ML20212N811
| ML20212N811 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1987 |
| From: | SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212N774 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8703130163 | |
| Download: ML20212N811 (26) | |
Text
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HABITABILITY OF THE LASALLE COUNTY STATION CONTROL ROOM FOLLONING POSTULATED ACCIDENT INVOLVING SHIPE NTS OF ANHYDROUS Af010NIA IN THE VICINITY OF LASALLE COUNTY STATION C00MONWEALTH EDISON COWANY CHICAGO, ILLINOIS Project Number 7343-48 February 1987 Revision 3 PREPARED BY SARGENT & LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO, ILLINOIS i
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In 1975, Comonwealth Edison Company comissioned a survey of industries and transportation ro~utes which may use, store, and/or transport hazardous chemicals in the vicinity of the LaSalle County. Station. This survey was conducted to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.78 (Reference 1). The 1975 survey indicated that anhydrous amonia was transported in the area of the LaSalle Station and that several industries stored and/or utilized this chemical at their facilities. At that time, no further
- analysis was perfomed to detemine whether uninhabitable conditions could i
be caused in the control room during an accidental release of anhydrous ammonia.
Instead, to expedite the licensing of the plant, redundant ammonia detectors were provided on each outside air intake of the control room.
A second survey was conducted between January, and May of 1986 in order to supplement the 1975 data. The purpose of the second survey was to gather additional data needed to perform quantitative analyses of the LaSalle Station control room habitability and exposure risk due to accidental release of anhydrous amonia. Two distinct types of analyses were perfomed. The first analysis evaluated the dispersion of the vapor released from a postulated accident and its subsequent infiltration into i
the control room. The second analysis determined the probability that uninhabitable conditions in the control room could be caused by accidents involving the transportation of anhydrous amonia and ammonia stored at nearby locations. The probability analysis considered the statistical data pertaining to accidents for a given mode of transportation, pertinent storage conditions, and the meteorological parameters that would be required to cause the development of toxic concentrations in the control room.
Another survey was conducted in January 1987 to determine the potential usage of anhydrous amonia on the leased farm lands within the station property boundaries.
The following sections describe the Regulatory Guides which form the basis of the control room habitability evaluation, the survey of amonia l
shipments around and within the LaSalle Station, the analysis of the habitability of the control room, and the conclusion reached regarding
-ammonia as a hazard.
It is concluded that the toxic hazard created by the accidental release of amonia in the vicinity of the LaSalle County Station is not a significant risk to the safe operation of the station.
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2.0 REGULATORY GUIDES Regulatory Guide 1.78 identifies anhydrous anunonia as a hazardous chemical and requires a control room habitability analysis in case there is an accidental amonia release from stationary or mobile sources near the i
pl ant.
It also provides a methodology for analyzing the effects of an l
amonia release.
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t Revision 3 Regulatory Position 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.78 states that amonia stored or situated at distances greater than five miles from the control room need not be considered in evaluating habitability.of the nuclear power plant control room during a. postulated amonia release.. Regulatory Guide-1.78 also specifies frequency, distance, and quantity of chemicals transported or stored with respect to the control room that require a control room habitability analysis. The Regulatory Guide also specifies minista frequencies of shipments for the three modes of transportation of amonia in the vicinity of the control room, namely, highways, railroads, and waterways.
d In order to establish the design basis events for a plant, Section 2.2.2.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.70 (Reference 2) requires identification of hazardous and toxic chemicals processed, stored or. transported.in the vicinity ofsthe site.
It further requires consideration of all facilities and activities _
1 within five miles of the plant and inclusion of facilities and activiti?s at greater distances as appropriate to their significance. For evaluatic'n of potential accidents, Section 2.2.3.1 of Regulatory Guide 1.70~ defines _
the design basis events external to the nuclear plant as those 9'ecidente that have a probability of occurrence on the order of'about 10- per year" or greater and have potential consequences serious enough to affect the-o safety of the plant to the extent that 10CFR Part 100.of the guidelines could be-exceeded. For toxic chemicals, the Regulatory:Cuide requires h
consideration of accidental releases of these chemicals from onsite storage f-facilities and nearby mobile and stationary sources. 'These toxic chemical concentrations detennined for a spectrum of meteorological conditions then should be used in evaluating control room habitability according to Regulatory Guide 1.78.
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Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 of the Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0000 (Reference,
- 3) requires a review of identified hazardous material which are stored.
and/or transported in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.78.
The reviw procedures require identification of facilities and activities within eight kilometers (5 miles) of the plant. Facilities and activities at/ greater distances should be considered if they otherwise have the potential for affecting the plant safety-related features.
As part of its acceptance criteria, Section 2.2.3 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) provides a probability criteria for determining if a toxic release need be considered a design basis event. Specifically, i.t states:
The probability of occurrence of the initiatinj events leading to potential consequences in excess of 10 CFR 4
Part 100 exposure guidelines should be estimated using assumptions that are as representative of the specific site as is practicable.
In addition, because of the low probabilities of the events under consideration, data are of ten not available to permit accurate calculation of probabilities. Accordingly, the expected rate of occurrence of potential exposures in mately 10 ghe 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines of approxi-excess of per year is acceptable if, when combined with reasonable qualitative argiments, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower. -_
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Revision 3 l
As part of its review procedures, Section 2.2.3 of the SRP states:
Similarly, special attention should be given to the 1
review of a site where several man made hazards are identified, but none of which, individually, has a-F probability exceeding the acceptance criteria stated n
herei n.-
The objective of this special review should L-be to assure that'the aggregate probability of an outcome that may lead to unacceptable plant damage meets the acceptance criteria of Subsection II of this SRP section.
