ML13226A266
| ML13226A266 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/2013 |
| From: | Boska J P Division of Operating Reactor Licensing |
| To: | Pascarelli R J Division of Operating Reactor Licensing |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2013-0264 | |
| Download: ML13226A266 (34) | |
Text
Boska, John From: Boska, John Sent: Friday, May 03, 2013 11:26 AM To: Hicks, Susan Cc: Pascarelli, Robert
Subject:
FW: change in public availability of slide package Attachments:
2013-03-25 Revised Duke slides (non-public).pdf Importance:
High Susie, the email string below discusses a set of slides used by the licensee at a public meeting, and the licensee later informed us that one of the slides had sensitive information.
Those slides are in ADAMS at ML1 3084A022.
You had changed this document profile to non-public.
The licensee has now provided us the same set of slides, but with the "Withhold from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390" added to the bottom of all the slides. Please replace ML1 3084A022 with the attached pdf file. The licensee has also provided a set of public slides, which I added to ADAMS as ML13123A204.
Thanks.John Boska Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 301-415-2901 email: john.boska@nrc.gov From: ADAMS IM Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 10:14 AM To: Boska, John; Pascarelli, Robert Cc: Monninger, John; CSIRT; McCarthy, James
Subject:
RE: change In public availability of slide package John, Thank you for the information
-document ML1 3084A022 has now been set for "Sensitive-Security
-Related-Periodic review required/MD Code A.3.Thanks Susie Hicks On Behalf of ADAMS IM[(b)(6) ] l can be reached at (b)(6)From: Boska, John Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 9:50 AM To: ADAMS IM; Pascarelli, Robert Cc: Monninger, John; CS_IRT; McCarthy, James
Subject:
RE: change in public availability of slide package Importance:
High Susie, I have talked to Bob Pascarelli about the document sensitivity.
Please label the sensitivity as Sensitive, and MD 3.4 Non-Public A.3 (sensitive-security-related-periodic review required).
Thanks.C__
John Boska Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 301-415-2901 email: iohn.boskanrc..qov From: ADAMS IM Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 8:51 AM To: Pascarelll, Robert Cc: Boska, John; Monninger, John; CSIRT; McCarthy, James
Subject:
RE: change in public availability of slide package Importance:
High Robert/James, ADAMS IM has changed the availability for ML13084A022 to Non-Public, which will automatically remove this file from Public Access once the synch occurs.For now this file is Non-Public/Non-Sensitive with "Non-Public Pending Review" added to the keyword file.Per our previous email request -please provide the proper document sensitivity selected from the attached MD Code Chart.Thanks Susie Hicks On Behalf of ADAMS IM (b)(6)(b)(6)( I can be reached at From: McCarthy, James Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 2:06 PM To: ADAMS IM; Pascarelli, Robert Cc: Boska, John; Monninger, John; CSIRT
Subject:
RE: change in public availability of slide package ADAMS IM, Thank you for the notification.
CSIRT will perform all necessary information spill reporting.
Jim McCarthy LIS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Computer Security Office Office: .01-415587 Mobile:i(b)(6), From: ADAMS IM Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 2:03 PM To: Pascarelli, Robert 2 Cc: Boska, John; Monninger, John; CSIRT
Subject:
RE: change In public availability of slide package Hello Robert, Below are guidelines to change Released Public files to Non-Public.
Also, please provide us with the proper document sensitivity which you can select from the attached ND Code Chart, so we can render this file ML13084A022 Non-Public?
Before we can process your request to withdraw a document(s) from the ADAMS Public Library (WBA), we need written authorization and justification (an e-mail message is fine) from a Division Director or above in the originating or responsible organization.
This requirement is documented in an August 28, 2002, memo from Stuart Reiter, Chief Information Officer, to all NRC Office Directors and Regional Administrators.
See ML022340277.
Please have the appropriate Division Director or above send the authorization and justification to the e-mail address ADAMS IM. If you have been given the authority required by ML022340277, have those manager(s) provide us with the delegation.
If the document(s) to be removed from WBA contains classified, safeguards, or privacy information, please let us know and we will take actions to immediately remove the document(s) prior to receiving the written authorization.
However, we still require the appropriate written authorization.
