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| {{#Wiki_filter:QualTech NP125 West Park LoopHuntsville, AL 35806Phone 256.722.8500 Fax: 256.722.8533 I http://quaftechnp.cwfc.com CUR TISS Flow Control CompanyQualTech NPFebruary 5, 2015 | | {{#Wiki_filter:QualTech NP 125 West Park Loop Huntsville, AL 35806 Phone 256.722.8500 Fax: 256.722.8533 I http://quaftechnp.cwfc.com CUR TISS Flow Control Company QualTech NP February 5, 2015 |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| | | Revision to 10 CFR part 21 Final Notification for Event 50015 for GE CR120 Relays On April 9, 2014, QualTech NP provided an initial 10 CFR part 21 notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concerning failures of General Electric Type CR120AD control relays.This was submitted due to failures of relays that were sent to Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) as basic components. |
| Revision to 10 CFR part 21 Final Notification for Event 50015 for GE CR120 RelaysOn April 9, 2014, QualTech NP provided an initial 10 CFR part 21 notification to the NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) concerning failures of General Electric Type CR120AD control relays.This was submitted due to failures of relays that were sent to Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) asbasic components. | | There were two affected orders, both of which were shipped to NPPD and have since been replaced with relays that have passed supplemental testing designed to identify the infant mortality failure mode described below.A failure analysis, performed by QualTech NP, revealed that the most likely initiator of the failure was a flaw or defect in the start wrap of the coil magnet wire. The flaw created an arc that involved windings directly beneath the start wrap which resulted in an open circuit on the coil windings. |
| There were two affected orders, both of which were shipped to NPPD and have sincebeen replaced with relays that have passed supplemental testing designed to identify the infant mortality failure mode described below.A failure analysis, performed by QualTech NP, revealed that the most likely initiator of the failure was aflaw or defect in the start wrap of the coil magnet wire. The flaw created an arc that involved windingsdirectly beneath the start wrap which resulted in an open circuit on the coil windings. | | This failure is classified as infant mortality, which appears to be similar to the failure mode identified in the 30 day 10 CFR part 21 report (accession number 9706190261) dated June 12, 1997 submitted by GPU Nuclear.QualTech NP performed a failure analysis and based on analysis / data provided from the failures found in 2014, considered a 100 hour burn-in test combined with a 100 mechanical cycle test would identify the infant mortality of subject relays. The replacement relays described in the first paragraph of this letter were subjected to this testing.It has since come to the attention of QualTech NP engineering staff that a similar failure analysis was performed (NRC082495, Revision 1) in response to failures identified at GPU Nuclear Power Plant (Oyster Creek Nuclear Station) as reported in the 30 day 10 CFR Part 21 report issued on June 12, 1997 (Accession Number 9706190261). |
| This failure isclassified as infant mortality, which appears to be similar to the failure mode identified in the 30 day 10CFR part 21 report (accession number 9706190261) dated June 12, 1997 submitted by GPU Nuclear.QualTech NP performed a failure analysis and based on analysis | | The test method used to identify this failure mode in 1996 utilized a larger sample size and different testing methodology than was used by QualTech NP in 2014. Given the recent failures by what appears to be a similar mode, QualTech NP engineering staff is updating its recommendation on the testing required for these relays to be in line with the 1997 recommendations. |
| / data provided from the failures foundin 2014, considered a 100 hour burn-in test combined with a 100 mechanical cycle test would identifythe infant mortality of subject relays. The replacement relays described in the first paragraph of this letterwere subjected to this testing.It has since come to the attention of QualTech NP engineering staff that a similar failure analysis wasperformed (NRC082495, Revision | | The test method employed to identify failures included applying -1038 VDC (Voltage Limited) and 49 mA (Current Limited) @ 1 cycle / second (50% duty cycle) to a 100% sample size, where a cycle is defined as one second energized and one second de-energized. |
| : 1) in response to failures identified at GPU Nuclear Power Plant(Oyster Creek Nuclear Station) as reported in the 30 day 10 CFR Part 21 report issued on June 12, 1997(Accession Number 9706190261).
