IR 05000272/2010004
| ML102980181 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/2010 |
| From: | Burritt A L Reactor Projects Branch 3 |
| To: | Joyce T P Public Service Enterprise Group |
| burritt al | |
| References | |
| IR-10-004 | |
| Download: ML102980181 (35) | |
Text
UNITED NUCLEAR REGULAtORY REGION 475 ALLENDALE KING OF PRUSSIA, PA October 25, 2010 Mr. Thomas P. Joyce President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC N09 P.O. Box Hancock'H Bridge, NJ SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2010004
Dear Mr .*Joyce:
On September 30,2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results discussed on October 7, 2010, with Mr. Fricker and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel..
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
However, two violations that were determined to be of very low safety significance are listed in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Secti()n 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violcltions and because they are entered into your corrective action program (CAP). If you contest NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, A TIN: Document Control Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Directclr, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Salem Nuclear Station. In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," i3 copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronic8111y for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly T.Joyce 2 Available Hecords (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the PubliC Electronic Reading Room). Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos: 50-272; 50-311 License Nos: DPR-70; DPR-75
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 0500027212010004 and 05000311/2010004
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information co w/encl: Distribution via ListServ T. Joyce 2 Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.govlreading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely.
IRAJ Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos: 50-272; 50-311 License Nos: DPR-70; DPR-75
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000272/2010004 and 05000311/2010004
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information CC w/encl: Distribution via ListServ Distribution w/encl. W. Dean, RA (R10RAMAIL Resource)
A. Turilin, DRP M. Dapas, ORA (R10RAMAIL Resource)
C. Douglas. DRP D. Lew, DRP (R1DRPMAIL Resource)
D. Schroeder, DRP, SRI J. Clifford, DRP (R1 DRPMAIL Resource)
P. McKenna, DRP, RI D. Roberts, DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource)
K. McKenzie, DRP, OA P. Wilson, DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource)
L. Trocine, RI OEDO A. Burritt, ORP RidsNrrPIVISalem Resource L Cline, DHP ROPreportsResource@nrc.gov DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH3\lnspection\Reports\lssued\SAL 1 004.docx SUNSI Review Complete:
ALB (Reviewer's Initials)
ML 102980181 After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record H it will be released to the Public. To receive a co OFFICE mmt RIIDRP RI/DRP NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt!
ALB DATE 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Docket Nos: License Nos: Report No: Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates: Inspectors:
Approved By: U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 50-272, 50-311 DPR-70, DPR-75 05000272/2010004 and 05000311/2010004 PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 P.O. Box Hancocks Bridge, NJ July 1, 2010 through September 30, 2010 D. Schroeder, Senior Resident Inspector S. Ibarrola, Acting Resident Inspector J. Ayala, Acting Resident Inspector E. Torres, Acting Resident Inspector E. Burket, Reactor Inspector J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist Arthur L. Burritt, Projects Branch Division of Reactor Enclosure TABLE OF
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
.........................................................................................................
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
...............................................................................................................1 R01 Adverse Weather Protection
............................................................
- ............
- ......... 1 R04 Equipment Alignment
............................................................................................. 1 R05 Fire Protection
........................................................................................................ 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures .................................................................................... 1 R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................
1R12 Maintenance
Effectiveness
..: .................................................................................
1R13 Maintenance
Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ................................
1R15 Operability
Evaluations
...........................................................................................
1R18 Plant Modifications
.............................
- ...................................................................
1R19 Post-Maintenance
Testing .................................................................................... 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities
.................................................................. 1 R22 Surveillance Testing ............................................................................................. RADIATION SAFETy...........................................................................................................
2RS1 Radiological
Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls ....................................
2RS2 Occupational
As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls
2RS4 Occupational
Dose Assessment
........................................................................... OTHER ACTIVITI ES ............................................................................................................ 40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
................................................................. 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems ............................................................. 40A3 Event Follow-up
................................................................................................... 40A5 Other Activities
...................................................................................................... 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit ........................................................................................ 40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations
................................................................................ ATTACHMENT:
=SUPPLEMENTAL
INFORMATION=
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
...................................................................................................
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
.......................................................
LIST OF DOCUMENTS
REVIEWED .......................................................................................
LIST OF ACRONYMS
...........................................................................................................Enclosure
- OF [[]]
FINDINGS IR 050002 J2I20 1 0004, 05000311/2010004;
07/01/2010
-09/30/2010;
Salem Nuclear Generating
Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Routine Integrated
Inspection
Report. The report covered a three-month
period of inspection
by resident inspectors, and announced
inspections
by a regional radiation
specialist
and reactor engineers.
The NRC's program for overseeing
the safe operation
of commercial
nuclear power reactors is described
in 1649, "Reactor Oversight
Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. No findings of significance
were identified.
Other Findings Two violations
of very low safety significance, which were identified
by PSEG, have been reviewed by the inspectors.
Corrective
actions taken or planned by
and their corrective
action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report. Enclosure
- REPORT [[]]
DETAILS Summary ()f Plant Status Salem Nuclear Generating
Station Unit No. 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power. On July 7, Unit 1 automatically
tripped following
a fault on the B main power transformer (MPT). Unit 1 was synchronized
to the grid on July 24 and full power was reached on July 25. On September
17, after operators
isolated bleed steam valve, 12BS22, due to an internal steam leak, operators
reduced power to 98 percent to comply with engineering
established
main turbine operating
limits. Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power for the remainder
of the inspection
period. Salem Nuclear Generating
Station Unit No.2 (Unit 2) began the period at full power. Unit 2 remained at or near full power for the duration of the inspection
period. 1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones:
Initiating
Events, Mitigating
Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency
R01 Adverse Weather Protection
(71111.01 -2 samples) .1 Evaluate Readiness
for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection
Scope The inspectors
completed
one adverse weather protection
sample to evaluate
for seasonal extreme weather conditions.
The inspectors
reviewed PSEG's
and protection
of risk significant
systems at Unit 1 and Unit 2 during hot conditions
between July 6 and July 7,2010. The inspectors
evaluated implementation
of summer readiness
procedures
and compensatory
measures extreme hot weather that included ultimate heat sink temperatures
above 84°F ambient air temperatures
above 100°F. The inspectors
walked down
strlJctures, systems, and components (SSCs) to ensure that weather related
did not adversely
impact sse operability.
In addition, the inspectors
assessed condition
of balance of plant equipment
with the potential
to initiate plant-level
The inspectors
performed
detailed walkdowns
of the service water (SW) emergency
diesel generators (EOGs), vital switchgear
rooms, the gas turbine (GTG), main and unit auxiliary
transformers, component
cooling water (CCW) exchangers, the main turbines and generators, and the station air
Th,e inspectors
observed portions of GTG performance
testing from the control room GTG local control panel. The inspectors
also reviewed PSEG corrective notifications
to ensure that PSEG appropriately
identified
and resolved weather problems.
The documents
reviewed are listed in the
b. Findings No findings were identified . . 2 Evaluate Readiness
to Cope with External Flooding a. Inspection
Scope Enclosure
I
.1 The inspectors
completed
one adverse weather protection
sample to evaluate readiness
for external flooding.
The inspectors
reviewed PSEG's preparations
and compensatory
measures for severe weather conditions
that posed a risk of flooding during the week of August 23, 2010. The inspectors
interviewed
operations
and engineering
personnel
regarding
the actions taken to prepare for the impending
severe weather and walked down risk significant
systems to independently
assess the adequacy of PSEG's preparations.
Specifically, the inspectors
reviewed the condition
of the service water intake structure (SWIS) external flood protection.
The inspectors
verified that degraded conditions
with the potential
to impact safety"related
components
and systems were reported in the CAP. Corrective
action notifications
written for degraded conditions
were reviewed to ensure that operability
of components
in the SWIS was not impacted.
For those areas where operator actions were
credited for maintaining
safety-related
system operability
during a flooding event, the inspectors
also verified that the procedures
used to direct those actions could be fully implemented
during the event. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
R04 Eguipment
Alignment
(71111.04 -4 samples;
71111.04S -1 sample) Partial Walkdown a. Inspection
Scope The inspectors
completed
four partial system walkdown inspection samples. The
inspectors
walked down the systems listed below to verify the operability
of redundant
or diverse trains and components
when safety equipment
was inoperable.
The inspectors
focused their review on potential
discrepancies
that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk. The inspectors
reviewed applicable
operating
procedures, walked down control systems components, and verified that selected breakers, valves, and support equipment
were in the correct position to support system operation.
The inspectors
also verified that
CAP to identify and resolve equipment
alignment
problems that could cause initiating
events or impact the capability
of mitigating
systems or barriers.
Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1,
- EDG [[]]
ODS on 'July * Unit 2, 21 and 23 chillers with 22 chiller DOS on September
b. Findings No findings were identified.
.2 Complete Walkdown a. Inspection
Scope The inspectors
conducted
one complete walkdown inspection
sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary
feedwater (AFW) system. The inspectors
independently
verified the alignment
and status of AFW motor-driven pumps
and valves electrical
power, labeling, hangers and supports, and associated
support systems. The walkdown also
included verification
of valve pesitiens, evaluation
of system piping and equipment
te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery
condition, oil reservoir
levels were nermal, pump rIO ems and pipe chases were adequately
ventilated, system parameters
were within established
ranges, and equipment
deficiencies
were appropriately
identified.
The inspectors
interviewed
engineering
personnel
and reviewed cerrective
action evaluations
associated
with the system to determine
whether equipment
alignment
preblems were identified
and apprepriately
resolved.
Decuments
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings NIt) findings were identified.
R05 Fire Protection
(71111.050 -6 samples) .1 Fire Pretectien
-Tours a. Inspection
Scope The inspectors
cempleted
six quarterly
fire protection
inspectien
samples. The in specters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition
and operational
status of fire protectien
features.
The inspectors
verified that combustibles
and ignition sources were contrelled
in accordance
with PSEG's administrative
procedures;
fire detection
and suppression
equipment
was available
for use; that passive fire barriers were maintained
in good material condition;
and that compensatory
measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable
fire protection
equipment
were implemented
in accordance
with PSEG's fire plan. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 2, 4160V switchgear
rooms, 64' elevation;
- Unit 1 and Unit 2, AFW pumps area, 84' elevation;
- Unit 1 and Unit 2, SW intake structure, 92' & 112' elevations;
and * Unit 2, chemical and volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank area, 64' elevation.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
'I R06 Flood Protectien
Measures (71111.06 -2 samples) .1 Internal Flooding Enclosure
.1 a. Inspection
Scope The inspectors
completed
one internal flooding area inspection
sample. The inspectors
eVi:lluated
flood protection
measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays. The inspectors
interviewed
engineering
personnel
and walked down the areas to assess operational
readiness
of various features in place to protect redundant
safety-related
components.
These features included plant drains, watertight
doors, sump pumps, and wall penetration
seals. The inspectors
also reviewed the flooding penetration
seal inspections.
operator logs, abnormal procedures, and corrective
action notifications
associated
with flood protection
measures.
Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identified . . 2 Underground
Bunkers/Manholes
Subiect to Flooding a. Inspection
Scope The inspectors
completed
one underground
cable inspection
sample. The inspectors
evaluated
the condition
of safety-related
cables located in underground
bunkers and manholes.
The inspectors
interviewed
engineering
personnel
and examined photographic
evidence of conditions
in manhole vault MH-SWI-1.
The inspectors
verified that safety-related
cables were not SUbmerged
in water, the integrity
of the cables, the condition
of cable support structures, and the ability to dewater these structures.
The inspectors
noted that PSEG had recently instituted
a cable aging management
program at the site. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
R11 Licensed Operator Regualification
Program (71111.11 Q -1 sample)
Activities
Review by Resident Staff a. Inspection
Scope The inspectors
completed
one quarterly
licensed operator requalification
program inspection
sample. Specifically, the inspectors
observed a scenario administered
to a single crew during a training drill on September
14, 2010. The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power, a loss of turbine generator
stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip, and a loss of coolant accident.
The inspectors
reviewed operator actions to implement
the abnormal and emergency
operating
procedures.
The inspectors
examined the operators'
ability to perform actions associated
with high risk activities, the Emergency
Plan, previous lessons learned items, and the correct use and implementation
of procedures.
The inspectors
also observed and verified that the deficiencies
were adequately
identified, discussed, and entered into the CAP, as appropriate.
Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance
Effectiveness
(71111.12Q -3 samples) a. Inspection
Scope
inspectors
completed
three quarterly
maintenance
effectiveness
inspection
samples. The inspectors
reviewed pelformance
monitoring
and maintenance
effectiveness
issues 'for three components/systems
listed below. The inspectors
reviewed PSEG's process for monitoring
equipment
pelformance
and assessing
preventive
maintenance
effectiveness.
The inspectors
verified that systems and components
were monitored
in accordance
with the Maintenance
Rule Program requirements.
The inspectors
compared documented functional
failure determinations
and unavailability
hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness
of PSEG's condition
monitoring
activities
and to determine
whether performance
goals were being met. The inspectors
reviewed applicable
work orders (Was), corrective
action notifications, and preventive
maintenance
tasks. The documents
reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment.
- 13 and 23 positive displacement
charging pumps * Unit
GTG b. Findings No findings were identified.
R13 Maintenance
Risk Assessments
and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 -6 samples) a. Inspection
Scope The inspectors
completed
six maintenance
risk assessment
and emergent work control inspection
samples. The inspectors
reviewed the maintenance
activities
listed below to verify that the appropriate
risk assessments
were pelformed
as specified
by 10 CFR 50.65(a}(4) prior to removing equipment
for work. The inspectors
reviewed the applicable
risk evaluations, work schedules, and control room logs for these configurations.
PSEG's risk management
actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings, control room
tours, and plant walkdowns.
The inspectors
also used PSEG's on..line risk monitor (Equipment
OOS workstation)
to gain insights into the risk associated
with these plant configurations.
The inspectors
reviewed notifications
documenting
problems associated
with risk assessments
and emergent work evaluations.
Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1, 13 AFW pump unavailability
from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage * Unit 1 and Unit 2, control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance
mode on July 28 * Unit 2, 2A
- EDG [[]]
OOS on July 29 * Unit 2, 2A EDG 008 on August 23 Enclosure
.1 Unit 1, 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed
tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September
Unit 2, 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance
on September
b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R 15 Operability
Evaluations
(71111.15 -5 samples) a. Inspection
Scope The inspectors
completed
five operability
evaluation
inspection
samples. The inspectors
revi:ewed
the operability
determinations
for degraded or non-conforming
conditions
associated
with: Unit 1, 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation
valve with inactive boron leak on weld; Unit 2, 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with
SW153)
failed in open position; Unit 2, 2A
BF22 feedwater
containment
isolation
valve internal noise; and * Unit 1 and Unit 2, CAV isolation
damper degraded seals. The inspectors
reviewed the technical
adequacy of the operability
determinations
to ensure the conclusions
were justified.
The inspectors
also walked down accessible
equipment
to corroborate
the adequacy of PSEG's operability
determinations.
Additionally, the inspectors
reviewed other PSEG identified
safety-related
equipment
deficiencies
during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability
screenings.
Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
No findings were identified.
R18 Plant Modifications
(71111.18 -2 samples) Temporary
Modifications
a. Inspection
Scope The inspectors
completed
two plant modification
inspection
samples by reviewing
the key characteristics
associated
with the two temporary
plant modifications
listed below. Th<<9 inspectors
verified that the design bases, licensing
bases, and performance
capability
of the affected'systems
were not degraded by the temporary
modifications.
The license amendment
associated
with the Technical
Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed.
Other documents
reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment.
Unit 1, 11 & 12 AFW pumps lifted leads . Unit 2, 2C battery temporary
installation
b. Findings A violation
of very low safety significance (Green) was identified
by PSEG and is documented
in Section 40A 7. 1 R 19 Post-Maintenance
Testing (71111 .19 -7 samples) a. InslDection
Scope The inspectors
completed
seven post-maintenance
testing (PMT) inspection
samples. ThE: inspectors
observed portions of and/or reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance
activities
listed below. The inspectors
verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately
addressed
by control room and engineering
personnel;
testing was adequate for the maintenance
performed;
acceptance
criteria were clear, demonstrated
operational
readiness
and were consistent
with design and licensing
basis documentation;
test instrumentation
had current calibrations
and the appropriate
range and accuracy for the application;
tests were performed, as written, with applicable
prerequisites
satisfied;
and equipment
was returned to an operational
status and ready to perform its safety function.
Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed
trip mechanism
head lever following
emergent corrective
maintenance
CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement WO 60091466.
2A
2SJ2. charging pump suction valve, thermal overload replacement WO 60092089, 22 control area chiller compressor
replacement WO 60087957, 2C 125 Vdc temporary
battery
AFW pump following
head lever maintenance
b. Findings No findings were identified.
R20 Refueling
and Other Outage Activities
(71111.20 -1 sample) a. Inspection
Scope Plant Trip Following
Main Generator
Trip_ On July 7, 2010, Unit 1 tripped following
a main generator
trip related to a failure of the B phase of the
- MPT. [[]]
PSEG conducted
a forced outage from July 7,2010, through July 24.2010, to repair the MPT, replace the 1 CV284, and perform additional
maintenance
activities.
During the outage, the inspectors
monitored
or observed the activities
listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities.
The documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes Outage risk management Decay heat removal operations
Configuration
management, including
maintenance
of defense in depth Status and configuration
of electrical
systems and switchyard
activities
to ensure that TSswere met Walkdown of selected containment
areas to check for unidentified
leakage or other (liscrepant
conditions Personnel
fatigue management
controls b. Findings No findings were identified.
R22 Surveillance
Testing (71111.22 -5 samples) a. Inspection
Scope The inspectors
completed
five surveillance
testing inspection
samples. The inspectors
observed portions of and/or reviewed results for the surveillance
tests listed below to verify, as appropriate, whether the applicable
system requirements
for operability
were adequately
incorporated
into the procedures
and that test acceptance
criteria were consistent
with procedure
requirements, the
UFSAR), and American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME)Section XI for pump and valve testing. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. S2.0P-ST.DG-0001, 2A Diesel Generator
Surveillance
Test S2.0P-ST.SJ-0001, Inservice
Testing -21 Safety Injection
Pump S1.IC-FT.RCP-0023, 1PT-474 Pressurizer
Pressure Protection
Channel IV Functional
Test S2.0P-ST.RHR-0002, Inservice
Testing -22
ST.RHR-0002, RHR Discharge
Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse Flow Test b. Findings No findings were identified.
2. RADIATION
SAFETY Cornerstone:
Radiation
Safety -Public and Occupational
2RS1 Radiological
Hazard Assessment
and Exposure Controls (71124.01)
a. Inspection
Scope Inspection
Planning The inspectors
reviewed PSEG performance
indicators
for the Occupational
Exposure Cornerstone
for follow-up.
The inspectors
reviewed the results of radiation
protection
program audits (e.g., PSEG's quality assurance
audits or other independent
audits). Enclosure
The inspectors
reviewed reports of operational
occurrences
related to occupational
radiation
safety since the last inspection.
The inspectors
reviewed Prompt Investigation
Report -Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm* Received During Radiography (notification
20467421)
regarding
an event on June 16, 2010, during radiography
operations
in the Unit 2 mechanical
penetration
service water room. During this activity, a locked high radiation
event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters
from the source of radiation).
PSEG has reported this event under the occupational
exposure cornerstone
and the associated
performance
indicator.
The inspectors
observed radiography
operations
conducted
in the Unit 1 containment
on July 19-20,2010, and verified that PSEG had implemented
corrective
actions from the June 16, 2010, event and that these corrective
actions were effective.
Ris,k-Significant
High Radiation
Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation
Area (VHRA) Controls The inspectors
discussed
with the Radiation
Protection
Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures
for high-risk
VHRAs. The inspectors
verified that any changes to PSEG procedures
did not substantially
reduce the effectiveness
and level of worker protection.
The inspectors
discussed
with first-line
health physics supervisors
the controls in place for special areas that have the potential
to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations.
The inspectors
verified that
VHRAs, and areas with the potential
to become a VHRA, ensured that unauthorized
individuals
were not able to gain access to the VHRA. Radiation
Worker Performance
During job performance
observations.
the inspectors
observed radiation
worker performance
with respect to stated radiation
protection
work requirements.
The inspectors
determined
that workers were aware of the significant
radiological
conditions
in their workplace, radiation
work permit controls/limits
were in place, and that their performance
reflected
the level of radiological
hazards present. The inspectors
reviewed radiological
problem reports since the last inspection
that found
cause ofthe event to be human performance
errors. The inspectors determined
that there was no observable
pattern traceable
to a similar cause. The inspectors
determined
that this perspective
matched the corrective
action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems.
The inspectors
discussed
with the RPM any problems with the corrective
actions planned or taken. b. Findings No findings were identified. Occupational
As Low as Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (71124.02) Enclosure
a. Inspection
Scope Verification
of Dose Estimates
and Exposure Tracking Systems The inspectors
selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions
and basis for the current annual collective
exposure estimate for reasonable
accuracy.
The inspectors
reviewed the applicable
procedures
to determine
the methodology
for estimating
exposures
from specific work activities
and the intended dose outcome. The inspectors
verified that for the selected work activities
that PSEG had established
measures to track, trend, and, if necessary, to reduce, occupational
doses for ongoing work activities.
The inspectors
verified that trigger points or criteria were established
to prompt additional
reviews and/or additional
ALARA planning and controls.
The inspectors
reviewed PSEG's collective
exposure performance
during the Spring 2010 refueling
outage at Unit 1 ('I RF20). Total collective
exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit. The inspectors
evaluated
PSEG's method of adjusting
exposure estimates, or planning work, when unexpected
changes in scope or emergent work were encountered.
The inspectors
determined
that adjustments
to exposure estimates
were based on sound radiation
protection
and ALARA principles
or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work. The inspectors
evaluated
the frequency
of these adjustments
determine the
adequacy of the original ALARA planning process. No findings were identified.
2RS4 Occupational
Dose Assessment
(71124.04)
a. Inspection
Scope §Qecial Bioassay The inspectors
selected internal dose assessments
obtained using in-vitro monitoring.
The inspectors
reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEG's program for in-vitro monitoring
of radionuclides, including
collection
and storage of samples. The inspectors
determined
that PSEG had not specifically
qualified
their vendor laboratory
to perform in-vitro sample counting, having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis, nor verifying
the lab's participation
in an analYSis cross-check
pmgram. The inspectors
reviewed the adequacy of PSEG's program for dose assessments
based on airborne/DAC
monitoring.
The inspectors
verified that flow rates and/or collection
times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing
zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate
lower limits of detection
are obtained.
The inspectors
reviewed the adequacy of procedural
guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel
apply protection
factors. The inspectors
reviewed dose assessments
performed
using airborne/DAC
monitoring.
The inspectors
verified that PSEG's DAC calculations
were Enclosure
representative
of the actual airborne radionuclide
mixture, including
hard-to-detect
nuclides.
The inspectors
reviewed the adequacy of PSEG's internal dose assessments
for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed
effective
dose equivalent.
The inspectors
determined
that the affected personnel
were properly monitored
with calibrated
equipment
and the data was analyzed and internal exposures
properly assessed in accordance
with PSEG procedures.
Dosimeter
Placement
and Assessment
of Effective
Dose Equivalent
for External
The inspectors
reviewed PSEG's methodology
for monitoring
external dose in situations
in which non-uniform
fields are expected or large dose gradients
exist. The inspectors
verified that PSEG had established
criteria for determining
when alternate
monitoring techniques were
to be implemented.
The inspectors
reviewed dose assessments
performed
using multibadging
during the current assessment
period. The inspectors
verified that the assessment
was performed
in accordance
with PSEG procedures
and dosimetric
standards.
Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE) The inspectors
review SDE dose assessments
for adequacy.
The inspectors
evaluated
PSEG's method for calculating
SDE from distributed
skin contamination
or discrete radioactive
particles.
Neutron Dose Assessment
The inspectors
evaluated
PSEG's neutron dosimetry
program, including
dosimeter
types and/or survey instrumentation.
The inspectors
selected neutron exposure situations
and verified that (a) dosimetry
and/or instrumentation
was appropriate
for the expected neutron spectra, (b) there was sufficient
sensitivity
for low dose and/or dose rate measurement, and (c) neutron dosimetry
was properly calibrated.
The inspectors
verified that interference
by gamma radiation
was accounted
for in the calibration.
The inspectors
verified that time and motion evaluations
were representative
of actual neutron exposure events, as applicable.
For the special dosimetric
situations
reviewed in this section, the inspectors
determined
how
SSigned the dose of record for total effective
dose equivalent, SDE. and lens dose equivalent.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
Enclosure*
4. OTHER
40A1 Performance
Indicator (PI) Verification
(71151 6 InsRection
Scope The inspectors
reviewed PSEG submittals
for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating
systems cornerstone
PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition
and guidance contained
in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory
Assessment
Performance
Indicator
Guideline," Revision 5. Cornerstone:
Mitigating
Systems * Unit 1 and Unit
RHR systems; and * Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems. The inspectors
verified the accuracy of the data' by comparing
it to CAP records, control room operators'
logs, the site operating
history database, and key PI summary records. b. Findings No findings were identified.
40A2 Identification
and Resolution
of Problems (71152 -1 work-around
sample) Review of Items Entered into the Corrective
Action Program As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification
and Resolution
of Problems," and in order to help identify repetitive
equipment
failures or specific human performance
issues for follow-up, the inspectors
performed
a daily screening
of all items entered into PSEG's CAP. This was accomplished
by reviewing
the description
of each new notification
and attending
daily management
review committee
meetings.
Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Review of Operator Workaround
Program Inspection
Scope The inspectors
conducted
a cumulative
review of operator workarounds
for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness
of PSEG's operator workaround
program. The inspectors
reviewed PSEG's control room distraction
report, operator burden list, and operator burden self-assessment.
The inspectors
focused on the potential
impact on mitigating
systems and the potential
to affect operator ability to implement
abnormal and emergency
operating
procedures.
The review included interviews
with licensed
and walkdowns
of main control room panels. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Findings and
No findings were
.1 16 PSEG identified
twelve operator challenges
at Unit 1 and Unit 2, but none of the challenges
were classified
as operator workarounds.
The inspectors
did not identify additional
operator challenges
or workarounds.
The inspectors
reviewed
103, "OperatorWorkaround
Program", and OP-AA-1 02-1 03 w 1 001 , UOperator
Burdens Program>>, for PSEG program requirements
and found that PSEG adequately
implemented
these procedures.
The most recent operator burden assessment
was reviewed for each unit. The inspectors
determined
that the cumulative
impact of the identified
operator challenges
was within manageable
limits. Event Followwup
(71153 -3 samples) iQ!.osed)
Licensee Event Report 05000272/2010-001-00, Automatic
Start of the 1C EDG On April 16, 2010, at 1641 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.244005e-4 months <br />, the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power. Surveillance
testing was being performed
to demonstrate
the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source. The 1 C EDG automatically
started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design. Abnormal operating
procedure
S1.0P-ABAKV-0003
was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus. Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended.
Thl9 unexpected
start of the 1 C
CSD breaker auxiliary
position switch (52STA switch). The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment
of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly.
The mis-adjustment
was the result of unclear procedural
guidance for measuring
the breaker plunger gap. Corrective
actions consist of replacement
of the
STA switch, proper adjustment
of the breaker plunger gap. inspection
of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps, and procedure
revisions
to improve the guidance for measuring
breaker plunger gaps. The inspectors'
review of this issue noted a licensee identified
violation
of regulatory
requirements, specifically
that PSEG maintenance
procedure
guidance for measuring
the breaker plunger gap was inadequate.
The enforcement
aspects ofthis violation
are discussed
in Section 40A7. This
ER 05000272-2010-002-00.
Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer
Bushing Failure On July 7. 2010, at approximately
1118, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50% reactor power. The turbine trip was caused by the actuation
of the regular and back-up phase B ...C differential
relays in the main generator
protection
scheme, which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer
bushing after an inadvertent actuation
of the transformer
fire protection
deluge system. The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot
sprinkler
heads that had mEllted due to the unusually
high ambient temperatures
combined with the transformer's
heat, direct sunlight.
and restricted
ventilation
caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer
B phase. Mist from the deluge system actuation, driven by the transformer
cooling fans, the heat rising from the transformer
and the close proximity
of the concrete wall enclosure, rose above the main power transformer
B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure. PSEG corrective
actions included replacing
the main power transformer
deluge system air-pilot
sprinkler
heads with sprinkler
heads that have a higher temperature
setpoint.
The Enclosure
.1 inspectors
completed
a review of this LER and did not identify a violation
of regulatory
requirements.
This lER is closed . . 3 (Closed) LER 05000272/2010-003-00, Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.0.4 On July 25, 2010, at 0940, a PSEG technician
identified
that the circuitry
was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic
start on a trip of both steam generator
pumps (SGFPs). At the time of discovery, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic
start circuitry
is required by
PSEG re-established
the automatic
start of the
SGFPs at 1557 on July 25, 2010. The cause of the failure to re-establish
the automatic
start circUitry
for the start of the motor driven
SGFPs was due to operators
performing
the incorrect
section of the procedure
to re-establish
the start circuitry
during mode ascension.
Corrective
actions consisted
of training, procedure
revisions, and personnel
accountability.
The inspectors
review of this issue noted a licensee identified
violation
of regulatory
requirements, specifically
that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry
required by TS 3.3.2.1 function 8f disabled was a condition
prohibited
by TS 3.0.4. The enforcement
aspects of this violation
are discussed
in Section 40A7. This
NRC Temporary
Instruction (TO 2515/177 -Managing Gas Accumulation
in Emergency
Core Cooling. Decay Heat Removal. and Containment
Sgray Systems a. Inspection
Scope
TI 2515/177 to support the NRC's confirmatory
review of licensee responses
to
GL) 2008-01, "Managing
Gas Accumulation
in Emergency
Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment
Spray Systems." Based on the review of
NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection
scope to the regional inslPectors.
The inspectors
used this inspection
guidance along with the
PSEG implemented
or was in the process of acceptably
implementing
the commitments, modifications, and programmatically
controlled
actions described
in their GL 2008-01 response.
The inspectors
verified that the plant-specific
information (including
licensing
basis documents
and design information)
was consistent
with the information
that PSEG submitted
to the
GL 2008-01. The inspectors
reviewed a sample of isometric
drawings and piping and instrument . diagrams and conducted
selected system piping walkdowns
to verify that PSEG's drawings reflected
the subject system configurations
and UFSAR descriptions.
Specifically, the inspectors
verified the following
related to a sample of isometric
drawings for the CVCS, RHR, safety injection (SI), and containment
spray (CS) systems: High pOint vents were identified; High points that did not have vents were recognized
and evaluated
with respect to their potential
for gas accumulation;
Other areas where gas could accumulate
and potentially
impact subject operability, such as orifices in horizontal
pipes, isolated branch lines, exchangers, improperly
sloped piping, and under closed valves, were
evaluated
in engineering
reviews or had ultrasonic
testing (UT) points which reasonably
detect void formation; For piping segments reviewed, branch lines and fittings were clearly shown. The inspectors
conducted
walkdowns
of portions of the above systems to reasonably
assure the acceptability
of PSEG's drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01. The inspectors
verified that PSEG conducted
walkdowns
of the applicable
systems to confirm that the combination
of system orientation, vents, instructions
and procedures, tests, and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently
full of water to assure operability.
The inspectors
reviewed PSEG's methodology
used to determine
system piping high pOints, identification
of negative sloped piping, and
calculations
of void sizes based on UT equipment
readings to ensure the methods were reasonable.
The inspectors
verified that PSEG included all emergency
core COOling systems, along with supporting
systems, within scope of the GL. In addition, the inspectors
verified that P5EG acceptably
addressed
flashing of
RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures
to ensure system operability.
The inspectors
also reviewed engineering
analyses associated
with the development
of acceptance
criteria for <:is-found
voids, which included engineering
assumptions
for void transport
and acceptability
of void fractions
at the suction and discharge
piping of the applicable
system pumps. The inspectors
coordinated
this review with NRR, who was concurrently
pursuing questions
associated
with void acceptance
criteria at the time of the inspection.
The inspectors
reviewed a sample of P5EG's procedures
used for filling and venting the associated
GL
systems to verify that the procedures
were effective
in venting or redl:..Icing
voiding to acceptable
levels. The inspectors
verified the installation
of a hardware vent, located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge
piping, as committed
to in P5EG's GL response.
