ML20082P437

Responds to Request for Info on Station Blackout Rule 10CFR50.63

ML20082P437
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	09/06/1991
From:	Feigenbaum T PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NYN-91141, NUDOCS 9109100329
Download: ML20082P437 (20)

Text

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l g New Hampshire Yk Ted C. Feigenbaum President and Chief Esecutive Officer NYN- 91141 F ptember 6,1991 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk

References:

(a) Facility Operating License No. NPF-86, Docket No. 50 443 (b) Station illackout Rule (10CFR50,63)

(c) New ilampshire Yankee letter NYN.89038 dated April 17, 1989, "Information Submittal Required by 10CFR50.63", G. S. Thomas to USNRC (d) New -Ilampshire Yankee letter NYN 90083 dated March 30, 1990,

" Supplemental Information Submittal on Station illackout R ule",

T. C. Feigenbaum to USNRC (c) USNRC letter dated July 31, 1991, "Scabrook - Station Blackout:

Request for Additional Information (TAC No. 68601)*, USNRC to T. C. Feigenbaum

Subject:

Response to Request for Information on Station Blackout Rule Gentlemen:

In References (c) and (d), New llampshire Yankee (NHY) submitted initial and supplemental information evaluating Seabrook Station Unit I against the requirements of the Station blackout (SILO) R ule, 10CFR50.63, The evaluation was based on the use of NUM ARC 87-00, " Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUM ARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors", except where USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.155 takes precedence.

In Reference (c), the NRC Staff requested aFJitional information regarding our SBO submittals. Enclosure 1 provides the NilY responses to the requests for additional information.

If you have any questions regarding the above, please contact Mr. Terry L. liarpster, l Director of Licensing Services, at (603) 474 9521, extension 2765.

l Very truly yours, l

i 9109100329 910906 &&h ja **

[ PDR ADOCK 05000443 Ted C. Fei 'nbaum 1 P PDR l

TCF:GK/act

- Enclosure 090054 New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshire P.O. Box 300

• Seabrook, NH 03874 e Telephone (603) 474 9521 gg l

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..' e  ;

h United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 6,1991  ;

Attention: Document Control Desk Page two j I

cc: hir. Thomas T. hiartin Regional Administrator l United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Region 1 .

475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 .

. hir. Gordon E. Edison, Sr. Project hianager Project Directorate 13  ;

Division of Reacto'r Projects i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission {

. Washington, DC 20555  ;

hir. Noel Dudley  :

NRC Senior Resident inspector  !

- P.O.130x 1149 j Seabrook, Nil 03874 i

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t NHC Olli:STIONS (GHOtIP I)  !

1. COPING lillH ATIOli f Note: Although NUMARC states that the data in Tables 32 and 33 of i NUM ARC 87 00' were not verified, the NRC corniders these data to be representative of the site. The licensee needs to r solve any differences.

NRC 'itti',STION 1:  ;

SW Groupinu Provide the individual parameters used in calculating the SW 6,roup (i.e., the site specific r values for annual snowfall, tornado frequency and storm frequency). Was a single right- f of way or multiple rights of-way considered in the calculation?

r NilY R10SPONSF.t t Snowfall I The site specific annual snowfall parameter is based on Pease Air Force !!ase data which was obtained from the National Climalle Data Center. The- data base used covers a 30 year j period of record from 1956 to 1985. Due to the coastal topography in the Seabrook Station region, Pease Air Force Unse is sufficiently c!ose (12 miles no'th of the site) to provide data representative of the Seabrook Station region, liased on there data, the annual stiowfall parameter is 69 inches.

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Tornndo i The tornado frequency parameter is based on the torna,'a data base maintained by the I National Severe Storm Forecast C:nter (NSSFC). A listing was obtained from NSSFC listing i all reported tornadoes within 50 nautical miles of Seabrook Station's latitude and longitude i over a 36 year period (19511986). This data base contains 28 toradoes of severity F2 or [

greater within 50 nautical miles of Seabrook. l The tornado parameter is defined as the annual rate of tornadoes of severity F2 or greater f in events per square mile. Since Seabrook is adjacent to open ocean, only the land area  !

within the 50 nautical mile radius was used for the tornado parameter estimation.

Based on 28 severity F2 or greater tornadoes in a 36 year period and a land a ca of 5,212 [

square miles, the site specific tornado frequency parameter is 1.5x10 events per year per square mile. [

Storms

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The f.torm frequency parameter was developed using the same straight wind and hurricane j probability relationships discussed in the response to question 1.2 below. Please refer to that response for details on the development of these two relationships.

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'NUMARC-874), ' Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiativa Addressing Station i D.lackout at 1 ightwater Reactors," dated November 20, 1987. ,

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e The parameter is the annual probability of winds at the site between 75 and 125 mph. The  !

probability within this wind speed range is the difference in the exceedence probabilities at  !

the two wind speeds. This calculation was performed separately for straight and hurticanc '

winds and then suinmed as discussed in the following response (see ESW Grouping). The  ;

resulting probabilities for the wind speed range are 3.35 x104 (straight winds) and 4.06x 10 4  !

