with RED & GREEN Lights OFF ENSURE GEM Box PLACED 1

-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1

-01 Control Room Annunciators in Alarm

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C

-9 PCIP-1.6 - -10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P

-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 9 A-3.2 - HDP1 DISCH PRESS HI 9 A-7.2 - HDP2 DISCH PRESS HI

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 1 Page 8 of 32 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT

-459 fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1 (Key 1). - PRZR level channel LT

-459 fails low Indications Available

PRZR LVL LO (5B

-3.6) PRZR LVL DEV LO (5C

-1.2) RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures RO RECOGNIZE PRZR level channel LT

-459 has failed low US Direct the performance of ABN

-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0 RO 1. Manually CONTROL u

-LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL OR u

-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL to maintain level at program.

RO 2. TRANSFER 1/u

-LS-459D, PRZR LVL CTRL CHAN SELECT to an operable alternate controlling channel.

RO 3. ENSURE 1/u

-LS-459E, u-LR-459 PRZR LVL SELECT selected to a valid channel.

RO 4. VERIFY normal letdown aligned

- NO RO 4. RNO - WHEN pressurizer level is greater than 17%, THEN RESTORE letdown per Attachment 6 or Letdown Job Aid

.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 32 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT

-459 fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Examiner Note:

US Directs restoration of Letdown per Job Aid.

RO 1. OPEN OR VERIFY open both letdown isolation valves.

1/u-LCV-459, LTDN ISOL VLV 1/u-LCV-460, LTDN ISOL VLV RO 2. ENSURE u-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL in MANUAL AND 30% demand (50% if two orifice valves will be opened).

RO 3. ENSURE u-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in MANUAL AND 50% demand.

RO 4. ADJUST charging to desired flow WHILE maintaining seal injection flow between 6 and 13 gpm.

RO 5. OPEN the desired orifice isolation valves.

1/u-8149A, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (45 GPM) 1/u-8149B, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (75 GPM) 1/u-8149C, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (75 GPM)

RO 6. ADJUST u-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL to obtain approximately 310 psig on u

-PI-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS, THEN PLACE in automatic.

RO 7. ADJUST u-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL to obtain approximately 95EF on u

-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP, THEN PLACE in automatic.

Simulator Operator:

If contacted as the prompt team

, acknowledge the request to repair LT-459. RO 5. If necessary, RECLOSE 1/u

-PCPR, PRZR CTRL HTR GROUP C by placing the control switch in the "ON" position.

RO 6. If desired, PLACE controller used in Step 1 in AUTO.

RO 7. VERIFY instruments on common instrument line

- NORMAL (see Attachment 1)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 32 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT

-459 fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX RO 10. REFER to Technical Specifications per Attachment 5.

3.3.1-1 Function 9, Technical Specification 3.3.1 Condition M, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to place in trip RO 11. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA

-421, as applicable.

When the Charging and Letdown flows are stable, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 2 Page 11 of 32 Event

Description:

Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT

-508) Fails High Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2 (Key 2). - RX18, Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT

-508) Fails High. Indications Available

Plant Computer Alarm for high Feed Header pressure 1-PI-508, FWP DISCH HDR PRESS indication fails high BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Feed Header Pressure 1

-PT-508 transmitter failure.

Examiner Note

Feed header pressure failing high will cause Feedwater Pump speed to lower. The Main Feedwater Pump Master Speed Controller will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario

. Examiner Note

If Pressurizer Pressure falls below 2220 psig, the RO should recognize entry into TS 3.4.1 for DNB.

US DIRECT performance of ABN

-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0.

BOP 1. PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller in MANUAL.

BOP 2. ADJUST 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller to MAINTAIN Steam Line Pressure.

Simulator Operator:

If contacted as prompt team acknowledge request to repair PT

-508. US 3. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 2 Page 12 of 32 Event

Description:

Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT

-508) Fails High Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Examiner Note

Feed header pressure transmitter PT

-508 will remain failed for the remainder of the scenario. The Main Feedwater Pump Master Speed Controller will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. Step 5.3.4 will NOT be performed.

US 4. WHEN repairs are complete, THEN PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWP MASTER SPD CTRL in

- AUTO as follows:

a. ENSURE differential pressure appropriate for plant conditions.
b. PLACE 1-SK-509A in - AUTO c. VERIFY correct differential pressure automatically maintained.

When control of Feedwater is restored, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 13 of 32 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure (PT

-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Simulator Operator

When directed, EXECUTE Event 3 (Key 3).

- RX09A, Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT

-505) Fails Low. Indications Available

6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRW BLK C

-5 1-PI-505 - Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I indication fails low 1-TI-412A - Ave TAVE TREF Deviation indication to maximum RO/BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE Control Rods INSERTING due to Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrument failure.

RO/BOP REPORT PT-505, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I has failed low. US DIRECT implementation of ABN

-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0.

RO 1. PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.

BOP 2. VERIFY Steam Dumps

- CLOSED WITH NO OPEN DEMAND.

2. RNO - I F Steam Dump operation NOT required, THEN PLACE at least one Steam Dump Interlock Select Switch

- OFF. 43/1-SDA, STM DMP INTRLK SELECT.

43/1-SDB, STM DMP INTRLK SELECT.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 14 of 32 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure (PT

-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX BOP 3. RESTORE steam dump availability by placing Steam Dumps in STM PRESS Mode per Attachment 7.

Examiner Note

ABN-709 Attachment 7 steps are after the steps for section 4.0 (next page)

RO 4. TRANSFER 1

-PS-505Z, TURB IMP PRESS CHAN SELECT to P S-506. Examiner Note

The crew will conduct a Reactivity Brief and execute a Reactivity Plan to restore TAVE to TREF. RO 5. ENSURE T AVE within 1ºF of TREF. RO 6. PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in AUTO.

US/RO 7. CHECK Reactor Plant in

- MODE 1. US/BOP 8. CHECK Turbine Power

- GREATER THAN 10% POWER.

US 9. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, VERIFY PCIP Window 4.6

- -13, IN PROPER STATE for existing plant conditions (DARK).

- YES Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 15 of 32 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure (PT

-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX US 10. VERIFY PCIP Window 1.3

- AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR C IN PROPER STATE (DARK) for actual Turbine power.

- NO US/BOP 10. RNO - IF AMSAC actuation blocked AND turbine power >40%, THEN ENSURE Automatic Actions of ALB

-9B 3.7, AMSAC ACT TURB TRIP as necessary.

US 11. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

LCO 3.3.1.T, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.

(Function 18.f, Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure P

-13) CONDITION T

- One or more required channels inoperable.

ACTION T.1

- Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within one (1) hour, OR ACTION T.2

- Be in MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

Examiner Note

The following six steps are from ABN

-709, Attachment 7, Transferring Steam Dumps and may be performed using the Control Board Job Aid.

BOP 1. ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in MANUAL.

BOP 2. MATCH 1-PK-507, STM DUMP PRESS CTRL demand to current Steam Dump Valve position.

BOP 3. VERIFY 1-PCIP, Window 1.4

- CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C

-9 is ON. BOP 4. PLACE 43/1

-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS.

BOP 5. ENSURE both STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches are ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 16 of 32 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure (PT

-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX BOP 6. I F desired to control Steam Dumps in AUTO, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. VERIFY 1-PI-507, MS HDR PRESS indicates current MSL pressure. b. ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL set to control at 1092 psig for "no load" conditions (Pot setting 6.86).
c. PLACE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL in AUTO.

When TS are completed and Rod Control has been restored to Automatic or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 4 Page 17 of 32 Event

Description:

Neutron Detector Well Fan #9 trips on motor overload Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4 (Key 4)

- Neutron Detector well fan #9 trips Indications Available

CB03-2.1 CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Neutron Detector well fan #9 tripped BOP Performs actions of ALM

-0031A Window 2.1 BOP 1. DETERMINE affected fan from the associated handswitch light indication.

1-HS-5435, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR FN 9 &

DMPR Examiner Note

The steps of SOP

-801A, Containment Ventilation System, Section 5.2.1, Neutron Detector Well Cooling System Startup are only to place the non-affected fan to start. BOP 2. START an alternate fan, as required per SOP

-801A. BOP 3. PLACE affected fan handswitch in Pull Out OR Stop, as available.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 4 Page 18 of 32 Event

Description:

Neutron Detector Well Fan #9 trips on motor overload Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Simulator Operator:

When contacted to investigate the fan trip wait 2 minutes a nd report back the breaker has tripped on motor overload.

RO/BOP 4. DISPATCH an operator to affected fan breaker to determine cause of trip. US 5. WHEN conditions permit, THEN PERFORM a Containment entry per STA-620 to check the fan for signs of damage (smoke, acrid odor, overheating).

US 6. CORRECT the condition OR INITIATE a CR per STA

-421, as applicable.

When the plant is stable or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 19 of 32 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5 (Key 5). - A MFP Recirc valve opens Indications Available

ALL S/G levels lowering FWP A/B RECIRC VLV NOT CLOSED (7B

-4.8) SG 1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A

-1.8) SG 2 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A

-2.8) SG 3 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A

-3.8) SG 4 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A

-4.8) SG 1 LVL DEV (8A

-1.12) SG 2 LVL DEV (8A

-2.12) SG 3 LVL DEV (8A

-3.12) SG 4 LVL DEV (8A

-4.12) BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE A MFP Recirc valve is open AND MFP speed control is in MANUAL. Raises MFP speed to restore S/G levels.

US Direct entry into ABN

-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section 11.0.

RO 1. Ensure 1/u

-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT in AUTO Examiner Note:

1-PV-2286 is Red tagged and cannot be opened. The crew will skip this step. BOP 2. Ensure u-HS-2286, LP FW HTR BYP VLV

- OPEN - NO Examiner Note:

Turbine power is already 600 MW so the next step will not be performed BOP 3. Reduce Turbine Power to 700 MW

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 20 of 32 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Simulator Operator: When contacted to isolate the A MFP recirc valve after 2 minutes DELETE MALFUNCTION FW06A Report back that the valve has been manually isolated by closing FW-0023. RO/BOP 4. Dispatch Operator to isolate affected recirc valve:

u-FV-2289, FWP A RECIRC VALVE u-FV-2290, FWP B RECIRC VALVE BOP 5. Verify Main Feedwater pump suction pressure

- GREATER THAN 200 PSIG u-PI-2295, FWP A SUCT PRESS u-PI-2297, FWP B SUCT PRESS RO/US 6. Verify the following:

a. Rods - ABOVE ROD INSERTION LIMIT
b. - (AFD) WITHIN LIMITS US 7. Verify Reactor Power change

- LESS THAN 15% RTP WITHIN ONE HOUR. Examiner Note:

The following step will not be performed as power is unchanged for this event US 8. Notify QSE Generation Controller and update GAPS to "Create Current Condition" for the down power.

Simulator Operator:

When contacted as a member of plant management inform the crew that continued operation of the A MFP with its recirc flowpath isolated at the current power is desired. US 9. Plant Management has determined continued operation of the Feedwater pump is required with recirc flowpath isolated.

US 10. Restore power to level specified by Shift Manager.

BOP 11. WHEN steam dumps have closed, THEN reset C

-7, if armed.

43/u-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT US 12. Initiate equipment repairs per STA

-606.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 21 of 32 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Examiner Note:

1-PV-2286 is Red tagged and cannot be open/closed. The crew will not perform this step.

BOP 13. Close u-HS-2286, LP FW HTR BYP VLV by performing Section 7.0 of this procedure.

US 14. Return to procedure and step in effect.

When the plant is stabilized or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 6 Page 22 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of XST1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Simulator Operator

When directed, EXECUTE Event 6 (Key 6). - Loss of XST1 transformer Indications Available
138 KV XFMR XST1 TRBL (CB 14-1.1) 138 KV XFMR XST1 LOR TRIP (CB 14-3.1) 138 KV XFMR XST1 VOLT LO (CB 14-3.2) BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE the loss of XST1 transformer and US Direct entry into ABN

-601, RESPONSE TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, Section 2.0.

Examiner Note:

The alarms that are received will send the crew to the ABN however they may use the ALMs to start the recovery. The ALM will direct the US to the TS.

US/BOP 1. Determine AC Power Status:

a. Check the Unit - IN MODES 1, 2, 3 OR 4

- YES b. Check 6.9 KV Safeguard Buses

- AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

- YES US/BOP c. Check Unit 6.9 KV Non

-Safeguard Buses

- ALL REMAINED ENERGIZED WITH LOADS CONNECTED TO THE BUS

- YES d. GO TO Step 4 BOP 4. Check Switchyard Bus Status

- ALL ENERGIZED V-E BUS, 345 KV E. BUS VOLT (CB

-12) - BETWEEN 340 KV and 361 KV V-W BUS, 345 KV W. BUS VOLT (CB

-12) - BETWEEN 340 KV and 361 KV V/ST1, INCOMING 138 KV XFMR FDR VOLT (CB

-12) - BETWEEN 135 KV and 144 KV (DE

-ENERGIZED)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 6 Page 23 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of XST1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX BOP 5. Monitor Blackout Sequencer Status:

a. Affected bus

- ENERGIZED - YES b. Verify Blackout Sequencer

- OPERATED OUTPUT-STEP TIME lights

- ALL LIT - NO Automatic lockouts AL light

- LIT - NO US 5. RNO - GO TO Step 6.

BOP 6. Check Transformer XST1 Status:

a. V/ST1, STARTUP XFMR XST1 138 KV FDR VOLT (CB

-12) - BETWEEN 135 KV and 144 KV

- NO US 6. RNO - INITIATE Attachment 2, Restoration of XST1.

Simulator Operator:

When contacted as the Shift Manager or Switchyard Coordinator inform the US that the Shift Manager will coordinate the actions of Attachment 2, and that the US should continue with ABN

-601, Section 2.0 actions.

US 1. Determine the origin for the loss of power by performing the following:

Contact the Switchyard Coordinator to provide assistance in determining the transformer status.

Examiner Note:

ABN-601 Steps 7, 8 & 9 relate to unaffected transformers and may be N/A'd by the SRO or read and verified.

