Information Notice 1988-58, Potential Problems with Asea Brown Boveri ITE-51L Time-Overcurrent Relays: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 16: Line 16:
{{#Wiki_filter:j
{{#Wiki_filter:j


UNITED STATES
===UNITED STATES===
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C.


OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
20555


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 8, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-58:   POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH ASEA BROWN BOVERI
===August 8, 1988===
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-58:  


===POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH ASEA BROWN BOVERI===
ITE-51L TIME-OVERCURRENT RELAYS
ITE-51L TIME-OVERCURRENT RELAYS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
                                                                  nuclear power
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
 
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for


reactors.
reactors.
Line 36: Line 38:
==Purpose==
==Purpose==
:
:
                                                                  to potential
This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential


This information notice is being provided to alert addressees relays. It
problems involving ASEA Brown Boveri ITE-51L time-overcurrent relays.


problems involving ASEA Brown Boveri ITE-51L time-overcurrent applicability
It


is expected that recipients will review this information for avoid similar
is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability


to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to notice do not
to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar


problems. However, suggestions contained in this information written response
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not


constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or
constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response


is required.
is required.
Line 54: Line 56:
==Description of Circumstances==
==Description of Circumstances==
:
:
                                                                    relays have
Several spurious actuations of ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB)  
 
ITE-51L relays have
Several spurious actuations of ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB) ITE-51L              resulted
 
actuations
 
occurred at the Beaver Valley nuclear power plant. These            safety-related
 
to
 
in unnecessary interruptions of the electrical power supply        the magnitude
 
equipment. The ITE-51L relays monitor circuit current. When              the relay
 
of the current exceeds a reference value for a specific    duration, licensee    has


actuates to energize the circuit breaker's trip coil. The by faulty silicon- determined that the spurious relay actuations were  caused
occurred at the Beaver Valley nuclear power plant. These actuations resulted


Company.
in unnecessary interruptions of the electrical power supply to safety-related


controlled rectifiers (SCRs) that were manufactured by the Motorola
equipment.


in electrical
The ITE-51L relays monitor circuit current. When the magnitude


SCRs are solid-state devices that are used as electronic switches the   SCR,   the device
of the current exceeds a reference value for a specific duration, the relay


circuits. When a voltage is applied across the  terminals    of
actuates to energize the circuit breaker's trip coil.


or  switched    on  by the
===The licensee has===
determined that the spurious relay actuations were caused by faulty silicon- controlled rectifiers (SCRs) that were manufactured by the Motorola Company.


is designed to allow current to flow only when 'gated"                  allowed    cur- proper electrical signal. The SCRs that failed at  Beaver    Valley
SCRs are solid-state devices that are used as electronic switches in electrical


signal.     These    "leakage"
circuits. When a voltage is applied across the terminals of the SCR, the device
rent to flow in the absence of the proper gating                      of the as- currents were of sufficient magnitude to energize the trip coil


sociated circuit breaker.
is designed to allow current to flow only when 'gated" or switched on by the


the late
proper electrical signal.


The licensee was informed by Motorola that SCRs manufactured between          these
The SCRs that failed at Beaver Valley allowed cur- rent to flow in the absence of the proper gating signal.


of failure  and    that
These "leakage"
currents were of sufficient magnitude to energize the trip coil of the as- sociated circuit breaker.


1970s and early 1980s are susceptible to this mode                          1982,  all
The licensee was informed by Motorola that SCRs manufactured between the late


SCRs are likely to fail within the first 2 years of service.      Since
1970s and early 1980s are susceptible to this mode of failure and that these


a  "burn-in"    test.   In this
SCRs are likely to fail within the first 2 years of service.


SCRs manufactured by Motorola have been subjected to                   with  and  with-'
===Since 1982, all===
  test, the SCRs are placed in a high-temperature environment    both
SCRs manufactured by Motorola have been subjected to a "burn-in" test. In this


perform normally
test, the SCRs are placed in a high-temperature environment both with and with-'
 
out voltage applied. SCRs that pass this test are expected to perform normally
out voltage applied. SCRs that pass this test are expected to


for an extended period.
for an extended period.
Line 114: Line 103:
88080200
88080200


IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-S5L relays installed in
IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-S5L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit i has 10.


related applications, and Unit i has 10. The licensee is testing all safety- in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.             the relays
===The licensee is testing all the relays===
in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.