(hurricane winds). The sum of the two is 7.4x104 which is the annual expectation at the  !

site of fastest mile wind velocities between 75 and 125 mph at 30 meters above grade. [

Richt.of wny For conservatism a single right of way (b =72.3) was considered in the calculation which  !

yichts the estimated frequency of loss of off site power due to severe weather (SW). The i reasons for this are as follows:

With all three transmisrion lines (Scobie Pond, Newington. and Tewksbury) in operation, it is assumed that the minimum number of lines required for operation per the Technical Specifications (Section 3.8.1.1) is two o'il of the three lines. This could be represented by i the Scobie Pond line and Newington line. These transmission lines utillre separate rights-  :

of way, spreading out in different direceons from the switchyard. Therefore, for this  ;

scenario, b - 12.5, which is for alles with transmission lines on two or more rights.of way.

The lhltd line Tewksbury, shares for five miles the same right of way with the Scoble Pond j line. As described in the Updated FSAR (UFSAR), Section 8.2.1.1, this etc" .n meets the i NRC's General Design Criterion 17 because t,i the combination of ,al separation ,

between the transmission towers and the safety factors in the d of the towers, j Notwithstanding the above, with the Newington line out of service ation will have to  :

operate with the two remaining lines (Scoble Pond and Tewksbu .ch share the same l right of way for a small distaneet therefore, for this scenario, b = 72.3 which is for sites ,

with transmission lines on one right of way. This is the value used in the coping assessment. l i

b'RC Ol!ESTION 2:  ;

i ESW Grouning l

Provide information on the site specific data used to determine the ESW grouping. Delineate the differences between the grouping given in NUMARC 87 00 (ESW Group 4) and that determined using the site specific data (ESW Group 3).

NIIY RESPONSE:

i The ESW parameter is the annual probability of wind storms at the site with wind velocities [

greater than or equal to 125 mph. l As noted in NUMARC 87 00 this parameter is normally associated with the occurrence of ,

great hurricanes. The site r>pecific evaluation included both a harricane and a non hurricane (straight wind) component. For both components, a wind speed probability relationship was ,

developed which is applicable to the Seabrook Station site.  !

The straight wind. probability relationship is based on information from NUltEG/CR 2639 l

l (Reference 1). This report provides wind speed probability relationships for four long term  ;

stations along the Atlantic coast in the Seabrook Station region (two in Boston, MA and two {

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The straight wind. probability relationship is based on information from NUREO/CR.7639  !

(lteference 1). This report provides wind speed probability relationships for four long Ictm l stations along the Atlantic coast in the Seabrook Station region (two in lluston, M A and two i in Portland, MH). Ilosion and Portland are about equidistant from Scabrook, south and [

north, respectively. l l

Two of the relationships were adjusted flom 10 meter fastest mile to 30 meter fastest mile i i lues. The four station values were averaged and are considered to be representative of  !

she Seabrook Station region. The results are presented in Table 1. I i

Even though the data used to develop the straight wind probability relationship do include  !

some tropical storms, a separate hurricane wind relatiorahlp for the Scabrook Station region -t was developed, The hurricane evaluation is based on detailed studies which are fully i described in References 2, 3 and 4. These studies summarire the results of detailed j probabilistic hurricane wind studies. The 6tudies provide results for two locations near l Scabrook (25 miles south and 75 miler, north), input parameters at both locations were '

based on historic hurricane data. Data for the Scabrook site were obtained by interpolating between these two locations.

References 2 and 4 were used to develop a hurricane wind speed.piobability relation 6 hip for  :

the Seabrook site. Thn relationship was adjusted to yield a 30 meter fastest mile i relationship. Iteferences 3 and 4 were used to develop an independent estimate which was l also adjusted to a 30 meter fastest mile reference. The two relationships were averaged and i are representative of the Scabrook Station site. The results are presented in Table 2. l r

The annual probability of exceeding 125 inph at the site was determined for both the straight wind and the hurricane components. As noted in NUM ARC M7-00, the predominant  ;

component was the hurricane portion. Interpola' ion from Table 2 yields an annual l probability of 2.54x10 for a hurricane wind a 125 inph at the site. Extrapolation from Table 1 yields an annual probability of 1,54 x 10' for the straight wind component. [

The sum of the above two probabilities is 2.6x10' which is the annual expectation at the site of a fastest mile wind a 125 mph at 30 meters above grade, r i

The ESW data for Seabrook given in NUMARC 87-00 is, as noted, not verified, it is our  ;

understanding that documentation is also not available for review. Ilowever the site specific  ;

value presented her(in is based on published reports and uses data which is appropriate for t the Seabrook Station site a .d region.

RI:l'l:HI:NCION I?OR NilY Hi?SpONSI:S TO NHC Opl:STIONS (GHOUp I)

- 1. NUREG/CR-2639, llistorical Extreme Winds for the United States Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico Coastlines, M.J. Changery, NOA A,1982 ,

, 2, ilurricane Wind Speeds in the Unite l States by !!atts, Cordes, Russell, Shaver and Simiu, Nationni Itureau of Standards,1980 i

3. Design Wind Speeds in Regions Dominated Ily Tropicnl Cycloner, by Georgiou, ,

Davenport and Vickery, Journal of Wind Engineering, Elsevict Science Pub,1983 l I

4. Wind Effects on Structures, Second Edition, Simiu and Scanlan, Wiley & Sons,1986 i

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l TAllll 1 STR AIGitT WINibl'ROHAHil.lTY HEl.ATIONSilli'_

Annual 30 Meter l'robability Fastest Mile of IIxceedence Wind Speed (ntpj,d 0.5 55  ;

0.2 62 0.1 67 0.05 72 0.04 74

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t 0.02 78 O 01 82 t 0.005 87 4

0.002 93 0.001 97 ,

1 TAlllE 2 litf RRICANE WINI).PROll Allil,lTY REIATIONSill!'

Annual 30 Meter l'tobability Fastest Mile pf Exceedence Wind Sneed (mnh) 0.04 76.6 0.02 93.0 0.01 105.1

! 0.0005 153.6 1~

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NitC Olli'STIONS (GHOtiP 11)

11. COPING CA PAllit.lTY NRC Otll'STION It fondensnte inventor.y.

In your March 30, 1990, submittal, it is stated that a cooldown will be performed until the secondary side reaches a pressure of 250 psig. Liased on information from similar plants which plan to cooldown following Emergency Contingency Actions Procedure ECA 0.0, we estimate that about 170,000 gallons of condensate will be necessary to remove decay haat and cool down. Provide a calculation showing the amount of condensate necessary to cope with a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Silo event. Include condensate necessary for decay-heat removal, cooldown, steam-generator level shrinkage, sensible heat removal, etc.

,NilY R!:S PO N SI':

Tbc following analysis is provided to conform with the format indicated in NUMARC 87-00, Section 7.2.1. The amount of water required to support plant cooldown (C) has been updated to reflect steata generator volume shrink. As a result, the value of (C) has increased by 23,392 gal, it should be noted however, that this increase does not change the final conclusion as previously stated in the March 30, 1990 submittal l Reference (d)].

. Pt. ANT RATING AT 102% OF FULL POWER (A) = 3,479 MWt

. WATER REQUIRED TO SUPPORT COOLDOWN (C):

Water required to remove SENSillLE IIEAT: 30,790 gal The makeup volume to compensate for steam generator volume shrink can be quantified as follows:

Steam Generator (SG) Fluid Volume: 5902 f t" (Ref. Westinghouse Technical Manual No.1440 C316)

Specific Volume @ 1000 psia: v = .02159 f t*/lbm Specific Volume @ 250 psig: v = .01873 ft*/lbrn Delta y = (.02159 .01873) = .00286 f t*/lbm SG Volume Shrink:

(5902 ft' / .021$9 ft /lbm)(.00286 8

ft*/lbm)(7.48 gal /ft') = 5,848 gal.

The Total Shrink For (4) SG's: (5,848 gal)(4) = 23,392 gal.

(C) = (30,790 + 23,392) gal. = 54,182 gal.

. WATER FOR DECAY llI!AT REMOVAL (11) = A*(22.12 gal /MWt) + C 11 = 3,479 (22.12) + 54,182 11 = 131,137 gal.

. Technical Specification volume for the condensate storage tank (D) = 212,000 gallons (Reference Technical Specification 3.7.1.3)

Conclusion:

(D) is greater than (II), therefore, per the NUMARC guideline, adequate condensate inventory is available.

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NHC OUESTION 2 i t

i Cluss 10 llatterv Capaciti j i

UFSAll Table 8.3 5 indicates that the safety related batteries are designed to last for 2 [

hours. Provide the load profile and the method and assumptions (temperature factor, design '

margin, aging factor, etc.), including justifications, which were used to verify the battery capacity with load shedding for four hours, include justification for the loads aksumed for  :

individual pieces of equipment. If the calculations package will provide cornplete answers  !

to these questions, please provide the package. }

v NilY RESPONSEt  !

l The battery load profiles for the Station tilackout (Silo) four hour duty cycle are provided 7 as Attachments 1 and 2 to this enclosure. The differences between these profiles und the i 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> profiles given in the UFSAlt (Figure 8.3 $1) reflect the use of actual versur, rated  !

load for some loads and load shedding. The battery siring calculation which shows that the (

batteries have sufficient capacity followed the guidelines provided in ll!E!! 48$. This j included a temperature correction factor to account for the batteries operating at the j minimum temperature anticipated during the SHO and an aging factor to ensure that the [

batteries still have sufficient capacity at the end of design life. Specific design margin was not included since this margin is included only in initial battery siring calculations to allow ,

for future load growth. The load current used for the individual pieces of equipment was i taken from the sizing calculation for the UFSAlt load profiles which were based on review (

of the devices in each circuit.  !

As described in UFSAll Secuan B.3.2.1, Scabrook has four safety related batteries and four DC puses with two batteries / buses per train. The normal configulation iri to have cach  !

battery feed its respective bus (one battery /one bus). Ilowever, per Technical Specifications, i it is permissible to operate for up to 30 days with the crosstie closed between the two bur.cs within a train, i.e., one battery feeding two buses (one battery /two buses). The battery siting calculation covers both the one battery /one bus configuration and the one battery /two bus configuration even though there is a very low probability of a Silo occurring at the tame j time as being in the one battery /two bus configuration.  !

Ni C Ot1ESTION 3r  !

Compressed All f I

a. According to the plant UFSAR, the atmosplerie steam dump valves (ADVT.) have i back up air supplies which are capable of supplying "10 complete cycles lopenings) {

in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />." Is the back up compressed air supply capable of opening each ADV l 10 timcs or all ADVs a total of 10 timer? If this supply is able to open each ADY {

10 times in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, then there are sufficient reserves to cope with a 4 hout Si1O '!

event. If, however, the back up supply is only capable of opening all ADVr. a total of 10 times, then there might not be enough air to cool down, provide information on the method whith will be used to depressurize the primary system using the ADVs  ;

if there is only enough air to open the ADVs a total of 10 times.

b. Will the valves be operated from the control room? If they are to be operated from [

other locations, will the area where they will be operated be habitable and accessible  !

during an Silo event? j i

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NilY lil:SPONSI:t

a. For station blackout, the Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDYs) will remain operational utillring the emergency high pressure bottled gas supply. This bottled gas supply was sired for ten (10) complete valve cycles of adj, ASDV, considerinC a period of ten hours to accour.t for system lokage. The siring was verified by pre-operational test.

b. The ASDVs will be operated from the hiain Control Room during station blackout.

NHC OUl'STION 4;,

Provide heat up calculations for each aren listed in the hiarch 30, 1990 submittal. This should include the following:

a. a summary description of the method and any computer program used,

b. the major assumptions made in ca:h calculation (i.c, initial temperature, heat load, equipment or personnel heat load, inverlor efficiency, etc.), 'ncluding justifications for the assumptions,

c. the calculated final .emperature and the EO temperature.

NilY Hl:SPONSl;;,

Effects of 1,oss of 11VAC Areas containing equipment required for safe shutdown during station blackout are identified as follows:

. Emergency Feedwater Pumphouse

. Vital Switchgear Room ( A and 11) and llatter , < oonis

. Containment Structure

- hiain Steam /Feedwater Pipe Chase (East and West)

+ hiain Steam /Feedwater Pipe Chase / Electrical Room (East)

- hialn Steam /Feedwater Pipe Chase Staltwell (West)

. hicchanical Penetration Area Electrical Tunnels (Electrical Penetration Area)

- hiain Control Room Of these areas, the following do not have a significant heat load: Vital Switchgear Room (A and II) and 11attery Rooms, hiain Control Room, and the Electrical Tunnels, llowever, an environmental evaluation for all the listed arcas is provided.

No spurious actuations resulting in system isolation or misalignment will occur as a result of elevated temperatures during station blackout. The fire protection Appendix R safe shutdown evaluation only considers spurious actuations r.s a result of hot shorts from melted cable insulation, This is not credible for station blackout.

Detailed calculations will be available for review at Seabrook Station. The following is a summary of all pertinent information for each area of concern:

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FFW Pumn llouse a) METilOD OF ANALYSIS: NUM ARC Sec. 7.2.4 b) TOTAL ROOM SURFACE AREA (M'): 525 INITI AL TEMPERATURE ('F): 104 l Maximum area temperature based on design basis outside ambient temperature (88'F)]

TOTAL 11 EAT LOAD (watts): 16,143 fTotal heat released by turbine and steam  ;

piping, a' .! instrumentation equipment) l c) FINAL TEMPfu .TURE (*F): 128  !

LOWEST OUALIFIED TEMPERATURE FOR EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN Tills 1 AREA ('F): 165

• Switchnear Room A & 11 and linttery Rooms a) METilOD OF ANALYSIS: NUM ARC Sec. 7.2.4 for Switchgear Room A&l3. The final temperature in the llattery Rooms is assumed to be equal to the steady strie temperature of the surrounding space, i.e., the Switchgear Rooms. The flattery  ;

Rooms have no significant internal heat load. [

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'E b) TOTAL ROOM SURFACE AREA (. '): Switchgear Room A 1,588 Switchgear Room 11 1,197 r

INITI AL TEMPER ATURE ('F): 104 [ Maximum area temperature based on design basis outside ambient temperature (88'F)]

TOTAL liEAT LOAD (watts): Switchgear Room A 15,900 Switchgear Room 13 8,396  ;

I These heat loads are 10% of thr: normal operating heat loads at power. This methodology has been used in safety related calculations for loss of all ac power.  !

c) FINAL TEMPERATURE ('F): Switchgear Room A 114 -

Switchgear Room 11 112 i LOWEST QUALIFIED TEMPERATURE FOR EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN Tills ,

AREA ('F): 130 (Mild Environment)

I Containment Structure l

a) METilOD OF ANALYSIS: MAAP 3.0B Computer Code [sovere accident (Level

l. 2 PRA)] with station blackout parameter file. This code allows temperature l ' calculation by compartment as described below.

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b) TOTAL ROOM SURFACE AREA (M'): Ref. MAAP 3.011 Parameter File j l

INITIAL TEMPERATURE ('F): 120 l Maximum area temperature based on design I basis outside ambient temperature (88'F)]

TOTAL llEAT LOAD (watts): Ref. M AAP 3.0B Parameter File.

The heat loads are based on plant shutdown from full power. The major contributors ,

to Containment heat up are Reactor Coolant System, Main Steam System and the 5 I assumed primary system leakage into Containment (366.5 gpm).

c) FINAL TEMPERATURE ('F): (annular compartment) 184 (upper compartment) 188 (lower compartment) 204- ,

(cavity) 227 l LOWEST OUALIFIED TEMPER ATURE FOR EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN TIIIS AREA ('F): _. (annular compartment) 255 (upper compartment) N/A j (lower compartment) 280 1 (cavity) 300 I l

The upper compartment contains no equipment that is required for SBO.

i MS/FW Pipe Chase Enst & West) a) METliOD OF ANALYSIS: Evaluated utilizing existing plant specific calculations (modified to suit SBO conditions) for steady state equilibrium heat balance. The l analysis for the West Chase envelopes that of the East Chase.

- b) - TOTAL RGOM SURFACE AREA (M'): West Chase 917 INITIAL TEMPERATURE ('F): 130 [ Maximum area temperature based on design basi; outside ambient temperature (88'F)]

TOTAL IIEAT LOAD (watts): 135,700 @ 135'F Chase Temperature 112,250 @ 206'F Chase Temperature Heat load is reduced because heat transfer from steam piping decreases as Chase temperature increases.

c) FINAL TEMPERATURE ('F): 206 4

LOWEST GUALIFIED TEMPERATURE FOR EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN TlilS .

AREA (*F): 225 {

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MS/FW Pine Chase Electrical Room i

a) htETilOO OF ANALYSIS: NUh1 ARC Sec. 7.2.4, modified to account for external thermal influences.

hi TOTAL ROOh! SURFACE AREA (ht'): 121 INITIAL TEh1PERATURE ('F): 118.5 (The initial internal temperature for this room is between 50*F and 104'F. Ilowever, this temperature has been adjusted to account for an internal wall surface at a higher temperature.)

TOTAL llEAT LOAD (watts): 1,777 This load consists of transmission heat gain and heat from instrumentation equipment.

c) FINAL TEhtPER ATURE ('F): 132 LOWEST OUALIFIED TEhiPERATURE FOR EQUIPh1ENT LOCATED IN Tills AREA ('F): 130 (hiild Environment)

This temperature pertains to the htSIV cabinets (qualification temperature for mild environment). htSIV closure will be performed in accordance with either Step 2 or Step 10 of Emergency Contingency Actions Procedure ECA0.0. In either case, htSIV closure will occur prior to the start of lond shedding which has been determined to begin within 30 minutes after the onset of station blackout. It would therefore be reasonable to conclude the h1Siv closure would necessarily occur within the first 30 minutes following the reactor trip. Once established, main steam isolation would be maintained for the duration of the event. The initial temperature *in the Electrical Room will be between 50*F and 104*F, and is expected to reach 132 F in four hours, it is expected that the temperature at 30 minutes into the event would be substantially less than 130*F. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the htSIV cabinets will be capab!c of performing the intended function during station blackout.

MS/FW Pine Chase SinirwelL(wed),,

a) hiETilOD OF ANALYSIS: NUh1 ARC Sec. 7.2A b) TOTAL ROOh! SURFACE AREA (ht'): 334 INITIAL TEh1PERATURE ('F): 130 [hinxirrium area temperature based on design basis outside ambient temperature (88'F)]

TOTAL 11 EAT LOAD (watts): 598 This is the internal heat load from lighting. There are no other internal heat loads for this area.

c) FINAL, TEh1PERATURE ('F): 13.1 LOWEST OUALIFIED TEhtPERATURE FOR EQUIPh1ENT LOCATED IN TI-ilS AREA ('F): 139 l

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> e Mechnnital Penetrailp_n Area (MPA.11 a) METilOD OF ANALYSIS: NUMARC Sec. 7 2.4, modified to account for external  ;

thermal influences. ,

1 b)- TOTAL ROOM SURFACE AREA ( M'): 38 (For exposure to 104'F external temperature) 279 (For exposure to temperature gecater than 104'F)

INITIAL TEMPER ATURE ('F): 104 (Default temperature when less than 104) 118 l (Weighted average for wall surfaces greater than inillal internal temperature) j TOTAL llEAT LOAD (watts): 10,308  !

This is the internal heat load from piping.

e)- FINAL TEMPERATURE (*F): 141 f LOWEST QUALIFIED TEMPERATURE FOR EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN Tills AREA ('F): 250  ;

Mechanical Penetration Area (MPA 2) a) METilOD OF ANALYSIS: NUM ARC Sec. 7.2.4, anodified to account for external thermal influences.  ;

b) TOTAL ROOM SURFACE AREA (M'): 41 (For exposure to 104'F external I temperature) 38 (For exposure to temperature greater than 104'F)

INITIAL TEMPER ATURE ('F): 104 (Default temperature when less than 104)118 l (Weighted average for wall surfaces greater than initial internal temperature) l TOTAL 11 EAT LOAD (watts): 3,556 f This is the internal heat load from piping and instrumentation equipment.

e)- FINAL TEMPERATURE ('F): 142 e i

LOWEST OUALIFIED TEMPERATURE FOR EQUIPMENT ')CATED IN Tills AREA ('F): 250 i

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' Mechanical Penetratlan Aren (MPA 3)-  :

I a) METHOD OF ANALYSIS: NUM ARC Sec. 7.2.4, modified to account for external ,

thermal influences. l b). TOTAL ROOM SURFACE AREA (M'); 75.5 (For exposure to temperature greater i than 104*F) i INITIAL TEMPERATURE (*F): 118 (Weighted average for wall surfaces greater L than initial internal temperature) i 11 ,

I

,r

_____s ... . _ . _ . , . . _ _ . _ ~ _ , . _ _ , , _ ,. , _ . , , ,

TOTAL llEAT LOAO (watts): 1,508 i This is the internal heat load from piping, c) FINAL TEMPERATURE ('F): 135 LOWEST QUALIFIED TEMPERATURE FOR EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN Tills AREA ('F): 250 Mechanical Penetration Aren (MPA 4) a) METilOD OF ANALYSIS: NUMARC Sec. 7.2.4, modified to necount for external l thermal influences.  ;

b) TOTAL ROOM SURFACE AREA (M'): 10 (For exposure to 104*F external temperature) 65 (For exposure to temperature greater than 104'F) 1 INITIAL TEMPERATURE ('F): 104 (Default temperature when less than 104) 117 (Weighted average for wall surfaces greater than initial internal temperature)

TOTAL 11 EAT LOAD (watts): 2,014 This is the Internal heat load from piping and instrumentation equipment, c) FINAL TEMPER ATURE ('F): 136 LOWEST OUALIFIED TEMPERATURE FOR EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN Tills AREA ('F): 250 hiechanical Penetration Aren (MPA 5) a) METIIOD OF ANALYSIS: NUMARC Sec. 7.2.4, modified to account for external thermal influences, b) TOTAL ROOM SURFACE AREA (M'): 74 (For exposure to 104'F external temperature) 14 (For exposure to temperature greater than 104'F)

INITI AL TEMPERATURE ('F): 104 (Default temperature when less than 104) 112 (Weighted average for wall surfaces greater than initial internal temperature)

TOTAL liEAT LOAD (watts): 1,863 This is the internal heat load from piping, c) FINAL TEMPERATURE ('F): 123 LOWEST GUALIFIED TEMPERATURE FOR EOUlFMENT LOCATED IN Tills AREA ('F): 250 12

i

.. r  ;

I:ltetrical Tunnels (1:lectrient Pencirntion_ Arryl a) METilOD OF ANALYSIS: Evaluated utiliring existing plant specific calculations for steady state equilibrium heat balance. [

b) TOTAL ROOM SURFACE AREA (M'): 140 (A tunnel) .

81 (D tunnel)

INITIAL TEMPER ATURE (*F): Calculation based on 88'F outdoor ambient temperature and the various temperature influences from adjacent areas. ,

I TOTAL llEAT LOAD (watts): 384 (A tunnel) 419 (D tunnel) t This is the internal heat load from electrical equipment. l c) FINAL TEMPER ATURE ('F): 111.3 i LOWEST GUALIFIED TEMPERATURE FOR EOlllPMENT LOCATED IN Tills l AREA ('F): 130 (Mild Environment)  !

Afnin Control Hoom i a) METilOD OF ANALYSIS: Evaluated utilizing existing plant specific station blackout l calculations for steady state equilibrium heat balance.

b) TOTAL ROOM SURFACE AREA (M'); 563 (for heat gain) t INITIAL TEMPERATURE ('F): 75 l Maximum area temperature based on design basis outside ambient temperature (88'F)] i e

TOTAL llEAT LOAD (watts): 8,748 This load consists of loads from instrumentation, lighting and occupancy.

t c) FINAL TEMPERATURE ('F): <120 LOWEST OUALIFIED TEMPER ATURE FOR EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN Tills  :

AREA ('F): 130 (Mild Environment) l NRC OUFSTION 5: l Containment Isolation Provide a list of all valves which cannot be excluded by the five criteria given in RO 1.155.

Provide either justification for the exclusion of all of the remaining valves or the manual actions which will be required to ensure that they are fully closed, or can be closed if needed, j I

13 m -,

~

L ,

NilY RESPONSra )

UFSAR Table 6,2 83 served as the source for initial identification of Containment Isolation valves, it should be noted that this table contains numerous valves that are not considered l essential for realntaining Containment integrity during design basis accident conditions. The -l scope of valves considered essential for maintaining Con'ainment integrity during an accident is encompassed by; t

1 ,

1) ulves that automatically close on Phase A or B Contaic nent isolation signal  ;

nd, '

2) valves that are included in the Containment Integrity Monthly and Cold Shatdown Surveillance Procedure (OX 1456.76), which lists valves that are not automatically closed on either a Phase A or Phase B isolation signal but are considered casential for maintaining Containment integrity.

Attachment 3 was developed from UFSAR Table 6.2-83 and identifies the valves which could not be excluded per RG 1.135 exclusion criteria. This table lists a number of valves (shown with asterisks) who's closure is not considered essential in establishing Containment integrity, as discussed hbove. None of the valves shown with an asterisk fall under the jurisdiction of Technical Specification 3/4.6.1, Surecillance Requirement 4.6.1.1 (a), nor are they listed in the Containment Integrity Monthly and Cold Shutdown Surveillance Procedure (CX 1456.76). The -remaining valves liste.1 in the table (without asterisks) are addressed by procedure for Containment isolation during station blackout.

Although listed in UFSAR Table 6.2-83, specific consideration was givce to valves CBS-V-8 'and CBS V-14 in order to determine the proper designation for these valves. These Containment sump isolation valves would be in the closed position at all times except : luring surveillance testing or in the event of an accident, sucl. as a LOCA, a main steam line break or a feedwater ut, break inside Containment. In the event cf av accident such as this, these valves vould tr + ned to allow for Containment sump recirculation when Containment

-isolation would raost probably be activated. Also, according to the American National Standard for Containment Isolation, tht se valves are technically not Containment isc:ation valves (reference - ANS 56.2/ ANSI N271-1976, Figure B 8, Page 45; Note 561, Page 36).

Furthermore, the UFSAR list of Containment isolatinn valves (Table 6.2 83) ti.kes exception to the applicable general design criteria for these valves (see the second column of Table 6.2-83). This is demonstrated by the fact that these valves do nct fit into any of the categories outlined in UFSAR. Section 6.2.4.1(d) which defines the applicable criteria for identifying Containment isolation valves.

Based on the above, CBS V 8 and CBS-V-14 are not considered Containment isolation valves for station blackout.

l No valves that have been identified as Containment isolation valves of concern for station blackout are required to be operable during a station blackout. Onte the valves are closed or verified closed, they will remain in that positicn for the duration of the event.

1 l

l l

ATTACllMiXr 1 l-bk 389.8#. 1 MIN , 60 AMPS

] E2 ] 317.91 RANDOM LOAD g 86 l

286.51 p

+- 1 i 40 240 1 15 TIME (MINUTES) (4 HRS)

OI.8,BINEv _OADS OF BUSES 11B AND 11D G

W n_

E2 85 31.9 I I I I I i 1 15 40 240 (4 HRS)

TIME (MINUTES)

BL 11D LOAD PROFILE

$ 1 MIN , 60 AMPS WG Eg 357.91 RANDOM LOAD 3$ ] 286.01 p I i l 1 15 40 TIME (MINUTES) 240 (4 HRS)

BUS 118 . LOAD FROFILE STATION BLACKOUT 4 HOUR LOAD PROFILES

1 ATTACIDiENT 2 l 1058.67

] 986.77 F-zg y n. 1 MIN , 60 AMPS

@k 386.77 RANDOM LOAD  !

O" l 276.57 p 1 l l l 1 15 40 240 (4 HRS)

TIME (MINUTES) ]

COMBINED LOADS OF BUSES 11A AND 11C 1

I l

$g 655.1 W n.

