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: 6. William Strewell, Supervisor, LaSalle County Highway Department, in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, June 3,1987. | : 6. William Strewell, Supervisor, LaSalle County Highway Department, in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, June 3,1987. | ||
7 Steven Schoff, Maintenance Foreman, LaSalle County Highway Depart-ment, in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, June 22, 1987. | 7 Steven Schoff, Maintenance Foreman, LaSalle County Highway Depart-ment, in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, June 22, 1987. | ||
: 8. Larry Hable, Member Services Adninistrative Director, Grow Mark, Bloomington, Ill. in a letter dated August 14, 1987 to S. C. Mehta, Sargent & Lundy Engineers. | : 8. Larry Hable, Member Services Adninistrative Director, Grow Mark, Bloomington, Ill. in a {{letter dated|date=August 14, 1987|text=letter dated August 14, 1987}} to S. C. Mehta, Sargent & Lundy Engineers. | ||
: 9. Glen Mcdonald, Plant Operations Manager, Seneca Port Authority, in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, June 19, 1987. | : 9. Glen Mcdonald, Plant Operations Manager, Seneca Port Authority, in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, June 19, 1987. | ||
: 10. Rick, Manager, LaSalle County Farm Supply, Streater, Ill. , in tele-phone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, September 15, 1987. | : 10. Rick, Manager, LaSalle County Farm Supply, Streater, Ill. , in tele-phone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, September 15, 1987. |
Latest revision as of 16:56, 11 December 2021
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Site: | LaSalle ![]() |
Issue date: | 12/31/1987 |
From: | SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
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Text
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i l
HABITABILITY OF THE LASALLE COUNTY STATION I
CONTROL ROOM FOLLOWING POSTULATED ACCIDENT INVOLVING SHIPMEKIS OF ANHYDROUS AMONIA IN THE VICIMITY OF LMALLE COUNTY STATION C020NWEALTH EDISON COMPANY CHICAGO, ILLINDIS Project Ntaber 7343-48 December 1987 Revision 5 PREPARED BY SARGENT & LUNCY ENGINEERS CHICAGO ILLINOIS 8801130345 880106 PDR ADOCK 05000373 P PDR
Revision 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMERY i
1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1 2.0 REGULATORY GUIDES 3
- 3. 0 SUtetARY OF AMONIA SHIPKNTS AROUND LASALLE 4.0 OISPERSION ANALYSIS AND CONTROL ROOM INFILTRATION IN 8 ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATORY GUIDE 1.78 11 5.0 PROBABILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN TE CONTROL ROOM BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING BARGE TRANSPORT-ATION 12 6.0 PROBABILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN TE CONTROL ROOM BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING COUNTY ROAD 6, STATION SERVICE ROAD AND LEASED FARM LANDS 13 l 7.0 PROB ABILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN THE CONTROL ROOM BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING OFFSITE AMONIA STORAGE TANKS 8.0 AGGRECATE PROBABILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS 13 IN TE CONTROL ROOM BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING Ai+10NIA RELEASES 13 9.0 OISCUSSION OF RESULTS 15
10.0 CONCLUSION
S 15 l 11.O REFERENCES EXHIBITS (1 through 15) 19
Revision 5 EXECUTIVE SumARY Anhydrous amonia is identified in Regulatory Guide 1.78 as a toxic substance which should be considered when evaluating the habitability of a nuclear power plant control room during a postulated hazardous chemical release. The hazard of the control room habitability posed by a particular toxic chemical depends upon the distance the material is stored f rom the control room, the quantity of the material transported near the site. In addition, the prevailing wind direction affects the 1ikelihood that an accidental release wilI reach the control roam ventilation air intakes.
Regulatory Guide 1.78 requires that mobile or stationary sources of anhydrous amonia within a five mile radius of the plant be included in the habitability analysi s. Regulatory Guide 1.70 in Section 2.2, requires that all facilities and activities within five miles of the nuclear plant be considered in the analysis, and in addition it requires that f acilities and activities at greater distances be considered as appropriate to their significance.
Section 2.2.3 of the Standard Review Plan (NUREG-0800) provides a probability criteria for determining if a toxic release need be considered a design basis event.
In 1975, a survey of industries and transportation routes which may use, store and/or transport hazardous chemicals in the vicinity of the LaSalle County Station was completed to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.78. The survey indicated that anhydrous amonia was transported in the area of the LaSalle Station and that several industries stored and/or utilized this chemical at their facilities. At that time, no further analysis was perfonned to l determine whether uninhabitable conditions could be caused in the control rom during an accidental release of anhydrous amonia. Instead, to expedite the licerising of the plant, redundant amonia detectors were provided on each outside ai r intake of the control room.
In 1986 and 1987, a second set of surveys was conducted to supplement the 1975 data and to provide additional information needed to perfom quantitative l analysis of the station control room habitability and exposure risk due to l accidental release of anhydrous amonia. The 1986-1987 survey yielded the l following resul ts:
- 1. State Highway 170 and County Road 6, the nearest roakays to the plant can be used by local f anners and tank trucks to transport amonia. Shipment of amonia on other highways and railroads need not be considered as these are more than 5 miles away from the plant.
- 2. A section of the Illinois River passes within the 5 miles of the station control rom air intake, and the survey indicated that shipments totaling 310,500 tons by 121 barges on the Illinois River is representative of the annual barge shipments of anhydrous amonia in the vicinity of the plant.
- 3. Two stationary storage facilities are located near the Illinois River. The Kaiser Agricultural Chemical company stores anhydrous amonia in two ref rigerated tanks (20,000 and 22,500 tons) which are located just inside the 5 mile radius of the plant. The Seneca Port Authority also stores
-i-
' Revision 5 30,000 tons of ammonia in a ref rigerated tank which is approximately 5.75 miles fra the plant: i 4 Commonwealth Edison is currently leasing approximately 300 acres of land 1 i
near the plant to local f amers. At the present time, the f amers are using 28% granular nitrogen to fertilize the leased property, however, the possibility of using anhydrous ammonia in the future does exist. The analysis assumed that as many as 10 f arm f ertilizer containers, each carrying approximately 1,450 gallons of amonia, could be used on the leased property each year. This ammonia would be transported on the station service road.
Two types of (vantitative analyses were conducted: Dispersion and Probability j
an aly si s. A dispersion analysis was done in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.78 to determine whether an accidental release of ammonia on waterways and roadways resulted in concentrations exceeding the toxicity limit in the control room two minutes af ter odor detection. Accidental releases which did not exceed the toxicity limit were not included in the probability analysis.
The probability analysis considered the meteorological data, length of transportation route within 5 miles of station, probability of accidents resci ting in spill s, and f requency of shipments for the transportation mode under co nsi der ation.
The results of the dispersion analysis showed that the accidental releases of amonia due to transportation of the f arm fertilizer containers and tank trucks on County Road 6 and IL.170, respectively, did not result in concentrations exceeding toxicity limits and that a probability analysis was not Warranted for these accidents. The probability analysis considered the accidental releases due to transportation of amonia on the river, tank trucks on County Road 6, f am fertilizer contains on station service road and on the leased land, and storage i n of f site tanks.
The aggregate prob:tHlity of causing uninhabitable conditions in the corro?ol room was determined by suming the individual probabilities due to accidents involving amonia barges, ammonia storage tanks, ammonia tank trucks, on-site The aggregate probability was calculated transportation to de 2.85 x 10- agd perstorage year. of ansnonia.This probability assessment is conservative, when it is cabined with reasonable galitative argments, a more realistic exposure risk assessment of 1.5 x 10 per year is obtained.
