ML20206S857
| ML20206S857 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 06/26/1986 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206S831 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 NUDOCS 8607070439 | |
| Download: ML20206S857 (49) | |
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1 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY FINAL
SUMMARY
REPORT OF THE HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW FOR THE LASALLE STATION SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM i
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June 2 6,1986 l
4767c/91-612-03 B607070439 860630 i :-
PDR ADOCK 05000373
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PREFACE This document was prepared jointly by the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) and the Advanced Resource Development (ARD)
Corporation.
The ARD Corporation -assisted CECO throughout all phases of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)
Human Factors Review.
i This report contains CECO's Final Summary Report for the human I
factors review of the LaSalle SPDS as per CECO's April 14, 1983 response (Reference 1) to NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 (Reference 2).
-ii-
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1-1 2.0 OVERVIEW 2-1 2.1 Data Collection Phase 2-4 2.2 Findings Assessment Phase 2-5
}
2.3 Reporting Phase 2-5 3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING 3-1 4.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL 4-1 4.1 Input Documentation 4-1 4.2 Output Documentation 4-2 J
5.0 INTEGRATION WITH OTHER SUPPLEMENT 1, l
NUREG-0737 INITIATIVES 5-1 6.0 REVIEW PROCESSES 6-1 6.1 Checklist Survey 6-1 6.2 Personnel Survey 6-2 6.3 Evaluation of Parameters Displayed on the SPDS with Respect to the DCRDR Task Analysis /
Validation Data 6-3 7.0 FINDINGS ASSESSMENT 7-1 8.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 8-1
9.0 REFERENCES
9-1 APPENDICES A
SPDS QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL SURVEY A-1 B
FINDINGS PERTAINING TO THE LASALLE SPDS B-1 1
-iii-
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Among the directives issued to the nuclear power industry by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the aftermath of the j
accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, was the need to develop a Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) for each generating station.
The purpose of the SPDS is to display in a single location the value/ status of primary variables which directly indicate the status of the safety parameters indicating the accomplishment or maintenance of plant safety functions.
The display should function to aid the. control room personnel during abnormal and emergency conditions in determining the safety status of the plant and in assessing whether abnormal conditions warrant corrective actions by the operators to avoid j
a degraded core.
Following the issuance of NUREGs 0696 (Reference 3) and 0737 (Reference 4) in 1980, Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) began the design of the SPDS for its operating stations and stations under construction.
Although human factors were taken into account during the initial design of the
- systems, CECO committed, as part of its April 14, 1983 response (Reference 1) to NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, to a human factors review of the SPDS at each of its nuclear stations.
The purpose of this review was to ensure that the design of the installed SPDS complies with sound human factors engineering principles and to integrate the SPDS Work with the human factors efforts associated with the other Supplement 1 initiatives.
1-1
The present human factors review is also seen by CECO as an integral part of the SPDS Verification and Validation process.
An important aspect of the review was an evaluation of whether or not the plant variables displayed on the SPDS are sufficient for the operators to assess the safety status of the plant.
This evaluation was conducted with reference to the task analysis data collected during the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) at LaSalle Station.
These data, in conjuntion with the data collected during the administration of those sections of the SPDS Checklist Survey and the SPDS Personnel Survey (see Section 2.1) that address parameter selection, verified the need for those parameters that are currently
)
presented by the SPDS as well as identified the need for any j
additional parameters.
)l The LaSalle Station SPDS review was conducted less than one year after the performance of similar reviews for both Dresden and the Quad Cities stations.
Because the SPDSs for these three stations are very
- similar, the information collected during the two previous reviews served as a check against, and supplement to, the information collected at LaSalle Station.
1-2
2.0 OVERVIEW The LaSalle SPDS has been operational since 31 December 1982.
The LaSalle Operating
- License, Attachment 2
has defined
" operational" to mean that the design is complete, hardware is purchased and installed, the software is developed, the functional testing is complete, and initial operations training on the use of the system is complete.
The approach taken in the design of the LaSalle SPDS was to display relevant plant information, from which the operators could determine plant safety
- status, on one CRT screen.
Computer graphics present this overview of plant safety status in a
readily interpretable
- manner, and this display is available continuously in the control room.
Figure
'l illustrates the format of the LaSalle SPDS.
There is no provision for the operators to modify or select the type of information displayed on the SPDS, or its format.
However, the operators do have interactive access to _ other more detailed j
displays of information related to the variables displayed on the SPDS, including trend information and point histories, by querying the Process computer and Prime computer network.
The human factors review of the SPDS evaluated the extent to which the display provides the necessary information for the control room operator to determine the safety status of the plant.
The SPDS was evaluated in terms _of the following:
o Appropriateness and completeness of. the information available through the system (i.e.,
does it provide 2-1
igure 1-Illustration of the SPDS display 2-2
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the parameters and variables necessary to determine the status of the critical safety - functions of the plant?)
o Effectiveness of the display format and coding techniques that are u' sed to draw the operators' attention'to important information i
o Location and positioning of the SPDS CRTs in the l
control room o
Readability of the information given the display hardware and environmental factors such as lighting i
and glare o
Adequacy.
of procedures and documentation for interpreting the display 1
The SPDS review was conducted as a ' three-phase process.
The first phase consisted of 'several data collection activities 1
that provided the basic data from which human factors problems were documented.
The second phase consisted of an assessment 1
of the findings identified in the data collection phase.
The i
third phase consisted of reporting the results of the review.
The present report is the product of this third phase.
2.1 Data Collection Phase There were several activities involved
.in-the review that provided data for consideration:
1 1'
)
o A human factors checklist Survey of-the SPDS and its implementation in-the LaSalle control room o
A Personnel Survey consisting:of structured interviews of operations personnel at various levels o
An evaluation of the variables and-parameters selected for inclusion in' the SPDS _ display with. reference to the. Task Analysis data collected during 'the LaSalle DCRDR.
.2-4
A more detailed description of the methods employed in each activity and the findings that resulted are presented in Section 6, 2.2 Findings Assessment Phase An assessment team was formed to evaluate the human factors problems identified during the Data Collection Phase.
This assessment team included representatives from both the plant and General Office.
The team recommended a resolution for each finding, either a corrective action to be taken or a justifica-tion describing why no modification is necessary.
2.3 Reporting Phase The present report represents the methodology, findings and conclusions from the LaSalle Station SPDS review.
The LaSalle SPDS findings are presented in Appendix 2.
This report was prepared to show compliance with CECO's April 14, 1983 commitments to the NRC (Reference 1).
i 1
2-5
3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING The human factors review of the LaSalle SPDS was conducted through the cooperative ef forts of CECO and ARD personnel.
The review team met or exceeded the CECO commitments in Reference 1 and included well qualified and experienced personnel in the areas of nuclear operations, engineering, human factors, and computer systems.
Both generating station and General Office personnel participated.
R.
L.
Kershner was the lead human factors engineer.
He was supported by senior and staff-level human factors engineers with appropriate experience in nuclear industry human factors.
In order to promote the integration of the SPDS review with other 0737 initiatives, a number of the human factors personnel who supported the LaSalle SPDS review were selected from those who had previously supported the DCRDR at LaSalle Station and
- who, during the same time frame as the SPDS
- review, were i
involved in the human factors review of the LaSalle Emergency
)
Response Facilities (ERFs).
The CECO effort was headed by the DCRDR Coordinator and Alternate DCRDR Coordinator (R.
E.
Howard and K.
A.
Hesse) in the Technical Services Nuclear Department.
They have partici-pated in human factors activities at each-of CECO's nuclear power stations and had coordinated the DCRDR and ERF projects at LaSalle Station.
They were assisted by upper-level plant and General Office personnel with direct responsibilities for emergency planning and plant operations.
Personnel from 3-1
1 i
)
l LaSalle Station supported the human factors team, as needed, as subject matter experts (SMEs).
These SMEs included personnel familiar with the computer systems and with operating procedures and instrumentation in the control room.
The LaSal3a assessment team consisted of senior staff and plant management personnel whose backgrounds and experience included directly relevant aspects of:
1.
Plant Operations 2.
I & C Engineering 3.
Human Factors Engineering 4.
Computer Systems 1
l 3-2 2
4.O DOCUMENTATION AND-DOCUMENT CONTROL 4.1 Input Documentation The review team used the following documents to support the review process:
Drawings of the physical layout of the LaSalle control Room Human Factors Checklist developed by CECO for use in the DCRDRs Design specifications for the SPDS and Prime computer displays DCRDR task analysis data and instrumentation i
requirements list The CECO Supplement 1 submittal letter to the NRC (Reference 1)
NUREGs 0696 (Reference 3),
0737 (Reference 4),
0835 (Reference 5), 0800 (Reference 6) and 0700 (Reference 7)
" Preliminary Human Factors Review of Commonwealth Edison's BWR Safety Parameter Display System,"
(Reference 8).
Sol Levy document (Reference 9)
CECO SPDS Requirements Document (Reference 10).
4-1
4.2 Output Documentation In addition to the present report, the following documents were generated during the review process:
SPDS Checklist derived from Input document
- 2; specific for CECO BWR SPDSs SPDS Checklist cross-referenced to CECO SPDS Requirements Document (Reference 10)
Completed SPDS checklist for the LaSalle SPDS Transcription of responses to the SPDS Personnel Survey Summary of content analysis of responses to the SPDS Personnel Survey Copy of findings as initially presented to CECO by ARD.
4-2
i 5.0 INTEGRATION WITH OTHER SUPPLEMENT 1, i
NUREG-0737 INITIATIVES l
i l
Commonwealth Edison Company has an integrated program to address each of the Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 initiatives, i
This program extends throughout its system of nuclear generating stations and has specific provisions for each station.
This program is headed by the CECO Station Nuclear Engineering Department which provides the necessary -integration f
and support to ensure that a systematic approach is adopted for J-the inclusion of each of the recommended design changes resulting from these initiatives.
Details of 'this process, j
including schedules were provided in Commonwealth Edison's-(
April 14, 1983 submittal to the NRC (Reference _l).
At each station, the design of.the Safety Parameter Display i
system (SPDS),
the Regulatory Guide 1.97-based instrument 4
- displays, the development of function-oriented emergency operating procedures, the training of the operating staff, the DCRDR, and the ERF reviews are being integrated ' in a manner-which takes' full advantage of the scheduling of each of these initiatives.
The-human factors - review of the SPDSs is being conducted after the DCRDR at each' station and after 'the operational date for the SPDS.
By performing the SPDS review after the DCRDR, it is possible to ' better, integrate the data collected and the findings derived from these two activities.
By performing the review after the ' operational date of the 1
- SPDS, it-is possible to obtain more meaningful input from -
1 5-1
operations, because by this time, they have had experience with the system.
The SPDS review for LaSalle Station was also integrated with the human factors review of the LaSalle
- ERFs, i.e.,
the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations i
Facility (EOF), which overlapped in time with the SPDS review.
The SPDS is available in the CECO ERFs, as well as in the control room at each
- station, and as
- such, it provides information to TSC/ EOF personnel.
Findings related specifically to the use of the SPDS displays in the ERFs will be documented in the report on the ERF reviews.
Findings related to the use of the SPDS in the control room, or more generally to the use of the SPDS at all sites where it is available, will be documented in the present report.
5-2
z--:-
6.0 REVIEW PROCESSES 6.1 Checklist Survey A checklist survey was conducted to determine whether the information displayed by the
- SPDS, and the equipment and procedures used to access the system, conform to sound human factors design guidance.
Features under investigation included o....
the display of critical plant va'rl'sbles, the use of color as an indicator of safety status, CRT specifications, and equipment placement and accessibility.
The checklist was applied across all modes of plant operation.
The checklist was developed in the following manner.
In 1982, CECO developed a preliminary human factors checklist (Reference
- 8) for their BWR SPDSs based on NUREG-0700 (Reference 7) and NUREG-0835 (Reference 5).
This checklist was used to review the SPDS prior to its implementation at the stations.
For the present
- review, this 1982 checklist was updated based on relevent sections from the recently issued appendix to NUREG-0800 (which constitutes the final version of NUREG-0835) and the checkJist derived from NUREG-0700 that CECO developed to support the DCRDRs.
The updated checklist encompassed all issues that had been addressed by the 1982 checklist.
The current checklist was cross-referenced with the list of Human Factors Design Requirements for the SPDS that was developed as part of. CECO's SPDS Verification and Validation Program.
6-1
A copy or the resulting SPDS checklist was completed by human factors engineers with assistance, as needed, by CECO subject matter experts.
Reference was made to the completed 1982 checklist, issues that had been deferred then because of the preliminary nature of the design were now addressed, and deficiencies that had been noted then were again checked to see if they had been corrected.
Remaining deficiencies were written as findings.
6.2 Personnel Survey Structured interviews were conducted by human factors engineers on a one-to-one basis with licensed operating personnel for the LaSalle control room.
The questionnaire presented in Appendix A was used as a basis for the interviews.
The interview, which lasted approximately one and one-half hours with each of ten individuals, was structured to provioe information regarding the following areas:
o Perceived usefulness of the SPDS 2
o Location of SPDS CRTs in the Control Room o
Display characteristics o
Use of coding techniques, labels, color 4
o Integration with annunciator alarm system o
Procedures and training for use of SPDS o
Availability of documentation Interviews were conducted with a
representative sample of Nuclear Station Operators (NSOs), Shift Control Room Engineers (SCREs) and Shift Engineers (SEs) from each station.
The interviewer verbally posed the questions to each participant and noted his response.
Care was taken at all stages to protect the confidentiality of the participants' responses.
Notes on the interview responses were transcribed and responses from all participants were compiled question by question.
A 6-2
content analysis was performed and a listing of issues was compiled.
Frequency counts as to the number of participants from a given position (NSO, SCRE, SE) who had mentioned each issue were derived.
Each issue was then categorized 'by human factors personnel as:
o A human factors problem o
A correct comment not considered a
human factors problem o
An incorrect comment; this was based on inconsisten-cies with other comments and with additional informa-tion available to the review team from various sources o
A general comment or opinion 6.3 Evaluation of Parameters Displayed on the SPDS with i
Respect to the DCRDR Task Analysis / Validation Data During the conduct of the LaSalle DCRDR a' _ comprehensive task analysis was performed.
The purpose of -the task analysis was to identify the controls and displays necessary in the' control room to permit operators to effectively mitigate ' emergency symptoms as delineated in the GE BWROG EPGs.
The review. was conducted to partially fullfill regulatory requirements as set forth in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
Because the DCRDR -task analysis was designed to be comprehensive and to. identify the displays used to mitigate critical emergency conditions,- the j
results provide a medium for verification of'the SPDS. parameter selection, as well as a vehicle to integrate the'SPDS with the other Supplement 1 initiatives.
To assure that the SPDS adequately reflects the parameters that are critical for monitoring plant safety status during emergency conditions, as well as in pre- _ and post-accident conditions, a comparison and evaluation was conducted between the -displays. and _ indicators determined to be relevant to 6-3
mitigating emergency conditions during the station's DCRDR and the variables displayed on the SPDS.
The approach described below was used to implement the comparison and evaluation.
The data collected in the DCRDR task analysis were entered into a computerized database management system.
This database was manipulated to produce a
listing that contained all the displays, including indicator lights, identified in the task analysis.
Specifically, the listing contained the following information for each display:
o Equipment identification number o
Parameter measured o
Units of measurement o
Task number (cross-indexed back to the BWROG EPGs) in which the display was identifed.
In
- addition, for each task number presented, the listing contained the required range for th[e parameter being displayed as well as the divisional increments in which that range should appear.
This list was compared to the SPDS parameters and input (from Reference 9) by a Human Factors Specialist (HFS) who was familiar with the station's task analysis data, working with a station Subject Matter Expert (SME).
The comparison and evaluation proceeded in the following steps:
1.
Determine which task analysis displays and indicators are currently being displayed on the SPDS or serve as input to the calculations chat produce the variables that are displayed.
Confirm that each of these displays and indicators reflects the status of a
safety parameter which indicates the accomplishment or maintenance of a plant safety function.
2.
Determine those task analysis displays and indicators that do not fall within the scope of the SPDS in that 6-4
they do not indicate the status of safety parameters which indicate the accomplishment or maintenance of plant safety functions.
3.
Determine those task analysis displays and indicators that may fall within the intended scope of the SPDS but which are not currently reflected in any SPDS input or variables.
4.
Determine whether the SPDS contains-variables or input that are not substantiated by displays or indicators identified in the task analysis.
5.
Determine whether or not the variables represented in the SPDS reflect the required range as identified in the task analysis.
The comparison and evaluation was conducted from the perspective of operating requirements, that is, what should be as opposed to what currently exists.
Limitations of the present hardware, computer software and/or display formats were not considered during the evaluations.
In general, the findings of this evaluation confirmed that the variables currently displayed on the SPDS reflect the status of parameters which indicate the accomplishment or maintenance of plant safety functions.
Some additional variables-were identified for consideration.
To attempt to configure a
display that would incorporate all of the candidate variables would not be advisable, because the screen would be cluttered and readability would be impaired.
However, variables that the SME judged to be worthy of consideration as alternatives to those presently displayed were documented in the form of HEDs.
6-5
7.0 FINDINGS ASSESSMENT The findings compiled from the data collection activities included the following information:
1.
Finding number 2.
Checklist guideline number that the finding violated 3.
Data collection activity from which the finding resulted 4.
Description of the problem 5.
Human factors comments and recommendations if any 6.
Resolution of the finding The LaSalle assessment team collectively arrived at a
resolution for each finding.
As the result of clarifications or additional information that arose in the course of the assessment process, it became apparent that some findings were not valid, either because of a misinterpretation of the data.
from which the finding had been written or because the problem specified in the finding had already been corrected.
These findings were cancelled and are rated as such in Appendix B.
\\
7-1
4 8.0 IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The ultimate responsibility for addressing the HEDs discovered r
in the SPDS review process rests with the Station Operations and Station Nuclear Engineering Departments.
The assessment team's recommendations with regard to the resolution of the findings were reviewed by appropriate representatives of these departments, in conjunction with human factors personnel, and final decisions were made as to which findings warranted l
correction.
Justifications were written for those findings that warranted no.further action.
These justifications are presented in Appendix B.
For each finding
'for-which a
corrective action was agreed upon, a CECO staff member with appropriate responsibility was identified.
This staff member.
I then determined a time frame for the implementation of the corrective action.
i j
8-1
9.0 REFERENCES
1.
April 14, 1983 letter from Cordell
- Reed, Commonwealth Edison,.
to Harold
- Denton, U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory commission, regarding CECO's response to NUREG-0737, Supplement 1.
2.
U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"
USNRC Report NUREG-0737, supplement 1 (Generic Letter 82-33)', 1982.
3.
U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
" Functional Criteria for Emergency
Response
Facilities,"
USNRC Report NUREG-0696, February, 1981.
4.
U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"
USNRC Report NUREG-0737, November, 1980.
5.
U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
" Human Factors Acceptance Criteria for the Safety Parameter Display System," USNRC Report NUREG-0835, October, 1981.
6.
U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition,"
USNRC Report NUREG-0800, Revision 0 of Appendix A to SRP Section 18.2,
" Human Factors Review Guidelines for the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS),"
January, 1985.
7.
U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
" Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews,"
USNRC Report NUREG-0700,
' September, 1981.
8.
- Conner, S.
A.
- Lau, P.
A.
" Preliminary Human Factors Review of Commonwealth Edison's BWR Safety Parameter Display System,", June, 1982.
9.
Lightfoot, L.,
- Beckett, M.
A.,
Fukushima, T.
Y.,
- Hashemi, H.,
- Hench, J.
E.,
Gillcrest, J.
D.,
- Golriz, K.,
- Johnson, C.
B.
"Dresden Unit 2 and 3 Safety Parameter Display System Signal Processing and Logic." Document #SLI-8307, Revision 1, September, 1983.
- 10. Marianyi, J.
J.,
- Wong, B.
M.
K.,
- Tate, L.,
& Dages, K.
M.
" Commonwealth Edison Company Safety Parameter Display System Requirements Document -- Revision 2,"
January, 1985.
9-1
APPENDIX A SPDS QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL SURVEY A-1
SPDS INTERVIEWS -- COVER LETTER ARD Corporation is supporting Commonwealth Edison Company in a human factors review of the CECO Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and other CRT displays that are available in the Control Rooms at each station.
The SPDS review will support the SPDS Verification and Validation Program from a human factors perspective.
As part of this effort, we are interviewing control room personnel who have had working experience with the SPDS and other displays.
Our goal is to determine:
(1) what information should be available on the SPDS and other displays and (2) how this information should be displayed (i.e.
what grouping, format, user-system interface)
The interviews will address the issues lisced in the attached questionnaire.
THERE IS NO NEED FOR YOU TO WRITE RESPONSES TO THESE QUESTIONS.
We are distributing the questionnaire now so that, if your schedule permits, you can familiarize yourself with the issues that will be raised during the interviews.
You will notice that similar questions are posed for the SPDS and for other displays to which the control room staff has access.
Your input will be valuable to us in documenting what the Operations staff views to be the strong points of the present SPDS, in identifying potential human factors problems, and in formulating recommendations that will bcth correct any problems and respond to recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements.
We anticipate that each interview will last about I hour.
The interviewer will be making notes on your verbal replies to the items on the questionnaire.
These notes will be transcribed and then combined and summarized, along with those of your colleagues, on a question by question
- basis, i
Your responses will be strictly confidential.
Only ARD personnel will have access to the transcribed notes, and the findings presented to CECO management will be based on the summaries.
The demographic information that we request-from you will be dissociated from your responses to the questionnaire.
Any potential human factors problems will be documented in the form of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs).
These HEDs will then be assessed and i
resolved by an HED Assessment Team consisting of CECO managers and a l
representative f rom ARD.
ARD will also support CECO in preparing a final l
report to the NRC.
l l
}
A-2 l
SPDS INTERVIEWS -- DEMOGRAPHICS 1.
Present position:
How long?
2.
How long with Commonwealth Edison?
3.
How long in nuclear industry?
4.
Previous industry positions:
5.
Do you hold a Reactor Operator (RO) license?
How long?
Which station (s)?
6.
Do you hold a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license?
How long?
Which station (s)?
A-3 m
i i
Date Interviewer Station Interviewee i SPDS (TOP LEVEL OVERVIEW OF PLANT STATUS)
General Information
- 1) How long have you used the SPDS?
- 2) Have there been any transients or abnormal events since you have been using the SPDS?
If so, did the display prove to be effective in monitoring plant status during these events? If not, why?
i
- 3) Has the SPDS been a useful tool in monitcring plant safety status under normal operating conditions? If not, why?
t t
4)
Is there adequate documentation for interpreting the SPDS displays?
Is the documentation readily available in the control room?
- 5) Have you been adequately trained in the use and interpretation of the SPDS?. If not, what improvements in training should be implemented?
i I
i A-4
Interviewee i
- 6) Which control room staff members use the SPDS during your shift and during an emergency?
DURING SHIFT DURING EMERGENCY Shift Engineer Shift Foreman Reactor Operator Shift Control Room Engineer i
Location i
- 7) Is the SPDS visible from the areas of the control room where you need to have the information displayed? If not, where should the SPDS be located?
?
J
- 8) Does the screen (s) block or distract from the view of other controls or displays? If so, which ones?
4 i
1 1
- 10) Are there any lighting problems (i.e., glare, reflections) that impair.use of the SPDS? Can the SPDS be used effectively with emergency lighting?
i l
i A-5
(
Interviewee i Parameter selection
- 11) Does the SPDS supply the appropriate information necessary to detect and monitor abnormal plant conditions? If not, why?
- 12) Please identify any presently displayed parameters that you do not think are useful.
Also identify any parameters that you think should be added to the display (Consider the requirements of Reg. Guide.1. 97 ).
In what format should these proposed parameters be displayed?
NOT USEFUL SHOULD BE ADDED Display characteristics
- 13) Is the format used to display the plant parameters easy to interpret? Can you visually detect changes in safety status quickly and accurately?
Please list any features that are currently well-designed as well as any suggestions for improvement.
I A-6
Interviewee i
- 14) Is color used effectively on the SPDS?
Is the use of color on the SPDS consistent with the use of color elsewhere in the control room?
- 15) Are validated and unvalidated data easily distinguishable from one another on the display?
Is there any on-screen indication that the system has failed or is inoperable?
- 16) Are the scales and alarm limits shown on the bar graphs at appropriate levels?
Does the display alert the operator to parameters that may be trending towards an alarm condition before the alarm set point is reached?
- 17) Are the alarm set points the same as those for corresponding annunciator system alarms?
Does the SPDS effectively supplement the annunciator system?
- 18) Is the SPDS labeled appropriately?
Are abbreviations and terms used by the SPDS consistent with those used elsewhere in the control room?
I
- 19) Do you have any additional comments or suggestions regarding the SPDS?
i A-7
Interviewee i OTHER CRT DISPLAYS AVAILABLE IN THE CONTROL ROOM General Information
+
- 20) Excluding the SPDS overview of plant status, what other information do you often get from CRT displays?
- 21) Do you find the trend data available on the Process computer and Prime computer to be useful?
Are these trend data displayed in a usable format? If not, why?
- 22) Is there adequate documentation for interpreting the Process computer and Prime computer displays and for determining how to interact with these systems? Is this documentation readily available in the control room?
- 23) Have you been adequately trained in the use and interpretation of Process i
computer displays and programs?
In the use and interpretation of Prime computer displays and programs?
A-8
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t Interviewee #
- 24) Which control room staff members use the Process computer and Prime computer during your shift and during an emergency?
DURING SHIFT DURING EMERGENCY Prime Process Prime Process l
Shift Engineer Shift Foreman Reactor Operator Shift Control Room Engineer Location
- 25) Are the Procesa and Prime computer displays and terminals located in-the areas of the control room where you need to have the information displayed?
If not, where should the terminals be located?
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- 26) Does the screen (s) block or distract from the view of other controls or i
displays? If so, which ones?
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- 27) Are there enough CRT displays in the control room?
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- 28) Are there any lighting problems (i.e., glare, reflections) that impair use-j of the Process or Prime computer displays?
Can - these displays be _used l
effectively with emergency lighting?
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Interviewee #
Parameter selection i
- 29) Please identify any information presently available on the Process ' or Prime computer that you think should be displayed in some other manner?
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- 30) Also identify any parameters or programs that you think should be added to the Process or Prime computers.
In what format should these proposed parameters be displayed?
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- 31) Are there any~ calculations presently performed by hand that should be implemented on the computers?
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A-10
Interviewee i Display characteristics
- 32) Is the format used to display the following types of information_ easy to interpret?
Please list any features that are currently well-designed as well as any suggestions _for improvement.
Alarm lists Trend displays ODCS Point status
- 33) Is color used effectively on the Process computer and Prime computer displays?. Is the use of color here consistent with the use of - color elsewhere in the control room?
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- 34) Are validated and unvalidated data easily distinguishable from one another on the Process and Prime computer displays?
- 35) Are the displays labeled appropriately?
Are abbreviations and terms consistent with those used elsewhere in the control room?
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Interviewee i User-system Interface
- 36) Please evaluate the keyboards for the Process and Prime computers.
Are the keys labeled with meaningful symbols or acronyms?
Are any labels ambiguous or misleading?
- 37) Are menus and prompts used effectively on the Process and Prime computers?
- 38) In requesting additional information from the system, has a delay in response time detracted from or interfered with the use of the Prime and Process computers? If yes, please explain.
- 39) Do you have any additional comments or suggestions regarding the Prime and Process computers?
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APPENDIX B FINDINGS PERTAINING TO THE LASALLE SPDS 1
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B-1
M Areas of Concern Identified by the SPDS Checklist Review Area 1.
GUIDELINE NO.:
5.1.3.1.C/NUREG-0800 6.1.2.A/NUREG-0800 6.2.1.B/NUREG-0800 FINDING:
Suppression level, RX pressure and dry well pressure are not displayed with an accuracy sufficient for the control room operator to discriminate between conditions that affect the plant's safety status and normal operating conditions.
The display ranges of these parameters are too narrow to allow determination of an off-normal condition prior to reaching the alarm point.
DISPOSITION:
There is a digital display of the actual value aoove the bargraph.
The operator has other instrumentation in the control room to refer to if either a wider or narrower scale is necessary.
The SPDS should not be used in place of control room safety-related instrumentation to monitor off-normal conditions prior to alarming Area 2.
GUIDELINE NO.:
5.1.3.3.1/NUREG-0800 FINDING:
C olor coding is used to distinguish vali-dated data from invalid and unvalidated data (i.e.,
values displayed in red or green have been validated, those in cyan have not).
However, coding is not used to differentiate invalid data from unvalidated data (i.e., both are shown in cyan).
DISPOSITION:
This is not critical to the response of an operator; all he needs to know is that a red or green value is valid.
Area 3.
GUIDELINE NO.:
5.1.3.4.B/NUREG-0800 FINDING:
The guideline states that both the calendar date and the time of day should be displayed so that a failed SPDS may be identified by these values being inaccurate (date) or static (time).
Only time of day is displayed by the LaSalle SPDS.
DISPOSITION:
Time of day is a sufficient indication of a failed SPDS because it is demonstrated immedi-ately by a discontinuation of the 5-second update.
The failure should be evident before a change in date i
occurs.
i Area 4.
GUIDELINE NO.:
5.1.4.1.A(1)/NUREG-0800 6.1.4.E.1/NUREG-0800 7.2.4.a/ Ceco-0700 FINDING:
The trend rate of change information presented on the display may be inaccurate for the parameters of RX water level and RX power level i
l B-2
because of fluctuations and os cilla ti ons.
Rate of change data are computed by taking the difference between the previous value and the current value (sampled every 5
seconds) and multiplying that difference by 12 to yield rate of change value as a function of minutes.
This procedure exaggerates fluctuations in the rate of change and does not truly i
reflect the average rate of change over one minute, as the display suggests.
DISPOSITION:
Longer duration trend capability is available on the process computer.
Area 5.
GUIDELINE NO.:
5.5.1.1.C.1/NUREG-0800 5.5.1.2.B/NUREG-0800 5.5.1.2.B.3/NUREG-0800 FINDING:
The SPDS does not have a display format for each mode of plant operation.
The SPDS consists of only one display format; setpoints, ranges and limit marks which vary according to a change in the mode of plant operation are not modified accordingly in the display format.
DISPOSITION:
The operator will be immediately aware of a change in mode of plant operation by referring to the contr ol room instrumentation, which displays parameters in ranges and with setpoints and limit marks appropriate to all modes.
The Verification and Validation (V and V)
Team will further investigate this finding during the review process.
Area 6.
GUIDELINE hO.:
5.7.1.A/NUREG-0800 FINDING:
The SPDS does not emit a distinct audible sound upon detecting an abnormal operating condition.
Upon a parameter reaching alarm, the SPDS bar graph associated with the parameter will turn red and blink until acknowledged by the operator.
The bar will turn green when the parameter falls below the alarm limit.
DISPOSITION:
Because the control room annunciator system is calibrated to sound at levels below or equal to the SPDS alarm points, annunciators for important parameters will alarm.
Therefore, it is believed that SPDS audible alarms will provide no added benefit.
In addition, alarm conditions are clearly shown on the screen using the color change and blinking mechanisms.
i Area 7.
_ GUIDELINE NO.:
6.1.4.F/NUREG-0800' FINDING:
Time history data are not available on the SPDS.
Such information is useful in analyzing the onset and development of abnormal operating conditions.
DISPOSITION:
Time history data are available on the g
process computer.
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Area 8.
GUIDELINE NO.:
6.2.3.1.B/NUREG-0800 7.2.7.D.3/ CECO-0700 7.2.7.K.1/ CECO-0700 7.2.7.L.3/ CECO-0700 FINDING:
The color yellow is used inappropriately to display scale values and labels on the SPDS display.
Yellow should be used only as an indication that potentially unsafe conditions exist.
The colors of the scale values and labels should be changed to a more neutral color, e.g., white.
DISPOSITION:
Change yellow markings' and labels to white.
Area 9.
GUIDELINE NO.:
6.2.3.1.C/NUREG-0800 FINDING:
Color coding is not used to alert the operator that a parameter is outside its normal range but not within a range that would represent a serious pr oblem.
Only two levels of color coding (i.e., green for normal state and red for alarm state) are used.
The use of yellow at the intermediate level would serve as a pre-alarm state warning.
DISPOSITION:
Because the intended function of the SPDS is to provide a global overview of plant status, the two-level color coding system serves as an ade-quate indication of a change to an abnormal status.
The system is to supplement, not replace, the existing control room instrumentation and annunciator system, which provide the necessary information to aid the operator's performance.
Area 10. GUIDELINE NO.:
7.2.1.h(1)/NUREG-0700 FINDING:
CRT parameters of brightness, contrast and color are not fully and independently controllable.
The brightness adjustment affects contrast; color may be turned on or off.
DISPOSITION:
These features are sufficiently adjustable.
Area 11. GUIDELINE NO.:
7.2.2.b(1)/ Ceco-0700 FINDING:
At the most reasonable viewing distances, the most prevalent characters have a visual angle of less than 12 minutes of arc, which is the recommended minimum level.
DISPOSITION:
The characters are readable.
Area 12. GUIDELINE NO.:
7.2.2.c/ CECO-0700 FINDING:
The title and warning box lettering for the Unit 2
SPDS screen have width-to-height ratios of 1.6:1 and 1.5:1, respectively.
The recommended range is 3 :5 to 1:1.
DISPOSITION:
These characters are readable.
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Area 13. GUIDELINE NO.:
7.2.2.d/ CECO-0700 FINDING:
The Unit 1
title has a
stroke-width-to-character-height ratio of 1:4.7; the Unit 2 title has a ratio of 1:3.3; the Unit 2 warning box lettering has a ratio of 1:4.
The recommended range is 1:5 to 1:10.
DISPOSITION:
These characters are readable.
Area 14. GUIDELINE NO.:
7.2.2.f(2)(f)/ Ceco-0700 FINDING:
The Unit 1
warning box lettering has a
horizontal character separation of 67% of character height; the Unit 2
war ning box lettering has a
separation of 100%. The recommended range is 10% to 65%.
DISPOSITION:
These characters are readable.
4 Area 15. GUIDELINE NO.:
7.2.2.g(l)/ CECO-0700 FINDING:
The Unit 2 SPDS display uses some slanted characters; the guideline states that only simple character fonts should be used.
DISPOSITION:
These characters are readable.
Area 16. GUIDELINE NO.:
7.2.2.g(2)/ Ceco-0700 FINDING:
A 5x7 dot matrix is used to form characters.
A 7x9 matrix is preferred.
DISPOSITION:
A 5x7 dot matrix is acceptable.
Area 17. GUIDELINE NO.:
7.2.3.c(1)(b)/ Ceco-0700 FINDING: The SPDS display is more than 200 above the horizontal line of sight of a seated operator viewing a frequently monitored display.
If SPDS is
" frequently monitored", this exceeds the limit.
DISPOSITION:
A general overview of plant conditions is visible from a
distance via the bar
- graphs, although digital values may not be visib13.
Also, the SPDS display may be accessed from any CRT in the control room.
The operator has sufficient freedom of movement in the control room to move to a better viewing position.
Area 18. GUIDELINE NO.:
7.2.3.d(l)(b)/ CECO-0700 FINDING:
SPDS display is more than 350 above horizontal LOS of an operator standing in the vicinity of the desks located near the display in the control room.
DISPOSITION:
A general overview of plant conditions is visible from a
distance via the bar
- graphs, although digital values may not be visible.
Also, the SPDS display may be accessed from any CRT in the control room.
The operator has sufficient f reedom of movement in the control room to move to a better viewing position.
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Areas of Concern Identified by the SPDS Personnel Survey Area 19. FINDING:
The SPDS was perceived to be ineffective in monitoring plant status during transient or abnormal events by all of the respondents (9 of 10) who were inv olved with such events since the SPDS has been in operation.
They questioned the reliability of the information presented.
DISPOSITION:
The V and V Team is addressing the assurance of reliablity.
Area 20. FINDING:
The SPDS was not perceived to be useful in monitoring plant status during normal operations by all of the respondents.
They questioned the reliability of the information presented.
DISPOSITION:
Additional training regarding the use of SPDS and its internal operations will be given.
The use of SPDS on the simulator should b oost operator confidence.
Area 21. FINDING:
Two of the respondents questioned the accuracy of the radiological inf ormation presented on the SPDS.
Alarm points were reached so frequently that such inf ormation soon became unnoticed.
DISPOSITION:
The V and V Team is addressing the assurance of reliablity.
Area 22. FINDING:
Two of the respondents questioned the accuracy of the reactor water level measurement.
DISPOSITION:
This reading is accurate.
Area 23. FINDING:
Seven of the respondents indicated that the documentation for the SPDS was either not available (2) or they did no know of its availability (5) in the control room.
DISPOSITION:
An SPDS user's manual is in preparation.
Area 24. FINDING:
Three respondents indicated that their training in the use of the SPDS was not suf ficient.
DISPOSITION:
SPDS training is being incorporated into qualification-requalification training and the system is now operable on the simulator.
Area 2 5. FINDING:
One respondent indicated that the malfunc-tioning of the SPDS at the simulator contributed to a failure to develop confidence in its use in the control room.
B-6
DISPOSITION:
The SPDS was recently installed at the simulator and therefore may have had s ome initial problems in shakedown testing.
This finding does not directly concern the SPDS at LaSalle Station, which has been operable for some time.
Area 2 6. FINDING:
Seven respondents indicated difficulties with the visibility of the SPDS from their specific locations.
It was indicated that they must be right under the screen in order to effectively read it.
DISPOSITION:
A general overview of plant conditions is visiole from a
distance via the bar
- graphs, although digital values may not be visible.
Also, the SPDS display may be accessed from any CRT in the control r oom.
Area 27. FINDING:
The respondents felt that the SPDS screen should be lower and/or possibly included in a desk-top display location.
DISPOSITION:
The SPDS displEy may be accessed from
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any CRT in the control room.
Area 28. FINDING:
Three respondents indicated that additional CRTs for the SPDS might be desirable.
They qualified that desire with the assumption that the system would need to become more effective and reliable in order for such additions to be of value.
DISPOSITION:
The SPDS display may be accessed from any CRT in the control room.
Area 29. FINDING:
In general, the respondents indicated that the nature of the information supplied by the SPDS was appropriate but that its lack of reliability hampered i
its effective use.
DISPOSITION:
The V and V Team is addressing the assurance of reliablity.
Area 30. FINDING:
One of the respondents indicated that color-use on the SPDS should be simplified by having one color for normal, another for abnormal and a third for d
not working.
DISPOSITION:
This suggested three-color scheme is not unlike the scheme currently in use (i.e.,
green for
- normal, red for abnormal, cyan for invalid and un-5 validated values).
Clock failure, not color coding, i
is considered the best indication of inoperability.
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i Area 31. FINDING:
Two respondents indicated that the failure for the clock to advance was the only sign.that the i
SPDS was not operating, and a more salient means of conveying such information was suggested.
DISPOSITION:
Clock failure is.
an acceptable indication of inoperability.
Area 32. FINDING:
Five respondents _ indicated that the SPDS did not alert to impending alarm conditions.
Two of them i
indicated a lack of trust in the information presented.
1 DISPOSITION:
Because the, intended function' of the j
SPDS is to provide a global overview of plant status, the two-level color coding system serves as an ade-quate indication of a change to an abnormal status.
The system is to supplement, not replace, the existing control room instrumentation and annunciator system, i
i which provide the necessary information to aid the operator's performance.
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Areas of Concern Identified by The DCRDR Task Analysis Area 33.
GUIDELINE NO.: 5.1.1.A(1)
FINDING:
During the SPDS review of the LaSalle DCRDR T.A.
data, an input for whether APRMs have upscale tripped or are inoperable was identified for inclu-sion in the SPDS display.
In order to determine whether reactor power readings were accurate the system would need to be aware of all six APRMs' status.
The same applies to the SRMs.
Ensure that the APRM and SRM upscale trip and inoperable input are included in the SPDS.
DISPOSITION:
The SPDS software presently will display the bargraph for RX power " cyan" if all APRMs are inoperable and have failed upscale.
If inputs indicate there are valid APRM signals and the average value exceeds the upscale alarm setpoint, then the RX power bargraph is displayed in
" red",
or alarm condition.
Based on this information, the V and V program will examine this finding further as part of the SPDS Software Description Document review at Control Point C.
From the review results, the V and V Team, with support from Process Computer Systems, will recommend an appropriate resolution for this finding to the LaSalle SPDS Assessment Team for their approval.
Area 34.
GUIDELINE NO.: 5.1.1.A(1)
FINDING:
During the SPDS review of the LaSalle DCRDR T.A.
data, an input for TIP isolation was identified that should be included in the SPDS display.
The TIPS are a potential source of high level containment radiation and in a
transient condition should be isolated.
Ensure that TIP isolation is included as an input to the SPDS.
DISPOSITION:
The TIP system is used infrequently during plant operations.
When TIPS are
- used, an operator is in continuous attendance at the TIP control panel.
There is a control room annunciator available to the operators which indicates that the TIPS have been sucessfully isolated.
The TIPS would have no effect on containment radiation when they are in the withdrawn or isolated position.
Based on the frequency and manner in which the TIP system is
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Area 35.
GUIDELINE NO.: 7.2.4.A(1)
FINDING:
During the SPDS review of the LaSalle DCRDR T.A.
data, the SME identified the Rad Release box in the display as problematic in that the user cannot readily differentiate whether an abnormal release is a
water release or an airborne release.
The following input to the display was identified that could be either water or air:
SBGT TR UNIT 1 INLET FLOW; SBGT H:,
MED AND LO WIDE RANGE NOBLE GAS CHANNEL ACTIVITY; SBGT WIDE RANGE NOBLE GAS EFFLUENT ACTIVITY.
1.
Add an additional Rad Release box to alert display user to abnormal water-based releases and change current box to alert the display user to j
abnormal air-based releases.
Split current input between the boxes as necessary.
2.
Make the current Rad Release box larger and split it into two sections for water-and air-based releases.
Split current inputs between sections as necessary.
DISPOSITION:
The Rad Release status box on the SPDS provides the control room operator overall informa-tion on the critical safety function of radiological control.
If the Rad Release box alarms, the operator must immediately use available control panel instrum-entation to assess
- first, the pathway or system responsible for the release, and then, whether the release is a liquid or gaseous effluent. Providing an indication on SPDS as to the type of rad release would not eliminate the need for control room personnel to use available control panel to use available control panel instrumentation to determine which system has caused the release.
Area 36.
GUIDELINE NO.: 5.1.1.A(1)
FINDING:
During the review of the LaSalle DCRDR T.A.
data, SPDS input was identified that is currently not provided but would be desirable on a secondary level equipment availability status display.
One such input is service water flow.
Add diagrammatical and/or numeric secondary displays to LaSa11e's SPDS to indicate service water flow.
DISPOSITION:
This information is available on other j
control room displays.
Furthermore, the use of secondary or backup displays to the primary SPDS display is not addressed as a requirement in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 for SPDS.
Presently, the effort within Commonwealth Edison is focused on completing the SPDS V
and V
program
- effort, obtaining NRC approval of the primary SPDS display, and ensuring that the SPDS provides reliable and accurate j
information to control room personnel.
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Area 37.
GUIDELINE NO.: 5.1.1.A(1)
FINDING:
During the review'of the LaSalle DCRDR T.A.
data, a number of parameters identified that would be desirable as secondary level displays in the SPDS.
The SME felt that ECCS pump status information should be readily available such as HPCS, LPCS and RHR pump flow.
The only current SPDS ECCS indicant is an "on/off, normal / abnormal" Core Spray box.
Add dia-grammatical and/or. numeric secondary displays to LaSalle's SPDS to indicate HPCS, LPCS and RHR pump flow; HPCS, LPCS, and RHR pump discharge pressure.
DISPOSITION:
This information is available on other control. room displays.
Furthermore, the use of secondary or backup displays to the primary SPDS display is not addressed as a
requirement in NUREG-0737, Supplement 1 for SPDS.
Presently, the l
effort within Commonwealth Edison is focused on completing the SPDS V and V program effort, obtaining NRC approval of the primary SPDS
- display, and ensuring that the SPDS provides reliable and accurate information to control room personnel.
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June 26, 1986 TO:
D. L. Farrar
SUBJECT:
Human Factors Review for LaSalle County Station g
Safety Parameter Display System 4
REFERENCES:
a) LaSalle County Station Unit 2 License NPF-18, Facility Operating License b) Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) letter, E. Swartz (CECO) to H. Denton Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated December 29, 1983 with attachment.
c) NRC Safety Parameter Display System Safety Evaluation for i
Dresden, Quad Cities and LaSalle to D. L. Farrar (CECO) from D. M. Crutchfield (NRC) dated June 23, 1984.
Enclosed is Commonwealth Edison Company's document entitled " Final Summary Report of the Human Factors Review for the LaSalle Station Safety Parameter-Display System" dated June 26, 1986. We are transmitting this information to you in response to the requirement contained in Attachment 2 of Reference (a), Items 1.(a).ii and 1.(a).iii. This transmittal covers the human factors review of the SPDS data display and functions and provides additional verification data supporting the SPDS parameter selection.
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Commonwealth Edison initially submitted our SPDS safety analysis and criteria for parameter selection for LaSalle county Station on December 29, 1983 (Reference (b)). Subsequently, the NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report (Reference (c)) which found the SPDS parameter selection process and variables acceptable and that the SPDS design should continue to be coordinated with the Emergency Procedure Guidelines.
Section 6.3 in the enclosed report discusses at length the evaluation of SPDS parameters with respect to the DCRDR Task Analysis and Validation Data. This task analysis survey was based on the control ro< a responses and actions required to i
effectively mitigate those emergency symptoms identified in the GE BWROG EPG's.
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In summary, the findings of this evaluation confirm that the parameters currently displayed on the SPDS are sufficient to aid the plant operator in accomplishing and maintaining the plant critical safety functions. They also confirm that this SPDS effort has been sufficiently integrated with the other NUREG-0737, supplement 1 initiatives. We also conclude that human factors engineering principles have been sufficiently addressed in the design and installation of this SPDS.
The human factors deficiencies identified in this review will be resolved on a schedule consistent with the integration effort on the other NUREG 0737 Supplement 1 initiatives and completion of the SPDS V&V program.
If you have any questions or comments relating to this information, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Very truly yours, ch
. L.
assin DAF:HLM:cs Enclosures 1098W 1
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