ML20151C674

Partially Withheld Enforcement Conference Insp Rept 50-293/87-30 on 870909 (Ref 10CFR73.21).Major Areas Discussed:Status of Security Program & Allegations Re Deficiencies in Security Program

ML20151C674
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	03/30/1988
From:	Keimig R, Lancaster W, Galen Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151C662	List: ML20151C658 ML20151C674
References
50-293-87-30-EC, NUDOCS 8804130129
Download: ML20151C674 (4)

See also: IR 05000293/1987030

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-293/87-30

Docket No. 50-293-

License No. DPR-35

Licensee: Boston Edison Company

2 O raintree hit) Office Park

Braintree, Massachusetts 02184

Facility Name: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

Meeting At: N3C Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania

Meeting Date: jeyembbr9,J987

Prepared by:

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G. C.~ Smith, Safeguards Specialist ' date

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Keimig'TfiTe afeguards Section, date

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veeting Summary: An Enforcement Conference was held at NRC Region I, King of

Prussia, Pennsylvania, on September 9, 1987, to discuss the findings of a

Special Inspection, No. 87-30. The special inspection concerned the status of

the security program, allegations relative to deficiencies in the security

program, and the circumstar:es that resulted in the degradati n of a vital

area barrier. The loss of Protected Area (PA) and Vital Area (VA) keys, guard

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force response to PA and VA alarms, repetitive security concerns and security

organization supervisory training were also discussed.

The meeting was attended by NRC and licensee management and lasted

approximately three hours.

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8804130129 880405

PDR ADOCK 05000293

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Details

1. Participants

A. Boston Edison Company

R. Bird, Senior Vice President, Nuclear

R. Ledgett, Executive Assistant to the Vice President, Nuclear

K. Roberts, Nuclear Operations Manager

R. Grazio, Field Engineering Section Manager

C. Higgins, Security Section Manager

G. Edgar, Licensing Counsel

B. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.ission

J. Allan, Deputy Regional Administrator

L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Reactor Projects Brarch 1

J. Wiggins, Chief, Projects Section IB

T. Martin, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

J. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch

0. Gromley, Project Engineer

D. Holody, Enforcement Specialist

J. Gutierrez, Regional Counsel

J. Lyash, Resident Inspector

W. Kushner, Safeguards Scientist

G. Smith, Safeguards !pecialist

W. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector

2. Security Concerns

At the start of the conference, Mr. Martin summarized Region I's understanding

of the circumstances relative to the licensee's identification of a degraded

vital area barrier, which led to NRC Special Inspection No. 50-293/87-30

on July 13-17, 1937. The inspection was conducted to review the licensee's

actions af ter finding an opening in the VA barrier and to determine the

validity of allegations made to the NRC concerning the licensee's security

program. The results of that Special Inspection were as follows: the

licensee's program to upgrade the security program is on schedule; two

instances of failure to maintain the integrity of a VA barrier were identi-

fied; one of the allegations reviewed resulted in identification of one of

the two VA barrier failures; and, the other allegations were not substantiated.

Mr. Martin expressed concern about the recurrence of VA barrier violations,

the quality of work being performed on VA barriers, the licensee's under-

standing of the purpose of the security program, and the response to PA

and VA alarms by the security force.

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The licensee stated that the 22" pipe penetration point going from the PA

into the VA had been created when contractor personnel removed a blank

flange without the licensee's authorization. The licensee further stated

that the consequences of this event to the health and safety of the public

were minimal because the plant was not operating at the time of the event

and there was no vital equipment inside the area. As a result of this

incident, BECO management has taken the following actions to prevent a

reoccurrence: retraining of. supervision that reemphasizes the importance

of VA barriers; procedural changes concerning work controls; and counsel-

ling of the supervisors involved in the incident.

The licensee stated that on July 8,1987, a VA door deficiency had been

discovered that would have permitted unauthorized access into a VA. The

licensee further stated that the unit was defueled at the time of discovery,

therefore, the consequences of this event to the health and safety of the

public was minimal. ' The licensee noted that a contributing cause to this

violation was insufficient follow-up on suggestions given to a 1985 con-

tractor review of Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) security

issues. As a result of the incident, the licensee stated that a VA door

survey would be conducted and would address the adequacy of all VA doors.

The results of this study will be provided to the NRC upon completion.

The licensee stated that on August 3, 1987, a contract security officer

had misplaced a set of PA and VA keys. The security officer, his super-

visor and the licensee's shif t supervisor failed to implement security

contingency procedures immediately upon notification of the event. Com-

pensatory security measures were implemented and the missing keys were

found on August 4, 1987. The licensee stated that when BECO management

discovered the loss of the keys, searches were conducted of both PA and VA

areas and the computerized alarm histories for these areas were analyzed

to ensure that no unauthorized access had been made. The licensee stated

that there was minimal impact on the health and safety of the public because

no penetrations to the PA and VA's had occurred. The licensee stated that

they have retrained all security personnel to ensure that the correct actions

are taken when either PA or VA keys are lost.

The licensee also stated that the three above mentioned events (VA pipe

penetration, VA door deficiency, loss of keys) were isolated cases of security

events and were not indicative of a programmatic breakdown. The licensee

feels that its security program is effective.

The licensee also provided a handout (see Attachment 1) detailing each

event, the ca se of the event, the consequences of the event, and the

corrective actions taken to prevent reoccurrence.

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ATTACHMENT 1

ATTACHMENT 1 TO THIS REPORT CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS

INFORMATION AND IS BEING WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC

DISCLOSURE