The probabilities are shown to be of the same order of magnitude as specified by Section 2.2.3 of the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800. Therefore, the toxic hazard created by the accidental release of amonia in the vicinity of LaSalle...e County Station is not considered a significant risk to the safe operation of s tati on.
Revision 5
1.0 INTRODUCTION
In 1975, Commonwealth Edison Company commissioned a survey of industries and transportation routes which may use, store, and/or transport hazardous chemicals in the vicinity of the LaSalle County Station. This survey was conducted to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.78 (Reference 1).
The 197S survey indicated that anhydrous manonia was transported in the area of the LaSalle Station and that several industries stored and/or utilized this chemical at their facilities. At that time, no further analysis was perfonned to determine whether uninhabitable conditions could be caused in the control room during an accidental release of anhydrous annonia. In-stead, to expedite the licensing of the plant, redundant annonia detectors were provided on each outside air intake of the control room.
During January, and May of 1986 another survey was conducted to supplement the 1975 data. The pJrpose of the srcond survey was to gather additional data needed to perform quantitative analyses of the LaSalle Station control room habitability and expc-Jre risX due to accidental release of anhydrous ammoni a. Two distinct types of analyses were performed. The first analysis evaluated the dispersion of the vapor released f rom a postulated accident and its subsequent infiltration into the control room. The second analysis determined the probability that uninhabitable conditions in the control roan could be caused by accidents involving the transportation of anhydrous ammonia and annonia stored at nearby locations. The probability analysis considered the statistical data pertaining to accidents for a given mode of transportation, pertinent storage conditions, and the meteorological param-eters that would be required to cause the development of toxic concentra-tions in the control room.
In January of 1987 another survey was conducted to determine the potential usage of anhydrous ammonia on the leased f arm lands within the station property boundaries.
Finally, during June through September of 1987, a survey was conducted to determine the potential shipments of ammonia through routes along the ins mediate vicinity of the station.
The following sections describe the Regulatory Guides which form the basis of the control room habitibility evaluation, the survey of ammonia shipments around and within the LaShlle Station, the analysis of the habitability of the control room, and the conclusion reached regarding ammonia as a hazard. It is concluded that the toxic hazard created by the accidental release of annonia in the vicinity of the LaSalle County Station is not a significant risk to the safe operation of the station.
2.0 RIGULATORY GUIDES Regulatory Guide 1.78 identifies anhydrous mwnonia as a hazardous chemical and requires a control room habitability analysis in case there is an accidental ammonia release from stationary or mobile sources near the pl ant. It also provides a methodology for analyzing the effects of an ammonia rel ease.
.' Revision 5 Regulatory Position 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.78 states that amonia stored or situated at distances greater than five miles from the control roan need not be considered in evaluating habitability of the nuc1 ear power p1 ant control room during a postulated amonia release. Regulatory Guide 1.78 also speci-fies the f requency, distance, and quantity of chemical s transported or stored with respect to the control room that require a control room hatd tability analysis.
In order to establish the design basi s events f or a plant, Section 2.2.2.2 j of Regulatory Guide 1.70 (Reference 2) requires identification of hazardous and toxic chemicals processed, stored or transported in the vicinity of the si t e. It further requires consideration of all facilities and activities l within five miles of the plant and inclusion of f acilities and activities at greater distances as appropriate to their significance. For evaluation of potential accidents, Section 2.2.3.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.70 defines the design basis events external to the nuclear plant as those accidents that have a probability of occurrence on the order of about 10-7 per year or greater and have potential consequences serious enough to affect the safety of the plant to the extent that 10CFR Part 100 of the guidelines could be e xceede d. For toxic chemicals, the Regulatory Guide requires consideration of accidental releases of these chemicals f rom onsite storage facilities and nearby mobile and stationary sources. These toxic chemical concentrations determined for a spectrum of meteorological conditions then should be used in evaluating control room habitability according to Regulatory Guide 1.78.
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 of the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800 (Reference
- 3) requires a review of identified hazardous material which are stored and/or transported in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.78. The review procedures require identification of facilities and activities within eight kilaneters (5 miles) of the plant. Facilities and activities at greater distances should be considered if they otherwise have the potential for af f ecting the plant saf ety-related f eatures.
As part of its acceptance criteria, Section 2.2.3 of the Standard Review Plan (SriP) provides a probability criteria for determining if a toxic re-lease need be considered a design basis event. Specifically, it states:
The probability of occurrence of the initiating events leading to potential consequences in excess of 10 CFR part 100 exposure guidelines should be estimated using assunptions that are as representative of the specific site as is practicable. In addition, because of the 1on probabilities of the events under consideration, data are of ten not available to permit accurate calculation of probabili ties. Accordingly, the expected rate of occurrence of potential exposures in excess gf the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines of approximately 10- per year is acceptable if, when combined with reasonable qualita-tive arguments, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower.
- l
' Revision 5 1
As part of its review procedures, Section 2.2.3 of the SRP states:
Similarly, special attention should be given to the review of a site where several man made hazards are identified, but none of which, individually, has a probability exceeding the acceptance criteria stated herei n. The objectiYe of this special roview should be to assure that the aggregate probability of an outcome that may lead to ur.dcceptab'e plant damage meets the acceptance criteria of Subtection II of this SRP section.
- 3. 0 SUM 1ARY OF AFNONIA SHIPENTS A10VND LASALLE 3.1 1975 Survey of Amonia Stipment Th !.aSalle County Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.
(UFSAR': Section 2.2.1, de.cribes the location of the plant site and the transportation routet n1ar the si tt. The UFSAR Sections 2.4.1 and 2.2.2 describe the nearby industrial, transportction, and military f acil i ti ee . Al1 industrial fc.cilities are 1ocated outside of a five mile radius of the plant; therefore, amonia used or stored at thete
- cilities need not be considered in evaluating the control room habit-netlity. A survey was conducted in 1975 to determine the shipment of amenia to these industries by the three modes of transportation, The U.S. Highesy 6 and State namely iii ghways, railroads and waterways.
Highway 4r, are the nearest highways to the station and the Chicago Rock Island and Pacific, the nearest railroad, are all located f arther than five mil ?s f run the sta' > on. Theref ore, transportation of amonia by these two modes of transportation wa not considered in the control room habitability analysis.
The UFSAR Section 2.2.2.4 describes the river traffic on the Illinois Ri ver. Section 2.2.3.1.C of the UFSAP. concluded that the only tra'is-portstion route carrying amonia within five miles of the station is the Illinois River, which is 1ocated approximately 4.7 miles nortt of the stati on. A review of the 1974 data on comodities transported on the Illinois River (UFSAR Table 2.2-4) did not differentiate barge shipments of amonia f rom other chemicals.
3.2 1986-1987 Surveys of Amonia Shipment These surveys were conducted between January 1986 and September 1987 -
The purpose of these surveys was to gather additional data needed to perf onn wantitative analyses of the control rc.n habitability and Each exposure risk due to accidental release of anhyt rous amonia.
mode of transportation was evaluated with regard to the frequency and volume of amonia shipmer.;;s #1th;n 5 miles of the plant. These surveys included carriers, river terminels, and end-users as a means of
, ccounting for all ammonia movesient in the area. Agricultural and industrial storage and utilization of annonia within and beyond 5 miles of the plant were also incorporated in the data base.
- 3-
Revision 5 The following goverment agencies were contacted for information con-cerning the shipment of anmonia:
- 1. U.S. Coast Guard, (Hazardous Chemical Branch), Chicago, Illinois and Washington, D.C.
- 2. U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers, Rock Island, Illinois.
- 3. Illinois Department of Transportation, Water Resources Divi-si on.
- 4. LaSalle County Chamber of Canmerce.
$. Lockmasters at Marseilles, Illinois.
- 6. Lockmasters at Dresden Island, Illinois.
- 7. Illinoi! Jepartment of Agriculture, Division of Plant In-dustries and Constner Services.
In addition, the following companies and organizations including users and distributors of anhydrous amonia were contacted for information:
- 1. The Illinois Fertilizer and Chemical Association
- 2. University of Illinois Agriculture Cooperative Extension
- 3. Seneca Port Operating Authority
- 4. Kendall-Grundy Fertilizer Sepply
- 5. Walter Seed and Fertilizer, Inc.
- 6. LaSalle Fertilizer Supply
- 7. OuPont Industrict.
- 8. CF Industries
- 9. Kaiser Agricultural Chemicals
- 10. Beker Industries
- .1. Olin Chemical Canpany
- 12. Berg-Warner Corporation
. 3. Agri Company
- 11. Conti-Carriers and Terminal s
- 15. Brent Towing Compani
- 16. Southern Towing Company
- Revision 5
- 17. Port Arthur Towing Company
- 18. Grow Mark Cooperative
- 19. Mazon Farm Elevator Co.
- 20. Crop Production Service
- 21. Ransom Fertilizer Service Since the nearest railroad (Chicago Rock Island & Pacific) is more than 5 miles from the LaSalle County Station, it was not surveyed for this an alysi s.
3.2.1 Transportation of Amonia on Roa&ays Regarding the shipment of amonia on highways, the survey re-vealed that U.S. Highway 6 and 51, and Interstate 80 and Illinois State H;ghways 17,18, 23, 47 and 170 may be used to transport amonia in tank trucks. These highways except for State Highway 170 are more than 5 miles away f rom the LaSalle County station and need not be further evaluated. State Highway 170 is 3.2 miles east of the nearest control room air intake and transportation of amonia on this highway had to he further eval ua ted.
The other road traffic of anhydrous amonia within 5 miles is due to the transportation of f arm fertilizer containers oy local farmers. These containers, each having a capacity of approximately 6,350 pounds, are taken fra distribution centers located outside the 5 mile radius of concern and driven over local roads to area f ams. The containers have a capacity of either 1,000 gallons or 1,450 gallons and it is possible to pull two in tandem. The nearest location of such a tank, on a local road or f arm, was determined to be approximately one hal f mile fran the control room (Reference 4). Also, approximately 300 acres of land within the station property boundary are leased to f amers. Currently, these f amsrs use 28% granular nitrogen to f ertilize the leased lands. Hwever, the possibility of using anhydrous amonia does exist. In the event anhydrous amonia were to be used, a maxima of 10 containers would be transported on County Road 6 to the fields via the station service road. It is expected that the entire contents of each tank would be i utilized within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of delivery and that application of anhydrous amonia would probably occur sometime during April and/or mid October (Reference 5).
In order to determine what other type of traffic exists on ;
County Road 6, the LaSalle County Highway Department was con- '
tacted. County Road 6 has been posted for load limitatior.: of 12 tons during spring and 27 tons during sumer (Reference 6j.
Tank trucks hauling amonia to dispatch centers carry 18-20 tons of amonia and weigh approximately 36-48 tons gross. Therefore transportation of amoria on County Road 6 was prohibited l
l I;
- Revisic.: 5 (Reference 6). However, in May of 1987, based on a decision of the weight restrictions on County Road the 6 were LaSalle County lif ted for a Board,(May year 15, 1987 - January 15, 1988) on an experimental basis. It is possible that the weight restrictions may be permanently lif ted if no deterioration of the road occurs (Reference 7).
A list of distribution centers (retailers of anhydrous annonia) within a 25-mile area of the station covered by several counties: LaSalle, Grundy, Livingston, Marshall, Kankakee, Putnam and Will, was obtained from the Illinois Department of Agricul ture. These were identified on the Illinois Highway map. The primary wholesale suppliers of ansnonia were also iden-ti fied. These are Grow Mark, Kaiser Agricultural, CF In-dustries, and W. R. Grace Company. A description of Kaiser Agricultural and CF Industries operation is presented in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Grow Mark, a f ann cooperative receives its amonia supply fran the CF Industries which in turn leases aranonia storage tanks from the Seneca Port Authority.
Kaiser Agricultural supplies ammonia to distribution centers within 100-miles of its storage facility covering Illinois and Wisconsi n. Tank trucks fill up at the terminal storage f acilities (CF Industries / Seneca Port, and Kaiser Agricultural) and service storage tanks located at the distribution centers.
The storage tank: sizes at the local distribution centers range between 18,000 to 30,000 gallons. None are located within a 5 mile radius of the LaSalle Station.
Based on the location of the distribution centers, conversations with the wholesale and retail suppliers (References 8, 9,10, 11,12,13,14 and 15), it was determihad that anhydrous amonia is primarily shipped on Interstate 80, U.S. Highways 6, and 51 and Illinois Highways 17, M, 23, 47 and 170. Wal ter Seed and Fertilizer, Inc stus aninonia in a 30,000 gallon tank at Grand Ridge, and is 1ocated 8.2 miles west of the station on th?
County 6 Road. The principal sources of its yearly 50 shipment (1S tons each) of ammonia supply are W.. R. Grace Company, lo-cated in Henry, Illinois on Illinois Highway 18, approximately 35 miles southwest of the station and Kaiser Agricultural approximately 5 miles north east of the station. Of the 50 yearly shipnents,16-17 shipnents of ammonia are provided by Kaiser Agricultural. Amnonia to Walter Seed and Fertilizer site is hauled on via U.S. 6 and Illinois 23 f rom Kaiser Agricul-tural. However, since County Road 6 is not posted anynore, ammonta could be transported on County Road 6 (Reference 15).
No other potential path could be determined which would use County road 6 to transport ammonia.
3.2.2 Transportation of Amonia on Water Ways i
In order to determine the frequency and quantity of anhydrous amonia transported by barge on the Illinois River in the vici.11ty of the LaSMle Station, all major industries and barge transportation canpanies were contacted to gather pertinent
Revision 5 i nf ormati on. Furthermore,- inf ormation regarding terminal s lo-cated along the river between the locks and dams at Marseilles and Dresden Island was reviewed to account for those amonia shipments passing by the site destined for delivery outside the 5 mile radius.
Anhydrous ammonia is generally shipped by barge in specially constructed ref rigerated cylinders (Ref erence 16). The nonnal cargo size of these barges ranges between 2400 and 2000 tons with two cylinders per barge (Reference 17). DuPont and CF Industries each receive amonia in special 3600-ton barges which unload at the Seneca Port Authority teminal (Reference 18).
Exhibit 1 is a presentation of anhydrous amonia users and dis-tributors and annual barge shipments in the vicinity of the LaSalle County Station. The Marseilles Lock and Dresden Lock statistics for 1984 are also shown on this exhibit. It can be seen that the normal annual tonnage of amonia shipped by the surveyed transportation companies (310,500 tons) compares very well with the Marseilles 1ock annual tonnage for 1984 (308,800 tons). The calculated average cargo weight of 2566 tons (310,500/121) carried by barges on the Illinois River al so com-pares very well with the nomal cargo weight ranging between 2400 and 3600 tons carried by the amonia barges.
3.2.3 Storage of Amonia Near LaSalle Station
' A survey of terminals along the Illinois river within 5 miles of the station indicated that there were very few major storage si tes for anhydrous amonia. Exhibit 2 lists the docks and archorage facilities on the Illinois River near the station.
Thi s exhibit updates Table 2.2 2 of the UFSAR. The exhibit lists dock and anchorage facilities between river miles 244 and 254 Only those terminals located between river miles 248 and 253 are within 5 miles of the control room. Kaiser Agricultural Chemical Canpany, which stores or utilizes anhydrous ammonia, is located outside the five mile radius of the control room. How-ever, according to Xaiser (Ref erence 19), it maintains two re-f rigerated storage tanks containing anhydrous amonia within the 5 mile radius of the LaSalle control room. One of these tanks is 20,000 tons capacity and the other is 22,500 tons capacity.
The Seneca Port Authority (located at river mile 253.8, outsie the 5 mile radius of the control roam) maintains a 30,000 ton ref rigerated tank and meters out amonia to DuPont and CF industri es.
3.2.4 Sumary of 1986-1987 Survey Resul ts The reeul ts of the 1986-1987 surveys indicate the following:
- 1. Shipment of anhytous amonia on highways (U.S. Highways 6 and 51, Interstate 80, and State Highways 17,18, 23 and 47) and the nearest railroad Chicago Rock Island & Pacific need not be considered in the LaSalle County Station control roan
-7 -
- Revision 5 habitability analysi s. These highways and railroad are more than 5 miles away fran the control room.
- 2. Shipment of amonia on State Highway 170 should be considered as it is 3.2 miles east of the LaSalle Station and does have ammonia shipping on it.
- 3. The nearest public road, County Road 6, is approximately 2560 feet away from the nearest air intake of the control room. Shipments of amonia in f arm fertilizer containers (6350 lbs) and tank trucks (18-20 tons) on County Road 6 need to be considered in the analysis.
- 4. The nearest station service road that could be used to transport the f arm fertilizer containers is approximately 550 feet away f rom the nearest air intake of the control room; amonia containers carrying approximately 6350 lbs of amonia need to be considered in the analysis.
- 5. A total of 10 f arm fertilizer containers may be used in a year on the leased 1 ands with one container renaining at the site f or one day. This should be considered.
- 6. A shipment of approximately 310,500 tons by 121 barges on the Illinois River is representative of an annual barge shipment of anhydrous amonia in the vicinity of the LaSalle County Station. The amonia is shipped in specially con-structed ref rigerated cylinders and the maximun carrying capacity of one cylinder is 1800 tons. This should be consi dered.
- 7. Storage of amonia in two tanks maintained by Kaiser should be considered as these are located within 5 miles of the LaSalle Station.
- 8. A tank maintained by the Seneca Port Authority is located more than 5 miles away from the plant. However, it should be considered due to the quantity to amonia stored in the tank.
4.0 DISPERSION ANALYSIS AND CONTROL ROOM INFILTRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATORY GUIDE 1./ 6 Regulatory guide 1.78 states in C.2 that "If hazardous chemicals such as those indicated in Table C-1 are known or projected to be frequently shipped by rail, water, or road routes within a five-mile radites of a nuclear power plant, estimates of these shipments should be considered in the evaluation of control room habitability...Shipnent are defined as being frequent if there are 10 per year for truck traffic, 30 per year for rail traffic, or 50 per year f or barge traf fic " Based on this, barge traffic on the Illinois River and truck traffic on state highway 90 and County Road 6 need be consi dered.
., .' Revision 5 In paragraph C.4 the regulatory guide states; The toxicity limits should be taken from appropriate authoritative sources such as those listed in the Ref erences section. For each chemical considered, the val as of importance are the haan detection threshold and the maxima concentre. ion that can be tolerated for two minutes without physical incapacitation of an average hwan (i.e., severe coughing, eye burn, or severe skin irritation). The 1atter concentration is considered the "toxicity 1imit." Based on this the human detection threshold for amonia is 10 ppm and the toxicity limit is 100 ppm.
In paragraph C.5 regulatory guide 1.78 states; Two types of industrial accidents should be considered for each source of hazardous chemicals:
maximum concentration chemical accidents and maxima concentration-duration chemical accidents.
For a maximum concentration accident, the quantity of the hazardous chemical to be considered is the instanteous release of the total contents of one of the f olicwing: (1) the largest storage container f alling within the guidelines of Table C-2 and located at a nearby stationary facility, (2) the largest shipping container (or for multiple containers of equal size, the f ailure of only one container unless the f ailure of that container could lead to successive f ailures) f alling within the guidelines of Table C-2 and frequently transported near the lite, or (3) the largest container stored onsi te. Maxima concentration accidents were analyzed for items 1 and 2.
No amonia is stored onsite.
Maximum concentration-duration accidents were not analyzed as they were judged to f all easily within the bounds of a maxima concentration accident and pose no additional threat to the LaSalle control room.
In paragraph C.7 it is stated that "The detection mechanism for each hazardous chemical should be considered. Haan detection may be appropriate if the buildup of the hazardous chemical in the control room is at a slow rate due to slow air turnover." And that "The time required for Duildup of a hazardous chemical fron the detection concentration to the toxicity limit shoul d be consi dered."
4.1 Barge Transportation Based on the rewirements of Regulatory Guide 1.78, an analysis was perfomed considering a cmplete rupture of a non-refrigerated 1800-ton ammonia carrier barge which instantly releases its contents. Upon r61 ease, aproximately 21% flashes imediately to vapor. The remainder is a liquid at
-250 F, which gradually M1; off by transfer of heat f rom the enviroment.
The flashed vapor constitutes the principal hazard to the station. The dispersion and propagation to the LaSalle site is predicted in accordance with methods described in Regulatory Guide 1.78. The stability class con-sidered is Paswill, Type F, which results in control rom concentrations which would be exceeded in less than 5% of all occurrences.
.- Revision 5 Exhibit 3 describes tne basis of the analysis and the results from the release from a barge on tne Illinois River. The control room air excnange
' rate used in the analysis is thot of a control room in the non-isolated mode. According to Regulatory Guide 1.78, this control room is classified as a Type C Control room. Exnibit 4 snows tne results of the dispersion dnalysis as the rise in Concentration with respect to time. According to tnis analysis, a response time that is rapid enough to avoid exposure to toxicity limitation is less then 48 seconds. According to Regulatory Guide 1.78 Table C-1, the concentration level for anhydrous ammonia is 100 ppm.
Exnibit 3 shows that the concentration would reacn 480 ppm two minutes af ter tne presence of the enemical in the control room becomes noticeable by its odor to personnel. Based on tnis determination that maximum concentrations would be exceeded if an accident occurred, it was determined necesory to perform a probability analysis to snow tnat accidental releases of ammonia are not d design bdsis event (see Section 5.0).
4.2 Highway Transportation As noted in the 1987 survey, tank trucks tronsport ommonia on State Highway 170 and a potential to transport ammonia on County Road 6 exists.
State Hignway 170 is locotea 3.2 miles east of the nearest LaSalle County station control room air intake. Using interpolation method provided in Appendix A and Table C-2 of Regulatory Guide 1.78, it was determined that tank trucks carrying less than 34.7 tons of ammonia on Highway 170 would not require o control room nobitobility evaluation for the LaSalle County ,
Station. The maximum weight of ammonia corried by tank trucks on Highway 170 is 20 tons. Therefore, transportotion of ammonia on Hignway 170 does not impact LaSalle County Station control room nabitability.
As noted in the 1987 survey, tank trucks carrying approximately 18 to 20 tons of annydrous ammonia could use County Road 6 in transporting ammonia from Kaiser Agricultrua! to Grona Ridge distribution center. Dispersion dnalysis snows that tne 2-minute toxicity limitation level of 100 ppm would be exceeded oue to an accidental release of tonk truck contents on Cou1ty Road 6. Tnerefore, a probability analysis was undertaken to show tnot accidental releases of ammonio from tank trucks are not 4 design basis event bdsed on probability (see Section 5.0).