| | According to test data, a minimum of 2280 cycles under the above conditions will identify 99.9% of the defective relays without damaging properly constructed relays.Given the new recommendation by QualTech NP, replacement relays will be provided to NPPD after subjecting them to the new supplemental testing. A full report detailing this test data is available for review upon request ("Approach to Detecting Manufacturing Defect in GE CR120AD03041AA Relays" NRC document NRC082495 Revision 1).Sincerely, Matthew Thelen mthelen(curtisswright.com QualTech NP 125 West Park Loop Huntsville, AL 35806 Phone 256.722.8500 Fax: 256.722.8533 f http://quattechnp.cwfc.com cuirm$%_))Flow Control Company QualTech NP February 5, 2015 |
| The test method used to identify this failure mode in 1996 utilized alarger sample size and different testing methodology than was used by QualTech NP in 2014. Given therecent failures by what appears to be a similar mode, QualTech NP engineering staff is updating itsrecommendation on the testing required for these relays to be in line with the 1997 recommendations. | |
| The test method employed to identify failures included applying | |
| -1038 VDC (Voltage Limited) and 49mA (Current Limited) | |
| @ 1 cycle / second (50% duty cycle) to a 100% sample size, where a cycle isdefined as one second energized and one second de-energized. | |
| According to test data, a minimum of2280 cycles under the above conditions will identify 99.9% of the defective relays without damagingproperly constructed relays.Given the new recommendation by QualTech NP, replacement relays will be provided to NPPD aftersubjecting them to the new supplemental testing. | |
| A full report detailing this test data is available forreview upon request ("Approach to Detecting Manufacturing Defect in GE CR120AD03041AA Relays"NRC document NRC082495 Revision 1).Sincerely, Matthew Thelenmthelen(curtisswright.com QualTech NP125 West Park LoopHuntsville, AL 35806Phone 256.722.8500 Fax: 256.722.8533 f http://quattechnp.cwfc.com cuirm$%_))Flow Control CompanyQualTech NPFebruary 5, 2015 | |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| | | Revision to 10 CFR part 21 Final Notification for Event 50015 for GE CR120 Relays On April 9, 2014, QualTech NP provided an initial 10 CFR part 21 notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concerning failures of General Electric Type CR120AD control relays.This was submitted due to failures of relays that were sent to Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) as basic components. |
| Revision to 10 CFR part 21 Final Notification for Event 50015 for GE CR120 RelaysOn April 9, 2014, QualTech NP provided an initial 10 CFR part 21 notification to the NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) concerning failures of General Electric Type CR120AD control relays.This was submitted due to failures of relays that were sent to Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) asbasic components. | | There were two affected orders, both of which were shipped to NPPD and have since been replaced with relays that have passed supplemental testing designed to identify the infant mortality failure mode described below.A failure analysis, performed by QualTech NP, revealed that the most likely initiator of the failure was a flaw or defect in the start wrap of the coil magnet wire. The flaw created an arc that involved windings directly beneath the start wrap which resulted in an open circuit on the coil windings. |
| There were two affected orders, both of which were shipped to NPPD and have sincebeen replaced with relays that have passed supplemental testing designed to identify the infant mortality failure mode described below.A failure analysis, performed by QualTech NP, revealed that the most likely initiator of the failure was aflaw or defect in the start wrap of the coil magnet wire. The flaw created an arc that involved windingsdirectly beneath the start wrap which resulted in an open circuit on the coil windings. | | This failure is classified as infant mortality, which appears to be similar to the failure mode identified in the 30 day 10 CFR part 21 report (accession number 9706190261) dated June 12, 1997 submitted by GPU Nuclear.QualTech NP performed a failure analysis and based on analysis / data provided from the failures found in 2014, considered a 100 hour bum-in test combined with a 100 mechanical cycle test would identify the infant mortality of subject relays. The replacement relays described in the first paragraph of this letter were subjected to this testing.It has since come to the attention of QualTech NP engineering staff that a similar failure analysis was performed (NRC082495, Revision 1) in response to failures identified at GPU Nuclear Power Plant (Oyster Creek Nuclear Station) as reported in the 30 day 10 CFR Part 21 report issued on June 12, 1997 (Accession Number 9706190261). |
| This failure isclassified as infant mortality, which appears to be similar to the failure mode identified in the 30 day 10CFR part 21 report (accession number 9706190261) dated June 12, 1997 submitted by GPU Nuclear.QualTech NP performed a failure analysis and based on analysis | | The test method used to identify this failure mode in 1996 utilized a larger sample size and different testing methodology than was used by QualTech NP in 2014. Given the recent failures by what appears to be a similar mode, QualTech NP engineering staff is updating its recommendation on the testing required for these relays to be in line with the 1997 recommendations. |
| / data provided from the failures foundin 2014, considered a 100 hour bum-in test combined with a 100 mechanical cycle test would identifythe infant mortality of subject relays. The replacement relays described in the first paragraph of this letterwere subjected to this testing.It has since come to the attention of QualTech NP engineering staff that a similar failure analysis wasperformed (NRC082495, Revision | | The test method employed to identify failures included applying -1038 VDC (Voltage Limited) and 49 mA (Current Limited) @ 1 cycle / second (50% duty cycle) to a 100% sample size, where a cycle is defined as one second energized and one second de-energized. |
| : 1) in response to failures identified at GPU Nuclear Power Plant(Oyster Creek Nuclear Station) as reported in the 30 day 10 CFR Part 21 report issued on June 12, 1997(Accession Number 9706190261).
| | According to test data, a minimum of 2280 cycles under the above conditions will identify 99.9% of the defective relays without damaging properly constructed relays.Given the new recommendation by QualTech NP, replacement relays will be provided to NPPD after subjecting them to the new supplemental testing. A full report detailing this test data is available for review upon request ("Approach to Detecting Manufacturing Defect in GE CR120AD03041AA Relays" NRC document NRC082495 Revision 1).Sincerely, Matthew Thelen mthelen(curtisswright.com}} |
| The test method used to identify this failure mode in 1996 utilized alarger sample size and different testing methodology than was used by QualTech NP in 2014. Given therecent failures by what appears to be a similar mode, QualTech NP engineering staff is updating itsrecommendation on the testing required for these relays to be in line with the 1997 recommendations. | |
| The test method employed to identify failures included applying | |
| -1038 VDC (Voltage Limited) and 49mA (Current Limited) | |
| @ 1 cycle / second (50% duty cycle) to a 100% sample size, where a cycle isdefined as one second energized and one second de-energized. | |
| According to test data, a minimum of2280 cycles under the above conditions will identify 99.9% of the defective relays without damagingproperly constructed relays.Given the new recommendation by QualTech NP, replacement relays will be provided to NPPD aftersubjecting them to the new supplemental testing. | |
| A full report detailing this test data is available forreview upon request ("Approach to Detecting Manufacturing Defect in GE CR120AD03041AA Relays"NRC document NRC082495 Revision 1).Sincerely, Matthew Thelenmthelen(curtisswright.com}} | |
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Category:Deficiency Report (per 10CFR50.55e and Part 21)
MONTHYEARML19317D0932019-10-25025 October 2019 Engine Systems, Inc., 10CFR21 Reporting of Defects and Non-Compliance - Engine Systems, Inc. Report No. 10 CFR21-0127, Rev. 0, Emd Fuel Injectors - Seized Plunger and Bushing ML17194A8252017-07-11011 July 2017 Part 21 Report Re Wedge Pin Failure in Anchor Darling Motor Operated Double Disc Gate Valves with Threaded Stem to Upper Wedge Connections ML17179A3782017-06-0707 June 2017 TE Connectivity - Part 21 Transfer of Information TE-023 ML16294A2642016-10-18018 October 2016 Part 21 Report - Defective Current to Pressure Transducers ML15050A2492015-02-0505 February 2015 Revision to 10 CFR Part 21 Final Notification for Event 50015 for GE CR120 Relays ML14275A1622014-09-25025 September 2014 Notification of Potential Part 21 Report - Electromatic Relief Valve Excessive Wear ML14210A0102014-07-23023 July 2014 Part 21 - Unseating of Valve Spring on Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve ML14204A7082014-07-23023 July 2014 Enclosure 2, Description of Closure Evaluation, Non-Proprietary Information - Class I (Public) ML14204A7072014-07-23023 July 2014 Completed Evaluation of Part 21 Potentially Reportable Condition Notification: Unseating of Valve Spring on SSPV ML14072A3262014-03-13013 March 2014 Enclosure 2: Description of Evaluation ML14072A3282014-03-13013 March 2014 Part 21 60-Day Interim Report Notification Re Unseating of Valve Spring on SSPV ML13165A3422013-06-12012 June 2013 60-Day Interim Report Involving an Evaluation of a Design Change to Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers ML13064A0122013-02-25025 February 2013 Notification of Potential Part 21 Report Re Wedge Pin Failure of an Anchor/Darling Double-Disc Gate Valve ML13042A0962013-02-0808 February 2013 Completed Evaluation of Part 21 Potentially Reportable Condition Notification: Error in Main Steam Line High Flow Calculational Methodology ML13044A0752013-02-0808 February 2013 Part 21 - Completed Evaluation for Potential Error in Main Steam Line High Flow Calculational Methodology ML12352A1232012-12-13013 December 2012 60-Day Interim Report Involving an Evaluation of a Design Change to Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers ML12348A1362012-12-13013 December 2012 Part 21 60-Day Interim Report Notification: Adequacy of Design Change in Am Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers ML12347A3082012-12-12012 December 2012 Part 21 60-Day Interim Report Notification: Error in Main