E2 85 55.1 l l I 1 15 40 240 (4 HRS)

TIME (MINUTES)

BUS 11C LOAD PROFILE wS 403.57 1 MIN , 60 AMPS Eg ] 331.67 RANDOM LOAD

@$ l 303.07 p l l l 1 15 40 TIME (MINUTES) 240 (4 HRS)

BUS 11A LOAD PROFILE STATION BLACKOUT 4 HOUR LOAD PROFILES

. _ . - _ - ..m .. . . _ _ .- __ .-

ATTACHMENT 3 t

, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES OF C0NCERN FOR STATION BLACKDUT

========-===============..======================s3-=s============s.===============ss-.s=-====

Comtnmnt. Isol. - Description . Valve Op. : Location : Normal Pos : Power Source - Control  : Remote Pos.: Coments  :

Vivs. Of Concern: - MOV/ Air :I.C./D.C :Open/Clcsed .  : Location :Ind. Avail e  :

.:RH-V-14.26 *, ': RHR Cold leg Inj.  : MOV -

0.C.  : Open NA -

Local  : Yes/MCB :Not Reqd. For Contnmnt. Integrity:

3

CBS-V-11.17 *  : Containment Spray  : Mov  : 0.C.  : Closed + NA  : Local No :Not Read. For Contnmnt. Integrity:

Not Reqd. For Contnmnt. Integrity:

SI-V-138.139 * :High Head Injection MOV  : 0.C. . Closed . NA -

Lc al  : No

SI-V-114 *  : Cold Leg Inj & Recirc . MOV  : 0.C. -

Open NA  : Local  : Yes/MCB :Not Reqd. For Contnmnt. Integrity:

CS-V-143 *  : Normal Charging Path MOV . 0.C.  : Open . NA -

Local - ' No :Not Peqd. For Contnmnt. Integrity:

.:RC-V-23,88 * :RCS Hot leg To RHR MOV  : I.C. -

Closed . NA - Local . Yes/MCB :Not Reqd. For Contnmnt. Integrity:

.  :{ Shutdown Cooling] - -

RH-V-32,70 * :RHR Hot leg Inj. - MOV 0.C.  : Closed

• NA Local . Yes/MCB :Not Reqd. For Contnmnt. Ir.tegrity:

SI-V-77.102 *  : Hot Lee Rectrc.  : NOV  : 0.C. Closed hA  : Local - Yes/MCB :Not Reqd. For Contnmnt. Integrity:

CS-V-150  : Letdown Isol. Air -

0.C. Open - DC;PP-1118:CKT 16 - MCB-DF-2 : Yes/MCB : Valve Can Be Closed From MCB -

CAP-V-1.4 :Contnet. Air Purge .

A,r  : 0.C. -

Closed . DC;PP-112A;CKT 16 : MCB-CR . Yes/MC8 : Valve Can Be Closed From MCB -

COP-V-1.4 :Contnmt. On-Line Purge: Air. 0.C. -

Closed DC;PP-112A:CKT 3 - MCB-CR  : Yes/MCB  : Valve Can Be Closed From NCB  :

$VLD-V-82 :RC Drains.Isol. Air -

0.C. - Open . DC;FP-112A;CKT 5 : KB-BR-4 : Yes/MCB : Valve Can Be Closed From MCB

RMW-V-30 :Centnmnt. Meader Isol. Air ~ -

0.C. Closed : DC;PP-1128;CKT 11 : MCB-CF

• Yes/MCB : Valve Can Be Closed From MCB  :

ss:s s == === = ===== ==== = ==== == = ==ssese ssss s s sssses===3sse mas sensmes== =s ussssssssssssssssssss ssssa sss======ssss=== = = =============s=3===== = = ================

• Although These Valves Are Considered Containment Isolation Valves. Their Closure Is Not Essential In Establishing Containment Integrity i In kn Accident As Defined In The Technical Specifications Section 3/4.6., Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.1 (a). Therefore, It Is Not Essential That These Valves Be Identified In The Station Blackout Procedures. These Valves Are Not Listed In The Containment Integrity Monthly (Procedure DX 1456.76). This Procedure Lists All Non-Phase A.B Automatic Valves That Are Verified Closed For Demonstrating Containment Integrity.

EXCLUSION CRITERIA

[1] Valves Normally Locked Cicsed During Normal Operation

[2] Valves That Fail Closed On loss Of AC Power;

[3] Check Valves;

[4] Valves In Ncn-Radioactive Closed-Loop Systems Not Expected ' ? - Breached In A Station Blackout (With The Exception Of Lines That Comunic. ;rectly Vith The Containment Atmophere): And.

[5] All Valves Less Than 3-Inch Nominal Diameter

[ NOTE] All Other Valves Listed In FSAR Table 6.2-o3 Were Eliminated Using The Above Listed Exclush n Criteria.