Exnibic 5 shows the control room concentration that could be caused by an accidental release of anhydrous ammonid from a 1450 gallon farm fertilizer contdiner on County Road 6. The nearest locotion of the fertilizer container on tnis road, is considered in this analysis. The container size dssumed is the largest size identitied for snis application. Tne concentration in the control room is found to be less tnan the toxicity limit.
Exnibit 6 shows the control room concentration that could be caused by an dCCidental release of anhydrous ammonid from a 1450 gallon f orm fertilizer container on the station service road. Exhibit 7 shows the results of theThe dispersion onalysis as the rise in concentration witn respect to titae.
maximum concentration shown in Exnibit 7 exceeds tne 2-minute toxicity limit ,
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Revision 5 100 ppm. Therefore, a probability analysis was undertaken to show that accidental releases of ammonia on the station service road and the leased f arm 1 ands are not a design basis event (see Section 6.0).
5.0 pROBA8ILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CON 0!TIONS IN Tif CONTROL ROOM BY ACCIDENT INVa.VING B ARGE TRAN5PWTATION The dispersion analysis shows that the calculated amonia concentration in the unisolated control room is 480 ppm at 2 minutes after the odor is de-tected. The dispersion analysis is based on a complete rupture of a 1800-ton amonia container and the consequent release of the entire content. The toxic level specified in Regulatory Guide 1.78 is 100 ppm. However, the Standard Review Plan and Regulatory Guide 1.70 provide criteria for acceptance based on probability calculation. An exposure risk of 10-7 applies when the calculation is performed with realistic asseptions. With conservative assumptions, the risk of 10-6 a ppl ies.
A probability analysis was perfonned by the following method. Statis ti cal meteorological data for the LaSalle site (33-foot level) were used which consisted of occurrence probabilities of stability class, wind direction and wind magnitude (Reference 26). Exhibit 8 shows the orientation of the wind direction sectors of the meteorological data with respect to the Illinois River and the LaSalle County Station. The probability that the control rom
' could be made uninhabitable is calcul ated from the probability of an accident within each sector, the probability that the wind had a direction which would carry released vapor to the control room and that the stability classes were E, F, or G. Under these stability classes, the control rom was found to be uninhabitable based on the diffusion analysis described in Regul atory Guide 1.78. Only the portion of the river within a distance of 5 miles from the station was considered it this analysis according to Regul atory Guide 1.78.
Exhibit 9 shows the computations performed and the exposure risk per barge s hi pment. In Exhibit 9, numerical values are given for the occurrence pro-babilities of wind direction and stability class f or each sector and the length of the river in each sector. The probability of control rom unin-habitability per shipment is calculated by the sunenation of the contribution made by each sector and stability class.7 For a total of 121 shipments per year a risk exposure level of 3.15 x 10- per year is estimated (Exhibit 9). The barge accident statistic was obtained from Reference 33 and the meteorological data was obtained f rom Reference 26.
The results of the probability calculation show that the LaSalle County Station control rom will remain habitable for up to 121 barge shipments of i amonia on the Illinois River for an acceptable exposure risk of l i
3.15 x 10-7 per year, l
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6.0 PROBABILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN THE CONTROL ROOM BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING COUNTY ROAD 0, STATION SERVICE ROAD AND LE ASED FARM LANDS Three probability analyses were performed. These involved accidents on County Road 6, station service road and those involving f am fertilizer containers on the leased lands.
6.1 Accidents on County Road 6 It was conservatively assumed that all the 50 annual tank truck ship-ment of amonia to the Grand Ridge distribution center from Kaiser Agricultural located at Seneca occur on County Road 6. The probability that the control could be made uninhabitable was calculated from the probability of an accident on County Road 6 under all stability classes and within the wind sectors covered by a five mile radius. Exhibit 10 shows computation performed. The results of the probability calculation show that at an exposure risk of 8.435 x 10-j per year the control room will remain habitable if there were any releases f ra these tanks.
6.2 Accidents on Station Service Road It was conservatively assumed that all the 10 farm fertilizer containers either pulled by tractors or pickup trucks are transported on the service road and these containers travel the entire length of service road. Although these can be pulled in tandem, it was asstned that 10 trips are made on this road every year. Wind direction sectors and the meteorological data with respect to this road and the control room were ignored in this probability analysis to conservatively estimate the accident probability. Exhibit 11 shows the computations performed and the exposure risk per truck shipment. per year is shipmen es timated.
These results show that the laSalle County Station control room will remain habitable for up to 10 shipments of amonia on phe station ser-vice road for an acceptable exposure risk of 2.7 x 10~ per year.
6.3 Accidents on Leased Land The probability that the control room could be made uninhabitable was calculated from the probability of an accident on leased land under all stability classes and within all wind sectors. It was asstmed that a total of 10 f am fertilizer containers are utilized in a year and that each container remains on leased lands for one day. Exhibit 11 shows such computations perfonned. The results of the probab calculation show that at an exposure risk of 2.74 per x 10 flitythe year, control room will remain habitable if there were any releases from these containers.
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Revision 5 7.0 PROBABILITY OF C40 SING UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN THE CONTROL ROOH BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING OFF51f t. APM)NIA STORAGE TANK 5 The Regulatory Guide 1.70 and the SRP require i review of f acilities and activities at distances greater than 5 miles if chey otherwise have the potential of affecting the control roan habitability. As indicated above, the Kaiser Agricultural Chemical Company stores anhydrous amonia in two ref rigerated tanks (20,000 and 22,500 tons). These tanks are located on the f ringes of the 5 mile radius. The Seneca Port Authority also stores 30,000 tons of ammonia in a reml erated tank at river mile 253.8 mile, is approxi-mately 5.75 miles from the plant.
A probability risk analysis was performed for these tanks. As bef ore, the analysis is based on a canplete rupture of the tanks and consequent release of the enti re content. Statistical meteorological data for the LaSalle site (33-foot level) were used which consist of occurrence probabilities of sta-oility class, wind direction and wind magnitude (Reference 26). The Kaiser tanks and Seneca tank are located North and NE of the plant, respectively.
The probability that the control roan could be made uninhabitable was calcu-1ated from the probability of an accident within each sector and the proba-Oility that the wind had a direction which would carry released vapor to the control roan under all stability classes ( A, B, C, 0, E, F & G).
Exhibit 12 ru such computations perfonned. The results of PI oility calcC Won show that at an exposure risk of 1.1 x 10-6 per year, the control roaa wil' remain habitable if there were any releases f ran these tanks.
8.0 ACGREGATE PROBABILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN THE CONTROL QM BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING AlHONIA RELEA5E5 The aggregate acceptable exposure risk to maintain habitaole conditions in the control room 13 the sum of the probability of amonia releases due to barge accidents, tank truck accidents on County Road 6, offsite storage tank rupture. Exhibit 13 shows that this and onsite f arm fertilizer conti.ineg/
aggregate probability is 2.85 x 10 year.
9.0 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS The maximum individual probability of offsite and onsite sources of anhydrous aninonia that could result in uninhabitable conditions in the con-trol room is 8.44 x 10-' per year (Exhibit 10g. Similar aggregate probabilities of th)se sources are 2.85 x 10' per year.
Thest probabiiities are acceptable, if, when combined with reasonable qual tative arysnents, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower.
The usi of this probability assessment is conservative and the realistic proDab lity can be shown to be lower because of the following conservatisms:
- 1. Almonia when spilled on water produces a buoyant plume of ammonia vapor. On the basis of spill studies of liquid ansnonia on water and
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Rovision 5 corresponding numerical models developed (Reference 27), the height of rise of amonia plume can be predicted. The height of rise of an ammonia plume due to a 1800-ton spill at a distance where the plant is located is estimated to range between 700 and 5000 feet depending upon atmospheric stability conditions. These heights of rise are based on the wind velocity which results in maximum control room concentration of amoni a. Therefore, any ammonia plume released due to barge accidents may not af fect the control room air intake which is located approxi-mately 370 feet above the normal river elevation.
