Information Notice 1988-58, Potential Problems with Asea Brown Boveri ITE-51L Time-Overcurrent Relays

Potential Problems with Asea Brown Boveri ITE-51L Time-Overcurrent Relays

ML031150022
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date:	08/08/1988
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-058, NUDOCS 8808020102
Download: ML031150022 (6)

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UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

August 8, 1988

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-58:

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH ASEA BROWN BOVERI

ITE-51L TIME-OVERCURRENT RELAYS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential

problems involving ASEA Brown Boveri ITE-51L time-overcurrent relays.

It

is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability

to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not

constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response

is required.

Description of Circumstances

Several spurious actuations of ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB)

ITE-51L relays have

occurred at the Beaver Valley nuclear power plant. These actuations resulted

in unnecessary interruptions of the electrical power supply to safety-related

equipment.

The ITE-51L relays monitor circuit current. When the magnitude

of the current exceeds a reference value for a specific duration, the relay

actuates to energize the circuit breaker's trip coil.

The licensee has

determined that the spurious relay actuations were caused by faulty silicon- controlled rectifiers (SCRs) that were manufactured by the Motorola Company.

SCRs are solid-state devices that are used as electronic switches in electrical

circuits. When a voltage is applied across the terminals of the SCR, the device

is designed to allow current to flow only when 'gated" or switched on by the

proper electrical signal.

The SCRs that failed at Beaver Valley allowed cur- rent to flow in the absence of the proper gating signal.

These "leakage"

currents were of sufficient magnitude to energize the trip coil of the as- sociated circuit breaker.

The licensee was informed by Motorola that SCRs manufactured between the late

1970s and early 1980s are susceptible to this mode of failure and that these

SCRs are likely to fail within the first 2 years of service.

Since 1982, all

SCRs manufactured by Motorola have been subjected to a "burn-in" test. In this

test, the SCRs are placed in a high-temperature environment both with and with-'

out voltage applied. SCRs that pass this test are expected to perform normally

for an extended period.

88080200

IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-S5L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit i has 10.

The licensee is testing all the relays

in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

office.

notice.

technical

regional

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

K. R. Naidu, NRR

(301) 492-0980

Technical Contacts:

N. E. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

S

Attachment

IN 88-58

August 8, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issuance

Issued to

88-57

88-56

88-55

88-54

Potential Loss of Safe

Shutdown Equipment Due to

Premature Silicon Controlled

Rectifier Failure

Potential Problems with

Silicone Foam Fire Barrier

Penetration Seals

Potential Problems Caused

by Single Failure of an

Engineered Safety Feature

Swing Bus

Failure of Circuit Breaker

Following Installation of

Amptector Direct Trip

Attachment

Licensee Violations of NRC

Regulations, Which Led to

Medical Diagnostic

Misadministrations

Failure of Intrauterine

Tandem of Fletcher

Applicator Brachytherapy

Devices During Patient

Treatment

8/8/88

8/4/88

8/3/88

7/28/88

7/28/88

7/27/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All manufacturers and

distributors of radio- pharmaceuticals for

human use, nuclear

pharmacies, and

medical licensees.

Medical licensees.

88-53

88-52

88-46,

Supplement 1

Licensee Report of

Defective Refurbished

Circuit Breakers

7/26/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

88-51

Failures of Main Steam

Isolation Valves

7/21/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10.

The licensee is testing all the relays

in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

office.

notice.

technical

regional

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

K. R. Naidu, NRR

(301) 492-0980

N. E.

(301)

Fields, NRR

492-1173 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• see previous concurrence

EAB:NRR

El

KNaidu*

N1

7/18/88

7/

• C:GCB:NRR

CHBerlinger

8/1/88 kB:NRR

Fields*

/14/88 EAB:NRR

DFischer*BCj re*

7/19/88 NRR:RVIB

EBaker*

7/19/88 VIB:NRR

WBrach*

7/20/88 AD:DRIS

BGrimes*

7/22/88 C:EAB:NRR

WLanning*

8/2/88

• D:DEST

LShao

7/29/88

'V/3/88

IN 88- July

, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10.

The licensee is testing all the relays

in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contacts listed below or the regional administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Technical Contact:

K. R. Naidu

(301) 492-0980

N. E. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• see previous concurrence

EAB:NRR

EAB:NRR

EAB:NRR

H:

KNaidu *

NFields* DFischer*BC &re*

/ /88

/ /88

/

/88 C:G S d--R

D:

D:DOEA:NRR

CHBerlinger LShao

CERossi

(/* /88

1 / /88

/ /88 NRR:RVIB

EBaker

/ /88 VIB:NRR

WBrach*

/ /88 AD:DRIS

BGrimes*

/

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'ink

C:EAB:NRR

WLanning

r/ 2 /88

IN 88- July

, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately one hundred and five ITE-51L type

relays installed in safety-related applications.

Unit 1 has ten of the faulty

relays in safety related applications. The licensee is in the process of

testing all the relays in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are

faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi. Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Technical Contact:

K. R.

(301)

Naidu

492-0980

N. E. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

EAB: 1RR

KNa i du

7 /A/88 EAB:N1 NFieli

7//1 l

RR

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DFischer

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7//1/88

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