IR 05000293/1987030

Partially Withheld Enforcement Conference Insp Rept 50-293/87-30 on 870909 (Ref 10CFR73.21).Major Areas Discussed:Status of Security Program & Allegations Re Deficiencies in Security Program

ML20151C674
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	03/30/1988
From:	Keimig R, Lancaster W, Galen Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151C662	List: ML20151C658 ML20151C674
References
50-293-87-30-EC, NUDOCS 8804130129
Download: ML20151C674 (4)

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REGION I

Report N /87-30 Docket No. 50-293-License No. DPR-35 Licensee: Boston Edison Company 2 O raintree hit) Office Park Braintree, Massachusetts 02184 Facility Name: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Meeting At: N3C Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania Meeting Date: jeyembbr9,J987 Prepared by:

.AM b YCanc ster, Physical Security 7 - 3 - t 6r date Insketo I AA i

s i/J, s G. C.~ Smith, Safeguards Specialist ' date Approved by: [cp _f.Ja-ps Keimig'TfiTe afeguards Section, date

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i veeting Summary: An Enforcement Conference was held at NRC Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, on September 9, 1987, to discuss the findings of a Special Inspection, No. 87-30. The special inspection concerned the status of the security program, allegations relative to deficiencies in the security program, and the circumstar:es that resulted in the degradati n of a vital area barrier. The loss of Protected Area (PA) and Vital Area (VA) keys, guard

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j force response to PA and VA alarms, repetitive security concerns and security organization supervisory training were also discusse The meeting was attended by NRC and licensee management and lasted approximately three hour .

8804130129 880405 PDR ADOCK 05000293 O DCD

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Details Participants Boston Edison Company R. Bird, Senior Vice President, Nuclear R. Ledgett, Executive Assistant to the Vice President, Nuclear K. Roberts, Nuclear Operations Manager R. Grazio, Field Engineering Section Manager C. Higgins, Security Section Manager G. Edgar, Licensing Counsel Nuclear Regulatory Comm.ission J. Allan, Deputy Regional Administrator L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Reactor Projects Brarch 1 J. Wiggins, Chief, Projects Section IB T. Martin, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards J. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch 0. Gromley, Project Engineer D. Holody, Enforcement Specialist J. Gutierrez, Regional Counsel J. Lyash, Resident Inspector W. Kushner, Safeguards Scientist G. Smith, Safeguards !pecialist W. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector Security Concerns At the start of the conference, Mr. Martin summarized Region I's understanding of the circumstances relative to the licensee's identification of a degraded vital area barrier, which led to NRC Special Inspection No. 50-293/87-30 on July 13-17, 193 The inspection was conducted to review the licensee's actions af ter finding an opening in the VA barrier and to determine the validity of allegations made to the NRC concerning the licensee's security program. The results of that Special Inspection were as follows: the licensee's program to upgrade the security program is on schedule; two instances of failure to maintain the integrity of a VA barrier were identi-fied; one of the allegations reviewed resulted in identification of one of the two VA barrier failures; and, the other allegations were not substantiate Mr. Martin expressed concern about the recurrence of VA barrier violations, the quality of work being performed on VA barriers, the licensee's under-standing of the purpose of the security program, and the response to PA and VA alarms by the security forc _ - _ ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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The licensee stated that the 22" pipe penetration point going from the PA into the VA had been created when contractor personnel removed a blank flange without the licensee's authorization. The licensee further stated that the consequences of this event to the health and safety of the public were minimal because the plant was not operating at the time of the event and there was no vital equipment inside the area. As a result of this incident, BECO management has taken the following actions to prevent a reoccurrence: retraining of. supervision that reemphasizes the importance of VA barriers; procedural changes concerning work controls; and counsel-ling of the supervisors involved in the inciden The licensee stated that on July 8,1987, a VA door deficiency had been discovered that would have permitted unauthorized access into a V The licensee further stated that the unit was defueled at the time of discovery, therefore, the consequences of this event to the health and safety of the public was minimal. ' The licensee noted that a contributing cause to this violation was insufficient follow-up on suggestions given to a 1985 con-tractor review of Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) security issues. As a result of the incident, the licensee stated that a VA door survey would be conducted and would address the adequacy of all VA door The results of this study will be provided to the NRC upon completio The licensee stated that on August 3, 1987, a contract security officer had misplaced a set of PA and VA key The security officer, his super-visor and the licensee's shif t supervisor failed to implement security contingency procedures immediately upon notification of the event. Com-pensatory security measures were implemented and the missing keys were found on August 4, 1987. The licensee stated that when BECO management discovered the loss of the keys, searches were conducted of both PA and VA areas and the computerized alarm histories for these areas were analyzed to ensure that no unauthorized access had been made. The licensee stated that there was minimal impact on the health and safety of the public because no penetrations to the PA and VA's had occurred. The licensee stated that they have retrained all security personnel to ensure that the correct actions are taken when either PA or VA keys are los The licensee also stated that the three above mentioned events (VA pipe penetration, VA door deficiency, loss of keys) were isolated cases of security events and were not indicative of a programmatic breakdown. The licensee feels that its security program is effectiv The licensee also provided a handout (see Attachment 1) detailing each event, the ca se of the event, the consequences of the event, and the corrective actions taken to prevent reoccurrenc ____.____________m__

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ATTACHMENT 1 ATTACHMENT 1 TO THIS REPORT CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION AND IS BEING WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE