ML20077L169

Temporary Instruction 2515/194 Report 05000272/2020010 and 05000311/2020010

ML20077L169
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/20/2020
From:	Glenn Dentel NRC Region 1
To:	Carr E Public Service Enterprise Group
References
IR 2020010
Download: ML20077L169 (10)

See also: IR 05000272/2020010

Text

March 20, 2020

Mr. Eric Carr

President and Chief Nuclear Officer

PSEG Nuclear, LLC

P. O. Box 236

Hancock's Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - TEMPORARY

INSTRUCTION 2515/194 REPORT 05000272/2020010 AND 05000311/2020010

Dear Mr. Carr:

On March 5, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at

Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection

with Mr. David Sharbaugh, Plant Manager and other members of your staff. The results of this

inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection

and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document

Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public

Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

X /RA/

Signed by: Glenn T. Dentel

Glenn T. Dentel, Chief

Engineering Branch 2

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 05000272 and 05000311

License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75

Enclosure:

As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

ML20077L169

Non-Sensitive Publicly Available

SUNSI Review

Sensitive Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRP RI//DRS

NAME CHobbs per email BBickett GDentel

DATE 3/18/20 3/19/20 3/20/20

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000272 and 05000311

License Numbers: DPR-70 and DPR-75

Report Numbers: 05000272/2020010 and 05000311/2020010

Licensee: PSEG Nuclear, LLC

Facility: Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: Hancock's Bridge, NJ 08038

Inspection Dates: March 2, 2020 to March 5, 2020

Inspectors: C. Hobbs, Reactor Inspector

J. Patel, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By: Glenn T. Dentel, Chief

Engineering Branch 2

Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees

performance by conducting a Temporary Instruction 2515/194 at Salem Nuclear Generating

Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor

Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial

nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more

information.

List of Findings and Violations

No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.

Additional Tracking Items

None.

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INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with

their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met

consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection

Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,

observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance

with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

2515/194 - Inspection of the Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative Associated with the

Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the Nuclear Energy Institute

Voluntary Industry Initiative, (ADAMS Accession No. ML15075A454) dated March 16,

2015. This included reviewing how the licensee updated their licensing basis to reflect the need

to protect against open phase conditions.

Inspection of the Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative Associated with the Open

Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities in Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)

(1 Sample)

(1) Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 electrical power distribution system is divided into three

voltage levels: 500 kV, 13 kV, and 4kV. The offsite electrical power system consists

of the 500 kV and 13 kV voltage levels which are contained inside the Salem

switchyard, while the onsite electrical power distribution system begins at the 4 kV

voltage level, outside of the Salem switchyard. Electrical power enters the Salem

switchyard at the 500 kV system which consists of a 500 kV ring bus with two

seperate offsite power transmission lines supplying power to different sections of the

500 kV ring bus. In addition, there is a third connection which is an inter-tie to the

Hope Creek 500 kV switchyard that is normally open. The 500 kV ring bus supplies

power to four Station Power Transformers (SPTs) which step the voltage down to

13 kV. Normal configuration is SPT 1 and 2 supply 13 kV power to the North 13 kV

Bus, while SPT 3 and 4 supply 13 kV power to the South 13 kV Bus. The North 13

kV Bus supplies power to SPTs 11, 12, 21, and 22 which step the voltage down to 4

kV. SPTs 11, 12, 21, and 22 supply alternate power to eight non-vital 4 kV buses

called group buses. Salem Unit 1 group non-vital buses are supplied by SPTs 11 and

12, while Salem Unit 2 group non-vital buses are supplied by SPTs 21 and 22. The

group buses are normally powered by Auxiliary Power Transformers (APTs) 1 and 2

which are powered from Salem Unit 1 main generator and Salem Unit 2 main

generator when their respective reactors are at power. During a reactor trip, power to

the non-vital 4 kV group buses will be automatically transferred to SPTs 11 and 12 for

Salem Unit 1, and SPTs 21, and 22 for Salem Unit 2.

