ML20151C674
| ML20151C674 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1988 |
| From: | Keimig R, Lancaster W, Galen Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151C662 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-293-87-30-EC, NUDOCS 8804130129 | |
| Download: ML20151C674 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000293/1987030
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-293/87-30
Docket No. 50-293-
License No. DPR-35
Licensee: Boston Edison Company
2 O raintree hit) Office Park
Braintree, Massachusetts 02184
Facility Name:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Meeting At: N3C Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania
Meeting Date:
jeyembbr9,J987
Prepared by:
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G. C.~ Smith, Safeguards Specialist
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afeguards Section,
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veeting Summary: An Enforcement Conference was held at NRC Region I, King of
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Prussia, Pennsylvania, on September 9, 1987, to discuss the findings of a
Special Inspection, No. 87-30. The special inspection concerned the status of
the security program, allegations relative to deficiencies in the security
.
program, and the circumstar:es that resulted in the degradati n of a vital
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area barrier.
The loss of Protected Area (PA) and Vital Area (VA) keys, guard
force response to PA and VA alarms, repetitive security concerns and security
organization supervisory training were also discussed.
The meeting was attended by NRC and licensee management and lasted
approximately three hours.
.
8804130129 880405
ADOCK 05000293
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Details
1.
Participants
A.
Boston Edison Company
R. Bird, Senior Vice President, Nuclear
R. Ledgett, Executive Assistant to the Vice President, Nuclear
K. Roberts, Nuclear Operations Manager
R. Grazio, Field Engineering Section Manager
C. Higgins, Security Section Manager
G. Edgar, Licensing Counsel
B.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm.ission
J. Allan, Deputy Regional Administrator
L. Bettenhausen, Chief, Reactor Projects Brarch 1
J. Wiggins, Chief, Projects Section IB
T. Martin, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
J. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch
0. Gromley, Project Engineer
D. Holody, Enforcement Specialist
J. Gutierrez, Regional Counsel
J. Lyash, Resident Inspector
W. Kushner, Safeguards Scientist
G. Smith, Safeguards !pecialist
W. Lancaster, Physical Security Inspector
2.
Security Concerns
At the start of the conference, Mr. Martin summarized Region I's understanding
of the circumstances relative to the licensee's identification of a degraded
vital area barrier, which led to NRC Special Inspection No. 50-293/87-30
on July 13-17, 1937.
The inspection was conducted to review the licensee's
actions af ter finding an opening in the VA barrier and to determine the
validity of allegations made to the NRC concerning the licensee's security
program. The results of that Special Inspection were as follows:
the
licensee's program to upgrade the security program is on schedule; two
instances of failure to maintain the integrity of a VA barrier were identi-
fied; one of the allegations reviewed resulted in identification of one of
the two VA barrier failures; and, the other allegations were not substantiated.
Mr. Martin expressed concern about the recurrence of VA barrier violations,
the quality of work being performed on VA barriers, the licensee's under-
standing of the purpose of the security program, and the response to PA
and VA alarms by the security force.
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The licensee stated that the 22" pipe penetration point going from the PA
into the VA had been created when contractor personnel removed a blank
flange without the licensee's authorization.
The licensee further stated
that the consequences of this event to the health and safety of the public
were minimal because the plant was not operating at the time of the event
and there was no vital equipment inside the area. As a result of this
incident, BECO management has taken the following actions to prevent a
reoccurrence:
retraining of. supervision that reemphasizes the importance
of VA barriers; procedural changes concerning work controls; and counsel-
ling of the supervisors involved in the incident.
The licensee stated that on July 8,1987, a VA door deficiency had been
discovered that would have permitted unauthorized access into a VA.
The
licensee further stated that the unit was defueled at the time of discovery,
therefore, the consequences of this event to the health and safety of the
public was minimal. ' The licensee noted that a contributing cause to this
violation was insufficient follow-up on suggestions given to a 1985 con-
tractor review of Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) security
issues. As a result of the incident, the licensee stated that a VA door
survey would be conducted and would address the adequacy of all VA doors.
The results of this study will be provided to the NRC upon completion.
The licensee stated that on August 3, 1987, a contract security officer
had misplaced a set of PA and VA keys.
The security officer, his super-
visor and the licensee's shif t supervisor failed to implement security
contingency procedures immediately upon notification of the event.
Com-
pensatory security measures were implemented and the missing keys were
found on August 4, 1987.
The licensee stated that when BECO management
discovered the loss of the keys, searches were conducted of both PA and VA
areas and the computerized alarm histories for these areas were analyzed
to ensure that no unauthorized access had been made.
The licensee stated
that there was minimal impact on the health and safety of the public because
no penetrations to the PA and VA's had occurred.
The licensee stated that
they have retrained all security personnel to ensure that the correct actions
are taken when either PA or VA keys are lost.
The licensee also stated that the three above mentioned events (VA pipe
penetration, VA door deficiency, loss of keys) were isolated cases of security
events and were not indicative of a programmatic breakdown. The licensee
feels that its security program is effective.
The licensee also provided a handout (see Attachment 1) detailing each
event, the ca se of the event, the consequences of the event, and the
corrective actions taken to prevent reoccurrence.
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ATTACHMENT 1
ATTACHMENT 1 TO THIS REPORT CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS
INFORMATION AND IS BEING WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE