NRC-2100-2022, EN 55999 Valcor Coil Shell Assemblies Final Notification (004)
| ML22266A194 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Catawba, Braidwood, Brunswick, Callaway, FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/12/2022 |
| From: | Swirad M Valcor Engineering Corp |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22266A196 | List: |
| References | |
| Valcor/NRC-2100-2022-QA1 Rev. 1 | |
| Download: ML22266A194 (7) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:Fax cover sheet To: 3018165151 From: valcor Pages: 6 Date: Mon Sep 12 2: 34: 02 PM EDT 2022 Re: Part 21 Notification for valcor PN V52653-6040-7 Comments:
- Regards, Michael Swirad QA Director Valcor Engineering 2 Lawrence Road Springfield, NJ 07081 P: 973-467-8400 x 7223 M:732-887-2320 email: mikeswirad@valcor.com<mailto:mikeswirad@valcor.com>
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VALCOR ENGINEERING CORPORATION 2 Lawrence Road, Springfield, N.J. 07081, U.S.A. (973) 467-8400 FAX (973) 46 7 -9391 FACSIMILE MESSAGE DATE: __9~/1_2~/_2~2~---- TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES 5 TO: FROM: NAME_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ NAME _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ COMPANY NRC Operation Center CITY /STATE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ FACSIMILE 301-816-5151 MESSAGE: Attached please find Part 21 notification report for Valcor Coil Shell Assemblies PN V52653-6040-7 If you do not receive all pages, please call (973) 467-8403 CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE; The document accompanying this telecopy transmission contains information belonging to the sender which is confidential and may be legally privileged. The information is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, copied information is strictly prohibited. If you have received this telecopy in error, please immediately notify us by telephone to arrange for return of the original document to us.
VALCOR ENGINEERING CORPORATION 2 Lawrence Road
- Springfield, New Jersey 07081 USA Phone: 973-467-8400, Fax: 973-467-9391 Nuclear Business Group September lZ, 2022 Valcor/NRC 2110-2022-QAl Rev. 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTENTION: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Subject:
10CFR Part 21 Final Notification for premature failures of Valcor Coil Shell Assemblies VS2653-6040-7
Reference:
Duke Energy Notification dated 5/19/2022 (RA-22-0167) This letter provides Valcor Engineering Corporation (VEC) formal notification of the identification of a defect in Valcor Coil Shell assemblies Part Number V52653-6040-7. The information required for this VEC Notification per §21.2l(d)(4) is attached. Please contact me if you have any questions or require any additional information. MikeSwirad Quality Assurance Director mJM~w**~d@;,ak:ot.tom
Enclosures:
(3 pages)
Enclosure 1 10 CFR Part 21 Report 2110-2022-QAl Rev. 1 Page 1 of 3 10 CFR Part 21 Notification per §21.21(dl(4) (i) Name and Address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission. Mike Swirad QA Director Valcor Engineering Corporation 2 Lawrence Road Springfield, NJ 07081 (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility 01* such activity within the U"ited States which fails to comply o,* co,,tai11s a defect. Coil Shell Assembly, Valcor PN V52653-6040-7 (supplied as "spare part" or as part of Valcor Solenoid Valve) {iii} Identification of the firm constructi"'J the facility or supplying the basic compo,,,mt which fails ta comply or contains a defect. Valcor Engineering Corporation 2 Lawrence Road Springfield, NJ 07081 (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply ai1d the safety hazard which is created or cm,ld be created by such defect or failure to comply. On May :1.9, 2022, Duke f_~:~erqy reqorted two (2) Coi: Shell Assembly fi:1i!ures cf \h:i!cor f_~:~9i~':eerinq Dw9. ~Jo. V52653*-604G*-7, o~': two (Fffere~':1:, rece:~t:y :nst1:1l!ed 3-V\.iay Sole~':oid va:,;es, Dw9. ~Jo. V7G900*-39-.3*-1, !ecated at thei~ Catawba Nucle;::i:- r.:iovve~ SL:1::io~':. The ctstorne~ i:~dic.::ted that both ceils caused "blown fuses in ::heir system**, exh:bited "'loss of nes:st;:ince", ;:1:--:d 1Nene in service fer less t~:;:rn six (6) rno:--:t~:s ,c1ftex ir:ital :ns.tallatio:--: and *function-c1I ::estin(f' Thes.e t:n!ts were categerized as be!n9 Safety Rel-c1ted. Dt:ke c:ted v:ola::ior:s of the r*equ:rements of CNS-121C.04-00-C022 Rev.003, MR.70900-.39-3-1 (40-Year Life Ex:::;ectancv) and teques.ted -c1 1C CTR Part 21 Re::::orti:--:g Eva:t:a::ion {Rer. ~FR. .39, RMJ.\ 2400, E.O. 9018, R/\.-22**0167, and NCR 2426.351). Valco1~ sole::oid v2lve VlG900*-39-3*-1 :s a ba:2nced, d:rect acti::gr ::::r-ee*-VJ2Y so:enoid operated valve. E:ectr:cal power- (105 to 140 VDC) to ope:*ate the va:ve is appl:ed tc tl1e coi: of t::e sc:eno:d t~rcugh a term:na: block located :n t~e top of the sole::oid housi::g. E:,ergizing the co:: causes tl1e :Jlu:,~1e1~ to pull :n,, tra~':sfe~r:nf~ ::he p:sten--seal 1:1ssernbly frer:--: th:; tpqer seat to the !ovver* seat, c1:1usi:--:g port 1 to be sealed off and open:nf~ qort 2, a:10*11inf~ 1 :t.=5 psig facility air* ::o flow f~orn ~Ext 2 to port 3. Te create t~':e requ:red r:--:.::g:--:etic for*ce,, U--:is sole:--:oid coil is 1--:":i:1de up of l40C tu~ns (r:--:i:--:irnur:--:) of 2.:_1 qauqe :nsulated r:--:ag:--:et 'Nire,, wr*.::pped ar*ound.:: Nf:1vtA ~1rade G7 bobbi~':,, 1:1nd cove~ed vvith K;:i:::;ton Tape outer wrap !nsul-c1tion. The rnaone:: w:r*e is con:--:ected to the 18-gauge leadv,,rire through a t;razed solder joi:--:t which :s addition-cilly :ns.ula::ed with 3M #*27 9:-cis.s t-c1pe and ~::a:::;ton ::-cipe. This so:eno:d cc:I assem\::;ly desig:--: has been in existe:xe at Valcot s.:nce 1978 T?--:is sole:--:oid coi: assert:b:v is ther: inser::ed ir:to a metallic coil shell ar:d is then potted to allov,,r co:I 17eat tc dissip2te as VJell as to maintain the coil assembly fixed. T:is asser:,b:y is :ctentified by VEC as V52fi53*-fiC40-*'7. The coi: sl1ell assembly is tl1en assemt;led c:,tc the va:ve sut:--asser:,b:y to fi:,ish t~e p:*ocess ct r:*:anut2ctu1~ing a solenoid valve.
Enclosure 1 10 CFR Part 21 Report 2110-2022-QAl Rev. 1 Page 2 of 3 (v) The date'"' which the information of ss,ch defect or failure to comply was obtained. M.ay 19, 2C22 (60 day Interim Report issued on July 15, 2022) (vi) In the case of a bask component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be St,ijpp!ied for,, manufactured., or being marn.rfactured for one or more fadliUes or acthtities ,mbject to the rngulations i" this part. QTY: VEC LOT# End Customer Sales Order Part# Customer PO Location of Installation Approx. Ship Date 1 A129620 Duke E181385 V70900- 39-3-1 3118384 Catawba 3/9/2021 2 A2 Duke E181385 V70900- 39-3-1 3118384 Catawba 3/9/2021 3 293551 Duke E181385 V70900- 39-3-1 3118384 Catawba s A3 Duke E181385 V70900- 39-3-1 3118384 Catawba (vii) The corrective action which has been., is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or* o.-gaa,izatio11 respoa,sible for the actio"; aml the length of time that has beea, 01* will be taken to complete the action. The root cause of the failed component is due to inconsistency in Coil Assembly manufacturing process, More specifically, one of the two coil terminal wires was shorted to coil windings directly beiow the location where the co!! wire is brazed to the terminal wire (hereafter referred to as the external termination point ETP) The ETP is insu!ated with a !ayer of Kapton tape and fiberglass tape and then secured to the outside of the coi! winding w:th rnore Kapton tape and f:berglass tape. Dimension checks found the location of the ETP is lower (1.0") than specified on the Vaicor engineering drawing (0.7.5" per V52605-.501) vvhich places it on the larger diarneter of the coil winding rather than the area with a smal!er diameter.
Enclosure 1 10 CFR Part 21 Report 2110-2022-QAl Rev. 1 Page 3 of 3 There !s evidence of a significant amount of heat at the ETP, The evidence !nC!udes:
- 1) a hole in the ETP insulation with charred fiberglass tape
- 2) two coil wires broken from the coil and melted to the ETP
- 3) charnng of the coi! w:res beneath tile ETP
- 4) melted copper
- 5) melted and re-*solidified brazing oozing from the ETP insulat:on This fault bmke at least six of the coil windings, shorted two coii wir*es to the ETP and effectively shortened the coi! length accounting for the drop in resistance. The heat which destroyed the insulation of the ETP and rnelted the coil vvires to the ETP 1Nas caused by one of the fo!lovving or a cornbination of them:
- 1) The insu!ation around the ETP was crushed by the error in locating the ETP mor*e than 0.75" below the top of the coii. The diameter of the coil winding Is larger where the ETP was incorrectly located. This appliecl more force to the ETP when it was inserted into the cast housing and applied more pressure to this area than intended, This pr*essure would pierce the insulation creating a catastrophic weak spot if there was a sharp spot on the brazed connection.
- 2) A process issue may have created a poor connection of the ieacl wire to tile coii wire. A poor connection 1Niil create rnor*e resistance and create !ocaiiz:ed heating. There were less 1Nraps of the coil wire (3 wraps) around the terminal wir*e on the bad terrnination versus the good termination {5 wraps). There was also rnelted and re-solidified brazing rnateriai. The brazing was either squeezed out when 1Nrapping the joint with tape or forced out vvhen overheating of the coil took place.
- 3) Damage to the coil wire insulation during manufactur*e. If the insu!ation of the coil wire was compromised dtffing assembly, this would create an inter-winding short leading to a hot spot.
This spot is dir*ect!y beneath the ETP. Such damage could come from a too! touching the coil wire accidentally (e.g. to compress the coi! 0.0. to meet the pr*int) or from a protrusion from the brazed area. V.::lcor :n:ti;:1::ed ir*:terna: and stp::.:lier Correct:,;e Act:ons. A.:I Co:I Shell A.sser:~b1:es. (i:~c!ud:r*:q stb** cort:pot:en:: Coil J.\s.sernt;ly Pf~ V.5260.5-501) have been qt:;:p-,c1n::ined and Valcor s.t:p:::;lier was r:ot:fed V-cilcor will tework all exis::ing Coi: /.\ssem\::;lies ir: stock to conform ::o VEC Er:g!neer*ing Dt-c1wit:g. V-cilcor :s res:::;onsib\e for a\::;ove correc:ive ae::ior:. It s.~:all take .30 to 60 days to com:::;lete. (viii) A,,v advice ,*elated to the defect or failure to comply about the fadlity, activity, 01* basic component that has been"" ls being,. or wrn be give11 to purchasers or ncensees. V.::lcor :s :11 a process of not:fyinq 1:111 affected custer:~ers. Defect in ce:1 She:1 Asser:":bly c1:1n11ot be visb:t!lv 1:1ml/or e:ectr:c1:1l!y ider*:t:fied ;:1:~d a:1 Coil s~*:el! Assemtilies t~*:at perform Safety ~-{elated functier*: must \::;e ser:d to va:cor for* evalu-citior:/replacert:en::. (ix) rn the case of ,m early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was t,*ansfe,*red. r~ct apf]liG:ble}}