Steam Line High Flow Calculational Methodology ML12319A0122012-09-27027 September 2012 Error in Main Steam Line High Flow Calculational Methodology ML12163A1302012-06-0606 June 2012 Part 21 Report - Failure of CRD Collet Retainer Tube/Outer Tube Weld ML12158A4472012-06-0606 June 2012 Part 21 60-Day Interim Report Notification - Closufailure of CRD Collet Retainer Tube/Outer Tube Weld ML12040A2832012-02-0707 February 2012 Notification of Potential Part 21 - Failure to Include Seismic Input in Reactor Control Blade Customer Guidance ML12038A0282012-02-0202 February 2012 Failure of CRD Collet Retainer Tube/Outer Tube Weld ML12032A2402012-02-0101 February 2012 Notification of Potential Part 21 - 60-Day Interim Report Notification: Failure of CRD Collet Retainer Tube/Outer Tube Weld ML11228A0842011-08-12012 August 2011 Notification of Part 21 - Failure to Include Seismic Input in Reactor Control Blade Customer Guidance ML1122401422011-08-11011 August 2011 Part 21 60-Day Interim Report Notification: Failure to Include Seismic Input in Channel-Control Blade Interference Customer Guidance ML1104800542011-02-15015 February 2011 Notification of Potential Part 21 Reportable Condition: Crack Indications in Marathon Control Rod Blades ML1104604872011-02-15015 February 2011 Notification of Potential Part 21 Reportable Condition Re Design Life of D and s Lattice Marathon Control Blades ML1035100312010-12-15015 December 2010 Notification of Potential Part 21 Report Concerning Failure to Include Seismic Input in Reactor Control Blade Customer Guidance ML1035001742010-12-15015 December 2010 Notification of Potential Part 21 Re 60-Day Interim Report Notification: Failure to Include Seismic Input in Channel-Control Blade Interference Customer Guidance ML1029502812010-10-20020 October 2010 Part 21 Notification - Crack Indications in Marathon Control Rod Blades ML1029305052010-10-20020 October 2010 GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy - Notification of Potential Part 21 60-Day Interim Report: Crack Indications in Marathon Control Rod Blades ML1027300632010-09-27027 September 2010 Notification of Potential Part 21 Report Concerning Failure to Include Seismic Input in Reactor Control Blade Customer Guidance ML1027006142010-09-27027 September 2010 Part 21 60-Day Interim Report Notification: Failure to Include Seismic Input in Channel-Control Blade Interference Customer Guidance ML1025202192010-09-0303 September 2010 Part 21 - Failure to Include Seismic Input in Reactor Control Blade Customer Guidance ML0930603952009-10-30030 October 2009 Transnuclear, Inc. - Submittal of Thirty Day Written Report of a Potential Deviation and Failure to Comply Associated with Unsubstantiated Certified Materials Test Reports for Certain Small Parts Utilized in Products Fabricated ML0927805882009-10-0101 October 2009 Transnuclear, Inc Part 21 Report Re Fasteners on Spent Fuel Storage Devices Not Meeting Standards ML0833301872008-11-21021 November 2008 Notification of Potential Part 21 Re Tyco Electronics, Transfer of Information - CII-012 ML0831900172008-11-12012 November 2008 Notification of Potential Part 21 on All Dimensionally Verified Commercial Grade Items Processed Per Fisher Manufacture Procedure Fmp 2K28 ML0823901062008-08-25025 August 2008 Notification of Potential Part 21 on Failure of F and G Switches ML0812008822008-04-14014 April 2008 Notification of Potential Part 21 on Safety Related Noncompliance Deviation ML0809906342008-04-0404 April 2008 Part 21 Notification Regarding Failure to Comply with the Requirements for Dedication of Commercial Grade Items ML0734402112007-12-0707 December 2007 Deficiency Report Part 21 Potential Insufficient Thread Engagement for Certain Pressure Transmitters ML0706802882007-03-0707 March 2007 Notification of Potential Part 21 on Defect in E7000 Relays ML0609504012006-04-0303 April 2006 Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement Reference: 10 CFR 21 Notification of 3/30/06 Rev1 ML0603303452006-01-23023 January 2006 10CFR21 Reporting of Defects and Non-Compliance - Engine Systems, Inc. Report No. 10CFR21-0091, Rev. 0., Woodward DRU Controls (Manufactured Between November 2000 and November 2005) ML0526900842005-09-20020 September 2005 Part 21 Notification Completion: Critical Power Determination for GE14 and GE12 Fuel with Zircaloy Spacers ML0509504282005-03-29029 March 2005 10CFR21 Reportable Condition Notification: Involving Potential to Exceed Low Pressure Technical Specification Safety Limit ML0316903862003-06-11011 June 2003 10CFR21 Reporting of Defects and Non-Compliance - Engine Systems, Inc., Report No. 10CFR21-0087, Rev 0, Emd Electric Start Motors at Oyster Creek 2019-10-25
