ML19338D119

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Ro:Evaluation & Analysis Required by IE Bulletin 79-14 Revealed Piping & Supports Have Less Conservatism During Seismic Events.Mods Will Be Made Prior to Startup
ML19338D119
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 09/15/1980
From: Werling J
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
References
IEB-79-14, RO-066-01P, RO-80-065-01P, RO-80-067-01P, NUDOCS 8009190500
Download: ML19338D119 (2)


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&1$ $ sam A.estue 7 #' DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Beaver Valley Power Station Post 0:ifice Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 September 15, 1980 BVPS: JAW:972 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 LERs 80-065/01P, 80-066/01P, 80-067/01P Mr. B. H. Grier, Director of Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Technical-3pecifications, LERs 80-065/01P, 80-066/01P and 80-067/01P, Technical Specification 6.9.1.8, Administrative Controls, are submitted. These occurrences were reported

, to Mr. J. Hegner, the Leaver Valley Resident Inspector, at 1045 hours0.0121 days <br />0.29 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.976225e-4 months <br /> on September 12, 1980.

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Evaluat. ion and reanalysis required by IE Bulletin 79-14 have shown that the following piping and supports have less conservatism during a seismic event than assumed for the safety analysis and will require remedial action. .

The first condition has been found at one location on each of two (2) reactor plant river water supply lines. The consequences of this would be a loss of all normal river water to the river water system during an operational basis earthquake and would be unisolable. Pipe support modifications to alleviate this condition will'be completed prior to plant startup.

The second condition that has been found exists on the "A" Steam Generator steam outlet piping hangers. Failure of these hangers would lead to a possible steam line rupture and loss of (one) heat sink. The combined cause for this condition is due to dead-weight plus an operational basis earthquake and a

, tur*oine trip. Modification of the hangers to alleviate this condition will be completed prior to plant startup. c hD) s

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- B009100 ifCO S

. e Mr. 8. H. Grier September 13, 1980-BVPS: JAW:972 Page 2 The third condition that has been found exists at a (2") two inch branch line off the 24" component cooling water header. Consequences of the loss of this line would lead to a loss of RHR because of the need to isolate the whole 24" header. The cause for this condition is due to a dead-weight load with a design basis earthquake. Pipe support modifications to alleviate this condition will be completed prior to startup.

Very truly yours, j/' J. A. Werling

{

Superintendent cc: Director Of Management & Program Analysis s/'

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 W. J. Ross, BVPS Licensing Project Manager United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 D. A. Beckman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, BVPS Site Inspector P. Higgins, Secretary, Prime Movers Committee - EEI Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, Palo Alto, California

, Mr. John Alford, PA Public Utilities Commission, Harrisburg, PA M YO

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