- 2. The probability of causing uninhabitable conditions due to release of ammonia from the ref rigerated storage tank is shown in Exhibit 12. This is based on accidents involving complete rupture and subsequent release of the entire tank contents. This calculation also assumed that all stability classes would be sufficient to able to cause the control room to become uninhabitable. (See Section 7.0)
Since ammonia is stored in refrigerated tanks at atmospheric pressure there is less likelihood that the entire contents of the tank will become airborne. Assuming a partial release of ammonia (10%) from the refrigerated Kaiser Agricultural Chemical tanks (20,000 and 25,000 tons) and Seneca port Authority tanks (30,000 tons), the probability of cau3ing uninhabitable conditions will be 2.0 x 10-7 per year and 1,62 x 10- per year, respectively (Exhibit 14). This new probability is based on stability Classes E, F and G only, rather than all stability classes considered in the analyses described in Section 7.0 and shown in Exhibit 12,
- 3. The assumption that tank trucks carry the full annual demand of anhydrous ammonia from Seneca to Grand Ridge on County Road 6 is conser-vative. Realistically, only the shipments from Kaiser Agricultural s,50). This would resul t in an would accident beprobability expected of to 2.81 occurx (16-17 10- y/ year.
Additionally, according to wholesale suppliers of ammonia, the instructions to truck drivers have instructions not to transport ammonia on County roads because conditions on these roads are poor and that due to movement of fam equipnent, and other traffic, transit time is quite longer on these roads than use of state highways (Reference 28). l
- 4. The new aggregate probability considering accidents for barges, storage tanks, tank trucks on County Road 6. farm fertflizer containers on service road and the leased land is 1.50 x 10 / year (Exhibit 15). ;
- 5. No credit was taken for cperator incapacitation events that would not result in exposures in excess of 10 CFR 100 guidelines. This analysis conservatively assumed that all such events resulted in an j overexposure. There is precedent for asstsping that only one out of ten l operator incapacitation events would result in an overexposure and that a conservative factor of 10 could be applied to the calculated aggregate propability (Reference 29). The resultant new probability is 1.5 x 10" / year. l
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- 6. In a study conducted to evaluate spill hazards associated with the modal transport of hazardous materials, it was found that the expected annual exposure rate associated with the entire shipment of a substance by one mode was generally the lowest for barge and that the barge mode of transport is better inspected and regulated f rom a safety point of view (Reference 30). In a similar study, it was concluded that for 9 hazardous chemical s, that transport by barge is saf est f or 6 chemicals including snhydrous amonia. (Reference 31).
- 7. The probability of causing uninhabitable conditions due to the release of amonia from f arm fertilizer containers on the station service road and f ra land on the station site which is leased for f arming assnes that every release exceeds toxicity concentrations in the control rom. If meteorological conditions of wind direction and atmosphere stability ure considered in this part of the analysis, a smaller exposure risk to the control room would have been predicted.
10.0 CONCLUSION
S An evaluation of transportation of ammonia and the impact of accidents on the LaSalle County Station per Regulatory Guide 1.78 inditates that amonia toricity 1imits can be exceeded in the control rom in same instances. The aggregate probability of causing uninhabitable conditions at the L*S*11' Cuunty Station control rocm has been calculated to be 2.85 x 10-6 / year as shown in Exhibit 13. It should be noted that a major portion of this probability is due to accident probabilities associated witn offsite storage This tanks owned by Kaiser Agricultural Chemical and Seneca Port Authority.
calculation is based on conservative asseptions. However, as discussed in Section 9.0, when the conservatism in the calculated probabili of reasonable asseptions, the exposure risk becomes / year 1.5 x 10 p (Exhi bit 14). The probabilities are shown to be of the same order of magnitude as the probability criteria specified by NUREG-0800.
Therefore, the toxic hazard posed by the ace.1dentai releases of amonia in the vicinity of the LaSalle County station is not considered a significant risk to the safe operation of the station.
11.O RE FE RE NCES
- 1. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.78, "A:3mptions for Evaluating tN Habitability of a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a i Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release," June 1974.
- 2. U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70, "Standard Fomat and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 3 Novmber 1978, 1
U.S. NRC Standard Review Plan NUREG-0800, Revi sion 2, July 1981. !
3.
l
- 4. Bill Woessner, County Agent, University of Illinois Agriculture I Extension Service, in a telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, February 14, 1986.
Revision 5
- 5. John Schuh, Comomealth Edison Company, Farm Leasing Manager, Real Estate Department, in conversations with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, December 18, 1986 and January 6,1987.
- 6. William Strewell, Supervisor, LaSalle County Highway Department, in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, June 3,1987.
7 Steven Schoff, Maintenance Foreman, LaSalle County Highway Depart-ment, in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, June 22, 1987.
- 8. Larry Hable, Member Services Adninistrative Director, Grow Mark, Bloomington, Ill. in a letter dated August 14, 1987 to S. C. Mehta, Sargent & Lundy Engineers.
- 9. Glen Mcdonald, Plant Operations Manager, Seneca Port Authority, in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, June 19, 1987.
- 10. Rick, Manager, LaSalle County Farm Supply, Streater, Ill. , in tele-phone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, September 15, 1987.
- 11. Pat Mino, Manager, Mazon Farm Elevator Co. , Mazon, Ill. , in tele-phone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, September 15, 1987.
- 12. Mike Gernatz, Manager, Crop Production Service Blackstone, Ill, in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, September 15, 1987.
- 13. Rich Fry, Manager, Ransa Fertilizer Service, Ransom, Ill. , in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, Septenber 15, 1987.
- 14. Billy Joe Ryan, Plant Operations Manager, Xaiser Agricultural Chemical, in telephone .>nversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, I September 16, 1987.
- 15. John Walters, Owner, Wal ter Seed and Fertilizer Inc. , Grand Ridge, Ill., in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, September 16, 1987.
- 16. William Pichocki, Traffic Manager, Olin Barge (C ' Chemical Capany), in telephone conversations with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, February 21, 1986, May 5, 1986.
- 17. Howard Case, Southern Towing Campany, in a telephone conversation ]
with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, February 20, 1986.
Revision 5
- 18. William Stegbauer, Vice President, Operations, Southern Towing Conpany, in telephone conversations with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, February 20, 1986, May 5, 1986.
- 19. Billy Joe Ryan, Plant Operations Manager, Kaiser Agricultural Chemical, in a telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, April 23, 1986,
- 20. Christine Pershey, LaSalle Station Onsite Nuclear Safety Group, in a telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, February 21, 1986.
- 21. Jim Farley, Jesse 3 rent, Traffic Dept. , Brent Towing Co. , in tele-phone conversations with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, February 21, 1986, May 5,1986.
- 22. Dennis Adson, AgriCo. , in a telephone conversation with Sargent &
Lundy Engineers, February 21, 1986.
- 23. Kevin Conway, Port Arthur Toding Co. , in telephone conversations with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, February 21,1986, May 5,1986.
- 24. U.S. NRC NUREG-0170 (Vol .1), Final Envi romental Statement on the .
Transportation of Radioactive Material By Air and Other Modes, December 1977.
- 25. Robert H. Jones, Consul tant, San Jose, Calif. , in a telephone con-versation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, July 30, 1987.
- 26. LaSalle County Station Onsite Meteorological Monitoring Data (October 1,1976 - Septmoer 30, 1978) collected by Murray & Trettel f or Commorweal th Edi son Canpany.