A similar vent installation
is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011. The inspectors
also confirmed
the planned implementation
of an additional
hardware high point vent modification
on each unit that was associated
with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated
to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion
and accumUlation
to be vented off (two vents per unit). The Unit 2 modification
is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810)
and the Unit 1 modification
is expected to be implemented
in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453).
The inspectors
verified that PSEG's surveillance
frequencies
were consistent
with the UFSAR, T5s, and associated
bases. The inspectors
reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance
results to ensure proper implementation
of the surveillance
program anc! that the existence
of unacceptable
gas accumulation
was evaluated
within the CAP, as necessary.
In addition, on August 4, 2010, the inspectors
observed portions of the performance
of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance
to assess the adequacy of procedures
and implementation.
The inspectors
reviewed CAP documents
to verify that selected actions described
in P5EG's nine-month
and supplemental
submittals
were acceptably
documented, including
completed
actions and the implementation
schedule for incomplete
actions. The inspectors
also verified that NRC commitments
in PSEG's submittals
were included in the CAP. Additionally, the inspectors
reviewed evaluations
and corrective
actions for various issues PSEG identified
during their GL 2008-01 Enclosure
review. The inspectors
performed
this review to ensure PSEG appropriately
evaluated
and adequately
addressed
any gas voiding concerns, including
the evaluation
of
for gas voids discovered
in the field. Finally, the inspectors
reviewed PSEG's training associated
with gas accumulation
to assess if appropriate
training was provided to the operations
and engineering
support staff to ensure appropriate
awareness
of the effects of gas voiding. Documents
reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings No findings were identified.
NRR is still evaluating
some technical
aspects associated
with void acceptance
criteria and will likely request additional
information
from
TI may require additional
inspections
prior to final closure. Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented
via separate correspondence
from NRR. 40A6 Meetings, Including
Exit The inspectors
presented
the inspection
results to Mr.
PSEG management
at the conclusion
of the inspection
on October 7, 2010. The inspectors
asked PSEG whether any materials
examined during the inspection
were proprietary.
No proprietary
information
was identified.
40A7 UcensesMldentified
Violations
The following
violations
of NRC requirements
were identified
by PSEG. They were determined
to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 2.3 of the NRC Enforcement
Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned
and Programs" states, in part, that written procedures
shall be established, implemented
and maintained
for activities
specified
in Regulatory
Guide 1.33, Revision
2, February 1978, Regulatory
Guide 1.33,Section IX. includes written procedures
for performing
maintenance, which can affect the performance
of safety related equipment.
Contrary to the above, PSEG did not adequately
implement
and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification
maintenance
procedure.
Specifically, the inappropriate
guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments
for 4KV magne-blast
breakers resulted in a miswadjustment
of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521ST A auxiliary
switch operating
mechanism.
This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> on April 16, 2010. This violation
was determined
to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood
of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory, it did not affect PSEG's ability to terminate
a leak path or add
PSEG's ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost. PSEG entered this violation
in their CAP as notification
20459055.
AFVV pumps start when both steam generator
feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2. Contrary to this requirement.
from 2132 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00353 weeks <br />8.11226e-4 months <br /> on July 22.2010, to 1557 hours0.018 days <br />0.433 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.924385e-4 months <br /> on July 25,2010, Enclosure
lhis auto start function was disabled.
Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded
prior to ascension
to Mode 2. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent
the loss of a system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time, or screen as potentially
risk significant
due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating
event.
TS violation
in their CAP as notification
20471722.
A
- IT [[]]
ACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL
INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTAL
- KEY [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
CONTACT Licensee personnel:
C. Fricker, Site Vice President
E. Eilola, Plant Manager L. Rajkowski, Engineering
Director R. DeSanctis, Maintenance
Director J. Garecht, Operations
Director J. Higgins, System Engineer F. Hummel, System Engineer R. Gary, Radiation
Protection
Manager S. Bowers, System Engineer E. Villar, Licensing
Engineer
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- AND [[]]
DISCUSSED
Closed 05000272/2010-001-00
LER Automatic
Start of the 1 C
LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer
Bushing Failure (Section 40A3.2) 0500027212010-003-00
LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.0.4 (Section 40A3.3)
- LIST [[]]
OF DOCUMENTS
REVIEWED In addition to the documents
identified
in the body of this report, the inspectors
reviewed the following
documents
and records: Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001, Adverse Environmental
Conditions, Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines, Revision 5 Orders 70111536 70049239 Attachment
Section 1 R04: Equipment
Alignment
S1.0P-ST-SW-0013, Service Water Valve Verification
Modes 1-4, Revision S 1. OP-SO ,AF-0001, Auxiliary
System Operation, Revision S1.0P-ST.AF-0008, Auxiliary
Valve Verification
Modes 1-3, Revision Se.MD-PM.ZZ-0005, Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance, Revision Drawings 205331 222508 205236 Notifications
20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722 Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793 Other Documents
VTD 174547, Terry Turbine Inspection
Manual, Revision 21 Section
Fire Protection
Procedures
FRS-II-421, Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, 4160V Switchgear
Rooms & Battery Rooms Elevation:
64', Revision 6 FRS-II-433, Salem Unit 1, (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, Auxiliary
Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation:
84', Revision 6 FRS-II-9111, Salem Unit 1, (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, Service Water Intake Structure
Elevation:
2' & 112', Revision 2 FRS-II-424, Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan, cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation:
64', Revision 2 Drawings FA-01, Detection
Design Layout 4160V Switchgear
Room Unit No.2 Elev. 64', Revision 0 FP-01, Sprinkler
Design Layout 4160V Switchgear
Room Unit No.2 Elev. 64', Revision A FP-12B. No.1 Unit Auxiliary
Building Fire Protection
Piping Aux. Feedwater
Pump Area Elev. 84', Revision 2 Notifications
20429890 20472945 Orders 70044438 Other Documents
Design Change Plan 80089591, S2 C02 Replacement
64', 78' and 84' Elevations
NC.DE-PS.zZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA, Salem Fire Protection
Report Fire Hazards Analysis, Revision 6 . I S-2-FP-FEE-1987, Fire Suppression
System Performance
Capability
Evaluation
-2FA-AB-64A, Revision 0 I Attachment
Section 1 R06: Flood Protection
Measures Procedure§
S2.0P-AB.SW*0001, Loss of Service Water Header Pressure, Revision 16 S2.0P-AB.SW-0003, Service Water Bay Leak, Revision 7 S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002, Flooding, Revision 3 S2.0P-SO.SW-0005, Service Water System Operation, Revision 40 SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026.
Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration
Seal Inspection, Revision 3 Drawings 205342 212805 Notifications
(*NRC identified)
20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545*
20474629*
20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20;318626
20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450 Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098
Other Documents
SC.DE-TS.ZZ-2034.
