ML13226A266
| ML13226A266 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 05/03/2013 |
| From: | Boska J Division of Operating Reactor Licensing |
| To: | Robert Pascarelli Division of Operating Reactor Licensing |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2013-0264 | |
| Download: ML13226A266 (34) | |
Text
Boska, John From: Boska, John Sent: Friday, May 03, 2013 11:26 AM To: Hicks, Susan Cc: Pascarelli, Robert
Subject:
FW: change in public availability of slide package Attachments: 2013-03-25 Revised Duke slides (non-public).pdf Importance: High Susie, the email string below discusses a set of slides used by the licensee at a public meeting, and the licensee later informed us that one of the slides had sensitive information. Those slides are in ADAMS at ML13084A022. You had changed this document profile to non-public. The licensee has now provided us the same set of slides, but with the "Withhold from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390" added to the bottom of all the slides. Please replace ML13084A022 with the attached pdf file. The licensee has also provided a set of public slides, which I added to ADAMS as ML13123A204. Thanks.
John Boska Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 301-415-2901 email: john.boska@nrc.gov From: ADAMS IM Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 10:14 AM To: Boska, John; Pascarelli, Robert Cc: Monninger, John; CSIRT; McCarthy, James
Subject:
RE: change Inpublic availability of slide package
- John, Thank you for the information - document ML13084A022 has now been set for "Sensitive-Security - Related-Periodic review required/MD Code A.3.
Thanks Susie Hicks On Behalf of ADAMS IM
[(b)(6) ] l can be reachedat (b)(6)
From: Boska, John Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 9:50 AM To: ADAMS IM; Pascarelli, Robert Cc: Monninger, John; CS_IRT; McCarthy, James
Subject:
RE: change in public availability of slide package Importance: High Susie, I have talked to Bob Pascarelli about the document sensitivity. Please label the sensitivity as Sensitive, and MD 3.4 Non-Public A.3 (sensitive- security-related- periodic review required). Thanks.
C__
John Boska Oconee Project Manager, NRR/DORL U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 301-415-2901 email: iohn.boskanrc..qov From: ADAMS IM Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 8:51 AM To: Pascarelll, Robert Cc: Boska, John; Monninger, John; CSIRT; McCarthy, James
Subject:
RE: change in public availability of slide package Importance: High Robert/James, ADAMS IM has changed the availability for ML13084A022 to Non-Public, which will automatically remove this file from Public Access once the synch occurs.
For now this file is Non-Public/Non-Sensitive with "Non-Public Pending Review" added to the keyword file.
Per our previous email request - please provide the proper document sensitivity selected from the attached MD Code Chart.
Thanks Susie Hicks On Behalf of ADAMS IM (b)(6)(b)(6) at
( I can be reached From: McCarthy, James Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 2:06 PM To: ADAMS IM; Pascarelli, Robert Cc: Boska, John; Monninger, John; CSIRT
Subject:
RE: change in public availability of slide package ADAMS IM, Thank you for the notification. CSIRT will perform all necessary information spill reporting.
Jim McCarthy LIS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Computer Security Office Office: .01-415587 Mobile:i(b)(6),
From: ADAMS IM Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 2:03 PM To: Pascarelli, Robert 2
Cc: Boska, John; Monninger, John; CSIRT
Subject:
RE: change In public availability of slide package Hello Robert, Below are guidelines to change Released Public files to Non-Public. Also, please provide us with the proper document sensitivity which you can select from the attached ND Code Chart, so we can render this file ML13084A022 Non-Public?
Before we can process your request to withdraw a document(s) from the ADAMS Public Library (WBA), we need written authorization and justification (an e-mail message is fine) from a Division Director or above in the originating or responsible organization. This requirement is documented in an August 28, 2002, memo from Stuart Reiter, Chief Information Officer, to all NRC Office Directors and Regional Administrators. See ML022340277. Please have the appropriate Division Director or above send the authorization and justification to the e-mail address ADAMS IM. If you have been given the authority required by ML022340277, have those manager(s) provide us with the delegation.
If the document(s) to be removed from WBA contains classified, safeguards, or privacy information, please let us know and we will take actions to immediately remove the document(s) prior to receiving the written authorization. However, we still require the appropriate written authorization. Please note that if this document is part of a publicly available ADAMS Package, we will change the Package's Public availability to A Non-Publicly Available status if appropriate.
Also note that in accordance with Management Directive 3.4, A Release of Information to the Public, the Office Directors and Regional Administrators are required to take corrective action in the event that any information for which they are responsible is released contrary to NRC policy and must inform the EDO and the Office of the Inspector General in writing of the occurrence.
The authorizing official or office requestor should e-mail WEBWork to remove the document or any links if they exist on any external Web pages. If your office maintains an external Web site separate from the official NRC Web page, you are responsible for.the removal of the document from the site.
Thanks Susan Hicks On Behalf of ADAMS IM X work at an alternate 1, cati n n (b)(6)an I can be reached at (b)(6) i From: Pascarelli, Robert Sent: Monday, April 22, 2013 12:33 PM To: ADAMS IM Cc: Boska, John; Monninger, John
Subject:
change In public availability of slide package On 03/25/2013, Duke Energy provided the staff with a slide presentation (ML13084A022) that we placed in ADAMS as publically available. Duke Energy subsequently informed the NRC that one of the slides contained SUNSI information (slide 18). Please change the profile of this document to non-publically available. Thank you.
Bob Pascarelli, Chief Plant Licensing Branch I1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 3
ADukeI kerg Agenda
- ,Current Dam Failure Analysis - January 28, 2011
, Breach Analysis Summary
, Model Development
,:,Updated Dam Failure Evaluation - submitted March 12, 2013
, Models Considered
ý Selection of Xu &Zhang
, Update Breach Parameters
, Sensitivity Analysis
, Independent Review Comparative Analysis - Large Modern Dam Failures
- ,Modifications Scope For Informaton Only
PDuke lrgy 2011 Breach Analysis Summary
,:, Breach parameters developed using regression methodology and technical papers:
ý Froehlich 2008
ý Walder &O'Connor
ý MacDonald &Langridge-Monopolis
- Breach analysis focused on maximizing flooding levels to provide a very conservative and bounding analysis:
ý Breach dimensions maximized to assume loss of most of the dam embankment,
ý Froehlich breach time of 5hours was reduced to 2.8
ý Maximum peak outflow was selected from all methods
ý Breach times of Keowee dams/dikes adjusted to maximize water directed at the site
> Tailwater effect below Jocassee dam was not considered For Informaton Only
luke 2011 BreachAnalysis Summary rnergy Jocassee Dam (postulated dam failure)
- ,Initial breach derived primarily from Froehlich regression equations.
Breach dimensions were adjusted based on physical constraints of natural valley Jocassee breach parameters:
- Top Width - 1156 (64% of overall crest)
, Bottom Width - 431 feet Bottom Elevation - 800 msl
- Breach Formation Time - 2,8 hrs, Peak outflow 5,400,000 cfs For Information Only
-Withho d' lI Disciosure unoer-0 CFR 2M.
9 Duke 2011 SE JocasseeDam Breach UEnergy Progressionand Stage-DischargeHydrographs Jocassee Dam Breach Progression and Hydrographs Case 2(100W) 6,000 4AD0Q000 0.8 10,6l 3,000,000 i
Io I' 2,00Q000 0M0 20 4:00 6., 8010 I O12:00140 16:00 1100 20:00 22:00 0M0 200 40 60 8 IND00 12:00 llme
-Headwlter -Tailwa'ter -Breach Proression - Breach Olscharge For lnformabon Only Withheldfrom PublcDcIMr fd6 ~~j
F31115(4 i nerg 2011 BreachAnalysis Summary Keowee Dam/Dikes (postulated cascading dam failures)
,:oOvertopping failure trigger of two feet over the crest o:.Cascading dam/dike failure on Keowee
, Keowee main dam- 2.8 hrs
, West Saddle Dam - 0.5 hrs
, Intake Canal Dike- 0.9 hrs
, Little River Dam - 1.9 hrs s:oConservative assumptions were made to maximize the water directed toward the power block For Information Only Wih rum Puolk* Disciosure unaer 10 CR -".;30
- I
a Model Development wfnergy HEC.RAS I,, JD Model
&ou~w*Mcwhmimm Owkwuhilonuahu NO T mor informa
Model Development
ýke SRH 2D Model ni ergy (57 thousand elements)
REUSE COWUA11OINAL AISK For Informaton Oný P.I~
"Whiheldft~u2~fds~wcuo *44a1CR 2.30
m 1 Duke 2011 Breach Analysis Summary VEnergy 2D Model WATER SURFACE ELEVATIONS AT KEOWEE DAM Jocassee-Keowee Dam Breach Study Pool Elevations at Keowee Dam 860 840 820 -Case NO0W n~o 8w
'"780 760 740 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Model Time (hrs)
For Information Only WIN0 2
uke w.nergy Updated Dam Failure Evaluation For Information Only
~i~no~u~.u.1 PI" ~cc~our un. 5i *1, ..
