ML20154H884
| ML20154H884 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1988 |
| From: | Bauser M FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO., NEWMAN & HOLTZINGER |
| To: | Bright G, Cole R, Cotter B Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#288-6339 OLA, NUDOCS 8805260099 | |
| Download: ML20154H884 (53) | |
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B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Chairman Glen O. Bright Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Board Panel !
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory )
Cornission Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Coraission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: In the Matter of Florida Power and Light !
Company (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1)
Docket No. 50-335-OLA i
i Dear Members of the Board Enclosed, for the information of the Board, is a copy of Amendment No. 30 to Facility Operating License No.
NPF-16 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2. This amendment ,
permits Unit No. I spent fuel to be transferred from the Unit l No. 1 spent fuel pool to the Unit No. 2 spent fuel pool up until the time that the Unit No. I pool is reracked. The amendment was referenced on page 15 of the Board's Memorandum e and Order, dated April 20, 1988, in connection with proffered !
Contention 4, and was issued May 10, 1988. ,e Sincerely, !
i 0800260099 080517 PDR O
ADOCK 05000335 PDR .:,2^,
- ] ) , y--";
Michael A. Bauser i
MABacja f
- cc Attached Service List
} %g> ! !
N May 17, 19 Bf g D '/
d a UNITED STATES OF AMERICA sf DocKrico NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD lt MAY l 81988* 3 DocrETING &
SERVICE BMNClf SECY NRC U
)
In the Matter of )
)
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-335-OLA
)
(St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 1) )
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of a Letter to the Members of the Board from Michael A. Bauser, dated May 17, 1988, were served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid and properly addressed, on the date shown below:
B. Paul Cotter, Jr., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
! Glenn O. Bright Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
! Washington, D.C. 20555 l
l Dr. Richard F. Cole
! Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Washington, D.C. 20555 Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 l.
2-Atomic Safety and Licensing Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Adjudicatory File Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Docket U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 (Two Copies)
Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Chief, Docketing and Service Section
.(Original plus two copies)
Benjamin H. Vogler, Esq.
Office of General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Campbell Rich 4626 S.E. Pilot Avenue Stuart, Florida 34997 Dated this 17th day of May, 1988.
/LLIJ Michael A. Bauter Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. s 1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone: (202) 955-6600 -
Counsel for Florida Power & Light Company f
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- UNITED STATES 3,3" , @ f.1 NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION g WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
.g, [ May 10, 1988 Docket No. 50-389 E 3. D 0 Mr. W. F. Conway Senior Vice President-Nuclear M MAY1iISM Florida Power & Liaht Company P. O. Box 14000 _ _
[b Ll ED.._,-_. _ _U U Lb o Juno Beach, Florida 33408 Newman & Ho!t7inger. P.C.
Dear Mr. Conway:
SUBJECT:
ST. LUCIE UNIT ?. - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: TRANSFER OF SPENT FUEL (TAC NOS. 61938 AND 61939)
The Comission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.30 to Facility Operating
'icense No. NPF-16 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2.
. This amendment consists of chances to the license in response to your application dated July 2, 1986, as supplemented by letters dated February 6 and 9, March 2 and 27 and April 28, 1987.
This amendment permits Unit No I spent fuel to be transferred from the Unit No. I spent fuel pool to the Unit No. 2 spent fuel pool.
Your application proposed a change in the license to pennit possession of Unit No.1 byproduct and special nuclear materials (in the form of Unit No.1 spent fuel assemblies) at Unit 2. The enclosed amendment reflects your proposed license change. In addition, we have added a license condition that permits the transfer up until the time that the Unit No I spent fuel pool is reracked. This added license condition is based upon our "need" evaluation and is contained in the Environmental Assessment that was forwarded to you by letter dated February 22, 1988. The license condition was discussed with and agreed to by your staff.
Lastly, our review concludes that (1) shipping cask NAC-1 is unsuitable for use
, in transferring St. Lucie 1 fuel assemblies, (2) shipping cask NLI-1/2 is i suitable as long as the initial uranium-235 enrichment is less than or equal to 3.7%, and (3) placement of St. Lucie Unit No. I fuel assemblies in either
, Region I or Region 11 racks of the St. Lucie Unit No. 2 spent fuel pool is
' acceptable when the provisions of St. Lucie Unit No. 2 Technical Specification 5.6.1.a.3 are met.
l l
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fir. ' W. F. Conway May 10, 1988 A copy of the Safety Evaluation is enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.
Sincerely, 4
//
l yt E. G. ourigny, roje Manager Project Direct ate I -2 Division of Reactor Projects-I/II
- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosures-
- 1. Amendment No. 30 to NPF-16
- 2. Safety Evaluation cc w/ enclosures:
See next page .
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Mr. W. F. Conway Florida Power & Light Company St. Lucie Plant cc:
Mr. Jack Shreve Jacob Daniel Nash ,
Office of the Public Counsel Office of Radiation Control Room 4, Holland Building Department of Health and Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd.
Resident inspector Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 c/o U.S. NRC 7585 S. Hwy A1A Regional Administrator, Region II Jensen Beach, Florida 34957 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Executive Director for Operations State Planning & Development 101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900 Clearinghouse Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Office of Planning & Budget Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold F. Reis. Eso.
Newman & Holtzinger 1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036 J ohn T. Butler, Esq.
Steel, Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, Florida 33131-2398 Administrator Department of Environmental Regulation Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Weldon B. Lewis, County Administrator l
St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue, Room 104 Fort Pierce, Florida 33450 l Mr. Charles 3. Brinkman, Manager Washington - Nuclear Operations -
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
- 7910 Woodmont Avenue '
Bethesda, Maryland 20814 l
l
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/
b' % UNITED STATES
' .' ~'% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ORLA!400 UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF ORLAllDO, FLORIDA AND FLORIDA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY DOCKET NO. 50-389 ST. LUCIE PLAliT UNIT h0. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 30 License No. NPF-16
- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The et al.appthe(lication fordateo licensee), amendment July 2, 1986,by Florida Power & Light Company, as supplemented February 6 and 9, March 2 and 27, and April 28, 1987, complies with the standards ano requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amenced (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. .
- 2. Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. NPF-16 is amended as follows:
A. Section 2.B.5 is changed to read:
- 5. Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70, FP&L to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2.
B. License Condition 2.C(19) is added as follows:
- 19. Unit No. I spent fuel may be transferrea from the Unit No. 1 spent fuel pool to the Unit No. 2 spent fuel pool, as necessary, until completion of all activities related to the increase in capacity of the Unit No. I spent fuel pool to 1706 spent fuel assemblies. Spent fuel assemblies transferred from the Unit i spent fuel pool to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool may remain in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool or be transferred back to the Unit 1 spent fuel pool.
- 3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR TH NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Herbert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate 11-2 Division of Reactor Projects-1/Il Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date Of Issuance: May 10, 1988
b e
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATING TO THE TRANSFER OF UNIT NO.1 SPENT FUEL BETWEEN UNIT NO. 1 AND UNIT NO. 2 0F THE ST. LUCIE PLANT RELATING TO AMENDMENT NO. 30 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-16 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, ET AL.
' ST. LUCIE PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-335 AND 50-389 l
l l
1 1
e
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Table of Contents Page 1.0 ' INTRODUCTION 1 2.0 EVALUATION 2 2.1 Criticality 2 2.2 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage Arrangements 3 2.3 Cask Movement and Path of Travel Inside Units 1 and 2 4 i
2.4 Cask Movement and Path of Travel Outside Units 1 and 2 4 2.5 Integrity of Spent Fuel Storage Pool Cooling 5 2.6 Integrity of Critical Safety Systems and Equipment 6 2.7 Occupational Radiation Exposure 7 '
2.8 Radiological Accident Analysis Evaluation 8 2.9 Spent Fuel Handling and Load Path Structural Integrity 9 2.10 General Design Criterion 5 Concern - Sharing of Structures, 10 Systems, and Components 2.11 Findings 11 3.0 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION COMMENTS 11
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
13
5.0 CONCLUSION
13
6.0 REFERENCES
15
- i. -
l
Attachment:
Technical Evaluation Report by Franklin Research Center l
l t . _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . -
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated July 2,1986, Florida Power and Light Company (FP&L, the licensee) requested approval to transfer spent fuel from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. Additional information was submitted by letters dated February 6 and 9,1987, March 2 and 27,1987, and April 28, 1967 and in telecons on February 19 and 23, 1987 in response to staff requests.
Facility Operating License No. DPR-67 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, currently permits storage of Unit 1 spent fuel in the Unit 1 spent fuel pool located in Fuel Handling Building Number 1. Similarly, Facility Operating License No. NPF-16 for the St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2, currently permits storage of Unit 2 spent fuel in the Unit 2 spent fuci peol located in fuel Handling Building Number 2. The Unit 1 spent fuel pool has a maximum capacity of 728 fuel assemblies. As a result of the Unit I refueling outage which ended in April 1987, there is no longer enough storage space in the pool to completely off-load the Unit i reactor core. The next Unit I refueling outage is scheduled for the summer of 1988. Additional spent fuel assemblies will be added to the pool at that time, compounding the problem. By letter dated June 12, 1987, the licensee proposed a license amendment to rerack the Unit 1 spent fuel pool, which would significantly increase the storage capacity of the pool. The reracking was authorized on March 11, 1988; it will take several months to complete. The completion of reracking of the spent fuel pool will obviate the need to transfer Unit 1 fuel to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool.
However, as described above and in the staff's Environmental Assessment issuea on February 22, 1988, spent fuel will have to be transferred if the rerack cannot be completed over the next few months.
The Unit 2 spent fuel pool has a maximum licensed capacity of 1076 fuel assemblies. Since Unit 2 was licensed in 1983 cnd is currently in its .
fourth operational cycle, there is a considerable amount of excess capacity in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool at this time.
The Fuel Handling Buildings are approximately 300 feet apart. The spent fuel pools do not comunicate with each other. In order to store Unit 1 spent fuel in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool, a fuel shipping cask would have to be used to transfer the spent fuel between the fuel pools. The licensee plans to use an approved shipping cask to transfer one fuel assembly at a time from Unit 1 to Unit 2.
The licensee does not have the authority to transfer spent fuel between units and store Unit i fuel in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. Thus, the licensee submitted an application for Commission review ano approval. The licensee proposed the Unit 2 license be amended as follows: "Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, FP&L to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2."
l
, 2 On October 20, 1986, a notice was published in the Federal Register (51 FR 37242),
which described the licensee's application for amendment. The notice also stated that any person whose interest might be affected by the proceeding might file a written petition to intervene by November 19, 1986. By letter dated November 6, 1986, Mr. John Paskavitch requested a hearina on the licensee's application. An Atomic Safety and Licensing Board was subsequently convened. The staff's discussion related to this matter is part of the following safety evaluation (Section 3.0).
Mr. Paskavitch's hearing request was dismissed by the ASLB in a Memorandum and Order dated January 16, 1987. 25 NRC 32. See discussion in a 3.0 infra.
In a separate but related matter, the Board wrote a letter of concern to the Counsels for the NRC staff and licensee dated December 9, 1986. The letter raised a concern in regard to General Design Criterion (GDC) 5, Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50. GDC 5 states the following:
Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components. Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions, including, in the event of an accident in me unit, an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining units.
The licensee addressed the Board's concern in a letter dated February 6, 1987.
This letter is considered by the staff to be part of the amendment application.
The staff's discussion related to the Board's concern is part of the following safety evaluation (Section 2.10).
The following contains the staff's evaluation of the licensee's request for amendment. The licensee determined that the only change needed was an authori-zation in the license itself to allow Unit 1 spent fuel to be possessed at Unit 2.
2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 Criticality
! The two areas of the criticality aspects of transferring fuel from the St. Lucie Unit I spent fuel pool to the St. Lucie Unit 2 spent fuel pool that require evaluation are: (1) the removal of fuel from the St. Lucie Unit 1 spent fuel pool and its placemes t in a shipping cask, and (2) the placement of St. Lucie Unit 1 spent fuel assemblies in the St. Lucie Unit 2 spent fuel pool.
By letter dated February 9, 1987, the licensee stated that shipping cask Model
' Nos. NAC-1 and NLI-1/2 are the only casks that meet the 25 ton Technical Specification 3.9.13 limit for the St. Lucie Unit I cask crane. These.two casks can each hold only one PWR fuel assembly. However, shipping cask NAC-1 is I currently approved for use with natural uraniun fuel only. The Certificate of Compliance No. 9183, Revision No. 4 dated July 30, 1986, also imposes other restrictions on the radioactive material that may be transported in shipping cask NAC-1. The PWR fuel assemblies stored in the St. Lucie linit 1 spent fuel pool do not meet the limitations imposed on the shipping cask. Therefore, the staff concludes that shipping cask NAC-1 is not acceptable for the purpose nf I transporting spent fuel assemblies from the St. Lucie Ur.it 1 spent fuel pool to the St. Lucie Unit 2 spent fuel pool.
i
3 Shipping cask HLl-1/2 has been approved for the shipment of a PWR fuel assembly whose average initial enrichment is no greater than 3.7 weight percent uranium-235. Other restrictions are noted in Certificate of Compliance No.
9010, Revision 17, dated August 28, 1986. Technical Specification 5.6.1.a.3 permits the storage of fuel assemblies in the St. Lucie Unit I spent fuel pool whose average initial enrichment can be up to 4.0 weight percent uranium-235.
Therefore, the licensee will need to develop procedural controls for the transfer of fuel assernblies from the St. Lucie Unit I spent fuel pool to a shipping cask so that the enrichment limit, in particular, and other limits, in general, for shipping cask NLi-1/2 are met. On the basis of appropriate procedural controls for the transfer of fuel assemblies from the St. Lucie Unit I spent fuel pool to shipping cask NL1-1/2, the staff concludes that the criticality aspects of this shipping cask, with one St. Lucie Unit I spent fuel assembly having an average initial enrichment of less than or equal to 3.7 weight percent uranium-235, are acceptable.
The staff's Safety Evaluation Report dated October 16, 1984 on the St. Lucie Unit 2 spent fuel pool states that Combustion Engineering (CE) 14x14 fuel assembly designs with uranium-235 enrichment up to 4.5 weight percent may be stored in the Region I racks. The evaluation further states that Region 11 racks can be used to store fuel which has experienced sufficient burnup such that storage in Re The Advanced Nuclear Fuels Corporation (ANFC)gion I racks is not required., formerly the EXXON Nuclear Company design for St. Lucie Uait 1 is mechanically, thermal-hydraulically, and neu-tronically simil" to the CE 14x14 fuel assembly design. Both the CE and ANFC fuel assemblies have uranium-235 enrichment of less than or equal to 4.0 weight percent uranium-235. Therefore, the staff concludes that the transfer of St. Lucie Unit I fuel assemblies from the shipping cask to the St. Lucie Unit 2 spent fuel pool is acceptable with regard to criticality limitations as follows: (1) the fuel assemblies may be placed in the Region 1 rack without further consideration, or (2) the fuel assemblies may be placed in the Region il racks provided that the initial uranium-235 enrichment and the assembly burnup meet the enrichments of St. Lucie Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.6.1.a.3.
As discussed above, the staff has made the following conclusions concerning the criticality aspects of transferring fuel assemblies from the St. Lucie Unit 1 >
spent fuel pool to the St. Lucie Unit 2 spent fuel pool:
(1) Shipping cask NAC-1 is not acceptable for shipping St. Lucie Unit I fuel assemblies.
(2) Shipping cask NL1-1/2 is acceptable for shipping St. Lucie Unit I fuel assemblies with initial uranium-235 enrichment less than or equal to 3.7% weight percent.
(3) The placement of St. Lucie Unit I fuel assemblies in the St. Lucje Unit 2 spent fuel pool Region I racks is acceptable; placennt in Region 11 racks is acceptable when the provisions of St. Lucie Unit 2 TS 5.6.1.a.3 are met.
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2.2 Spggt,,Fyg}_3ssg.m,b]L Stggagg,$rgagggmggts The St. Lucie Unit I spent fuel pool currently contains a mixture of CE and ANFC fuel. The use of ANFC fuel at St. Lucie 1 was approved by the staff in a letter dated March 1, 1984 St. Lucie Unit 2 has used only CE fuel during its first two cycles of operation. In a letter dated March 13, 1984, the licensee stated that the Unit 2 spent fuel racks are designed to accommodate storage of Unit I fuel. These racks were approved by the staff in a letter dated October 16, 1984 In a letter dated February 9,1987, the licensee provided the following odditional informatio.: regarding the spent fuel transfer:
- a. The initial batch of Unit I spent fuel assemblies to be transferred to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool would be that batch offloaded during the first refueling cutage (April-May 1978).
- b. It is expected that only 15 to 25 spent fuel assemblies would be subject to transfer to Unit 2 should a Unit 1 full core off-load be necessary.
- c. The Unit I spent fuel assemblies would be put into the Unit 2 rack positions closest to the cask laydown area in order to be consistent with Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.1.
- d. The shipping cask to be used to transfer Unit I spent fuel assemblies will meet the 25 ton limit per TS 3.9.13 for the Unit I cask crane.
- e. Transfer of Unit I spent fuel back to Unit I will follow the identical path from Unit 2.
The staff concludes that the spent fuel assembly storage arrangements described above are acceptable. It should be noted that the licensee's statement, that only 15 to 25 spent fuel assemblies would be subject to transfer, assumes that the transfer takes place before the 1988 refueling outage and that the spent fuel pool is not reracked before that time. Considering the possibility that the pool will not be reracked in 1988, the staff, in its Environmental Assessment, used an upper limit of 100 spent fuel assemblies to be transferred in evaluating occupational dose.
2.3 Cask Hovement and Path of Travel inside Units 1 and 2 Unit I spent fuel assemblies will be transferred into the Unit 2 spent fuel pool in a fuel shipping cask having a nominal weight of 25 tons or less when fully loaded. This conforms with Unit 1 TS 3.9.13, which limits the load that may be handled by the spent fuel cask crane to a maximum of 25 tons. The corresponding limit for the Unit 2 crane (Unit 2 TS 3.9.12) is 100 tons.