BOP 10. Verify Diesel Generators

- NOT RUNNING BOP 11. Verify 6.9KV Bux XA1

- ENERGIZED Simulator Operator:

If contacted as the Shift Manager to have Unit 2 perform SR 3.8.1.1, state that the Extra RO will perform the SR.

US 12. Refer to the appropriate TS

MODES 1, 2, 3, OR 4

- Section 3.8.1 AC Sources

- Operating Condition A is applicable This is a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> spec to perform SR 3.8.1.1

- Verification of offsite sources 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore power When the plant is stabilized or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 7

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 7 & 8 Page 24 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1

-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 7 (Key 7). - Loss of offsite power Indications Available

Reactor Trip Turbine Trip Multiple Annunciators CREW RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE the Reactor Trip and perform Immediate Actions US Direct entry into EOP

-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection RO 1. VERIFY Reactor Trip:

a. Verify the following: VERIFY Reactor Trip Breakers

- OPEN. VERIFY Neutron flux

- DECREASING.

b. VERIFY all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights

- ON. - NO Examiner Note:

Emergency Boration is required since all DRPI lights are DARK. This is on Attachment 1.A of both EOP

-0.0A and EOS

-0.1A. The steps are listed as if this is going to be performed in EOS

-0.1A since the transition to this procedure will take place very quickly from EOP

-0.0A. Critical Task Start Time on Loss of DRPI: ___________

BOP 2. VERIFY Turbine Trip:

VERIFY all HP Turbine Stop Valves

- CLOSED. Examiner Note:

The EDG 1-01 will fail to start an d cannot be started due to an air start failure Simulator Operator:

If contacted to investigate the failure of the EDG 1-01, wait 2 minutes and report back that the diesel will not start and an air start failure alarm is locked in BOP 3. VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 7 & 8 Page 25 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1

-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

a. VERIFY AC Safeguards Buses

- AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

b. VERIFY both AC Safeguards Buses

- ENERGIZED.

- NO b. RNO - Restore power to de

-energized AC safeguards bus per ABN-601, RESPONSE TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM MALFUNCTION or ABN

-602, RESPONSE TO A 6900/480 VOLT SYSTEM MALFUNCTION when time permits.

RO 4. CHECK SI status:

a. CHECK if SI is actuated. o VERIFY SI indicated on the First Out Annunciator Panel 1

-ALB-6C. o VERIFY SI Actuated blue status light

- ON. - NO RO 4. a. RNO - Check if SI is required:

o Steam Line Pressure less than 610 psig.

- NO o Pressurizer Pressure less than 1820 psig. - NO o Containment Pressure greater than 3.0 psig.

- NO o IF SI is NOT required, THEN go to EOS

-0.1A, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.

US Transitions to EO S-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response Examiner Note:

RO initiates Emergency Boration for Loss of DRPI per Attachment 1.A of EOP-0.0A or EOS

-0.1A. (Guidance is duplicated in both procedures)

CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT CT-1 Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS

-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response within a maximum of 15 minutes following the loss of DRPI. Emergency Boration Initiated Time:_______________

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 7 & 8 Page 26 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1

-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX RO 1. Ensure a charging pump is running:

1/u-APCH1, CCP 1

- NO 1/u-APCH2, CCP 2

- YES 1/u-APPD, PDP CT-1 RO 2. Start a boric acid transfer pump:

1/u-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 1

- AUTO (AFTER START)

- NO 1/u-APBA2, BA XFER PMP 2

- AUTO (AFTER START)

- YES CT-1 RO 3. Open 1/u-8104, EMER BORATE VLV Examiner Note:

When the RO opens the emergency borate valve 1/1

-8104 it will auto insert event 9 (60 second delay) for the loss of all AFW. This will give the crew a RED path on Heat Sink.

RO 4. Verify flow on u

-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO RO 5. Verify flow on u

-FI-121A, CHRG FLOW RO 6. IF EMER BORATE FLOW OR CHRG FLOW can NOT be verified, THEN initiate Emergency Boration Flow per another method of ABN

-107. RO 7. WHEN desired to terminate emergency boration (Reference Attachment 7 of ABN

-107), THEN GO TO Step 8 of ABN

-107. US Transitions to FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Heat Sink on Red Path

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 9 Page 27 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX US 1. Check If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required:

a. RCS pressure

- GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED SG PRESSURE - YES b. RCS temperature

- GREATER THAN 350°F

- YES RO 2. Check CCP Status

- BOTH AVAILABLE

- NO Examiner Note:

There will be no power to the A train PORV block valve but since it was open when it lost power it will still be open when the crew opens the associated PORV RO 2. RNO - Immediately perform the following:

a. STOP ALL RCPs.
b. Verify power to PRZR PORV block valves

- AVAILABLE c. Go to Step 13. OBSERVE CAUTION PRIOR TO STEP 13.

CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT CT-2 Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH

-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

CT-2 RO 13. Actuate SI

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 9 Page 28 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX RO 14. Verify RCS Feed Path:

a. Check CCP SI flow indicator

- CHECK FOR FLOW

b. Check SI pumps

- BOTH RUNNING

- NO RO 14. b. RNO - Perform the following:

1) Manually start pump(s) and align valves as necessary.
2) IF either of the following RCS feed paths exists, THEN go to Step 15. CCPs - BOTH INJECTING

- NO AT LEAST ONE CCP INJECTING AND ONE SI PUMP RUNNING - YES Examiner Note:

Steps 15 - 20 will be performed via Attachment 1D and will not be directed individually by the US.

BOP 15. Check If Diesels Should Be Emergency Started:

a. Check diesel generator(s)

- RUNNING - DG 1-02 Only b. Place D/G EMER STOP/START handswitch(es) in START.

BOP 16. Reset SI. BOP 17. Reset SI Sequencers.

BOP 18. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A And Phase B.

BOP 19. Reset Containment Spray Signal.

Simulator Operator

When requested to RESET Instrument Air Compressor 1

-02 Breaker, wait 2 minutes and EXECUTE remote function EDR74 to CLOSE (Key 11). Provide Field Support report that IAC 1

-02 Breaker is Closed. BOP 20. Establish Instrument Air And Nitrogen To Containment:

a. Establish instrument air:
1) Verify air compressor running.

Establish instrument air to containment.

b. Establish nitrogen:
1) -HC-943 - CLOSED 2) Open SI/PORV ACCUM N2 ISOL VLV, 1/1

-8880.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 9 Page 29 of 32 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX Examiner Note:

There will be no power to the A train PORV block valve but since it was open when it lost power it will still be open when the crew opens the associated PORV CT-2 RO 21. Establish RCS Bleed Path:

a. Verify power to PRZR PORV block valves

- AVAILABLE b. Verify PRZR PORV block valves

- BOTH OPEN c. Open PRZR PORVs.

RO 22. Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path:

PRZR PORVs

- BOTH OPEN PRZR PORV block valves

- BOTH OPEN After the bleed and feed is initiated, TERMINATE the scenario.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

2016 NRC Scenario 2
Rev. 1 ;Initialize to IC-16 ;Setup MDAFWP 1-02 in Pull

-Out - Breaker Deenergized IRF FWR021 f:0

1-PV-2286 Isolated for Repairs IOR LOFWHS2286_1 f
0 IOR LOFWHS2286_2 f:0 IRF FWR056 f:0
Event 1 - PRZ LVL [LT-459] Fails Low IMF RX05A f
0 k:1
Event 2 - Main Feedwater Header Pressure [P T-508] Fails High
PT-508 Fails High IMF RX18 f
1500 k:2
Event 3 - Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure [PT

-505A] Fails Low

PT-505A Fails Low IMF RX09A f
0 k:3
Event 4 - Neutron Detector Well FN 9 Motor Overload

IMF CH03 f:1 k:4

Event 5 - FWP A Recirc Valve Fails Open IMF FW06A f
100 r:10 k:5
Local Isolation of FV

-2289 by FW

-0023 ;Delete Malfunction FW06A IOR LOFWZL2289_1 f:0 k:5 d:120 IOR LOFWZL2289_2 f:1 k:5 d:120 IOR LOANAN7B_32 f:1 k:5 d:120

Event 6 - Loss of XST1

IMF ED02 f:1 k:6 ;Event 7 - Loss of Offsite Power/DG 1

-01 Air Start Failure

LOOP IMF ED01 f
1 k:7
Reset IAC 1

-02 Breaker IRF EDR74 f:2 k:11

DG 1-01 Air Start Failure IMF EG06A f
1
Event 8 - Emergency Boration for Loss of DRPI
Event 9 - TDAFWP Trip if Running (FRH Entry)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 1.DOCX

TDAFWP Trip after emergency borate started

{DICVHS8104.Value=2} IMF FW09A f:1 d:60

GUARDED EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT (GEM) SIGN POSTING LOG REASON FOR POSTING MD AFWP 1-02 INOPERABLE STI-600.01-1 Page 1 of 1 REFERENCE USE Rev. 0 Component to be Posted Nomenclature Posting Installed Initial Posting Checked Initial Posting Removed Initial 1-HS-2450A MD AFWP 1 => CB / 830 / X

-135 JGR RB 1APMD1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1

-01 MOTOR BREAKER => SG / 810 / 1

-083 JGR RB S1-16 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 ROOM => SG / 790 / 1

-072 JGR RB Authorized By Joe UnitSupervisor Date Today Posting Removal Authorized By Date Open Narrative Log Entry Entered Open Narrative Log Entry Closed Comments: This form is not maintained. Verify correct items Guarded per STI

-600.01 prior to use.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

July 2016 NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

53% power MOL

- RCS Boron is 1054 ppm Turnover: 600 MWe due to a B MFP trip.

1-02 MDAFWP in Pull Out (DANGER tagged) with breaker de

-energized for scheduled maintenance.

Restored B MFP following the trip but 1

-PV-2286 was damaged and is DANGER tagged out for repairs.

Hold power per load dispatch.

Critical Tasks: CT-1 Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS

-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response within a maximum of 15 minutes following the loss of DRPI.

CT-1 Manually control the Main Feedwater Master Speed Controller to prevent receiving an automatic reactor trip due to low steam generator levels, or a trip of Main Feed Pumps due to low suction pressure, and subsequent manual reactor trip.

CT-2 Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH

-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 RX05A I (RO, SRO)

TS (SRO) PRZR level instrument LT

-459 fails low 2 RX18 I (BOP, SRO) Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT

-508) Fails High 3 R X 0 9A I (RO , BOP, SRO) TS (SRO) Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure (PT

-505A) Fails Low 4 CH03 C (BOP, SRO)

Neutron Detector Well Fan 9 trips on motor overload 5 FW06A C (BOP, SRO) Main Feed Pump A Recirc valve fails open 6 ED02 TS (SRO) Loss of XST1 Transformer 7 ED01 EG06A M (RO,BOP,SRO)

Loss of offsite power Failure of the DG 1-01 to start (air start failure

) 8 Emergency Boration due to loss of DRPI 9 FW09A M (RO,BOP,SRO)

Loss of all AFW TDAFWP Overspeed Trip

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8 7 Total malfunctions (5

-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1

-2) 6 5 Abnormal events (2

-4) 2 Major transients (1

-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1

-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2

-3)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC 2 Turnover: The plant is at 600 MW following a B MFP trip. Reactor power is being held stable per instruction of the Load Dispatcher. MDAFWP 1-02 is Danger tagged for planned maintenance. When the B MFP tripped it caused damage to 1

-PV-2286, Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve. The MFP has been restored to operati on but 1-PV-2286 is Danger tagged to complete repairs. Event 1 (Key 1) The first event will be a PRZR level channel (LT-459) failing low. Entry into ABN-706, PRZR Level Instrumentation Malfunction, section 2.0, will be required.

Letdown will isolate, charging will be placed in manual to control PRZR level. Actions will include selecting an operable channel, restoring letdown, and then restoring PRZR level to program and placing controls back in automatic. The SRO will determine the loss of this channel is a TS entry for LCO 3.3.1 , Reactor Trip System Instrumentation; function 9

, Condition M.

Event 2 (Key 2) The next event is Main Feedwater (MFW) Header Pressure Transmitter (PT-508) will fail high. Entry into ABN-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction Section 5.0, is required. Section 5.0 is designated for Feed Header Pressure Malfunction. Actions include placing the MFW Pump Turbine Master Speed Controller in MANUAL. This controller will remain in MANUAL for the duration of the scenario and require monitoring/adjustment

. If Pressurizer Pressure falls below 2220 psig, the DNB TS 3.4.1 should be entered. Event 3 (Key 3) Once the plant is stabilized, the next event is a Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT-505) will fail low. Crew actions are per ABN

-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0 is required. Section 4.0 is designated for Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure Malfunction. Actions include placing Rod Control in Manual and bypassing the failed Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure channel. The SRO will refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation; Function 18f, Condition T

. Event 4 (Key 4) The next event will be a trip of the running Neutron Detector Well Fan #9. This will alarm 2.1 CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP. The ALM will direct the crew to determine which fan has tripped and start the other fan as required using SOP

-801A, Containment Ventilation System. The crew will place the tripped fan handswitch in Pull Out or Stop as applicable.

Event 5 (Key 5) The next event is MFP

'A' Recirculation Valve , 1-FCV-2289, opening. ABN-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, section 11

.0 will be entered. Since earlier in this scenario the main feedwater header pressure transmitter failed MFP speed control is in manual. Manual speed control is required to restore S/G levels and stabilize the plant. The RO must ensure rods are in auto for this event.

The crew will dispatch an operator to isolate the failed open recirculation valve. Once the failed valve is isolated, the BOP will adjust MFP speed again for the current plant configuration.

Event 6 (Key 6) The next event is a loss of XST1 which is the alternate offsite power source for Unit 1. The ALM will have the crew enter ABN

-601, Response to a 138/345 KV System Malfunction, as well as a TS entry for 3.8.1, Electrical Power Systems, AC Sources

- Operating, Condition A

.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Event 7 (Key 7)

The major event is a loss of all offsite power causing a reactor trip. The crew will enter EOP

-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Coincident with the loss of offsite power DG 1-01 will fail to auto start and cannot be manually started due to an air start failure. This will cause a complete loss of all safeguards train

'A' power. The crew will transition to EOS

-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, to continue with recovery efforts.

Event 8 - CT-1 (Auto) Due to the Loss of Offsite Power, DRPI is lost and per EOP-0.0A and EOS-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response, Attachment s 1.A , an Emergency Boration will be required. The crew will then perform CT-1; Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS

-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response. This will be completed by enterin g A BN-107, Emergency Boration.

Event 9 (Auto Triggered when 1/1-8104 is placed in open per ABN-107) After the crew has commenced the emergency boration the TDAFWP will trip on Overspeed. This combined with the loss of all Safeguards Train 'A' power as well as the inoperability of MDAFWP 1-02 will place the crew in a loss of heat sink event. The crew will enter FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, and actuate SI. The crew will then perform CT

-2, Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH

-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Termination Criteria This scenario is terminated after the crew establishes a bleed and feed path per FRH

-0.1A. One CCP and one SI pump running with both PRZR PORV s open.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Risk Significance Determination Risk Significance Event Guidance Failure of risk important system s prior to Reactor Tr ip Loss of Transformer XST1 FSAR 8.2.1.2.1 - Two independent power sources are available on an immediate basis following a DBA to ensure operation of the vital safety functions. The second offsite power source will no longer be available on loss of XST1.

Risk significant core damage sequence FSAR 15.2.6.3 Loss of Non

-emergency AC power to the station auxiliaries

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink EOS-0.2A, Natural Circulation Cooldown - For Units 1 and 2, the analysis of the natural circulation capability of the RCS has demonstrated that sufficient heat removal capability exists following reactor coolant pump coastdown to prevent fuel or clad damage.

CPNPP Accident Sequence Quantification, R&R

-PN-022 - Loss of secondary heat removal, not related to ventilation failures, accounts for about 9% of CDF.

Risk significant operator actions Initiation of Boration to Add Negative Reactivity to the Core (TSA 2.14)

STI 214.01; ABN

-107, Emergency Boration; WCAP-1687 1-P, Section 6.3.5; TRM Bases 13.1.31

- Within 15 minutes, when local alignment is required to establish boration flow. Boration is initiated within the prescribed time. When local manual control credited, admin controls are utilized to ensure personnel are aware/designated to perform alignment to establish boration flow.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Critical Task Determination Critical Task Safety Significance Cueing Measurable Performance Indicators Performance Feedback Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS

-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response within a maximum of 15 minutes following the loss of DRPI.

Shutdown Margin must be maintained. Since there are NO DRPI lights lit the bases states to borate at least 3600 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water to ensure shutdown margin is maintained. This gallon value corresponds to 2 of the most reactive rods stuck out.

After the loss of offsite power and the failure of the DG 1-01, DRPI will be dark and no CCP will be running. Per attachment 1.A of EO S-0.1 A , ABN-107 will be performed.

Started CCP 1-02, started Boric Acid Transfer Pump 1-02 , and opened 1/1

-8104 , EMER BORATE VLV

. Boration flow will be indicated on 1-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO

. Manually control the Main Feedwater Master Speed Controller to prevent receiving an automatic reactor trip due to low steam generator levels, or a trip of Main Feed Pumps due to low suction pressure, and subsequent manual reactor trip. Result of improper operator action or inaction, i.e., such as an unintentional RPS or ESF actuation.

After the Main Feed Pump A recirc valve fails open, S/G levels will begin decreasing. Manual control of the feed pump speed will maintain S/G levels on program.

S/G levels maintained on program without tripping the reactor or tripping the Main Feed Pumps on low suction Pressure , followed by a manual reactor trip (ABN-302, immediate operator action)

. Neither reactor nor Main Feed Pumps do not trip. Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH

-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. Actuating SI will ensure a feed path of cool water to the RCS (core) and isolate the containment to confine any RCS releases from the bleed flow. AFW flow will not be indicated on any AFW flow meter. Also no AFW pump s will be running. A RED path showing on CSFST for heat sink. The need for a heat sink as indicated by RCS Actuated SI, ensured at least one CCP and SI pump is running with flow indicated providing a feed path for the RCS. Both PRZR PORV s Flow indicated on both a CCP and an SI pump. PRZR PORV s open with block valve s open. RCS pressure and temperature lowering.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX The bleed flow through both PORVs will ensure that enough cool water will feed from the ECCS flow path to remove sufficient decay heat.

temperature and pressure. o pen providing a bleed path for the RCS.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC

-16 and 2016 NRC Scenario 2. EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND VALUE INITIATING PARAMETER SETUP FWR021 1-02 MDAFWP in Pull Out RACKOUT K0 FWR056 1-PV-2286 Isolated for repairs CLOSED K0 (NOTE) NOTE: See Scenario file on last page for list of event overrides.

7 EG06A 1-01 EDG air start failure FAIL K0 9 Condition FW09A TDAFWP trips on 1/1

-8104 valve opening (60 sec ond delay) TRIP 8104 Open 1 RX05A PRZR level channel LT

-459 fails low 0 % K1 2 RX18 Main Feedwater Header Pressure transmitter fails high 1500 psig K2 3 RX09A Main Turbine First Stage pressure PT

-505A fails low 0 % K3 4 CH03 Neutron Detector well fan 9 trip TRIP K4 5 FW06A A MFP recirc valve fails open OPEN K5 (NOTE) NOTE: See Scenario file on last page for list of event overrides.

6 ED02 Loss of XST1 Transformer FAIL K6 7 ED01 Loss of offsite power FAIL K7 7 EG06A 1-01 EDG air start failure FAIL K0 8 Emergency Borate 9 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 9 Cond. FW09A TDAFWP trips on 1/1

-8104 valve opening (60 second delay)

TRIP 8104 Open 9 EDR74 Reset IAC 1

-02 Breaker CLOSE K11 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC-16 and 2016 NRC Scenario 2 and place in RUN. ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (1054 ppm)

. ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MW e/minute. ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.

ENSURE ASD speakers are ON at half volume

. ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk: - IPO-003A, Power Operations ENSURE TT06 on PWROPS and all points ON

-SCALE ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 167 steps. ENSURE RED tag on MDAFWP 1-02 with handswitch in Pull Out ENSURE RED tag on 1-PV-2286 with RED & GREEN Lights OFF ENSURE GEM Box PLACED 1

-HS-2450A for MDAFWP 1-01 Control Room Annunciators in Alarm

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C

-9 PCIP-1.6 - -10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P

-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK 9 A-3.2 - HDP1 DISCH PRESS HI 9 A-7.2 - HDP2 DISCH PRESS HI

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 1 Page 9 of 33 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT

-459 fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1 (Key 1). - PRZR level channel LT

-459 fails low Indications Available

PRZR LVL LO (5B

-3.6) PRZR LVL DEV LO (5C

-1.2) RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures RO RECOGNIZE PRZR level channel LT

-459 has failed low US Direct the performance of ABN

-706, Pressurizer Level Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0 RO 1. Manually CONTROL u

-LK-459, PRZR LVL CTRL OR u

-FK-121, CCP CHRG FLO CTRL to maintain level at program.

RO 2. TRANSFER 1/u

-LS-459D, PRZR LVL CTRL CHAN SELECT to an operable alternate controlling channel. RO 3. ENSURE 1/u

-LS-459E, u-LR-459 PRZR LVL SELECT selected to a valid channel.

RO 4. VERIFY normal letdown aligned

- NO RO 4. RNO - WHEN pressurizer level is greater than 17%, THEN RESTORE letdown per Attachment 6 or Letdown Job Aid

.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 33 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT

-459 fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Examiner Note:

US Directs restoration of Letdown per Job Aid.

RO 1. OPEN OR VERIFY open both letdown isolation valves.

1/u-LCV-459, LTDN ISOL VLV 1/u-LCV-460, LTDN ISOL VLV RO 2. ENSURE u-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL in MANUAL AND 30% demand (50% if two orifice valves will be opened).

RO 3. ENSURE u-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in MANUAL AND 50% demand.

RO 4. ADJUST charging to desired flow WHILE maintaining seal injection flow between 6 and 13 gpm.

RO 5. OPEN the desired orifice isolation valves.

1/u-8149A, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (45 GPM) 1/u-8149B, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (75 GPM) 1/u-8149C, LTDN ORIFICE ISOL VLV (75 GPM)

RO 6. ADJUST u-PK-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS CTRL to obtain approximately 310 psig on u

-PI-131, LTDN HX OUT PRESS, THEN PLACE in automatic.

RO 7. ADJUST u-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL to obtain approximately 95EF on u

-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP, THEN PLACE in automatic.

Simulator Operator:

If contacted as the prompt team

, acknowledge the request to repair LT-459. RO 5. If necessary, RECLOSE 1/u

-PCPR, PRZR CTRL HTR GROUP C by placing the control switch in the "ON" position.

RO 6. If desired, PLACE controller used in Step 1 in AUTO.

RO 7. VERIFY instruments on common instrument line

- NORMAL (see Attachment 1)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 33 Event

Description:

PRZR level channel LT

-459 fails low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX RO 10. REFER to Technical Specifications per Attachment 5.

3.3.1-1 Function 9, Technical Specification 3.3.1 Condition M, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to place in trip RO 11. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA

-421, as applicable.

When the Charging and Letdown flows are stable, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 2 Page 12 of 33 Event

Description:

Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT

-508) Fails High Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2 (Key 2). - RX18, Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT

-508) Fails High. Indications Available

Plant Computer Alarm for high Feed Header pressure 1-PI-508, FWP DISCH HDR PRESS indication fails high BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Feed Header Pressure 1

-PT-508 transmitter failure.

Examiner Note

Feed header pressure failing high will cause Feedwater Pump speed to lower. The Main Feedwater Pump Master Speed Controller will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario

. Examiner Note: If Pressurizer Pressure falls below 2220 psig, the RO should recognize entry into TS 3.4.1 for DNB.

US DIRECT performance of ABN

-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 5.0.

BOP 1. PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller in MANUAL.

BOP 2. ADJUST 1-SK-509A, FWPT Master Speed Controller to MAINTAIN Steam Line Pressure.

Simulator Operator:

If contacted as prompt team acknowledge request to repair PT

-508. US 3. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 2 Page 13 of 33 Event

Description:

Feed Header Pressure Transmitter (PT

-508) Fails High Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Examiner Note

Feed header pressure transmitter PT

-508 will remain failed for the remainder of the scenario. The Main Feedwater Pump Master Speed Controller will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. Step 5.3.4 will NOT be performed.

US 4. WHEN repairs are complete, THEN PLACE 1-SK-509A, FWP MASTER SPD CTRL in

- AUTO as follows:

a. ENSURE differential pressure appropriate for plant conditions.
b. PLACE 1-SK-509A in - AUTO c. VERIFY correct differential pressure automatically maintained.

When control of Feedwater is restored, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 14 of 33 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure (PT

-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Simulator Operator

When directed, EXECUTE Event 3 (Key 3).

- RX09A, Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure Transmitter (PT

-505) Fails Low. Indications Available

6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV PCIP-2.4 - LO TURB PWR ROD WITHDRW BLK C

-5 1-PI-505 - Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I indication fails low 1-TI-412A - Ave TAVE TREF Deviation indication to maximum RO/BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE Control Rods INSERTING due to Turbine Impulse Pressure Instrument failure.

RO/BOP REPORT PT-505, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel I has failed low. US DIRECT implementation of ABN

-709, Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure, and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction, Section 4.0.

RO 1. PLACE 1/1-RBSS Control Rod Bank Select Switch in MANUAL.

BOP 2. VERIFY Steam Dumps

- CLOSED WITH NO OPEN DEMAND.

2. RNO - I F Steam Dump operation NOT required, THEN PLACE at least one Steam Dump Interlock Select Switch

- OFF. 43/1-SDA, STM DMP INTRLK SELECT.

43/1-SDB, STM DMP INTRLK SELECT.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 15 of 33 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure (PT

-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX BOP 3. RESTORE steam dump availability by placing Steam Dumps in STM PRESS Mode per Attachment 7.

Examiner Note

ABN-709 Attachment 7 steps are after the steps for section 4.0 (next page)

RO 4. TRANSFER 1

-PS-505Z, TURB IMP PRESS CHAN SELECT to P S-506. Examiner Note

The crew will conduct a Reactivity Brief and execute a Reactivity Plan to restore TAVE to TREF. RO 5. ENSURE T AVE within 1ºF of TREF. RO 6. PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in AUTO.

US/RO 7. CHECK Reactor Plant in

- MODE 1. US/BOP 8. CHECK Turbine Power

- GREATER THAN 10% POWER.

US 9. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, VERIFY PCIP Window 4.6

- -13, IN PROPER STATE for existing plant conditions (DARK).

- YES Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 16 of 33 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure (PT

-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX US 10. VERIFY PCIP Window 1.3

- AMSAC BLK TURB < 40% PWR C IN PROPER STATE (DARK) for actual Turbine power.

- NO US/BOP 10. RNO - IF AMSAC actuation blocked AND turbine power >40%, THEN ENSURE Automatic Actions of ALB

-9B 3.7, AMSAC ACT TURB TRIP as necessary.

US 11. INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

LCO 3.3.1.T, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation.

(Function 18.f, Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure P

-13) CONDITION T

- One or more required channels inoperable.

ACTION T.1

- Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within one (1) hour, OR ACTION T.2

- Be in MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.

Examiner Note

The following six steps are from ABN

-709, Attachment 7, Transferring Steam Dumps and may be performed using the Control Board Job Aid.

BOP 1. ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL is in MANUAL.

BOP 2. MATCH 1-PK-507, STM DUMP PRESS CTRL demand to current Steam Dump Valve position.

BOP 3. VERIFY 1-PCIP, Window 1.4

- CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C

-9 is ON. BOP 4. PLACE 43/1

-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in STM PRESS.

BOP 5. ENSURE both STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches are ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 3 Page 17 of 33 Event

Description:

Main Turbine 1 st Stage Pressure (PT

-505A) Fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX BOP 6. I F desired to control Steam Dumps in AUTO, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. VERIFY 1-PI-507, MS HDR PRESS indicates current MSL pressure. b. ENSURE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL set to control at 1092 psig for "no load" conditions (Pot setting 6.86).
c. PLACE 1-PK-507, STM DMP PRESS CTRL in AUTO.

When TS are completed and Rod Control has been restored to Automatic or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 4 Page 18 of 33 Event

Description:

Neutron Detector Well Fan #9 trips on motor overload Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4 (Key 4)

- Neutron Detector well fan #9 trips Indications Available

CB03-2.1 CNTMT FN MASTER TRIP BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE Neutron Detector well fan #9 tripped BOP Performs actions of ALM

-0031A Window 2.1 BOP 1. DETERMINE affected fan from the associated handswitch light indication.

1-HS-5435, NEUT DET WELL FN CLR FN 9 &

DMPR Examiner Note

The steps of SOP

-801A, Containment Ventilation System, Section 5.2.1, Neutron Detector Well Cooling System Startup are only to place the non-affected fan to start. BOP 2. START an alternate fan, as required per SOP

-801A. BOP 3. PLACE affected fan handswitch in Pull Out OR Stop, as available.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 4 Page 19 of 33 Event

Description:

Neutron Detector Well Fan #9 trips on motor overload Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Simulator Operator:

When contacted to investigate the fan trip wait 2 minutes a nd report back the breaker has tripped on motor overload.

RO/BOP 4. DISPATCH an operator to affected fan breaker to determine cause of trip. US 5. WHEN conditions permit, THEN PERFORM a Containment entry per STA-620 to check the fan for signs of damage (smoke, acrid odor, overheating).

US 6. CORRECT the condition OR INITIATE a CR per STA

-421, as applicable.

When the plant is stable or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 20 of 33 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5 (Key 5). - A MFP Recirc valve opens Indications Available

ALL S/G levels lowering FWP A/B RECIRC VLV NOT CLOSED (7B

-4.8) SG 1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A

-1.8) SG 2 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A

-2.8) SG 3 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A

-3.8) SG 4 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH (8A

-4.8) SG 1 LVL DEV (8A

-1.12) SG 2 LVL DEV (8A

-2.12) SG 3 LVL DEV (8A

-3.12) SG 4 LVL DEV (8A

-4.12) BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE A MFP Recirc valve is open AND MFP speed control is in MANUAL. Raises MFP speed to restore S/G levels.

CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT CT-1 Manually control the Main Feedwater Master Speed Controller to prevent receiving an automatic reactor trip due to low steam generator levels, or a trip of Main Feed Pumps due to low suction pressure, and subsequent manual reactor trip.

US Direct entry into ABN

-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section 11.0.

RO 1. Ensure 1/u

-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT in AUTO Examiner Note:

1-PV-2286 is Red tagged and cannot be opened. The crew will skip this step. BOP 2. Ensure u-HS-2286, LP FW HTR BYP VLV

- OPEN - NO Examiner Note:

Turbine power is already 600 MW so the next step will not be performed

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 21 of 33 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX BOP 3. Reduce Turbine Power to 700 MW Simulator Operator: When contacted to isolate the A MFP recirc valve after 2 minutes DELETE MALFUNCTION FW06A Report back that the valve has been manually isolated by closing FW-0023. RO/BOP 4. Dispatch Operator to isolate affected recirc valve:

u-FV-2289, FWP A RECIRC VALVE u-FV-2290, FWP B RECIRC VALVE BOP 5. Verify Main Feedwater pump suction pressure

- GREATER THAN 200 PSIG u-PI-2295, FWP A SUCT PRESS u-PI-2297, FWP B SUCT PRESS RO/US 6. Verify the following:

a. Rods - ABOVE ROD INSERTION LIMIT
b. - (AFD) WITHIN LIMITS US 7. Verify Reactor Power change

- LESS THAN 15% RTP WITHIN ONE HOUR. Examiner Note:

The following step will not be performed as power is unchanged for this event US 8. Notify QSE Generation Controller and update GAPS to "Create Current Condition" for the down power.

Simulator Operator:

When contacted as a member of plant management inform the crew that continued operation of the A MFP with its recirc flowpath isolated at the current power is desired. US 9. Plant Management has determined continued operation of the Feedwater pump is required with recirc flowpath isolated.

US 10. Restore power to level specified by Shift Manager.

BOP 11. WHEN steam dumps have closed, THEN reset C

-7, if armed.

43/u-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 5 Page 22 of 33 Event

Description:

A MFP recirc valve opens Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX US 12. Initiate equipment repairs per STA

-606. Examiner Note:

1-PV-2286 is Red tagged and cannot be open/closed. The crew will not perform this step.

BOP 13. Close u-HS-2286, LP FW HTR BYP VLV by performing Section 7.0 of this procedure.

US 14. Return to procedure and step in effect.

When the plant is stabilized or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 6 Page 23 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of XST1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Simulator Operator

When directed, EXECUTE Event 6 (Key 6). - Loss of XST1 transformer Indications Available
138 KV XFMR XST1 TRBL (CB 14-1.1) 138 KV XFMR XST1 LOR TRIP (CB 14-3.1) 138 KV XFMR XST1 VOLT LO (CB 14-3.2) BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE the loss of XST1 transformer and US Direct entry into ABN

-601, RESPONSE TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, Section 2.0.

Examiner Note:

The alarms that are received will send the crew to the ABN however they may use the ALMs to start the recovery. The ALM will direct the US to the TS.

US/BOP 1. Determine AC Power Status:

a. Check the Unit - IN MODES 1, 2, 3 OR 4

- YES b. Check 6.9 KV Safeguard Buses

- AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

- YES US/BOP c. Check Unit 6.9 KV Non

-Safeguard Buses

- ALL REMAINED ENERGIZED WITH LOADS CONNECTED TO THE BUS

- YES d. GO TO Step 4 BOP 4. Check Switchyard Bus Status

- ALL ENERGIZED V-E BUS, 345 KV E. BUS VOLT (CB

-12) - BETWEEN 340 KV and 361 KV V-W BUS, 345 KV W. BUS VOLT (CB

-12) - BETWEEN 340 KV and 361 KV V/ST1, INCOMING 138 KV XFMR FDR VOLT (CB

-12) - BETWEEN 135 KV and 144 KV (DE

-ENERGIZED)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 6 Page 24 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of XST1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX BOP 5. Monitor Blackout Sequencer Status:

a. Affected bus

- ENERGIZED - YES b. Verify Blackout Sequencer

- OPERATED OUTPUT-STEP TIME lights

- ALL LIT - NO Automatic lockouts AL light

- LIT - NO US 5. RNO - GO TO Step 6.

BOP 6. Check Transformer XST1 Status:

a. V/ST1, STARTUP XFMR XST1 138 KV FDR VOLT (CB

-12) - BETWEEN 135 KV and 144 KV

- NO US 6. RNO - INITIATE Attachment 2, Restoration of XST1.

Simulator Operator:

When contacted as the Shift Manager or Switchyard Coordinator inform the US that the Shift Manager will coordinate the actions of Attachment 2, and that the US should continue with ABN

-601, Section 2.0 actions.

US 1. Determine the origin for the loss of power by performing the following:

Contact the Switchyard Coordinator to provide assistance in determining the transformer status.

Examiner Note:

ABN-601 Steps 7, 8 & 9 relate to unaffected transformers and may be N/A'd by the SRO or read and verified.

BOP 10. Verify Diesel Generators

- NOT RUNNING BOP 11. Verify 6.9KV Bux XA1

- ENERGIZED Simulator Operator:

If contacted as the Shift Manager to have Unit 2 perform SR 3.8.1.1, state that the Extra RO will perform the SR.

US 12. Refer to the appropriate TS

MODES 1, 2, 3, OR 4

- Section 3.8.1 AC Sources

- Operating Condition A is applicable This is a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> spec to perform SR 3.8.1.1

- Verification of offsite sources 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore power When the plant is stabilized or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 7

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 7 & 8 Page 25 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1

-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 7 (Key 7). - Loss of offsite power Indications Available

Reactor Trip Turbine Trip Multiple Annunciators CREW RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO/BOP RECOGNIZE the Reactor Trip and perform Immediate Actions US Direct entry into EOP

-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection RO 1. VERIFY Reactor Trip:

a. Verify the following: VERIFY Reactor Trip Breakers

- OPEN. VERIFY Neutron flux

- DECREASING.

b. VERIFY all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights

- ON. - NO Examiner Note:

Emergency Boration is required since all DRPI lights are DARK. This is on Attachment 1.A of both EOP

-0.0A and EOS

-0.1A. The steps are listed as if this is going to be performed in EOS

-0.1A since the transition to this procedure will take place very quickly from EOP

-0.0A. Critical Task Start Time on Loss of DRPI: ___________

BOP 2. VERIFY Turbine Trip:

VERIFY all HP Turbine Stop Valves

- CLOSED. Examiner Note:

The EDG 1-01 will fail to start an d cannot be started due to an air start failure Simulator Operator:

If contacted to investigate the failure of the EDG 1-01, wait 2 minutes and report back that the diesel will not start and an air start failure alarm is locked in BOP 3. VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 7 & 8 Page 26 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1

-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

a. VERIFY AC Safeguards Buses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.
b. VERIFY both AC Safeguards Buses

- ENERGIZED.

- NO b. RNO - Restore power to de

-energized AC safeguards bus per ABN-601, RESPONSE TO A 138/345 KV SYSTEM MALFUNCTION or ABN

-602, RESPONSE TO A 6900/480 VOLT SYSTEM MALFUNCTION when time permits.

RO 4. CHECK SI status:

a. CHECK if SI is actuated.

o VERIFY SI indicated on the First Out Annunciator Panel 1

-ALB-6C. o VERIFY SI Actuated blue status light

- ON. - NO RO 4. a. RNO - Check if SI is required:

o Steam Line Pressure less than 610 psig.

- NO o Pressurizer Pressure less than 1820 psig.

- NO o Containment Pressure greater than 3.0 psig.

- NO o IF SI is NOT required, THEN go to EOS

-0.1A, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE, Step 1.

US Transitions to EO S-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response Examiner Note:

RO initiates Emergency Boration for Loss of DRPI per Attachment 1.A of EOP-0.0A or EOS

-0.1A. (Guidance is duplicated in both procedures)

CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT CT-1 Initiate Emergency Boration prior to exiting EOS

-0.1A, Reactor Trip Response within a maximum of 15 minutes following the loss of DRPI. Emergency Boration Initiated Time:_______________

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 7 & 8 Page 27 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of offsite power, failure of 1

-01 EDG to start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX RO 1. Ensure a charging pump is running:

1/u-APCH1, CCP 1

- NO 1/u-APCH2, CCP 2

- YES 1/u-APPD, PDP CT-1 RO 2. Start a boric acid transfer pump:

1/u-APBA1, BA XFER PMP 1

- AUTO (AFTER START)

- NO 1/u-APBA2, BA XFER PMP 2

- AUTO (AFTER START)

- YES CT-1 RO 3. Open 1/u-8104, EMER BORATE VLV Examiner Note:

When the RO opens the emergency borate valve 1/1

-8104 it will auto insert event 9 (60 second delay) for the loss of all AFW. This will give the crew a RED path on Heat Sink.

RO 4. Verify flow on u-FI-183A, EMER BORATE FLO RO 5. Verify flow on u

-FI-121A, CHRG FLOW RO 6. IF EMER BORATE FLOW OR CHRG FLOW can NOT be verified, THEN initiate Emergency Boration Flow per another method of ABN

-107. RO 7. WHEN desired to terminate emergency boration (Reference Attachment 7 of ABN

-107), THEN GO TO Step 8 of ABN

-107. US Transitions to FRH-0.1A, Response to Loss of Heat Sink on Red Path

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 9 Page 28 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX US 1. Check If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required:

a. RCS pressure

- GREATER THAN ANY NON

-FAULTED SG PRESSURE - YES b. RCS temperature

- GREATER THAN 350°F

- YES RO 2. Check CCP Status

- BOTH AVAILABLE

- NO Examiner Note:

There will be no power to the A train PORV block valve but since it was open when it lost power it will still be open when the crew opens the associated PORV RO 2. RNO - Immediately perform the following:

a. STOP ALL RCPs.
b. Verify power to PRZR PORV block valves

- AVAILABLE c. Go to Step 13. OBSERVE CAUTION PRIOR TO STEP 13.

CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT CT-2 Establish an RCS bleed and feed path prior to exiting FRH

-0.1A, Response to a Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

CT-2 RO 13. Actuate SI

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 9 Page 29 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX RO 14. Verify RCS Feed Path:

a. Check CCP SI flow indicator

- CHECK FOR FLOW

b. Check SI pumps

- BOTH RUNNING

- NO RO 14. b. RNO - Perform the following:

1) Manually start pump(s) and align valves as necessary.
2) IF either of the following RCS feed paths exists, THEN go to Step 15. CCPs - BOTH INJECTING

- NO AT LEAST ONE CCP INJECTING AND ONE SI PUMP RUNNING - YES Examiner Note:

Steps 15 - 20 will be performed via Attachment 1D and will not be directed individually by the US.

BOP 15. Check If Diesels Should Be Emergency Started:

a. Check diesel generator(s)

- RUNNING - DG 1-02 Only b. Place D/G EMER STOP/START handswitch(es) in START.

BOP 16. Reset SI. BOP 17. Reset SI Sequencers.

BOP 18. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A And Phase B.

BOP 19. Reset Containment Spray Signal.

Simulator Operator

When requested to RESET Instrument Air Compressor 1

-02 Breaker, wait 2 minutes and EXECUTE remote function EDR74 to CLOSE (Key 11). Provide Field Support report that IAC 1

-02 Breaker is Closed. BOP 20. Establish Instrument Air And Nitrogen To Containment:

a. Establish instrument air:
1) Verify air compressor running.

Establish instrument air to containment.

b. Establish nitrogen:
1) -HC-943 - CLOSED 2) Open SI/PORV ACCUM N2 ISOL VLV, 1/1

-8880.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

2 Event # 9 Page 30 of 33 Event

Description:

Loss of Heat Sink Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX Examiner Note:

There will be no power to the A train PORV block valve but since it was open when it lost power it will still be open when the crew opens the associated PORV CT-2 RO 21. Establish RCS Bleed Path:

a. Verify power to PRZR PORV block valves

- AVAILABLE b. Verify PRZR PORV block valves

- BOTH OPEN c. Open PRZR PORVs.

RO 22. Verify Adequate RCS Bleed Path:

PRZR PORVs

- BOTH OPEN PRZR PORV block valves

- BOTH OPEN After the bleed and feed is initiated, TERMINATE the scenario.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

2016 NRC Scenario 2
Rev. 1 ;Initialize to IC-16 ;Setup MDAFWP 1-02 in Pull

-Out - Breaker Deenergized IRF FWR021 f:0

1-PV-2286 Isolated for Repairs IOR LOFWHS2286_1 f
0 IOR LOFWHS2286_2 f:0 IRF FWR056 f:0
Event 1 - PRZ LVL [LT-459] Fails Low IMF RX05A f
0 k:1
Event 2 - Main Feedwater Header Pressure [PT

-508] Fails High

PT-508 Fails High IMF RX18 f
1500 k:2
Event 3 - Main Turbine 1st Stage Pressure [PT

-505A] Fails Low

PT-505A Fails Low IMF RX09A f
0 k:3
Event 4 - Neutron Detector Well FN 9 Motor Overload

IMF CH03 f:1 k:4

Event 5 - FWP A Recirc Valve Fails Open IMF FW06A f
100 r:10 k:5
Local Isolation of FV

-2289 by FW

-0023 ;Delete Malfunction FW06A IOR LOFWZL2289_1 f:0 k:5 d:120 IOR LOFWZL2289_2 f:1 k:5 d:120 IOR LOANAN7B_32 f:1 k:5 d:120

Event 6 - Loss of XST1 IMF ED02 f
1 k:6
Event 7 - Loss of Offsite Power/DG 1

-01 Air Start Failure

LOOP IMF ED01 f
1 k:7
Reset IAC 1

-02 Breaker IRF EDR74 f:2 k:11

DG 1-01 Air Start Failure IMF EG06A f
1
Event 8 - Emergency Boration for Loss of DRPI
Event 9 - TDAFWP Trip if Running (FRH Entry)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 2 REV. 3_AS RUN 2.DOCX

TDAFWP Trip after emergency borate started

{DICVHS8104.Value=2} IMF FW09A f:1 d:60

GUARDED EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT (GEM) SIGN POSTING LOG REASON FOR POSTING MD AFWP 1-02 INOPERABLE STI-600.01-1 Page 1 of 1 REFERENCE USE Rev. 0 Component to be Posted Nomenclature Posting Installed Initial Posting Checked Initial Posting Removed Initial 1-HS-2450A MD AFWP 1 => CB / 830 / X

-135 JGR RB 1APMD1 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1

-01 MOTOR BREAKER => SG / 810 / 1

-083 JGR RB S1-16 MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 1-01 ROOM => SG / 790 / 1

-072 JGR RB Authorized By Joe UnitSupervisor Date Today Posting Removal Authorized By Date Open Narrative Log Entry Entered Open Narrative Log Entry Closed Comments: This form is not maintained. Verify correct items Guarded per STI

-600.01 prior to use.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Facility: CPNPP 1 & 2 Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

July 2016 NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

100% power MOL

- RCS Boron is 9 24 ppm Turnover: Maintain steady-state power conditions

. Critical Tasks:

CT-1 Manually Trip Reactor due to Failure to Automatically Trip prior to exiting EOP

-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

. CT-2 Identify and Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown per EOP

-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture

. Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description 1 RP05D I (RO, SRO)

TS (SRO) Cold Leg Loop 4 NR Temperature Transmitter Failure (TE-4 41B) Fails High 2 RP03A I (BOP, SRO)

TS (SRO) Steam Generator (1

-01) Steam Line Pressure Instrument (PT-514) Fails Low. 3 Override C (RO, SRO)

Letdown HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure (TK

-130) Fails Low 4 FW22 C (BOP, SRO) TS (SRO) Station Service Water Pump 1

-01 Trip 5 TC08C C (BOP, SRO) High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV

-2430A) Fails Closed 6 SG02C M (RO , BOP, SRO) Steam Generator 1

-03 Tube Rupture 7 RP15E C (BOP, SRO) Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 8 MS08C C (RO, SRO) Steam Generator 1

-03 MSIV Fails to Close

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8 Total malfunctions (5

-8) 2 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1

-2) 5 Abnormal events (2

-4) 1 Major transients (1

-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1

-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0

-2) 2 Critical tasks (2

-3)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX SCENARIO

SUMMARY

NRC 3 Event 1 (Key 1) The crew will assume the watch at 100% power with no scheduled activities per IPO

-003A, Power Operations. The first event is a failure high of a Reactor Coolant System Loop 4 Narrow Range Temperature (TE=441B) element.

Crew actions are per ABN-704, T c/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction

, Section 2.0. Section 2.0 is designated for T c/N-16 Instrumentation Malfunction. Actions include placing the Control Rods in MANUAL and defea ting the failed channel. Control Rods will be restored in Manual to their pre

-failure position and remain in Manual until restored to Operable per ABN

-704. The SRO will refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation (Functions 6 & 7); Condition E, One channel inoperable

. Event 2 (Key 2) The next event is a failure low of Main Steam Line 1 Pressure Instrument (PT-514). Crew actions are per ABN

-70 9 , Steam Line Pressure, Steam Header Pressure, Turbine 1 st-Stage Pressure and Feed Header Pressure Instrument Malfunction

, Section 2.0. Section 2.0 is designated for Steam Line Pressure Malfunction. The crew must manually control Steam Generator level, transfer to an Alternate Steam Flow Channel, and restore Steam Generator (SG) Feedwater Flow Control to AUTO.

The SRO will refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature System (ESFAS) Instrumentation (Functions 1.e & 4.d); Condition D, One channel inoperable

. Event 3 (Key 3) The next event is a failure of the Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Controller, TK

-130. The controller output will fail to zero demand and cause TCV

-4646, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL valve to close. This will result in Letdown Heat Exchanger High temperature alarms and Letdown flow to divert to the VCT on high temperature. The cre w will respond per the ALM, take manual control of TK

-130 and raise demand to establish Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet temperature to approximately 95°F.

Event 4 (Key 4) The next event is a trip of Station Service Water Pump 1

-01. Crew actions are per ABN-501, Station Service Water System Malfunction, Section 2.0

. Section 2.0 is designated for Station Service Water Pump Trip. Various equipment controls, as directed by ABN-501, are placed in PUL L-OUT to prevent starting with no cooling water available. The SRO will refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.7.8, Station Service Water System; Condition B, One SSWS Train inoperable. The SRO will also refer to Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating; Condition B, One DG inoperable as DG 1

-01 must be placed in PULL

-OUT upon the loss of Train A Station Service Water.

Event 5 (Key 5) The next event is High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 fails closed. The crew will enter ABN

-401, Main Turbine Malfunction, Section 9.0. Section 9.0 is designated for Inadvertent Closure of an HP or LP Stop or Control Valve. Actions include placing rod control in Auto to allow the rod control system to respond to the plant transient and reducing turbine load to allow all operable HP Control Valves to come off their full open seat. Event 6 - (Key 6) The major event is a Tube Rupture on SG 1

-03. The Crew will diagnose the Tube Rupture due to multiple Radiation alarms and lowering Pressurizer Pressure and Level. The crew will enter EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and transition to EOP

-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. A maximum rate RCS cooldown to a target CET temperature as determined in EOP

-3.0A will be conducted.

Event 7 - CT-1 (Auto) The Reactor will be manually tripped and Safety Injection manually initiated. The Reactor will fail to trip from both handswitches at CB

-07 and CB-10. The crew will then perform CT

-1, Manually Trip Reactor due to Failure to Automatically Trip prior to exiting EOP

-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

The Reactor must be manually tripped by momentarily de-energizing 480V Normal Switchgear 1B3 and 1B4 to de

-energize the Rod Drive MG Sets. The critical task is considered not met if the crew is not successful in tripping the reactor during EOP

-0.0A and transitions to FRS

-0.1A.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Event 8 (Auto)

CT-2 During performance of CT

-2, Identify and Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown per EOP

-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture

. SG 1-03 MSIV will fail to close. The crew will close all remaining MSIVs, disable the Steam Dumps, and close the Main Steam to Auxiliary Steam Supply Valve. The RCS cooldown will then be conducted via the intact SG ARVs to atmosphere.

Termination Criteria This scenario is terminated when the target CET Temperature is reached during the RCS cooldown in accordance with EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Risk Significance Determination Risk Significance Event Guidance Failure of risk important system prior to Reactor Trip Event 4 - Station Service Water Pump Trip ABN-501; DBD-ME-011 - Initial operator action to place the affected DG Emergency Stop/Start handswitch in PULL

-OUT to remove the DG from service as it will ONLY operate for 1 minute under load

, without service water cooling flow, before damage will occur.

Risk significant operator actions Event 7 - Manually tripping the Reactor by momentarily de

-

energizing 1B3 and 1B4

Event 8 - Closing all intact SG MSIVs upon failure of the ruptured SG MSIV to close FSAR 15.8

- The worst common mode failure which is postulate d

to occur is the failure to trip the reactor after an anticipated transient has occurred.

FSAR 15.6.3.2

- The closing of all intact SG MSIVs falls in line with the conservative analysis of the postulated SGTR which assumes a loss of offsite power. Thus, a release of steam from the secondary system occurs due to the loss of steam dump capability and the subsequent venting to the atmosphere through the ARVs.

Risk significant core damage sequence Events 5 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture (1) STI-214.01 TCA-1.9 - Manual Actions to Mitigate Effects of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture: 1) TDAFWP flow stopped (excessive AFW flow) within 3 minutes of reactor trip. 2) Identify and Isolate ruptured SG within 13 minutes after initiation of SGTR. 3) Initiate maximum rate cooldown within 5 minutes after isolation of ruptured SG. 4) Initiate RCS depressurization with PORVs within 2 minutes after completion of RCS cooldown. 5) Secure ECCS within 2 minutes after completion of RCS depressurization.

(1) Crew manning for Initial License Examination less than Timed Operator Action validation constraints

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Critical Task Determination Critical Task Safety Significance Cueing Measurable Performance Indicators Performance Feedback CT Manually Trip Reactor due to Failure to Automatically Trip prior to exiting EOP-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

FSAR 7.1.2.1 Procedural direction at EOP-0.0A Step 1 to determine if a reactor trip has occurred. Position indication of the Reactor Trip breakers and Reactor Power, Annunciator First out alarms. The operator will attempt to manually trip the Reactor with the handswitches on both CB-07 and CB-10; however, the Reactor will fail to trip. The operator will then momentarily deenergize the 480V normal switchgear 1B3 and 1B4 to secure power to the Rod Drive MG sets.

De-energizing the Rod Drive MG sets will result in a loss of power to the Rod Drive Mechanisms and the Control Rods will insert into the core. Reactor Trip Breakers will remain closed , neutron flux will lower and rod bottom lights will be lit. CT Identify and Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown per EOP

-3.0A , Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. STI-214.01, TCA-1.9; FSAR 15.6.3.1.1; WCAP

-16871-P, Section 6.4; DBD-ME-027 Procedurally driven from EOP-3.0A, to identify and isolate a ruptured SG. Indications include MSL Radiation alarms and SG level.

The operator will attempt close the ruptured SG MSIV from the control room, however, the MSIV will fail to close and all other MSIVs must be closed. The MSIV will be locally closed in the field. The

operator will stop feeding the SG once sufficient level to cover the tubes is available.

SG pressure increasing, AFW flow reduced to zero and valve position indications.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP Initialize to IC

-18 and 2016 NRC Scenario 3. EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND VALUE INITIATING PARAMETER 7 RP 15E Reactor Trip Breakers Jammed Closed

- All FAIL K0 8 MS08C SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close FAIL K0 1 RP05D Loop 4 Cold Leg Temperature (TE

-4 41B) Failure 630°F K1 2 RP03A MSL 1 Steam Pressure (PT

-514) Failure 0 PSIG K2 3 Override Letdown HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure (TK-130) Fails Low f:10 K3 NOTE: See Scenario file on last page for all event overrides.

4 SW01A SSW Pump 1

-01 Trip TRIP K4 4 CVR06 CCP 1-02 Aux Lube Oil Pump to Auto AUTO K11 4 CVR05 CCP 1-01 Aux Lube Oil Pump to Off OFF K12 5 TC08C High Pressure Stop Valve #3 Fails Closed CLOSE K5 6 SG02C SG 1-03 Tube Rupture 1 Tube 1 Tube K 6 7 RP15E Reactor Trip Breakers Jammed Closed

- All FAIL K0 7 RPR112 RPR113 Reactor Trip Breakers Locally Opened OPEN K13 8 MS08C SG 1-03 MSIV Fails to Close OPEN K0 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: INITIALIZE to IC-18 and 2016 NRC Scenario 3. ENSURE all Simulator Annunciator Alarms are ACTIVE.

ENSURE all Control Board Tags are removed.

ENSURE Operator Aid Tags reflect current boron conditions (924 ppm). ENSURE Rod Bank Update (RBU) is performed.

ENSURE Turbine Load Rate set at 10 MWe/minute.

ENSURE 60/90 buttons DEPRESSED on ASD.

ENSURE ASD speakers are ON to half volume.

ENSURE Reactivity Briefing Sheet printout provided with Turnover.

ENSURE procedures in progress are on SRO desk: - COPY of IPO-003A, Power Operations, Section 5.5, Operating at Constant Turbine Load.

ENSURE Control Rods are in AUTO with Bank D at 215 steps.

Control Room Annunciators in Alarm

PCIP-1.1 - SR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.2 - IR TRN A RX TRIP BLK PCIP-1.4 - CNDSR AVAIL STM DMP ARMED C

-9 PCIP-1.6 - RX 10% PWR P-10 PCIP-2.1 - SR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.2 - IR TRN B RX TRIP BLK PCIP-2.5 - SR RX TRIP BLK PERM P

-6 PCIP-3.2 - PR TRN A LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK PCIP-4.2 - PR TRN B LO SETPT RX TRIP BLK

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 1 Page 8 of 38 Event

Description:

NR Cold Leg Loop 4 Temperature Instrument failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 1 (Key 1). - NR Cold Leg Loop 4 TI (TE-4 41B) fails high.

Indications Available

6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV 6D-2.10 - AVE TAVE HI 6D-3.14 - 1 OF 4 OT N16 ROD STOP & TURB RUNBACK 1-TI-4 41A, CL 4 TEMP (NR) CHAN IV indication failed high 1-TI-4 42, RC LOOP 4 TAVE CHAN I V indication failed high RO RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

RO RECOGNIZE Control Rods inserting due to TCOLD failed high and Placed Control Rods in Manual

. US DIRECT performance of ABN

-704, Tc / N

-16 Instrumentation Malfunction, Section 2.0.

Examiner Note

The RO may place 1

-FK-121, Charging Flow Controller, in MANUAL to maintain PZR level on setpoint.

RO PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in MANUAL

. [Step 2.3.1

]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 1 Page 9 of 38 Event

Description:

NR Cold Leg Loop 4 Temperature Instrument failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX RO SELECT LOOP 4 on 1-TS-412T, T AVE Channel Defeat. [Step 2.3.2

] RO/BOP VERIFY Steam Dump System is NOT actuated and NOT armed.

[Step 2.3.3

] Examiner Note

The crew will conduct a Reactivity Brief and execute a Reactivity Plan to restore TAVE to TREF. US/RO RESTORE TAVE to within 1°F of TREF. [Step 2.3.4]

RO/BOP SELECT LOOP 4 on 1/1-JS-411E, N16 Power Channel Defeat.

[Step 2.3.5

] RO/BOP ENSURE a valid N16 channel supplying recorder on 1/1

-TS-411E, 1 TR 41 1 CHAN SELECT. [Step 2.3.6

] RO/BOP VERIFY PCIP, Window 3.4

- TURB LOAD REJ STM DMP ARMED C

-7, not ARMED (DARK). [Step 2.3.7

] US/BOP VERIFY Steam Dumps were NOT blocked. [Step 2.3.8] US EVALUATE Technical Specifications. [Step 2.3.11

] LCO 3.3.1.E, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation (Functions 6 & 7).

CONDITION E

- One channel inoperable.

ACTION E.1

- Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR ACTION E.2

- Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br />.

US INITIATE a work request per STA-606. [Step 2.3.12

] US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA-421. [Step 2.3.13

] When Technical Specifications are addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, proceed to Event 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 2 Page 10 of 38 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 1

-01 Steam Line Pressure Instrument Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 2 (Key 2). - RP03A, SG 1

-01 Steam Pressure Transmitter PT

-514 fails low

. Indications Available

8A-1.7 - MSL 1 OF 3 PRESS LO 8A-1.8 - SG1 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-1.16 - SG 1 1 OF 3 PRESS RATE HI Feedwater flow lowering Feedwater pumps lowering in speed BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

US DIRECT performance of ABN

-709, STM LINE, STM HDR, & TURB 1st STAGE PRESS. & FEED HDR PRESS. INSTR MALFUNCTION, Section 2.0, Steam Line Pressure Instrument Malfunction.

BOP CHECK ONE Main Steamline Pressure Channel indicating

- GREATER THAN 60 psig difference between remaining channels. [Step 2.3.1] DETERMINE 1

-PI-514A indicating approximately 990 psig LOWER than remaining channels. [Step 2.3.1] BOP VERIFY Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves

- CLOSED: [Step 2.3.2] 1-ZL-2325, SG 1 ATMOS RLF VLV 1-ZL-2326, SG 2 ATMOS RLF VLV 1-ZL-2327, SG 3 ATMOS RLF VLV 1-ZL-2328, SG 4 ATMOS RLF VLV AND The following channels are indicating

- NORMAL: [Step 2.3.2] 1-PI-2325, MSL 1 PRESS 1-PI-2326, MSL 2 PRESS 1-PI-2327, MSL 3 PRESS 1-PI-2328, MSL 4 PRESS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 2 Page 11 of 38 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 1

-01 Steam Line Pressure Instrument Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX BOP PLACE 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL in MANUAL AND CONTROL Steam Generator 1

-01 level in normal operating range: [Step 2.3.3] BOP Manually CONTROL 1

-SK-509A, FWPT MASTER SPD CTRL as necessary.

[Step 2.3.4] BOP SELECT Alternate Steam Flow Channel: [Step 2.3.5] Loop, 1-FS-512C, SG 1 STM FLO CHAN SELECT [Step 2.3.5.a] Steam pressure/associated steam flow 1-FY-512B (PT-514/FT-512) OR 1-FY-513B (PT-515/FT-513) BOP VERIFY Steam Generator 1

-01 is stable at program level. [Step 2.3.6] BOP PLACE 1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL in AUTO AND VERIFY SG 1

-01 level - CONTROLLING NORMAL OPERATING RANGE

[Step 2.3.7] US Evaluate Technical Specifications. [Step 2.3.11] LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, Table 3.3.2

-1, Function 1.e, Steam Line Pressure

- Low. LCO 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2

-1, Function 4d (1)

- Steam Line Pressure Low and Negative Rate

- High CONDITION D

- One channel inoperabl e ACTION D.1

- Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, OR ACTION D.2.1

- Be in MODE 3 within 78 hours9.027778e-4 days <br />0.0217 hours <br />1.289683e-4 weeks <br />2.9679e-5 months <br /> AND ACTION D.2.2

- Be in MODE 4, within 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br />

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 2 Page 12 of 38 Event

Description:

Steam Generator 1

-01 Steam Line Pressure Instrument Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX US INITIATE a Condition Report per STA

-421, as applicable.

[Step 2.3.12]

When Technical Specifications have been addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 3 Page 13 of 38 Event

Description:

Letdown HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure (TK

-130) Fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 3 (Key 3).

- Override , LTDN HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure (TK

-130) Fails Low

. Indications Available

6 A-1.3 - LTDN HX OUT TEMP HI 6A-2.3 - LTDN HX NORM OUT FLO DIVERT 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP Rising RO RESPOND to Annunciator Procedure Alarms.

RO RECOGNIZE 1-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL has failed to 0% output and 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP is rising.

Examiner Note

The operator can take manual control of 1

-TK-130 and open TCV

-4646 as an automatic control system has malfunctioned, per ODA-102. RO Performs actions of ALM-0061A, Window 1.3 RO MONITOR 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP. [Step 1]

IF temperature increases to 135°F, ensure 1/1

-TCV-129, LTDN DIVERT VLV is diverted to the VCT. [Step 1.A]

RO MONITOR 1-TI-381, BTRS DEMIN IN TEMP. [Step 2]

The BTRS system is NOT in service. [Step 2.A]

RO VERIFY charging flow is 12 gpm greater than letdown flow. [Step 3]

RO VERIFY 1-TI-127, REGEN HX LTDN OUT TEMP is 350°F. [Step 4]

1-TI-127, REGEN HX LTDN OUT TEMP is NOT > 350°F. [Step 4.A]

BOP VERIFY 1-ZL-4646, LTDN HX CCW RET VLV is OPEN. (1

-CB-03) [Step 5]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 3 Page 14 of 38 Event

Description:

Letdown HX Outlet Flow Controller Failure (TK

-130) Fails Low Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX RO IF 1-ZL-4646 is CLOSED, place 1

-TK-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP CTRL in manual AND adjust letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature to 95

°F. [Step 5.A]

The controller will respond appropriately in MANUAL to control letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature at 95

°F. [Step 5.B]

RO ENSURE 1-TI-130, LTDN HX OUT TEMP is maintained < 125

°F. [Step 6]

Letdown heat exchanger outlet temperature can be maintained < 125

°F with 1-TK-130 in manual. [Step 6.A]

US/RO NOTIFY Chemistry and Radiation protection personnel that Letdown has diverted to the VCT. [Step 7]

US Correct the condition or initiate a work request per STA

-606. [Step 8]

When Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature is appropriately controlled, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 4

.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 4 Page 15 of 38 Event

Description:

Station Service Water Pump 1

-01 Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 4 (Key 4). - SW01A , Station Service Water Pump 1

-01 Trip. Indications Available

01-1.8 - SSWP 1 / 2 OVRLOAD / TRIP 0 1-1.11 - CCP 1 L/O CLR SSW RET FLO LO 0 1-1.12 - SIP 1 L/O CLR SSW RET FLO LO 0 1-3.8 - CSP 1 & 3 BRG CLR SSW RET FLO LO 3B-4.5 - CCW HX 1 / 2 SPLY FLO LO BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures.

BOP RECOGNIZE 1

-HS-4250A, Service Water Pump 1

-01 amber MISMATCH and white TRIP lights illuminated.

US DIRECT performance of ABN

-501, Station Service Water System Malfunction, Section 2.0 Examiner Note

Diamond steps ( are Initial Operator Actions.

BOP PLACE CS-1DG 1E, Train A Diesel Generator Emergency Start/Stop handswitch in PULLOUT. [Step 2.3.1]

BOP VERIFY Train B SSW Pump - RUNNING. [Step 2.3.2]

BOP VERIFY Train B CCW Pump

- RUNNING. [Step 2.3.3]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 4 Page 16 of 38 Event

Description:

Station Service Water Pump 1

-01 Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When asked about status of SSW Pump breaker/motor, wait 2 minutes and REPORT that the SSW Pump 1

-01 50/51 overcurrent relays on Phases B & C are tripped and the motor is hot.

RO/BOP VERIFY equipment on Train A not required for operation:

[Step 2.3.4]

Centrifugal Charging Pump 1

-01 Diesel Generator 1

-01 Component Cooling Water Pump 1

-01 Safety Injection Pump 1

-01 Containment Spray Pumps 1

-01 & 1-03 Determines CCP 1

-01 is running and CCP 1

-02 must be started. [Step 2.3.4 RNO]

Simulator Operator:

When contacted, EXECUTE remote function CVR0 6 (Key 11) to START CCP 1-02 Auxiliary Oil Pump and CVR05 (Key 12) to STOP CCP 1

-01 Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump

. RO START Centrifugal Charging Pump 1

-02. RO/BOP PLACE equipment on Train A in PULL OUT.

[Step 2.3.5]

Centrifugal Charging Pump 1

-01 Station Service Water Pump 1

-01 (may leave as is due to CAUTION)

Safety Injection Pump 1

-01 Containment Spray Pumps 1

-01 & 1-03 BOP VERIFY CCW Pump 1

-01 RUNNING. [Step 2.3.6 and 2.3.6.a]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 4 Page 17 of 38 Event

Description:

Station Service Water Pump 1

-01 Trip Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX BOP VERIFY CCW Heat Exchanger outlet temperature on Train A remains < 122ºF. [Step 2.3.6.b]

US Initiate a Work Request per STA

-606. [Step 2.3.7]

US Refer to EPP

-201. [Step 2.3.8]

US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

[Step 2.3.9]

LCO 3.7.8.B

, Station Service Water System

. CONDITION B

- One SSWS Train inoperable

. ACTION B.1

- Restore SSWS Train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. LCO 3.8.1.B

, AC Sources

- Operating. CONDITION B

- One DG inoperable

. ACTION B.1

- Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for the required offsite circuits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter

. ACTION B.2

- Declare required feature(s) supported by the inoperable DG inoperable when its required redundant feature(s) is inoperable within four hours from discovery of Condition B concurrent within inoperability of redundant required feature(s)

. ACTION B.3

- Determine OPERABLE DG(s) is not inoperable due to common cause failure within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Simulator Operator: If contacted, INFORM the Unit Supervisor that another operator will perform required Tech Spec Surveillance.

US Complete OPT

-215 verification within one hour. [Step 2.3.10]

US Submit a Condition Report per STA

-421. [Step 2.3.11]

When Technical Specifications have been addressed, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Event 5

.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 5 Page 18 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV

-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Event 5 (Key 5). - TC08C , High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV

-2430A) Fails Closed.

Indications Available

6D-1.10 - AVE TAVE TREF DEV 8A-3.6 - SG3 LVL LO 8A-3.8 - SG3 STM & FW FLO MISMATCH 8A-3.12 - SG3 LVL DEV Main Generator Load Decreasing on Turbine Digital Display Steam Dumps operating to control RCS Temperature Various Heater Drain Alarms BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures BOP RECOGNIZE High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 has Failed Closed RO Immediately PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in AUTO to allow the Rod Control System to Automatically respond to the plant transient.

Examiner Note

If Control Rods are not placed in Auto expeditiously, 1

-PV-2286, LP HTR BYPASS VLV may open. If 1-PV-2286 opens, the crew may address the actions of ABN

-302, Section 7.0 prior to addressing ABN

-401, Section 9.0. The ABN-302 response is included following the ABN

-401 response and begins on page 21.

US DIRECT performance of ABN

-401, Main Turbine Malfunction, Section 9.0 BOP VERIFY operable HP Control Valves are 98% open. [Step 9.3.1]

RO/BOP PERFORM the following:

ENSURE 1/1

-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT in AUTO. [Step 9.3.1 RNO a]

Reduce Turbine power to 50 MW less than current load target at a rate of 100 MW per minute. [Step 9.3.1 RNO b]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 5 Page 19 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV

-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX BOP SET Turbine Load Rate Setpoint Controller to 100 MWe/min. OPEN "Load Rate Setpoint" OSD.

SELECT blue bar and ENTER 100 MWe/min. CLOSE "Load Rate Setpoint" OSD.

BOP SET Turbine Load Target to 50 MWe less than current load value

. OPEN "Load Target" OSD.

SELECT blue bar and ENTER appropriate MWe. DEPRESS "Accept" then VERIFY value in blue bar is desired "Load Target" (magnitude and direction).

DEPRESS "Execute" then VERIFY "Load Target" changes to desired load. CLOSE "Load Target" OSD.