DUke S UpdatedDam FailureEvaluation iEnergy Fukushima 2.1 Attributes of updated and refined dam failure analysis
.: Updated methodology and present day regulatory guidance
.: Performed to meet NUREG CR/7046, 2011 &ANS 2.8,1992
- ,Realistic but still conservative assumptions
,:,Physical characteristics of the dams/dikes recognized including materials and method/quality of construction
. Overtopping and Seismic are confirmed from the 2011 SE, as not being credible failure modes For Information Ony
-VWMo6l7 rom i'uoii* Dfl iumure unaer CFR 2.I;M
EDUke UpdatedDam FailureEvaluation iEnergy Fukushima 2.1 Overtopping of the Jocassee dam was confirmed not to be a credible failure mode i:s The Jocassee dam and dikes include 15 feet of freeboard
- .The Jocassee watershed issmall relative to storage capacity - 148 square miles
.:. The top of the spillways are located at 1110 (full normal level)
ý Four diverse methods of assuring spillway gate operation
, Rigorous spillway gate maintenance and surveillance testing as required and monitored by FERC
- , Lake management procedures require consideration of lower level to anticipate additional storage needs for significant storms
ý Weekly rain forecast are prepared by Duke Energy to project rainfall for the basin
ý Precipitation monitoring has assured that no overtopping of the spillway gates has occurred in40 +years of operation
.:, PMF using current HRR.51,52 results in3feet of freeboard margin
- . 2011 SE also concluded that overtopping was not credible For Information Only 40'00mAu 'm ISC osure ,
- Duke UpdatedDam FailureEvaluation iEnergy Fukushima 2.1 Seismic Failure of the Dam was confirmed not to be a credible failure mode
> The Jocassee dam isdesigned to a0.12 ghorizontal ground acceleration (Oconee site isdesigned to a 0.1g horizontal ground acceleration).
,:. 2007 Updated Fragility Analysis
> High Confidence of aLow Probability of Failure (HCLPF) of the dam by sliding 0.305 g
> Evaluation was performed by Applied Research &Engineering Sciences (ARES) Corp., formerly EQE, a respected consulting firm inthe area of seismic fragility
> The ARES report concluded the median centered fragility value for failure of the dam is1.64 g.
> Maximum Probabilistic Peak Ground Acceleration for a2%probability of being exceeded within a50 year period is0.197 g(using the United States Geologic Service hazard maps applicable to Jocassee),
,:. Jocassee dam isincluded inthe seismic model of the Oconee Probable Risk Assessment.
> The combination of the updated seismic fragility with the seismic hazard curve results inanegligible risk contribution from seismic events.
> Inaletter dated 11/20/07 and inthe 1/28/11 SE repor, the NRC concluded that there isanegligible risk For Information Only Withhnld from Public, Dcb under,10,: CFR," 2.3N
Duke Models Considered Energy Regression Analysis
>Froehlich 2008
>Walder &O'Connor
ý MacDonald &Langridge-Monopolis 1984
ý Xu &Zhang 2009 For Information Only MULLId fi*inrPub*i*Diclo3ure under iTCVr 2,*.
- DUke Selection of Xu &Zhang 2009 EEnergy Basis
- .Most current regression method developed and validated with the largest data base of dam failures:
ý 182 earth and rockfill dam failures compiled
ý 75 failures w/sufficient info to develop breach regression models o:,Empirical formulas that account for physical characteristics of dam/reservoir: dam type, failure mode, height, dam erodibility, reservoir shape/storage)
- ,33 of the 75 failures were on large dams ( >.. 15 meters)
,:.Applies to multi-zoned dams t:. Method yields realistic but conservative breach parameters
,:,Recognized by industry experts For Informaton Ony W-oeitk~~ ,[w CP, Ure
- DUke Breach Parameters Energy Fukushima Update
,:.Jocassee Dam - Xu &Zhang
> Starting reservoir elevation 1110 (normal full pond)
> Rockfill dam with low erodibility classification
> Piping failure initiating at 1020 feet msl (Sunny Day Failure)
> Breach parameters:
V"Top Width- 701' (39% of overall crest)
VBottom Width - 431' VBottom Elevation - 870' VBreach Formation Time:
, Xu &Zhang - 29.2 hrs.(13.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> piping +16.0 open weir)
, Froehlich - 16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> (open weir) v/Peak outflow: 1,760,000 cfs For Information Only
-WihhodiemfrCP6e~wunS" M
Duke JocasseeDam Energy Low Erodibility Classification (b)(7)(F)
For Information Only
-WIu f *"tud uI 10V IFh lo IioUI
Duke Fukushima Model Energy -'2 1 Breach Formation Time Xu &Zhang definition: 29.2 (13.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> piping +16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weir)
Froehlich definition: 16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weir For Information Only alrom-hbi e1i~~~rurdrI
-WIith!~ .S
uKe FukushimaModel JocasseeDam Breach Progressionand Stage-DischargeHydrographs L ,I ry Jocassee Dam Breach Progression and Hydrographs BEP ILE 1.20 3,o000,0 I!
irn 2,500,000
'o.0 0.80 2,000 a
.1 1,504000 Io I
0.40 1,000,0 U.-
Ulu I S0,000 D
61 6:08:00 .001 OO 20 4 82 OD 0 12.9 14:0 1610 1S.0 20:00 21-0 OWO 200 4:0 flow
-Headwater -T~Ivwter - Bfeadi Prgression - Biea*h DischafrM
- - -- Breach MUMllif -- -- Sreach Formiation Comp~lel Breach Formalon Time Xu &Zhang dofiniUon:. 29.2 (13.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> piping +16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weir) Froehlich definlion: .16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weir For Information Only Withhoid from Public DI5d uure und-er10CR
Duke Breach Parameters lEnergy Fukushima Update
- ,Keowee Dam
ý Starting reservoir elevation 800 (normal full pond)
, Homogeneous earth fill dam
, Overtopping failure trigger of two feet over the crest at 817 msl by rapid rise of Keowee reservoir over the crest Multiple simultaneous breach initiation formation points across the Keowee dam and West Saddle dam o:oCascading dam/dike failure on Keowee
ý Keowee main dam- 0.75 hrs
ý West Saddle Dam - 0.5 hrs (shorter than main dam, ratio of height)
For Information Only Wihhldfa Pbl ibQsure under 10 CFR 2.39
a FukushimaModel Keowee Dam
,1nergy Breach ProgressionHEC-RAS NffiOMjV'&'1 0.9 0.86 0.7 05 40.
03 02 I.
0 0 0.] 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 Relative Time Progression For Information Only
-deIsIIuIIUIIrgld e~t~Uv j4Ou-nfV
Duke Fukushima IDModeling
.nergy Keowee Dam -Headwater and Tailwater Stage Hydrographs Final BEP LE 1-D Model Performance 830 820 810 S00 790 780 770 760 1750 S740 S730 S720 710 700 690 680 670 660 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 Model Time. hours
-BEPLEHW -BEPLETW For Information Only
- -Withhol*d f J ui*; ""j .......undr *1FR-.,,
VlUKl Fukushima 2.1 2D Modeling
- ,nergy Keowee Dam Breach Progression R.ijv: *,"**
1 0.9 0.8 C
o 0.7 I.
~06 IL
.C u0.5 0.4 00.3 0.2 0.1 0
16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8 16.9 17 Time (hr)
For Information Only
UKG L ,nergy Fukushima2D Modeling Velocity and Flow Pattern at l7 hrs.
- -17.U 0 2 4 6 8 101214 16 182022242628303234363840 For Informabon Only
Duke L fnergy Fukushima2D Modeling Velocity and Flow Pattern at 20 hrs.