- 27. Arthur D. Littie, Inc. , "Prediction of Hazard of Spills of Anhydrous Annonia on Water," NTIS AD-779-400, Report to U.S. Coast Guard, March 1974,
- 26. Larry Hinble, Member Services Adninistrative Director, Grow Mark i Bloomington, in telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engi-i neers, August 18, 1987. i I
- 29. Duquesne Light Conpany Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Canission, "Beaver Valley Power Station Control Room Habitability," Decenber 28, 1981.
- 30. G. R. Angell and A. S. Kale 1kar, "The Cost and Relative Spill Hazards Associated with the Model Transport of Hazardous Materials,"
Proceedings of 1974 National Conference on Control of Hazardous Material s bill s, San Francisco ( A.I. ChE. New York,1976).
- 31. A. S. Kal e1 kar, L. J . Partri dge, and R. E. Brooks, J r. , "Deci si on Analysis in Hazardous Material Transportation," Ibid. ;
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- 32. J. A. Simons, R. C. Erdnann, and B. N. Naf t, "Risk Assessment of Large Spills of Toxic Material s," Ibid.
- 33. A Modal Economic and Safety Analysis of the Transportation of Hazardous Substances in Bulk. Arthur D. Little, prepared for Mari time Admi nistration,1974. ,
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Revision 5 EXHIBIT 1 SURVEY OF USERS / DISTRIBUTORS OF ANHYOROUS AMMONIA IN THE VIGINITY OF Tit. LA5ALLE COUNTY STATION Anhydrous Ammonia Users Yearly Tonnage Seneca Port Authort ty (Reference 10) 150,000*
Kaiser Agricultural (Reference 19) 67,500**
Total 217,500 Frequency Tonnage (barges / (Tons /
Transportation Canpanies year) year)
Soutnern Towing Campanies (Ref erence 18) 68 172,000 Brent Towing (Ref erence 21) 24 67,500 Olin Barges (Ref erence 16) 15 36,000 (01in Chemical)
AgriCo (Ref erence 22) 4 10,000 Port Arthur Toving (Reference 23) 10 25,000 Total 121 310,500 Nitrogeneous Chemical Loc < Statistics 1984 (Reference 20) Fertilizers (Tons) 308,800 Marseilles Loc ( 65,300 3resden Island Lock
- Annydrous ammont a is delivered to Seneca Port Authority and then metered out to DuPont and CF Industries.
Of 150,000 tons received, 30,000 tons is stored in a ref rigerated tank and 60,000 tons each is metered out to DuPont and CF Industries respectively (Reference 19).
- 0f 67,500 tons received, 45,000 tons is stored in two ref rigerated tanks.
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- Revision 5 EXHIBIT 2 00CK AND ANCHORAGE FACILITIES ON TE ILLINDIS RIVER NEAR TE SITE.
RIVER MILE FACILITY 244.1 Borg Warner chemical Co.
247.5 Snug Harbor Boat Club (1) small boat launching ramp (1) 247.9 Pittsourgh - Des Moines Steel Co.
248.7 Kaiser Agricultural Chemical (2) 249.8 Beker Industries (3) 252.0 Spring Brook Marina (1) 251.8 Ccmnonweal th Edison 252.7 L Peavey Grain Co.
252.7 R Continental Grain Co.
252.8 Seneca Boat Cluo (1)
Anchor-Inn Marina (4) 253.0 Anchor Marine, Inc.
253.4 Conti-Carriers & Terminal s 253.8 Seneca Port District 253.9 Boat slip (1)
- 1. small ooat launching and docks only
- 2. Kaiser Alumintsn and Chemical replaced Illinois Nitrogen Corp. at this l ocati on i n 1981. Kaiser Agricul tural Chemical is a 1985 spin-of f of Kaiser Alumintsn and Chemical.
- 3. The UFSAR Taole 2.2-3 indicates that Beker utilized anhydrous ammonia.
The 1986-1987 surveys revealed that Beker no longer handles or stores anhydrous ammonia.
- 4. Doth small boats and barge facilities L or R Lef t or Right River Bank Source: U.S. Annj Engineer District, Corps of Engineers, Chicago, Illinois, Clerk of the Illinois Waterways, From Mississippi River at Grafton, Illinois to Lake Michigan at Chicago & Caltsnet Harbors, April 19/4.
Illinois Department of Transportation, Water Resources Division, Chicago, Illinois f ran Directory of Lake and River Terminals in Illinois, June 1982, i
Revision 5 EXHIBIT 3 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ANALYSIS (BARGE ON ILLINOIS RIVER)
Material spflied anhydrous ammonia Wei ght 1800 tons 22,700 f t.
Minimun di stance f rom control room Control room air exchange rate 0.8 per hour (not isolated)
F Aenospheric Staoility Class Ambient air temperature 900F Concer.cration detectable by odor 10 ppm 100 ppm To.ic concentration (2 minutes after detecti on) 23300 ppm Maximum calculated concentration at ai r intake 480 ppm Maximun calculated concentration in control roam 2 minutes af ter detection Wind speeo causing maximum concentration 5 m/sec in control room 1
500 ..
Concent r;it i.*n ! minentes ,ilt< . ' . r . . t i ..n ,
a 400 .
E 300 o.
O.
~
e
-4 c
O a
1 200 .
u u u O c
O
~4 e
e 54 a
c
-- -- - - -- Toxic Concentration
$ 100 -
c O
O Concentration detectable by odor
= . . a w 0 m . a o t
1280 1300 1320 1340 1360 1380 1400 1420 4 m
Time elapsed after spill, sec. g Exhibit 4 Concentration in Control Room after 1800 ton spill of anhydrous ammonia. vi 5 m/sec wind, F stability. ,
, =_ _
'. Revision 5 EXHIBIT 5 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ANALYSIS (COUNTY ROAD 6)
Material spilled anhydrous ammonia Wei ght 6344 pounds Minimun di stance f ram control roam 2560 f t.
Control room air exchange rate 0.8 per hour (not i sol ated)
F Atmospheric Staoility Class Ancient ai r temperature 77.9 0F Concentration detectaole by odor 10 ppm Toxic concentration (2 minute exposure) 100 ppm
, Maximum calculated concentration at 4246 ppm ai r intake Maximum calculated concentration in 99.7 ppm control room 2 minutes after detection Wind speed causing maximun concentration 0.55 m/sec in control room 9
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.' Revision 5 EXHIBIT 6 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ANALYSIS
( STATION SERVICE ROAD)
Material spilled anhydrous ownnnia Wei ght 6344 pounds Minimun di stance f ran control roan 550 f t.
Control roan air exchange rate 0.8 per hour (not i solated)
Atnospheric Staoility Class F AT.cient ai r temperature 77.9 0F Concentration detectable by odor 10 ppm Toxic concentration (2 minute exposure) 100 ppm Maximum calculated concentration at 162,000 ppm air intake Maximum calculatec concentration in 2434 ppm control roam 2 minutes af ter detection Wind speed causing maximum concentration 0.255 m/sec in control roon l
l l
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120 seconds g 1500 -
o.
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,4 5 #
N ro w u
' u 1000 -
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O 500 -
,/
Detection w at 10 pom Toxic concentration 100 ppm g
_ __ .- __ -- - -- - g.
l I } P-0 0
640 660 680 700 550 580 600 620 w Exhibit 7 Time elapsed after accidental release, seconds .
Concentration in control room after accidental release of 6350 lb of Anhydroun Ammonia at 550 ft.
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Revision 5
- EXHIBIT 9 CONTROL ROOM RISK ANALYSIS FOR BARGE SHIPMENTS OF ANHYOROUS AMMONIA ON THE !LLIN0!S RIVER Probability of -
Length of occurrence of Sumatio n ,
river within wind direction and of river length sector and stability class and probability within 5 miles (include all by class Wind of site wind speeds) '
Sector Li (mil es ) Mi 7. LixMi (miles)
(stability class)
E F G NNW 0.35 0.0173 0.0037 0.0064 0.00959 N 2.10 0.0072 0.0012 C 0016 0.0210 NNE 1.90 0.0045 0.0009 0.0012 0.01254
!!E 0.095 0.0109 0.0030 0.0023 0.01539 (Sumntion of river length and probability by E. L i xMi = 0.05852 class and wind sector) uninhabitability per barge sh Probability Pa of =control x f. Li xMi rop / shipment where Pa = 4.46 x 10'gpment 2.6 x 10' =
releases / barge mile * (Reference 33)
PROBABILITY OF CONTROL ROOM UNINHABITABILITY OUE TO 121 BARGE SHIPMENTS PER !
YEAR = 121 x 2.6 x 10"g
= 3.15 x 10*7/ year j
- The accident rate of 5.13 x 10-S provided in March 6,1987 submittal ( Attach- '
ment D) appears in a report "Barge Accident Statistics for Use in Radioactive '
Materials Transportation Risk Assessments" March 1983, prepared by R. H.
Jones, Consultant for the Sandia National Laboratory. Transportation Tech-nology Center. Th ived using an overall barge accident i rate of 6.06 x 10*gs accident
/ barge rate was Km (9.753 x 10-deg/ barge mile) listed in Table 5-7 of Ref erence 24 (NUREG-0170).
Mr. Jones was contacted to verify the value of 5.13 x 10-8 listed in his report. Mr. Jones could not confirm this valu . However, Mr. Jones calculated a barge accident rate of 2.65 x 10'g/ barge mile in a telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers 30,1987 (Reference 25).
This was based on accident rate (9.753 x 10*gn July
/ barge mile) and severity 1 fraction (2.722 x 10-4) listed in NUREG-0170 (Reference 24). l For conservatism, a higher barge accident rate of 4.46 x 10"8/ barge mile for ammonia spills provided in Reference 33 is used for probability calculation, l
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Revision 5 EXHIBIT 10 CONTROL ROOM RISK ANALYSIS FOR ROADWAY SHIPENT5 0F ANHYDROU5 A?90NIA ON TE COUNTY ROA0 6 Probability of Length of occurrence of Sumation of road wi thin wind direction and road l ength sector and stability class and probability wi tnin 5 miles (include all by class Wind of site wind speeds)
Sector Li (miles) Mi SLief (miles)
( A B C D E F 4 G) 2.20 0.038 0.0836 E
2.0 0.041 8 0.0836 ESE 0, 5 0.0459 0.02295 SE 0,0464 0,01067 SSE 0.23 0.23 0.0716 0.01646 5
SSW 0.20 0.0800 0.016 0.50 0.0726 0.0363 SW 2.10 0.0747 0.15687 WSW
- 2. 0 0.101 0.202 W
(Summation of road length and probability by 1 Lidi = 0.62845 cl ass and wind sector)
ProDaoility of control room uninhabitaoility for single tank truck shipment
= Pa
- x1Li x Mi = 27x10-9 x 0.62845
= 1.687x10-8/ shipment PROBABILITY OF CONTROL ROOM UNINMBITABILITY OUE TO 50 TANK TRUCK SHIPE
= 50 x 16,87 10-9/ year
= 8.435 x 10 9/ year where Pa* = 27 x 10-9 accidents / vehicle mile (Reference 33)
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- Revi si on 5 EXHIBIT 11 PROB ABILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CONTROL ROOM CONDITIONS A5 A RE5 ULT (F ACCIENTAL RELE A5E OF AP90NIA Gi 5TATION SERVICE ROAD AND LEASED LAND FOR FARMING Station Service Road Approximate length of station service =1 road, mil es No. of vehic1es towing amonia = 10 Accident f ailure rate = 27 x 10-9 (accidents / vehicle mile) (Reference 33)
= 2.70 x 10-7/ year PROBMILITY OF CONTROL ROOM UNINHABITABILITY DUE TO ACCIDENTS ON TE SERVICE ROAD Leased Land No, of ammonia tanks stored / year = 10 Length of time each tank remains on premises =1 af ter delivery, days Estimated accident f rewency per year = 10-5 (Reference 32)
= 2.74 x 10-7/ year PROBABILITY OF CONTROL ROOM UNINHABITABILITY DUE TO ACCIDENTS ON TE LEASED LAND (10 x h x 10-5) i 1
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Revi st oa 5 i l
,' EXHIBIT 12 i CONTROL ROOM RISK ANALYSIS FOR POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS INVQ.VING STATIONART SOURCE 5 Kaiser Agricultural Seneca Port Source _
Chemical Authority Quanti ty 1 - 20,000 ton tank 30,000 tons 1 - 25,000 ton tank Distance from LaSalle Station 5 mil es 5.75 miles NE Wind Sector N Probability of wind blowing from sector (all stability 0.0334 0.0487 classes & wind speeds)
Estimated accident f requency 10-5 10-5 per year (Ref erence 32) l PROB ABILITY OF CONTROL ROOM 6.60 x 10'7 / year 4.87 x 10-7/ year BECOMING UNINHABITABLE 1
1 a
n
.g ,
Revision 5 EXHIBli 13 CONSERVATIVE '.GGREGATE PROBABILITP OF UNINHABITABLE C')NDITIONS IN LASALLE COUNTY STAT 10N CONTROL ROOM Event Probabil i ty/ Year Barge Traffic 3.15 x 10-7 (exhibit 9)
Kai ser Agricul tural Chemical Tanks 6.68 x 10-7 ( Exhibi t 12)
Seneca Port Authority Tanks I. 37 x 10 ' (Exhioit 12)
Tank Trucks on County Road 6 8.44 x 10-7 ( Exhi bi t 10)
Fertilizer Tanks on Station Service Road 2.70 x 10-7 (Exhibit 11)
Fertilizer Tanks on Leased Land 2.74 x 10-7 ( Exhibi t 11)
AGGREGATE PROBABILITY
= 2.85 x 10-6/ year k
k
r . .
_' - Revi sion 5 EXH! BIT 14 RE ALISTIC PROBABILITY OF UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN LASALLE COUNTY STATION CONTROL ROOM DUE TO OFF5ITE STORAGE TANK 5 Source Kaiser Agricultural Seneca Port Chemical Authori ty Quanti ty 1 - 20,000 ton tank 30,000 tons 1 - 25,000 ton tank Distance from LaSalle Station 5 mil es 5.75 miles Wind Sector N NE Probacility of wind blowing 0.01 0. 01 62 fran sector (all stability classes & wind speeds)
Estimated accident f requency 10-5 10-5 per year (Reference 33)
PROS ABILITY OF CONTROL ROOM 2.0 X 10-5/ year 1.62 x 10-7 / year BECOMING UNINHABITABLE I
( .
Revision 5 EXHIBIT 15 REALISTIC AGGREGATE PROBABILITY OF UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN LA5ALLE COUNTY 5TATION CONTROL ROOM l
l Event Probabil i ty/ Year Barge Traffic 3.15 x 10-7 Kai ser Agricul tural Chemical Tanks 2.0 x 10-7 Seneca Port Authority Tanks 1.62 x 10-7 Tank Trucks on County Road 6 2.81 x 10-7 Fertilizer Tanks on Station Service Road 2.70 x 10-7 f 2.74 x 10-7 I Fertilizer Tanks on Leased Land l 1.5 x 10-6fy,37 l l
A factor of 10 (operator incapacitation 1 events leading to exposures in excess of 10CFR100 guidelines) can be applied to l obtain the realistic aggregate probability (Reference 29)
= 1.5 x 10-7/ year l
1 l
1
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