BOP VERIFY Steam Generator levels at or trending to program. [Step 9.3.2]

RO VERIFY PR Delta Flux

- (AFD) WITHIN LIMITS:

[Step 9.3.3]

1-NI-41C, PR DELTA FLUX CHAN I 1-NI-42C, PR DELTA FLUX CHAN II 1-NI-43C, PR DELTA FLUX CHAN III 1-NI-44C, PR DELTA FLUX CHAN IV RO VERIFY the Steam Dumps AND Rod Control System

- RESPONDING TO MAINTAIN Tave to Tref. [Step 9.3.4]

1-TI-412A, AVE Tave

-Tref DEV RO VERIFY Pressurizer Level

- TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL. [Step 9.3.5]

1-LR-459, PRZR LVL/PRZR LVL STPT

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 5 Page 20 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV

-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX RO VERIFY Pressurizer Pressure

- TRENDING TO PROGRAM PRESSURE. [Step 9.3.6]

1PR-455, PRESS BOP CHECK Steam Generator Feedwater Level AND Flow Control Valve status: [Step 9.3.7]

Steam Generator Levels

- AT 67% [Step 9.3.7.a]

1-LI-551/519, SG 1 LVL (NR) 1-LI-552/529, SG 2 LVL (NR) 1-LI-553/539, SG 3 LVL (NR) 1-LI-554/549, SG 4 LVL (NR)

BOP ALL Steam Generator Feedwater Flow Valves

- IN AUTO

[Step 9.3.7.b]

1-FK-510, SG 1 FW FLO CTRL 1-FK-520, SG 2 FW FLO CTRL 1-FK-530, SG 3 FW FLO CTRL 1-FK-540, SG 4 FW FLO CTRL BOP RESET Steam Dump Valves [Step 9.3.8]

VERIFY ALL Steam Dumps

- CLOSED [Step 9.3.8.a]

VERIFY 1-UI-500, STM DMP DEMAND

- 0% [Step 9.3.8.b]

PLACE 43/1

-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT to RESET AND then TAVE position [Step 9.3.8.c]

BOP VERIFY Turbine Load

- STABLE [Step 9.3.9]

GEN MEGAWATTS GEN MEGAVARS BOP VERIFY ALL operable HP Turbine Control Valves

- INDICATE LESS THAN 100% OPEN:

[Step 9.3.10]

TG Control Display OR 1-ZI-2429B, HPT CTRL VLV 1 POSN 1-ZI-2431B, HPT CTRL VLV 2 POSN 1-ZI-2430B, HPT CTRL VLV 3 POSN 1-ZI-2428B, HPT CTRL VLV 4 POSN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 5 Page 21 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV

-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Examiner Note

Control Rods may insert below the LO

-LO Limit on this transient, if this occurs the Unit Supervisor should refer to TS 3.1.6, Control Bank Insertion Limits. US REFER to TS/TR listed in Section 10.1 [Step 9.3.11]

BOP RESET Turbine Runback per Section 8.0, if necessary (NOT required) [Step 9.3.12]

BOP RESPOND to Annunciator Alarm Procedures

. RO/BOP OBSERVE rising Reactor Power and lowering Main Feedwater temperatures

. US DIRECT performance of ABN

-302, Feedwater, Condensate, Heater Drain System Malfunction, Section 7.0.

Examiner Note

Diamond step s ( are Initial Operator Action
s. US ENSURE Turbine Power

- LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 900 MWe.

[Step 7.3.1

- YES] RO PLACE 1/1-RBSS, CONTROL ROD BANK SELECT Switch in AUTO. BOP MANUALLY RUNBACK Turbine Power to 900 MWe.

DEPRESS "900 MWe" Manual Runback button.

CLICK on "0/1" button.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 5 Page 22 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV

-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX CLICK on "EXECUTE" then VERIFY Runback in progress.

Simulator Operator: 3 minutes after being dispatched, REPORT no indication of piping or hanger damage

. US Locally INSPECT Heater Drain System for signs of water hammer induced damage. [Step 7.3.2

- YES] BOP ENSURE Feedwater Pump suction pressure > 250 PSIG. [Step 7.3.3

- YES] 1-PI-2295, FWP A SUCT PRESS 1-PI-2297, FWP B SUCT PRESS US/BOP RESET Turbine Runback per ABN-401. [Step 7.3.4

- YES] Examiner Note

The following steps are from ABN

-401, Main Turbine Malfunction, Section 8.0, Turbine Reloading after Runback

. VERIFY alarm 6D

-1.9, ANY TURB RUNBACK EFFECTIVE

- DARK. [Step 8.3.1

- YES] In the Load Control Section, ENSURE Load Rate Setpoint Controller is

SET to support reload or current plant conditions

. [Step 8.3.2

- YES] In the Load Control Section, ENSURE Load Target Setpoint Controller is set for actual MWe. [Step 8.3.3

- YES] If Manual Runback was used, TURN OFF the appropriate Subloop Controller on the TG Control Display in the MANUAL RUNBACKS Section. [Step 8.3.4

- YES] VERIFY Runback is RESET. [Step 8.3.5

- YES] VERIFY Runback

- GREATER THAN 15% WITHIN ONE HOUR and CONTACT Chemistry

. [Step 8.3.6

- YES] CONTROL Turbine Load as required per IPO

-003A. [Step 8.3.7

- YES] Examiner Note

Combination of events prior to / during this scenario will result in exceeding the Rod Insertion Limits (RIL). The RO should inform the SRO when ALB

-6D, Window 2.7

- ANY CONTROL ROD BANK AT LO

-LO LIMIT is LIT. Technical Specifications must be referenced.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 5 Page 23 of 38 Event

Description:

High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve #3 (UV

-2430A) Fails Closed Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX US EVALUATE Technical Specifications.

LCO 3.1.6.A , Control Bank Insertion Limits

. CONDITION A

- Control bank insertion limits not met

. ACTION A.1.1 - Verify SDM to be within the limits provided in the COLR within one (1) hour , OR ACTION A.1.2 - initiate Boration to restore SDM to within limit within one (1) hour, AND ACTION A.2

- Restore control bank(s) to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

BOP When Steam Dumps have closed

- RESET C-7. [Step 7.3.5

- YES] Momentarily PLACE 43/1

-SD, STM DMP MODE SELECT in RESET. VERIFY PCIP, Window 3.4

- TURB LOAD REJ STM DMP ARMED C

-7 is DARK. Examiner Note: Closing 1-PV-2286 is a significant plant reactivity event and requires a detailed reactivity brief. The crew will not be expected to perform additional actions in this section prior to proceeding with the next event

. When the plant has been stabilized, or at Lead Examiner discretion, PROCEED to Events 6, 7 and 8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 24 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1

-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Simulator Operator: When directed, EXECUTE Events 6, 7 and 8 (Key 6). - SG02C, SG 1-03 Tube Rupture

- RP15E, RX Trip Breakers Jammed Closed

- ALL - MS08C, SG 1

-03 MSIV Fails to Close Indications Available

6A-3.4 - CHRG FLO HI / LO 5 C-1.2 - PRZR LV L DEV LO 5C-3.3 - PRZR PRESS LO BACKUP HTRS ON PC MSL-180 (1-RE-2327) is RED Main Steam Line Radiation level rising Pressurizer pressure lowering RO/BOP RECOGNIZE lowering RCS temperature and pressure.

RO/BOP DETERMINE Reactor Trip/Safety Injection initiation required. Attempt to manually trip the reactor and manually initiate Safety Injection

. US DIRECT performance of EOP

-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT CT-1 Manually Trip Reactor due to Failure to Automatically Trip prior to exiting EOP

-0.0A, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO VERIFY Reactor Trip: [Step 1]

VERIFY Reactor Trip Breakers

- OPEN. [Step 1.a]

VERIFY Neutron flux

- DECREASING. [Step 1.a]

RO/BOP Manually trip reactor from both trip switches [Step 1.a RNO]

BOP IF reactor will not trip, THEN momentarily de-energize 480 V normal switchgear 1B3 and 1B4. [Step 1.a RNO]

CT-1 BOP Momentarily places BOTH CS-1B3-1, INCOMING BKR 1B3

-1 AND CS-1B4-1, INCOMING BKR 1B4

-1 to TRIP and then back to CLOSE

. RO VERIFY all Control Rod Position Rod Bottom Lights

- ON. [Step 1.b]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 25 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1

-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX BOP VERIFY Turbine Trip: [Step 2]

VERIFY all HP Turbine Stop Valves

- CLOSED. [Step 2]

BOP VERIFY Power to AC Safeguards Buses: [Step 3]

VERIFY AC Safeguards Buses

- AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED.

[Step 3.a]

VERIFY both AC Safeguards Buses

- ENERGIZED. [Step 3.b]

RO CHECK SI status: [Step 4]

RO CHECK if SI is actuated. [Step 4.a]

RO Manually INITIATE Train A and Train B Safety Injection Signal

. RO PLACE 1/1-SIA2, SI MAN ACT Switch to ACT position at CB

-07 and DETERMINE SI has actuated on both Trains. [Step 4.a] RO VERIFY Both Trains SI Actuated: [Step 4.b

] SI Actuated blue status light

- ON NOT FLASHING.

Simulator Operator: If contacted to open the Reactor Trip Breakers, wait 2 minutes and Execute Key 13. Examiner Note

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps performed by BOP begin on Page 3 2 of the scenario guide.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 26 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1

-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX US/BOP INITIATE Proper Safeguards Equipment Operation Per Attachment 2.

[Step 5] Examiner Note

The crew should stop AFW flow to SG 1

-03 promptly after it has been identified as ruptured AND level is greater than 43%

per EOP-0.0A, Attachment 1.A, Foldout for EOP

-0.0A Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

RO VERIFY AFW Alignment: [Step

  • 6] VERIFY both MDAFW Pumps

- RUNNING. [Step 6.a]

PLACE TDAFW Pump in PULLOUT per Foldout Page. [Step 6.b]

VERIFY AFW total flow

- GREATER THAN 460 GPM. [Step 6.c]

VERIFY AFW valve alignment

- PROPER ALIGNMENT. [Step 6.d]

RO VERIFY Containment Spray NOT Required: [Step *7] VERIFY 1-ALB-2B, Window 1

-8, CS ACT

- NOT ILLUMINATED.

[Step 7.a]

VERIFY 1-ALB-2B, Window 4

-11, CNTMT ISOL PHASE B ACT

- NOT ILLUMINATED. [Step 7.a]

VERIFY Containment pressure

- LESS THAN 18.0 PSIG. [Step 7.a] VERIFY Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves - CLOSED. [Step 7.b]

VERIFY Containment Spray Pumps 2 & 4 - RUNNING. [Step 7.c] RO CHECK if Main Steam lines should be ISOLATED: [Step *8] VERIFY Containment pressure

- GREATER THAN 6.0 PSIG. [Step 8.a]

VERIFY Steam Line pressure

- LESS THAN 610 PSIG. [Step 8.a] Go to Step 9. [Step 8.a RNO a]

RO CHECK RCS Temperature: [Step *9] VERIFY RCS Average Temperature

- STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 557°F. [Step 9]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 27 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1

-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX RO CHECK PRZR Valve Status: [Step 10] VERIFY PRZR Safeties

- CLOSED. [Step 10.a]

VERIFY Normal PRZR Spray Valves

- CLOSED. [Step 10.b]

VERIFY PORVs

- CLOSED. [Step 10.c] VERIFY Power to at least 1 Block Valve

- AVAILABLE. [Step 10.d]

VERIFY Block Valves

- AT LEAST ONE OPEN. [Step 10.e]

RO CHECK if RCPs Should Be Stopped: [Step 11] VERIFY RCS subcooling

- LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT). [Step 11.a]

GO to Step 12. [Step 11.a RNO a] US/RO CHECK if any SG is Faulted: [Step 12] VERIFY any Steam Generator pressure

- DECREASING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER. [Step 12.a]

VERIFY Steam Generator 1

-01 pressure - COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED. [Step 12.a

] Go to Step 13. [Step 12.a RNO a]

US/RO CHECK if SG Tubes Are Not Ruptured:

[Step 13] Condenser off gas radiation

- NORMAL (COG

-182, 1RE-2959) Main steamline radiation

- NORMAL (MSL-178 through 181, 1RE

-2325 through 2328)

SG blowdown sample radiation monitor

- NORMAL (SGS

-164, 1RE-4200) No Steam Generator level increasing in an uncontrolled manner Go to EOP-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Step 1 based on indications that SG 1

-03 is ruptured. [Step 13 RNO]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 28 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1

-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX US Transitions to EOS

-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture US/RO CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

[Step *1] VERIFY RCS subcooling

- LESS THAN 25°F (55°F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT)

. [Step 1.a]

GO to Step 2. [Step 1.a RNO]

. US/BOP IDENTIFY Steam Generator 1

-0 3 as ruptured. [Step *2] OBSERVE high radiation from Steam Generator 1

-0 3 Main Steam Line.

OBSERVE SG 1

-03 level rising out of control.

CRITICAL TASK STATEMENT CT-2 Identify and Isolate the Ruptured Steam Generator Prior to Commencing an Operator Induced Cooldown per EOP

-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

CT-2 RO/BOP ISOLATE flow from Ruptured Steam Generator 1

-03: [Step 3]

CT-2 ADJUST SG 1

-03 Atmospheric Controller Setpoint to 1160 PSIG. [Step 3.a]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 29 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1

-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX CHECK SG 1

-03 Atmospheric Relief Valve

- CLOSED. [Step 3.b]

CLOSE SG 1

-03 Main Steam Line Isolation Valve. [Step 3.c]

CLOSE SG 1

-0 3 Drip Pot Isolation Valves. [Step 3.c]

CT-2 RECOGNIZES SG 1

-03 MSIV will NOT close and CLOSES all remaining SG MSIVs. [Step 3.c RNO c.1)]

CT-2 PLACES STM DMP INTLK SELECT switches 43/1

-SDA and 43/1-SDB in OFF to close the Steam Dump Valves. [Step 3.c RNO c.2)]

CT-2 CLOSES 1-HS-3228, MS TO AUX STM SPLY VLV. [Step 3.c RNO c.3)]

DISPATCHES operators to LOCALLY close SG 1

-03 MSIV. [Step 3.c RNO c.4)]

Examiner Note

The intact SG ARVs (SGs 1, 2 and 4) should be set to control at 1092 psig, the steam pressure corresponding to the No load RCS average temperature of 557°F. Simulator Operator: When contacted to Close MSIV 1

-03, wait 2 minutes and then DELETE Malfunction MS08C.