Loads in excess of 2,000 pounds are prohibited from travel over irradiated fuel in the Unit I spent fuel pool per Unit 1 TS 3.9.7. A corresponding load limit for Unit 2 of 1600 pounds is indicated in Unit 2 TS 3.9.7. A Unit I spent fuel assembly weighs less than 1,300 pounds (less than the above TS limit for either unit), and therefore, Unit I spent fuel assembly travel over either spent fuel pool is acceptable.
5 Crane and cask movement arrangements are described in Section 9.1 of the Unit I and Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs). The staff previously concluded that St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 are in conformance with the heavy loads handling criteria of NUREG-0612 "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," Sections 5.1.1 and 5.3 by letters dated March 4,1985 (St. Lucie Unit 1) and April 2,1985 (St. Lucie Unit 2). This review included movement of a 25-ton cask within the Units 1 and 2 buildings, and thus a further review in this regard is unnecessary. Thus, the staff concludes that the cask movements and path of travel inside the buildings of both units are acceptable fer the proposed transfer of Unit I spent fuel to Unit 2.
2.4 Cgsk,dgygmggt,ggy,Pgth,9 f ,J[gyg],h ts!yg,Ugfts,1,ggy_2 in their submittals dated February 9,1987 and March 2,1987, the licensee stated that an evaluation had been performed for a spent fuel trans-shipment utilizing a 25-ton cask along a path starting at the Unit I cask loading area and traveling to the Unit 2 cask leading area. This path coincides with a portion of the intermodal cask transporter path previously evaluated for effects upon underground structures and utilities. The spent fuel trans-shipment path road surface is paved with Portland cerrent concrete or asphaltic concrete. Two tre.nsport vehicles were considered in the evaluation. The reactions of the two transport vehicles were compared to the maximum reactions of the intermodal cask transporter that was previously evaluated. Since the reactions of the intermodal cask transporter were greater than the reaction for either of the two transport vehicles, the intermodal cask transporter evaluation is considered to be an enveloping evaluation. The stress analysis which was perforrred indicated that safety-related (Category 1) components located beneath the path of travel, including missile protection slabs, underground facilities (pipes and conduits), manholes and manhole covers, have the capability to withstand the prescribed sustained and live loads with an acceptable margin of safety.
The licensee also indicated that to reduce the likelihood of a cask crop accident, the roadway will te inspected for general deterioration so that it can be repaired, if necessary, prior to the transport of spent fuel. The' l shipping cask will also be adequately secured to the transport vehicle. To l further reduce the possibility of a cask drop, the following additional features are provided:
- a. Conservative design margins in the lifting components.
l l b. Redundant braking systems for hoists.
1
- c. Periodic tests and inspections of the cranes, f
1
- d. Use of qualified crane operators and riggers,
- e. Use of specific operating and administrative procedures. .
l The licensee's evaluation concerning the structural integrity of the spent fuel trans-shipment path has also been reviewed by the staff and is addressed in Section 2.9 of this safety evaluation. The licensee has also evaluated the l
l
. 6 potential radiological effects of a cask drop outside the fuel handling building in the Unit 1 FSAR, Section 9.1.4 The staff evaluation of this issue is contained in Section 2.8. Thus, the staf f concludes that the cask movement and path of travel outside Units I and 2 are in accordance with staff guidelines and are, therefore, acceptable.
2.5 integrity _of_ Spent _ Fuel _ Storage _Pooljooling The ability of the spent fuel storage pool to maintain an adequate water level following damage to the pool floor resulting from a postulated free fall drop of a fuel shipping cask was considered by the licensee in the St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 FSARs. The licensee stated the following in their submittal dated February 9, 1987:
"a. For both Units 1 and 2, the cask is physically prevented and administratively prohibited from traveling over the spent fuel pool outside the cask storage area.
- b. Section 9.1.4.3 of the Unit 1 FSAR postulates two cask drop accidents for the Unit I spent fuel pool, a vertical and tipped cask drop. The vertical cask drop into the cask storage area has been analyzed to determined if the leak-tight barrier of the pool can be breached. The results of the analysis indicate that the leak-tight integrity is maintained for a 25 ton cask drop. Technical Specification 3/4.9.13, "Spent Fuel Cask Crane," provides assur-ance that the Unit I fuel cask crane does not handle loads in excess of 25 tons. A tipped cask drop has also been considered and the analysis results found to be acceptable,
- c. A concrete wall to the top of the Unit I spent fuel pool separates the cask storage area from the spent fuel storage area. The wall prevents a water level reduction over the spent fuel assemblies even if a dropped fuel cask causes damage to the pool or pool liner in the cask storage area.
- d. Unit I spent fuel assemblies would be transferred to Unit 2 spent fuel pool rack positions in conformance with Unit 2 TS 5.6.1."
The staff previously concluded in Supplement No. 2 to the St. Lucie Unit 1 SER dated March 1,1976, that the cask drop accident for a cask not exceeding 25 tons will not result in a breach of the leak-tight integrity of the fuel pool, I and a 25-ton single element spent fuel cask drop anywhere along its travel l path will not result in unacceptable release of radioactivity or damage to safety-related equiptrent. Further, the staff evaluation concerning the St.
Lucie Unit I spent fuel pool reracking (Amendment No. 22) dated March 29, 1978 stdted that the consequences of fuel handling accidents in the spent fuel pool are not changed from those presented in the earlier safety evaluation, and are acceptable. Thus, the staff evaluations for St. Lucie Unit I dated March 29, i 1978 (Amendment No. 22), May 8, 1975 (Supplement I to SER) and November 8, 1974 (original SER), which found the spent fuel cooling system to be acceptable, are still valid. The staff acceptance of the St. Lucie Unit 2 spent fuel pool cooling and spent fuel handling systems is contained in the evaluations dated October 1981 (original SER), April 1983 (Supplement 3 to SER) and October 16, 1984 (Amendment No. 7). Thus, the staff concludes that the integrity of spent fuel pool cooling capability will be maintained during the spent fuel transfer, i
7 2.6 Integrity of Critical Safety Systems and Equipment As noted previously, the staff concluded in Supplement No. 2 to the St. Lucie Unit 1 SER dated March 1, 1976 that "a 25-ton single element spent fuel cask drop can be tolerated anywhere along its travel path without resulting in an unacceptable release of radioactive or damage to safety-related equipment.
Since a cask drop accident can be tolerated without unacceptable consequences, the applicant's approach to cask drop protection is, therefore, acceptable."
In addition, the staff subsequently concluded in its evaluation dated March 29, 1978 concerning the reracking of St. Lucie Unit 1 that the above conclusion remains unchanged.
The staff SER dated October 1981 for initial licensing of St. Lucie Unit 2 stated that "the cask travel within the fuel handling building is limited to the opening in the building roof through which the hoist cables must pass, thus preventing cask travel over any portion of the spent fuel pool and over any safety-related equipment. A cask drop is very unlikely due to the cask crane design features such as upper hoisting limit switches, dual stopping and event of a cask drop, the cask would fall into the cask pool which could damage the floor of the cask pool but would not damage the spent fuel pool and therefore, the requirements of General Design CHterion 61, ' Fuel Storage and Handling and Radioactivity Control,' and the guioelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13,
' Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis,' are satisfied for handling of the spent fuel cask." The staff SER dated October 16, 1984 concerning the reracking of the St. Lucie Unit 2 spent fuel pool stated that this conclusion remains unchanged.
As mentioned in Section 2.4, the staff evaluation of the integrity of safety-related components buried under the cask path of travel between Units 1 and 2 is addressed elsewhere (!.ection 2.9). Thus, the staff concludes that the integrity of critical safety systems and eouipment is not compromised for the proposed spent fuel transfer.
2.7 Occupational Radiation Exposu_re ,
The staff has reviewed the licensee's plan to transfer spent fuel assemblies between Units 1 and 2 with respect to occupational radiation exposure and '
concludes that design and operational considerations are in accordance with the ALARA policy. This conclusion is based on the licensee having considered the requirements of 10 CFR 20.101 and 20.103, and the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. The occupational exposure for the spent fuel transfer operation is estimated by the licensee to be less than 0.4 person-rem per spent fuel assembly. This estimate is based on the licensee's detailed break-down of occupational exposure for each phase of the transfer. The licensee considered the number of individuals performing a specific job, their occupancy time while perfonning this job, and the average dose rate in the area where the job is being performed. The spent fuel assemblies themselves contribute a negligible dose rate in the spent fuel pool area because of the depth of water in the spent fuel pool. One potential source of radiation is radioactive activation of corrosion products, called crud. Crud may be released to the spent fuel pool water because of fuel movement during the spent fuel assemblies' transfer. This could increase radiation levels in the vicinity of both spent fuel pools. The licensee expects that crud of the spent fuel pool walls for either unit will not present a significant contribution to exposure. Further, the spent fuel pool cleanup system will remove deposits in the spent fuel pool water and thereby reduce crud levels.
O
- 8 During the spent fuel assembly transfer, occupational exposure will be limited by the existing ALARA procedures and guidelines. The staff previously reviewed these ALARA procedures as part of its evaluation for the St. Lucie Unit I license extension and concluded that these procedures as described in the updated FSAR (radiation protection plans) are in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20 and are consistent with the criteria of Regulatory Guide 6.8.
The licensee also plans to use operating experience gained from previous spent fuel assembly transfers at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 to further minimize collective doses to workers. Further, NRC inspectors will monitor impicmenta-tion of the procedures, surveillance and radiation protection program (con-ference call with Region II on May 7, 1987). Therefore, the staff concludes that the radiation protection program is adequate for ensuring that occupa-tional radiation exposure during the spent fuel transfer will be maintained in accordance with ALARA guidelines, including Regulatory Guide 8.8, and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20.
2.8 Radiolocical Accident Analysis Evaluation The staff has reviewed the potential consequences of three postulated design basis accidents which involve spent fuel as part of the review of the accept-ability of the licensee's request to transport spent fuel from the St. Lucie Unit 1 spent fuel pool (SFP) to that of St. Lucie Unit 2. These accidents are the fuel handling, cask drop, and cask transport accidents. The radiological consequences of these accidents were previously analyzed by the staff and reported in SERs dated November 8, 1974, March 1, 1976, and March 29, 1978 for St. Lucie Unit 1, and October 1981 and October 15, 1984 for Unit 2. The previous fuel handling and cask drop accidents do not require reevaluation because the operations potentially involved with these accidents are not modifie:1 by the proposed license amendment. The cask transport accident previously involved t.e transport of 10 spent fuel assemblies following a 90 day cooldown period. The proposed license amendment would permit only the transport of a sing (le fuel assembly which could cc. cur at the earliest with aaccor 1490 hour0.0172 days <br />0.414 hours <br />0.00246 weeks <br />5.66945e-4 months <br /> cooldown fuel, before a shipping cask would be allowed into the cask compartment in the area of the SFP with greater than a third of the core in storage, is 1490 hours0.0172 days <br />0.414 hours <br />0.00246 weeks <br />5.66945e-4 months <br />).
The staff has reevaluated the consequences of the single fuel assembly cask transport accident. The accident assumptions are tabulated in Table 1. The calculated thyroid doses at the exclusion area and low population zone boundary l
were 18.4 and 7.2 rem, respectively. The whole body doses at both locations
( were less than 0.1 rem. These calculated doses are well below the guideline i
values stated in 10 CFR Part 100, i.e., 300 rem to the thyroid and 25 rem i to the whole body. Thus, the staff concludes that the consequences of postu-lated design basis accidents for the spent fuel transfer are acceptable.
1 l
9 Table 1 - Assumptions Used in The fuel Transport Accident Analysis Power Level 2754 Hwt Number of Fuel Rods Damaged 236 Total Number of Fuel Rods in Core 51,212 Radiation Peaking Factor of Damaged Rods 1.65 Shutoown Time 1490 hours0.0172 days <br />0.414 hours <br />0.00246 weeks <br />5.66945e-4 months <br /> Inventory Released from Damaged Rods 10% (iodines) 107.(noblegases other thcn Kr-85)'
30%(Kr-85)
Atmospheric Diffusion Factors (seconds per cubic meter) 0-2 hour X/Q Value at 1560 meters 1.6 E-4 0-8 hour X/Q Value at 1610 meters 6.3 E-5 2.9 Spent Fuel Handling and Load Path Structural Integrity The following evaluation addresses spent fuel handling and load path structural integrity. Franklin Research Center (FRC) assisted the staff in its review and prepared a Technical Evaluation Report (TER) in support of the staff's evolua-tion. The TER is attached and is considered a part of this safety evaluation.
- The licensee's July 2,1986 submittal stated that the proposed license l
amendment does not alter the type or amount of reactor fuel which can be i received, used, and possessed at the site for operation of St. Lucie Units 1 and 2. In the proposed license amendment for fuel pool reracking, dated March 13, 1984, it was stated that the St. Lucie Unit 2 spent fuel racks would be designed to accommodate the storage of Unit 1 fuel assemblies. The St. Lucie l
Unit 2 racks were approved by the NRC on October 16, 1984 (Amendment No. 7).
Therefore, storage of St. Lucie Unit 1 spent fuel in the Unit 2 racks is i
acceptable.
l The licensee's July 2,1986 submittai also stated that spent fuel from St. Lucie Unit 1 will be transferred to Unit 2 in a fuel shipping cask having a nominal
! weight of 25 tons or less when loaded. This statement conforms with Unit 1 l TS 3.9.13, which limits the load that may be handled by the spent fuel cask crane to a maximum of 25 tons. The corresponding limit for the Unit'2 spent fuel l
cask crane is 100 tons (Unit 2 T5 3.9.12). Thus, the spent fuel cask cranes of both units are capable of handling the spent fuel transfer load safely.
The method of handling of St. Lucie Unit 1 spent fuel assemblies during the transfer from Unit 1 to Unit 2 is described in the licensee's letter of March 2, 1987. FRC has evaluated the method and concluded that the method is adequate.
10 There are two possible cask transporter vehicles to be used for the proposed spent fuel transport between St. Lucie Units 1 and 2: the Rogers Vehicle (RV) and the other vehicle (0). The transport vehicle is only allowed to cross a designated path. The path affects a roadway, missile protection slabs, and underground facilities (i.e., pipes, electric conduit, manholes, and catch basins), all of which were originally designed for the load of an intermodal cask transporter. Wheel arrangements and the weight of the two cask transporters (RV and 0) proposed to be used and of the original intermodal trans-porter were provideo by the licensee. The information provided was sufficient to evaluate the safety of structures that would be affected by the loads of the transporter vehicles. The licensee reported that the stress analysis results indicated that all Category I structural components within the load path of the transporter vehicles have thc capability to withstand prescribed loads for the intermodal cask transporters with an acceptable margin of safety and for the RV and 0 transporters with an even higher margin of safety than that of the intermodal transporter. The weight and wheel arrangements were reviewed and escluated by FRC, which concluded that the RV and 0 transporters, which were proposed to be used, would produce less stress for the Category I structures than would the intcrnodal transporter, which was used originally for the design of Category I structu*es. Therefore, the roadway, missile protection slabs, and underground facilities (i.e., pipes, electric conduit, manholes, and catch basins) all have the capability to w thstand the loads of transport vehicles that would i
cross over them.
The licensee's July 2, 1986 submittal stated that the proposed amendment will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated since the configuration and operation of the plant remain essentially the same. What is not the same is that only a certain number of Unit I spent fuel sssemblies may be transferred to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool.
The Unit 1 assemblies that may be transferred have essentially the sanie mechanical design, enrichments, and burnup histories as those of the Unit 2 fuel assentlies evaluated and stipulated in the Unit 2 FSAR. Furthermore, the Unit 2 spent fuel racks were designed to accomodate the storage of the Unit 1 fuel. Since the previously approved designs of the two pools and the associated operating and accident analysis assumptions have not been changed, the hRC and its consultant, FRC, agree with the licensee that the proposed amendment will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The licensee's July 2,1986 submittal also stated that the proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since the change does not modify the config-uration or operation of the plant. It also stated that a spent fuel shipping cask that meets the packaging and transportation requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 will be used to transfer spent fuel assemblies, and potential fuel handling and cask drop accidents were evaluated in the FSARs of both units, including the potential drop of a cask outside the fuel handling building. Since the accidents of load handling and transport of the spent fuel have beenJevaluated I 6nd accepted by the previous accident analyses, the NRC and its consultant, FRC, agree with the licensee that the proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated and will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety of the plant.
11 Based on the review of the submittals by the licensee and of the TER by FRC, the staff has concluded that (1) the handling of spent fuel assemblies that has been proposed by the licensee is adequate, and (2) the load path proposed in the license amendment for transporting spent fuel assemblies from Unit 1 to Unit 2 has been found safe.
2.10 General Design Criterion 5 Concern - Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components By letter dated December 9,1986, the Atomic Safety and Licensing board raised a concern in regard to the General Design Criterion (GDC) 5. The Bucrd noted that the staff's October 1981 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1 (HUREG-0843) stated that, because there was (at the tinee) no sharing of spent fuel facilities between the two St. Lucie Units, the requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 5 were not applicable. The Board also stated that it appeared that GDC 5 would become applicable if the :
proposed amendment were to be approved.
By letter dated February 6,1987, the licensee addressed the Board's concern.
The licensee stated that GDC 5 only applies to situations in which a single structure, system, or component performs a safety function for more than one unit. In general, the purpose of GDC 5 is to assure that an accident at one unit will not significantly impair the ability of the structure, system, or component to perform its safety function for the other unit. The licensee .
further stated that GDC 5 does not apply in situations in which a structure, systen, or component is not being "shared" by more than one unit; i.e., where a structure, system, or component is not designed to perform a safety function '
for more than one unit at the same time. Thus, St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 will not share any structure, systen, or component which perfs -ms a safety function associated with storage of spent fuel at St. Lucie. Lastly, the licensee stated that GDC 5 does not apply to the St. Lucie spent fuel transfer amend-ment, and the statement contained in the staff's SER of October 1981 will remain valid after issuance of the amendment.
The staff has reviewed the licensee's discussion above regarding the applicability of GDC 5 to the proposed transfer of Unit 1 spent fuel to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. The staff cannot agree with the licensee that GDC 5 is not applicable for this practice because the Unit 2 spent fuel pool will now be shared for the purpose of storing spent fuel which is a safety function from the standpoint of protection against unacceptable radiological releases.
However, the staff concludes from the review of the licensee's information j that such sharing will not adversely affect the ability of the Unit 2 spent r fuel pool to perform its function since adequate storage and cooling are "
provided for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 spent fuel. Therefore, the staff concludes that the requirements GDC 5 are met.
2,11 Findings The staff has concluded that the transfer of Unit 1 spent fuel between the St. Lucie Unit 1 and 2 spent fuel pools is acceptable subject to the following conditions:
(1) Shipping cask NAC-1 is not acceptable for shipping St. Lucie Unit 1 fuel assentlies,
. 12 (2) Shipping cask NL1-1/2 is acceptable for shipping St. Lucie Unit 1 fuel assemblies as Icng as the initial uranium-235 enrich-ment is less than or equal to 3.7 weight percent, (3) The placement of St. Lucie Unit 1 fuel assemblies in St. Lucie Unit 2 spent fuel pool Region I racks is acceptable; placement in Region 11 racks is acceptable when the provisions of St. Lucie Unit 2 TS 5.6.1.a.3 are met, and (4) Based on need, as described in the introduction section of the evaluation, Unit 1 fuel may be transferred from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool until such time that the Unit 1 spent fuel pool is reracked.
3.0 PUBLIC COMMENTS On October 20, 1986, a notice was published in the Federal Register (51 FR 37242), which described the licensee's application for amendment. The staff proposed that the application did not involve a significant hazards considera-tion. The notice also stated that any person whose interest might be affected by the proceeding might file a written petition to intervene by November 19, 1986. By letter dated November 6,1986, Nr. John Paskavitch requested a hearing on the licensee's application. His letter consisted of one sentence which read:
"My request is for a hearing in Floriaa Power and Light's application to move some fuel in the St. Lucie nuclear plant Unit il to Unit #11." On November 20, 1986, an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board was established to rule on the request for hearing and to presiae over the proceeding in the event that a hearing was ordered. The licensee filed a response dated December 1, 1986, in opposition to the hearing request. The NRC staff filed a response on December 8, 1986, also opposing the hearing request. By Memorancum and Graer dated December 9,1986, the Board permitted Mr. Paskavitch to file an amended petition by December 24, 1986, setting forth with particularity his interest in the proceeding, how that interest might be affected by the results of the proceeding, and the specific aspect (s) of the proceecing as to which he wished to intervene. On December 10, 1986, Mr. Paskavitch filed a document entitled, "Petitioner's Reasons for a Request for Hearing " Mr. Paskavitch's request included a number of questions regarding the license amendment application. It contained no statement concerning his interest in the proceeding. The licensee and the NRC staff filed responses, oated January 9,1987 and January 5,1987, respectively. By Memorandum and Order dated January 16,1987, 25 hRC 32, the Board dismissed Mr. Paskavitch's hearing request and terminated the proceeding on the basis that Mr. Paskavitch's request failed to satisfy the intervention requirements of 10 CFR 2.714(a).
Even though the only request for hearing was denied and the proceeding was terminated, the staff reviewed Mr. Paskavitch's questions and provides the following responses.
Question 1: "What caused the need to shift spent fuel rods from one pool to another?" ,
The fuel transfer has not yet taken place, as the transfer requires staff review and approval. One aspect of the staff review and approval is the need to transfer fuel from Unit 1 to Unit 2. This need was addressed in Section 11 of c the staff's Environmental Asses'sment entitled "Identification of the Proposed Action" and in Section III entitled "Need for the Proposed Action."
, 13 Question 2: "how many rods will be relocated?"
The staff reviewed the licensee's application and assumed that for occupational dose calculation purposes, no more than 100 fuel asseablies would be moved from Unit I to Unit 2. The details of this evaluation are contained in Section IV.1 of the staff's Environmental Assessment entitled, "Occupational Radiation Exposure." Each fuel assembly contains a maximum of 176 fuel rods, and each asserbly will be transferred as a whole.
Question 3: "How many hours will be needed and in what time period to make the shift?" ',
4 The staff does nct evaluate how many people are ne"tded and in what time period to nake the shif t. This is a licensee oecision. The staff does evaluate the total dose to all personnel involveo in the projert in orcer to determine that the transfer meets ALARA dose guidelines. This etaluation is contained in Section IV.1 of the staff's Environmental Asses m nt entitled "0ccupational Radiation Exposure."
Question 4: "What will be the cost of the move?"
The staff does not address cost to the licensee in makir.g its determination as to the acceptability of the transfer. The staff does not kaon the answer to this question.
Question 5: "What will be the increase in radiation dosing to the workers moving the rods?"
This question was answered in Section IV.1 of the staff's Environmental Assess-ment entitled "Occupational Radiation Exposure."
Question 6: "What will be the increase in radiation cosing to the people living within 10 miles of the plant?"
This question was onswered in Section IV.2 of the staff's Environmental Assess-ment entitled "Public Radiation Exposure" for a person standing at the site boundary under riormal and accident conditions.
Question 7: "If (17 m/r) .017 REM is the allowable dose to the civilian populd-ation per year, should pregnant women and children be moved to the evacuation zone, the 10 mile limit during the move?"
ho; no offsite actions by citizens are recomended or needed.
Question 8: "Should potassium iodide pills be distributed to all pregnant women ano children in case of an accident during the transfer of the fuel rods?"
No; the staff does not see a need for distribution and use of potassium iodide pills.
4.0 ENVIR0hMENTAL M SIDERATION A Notice of Issuance of Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact relating to the proposed transfer of spent fuel from St. Lucie Unit No. I to Unit No. 2 was published in the Federal Register on February 26, 1988 (53FR5845).
i
., 14 S.0 CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the consideratio s discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission': regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the ;
health and safety of the public.
Date: May 10, 1988 Principal Contributors:
D. Fieno J. Ma J. Minns J. Raval -
- 1. Spickler E. Touris:.y
Attachment:
Technical Evaluation Report
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7.0 REFERENCES
Subject:
Proposed License Amendment, Spent Fuel Transfer.
- 2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, October 16, 1986, from A. C. Thadani (NRC) to C. O. Woody (FP&L),
Subject:
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration and Oppurtunity for Hearing.
Also: Federal Register Notice, bl FR 37242, October 20, 1986.
- 3. Letter from Mr. J. Paskovitch to Comission, US NRC, liovember 6,1986, '
Subject:
Request for Hearing.
- 4. Letter from Mr. J. Paskovitch to Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, US NRC, December 10, 1986,
Subject:
Petitioner's Reasons for a Request for Hearing.
- 5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, December 10, 1986, from E. G. Tourigny (NRC) to C. O. Woody (FP&L),
Subject:
Request for Additional Information.
- 6. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, January 23, 1987, from E. G. Tourigny (NRC) to C. O. Woody (FP&L),
Subject:
Request for Additional Information.
Subject:
Spent Fuel Transfer - GDC 5 Applicability.
Subject:
Spent Fuel Transfer.
Subject:
Spent Fuel Transfer.
Subject:
Spent fuel Transfer.
- 11. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, March 29, 1987, from E. G. Tcarigny (NRC) to C. O. Woody (FP&L),
Subject:
Request for Additional Inforn.ation.
Subject:
Spent Fuel Transfer - Occupational Exposures.
- 13. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, February 22, 1988, from H. N. Berkow (NRC) to C. O. Woody (FP&L),
Subject:
St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 -
Environmental Assessment Regarding Transfer of Unit No.1 Spent Tuel to Unit No. 2.
Also: Federal Register Notice, 53 FR 5845, February 26, 1988.
14 U.S. Hucitar Regulatory Comission, March 11, 1988, from E. G. Tourigny (NRC) to W. F. Conway (FP&L),
Subject:
St. Lucie, Unit No. 1 - Issuance of Amendment Re: Spent Fuel Pool Expansion.
us
I ATTACHMENT i
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TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT l 1
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l l N RC DOCKET NO. 50-38 9 F AC PROJECT C5506 NRO TAC NO. -- FRC ASSONMENT 26 :
} NRC CONTRACT N O. N RC-C3 81 133 FRCTASK 665 EVALUATION CT PROPOSED LICC!SE AMDIOMDIT REGAPCING SPCIT TUEL TFANSTER TI4RIOA eCWIR AND LIGHT CCMPA!."t ST. LUCIE CCiEFATING STATION UNIT 2 TER-C5506-665 Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission FAC Group Leader: A. okaily Weshington, o.C. 20555 NRC Lead Engineer: J . P.a JUhT 19, 1987 Thl report was prepared as an secount of work sponsored by an agency of the United State Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thersel, or any of their employees. makes e..sy warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liabliity or l responsibt!!ty for any third party's use, or the results of su:h ;se, of any information, appa.
retus, product or process dia:losed in this report, or represents that its was by such third l party would not infring e privatety owned rights. t Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by:
As A c4&lg Prir.cipal Author
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mum De'partment C)lrect@
o.te: c/19 /1489 o.ie: 64//'/B F i I o.ie: c,-n -n FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENTER DEVI$40N OF AtVIN/ CAL 1 PAN Mtm 6 satt mast MN M nel 9706D40POO 070619 CF ADOCK 05000339 CF ,
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TEA-C5506-665 CotCDCS Section Title Pace 1 ItCRCDUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 TECHNICAL DISCUSSION OF THE LICDiSEE'S SATETY EVALUJ. TION . . 3 2.1 Evaluation of the Licensee's Original Submittal . . . 3 2.1.1 Comparison of Unit I ruel Assembly Design with That >
of Unit 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1.2 Design Adequacy of Unit 2 Spent ruel Pool and Racks to Accocrodate Storage of Unit 1 ruel Assee.blies . . . . . . . . . . . B 2.1.3 Spent ruel Transfer. . . . . . . . . 10 2.1.4 Safe Load Path . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2 Evaluation of the Licensee Responses to the NRC's Request for Addit aonal Inforeation. . . . . . . . . 12 2.2.1 Structural Data of the Spent fuel Shipping Cask. . 12 2.2.2 Structural Design Data Pertinent to the Transport Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.2.3 Structural Details of Missile Protection Slabs and Underground racilities . . . . . . . . 16 2.2.4 Stress Analysis Results of Missile Protection Slabs and Underground racilities Crossed by Spent Tuel
.. Transport Vehicles . . . . . . . . . 16
, 2.2.5 Safe Handling of Unit 1 Spent ruel Asseeblies . . .21 2.2.6 Hechanical Design Parameters of Fuel Assee511es Desigr.ed by Exxon Nuclear Coepany (DJC). . . . 22 EVALUATICN Or UE LICD?SEE'S NO SIGNIFICANT HAZAROS 1,5 3
CONSIDERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4 CONOLUSICNS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 l'
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. i TER-C5505-665 !
l 4 TORIWORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by reanklin Research Center (FRC) under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cacission (Office of Nuclear Rsactor Regulation) for technical assistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by the NRC.
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- 1. INTRCO.CTION 2 ty i l
%M1N . ":III- h 6 hP, N.Qih section 10CTR50.90, Florida Power and Light Company (TPL) submitted a request j (1) to a. mend racility Operating License NPT-16 of St. Lucie Unit 2. Condition l
l 2.B.5 of the Unit 2 license presently allows FFL to "possess, but not separate, such byproduct and specia"; nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility." Th6 ter1m "facility" refers to the applicable unit. The possession by Unit 2 of byproduct and special nuclear u.aterial p t f 2:y ageratacam of Er.:t 1. is. tAmrufore. mot specifically CM am tce Utnft @ 11scoise att tme amam2. ttitues. Unsis gmspouwtl Czesse asmandeserttt best been submitted by TPL to establish the option of transferring spent fuel from St. Lucie Unit 1 to St. Lucac Unit 2. The Unit 1 spent fuel pool will lose j full core tr erve capacity as a result of the 1987 refueling outage, and the )
planned rera:k of the spent fuel pool cannot be accoeplished prior to 1988. j If, in the interim, full core off-load of Unit 1 should be necessary, available storage in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool will be required to store Unit
. @ p e n .f u s t -= = = = ~W e s . ta n il"Fv a*do m i-+'= f a nchatwe W h Wmmi t s
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are dismsd w i.i. 7MeF- ."-.---r-t l detectination attached to the Licensee's request (1).
l After a comprehensive structural review and evaluation of the Licensee's l
request (1), Tranklin Research Center (TRC) prepared a request for additional inferv.ation. (RAI.6 which. was- subsitted to ther Limew tW@ thac NE staff.
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2--
- -JI . warrE2 . i -
the tic staff en March '2. 'ITT7131 and was reviewe5 yrtucpt17 by TRC. 'Some technical assues rem.ained unresolved to t!)e satisfa-tior. of TRC. At the conclusion of a telephone conference call:between the NRC. TRC, and TPL staffs, the, Licensee agreed and subsequently submitted additional raterials j r 4, 5) that address the unresolved issues. A second telephone conference call
! r aweu. all involved parties followed the. review of the latest subreittals (4.
- 5) to <*1arify the Licenste's response pertinent to some basic assunptions related to the original designs of the missile protection slab and underground l
l facilities.
This report evaluates the structures,that would be affected by the
! changes proposed by the Licensee :n sts requested amendsent to Tactitty Operating License NPT-16 of St. Lucie Unit 2.
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i TER-C5506-6 65
. 1 The evaluation is made on the basis .of coeparing the loads imposed by the transport vehicles on affected Category 1 structures against the correspor. ding design loads previously approved by the NRC. If the new loads were less than the original design loads, then the new margins of safety of these structures would be highc? than those calculated in the original design: consequently, the proposed amend-ent would pose no threat to the public health and welf are and would not involve a significant hazards consideration.
Conversely, if the nov leads were greater than the original design loads..
then a new margin of safety would have to be calculated by the Licensee. The new margin of safety would then be compared to the original cargin of safety to determine its acceptability.
This evaluation approach assumes that the original design of r :n ar 1 stru:tures affected by this amendment has been adequately che:ked orcing to the URC standards: therefore, the original design calculations were not rechecked.
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TER-C550 6-6 6 5
- 2. TECHNICAL DISCUSSION OF THE LICD!SEE'S SATLTl EVEUATION h 2.1 EVALUATION OF THE LICDJSEE'S ORIGINAL SUBMITTAL This section pertains to the technical r.aterial presented in the safety h
'( evaluation section of the Licensee's "Safety Evaluation /No Significant Hazards consideration" report attached to the original subreittal (1). Each of the following subsections su.-rt. arises the Licensee's findings regarding particular issues and is followed by a technical statement which reflects the TRC evaluation viewpoint.
2.1.1 Conarison of Unit 1 Puel Assembly Design with That of Unit 2 At the time of issuance of the Licenses submittal (1), St. Lucie Unit 1 ,
was in its seventh cycle of operation (at the current time it is in the eighth cycle of operation). The initial cycle through Cycle 5 used fuel elements r.anufactured by Coebustion Engineering Inc. (CE). Section 4.2 of the Unit 1 l Final Safety Analysis Report (TSAR) describes the rechanical design of Unit 1 !
fuel ranufactured by CE. Fuel elements r.anufactured by Exxon Nuclear Coepany.
Inc. (D;C) . were introduced in Cycle 6; thus, Cycle 6 had, and Cycle 7 has, a eixture of CE and DiC fuel. Cycle 8 is scheduled to operate with DiC fuel only. References 6 and 7 describe the mechanical design of Unit 1 fuel e.anufactured by DJC. The use of DJC fuel at St. Lucie Unit 1 was approved by the hT (8). St. Lucie Unit 2 has coepleted two cycles of operation. Section 4 2.2 of the Unit 2 TSAR describes the mechanical design of Unit 2 fuel, which is e.anufactured by CE. Table 2-1 shows the basic mechanical design parameters of Unit 1 and Unit 2 fuel assen51ies r.anufactured by CE, for ccaparison purposes, rigures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3 present general configurations and basic dimensions of the fuel asserblies e.anuf actured by CE and DJC for Unit 1, and by CE for Unit 2, respectively.
It should be noted that Table 2-1 which is a reproduction of Table 1 of the original Licensee subeittal (1), did.not specify whether the mechanica.
paramet ers listed under Unit 1 colur belong to the CE or D4C fuel assently.
Af ter comparing the mechanical parameters of the CE fuel assembly presented an Table 4.2-1 of Unit 1 TSAR. it was concluded that the Unit 1 mechanical parameters presented an Table 1 (1) must have been those of the CE fuel assently. Since Unit 1 as scheduled to operate with Dl fuel only starting 3
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TER-C5506-665 Table 2-1. Co parison of Mechanical Design Parameters of Fuel Assemblies Manufactured by CE for Units 1 and 2
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Fwl fled Plich (W Aeil Ll40 ASO4 weight (16) I!!$.1280 . 1303 Owto:de Olmm:w .. 7.M0 a 7.990 7.972 s 7.n2 Fwl Red torwl Red (whos) ,
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7
L TER-C5506-665 with Cycle 8, the Licensee has been requested (2) to provide the DiC fuel ee:hanical parameters to see how they compare with Unit 2 CE fuel asseetties
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(see Section 2.2.6 for the evaluation of the Licensee response (3)).
2.1.2 Design Adecuacy of Unit 2 Spent ruel Pool and Racks to Accomodate Sterace of Unit 1 ruel Assemblies To determine the adequacy of Unit 2 spent fuel pool and racks to accom-rodate storage of Unat 1 fuel asseetlies, the applicable sections of the Units 1 and 2 TSARS had to be revaewed and evaluated. For St. Lucie Unit 1, the spent fuel pool is described and evaluated in Section 9.1.2 of the Unit 1 TSAR. The fuel handling system is described and evaluated in TSAR Section 9.1.4. Tael handling accidents and cask drop accidents are evaluated in TSAR Sections 15.4.3 and 9.1.4, respectively.
For St. Lucie Unit 2. the spent fuel pool is described and evaluated in Section 9.1.2 of the Unit 2 TSAR. The fuel handling system is described and
- evaluated in TSAR Section 9.1.4. Tuel handling accidents and cask drop l accidents are evalt.z.ed an TSAR Sections 15.7.4.1.2 and 15.7.4.1.3.
respectively.
As stated in the Licensee sutaittal (1), the proposed license amend. ment does not alter the type or amount of reactor fuel which can be received, used, and possessed at the site for operatam of both St. Lucie units. The amount of rea: tor fuel that r.ay be stored in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool, and the e.anner in which it r.ay be stored and handled, will not be altered by thw l proposed change sin:e the limatations for fuel storage and handling rer.ain governed by the analyses described in the TSAR. Storage of Unit 1 spcnt fuel l
in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool wall not result in any condition for which the pool is not designed. The asseetlies stored in each pool have similar fuel l
enrichments and burnup histories. Also, as stated in Reference 9. the Unit 2 spent fuel rseks have been desagned to accceodate storage of Unit 1 fuel i asseeblies. The Unit 2 racks (see Tagure 2-4) were approved by the NRC in Re f e rence l'). The racks are monolithic honey:cea structures wath square fuel storage locations, and f abricated f rom 304 stainless steel that is 0.135 inches thick. Each cell is formed bl welding along the intersectang seats, which enables the asseebled cells to become a f ree-standing nodule that i sma-
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TER-C5506-66 5 cally qualified without dependang on sivighborang modules or fuel pool walls for support (11). The noennal center-to-center spacing of the cells as 8.96 inches.
2.1.3 Spent ruel Transfer .
As stated in the Licensee submittal (1), spent fuel from Unit 1 will be transferred to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool in a fuel shipping cask having a nominal weight of 25 tons or less when loaded. This conforms with Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.9.13 which limits the load that may be handled by the spent fuel cask crane to a maximus of 25 tons. The corresponding limit for the Unit 2 crane (Unat 2 Technical Specification 3.9.12) is 100 tons.
The process wall begin wath the spent fuel handling machine transferring the assemblies underwater from the spent fuel racks to the' spent fuel shipping ,
cask. The cask is designed such that fuel assemblies are placed an the cask while still r.anntaining the manamur water levt! above the fuel assemblies.
' Af ter the cask is loaded wath an assembly, it is prepared for transport.
Controls will be in ef f ect to , reduce possible spre6d of cont Amanatton. The crane then loads the spent fuel shipping cask onto ti.e transport vehicle for travel to Unat 2.
The Licensee submittal does not describe how a spent fuel assembly of Unit 1 will be transferred safely from the shipping cask mounted on the '
transport vehicle to the designated spent fuel rack of Unit 2. The Licensee I has been tsquested [2] to provide a detailed description regarding the safe handling of the Unit 1 spent fuel asserblies (see Section 2.2.5 for the evaluation of the Lacensee response (3)).
l l 2.1.4 Saf e Load Path The load path for transportang the shapping cask between the Unat 1 and Unit 2 fuel handling bualdangs as shown an rigure 2-5. The Lheensee stated (1) that this load path has been evaluated and has been found to provade a safe l
path for transport of the spent fuel assemblies. For each of the two trans-porter vehicles consadered an the load path evalustaon. the maxamun wheel loads were found to be acceptable considerang the effects on all surfaces.
ar.:1udane the roadva/. massale protection slabs. an.d underground f acalatzes (i.e. papes. electrac conduat, manholes. and cateh basans).
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1 The Licensee submittal [1] does not provide any structural analysts i r 4 L sumary or structural details of the underground f acilities that will be j -
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crossed over by either of the two transporter vehicles carrying the spent fuel 8 E shipping casks. The Licensee nas been requested [2] to provide specific j ;, '
structural details and data pertanent to the findings regarding the safe load
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path evaluation (see Section 2.2 for the evaluation of the Licensee's response 1 ,
l [3] to the RAI [2)). )
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'j l l 2.2 EVALUATION OF THE LICD.'SEE R.ESPONSES TO THE NRC'S REQUEST TOR AODITIONAL .
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This section presents a su c.ary of the Licensee responses [3, 4, 5) to
}f the NE's request for additional information [2] and the corresponding evaluation ccernents.
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1 2.2.1 Structural Data of the Sper.t Tuel Shippino Cask d i The spat fuel shipping ca x that will be used to transfer spent fuel #
asser.blies free Unit 1 to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool would be either the Model -
NAO-1 or NL1-1/2. Thwse shipping casks have certificates of compliance No. J 9183, Rev. 3, dated Never.ber 14, 1984, and No. 9010, Rev. 17, dated August 28. j i 1986, respectively, issued by the !.*E. The basic configuration and the ;f corresponding design data of the two cask models (NAO-1 and C-1/2) are shown :
in Figures 2-6 and 2-7, respectively. .
The Licensee response is adequate. ;j 1
i 2.2.2 Structural Design Data Pertinent to the Trartyrter Vehicles k There are two possible cask transporter vehicles to be used for the prcposed spent fuel transport between St. Lucie Units 1 and 2: the Rogers Vehicle (RN') and the other vehaele (O). 'The load path evaluation performed by the Licensee as part of the study coepared the loads from the two cask transport vehicles to the oraganal heavy v.aul rcute desagn loads. The I or gstal heavy haul route desagn loads of the roadway, massale protection slabs, and underground f acilities were governed by the interrodal cask transporter. Tagure 2-8 provades a plan Yiew of the wheel arrangements for I
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t Tagure 2-6. NAO-1 Shappang Cask Data and Confagurataon 4
TER-C5506-6 6 5 Cask Description The El-1/2 shipping cask is designed if and licerised to transport one PWR fuel .? f assembly, two BWR fuel assemblies, or a r irradiated nuclear components such as # h control and poison rods. In conjune- "; [
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legal weight truck cask capable of '
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TER-C5 5 2 6- 6 6 3 the two cask transporters (RV and 0) and the intermodal vehicle as well as wheel infor-ation. The anforration provaded in Figure 2-8 is technacally sufficient to evaluate structures that would be affected by the loads ieposed on the shappang path.
The Licensee's response as adequate.
2.2.3 Stru:tural Detatis of Missile Protection Slabs and Under reund racilities l
The Licensee's response [3] identifie Category 1 underground facilities that are in the path to be crossed by the spent fuel transporter vehicles as
- these shown on Table 2-2. The table lists the plan layout and structural detail drawings on which the underground facilities can be found (e.g., Kar.hele 127 (MM 127) is shown in plan on drawing 8770-G-408, Sheet 1, Revision 13 at c oo rdir.a t e J14 ) . Stru
- tural details are shown on drawing 8770-G-627, Revasiert
- 5. at coordinates E9 and J9 and on drawing 8770-G-628. Sheet 1, Revision 2, in the Notes." Tatle 2-3 lasts the plan layouts and the stru:tural detail l
drawin;s.
1 Af ter revaew of all drawangs Insted in Table 2-3, it was determined that the Licensee's response as technically adequate, i
2.2.4 Stress Analysts Results of Missile Prote: tion Slats and Undergreu J Tactitt nes Crossed tv Spent Twel Transport Vehicles The Licensee's response (3) to a request to provide stress ar.alysis results of Category 1 structural coeponents that would be crossed by spent fuel transport vehicles is presented in Table 2-2. Table 2-2 provides a i
su.rary of stress ar.alysis results indicating that every Category 1 structural cocponent discussed an Section 2.2.3 above has the capability to withstand prescribed sustained and live load with an a :eptable margin of safety. For exa ple Mar. hole 127 (MH 127) was designed on the basts of ultarate strength design (USD) for an "origar.41 desagn live load" of 26.4 kips and yielded a cargin of safety of 1.8: the spent fuel transporter vehicles produ:e corres-pending loads of 7.33 kaps for the Rogers vehicle (RV) and 8.0 kips for the other vehicle (C).
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Table 2-3. Plan Layouts and Structural Detail Drawings Reviewed C%:m m _m ev. % Title 8770-C.170 $a I 9 Yad Piping SA No, l A 877aC.383 26 D;esel Ceaeretor Swild;ng .
Cc%it, Cro.nding & Lcting 8770-C-607 $m i 16 Yord Nt Rea 8770-C-408 $a i 13 Yad Nt Res W L*.ghtirs P% $xtioru W Detoils . $a 1 87 4 C-427 $ Electr'co' Manote Detells .
M&R $n 1 871^w C-428 Se i 2 Elsetricel Ma+ ole Detells .
M&R$n2 8770-C-471 4 Cet Ccoling Pms .
Fe.rections Mu nvy 8770-C-472 3 Cowf Cooling Pumps .
Mas & Reinf $a i r 874C-473 $ Cet Coolicq Pms .
Mas & Reinf SA 2 29 4 C-0$7 $01 I Yord Composite $a 1 27 4 C 427 7 E tx Matele Details . M&R q 2718-C 428 $6 7 0 Etx. M vcete Deteils . M&R NOTE: 8770.denotu Sts Lwie t i drew ngs oW 2f % $1. Lucie #2.
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TDFC 506-665 ,
The "e.argan of safety" shown in Table 2-2 is based upon the "original design lave load." By comparing the original desir;n live loads with the spent fuel transporter vehicle wheel loads shown in Table 2-2, it can be seen that the spent fuel transporter vehicle wheel loads are no scre than half of the origanal design live loads. Accordingly, the targins of safety for the spent fuel transporter vehicle are considerably higher than the margin of safety shown in Table 2-2. The following example presented by the t.icensee [5]
describes how this conclusion was reached for one of the alssile protection slabs (second item on Table 2-2).
The missile protection slab over the pipe tunnel was designed for the e.artmum wheel load from the intermodal cask transporter. This load consists of two 26.3-kaps concentrated loads spaced 5'0" apart (see Tagure 2-8). Each 23.6-kips load represents the e.axsmum load exerted by one dual-tired wheel.
The Rogers vehicle (RV). one of the two ;cssible vehicles to be used for the proposed spent fuel transport between units, consists of a tractor and a drop deck lowboy. The rear wheels of the tractor present a similar case for comparison with the design b'asts intermodai cask transporter. The e.aximum wheel load at this location as 10.15 kips per dual-tired wheel: the wheels, and therefore the loads, are spaced 4'2" apart (see rigura 2-8). This case affords a direct comparison with the design basis condition. It is apparent that substantaal additional e.argin is provid in the design to accomodate this load (i.e., 10.15 kips ( 23.6 kips).
l The arrangement of the rear wheels of'ths lowboy differs from that of the j intermodal cask transporter. The e.aximua wheel load at this location is 7.3 kips per dual-ttred wheel. There are three wheels an tandem spaced 4'2" a pa r t . For the purposes of comparison with the design basis case, these loads l are conservatively assuned as grouped together into one 22-nips load. It can be seen that*this coebined load f rom three wheels, assumed to be acting at one point, as still less than a single wheel load f rom the interrodal cask trans-porter (23.6 kips). It as theref e apparent that this case is also less severe than the desagn basas condation.
The other vehtele to be used for spent fuel transport (designated as the "0" vehtele on rigure 2-8) also presents a'sim.ilar case for coeparison wath the antermodal cask transporter. The e.axtrnum wheel load, either at the rear of the tra: tor or the rear of the traaler, as I kaps per dual tire wheel: the l
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TEB-C 5506 -6 6 3 -
spacing of the wheels as assured to be stellar to that of the other vehteles, however, this is not a cratical assurption, since grouping the wheel loads as des:ribcd above stall produces a load (16 kips) less than a single wheel lead f rom the anterecdal cask trans;orter (23.6 kips). It is, therefore, apparent that tha s case is much less severe than the design basis condition.
Tractor front wheel loads are in every case much less than the other wheel loads and, therefere, do not govern.
The tire size for the interecdal cask transporter (12" x 20") is se. aller than that for the Rogers vehicle (12" r 24") and therefore represents a ecre severe case for design check of punching shear. Tire size data for the "O" vehicle were not available, however, since those leads are sa:h sealler than the design basas loads, it seers reasonable to con:1ude that nominal variations an tire size su:h as eight be expected will not alter the con:!usions of this evaluation.
Based on stru:tural evaluation of the Lacensee's response (3. 4. 5), it is concluded that Category 1 structural coe;cnents listed in Table 2-2 have the capability to withstand the pres: rated sustained and lave leads leposed by spent fuel transporter vehteles.
2.2.5 Safe Handlan: ef Unat 1 Spent ruel Asse-blies l
As stated in the Licensee's response (3), the shipping cask will be ecved into position under the Unit 2 cask crane after following the predetermined spent fuel transfer path from Unit 1. The Unit 2 cask crane is roved into j position and picks up the cask lifting yoke. The traaler down-raggers are l
then lowered. wheel cho:ks are installed, the tractor is dis:ennected and driven to ats parking place. The bolts which retaan the forward trur.nion ecunts are re oved and stored. The cask. lifting yoke is posationed over the upper laf t<ng trut.naens and e.anually engaged to the laf tang lugs. The cask as lifted to the vertacal posation and then lafted clear of thz transport traaler.
The cask as placed in the Unit 2 cask wash area where it as orepared for
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coveme nt anto the Unat 2 sperm fuel stcragt pool. The ir.ner head c.Msure bolts are detensaened, and the cas/x is it'Md into posatact ovcr the center of the pool cask area. Decaneralance ' ' er as ept eyed on t' cask as .( !s lowered into the pool through the ray. Mhe n t ht- top oi "ask as I
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m-C5526 665 at a convenient height above the pool water level, the denineralized spray as stopped, the anner closure head bolts are removed and placed in storage, and the demaneralised water as agaan started as the cask continues to be lowered to the bottoo of the cask loadang area floor.
For the NAO-1 (Tagure 2-6), the cask crane hook is detached frun the cask crane liftang yoke bale. The hook is washed down with domineralised water as it is retracted out of the pool. For the N1.1-1/2 (Tigure 2-7), the cask lif tin; yoke ares are diaconnected from the cask using the arn-mounted hydraulac actuating system. The inner cask cover is reecved as the yoke is lafted out of the pool. A spray of dominera11:ed water is again used to wash down the cable system the crane hook, the lifting yoke, and the inner cask cover.
Af ter a period of drap drying, the trolley is backed out of the pool a
- sufficient dastance to allow free access too the cask top by the spent fuel I
bridge crane (ST M). For the NAT-1. the STBC as positioned over the cask and the anner cask cover laitang point as engaged. The cover is then removed and placed an a desagnated tesperary storage location for replacerent af ter the fuel assently has been renoved from the cask. The inner cover lif ting tool is then placed in ats designated temporary storage location. Tor both the NAO-1 a and the h".1-1/2 the STIC then roves inW position over the cask opening to latch onto the fuel assertly. Once latched, the fuel assertly is picked up ty the STEC. moved through the Unit 2 cask keyway door, and taken to a predeter-reined pool storage location where it is lowered into place. The STM unlatches free the fuel asser.bly and returns to its desagnated storage /parkang position.
Based on evaluataon of the aforementioned response, it as concluded that safe handlang of Unit I spent fuel asserblies as adequately demonstrated.
2.2.6 Me:hanaeal Design Paraweters of Tuel Assemblies Desicned by Exren Nuclear Co'epany ( DC The Licensee response [3] stated that the basac rechanical desagn parar-eters of DC spent fuel asserblaes are described in DC Topical Report YN-hT-8 2-09 ( 6 ) . The Licensee andacated that at would initaally plan to ecve l
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' TER-C 5 506 -6 6 5 l
l.
1 only the fuel which has had the longest decay time. As a result, Batch A
- asse-blies, which were removed froe Unit 1 reactor at the and of Cycle 1. .
would be noved first. These asseeb!les have almost 9 years of dscay tire and EI are spent fuel assemblies (STAS) of the Combustion Engineering (CE) design. .,'
The basic eechanical design parameters of these CE-designed STAS are shown in i Table 2-1.
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- 3. EVALUATICN CT THE LICD;SEE'S NO S!CNITICAM HA2.ACS CONSIDETsATICN The NRC has provided standards for determining whether a significant
- hazards consideration exists (1DCTR50.92(c)). A proposed anandment to an operating license for the facility involves no sign'ificant hazards conside- i Ivouldnot:
ration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed trendsent (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or conse-quences cf an a::ident previously evaluated, or (2) creatn the possibility of a new or different kand of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or l
(3) involve a significant reduction in a cargin of safety.
As the Licensee stated in its submittal (1):
- 1. This ameni ent will not significantly increase the probability or consequen:e of an accident previously evaluated sin e the configurataen and operation of the plant will remain essential'.y the same. The only thing that will change is that a certain nueter of Unit 1 spent fuel assentlies may be transferred from the Unit 1 spent fuel pool to the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. The designs of the two pools, and the assocasted operating and accident analysis assunp-taons, are not changed. The Unit 1 assemblies that r.ay be trans-ferred have essentially the same zechanical design (sise), enrich-rents, and burnup histories as evaluated in the Unit 2 TSAR for Unat 2 fuel asseellaes. As stated in,Referen:e ll, the Unit 2 spent fuel
, racks are designed to accoe.cdate storage of the Unit 1 fuel.
- 2. This amend ent will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any prevaeusly evaluated, sinct this ' change does not redify the conf.sguration or operation of the plant. A spent fuel shipping cask that ecets the packaging and transportation requirem nts I of 1D2rR71 will be used to transfer spent fuel assemblies between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 fuel handling buildings. Potential fuel handlinq
! and cask drop accidents are evaldated in both TSARS, including the potential drop of a cask outside ~the fuel handling building. The load handlang and transport of the spent fuel are enveloped by l previous analyses.
- 3. This teendment will not involve a significant reductaon in the cargan of safety. In all cases, the r$AR accadent analyses results bound all accadent sceneraos contemplated by this amendsent.
l Therefore, on the basis of the above discussion, it in concluded that operatten of St. Lucae Unat 2 an accordance with the proposed ar.endment would pose no threat to the public health and welfare, and would not anvolve a significant ha:ards constderatton, s
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based on revaew and evaluation of the Florida Power and Light Coepany ,
subreittals (1, 3, 4, 5) pertaining to the request to amend racility Operating ;s License NPT-16 of St. Lucie Unit 2, the fo11oving conclusions have been .'
reached: -
- 1. The design margins of safety of Category 1 structural coeponents ;
(missile protection slabs and underground facilities) under loads '
irposed by the crossing of spent fuel transport vehicles have been .
evaluated and found to be acceptable. Accordingly, the load path
- proposed in the Lacensee anonitent for transporting spent fuel -
asser511es from Unit 1 to Unit 2 has been found safe. ,
- 2. The safe handling of Unit 1 spent fuel assentlies is adequately I derionstrated.
- 3. Based on the above conclusion, operations of St. Lucie Unit 2 in accordance wath the proposed amen & tent would pose no threat to the public health and welfare, and would not involve a significant ha:ards consideration.
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