[Table view] Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML23342A1162024-01-0909 January 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan L-23-019, Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.152023-12-18018 December 2023 Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.15 IR 05000219/20230022023-11-0909 November 2023 EA-23-076 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty - $43,750 - NRC Inspection Report No. 05000219/2023002 ML23286A1552023-10-13013 October 2023 Defueled Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) ML23249A1212023-09-0606 September 2023 NRC Inspection Report 05000219/2023002, Apparent Violation (EA-23-076) ML23242A1162023-08-30030 August 2023 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Change Summary Report January 1, 2021 Through December 31, 2022 ML23214A2472023-08-22022 August 2023 NRC Inspection Report 05000219/2023002 IR 05000219/20230012023-05-31031 May 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000219/2023001 IR 07200015/20234012023-05-16016 May 2023 NRC Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Report 07200015/2023401 ML23114A0912023-04-24024 April 2023 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2022 ML23114A0872023-04-24024 April 2023 Annual Radioactive Environmental Operating Report for 2022 L-23-004, HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 20222023-04-24024 April 2023 HDI Annual Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Reports - 2022 L-23-003, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations2023-03-31031 March 2023 Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations ML23088A0382023-03-29029 March 2023 Stations 1, 2, & 3, Palisades Nuclear Plant, and Big Rock Point - Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance ML22361A1022023-02-24024 February 2023 Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Changes for Some Decommissioning Facilities and Establishment of Backup Project Manager for All Decommissioning Facilities IR 05000219/20220022023-02-0909 February 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000219/2022002 ML23031A3012023-02-0808 February 2023 Discontinuation of Radiological Effluent Monitoring Location in the Sewerage System ML23033A5052023-02-0202 February 2023 First Use Notification of NRC Approved Cask RT-100 ML23025A0112023-01-24024 January 2023 LLRW Late Shipment Investigation Report Per 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML22347A2732022-12-21021 December 2022 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Plan Dated December 21, 2022 ML22297A1432022-12-15015 December 2022 Part 20 App G Exemption Letter L-22-042, Oyster, Pilgrim, Indian Point, Palisades and Big Rock Point - Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.152022-12-14014 December 2022 Oyster, Pilgrim, Indian Point, Palisades and Big Rock Point - Proof of Financial Protection 10 CFR 140.15 IR 07200015/20224012022-12-0606 December 2022 NRC Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Report 07200015/2022401 (Letter & Enclosure 1) ML22280A0762022-11-0202 November 2022 Us NRC Analysis of Holtec Decommissioning Internationals Funding Status Report for Oyster Creek, Indian Point and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML22276A1762022-10-24024 October 2022 Decommissioning International Proposed Revisions to the Quality Assurance Program Approval Forms for Radioactive Material Packages ML22286A1402022-10-13013 October 2022 NRC Confirmatory Order EA-21-041 IR 05000219/20220012022-08-11011 August 2022 NRC Inspection Report 05000219/2022001 ML22215A1772022-08-0303 August 2022 Decommissioning International (HDI) Proposed Revisions to the Quality Assurance Program Approval Forms for Radioactive Material Packages ML22214A1732022-08-0202 August 2022 Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 20, Appendix G, Section Iii.E ML22207B8382022-07-26026 July 2022 NRC Confirmatory Order EA-21-041 ML22130A6882022-05-10010 May 