Technical
Requirements
for Construction
of Electrical
Installation, Salem Generating
Station. Revision 5 SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026, Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration
Seal Inspection, dated April 23, 2010 SC.OP-DLZZ-0008, Circulating/Service
Water Logs, dated July 26,2010, and August 2. 2010 ER-AA-3003, Cable Condition
Monitoring
and Aging Management
Program, Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01, Inaccessible
or Underground
Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation
Systems or Cause Plant Transients, dated 2/7/2007
NRC Generic Letter 2007-01. dated 1211212007
Specification
No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0, Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use at Salem & Hope Creek Generating
Stations General Specification
85651-0-1, 5KVto 15KV Insulated
Cable Program Element 5, Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments
NRC Information Notice 2002-12. Submerged
Safety-Related
Electrical
Cables NRC Component
DeSign Bases Inspection
Report 05000416/2009006
Engineering
Evaluation
Number: S-C-4KV-EEE-1751, Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially
submerged
condition
for Salem Unit 1 and 2 Seabrook Issue Summary, Condition
Report No. 211208,357, Topic Submerged
Service Water Electrical
Cables, dated 11/19/2009
Section 1 R11: Licensed Operator Regualification
Program Procedures
TO-AA-301, Simulator
Configuration
Management, Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response, Revision 27 Attachment
Section 1 R12: Maintenance
Effectiveness
Notifications
20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633 Other Documents
Salem 1 Jet Narrative
Log, from 9/28/2008
-9/28/2010
evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development
and Action Plan (Monitoring)
Goal Setting Template Maintenance
Rule Scoping Document (for CVC) Section 1 Ri3: Maintenance
Risk Assessments
and Emergent Work .control Procedures
Risk Management, Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002, On-Line Risk Management, Revision 5 WC-AA-101, On-Line Work Management
Process, Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116, Protected
Equipment
Program, Revision 2 Notifications
20476129 Orders 30105373 30188989
60091834 Other Documents
PRA Risk Assessment
for Work Week 037 Section iRiS: Operability
Evaluations
Procedures
S2.0P-PTSW-0005, Service Water Fouling Monitoring
Room Coolers, Revision 8 S2.0P-SO.SW-0008, Inservice
Room Cooler Flushes, Revision 0 S2.0P-STDG-0001, 2A Diesel Generator
Surveillance
Test, Revision 46 Drawings 205228 205342 205337 Notifications
20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841 Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466 Other Documents
- SER [[]]
OTDM. Issue Resolution
Documentation
Form for 1 CV284, Revision 6 Attachment
Section 1 R18: Plant Modifications
Procedure§, S1.0P-IO.ZZ-0002, Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby, Revision 56 S 1.OP-IO.ZZ-01
03, Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative
Requirements, Revision 6 S1.0P-SO.RPS-0009, Install/Removal
of
SGFP Trips, Revision 5 S1.0P-SO.PC-0001, SWitchgear
and Penetration
Areas Ventilation
Operation, Revision 20 Design Changes
VDC Battery Online Replacement
Notifications
20471722 20477280 Orders 70104212 Other Documents
Letter from the
PSEG, Subj: Salem Nuclear Generating
Station, Unit No.2, Issuance of Amendment
Re: One-time On-line Battery Replacement.
daled 9/112010 Control Room Logs Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance
Testing Procedures
S1.0P-SO.AF-0001(Q), Auxiliary
System Operation, Revision 27 S2.0P-ST.CC-0003(Q), Inservice
Testing, 23 Component
Cooling Pump, Revision 25 SC.MD-PM.AF-0007(Q), 13 and 23 Auxiliary
Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection
and Lubrication, Revision 0 S2.0P-ST.CH-0004, Chilled Water System -Chillers, Revision 17 S2.0P-ST.125-0001, Electrical
Power Systems
ST.SJ-0003, Inservice
Testing. Safety Injection
Valves, Modes 1 -6, Revision 12 S2.RA-ST.SJ-0003, Inservice
Testing, Safety Injection
Valves, Modes 1 -6, Acceptance
Criteria, Revision 14' . S1.0P*PT.AF-0003, 13 Auxiliary
Pump Periodic Run, Revision 0 S2.0P-ST.DG-0001, 2A Diesel Generator
Surveillance
Test, Revision 46 Notifications
20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141 Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466 Other Documents
Salem 2 Narrative
Log, dated 9124/2010
Salem Prompt Investigation
Report, No. 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 9/2/2010 Root Cause Investigation
Report, 13123 Auxiliary
Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious Trips, dated 9/20/2010
(page 1 of 3), Revision 10 Attachment
Section 1 R20: Refueling
and Other Outage Activities
Procedures
OP-AA-10B-108, Unit Restart Review, Revision 9 Notifications
20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651 Orders 60091125 Other
S1.0P-SO.AF-0001, Attachment
2, Turbine-Driven
OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001, Attachment
1, Trip Report, Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001, Attachment
2, Post Reactor Trip/ECCS
Actuation
Review, Revision 1 Prompt Investigation
Report. "B" Phase Main Power Transformer/High
Voltage Bushing Failure, dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem
Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR
Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer
& Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency
Classificati.on
Guide, Attachment
14, Four Hour Report -NRC Operations
Salem Emergency
Classification
Guide, Attachment
29, Twenty-four
Hour Report North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) Disturbance
Reporting
SequencE'
of Events Review Report Section 1R22: Surveillance
Testing Procedures
S1.IC-FT.RCP-0023, 1PT-474 Pressurizer
Pressure Protection
Channel IV, Revision 16 S2.0P-ST.DG-001, 2A Diesel Generator
Surveillance
Test, Revision 46 S2.0P-ST.SJ-0001, Inservice
Testing -21 Safety Injection
Pump, Revision 19 S2.0P-ST.RHR-0002, Inservice
Testing -22 Residual Heat Removal Pump, Revision 28 S2.RA-ST.RHR-0002, Inservice
Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance
Criteria, Revision 8 S2.0P-PT.RHR-0002, 22 RHR Pump Flow Data, Revision 4 Drawings 223678 Notifications
(*NRC identified)
20153697'
20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159*
20474660 20474496 20472575 Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347 Section 2RS1: Radiological
Hazard Assessment
and Exposure Controls Notifications
20467421 Attachment
Other
Prompt Investiga1ion
Report, Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography
Section 2RS2: Occupational
ALARA Planning and Controls
20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304
Other Documents
Salem Unit 1 20 th Refueling
Outage Radiological
Performance
Report Past-ALAR A Review 2010-59 Section 2RS4: Occupational
Dose Assessment
Procedures
RP-AA-220, Bioassay Program, Revision 6 I RP-AA-21, Dosimetry
Issue, Usage, and Control, Revision 10 i ! Section 4OA1: Performance
Indicator
Verification
I Notifications
20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 . 20472916 20477296 Other Documents
Salem 1 SW Narrative
Lag, from 7/1/2009 -7/1/2010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative
Log, from 7/1/2009 -7/1/2010 Salem 1 AF Narrative
Lag, from 711/2009 -7/1/2010 Salem 2 SW Narrative
Log, from 6/30/2009
-6/30/2010
Salem 2 RHR Narrative
Log, from 6/30/2009
-6/3012010
Salem 2 AF Narrative
Lag, from 6/30/2009
-6/30/2010
Section 40A2: Identification
and Resolution
of Problems Notifications
20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952 Orders 70092096 Other Documents
Operator Burdens Program, Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103, Operator Work-Around
Program, Revision 2 Quarterly
Operator Burden Assessment, Salem Unit 1 -Second Quarter Quarterly
Operator Burden Assessment, Salem Unit 2 -Second Quarter Attachment
Section 4()A3: Event Follow-up
Procedures
SC.MD-PRAKV-0002, 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock
Gap Verification, Revision 9 Notifications
20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352 Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345 Other Documents
Prompt Investigation
Report, Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 11/12 SGFP Trips disabled when required by Technical
SpeCifications
4.160KV Function Level Maintenance
Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations
Narrative
Log (Day and Night Shift), dated 4/16/2010
Salem Unit 1 Operations
Narrative
Log (Night Shift), dated 4/1712010
Section 40A5: Other Activities .