Please note that if this document is part of a publicly available ADAMS Package, we will change the Package's Public availability to A Non-Publicly Available status if appropriate.
Also note that in accordance with Management Directive 3.4, A Release of Information to the Public, the Office Directors and Regional Administrators are required to take corrective action in the event that any information for which they are responsible is released contrary to NRC policy and must inform the EDO and the Office of the Inspector General in writing of the occurrence.
The authorizing official or office requestor should e-mail WEBWork to remove the document or any links if they exist on any external Web pages. If your office maintains an external Web site separate from the official NRC Web page, you are responsible for.the removal of the document from the site.Thanks Susan Hicks On Behalf of ADAMS IM X work at an alternate 1, cati n n (b)(6)an I can be reached at (b)(6) i From: Pascarelli, Robert Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 12:33 PM To: ADAMS IM Cc: Boska, John; Monninger, John
Subject:
change In public availability of slide package On 03/25/2013, Duke Energy provided the staff with a slide presentation (ML13084A022) that we placed in ADAMS as publically available.
Duke Energy subsequently informed the NRC that one of the slides contained SUNSI information (slide 18). Please change the profile of this document to non-publically available.
Thank you.Bob Pascarelli, Chief Plant Licensing Branch I1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 3
ADukeI kerg Agenda*:, Current Dam Failure Analysis -January 28, 2011 , Breach Analysis Summary , Model Development
,:, Updated Dam Failure Evaluation
-submitted March 12, 2013 , Models Considered
ý Selection of Xu & Zhang , Update Breach Parameters , Sensitivity Analysis , Independent Review Comparative Analysis -Large Modern Dam Failures*:, Modifications Scope For Informaton Only PDuke lrgy 2011 Breach Analysis Summary ,:, Breach parameters developed using regression methodology and technical papers:ý Froehlich 2008ý Walder & O'Connorý MacDonald
& Langridge-Monopolis
- Breach analysis focused on maximizing flooding levels to provide a very conservative and bounding analysis:ý Breach dimensions maximized to assume loss of most of the dam embankment,ý Froehlich breach time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> was reduced to 2.8ý Maximum peak outflow was selected from all methodsý Breach times of Keowee dams/dikes adjusted to maximize water directed at the site> Tailwater effect below Jocassee dam was not considered For Informaton Only luke rnergy 2011 Breach Analysis Summary Jocassee Dam (postulated dam failure)*:, Initial breach derived primarily from Froehlich equations.
regression Breach dimensions were adjusted based on physical constraints of natural valley Jocassee breach parameters:Top Width -1156 (64% of overall crest), Bottom Width -431 feet Bottom Elevation
-800 mslBreach Formation Time -2,8 hrs, Peak outflow 5,400,000 cfs For Information Only-Withho d ' lI Disciosure unoer-0 CFR 2M.
9 Duke UEnergy 2011 SE Jocassee Dam Breach Progression and Stage-Discharge Hydrographs Jocassee Dam Breach Progression and Hydrographs Case 2(100W)0.8 10,6l i Io I'6,000 4AD0Q000 3,000,000 2,00Q000 0M0 20 4:00 6., 8010 I O12:00 140 16:00 1100 20:00 22:00 0M0 200 40 60 8 IND00 12:00 llme-Headwlter -Tailwa'ter -Breach Proression
-Breach Olscharge For lnformabon Only Withheldfrom PublcDcIMr fd6 ~~j F31115(4 i nerg 2011 Breach Analysis Summary Keowee Dam/Dikes (postulated cascading dam failures),:o Overtopping failure trigger of two feet over the crest o:. Cascading dam/dike failure on Keowee , Keowee main dam- 2.8 hrs , West Saddle Dam -0.5 hrs , Intake Canal Dike- 0.9 hrs , Little River Dam -1.9 hrs s:o Conservative assumptions were made to maximize the water directed toward the power block For Information Only Wih ;I rum Disciosure unaer 10 CR -".;30 a wfnergy Model Development HEC.RAS JD Model I,, :&ou~w*Mcwhmimm Owkwuhilonuahu NO T *mor informa
ýke Model Development ni ergy SRH 2D Model (57 thousand elements)REUSE COWUA11OINAL AISK For Informaton Oný"Whiheldft~
P.I~ u2~fds~wcuo
- 44a1CR 2.30 m 1 Duke 2011 Breach Analysis Summary VEnergy 2D Model WATER SURFACE ELEVATIONS AT KEOWEE DAM Jocassee-Keowee Dam Breach Study Pool Elevations at Keowee Dam 860 840 820 8w n~o'"780 760 740-Case NO0W 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Model Time (hrs)For Information Only WIN0 2 uke w.nergy Updated Dam Failure Evaluation For Information Only~i~no~u~.u.1 PI" ~cc~our un.5 1, i * ..
S DUke Updated Dam Failure Evaluation iEnergy Fukushima
2.1 Attributes
of updated and refined dam failure analysis.: Updated methodology and present day regulatory guidance.: Performed to meet NUREG CR/7046, 2011 & ANS 2.8,1992*:, Realistic but still conservative assumptions
,:, Physical characteristics of the dams/dikes recognized including materials and method/quality of construction
.Overtopping and Seismic are confirmed from the 2011 SE, as not being credible failure modes For Information Ony-VWMo6l7 rom Dfl iumure unaer CFR 2.I;M -
EDUke Updated Dam Failure Evaluation iEnergy Fukushima
2.1 Overtopping
of the Jocassee dam was confirmed not to be a credible failure mode i:s The Jocassee dam and dikes include 15 feet of freeboard*:. The Jocassee watershed is small relative to storage capacity -148 square miles.:. The top of the spillways are located at 1110 (full normal level)ý Four diverse methods of assuring spillway gate operation , Rigorous spillway gate maintenance and surveillance testing as required and monitored by FERC*:, Lake management procedures require consideration of lower level to anticipate additional storage needs for significant stormsý Weekly rain forecast are prepared by Duke Energy to project rainfall for the basiný Precipitation monitoring has assured that no overtopping of the spillway gates has occurred in 40 + years of operation.:, PMF using current HRR.51,52 results in 3 feet of freeboard margin*:. 2011 SE also concluded that overtopping was not credible For Information Only 40'00mA 'm u ISC osure ,
- Duke Updated Dam Failure Evaluation iEnergy Fukushima
2.1 Seismic
Failure of the Dam was confirmed not to be a credible failure mode*:, Seismic evaluation based on current FERC criteria using the 1989 EPRI Hazard Curves> The Jocassee dam is designed to a 0.12 g horizontal ground acceleration (Oconee site is designed to a 0.1g horizontal ground acceleration).
,:. 2007 Updated Fragility Analysis> High Confidence of a Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) of the dam by sliding 0.305 g> Evaluation was performed by Applied Research & Engineering Sciences (ARES) Corp., formerly EQE, a respected consulting firm in the area of seismic fragility> The ARES report concluded the median centered fragility value for failure of the dam is 1.64 g.> Maximum Probabilistic Peak Ground Acceleration for a 2% probability of being exceeded within a 50 year period is 0.197 g (using the United States Geologic Service hazard maps applicable to Jocassee), ,:. Jocassee dam is included in the seismic model of the Oconee Probable Risk Assessment.
> The combination of the updated seismic fragility with the seismic hazard curve results in a negligible risk contribution from seismic events.> In a letter dated 11/20/07 and in the 1/28/11 SE repor, the NRC concluded that there is a negligible risk For Information Only Withhnld from Public, Dcb ,: under,10 CFR," 2.3N Duke Energy Models Considered Regression Analysis> Froehlich 2008> Walder & O'Connorý MacDonald
& Langridge-Monopolis 1984ý Xu & Zhang 2009 For Information Only MULLId Diclo3ure under iT CVr
- DUke Selection of Xu & Zhang 2009 EEnergy Basis*:. Most current regression method developed and validated with the largest data base of dam failures:ý 182 earth and rockfill dam failures compiledý 75 failures w/ sufficient info to develop breach regression models o:, Empirical formulas that account for physical characteristics of dam/reservoir:
dam type, failure mode, height, dam erodibility, reservoir shape/storage)
- , 33 of the 75 failures were on large dams ( >.. 15 meters),:. Applies to multi-zoned dams t:. Method yields realistic but conservative breach parameters
,:, Recognized by industry experts For Informaton Ony W-oeitk~~
CP, ,[w re U
- DUke Breach Parameters Energy Fukushima Update ,:. Jocassee Dam -Xu & Zhang> Starting reservoir elevation 1110 (normal full pond)> Rockfill dam with low erodibility classification
> Piping failure initiating at 1020 feet msl (Sunny Day Failure)> Breach parameters:
V"Top Width- 701' (39% of overall crest)V Bottom Width -431'V Bottom Elevation
-870'V Breach Formation Time: , Xu & Zhang -29.2 hrs.(13.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> piping +16.0 open weir), Froehlich
-16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> (open weir)v/Peak outflow: 1,760,000 cfs For Information Only-Wihhod iemfrCP6e~wunS" M Duke Energy Jocassee Dam Low Erodibility Classification (b)(7)(F)For Information Only-WIu lo f IioUI I u V 10 IF h Duke Energy Fukushima Model-'2 1 Breach Formation Time Xu & Zhang definition:
29.2 (13.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> piping + 16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weir)Froehlich definition:
16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weir For Information Only-WIith!~ alrom-hbi i~~~rurdrI e1 .S uKe Fukushima Model Jocassee Dam Breach Progression and Stage-Discharge Hydrographs L ,I ry Jocassee Dam Breach Progression and Hydrographs BEP ILE 1.20!I 3,o000,0 irn 2,500,000'o.0 0.80 a Io 0.40 I U.-2,000.1 D 1,504000 1,000,0 Ulu I S0,000 OO 20 4 61 82 OD 0 12.9 14:0 1610 1S.0 20:00 21-0 OWO 200 4:0 flow 6:0 8:00 .001-Headwater
- - -- Breach MUMllif-T~Ivwter-Bfeadi Prgression
Sreach Formiation Comp~lel-DischafrM Breach Formalon Time Xu & Zhang dofiniUon:.
29.2 (13.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> piping + 16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weir) Froehlich definlion:
.16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weir For Information Only Withhoid from Public DI5d uure und-er10CR Duke Breach Parameters lEnergy Fukushima Update*:, Keowee Damý Starting reservoir elevation 800 (normal full pond), Homogeneous earth fill dam , Overtopping failure trigger of two feet over the crest at 817 msl by rapid rise of Keowee reservoir over the crest Multiple simultaneous breach initiation formation points across the Keowee dam and West Saddle dam o:o Cascading dam/dike failure on Keoweeý Keowee main dam- 0.75 hrsý West Saddle Dam -0.5 hrs (shorter than main dam, ratio of height)For Information Only Wihhldfa Pbl ibQsure under 10 CFR 2.39 a Fukushima Model Keowee Dam Breach Progression HEC-RAS ,1n ergy NffiOMjV'&'1 6 0.9 0.8 0.7 05 40.03 02 I.0 0 0.] 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 Relative Time Progression For Information Only-deIsIIuIIUIIrgld e~t~Uv j4Ou-nfV Duke.nergy Fukushima ID Modeling Keowee Dam -Headwater and Tailwater Stage Hydrographs Final BEP LE 1-D Model Performance 830 820 810 S00 790 780 770 760 1750 S740 S730 S720 710 700 690 680 670 660 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 Model Time. hours-BEPLEHW -BEPLETW For Information Only*
J f ""j ....... undr FR-.,,
VlUKl:,nergy Fukushima 2.1 2D Modeling Keowee Dam Breach Progression R.ijv: 1 0.9 0.8 C o 0.7 I.~06 IL.C u0.5 0.4 00.3 0.2 0.1 0 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 Time (hr)16.7 16.8 16.9 17 For Information Only , -, , -.. , -..,., ,
UKG L ,nergy Fukushima 2D Modeling Velocity and Flow Pattern at l7 hrs.:- 17.U 0 2 4 6 8 101214 16 182022242628303234363840 For Informabon Only Duke L fnergy Fukushima 2D Modeling Velocity and Flow Pattern at 20 hrs.0.0 2 4 6 8 10121416182022242628303234363840 For Informaton Only-t o R li lwu* t l er i A, A ^ 1 A o4 luke nergy Fukushima JD-2D Modeling Results Breachine Keowee Dam Intake Dike HEC-RAS 2-D HEC-RAS 2-D Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time 817 16.28 817 16.24 n/a n/a n/a n/a NW 4 Maximum Water Surfaces Keowee Dam Intake Dike HEC-RAS 2-D HEC-RAS 2-D Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time 818.4 16,53 820.1 16.58 810 17,17 807.2 17.67____ ___ __ ___ ___ A= A , Maximum Water Surfaces Swale Tallwater HEC-RAS 2-D HEC-RAS 2-D Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Ti m e Elevation Decimal 1ime 817.5 16.55 815.5 16.53 787.4 17.52 790.4 18.41-4 X 10 N 11 1 , -I A W -li, For Informaton Only Sensitivity Analysis Model Peak Oufflow (cfs)McDonald & Langridge-Monopolis 1984 1,566,381 Costa, 1985 1,634,480 Xu & Zhang, 2009 1,760,000 Evans, 1986 1,803,331 SoS, 1981 2,647,711 Bureau of Reclamation, 1982 3,046,462 McDonald & Langridge-Monopolis 1984 5,093,603 (upper envelope)Froehlich (with additional conservatism), 2008 5,440,000 Data in this table based on Wahl 2004, January 28, 2011 SE and updated Xu & Zhang data 100+ HEC-RAS studies performed with varied breach parameters and control variables Erodiblity was the most significant factor influencing the breach parameters for Xu & Zhang 2009 Bias of conservatism with realism For Informaton Only,.,.,.,:.
l;,-, .....
vke Independent Review Breach Parameters wnergy , Independent Peer Review Joe Ehasz, P.E.David Bowles, Ph. D P.E. P.H., FERC Board of Consultant Review Gonzalo Castro, Ph.D., P.E.James Michael Duncan, Ph.D., P.E.James F Ruff, Ph.D., P.E.Gabriel Fernandez, Ph.D., P.E.For Information Only LiJtll I JA Ami AAA'.'vimn~ia trom ~UWi~ ui~cIo~ur~
unacr lv ~
S Duke Comparative Analysis nergy Large Modern Dam Failures*:. Taum Sauk , Overtopping failure initiated by human error (previous overtopping events had occurred), Random rockfill embankment supporting the inner concrete liner loosely placed by end dumping the material without compaction except for the top 16' of 84' height , The embankment was constructed on a very steep downstream slope of 1.3H to lV with a 10 high concrete parapet wall along the crest of the damEmbankment was highly erodible and contained over 45% sand sized material (also evident in unusual level of surface erosion from rain events)*:..Teton , earthen dam with majority of dam constructed of highly erodible windblown silt (infant mortality event), No transition zones (sand and/or fine filters) were included between the silt core and the sand & gravel , Thin layer of small rock fill on both up and downstream faces with a majority of protection relied upon mix of sand, gravel and cobble , Piping failure at 130' below the crest due to inadequate protection of impervious core trench material , Breach top width 781' (-25% of overall crest)*:, Hell Hole> True rockfill dam,with upstream sloping impervious core with massive rock fill sections up and down stream to support and protect the core., Failure caused by overtopping durng construction due to an intense rain event that could not be passed through the construction diversion tunnel , After overtopping of the core started, the dam took 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> to complete the breach and empty the upstream reservoir For Information Onylll ll~llIUad Duke Modification Scope l onergy Updated ,:, Modifications for protection from dam failure (under review): 1. Relocation of external backup power transmission line 2. Intake Dike embankment protection
- 3. East embankment protection
- 4. Discharge Diversion wall*:. Modifications for Local Intense Precipitation (under review):ý Transformer relocation
ý Diversion walls and drainage canalsý Aux building and Turbine building protection For Information Only--W ,,hokIf I Pubic Man u vw r 10"FR 103k Duke wwM ergE Modification Options I ý 77,77 =1 1'-<Jocassee Dam (~ 2 C.uaIwIm/N..~
a~1///*J , For Information Only Disclosure une.elu'.I"r" .3C
.uke inergy..... .......i -i;;Questions and Feedback For Information Only