The South 13 kV Bus supplies power to SPTs 13, 14, 23, and 24. Each Salem unit

has three vital 4kV buses that supply power to Engineered Safeguard Features

(ESFs) 480 V loads. SPTs 13 and 14 supply power to Salem Unit 1, 4 kV vital buses,

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while SPTs 23 and 24 supply power to Salem Unit 2, 4 kV vital buses. Normal

configuration is to have one SPT carry the load for two 4 kV vital buses, while the

other SPT carries the load for one 4 kV vital bus. In the event both SPTs are lost or

degraded to a vital 4 kV bus, each 4 kV vital bus has its own respective standby

diesel generator that will start and synchronize onto its respective 4 kV vital bus,

automatically within 13 seconds. Only two vital 4 kV buses are required to shutdown

an individual Salem unit. The third 4 kV vital bus on each Salem unit is for

redundancy.

The Open Phase Protection (OPP) system utilized at Salem consists of a hybrid

design with protection at both the 500 kV level and additional protection at the 13 kV

level. At the 500 kV level, the OPP system utilizes the Power Systems Sentinel

Technologies, LLC (PSSTech) design. This design consists of a neutral current

injection method, in which a small neutral current is injected to the primary (high) side

neutral bushing. Changes in the neutral impedance are then monitored to determine

if an open phase condition exists. This method of protection is designed to work in

both high and low transformer loading conditions. At Salem Nuclear Generating

Station, each PSSTech system control cabinet contains single channel protection,

with one Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL) protection relay. One PSSTech

system control cabinet is installed at each of the four 500 kV transformers (SPTs 1, 2,

3, and 4) in the Salem switchyard. The active trip capability on each control cabinet

would open the upstream 500 kV switchyard breaker supplying power to that 500 kV

SPT in the event an Open Phase Condition (OPC) was detected. The PSSTech

system was functioning in alarm only mode at the time of inspection, with the active

trip feature disabled by hand switch on the front of the control cabinet.

At the 13 kV level, OPP is provided by SEL-751 multifunction negative sequence

relays (59Q) that monitor vital 4 kV bus infeed through potential transformers. Eight

relays total, four for each Salem Unit are installed. Each SPT feeding power to 4 kV

vital buses, has two 59Q relays installed that utilize a two out of two coincidence logic

to prevent spurious trips of the system. Relay settings have been adjusted to account

for normal system grid imbalance. In the event an OPC was detected at the 13 kV

level, the 13 kV infeed breakers to their respective SPTs would trip open. This would

be STPs 13 and 14 for Salem Unit 1, and SPTs 23 and 24 for Salem Unit 2. This

would be accomplished by activation of the SPT lockout relay. At the time of the

inspection, the SEL-751 relays were operating in alarm mode only, with the active trip

feature disabled by opening knife switches located next to the relays.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Detection, Alarms, General, and Protective Actions Criteria 2515/194

Based on discussion with PSEG staff, review of design and testing documentation, and

walkdowns of installed equipment, the inspectors had reasonable assurance that PSEG is

appropriately implementing, with noted exceptions discussed below, the Voluntary Industry

Initiative at Salem Nuclear Generating Station. The inspectors determined that:

03.01(a)(1) Open Phase Conditions are detected and alarmed in the main control room for

both Salem units.

03.01(a)(2) Open Phase Condition detection circuits are sensitive enough to identify an OPC

for all credited transformer loading conditions (high and low loading). In addition, enhanced

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monitoring criteria have been proceduralized for taking an OPP PSST panel out of service, as

well as for non-functional SEL-751 relays.

03.01(a)(3) Open Phase Condition design schemes minimize misoperation and spurious

operation in the range of voltage unbalance normally expected in the transmission system.

Misoperation and spurious operation have been accounted for in calculation, implemented

through protective relay settings, and utilization of coincidence logic at the 13 kV level of the

system.

03.01(a)(4) No Class-1E circuits were replaced with non-Class-1E circuits during the

implementation of the OPC modification.

03.01(a)(5) The Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 UFSAR was updated to discuss the design features

and protection schemes for the OPP system under UFSAR change notice 17-015.

03.01(b)(1) Salem Unit 1 and Unit 2 have determined that an OPC is a credible failure and

have installed an Open Phase Protection system for both units.