S1.0P-AB.LOCA-0001, Shutdown LOCA, Revision S1.0P-SO.CVC-0007, Fill and Vent of the cves, Revision S1.0P-SO.RHR-0001, Initiating
RHR, Revision S1.0P-SO.RHR-0002, Terminating
SO.SJ-0001, Preparation
of the Safety Injection
System for Operation, Revision S1.0P-ST.SJ-0009, ECCS Subsystems
-Tavg 2! 350°F, Revision S2.0P-SO.eS-0001, Preparation
of the
ST.SJ-0009, ECCS Subsystems
-Tavg 2! 350"F, Revision 205228 205232
205234 205235 CVC-1-2B
RH-1-1A RH-1-1B Notifications
(*NRC
20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080
20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108
20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 60082989 70079735 70095588
70096422 70101308
Calculations
and
11050-740-02, Waterhammer
Technical
Evaluation
for Salem 1 & 2 eve System, Revision 11050-740-03, Waterhammer
Technical
Evaluation
for Salem 1 & 2 RHR System, Revision 11050-740-04, Waterhammer
Technical
Evaluation
for 5alem 1 & 251 System, Revision Attachment
80097737, Adding Vent Valves on S'IRHR-11RH19
Cross Connect Header between
SJ43
and 22/24SJ43
Valves (Design Change Request), Revision 0 Sargent & Lundy LLC Project
Salem Unit
CS System Evaluation, dat,ed 1212012008
Sargent & Lundy
GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation, dated 12/20/2008
Sargent & Lundy
GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation, dated 12/20/2008
Sargent & Lundy
GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation, dated 1212012008
Sargent & Lundy
GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation.
dated 10/2712008
Sargent & Lundy
GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation, dated 10/27/2008
Sargent & Lundy
GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation, dated 1 0/27/2008
Sargent & Lundy
GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation, dated 10/27/2008
S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0, Hydraulic
Analysis of the Spray System, Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893, Allowable
Volume of Non-Condensable
Gases in RHR Recirculation Connect Piping, Revision 0 Technical
Basis for the Simplified
Equation, NEI System Gas Accumulation
Management
Workshop, dated 1/21/2010
VTD 431261, Industry Guidance -Evaluation
of Unexpected
Voids or Gas Identified
in Plant
WCAP-16631-NP, Testing/Evaluation
of Gas Transport
to Suction of ECCS Pumps, Revision 0 Completed
Tests S1.0P-ST.SJ-0009, ECCS Subsystems
-Tavg <i! 350"F, performed
4/17/2009, 8/13/2009, 12/11/2009,1/16/2010,211212010,3/11/2010,4/25/20410, and 5/14/2010
S2.0P-ST.SJ-0009, ECCS Subsystems
-Tavg 350 D F, performed
7/9/2009, 8/7i2009, 1/8/2010,2/6/2010,3/6/2010,4/9/2010,5/5/2010, and 6/15/2010
Other Documents
- NRC [[]]
GL 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation
in Emergency
Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment
Spray Systems, dated 1/11/2008
PSEG to NRC, Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month
Response to
- NRC [[]]
PSEG to NRC, Salem Unit 1 Supplementa.1 (Post-Outage)
Response
- 10 NRC [[]]
PSEG to NRC, Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage)
Response to
- NRC [[]]
PSEG to NRC, Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional
Information
Regarding
GL 2008-01, dated 3111f2010
S-C-RHR-MEE-1055, Shutdown LOCA Design Basis, Salem Units 1 and 2, Revision 0 Engineering
Support Training.
Gas Intrusion, Revision 3 Long
Training Plan 0910, licensed Operator Requalification
Training, Revision 1 System Health Reports, Unit 1 and
- ADAMS [[]]
- AFW [[]]
- ALARA [[]]
- CAP [[]]
- CCW [[]]
- CFR [[]]
- CS [[]]
- CVCS [[]]
- DAC [[]]
- EDG [[]]
- GL [[]]
- GTG [[]]
- HRA [[]]
- HX [[]]
- LER [[]]
- MPT [[]]
- NCV [[]]
- NEI [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- NRR [[]]
- OOS [[]]
- PARS [[]]
- PI [[]]
- PMT [[]]
- PSEG [[]]
- RCS [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RPM [[]]
- SDE [[]]
- SGFP [[]]
- SI [[]]
- SSC [[]]
- SW [[]]
- SWIS [[]]
- TI [[]]
- TS [[]]
- TSAS [[]]
- UT [[]]
- VHRA [[]]
- WO [[]]
LIST OF
Agency-wide
Documents
Access and Management
System Auxiliary
As Low As Reasonably
Achievable
Corrective
Action Program Component
Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation
Containment
Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration
Emergency
Diesel Generator
Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator
High Radiation
Area Heat Exchanger
Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer
Non-cited
Violation
Nuclear Energy Institute
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Out-of -Service Publicly Available
Records Performance
Indicator
Post-Maintenance
Testing Public Service Enterprise
Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation
Protection
Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent
Pump Safety Injection
Structures, Systems, and Components
Service Water Service Water Intake Structure
Temporary
Instruction
Technical*Specifications
Technical
Specification
Action Statement
Ultrasonic
Test Very High Radiation
Area Work Order Attachment