0.0 2 4 6 8 10121416182022242628303234363840 For Informaton Only R lit l ierA,
-t olwu* A^ 1 A o4
luke Fukushima JD-2D nergy ModelingResults Breachine Keowee Dam Intake Dike HEC-RAS 2-D HEC-RAS 2-D Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time 817 16.28 817 16.24 n/a n/a n/a n/a NW 4 Maximum Water Surfaces Keowee Dam Intake Dike HEC-RAS 2-D HEC-RAS 2-D Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time 818.4 16,53 820.1 16.58 810 17,17 807.2 17.67
___ __ ___ ___ A= *i.*A *::-.* * ,
Maximum Water Surfaces Swale Tallwater HEC-RAS 2-D HEC-RAS 2-D Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal 1ime 817.5 16.55 815.5 16.53 787.4 17.52 790.4 18.41 111 ,
N 10 X - IA W-
-4 li, For Informaton Only
Sensitivity Analysis Model Peak Oufflow (cfs)
McDonald &Langridge-Monopolis 1984 1,566,381 Costa, 1985 1,634,480 Xu &Zhang, 2009 1,760,000 Evans, 1986 1,803,331 SoS, 1981 2,647,711 Bureau of Reclamation, 1982 3,046,462 McDonald &Langridge-Monopolis 1984 5,093,603 (upper envelope)
Froehlich (with additional conservatism), 2008 5,440,000 Data inthis table based on Wahl 2004, January 28, 2011 SE and updated Xu &Zhang data 100+ HEC-RAS studies performed with varied breach parameters and control variables Erodiblity was the most significant factor influencing the breach parameters for Xu &Zhang 2009 Bias of conservatism with realism For Informaton Only
- *.,* ,.,.,.,:. ..... l;,-,
vke IndependentReview wnergy Breach Parameters
, Independent Peer Review Joe Ehasz, P.E.
David Bowles, Ph. DP.E. P.H.
, FERC Board of Consultant Review Gonzalo Castro, Ph.D., P.E.
James Michael Duncan, Ph.D., P.E.
James FRuff, Ph.D., P.E.
Gabriel Fernandez, Ph.D., P.E.
LiJtll For Information Only I JA Ami
- AAA
'.'vimn~ia trom ~UWi~ ui~cIo~ur~ unacr lv ~
Duke S ComparativeAnalysis nergy Large Modern Dam Failures
- .Taum Sauk
, Overtopping failure initiated by human error (previous overtopping events had occurred)
, Random rockfill embankment supporting the inner concrete liner loosely placed by end dumping the material without compaction except for the top 16' of 84' height
, The embankment was constructed on avery steep downstream slope of 1.3H to lV with a10 high concrete parapet wall along the crest of the dam
- Embankment was highly erodible and contained over 45% sand sized material (also evident inunusual level of surface erosion from rain events)
- ..Teton
, earthen dam with majority of dam constructed of highly erodible windblown silt (infant mortality event)
, No transition zones (sand and/or fine filters) were included between the silt core and the sand &gravel
, Thin layer of small rock fill on both up and downstream faces with amajority of protection relied upon mix of sand, gravel and cobble
, Piping failure at 130' below the crest due to inadequate protection of impervious core trench material
, Breach top width 781' (-25% of overall crest)
- , Hell Hole
> True rockfill dam,with upstream sloping impervious core with massive rock fill sections up and down stream to support and protect the core.
, Failure caused by overtopping durng construction due to an intense rain event that could not be passed through the construction diversion tunnel
, After overtopping of the core started, the dam took 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> to complete the breach and empty the upstream reservoir For Information Ony lll ll~llIUad IeL*.~ePR...........
Duke Modification Scope l onergy Updated
,:,Modifications for protection from dam failure (under review):
- 1. Relocation of external backup power transmission line
- 2. Intake Dike embankment protection
- 3. East embankment protection
- 4. Discharge Diversion wall
- .Modifications for Local Intense Precipitation (under review):
ý Transformer relocation
ý Diversion walls and drainage canals
ý Aux building and Turbine building protection For Information Only
--W Pubic I *; Man u vw
,,hokIf 10"FR r 103k
Duke Modification Options wwM ergE I ý 77,77=1 1'
- <Jocassee Dam
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2 uaIwIm/N..~ a
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For Information Only Wihn*fr-nPblic Disclosure une.elu'.I"r" .3C
.uke inergy .....
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Questions and Feedback For Information Only