03.01(b)(2) With an OPC occurence and no accident condition signal present, an OPC will

not adversely affect the function of important-to-safety SSCs. The OPP system at Salem

Units 1 and 2 is designed to actuate an existing transformer lockout relay at both the 500 kV

and 13 kV level if the active trip feature of the system is enabled. The trip function, if

enabled, would provide an additional input to the associated transformer lockout relays,

however, the credited plant response is unaffected and will be the same regardless of the

conditions that generated the lockout of the transformer.

No findings were identified.

Protective Actions Exceptions 2515/194

03.01(b)(3) With an OPC occurrence and an accident condition signal present, the inspectors

could not verify that automatic detection and actuation will transfer loads as required to

mitigate postulated accidents to an alternate source and ensure safety functions are

preserved. At the time of the inspection, the OPP system at Salem Units 1 and 2 was

operating in alarm mode only with the active trip features of the system disabled. Alarm

response procedures are in place to have operators manually separate either unit from offsite

power if it is determined that an OPC exists. The OPP system was still in the 24 month

monitoring period described in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Voluntary Industry Initiative

(VII). The monitoring period is scheduled to end in December 2020, at which time the station

will decide to enable active trip features of the system or adopt the risk informed operator

manual action methodology described in NEI technical report 19-02. This exception was

documented in NOTF 20846122.

03.01(b)(4) Periodic tests, calibrations, and setpoint verifications had not been established for

the OPP system at the time of the inspection. This exception was identified in the station self

assessment conducted prior to the start of the inspection and documented in NOTFs

20845339 and 20846123.

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EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On March 5, 2020, the inspectors presented the Temporary Instruction 2515/194 results

to Mr. David Sharbaugh, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.

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DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2515/194 Calculations ES-15.020 Salem Open Phase Protection Analysis 0

ES-15.022(Q) Salem 1E Motor Operability Analysis for Unbalanced Loads 0

Corrective Action NOTFs

Documents 20825396,

20828253,

20828254,

2028256

Corrective Action NOTFs

Documents 20845339,

Resulting from 20846122,

Inspection 20846123

Drawings 203000 S 8789- Salem Unit 1 & Unit 2 One Line Diagram - Generators & 67

67 Main Transformers

203000-SIMP-3 Salem Unit 1 & Unit 2 One Line Diagram - Salem 500 kV - 4 3

kV Electrical Distribution

203002 A 8789- Salem Unit 1 One Line Diagram - 4160V Vital Buses 37

37

208625 S 1000- Salem Unit 1 & Unit 2 One Line Diagram - 500 kV Switchyard 39

39

Engineering SCN 17-015 Salem Units 1 & 2 UFSAR change notice for Open Phase 11/16/17

Changes Condition protection system

Engineering DCP 80119154 50.59 Review Salem Unit 1 Open Phase Protection 0

Evaluations DCP 80119205 50.59 Review Salem Unit 2 Open Phase Protection 0

Procedures S1.OP-DL.ZZ- Salem Unit 1 Control Room Log Modes 5, 6, and Defueled 52

0002(Q)

S1.OP-DL.ZZ- Salem Unit 1 Control Room Log Modes 1 - 4 92

0003(Q)

S1.OP-ST.500- Salem Unit 1 - Electrical Power Systems AC Sources 16

0001(Q) Alignment

S1.OP.AR.ZZ- Salem Unit 1 - Alarm K-45 - Open Phase 47

0010(Q)

S2.OP-AR.ZZ- Salem Unit 2 - Alarm K-45 - Open Phase 36

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Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

0010(Q)

S2.OP-DL.ZZ- Salem Unit 2 Control Room Log - Modes 5, 6, and Defueled 50

0002(Q)

S2.OP-DL.ZZ- Salem Unit 2 Control Room Log Modes 1 - 4 116

0003(Q)

S2.OP-ST.500- Salem Unit 2 - Electrical Power Systems AC Sources 14

0001(Q) Alignment

SC.OP-DL.ZZ- Electrical Equipment Log 17

007(Z)

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