2022 Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G L-22-026, Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Report - 20212022-04-29029 April 2022 Occupational Radiation Exposure Data Report - 2021 ML22118A6122022-04-28028 April 2022 Annual Radioactive Environmental Operating Report for 2021 ML22118A5822022-04-28028 April 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2021 ML22091A1062022-04-0101 April 2022 Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance (10 CFR 50.54(w)(3)) L-22-022, and Indian Point Nuclear Generating Stations 1, 2, & 3 - Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations - Holtec.2022-03-25025 March 2022 and Indian Point Nuclear Generating Stations 1, 2, & 3 - Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations - Holtec. ML22069A3762022-03-10010 March 2022 Late LLRW Shipment Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML22032A0582022-03-0808 March 2022 EA-21-139; EA-150: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station - NRC Investigation Report Nos.. 1-2021-002 & 1-2021-014 ML22060A2202022-03-0202 March 2022 NRC Office of Investigations Case No. 1-2021-009 ML22049B2452022-02-19019 February 2022 Late Low Level Radwaste Shipment Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20 Appendix G IR 05000219/20214022022-01-26026 January 2022 EA-21-041: Confirmatory Order Related to Oyster Greek Nuclear Generating Station - NRC Investigation Report I-2020-007; NRC Inspection Report Nos. 05000219/2021402 & 07200015/2021401 ML22025A3422022-01-25025 January 2022 and Big Rock Point - Changes to Site Organization ML22025A2182022-01-25025 January 2022 Late LLRW Shipments Investigation Report Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML22021B5512022-01-21021 January 2022 Compensatory Measures Not Implemented Per Site'S Physical Security Plan Due to Multiplexer (Mux) Power Supply Failure L-21-134, and Indian Point Nuclear Generating Stations 1, 2, & 3 - Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations2021-12-17017 December 2021 and Indian Point Nuclear Generating Stations 1, 2, & 3 - Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations ML21349A5192021-12-15015 December 2021 Commitment Change Summary Report ML21285A1912021-11-30030 November 2021 Nrc'S Analysis of Holtec Decommissioning International'S Decommissioning Funding Status Report for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Docket Nos 50-219 and 50-293 IR 05000219/20210032021-11-16016 November 2021 NRC Inspection Report No. 05000219/2021003 L-21-118, Changes to Signature Authority & Addressee for Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC Correspondence Re to Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2, 3, & Palisades2021-11-0909 November 2021 Changes to Signature Authority & Addressee for Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC Correspondence Re to Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 1, 2, 3, & Palisades IR 05000219/20214042021-08-26026 August 2021 NRC Independent Spent Fuel Storage Security Inspection Report No. 07200015/2021402 and Security Decommissioning Inspection Report 05000219/2021404 - (Public) 2024-01-09
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QualTech NP 125 West Park Loop Huntsville, AL 35806 Phone 256.722.8500 Fax: 256.722.8533 I http://quaftechnp.cwfc.com CUR TISS Flow Control Company QualTech NP February 5, 2015
Subject:
Revision to 10 CFR part 21 Final Notification for Event 50015 for GE CR120 Relays On April 9, 2014, QualTech NP provided an initial 10 CFR part 21 notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concerning failures of General Electric Type CR120AD control relays.This was submitted due to failures of relays that were sent to Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) as basic components.
There were two affected orders, both of which were shipped to NPPD and have since been replaced with relays that have passed supplemental testing designed to identify the infant mortality failure mode described below.A failure analysis, performed by QualTech NP, revealed that the most likely initiator of the failure was a flaw or defect in the start wrap of the coil magnet wire. The flaw created an arc that involved windings directly beneath the start wrap which resulted in an open circuit on the coil windings.
This failure is classified as infant mortality, which appears to be similar to the failure mode identified in the 30 day 10 CFR part 21 report (accession number 9706190261) dated June 12, 1997 submitted by GPU Nuclear.QualTech NP performed a failure analysis and based on analysis / data provided from the failures found in 2014, considered a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> burn-in test combined with a 100 mechanical cycle test would identify the infant mortality of subject relays. The replacement relays described in the first paragraph of this letter were subjected to this testing.It has since come to the attention of QualTech NP engineering staff that a similar failure analysis was performed (NRC082495, Revision 1) in response to failures identified at GPU Nuclear Power Plant (Oyster Creek Nuclear Station) as reported in the 30 day 10 CFR Part 21 report issued on June 12, 1997 (Accession Number 9706190261).
The test method used to identify this failure mode in 1996 utilized a larger sample size and different testing methodology than was used by QualTech NP in 2014. Given the recent failures by what appears to be a similar mode, QualTech NP engineering staff is updating its recommendation on the testing required for these relays to be in line with the 1997 recommendations.
The test method employed to identify failures included applying -1038 VDC (Voltage Limited) and 49 mA (Current Limited) @ 1 cycle / second (50% duty cycle) to a 100% sample size, where a cycle is defined as one second energized and one second de-energized.
According to test data, a minimum of 2280 cycles under the above conditions will identify 99.9% of the defective relays without damaging properly constructed relays.Given the new recommendation by QualTech NP, replacement relays will be provided to NPPD after subjecting them to the new supplemental testing. A full report detailing this test data is available for review upon request ("Approach to Detecting Manufacturing Defect in GE CR120AD03041AA Relays" NRC document NRC082495 Revision 1).Sincerely, Matthew Thelen mthelen(curtisswright.com QualTech NP 125 West Park Loop Huntsville, AL 35806 Phone 256.722.8500 Fax: 256.722.8533 f http://quattechnp.cwfc.com cuirm$%_))Flow Control Company QualTech NP February 5, 2015
Subject:
Revision to 10 CFR part 21 Final Notification for Event 50015 for GE CR120 Relays On April 9, 2014, QualTech NP provided an initial 10 CFR part 21 notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concerning failures of General Electric Type CR120AD control relays.This was submitted due to failures of relays that were sent to Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) as basic components.
There were two affected orders, both of which were shipped to NPPD and have since been replaced with relays that have passed supplemental testing designed to identify the infant mortality failure mode described below.A failure analysis, performed by QualTech NP, revealed that the most likely initiator of the failure was a flaw or defect in the start wrap of the coil magnet wire. The flaw created an arc that involved windings directly beneath the start wrap which resulted in an open circuit on the coil windings.
This failure is classified as infant mortality, which appears to be similar to the failure mode identified in the 30 day 10 CFR part 21 report (accession number 9706190261) dated June 12, 1997 submitted by GPU Nuclear.QualTech NP performed a failure analysis and based on analysis / data provided from the failures found in 2014, considered a 100 hour0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> bum-in test combined with a 100 mechanical cycle test would identify the infant mortality of subject relays. The replacement relays described in the first paragraph of this letter were subjected to this testing.It has since come to the attention of QualTech NP engineering staff that a similar failure analysis was performed (NRC082495, Revision 1) in response to failures identified at GPU Nuclear Power Plant (Oyster Creek Nuclear Station) as reported in the 30 day 10 CFR Part 21 report issued on June 12, 1997 (Accession Number 9706190261).
The test method used to identify this failure mode in 1996 utilized a larger sample size and different testing methodology than was used by QualTech NP in 2014. Given the recent failures by what appears to be a similar mode, QualTech NP engineering staff is updating its recommendation on the testing required for these relays to be in line with the 1997 recommendations.
The test method employed to identify failures included applying -1038 VDC (Voltage Limited) and 49 mA (Current Limited) @ 1 cycle / second (50% duty cycle) to a 100% sample size, where a cycle is defined as one second energized and one second de-energized.
According to test data, a minimum of 2280 cycles under the above conditions will identify 99.9% of the defective relays without damaging properly constructed relays.Given the new recommendation by QualTech NP, replacement relays will be provided to NPPD after subjecting them to the new supplemental testing. A full report detailing this test data is available for review upon request ("Approach to Detecting Manufacturing Defect in GE CR120AD03041AA Relays" NRC document NRC082495 Revision 1).Sincerely, Matthew Thelen mthelen(curtisswright.com