USE SGs 1, 2 and 4 ARVs during subsequent RCS cooldown. [Step 3.c RNO c.6)]

PULL-OUT steam supply valve handswitch from ruptured SG(s) to TDAFWP. (NOT Applicable) [Step 3.d]

VERIFY blowdown isolation valves from SG 1 CLOSED [Step 3.e]

US/RO CHECK SG 1

-03 Level: [Step *4]

Narrow range level

- GREATER THAN 43% (50% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) [Step 4.a]

Stop AFW flow to SG 1-03. [Step 4.b]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 30 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1

-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX BOP/RO CHECK SG 1

-03 Pressure

- GREATER THAN 420 PSIG [Step 5]

Examiner Note

When ruptured Steam Generator pressure is between two values provided on the Table at Step 6.c, the correlating Core Exit Temperature for the lower pressure value is used

. SG Pressure ___________.

BOP/RO INITIATE RCS Cooldown: [Step *6]

CHECK PRZR pressure

- LESS THAN 1960 PSIG [Step 6.a]

BLOCK low steamline pressure SI signal [Step 6.b]

DETERMINE required core exit temperature from Table 1. [Step 6.c]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 31 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1

-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Examiner Note

Required CET Temp _____________.

BOP/RO RECOGNIZES that condenser is unavailable due to shutting all intact SG MSIVs. [Step 6.d]

DUMP steam at maximum rate from SGs 1, 2 and 4 using ARVs. [Step 6.d RNO d]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 32 of 38 Event

Description:

SG 1-03 Tube Rupture / Automatic Reactor Trip Failure, Manual Trip from 1B3 and 1B4 / SG 1

-03 MSIV Fails to Close Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Make plant announcement and notify Plant Staff of steam release. [Step 6.d RNO d.1)]

PERFORM the following as necessary to release steam: [Step 6.d RNO d.2)]

PLACE SGs 1, 2 and 4 ARVs in manual and fully open valves.

PLACE all PRZR heater switches to OFF position. [Step 6.e]

Core exit TCs

- LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE [Step 6.f]

STOP RCS cooldown. [Step 6.g]

MAINTAIN core exit TCs

- LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE [Step 6.h]

When the target CET Temperature is reached during the RCS cooldown in accordance with EOP

-3.0A, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, TERMINATE the Scenario

.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # Att. 2 Page 33 of 38 Event

Description:

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Examiner Note

These steps are performed by the BOP per EOP

-0.0A, Attachment 2.

BOP VERIFY SSW Alignment: [Step 1]

VERIFY SSW Pump 1 RUNNING. [Step 1.a]

VERIFY EDG 1-02 Cooler SSW return flow. [Step 1.b]

BOP VERIFY Safety Injection Pump 1 RUNNING. [Step 2]

BOP VERIFY Containment Isolation Phase A

- APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION (RED WINDOWS). [Step 3] BOP VERIFY Containment Ventilation Isolation

- APPROPRIATE MLB LIGHT INDICATION (GREEN WINDOWS). [Step 4] BOP VERIFY CCW Pump s - RUNNING. [Step 5]

BOP VERIFY RHR Pumps

- RUNNING. [Step 6]

BOP VERIFY Proper CVCS Alignment: [Step 7]

VERIFY CCP 1 RUNNING. [Step 7.a]

VERIFY Letdown Relief Valve Isolation: [Step 7.b]

Letdown Orifice Isolation Valves

- CLOSED. [Step 7.b.1)]

Letdown Isolation Valves 1/1

-LCV-459 & 1/1-LCV-460 - CLOSED. [Step 7.b.2)]

BOP VERIFY ECCS flow: [Step 8]

CCP SI flow indicator

- CHECK FOR FLOW. [Step 8.a

]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # Att. 2 Page 34 of 38 Event

Description:

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX RCS pressure

- LESS THAN 1700 PSIG (1800 PSIG FOR ADVER SE CONTAINMENT). [Step 8.b] GO to Step 9. [Step 8.

b RNO b] BOP VERIFY Feedwater Isolation Complete: [Step 9]

Feedwater Isolation Valves

- CLOSED. Feedwater Isolation Bypass Valves

- CLOSED. Feedwater Bypass Control Valves

- CLOSED. Feedwater Control Valves

- CLOSED. BOP VERIFY Diesel Generator 1 RUNNING. [Step 10]

BOP VERIFY Monitor Lights for SI Load Shedding on 1

-MLB-9 and 1-MLB LIT. [Step 11]

BOP VERIFY Proper SI alignment

- PROPER MLB LIGHT INDICATION. [Step 12]

BOP VERIFY Components on Table 1 are Properly Aligned. [Step 1 3]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # Att. 2 Page 35 of 38 Event

Description:

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Location Equipment Description Condition CB-03 X-HS-5534 H2 PRG SPLY FN 4 STOPPED CB-03 X-HS-5532 H2 PRG SPLY FN 3 STOPPED CB-04 1/1-8716A RHRP 1 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-04 1/1-8716B RHRP 2 XTIE VLV OPEN CB-06 1/1-8153 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-06 1/1-8154 XS LTDN ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-07 1/1-RTBAL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-RTBBL RX TRIP BKR OPEN CB-07 1/1-BBAL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-07 1/1-BBBL RX TRIP BYP BKR OPEN/DEENERGIZED CB-08 1-HS-2397A SG 1 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2398A SG 2 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2399A SG 3 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2400A SG 4 BLDN HELB ISOL VLV CLOSED CB-08 1-HS-2111C FWPT A TRIP TRIPPED CB-08 1-HS-2112C FWPT B TRIP TRIPPED CB-09 1-HS-2490 CNDS XFER PUMP STOPPED (MCC deenergized on SI) CV-01 X-HS-6181 PRI PLT SPLY FN 17 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6188 PRI PLT SPLY FN 18 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6195 PRI PLT SPLY FN 19 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6202 PRI PLT SPLY FN 20 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6209 PRI PLT SPLY FN 21 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6216 PRI PLT SPLY FN 22 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6223 PRI PLT SPLY FN 23 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-6230 PRI PLT SPLY FN 24 & INTK DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 X-HS-3631 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 1 & BSTR FN 42 STARTED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # Att. 2 Page 36 of 38 Event

Description:

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX CV-01 X-HS-3632 UPS & DISTR RM A/C FN 2 & BSTR FN 43 STARTED CV-01 1-HS-5600 ELEC AREA EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5601 ELEC AREA EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5602 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH FN 3 & EXH DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5603 MS & FW PIPE AREA EXH FN 4 & EXH DMPR STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5618 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY FN 17 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-01 1-HS-5620 MS & FW PIPE AREA SPLY FN 18 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5855 CR EXH FN 1 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5856 CR EXH FN 2 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5731 SFP EXH FN 33 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5733 SFP EXH FN 34 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5727 SFP EXH FN 35 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED CV-03 X-HS-5729 SFP EXH FN 36 STOPPED/DEENERGIZED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Operating Test :

NRC Scenario #

3 Event # Att. 2 Page 37 of 38 Event

Description:

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX Examiner Note

The next four (4) steps would be performed on Unit 2.

CB-03 2-HS-5538 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5539 AIR PRG EXH ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5537 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED CB-03 2-HS-5536 AIR PRG SPLY ISOL DMPR CLOSED BOP NOTIFY Unit Supervisor attachment instructions complete AND to IMPLEMENT FRGs as required.

EOP-0.0A, Attachment 2 steps are now complete.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 CPNPP 2016 NRC SIMULATOR SCENARIO 3 REV. 2.DOCX

2016 NRC Scenario 3
Rev. 1 ;Event 1 - Loop 4 Tcold Fails High
TE-441B Failure High IMF RP05D f
630 k:1
Event 2 - Main Steam Line 1 Steam Pressure Fails Low
PT-514 Failure Low IMF RP03A f
0 k:2
Event 3 TK-130 Fails to 0% Demand - Manual reopens valve

IOR AICVTK130 f:10 k:3

{AOCVTK130.Value=0}IMF CV05 f:0

{AOCVTK130.Value=0}IOR LOCVTK130_1 f:1

{AOCVTK130.Value=0}IOR LOCVTK130_2 f:0

{AOCVTK130.Value=0}IOR DICVTK130_2 f:1

{AOCVTK130.Value=0}IOR DICVTK130_4 f:1

{DICVTK130_2.Value=1}DMF CV05

{DICVTK130_2.Value=1}DOR LOCVTK130_1

{DICVTK130_2.Value=1}DOR LOCVTK130_2

{DICVTK130_2.Value=1}DOR DICVTK130_

2 {DICVTK130_2.Value=1}DOR DICVTK130_4

{DICVTK130_1.Value=1}IMF CV05 f:0

Event 4 - Station Service Water Pump 1

-01 Trip ;SSWP 1-01 Trips IMF SW01A f:1 k:4

Event 5 - High Pressure Stop Valve Fails Closed
HP Stop Valve 3 Failure IMF TC08C f
1 k:5
Event 6 - SGTR #3
SGTR 1 Tube IMF SG02C f
1 k:6
Event 7 - ALL Automatic & Manual Rx Trip Failures
Rx Trip Breakers Jammed Close

- All IMF RP15E f:1

Event 8 - SG #3 MSIV Fails to Close in Manual
1-HV-2335A Fails to Manually Close IMF MS08C f
1
KEY 11 CCP 1

-02 Aux Lube Oil Pump to Auto

IRF CVR06 f:1 k:11

KEY 12 CCP 1

-01 Aux Lube Oil Pump to Off

IRF CVR05 f:0 k:12

KEY 13 Rx Trip Breakers Open IRF RPR112 f
2 k:13 IRF RPR113 f:2 k:13

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 CPNPP 2016 NRC ES

-301-5 TRANSIENT AND EVENT CHECKLIST REV. 2.DOCX Facility: CPNPP 1 and 2 Date of Exam:

07/11/1 6 Operating Test No.:

Ju ly NRC A P P L I C A N T E V E N T T Y P E SCENARIOS CPNPP #1 CPNPP #2 CPNPP #3 T O T A L MINIMUM(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P R I U SRO-U1 RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 I/C 1,2,3,4,5 2,4,5, 7 9 4 4 2 MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS 1,3,6 - 3 0 2 2 SRO-U2 RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 I/C 1,3 1,2,3, 4, 5, 7, 8 9 4 4 2 MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS - 1,2,4 3 0 2 2 SRO-U 3 RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 I/C 1,2,3,4,5 1,2,3,4,5,7, 8 12 4 4 2 MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS 1,3, 6 1,2,4 6 0 2 2 ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 CPNPP 2016 NRC ES

-301-5 TRANSIENT AND EVENT CHECKLIST REV. 2.DOCX Facility: CPNPP 1 and 2 Date of Exam:

07/11/16 Operating Test No.:

Ju ly NRC A P P L I C A N T E V E N T T Y P E SCENARIOS CPNPP #1 CPNPP #2 CPNPP #3 T O T A L MINIMUM(*)

CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P S R O A T C B O P R I U RO 1 RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 I/C 2,3,4, 5 1,3,8 7 4 4 2 MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS - - 0 0 2 2 RO2 RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 I/C 2,3,4, 5 1,3,8 7 4 4 2 MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS - - 0 0 2 2 RO3 RX - - 0 1 1 0 NOR - - 0 1 1 1 I/C 1,3 2,4,5, 7 6 4 4 2 MAJ 7,9 6 3 2 2 1 TS - - 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position. 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D.

(*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1

-for-1 basis. 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right

-hand columns.

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 CPNPP 2016 NRC ES

-301-6 Competencies Checklist Rev.2.docx Facility: CPNPP Date of Examination:

07/11/16 Operating Test No. Ju ly NRC Applicants SRO-U 1 SRO-U 2 SRO-U3 Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Interpret/Diag

-nose Events and Conditions

- 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 2,4,5,6,7 - 1,3,7,8,9 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 Comply With and Use Procedures (1)

- 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 2,4,5,6,7 - 1,3,7,8,9 1,2,3, 4,5,6,7,8 - 1,2,3, 4,5,6,7,8,9 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 Operate Control Boards (2) - - 2,4,5,6,7 - 1,3,7,8,9 N/A - N/A N/A Communicate and Interact - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 2,4,5,6,7 - 1,3,7,8,9 1,2,3, 4,5,6,7,8 - 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

- 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 N/A - N/A 1,2,3, 4,5,6,7,8 - 1,2,3, 4,5,6,7,8,9 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8 Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

- 1,3,6 N/A - N/A 1,2,4 - 1,3,6 1,2,4 Notes: (1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO

-U. (3) Only applicable to SROs.

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 CPNPP 2016 NRC ES

-301-6 Competencies Checklist Rev.2.docx Facility: CPNPP Date of Examination:

07/11/16 Operating Test No. July NRC Applicants RO1 RO 2 RO 3 Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Interpret/Diag

-nose Events and Conditions

- 2,4,5,6,7,9 1,3,5,6,7,8 - 2,4,5,6,7,9 1,3,5,6,7,8 - 1,3,7,8,9 2,4,5,6,7 Comply With and Use Procedures (1)

- 2,3,4,5,6,7, 9 1,3,4, 5,6,7, 8 - 2,3,4, 5,6,7, 9 1,3,4, 5,6,7, 8 - 1,3,7,8,9 2,4,5,6,7 Operate Control Boards (2) - 2,3,4,5,7,9 1,3,4,5,6,7, 8 - 2,3,4,5,7,9 1,3,4,5,6,7, 8 - 1,3,7,8,9 2,4,5,6,7 Communicate and Interact - 2,3,4,5,6,7, 9 1,3,4, 5,6,7, 8 - 2,3,4, 5,6,7, 9 1,3,4,5,6,7, 8 - 1,3,7,8,9 2,4,5,6,7 Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3)

- N/A N/A - N/A N/A - N/A N/A Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

- N/A N/A - N/A N/A - N/A N/A Notes: (1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO

-U. (3) Only applicable to SROs.