No specific action or written response is required by this information
No specific action or written response is required by this information


If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the


contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate technical
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate


office.
office.
notice.
technical


regional
regional


Charles E. Rossi, Director
===Charles E. Rossi, Director===
 
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Division of Operational Events Assessment


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
 
K. R. Naidu, NRR
Technical Contacts:  K. R. Naidu, NRR


(301) 492-0980
(301) 492-0980
                      N. E. Fields, NRR
Technical Contacts:


(301) 492-1173 Attachment:   List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
===N. E. Fields, NRR===
(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


S
S
Line 145: Line 138:
Attachment
Attachment


IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IN 88-58


===August 8, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED===
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


===Information                                 Date of===
Information
Notice No.     Subject                       Issuance Issued to
 
Date of
 
Notice No.
 
Subject


88-57          Potential Loss of Safe        8/8/88  All holders of OLs
Issuance


Shutdown Equipment Due to             or CPs for nuclear
Issued to


Premature Silicon Controlled          power reactors.
88-57
88-56
88-55
88-54


===Potential Loss of Safe===
Shutdown Equipment Due to
===Premature Silicon Controlled===
Rectifier Failure
Rectifier Failure


88-56          Potential Problems with       8/4/88  All holders of OLs
===Potential Problems with===
Silicone Foam Fire Barrier
 
===Penetration Seals===
Potential Problems Caused
 
by Single Failure of an
 
===Engineered Safety Feature===
Swing Bus
 
===Failure of Circuit Breaker===
Following Installation of
 
===Amptector Direct Trip===
Attachment
 
===Licensee Violations of NRC===
Regulations, Which Led to
 
===Medical Diagnostic===
Misadministrations
 
===Failure of Intrauterine===
Tandem of Fletcher


Silicone Foam Fire Barrier            or CPs for nuclear
===Applicator Brachytherapy===
Devices During Patient


Penetration Seals                      power reactors.
Treatment


88-55          Potential Problems Caused    8/3/88   All holders of OLs
8/8/88
8/4/88
8/3/88
7/28/88
7/28/88
7/27/88


by Single Failure of an                or CPs for nuclear
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


Engineered Safety Feature              power reactors.
power reactors.


Swing Bus
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


88-54          Failure of Circuit Breaker    7/28/88  All holders of OLs
power reactors.


Following Installation of             or CPs for nuclear
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


Amptector Direct Trip                  power reactors.
power reactors.


Attachment
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


88-53          Licensee Violations of NRC    7/28/88  All manufacturers and
power reactors.


Regulations, Which Led to              distributors of radio- Medical Diagnostic                    pharmaceuticals for
===All manufacturers and===
distributors of radio- pharmaceuticals for


Misadministrations                    human use, nuclear
human use, nuclear


pharmacies, and
pharmacies, and
Line 192: Line 233:
medical licensees.
medical licensees.


88-52         Failure of Intrauterine      7/27/88 Medical licensees.
Medical licensees.
 
88-53
88-52
88-46,


Tandem of Fletcher
===Supplement 1===
Licensee Report of


Applicator Brachytherapy
===Defective Refurbished===
Circuit Breakers


Devices During Patient
7/26/88


Treatment
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


88-46,        Licensee Report of            7/26/88  All holders of OLs
power reactors.


Supplement 1  Defective Refurbished                  or CPs for nuclear
88-51


Circuit Breakers                      power reactors.
===Failures of Main Steam===
Isolation Valves


88-51          Failures of Main Steam        7/21/88 All holders of OLs
7/21/88


Isolation Valves                      or CPs for nuclear
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


power reactors.
power reactors.
Line 218: Line 268:
CP = Construction Permit
CP = Construction Permit


IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10. The licensee is testing all the relays
IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10.


===The licensee is testing all the relays===
in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.
in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.


notice.
No specific action or written response is required by this information


No specific action or written response is required by this information technical
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the
 
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the regional


contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate
Line 232: Line 281:
office.
office.


Charles E. Rossi, Director
notice.
 
technical
 
regional


===Charles E. Rossi, Director===
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Division of Operational Events Assessment


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical Contacts:


Technical Contacts:    K. R. Naidu, NRR
===K. R. Naidu, NRR===
(301) 492-0980
N. E.


(301) 492-0980
(301)
                        N. E. Fields, NRR
Fields, NRR


(301) 492-1173 Attachment:   List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
492-1173 Attachment:


===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
*see previous concurrence
*see previous concurrence


EAB:NRR   ElkB:NRR   EAB:NRR           NRR:RVIB   VIB:NRR   AD:DRIS   C:EAB:NRR
EAB:NRR
 
El
 
KNaidu*
N1
7/18/88
7/
*C:GCB:NRR
 
CHBerlinger
 
8/1/88 kB:NRR
 
Fields*
/14/88 EAB:NRR
 
DFischer*BCj re*
7/19/88 NRR:RVIB
 
EBaker*
7/19/88 VIB:NRR
 
WBrach*
7/20/88 AD:DRIS
 
BGrimes*
7/22/88 C:EAB:NRR
 
WLanning*
8/2/88
*D:DEST


KNaidu*    N1Fields*  DFischer*BCj re* EBaker*      WBrach*    BGrimes* WLanning*
LShao
  7/18/88    7//14/88  7/19/88            7/19/88    7/20/88    7/22/88    8/2/88
  *C:GCB:NRR      *D:DEST


CHBerlinger    LShao
7/29/88
'V/3/88


8/1/88          7/29/88        'V/3/88
IN 88- July


IN 88- July , 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10. The licensee is testing all the relays
, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10.


===The licensee is testing all the relays===
in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.
in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.


Line 269: Line 358:
office.
office.


Charles E. Rossi, Director
===Charles E. Rossi, Director===
 
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Division of Operational Events Assessment


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Line 279: Line 367:


(301) 492-0980
(301) 492-0980
                    N. E. Fields, NRR


===N. E. Fields, NRR===
(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


*see previous concurrence                                                   'ink
*see previous concurrence
 
EAB:NRR
 
EAB:NRR
 
EAB:NRR
 
H:
KNaidu *
NFields* DFischer*BC &re*
/ /88
/ /88
/
/88 C:G S d--R
 
D:
D:DOEA:NRR
 
CHBerlinger LShao
 
CERossi
 
(/* /88
1 / /88
/ /88 NRR:RVIB
 
EBaker
 
/ /88 VIB:NRR


EAB:NRR EAB:NRR    EAB:NRR      H:    NRR:RVIB  VIB:NRR    AD:DRIS   C:EAB:NRR
WBrach*
/ /88 AD:DRIS


KNaidu
BGrimes*
/
/88
'ink


* NFields*  DFischer*BC    &re*  EBaker    WBrach*    BGrimes* WLanning
C:EAB:NRR


/ /88 / /88        / /88                / /88    / /88      / /88 r/ 2 /88 C:G S d--R  D:          D:DOEA:NRR
WLanning


CHBerlinger LShao 88     CERossi
r/ 2 /88


(/* /88    1 / /            / /88
IN 88- July


IN 88- July , 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately one hundred and five ITE-51L type
, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately one hundred and five ITE-51L type


relays installed in safety-related applications. Unit 1 has ten of the faulty
relays installed in safety-related applications.


===Unit 1 has ten of the faulty===
relays in safety related applications. The licensee is in the process of
relays in safety related applications. The licensee is in the process of


Line 315: Line 437:
office.
office.


Charles E. Rossi. Director
===Charles E. Rossi. Director===
 
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Division of Operational Events Assessment


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
K. R. Naidu
K. R.
 
(301)
Naidu


(301) 492-0980
492-0980
                        N. E. Fields, NRR


===N. E. Fields, NRR===
(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


r1)Y--1- /4 -j
EAB: 1RR
 
KNa i du
 
7 /A/88 EAB:N1 NFieli
 
7//1 l
 
RR
 
&XAB R T2 ds
 
DFischer
 
aS
 
7//1/88
8
4G
 
3/p/
W
 
TRR:RVIB
 
EBaker
 
7 /A/88 r -1
1) Y- - /4 -j


'Vz'X,
'Vz'X,
  EAB: 1RR    EAB:N1RR    &XAB R T2          TRR:RVIB    C:EAB:NRR     C:GCB:NRR
C:EAB:NRR
 
WLanning
 
/ /88 C:GCB:NRR


KNa idu    NFielids    DFischer          EBaker      WLanning      CHBerlinger
CHBerlinger


7 /A/88 7//1 l aS      7//1/88        8    7 /A/88        / /88      / /88 u:IMUEA:NRR
/ /88 u:IMUEA:NRR


WRossi                         4G      Ra
WRossi


/ /88             3/p/    W}}
/ /88 Ra}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 10:29, 16 January 2025

Potential Problems with Asea Brown Boveri ITE-51L Time-Overcurrent Relays
ML031150022
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date: 08/08/1988
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-058, NUDOCS 8808020102
Download: ML031150022 (6)
v • d • e


j

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

August 8, 1988

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-58:

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH ASEA BROWN BOVERI

ITE-51L TIME-OVERCURRENT RELAYS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential

problems involving ASEA Brown Boveri ITE-51L time-overcurrent relays.

It

is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability

to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not

constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response

is required.

Description of Circumstances

Several spurious actuations of ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB)

ITE-51L relays have

occurred at the Beaver Valley nuclear power plant. These actuations resulted

in unnecessary interruptions of the electrical power supply to safety-related

equipment.

The ITE-51L relays monitor circuit current. When the magnitude

of the current exceeds a reference value for a specific duration, the relay

actuates to energize the circuit breaker's trip coil.

The licensee has

determined that the spurious relay actuations were caused by faulty silicon- controlled rectifiers (SCRs) that were manufactured by the Motorola Company.

SCRs are solid-state devices that are used as electronic switches in electrical

circuits. When a voltage is applied across the terminals of the SCR, the device

is designed to allow current to flow only when 'gated" or switched on by the

proper electrical signal.

The SCRs that failed at Beaver Valley allowed cur- rent to flow in the absence of the proper gating signal.

These "leakage"

currents were of sufficient magnitude to energize the trip coil of the as- sociated circuit breaker.

The licensee was informed by Motorola that SCRs manufactured between the late

1970s and early 1980s are susceptible to this mode of failure and that these

SCRs are likely to fail within the first 2 years of service.

Since 1982, all

SCRs manufactured by Motorola have been subjected to a "burn-in" test. In this

test, the SCRs are placed in a high-temperature environment both with and with-'

out voltage applied. SCRs that pass this test are expected to perform normally

for an extended period.

88080200

IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-S5L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit i has 10.

The licensee is testing all the relays

in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

office.

notice.

technical

regional

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

K. R. Naidu, NRR

(301) 492-0980

Technical Contacts:

N. E. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

S

Attachment

IN 88-58

August 8, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issuance

Issued to

88-57

88-56

88-55

88-54

Potential Loss of Safe

Shutdown Equipment Due to

Premature Silicon Controlled

Rectifier Failure

Potential Problems with

Silicone Foam Fire Barrier

Penetration Seals

Potential Problems Caused

by Single Failure of an

Engineered Safety Feature

Swing Bus

Failure of Circuit Breaker

Following Installation of

Amptector Direct Trip

Attachment

Licensee Violations of NRC

Regulations, Which Led to

Medical Diagnostic

Misadministrations

Failure of Intrauterine

Tandem of Fletcher

Applicator Brachytherapy

Devices During Patient

Treatment

8/8/88

8/4/88

8/3/88

7/28/88

7/28/88

7/27/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All manufacturers and

distributors of radio- pharmaceuticals for

human use, nuclear

pharmacies, and

medical licensees.

Medical licensees.

88-53

88-52

88-46,

Supplement 1

Licensee Report of

Defective Refurbished

Circuit Breakers

7/26/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

88-51

Failures of Main Steam

Isolation Valves

7/21/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10.

The licensee is testing all the relays

in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

office.

notice.

technical

regional

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

K. R. Naidu, NRR

(301) 492-0980

N. E.

(301)

Fields, NRR

492-1173 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • see previous concurrence

EAB:NRR

El

KNaidu*

N1

7/18/88

7/

  • C:GCB:NRR

CHBerlinger

8/1/88 kB:NRR

Fields*

/14/88 EAB:NRR

DFischer*BCj re*

7/19/88 NRR:RVIB

EBaker*

7/19/88 VIB:NRR

WBrach*

7/20/88 AD:DRIS

BGrimes*

7/22/88 C:EAB:NRR

WLanning*

8/2/88

  • D:DEST

LShao

7/29/88

'V/3/88

IN 88- July

, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10.

The licensee is testing all the relays

in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contacts listed below or the regional administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

K. R. Naidu

(301) 492-0980

N. E. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • see previous concurrence

EAB:NRR

EAB:NRR

EAB:NRR

H:

KNaidu *

NFields* DFischer*BC &re*

/ /88

/ /88

/

/88 C:G S d--R

D:

D:DOEA:NRR

CHBerlinger LShao

CERossi

(/* /88

1 / /88

/ /88 NRR:RVIB

EBaker

/ /88 VIB:NRR

WBrach*

/ /88 AD:DRIS

BGrimes*

/

/88

'ink

C:EAB:NRR

WLanning

r/ 2 /88

IN 88- July

, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately one hundred and five ITE-51L type

relays installed in safety-related applications.

Unit 1 has ten of the faulty

relays in safety related applications. The licensee is in the process of

testing all the relays in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are

faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi. Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

K. R.

(301)

Naidu

492-0980

N. E. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

EAB: 1RR

KNa i du

7 /A/88 EAB:N1 NFieli

7//1 l

RR

&XAB R T2 ds

DFischer

aS

7//1/88

8

4G

3/p/

W

TRR:RVIB

EBaker

7 /A/88 r -1

1) Y- - /4 -j

'Vz'X,

C:EAB:NRR

WLanning

/ /88 C:GCB:NRR

CHBerlinger

/ /88 u:IMUEA:NRR

WRossi

/ /88 Ra


Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=Information_Notice_1988-58,_Potential_Problems_with_Asea_Brown_Boveri_ITE-51L_Time-Overcurrent_Relays&oldid=5421873"