3.0 SUMARY OF AMONIA SHIPMENTS AROUND LASALLE 3.1-1975 Survey of Annonia Shipment (O
The LaSalle County Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 2.2.1, describes the location of the plant site and Kr the transportation routes near the site. The UFSAR Sections 2.2.1 1"-
and 2.2.2 describe the nearby industrial, transportation, and e ^
military facilities. All industrial facilities are located outside of a five mile radius of the plant; therefore, annonia used or stored at these facilities need not be considered in evaluating the control room habitability. A survey was conducted in 1975 to determine the
$, 7 shipment of annonia to these industries by the three modes of transportation, namely highways, railroads and waterways. The U.S.
1 Highway 6 and State Highway 47, are the nearest highways to the
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station and the Chicago Rock Isiand and Pacific, the nearest-(f railroad, are all located farther than five miles from the station.
Therefore, transportation of annonia by these two modes of
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transportation was not considered in the control room habitability analysis.
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The UFSAR Section 2.2.2.4 describes the river traffic on the Illinois River.
Section 2.2.3.1.C of the UFSAR concluded that the only t
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transported on the Illinois River (UFSAR Table 2.2-4) did not 4< q differentiate barge shipments of annonia from other chemicals.
3.2 1986-1987 Surveys of Annonia Shipment These surveys were conducted between January 1986 and January 1987.
The purpose of these surveys was to gather additional data needed to perform quantitative analyses of the control room habitability and j
E exposure risk due to accidental release of anhydrous annonia. Each mode of transportation was evaluated with regard to the frequency and voline of ammonia shipments within 5 miles of the plant.
These surveys included carriers, river terminals, and end-users as a means of accounting for all annonia movement in the area. Agricultural and j
industrial storage and utilization of annonia within and beyond 5 miles of the plant were also incorporated in the data base.
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The fc11owing government agencies were contacted for infomation concerning the shipment of ammonia:
1.
U.S. Coast Guard, (Hazardous Chemical Branch), Chicago, Illinois and Washington, D.C.
2.'
.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Rock Isla d, Illinois.
3;='
Illinois Department of Transportation, ' Water Resources Division.
- 4. j LaSalle County Chamber of Comerce.
5.
Lockmasters at Marseilles, Illinois.
6.
Lockmasters at Dresden Island, Illinois.
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In addition, tha following companies and organizations including users and ' distributors of anhydrous amonia were contacted for information:
N T e Illinois Fertilizer and Chemical Association 1.
2.
University of Illinois Agriculture Cooperative Extension 3.
Seneca Port Operating Authority
- 4.
- Kendall-Grundy Fertilizer Supply 5.
Walter Seed and Fertilizer, Inc.
6.
LaSalle Fertilizer Supply 7.
DuPont Industries 8.
CF Industries 9.
Kaiser Agricultural C%ni il s 10.
Beker Industries 11.
Olin Chemical Company 12.
Borg-Warner Corporstion 13.
Agri C'ompany 14.
Conti-Carriers and Terminals 15.
Brent Towing Company 16.
Southern Towing Company
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ft Rsvision 3 17.
Port Arthur Towing Company Since the nearest railroad (Chicago Rock Island & Pacific) is more than 5 miles from the LaSalle County Station, it was not surveyed for this analysis. Although the two nearest highways, U.S. Hwy. 6 and State Hwy. 47 are more than 5 miles away, local roadways can carry small quantities of amonia for agricultural uses.
The only road traffic of anhydrous amonia within 5 miles is due to the transportation of fertilizer tanks by local famers. These tanks, each approximately 6,350 pound capacity, are taken from distribution centers located outside the 5 mile radius of concern and driven over local roads to area farms. The tanks are either 1,000 gallons or 1,450 gallons and it is possible to pull two tanks in tandem.
The nearest location of such a tank, on a local road or farm, was determined. Based on infomation provided by the county agricultural extension office, the nearest farm or roadway (County Road 6) is approximately one half mile from the control room (Reference 4).
Also, approximately 300 acres of land within the station property boundary are leased to farmers. Currently, these farmers use 28%
granular nitrogen to fertilize the leased lands. However, the possibility of using anhydrous ammonia does exist.
In the event anhydrous ammonia is used, a maximum of 10 tanks would be transported on County Road 6 to the fields via the station service road.
It is expected that the entire contents of each tank will be utilized within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of delivery of such tanks and that application of anhydrous amonia would probably occur sometime during April and/or mid October (Reference 5).
In order to detemine the frequency and quantity of anhydrous amonia transported by barge on the Illinois River in the vicinity of the LaSalle Station, all major industries and barge transportation companies were contacted to gather pertinent information.
Furthemore, infomation regarding terminals located along the river between the locks and dams at Marseilles and Dresden Island was reviewed to account for those amonia shipments passing by the site destined for delivery outside the 5 mile radius.
A survey of terminals along the Illinois river within 5 miles of the station indicated that there were very few major storage sites for anhydrous amonia. Exhibit 1 lists the decks and anchorage l
facilities on the Illinois River near the station.
This exhibit l
updates Table 2.2-2 of the UFSAR. The exhibit lists dock and l
anchorage facilities between river miles 244 and 254. Only those terminals located between river miles 248 and 253 are within 5 miles of the control room. Kaiser Agricultural Chemical Company, which stores or utilizes anhydrous amonia, is located outside the five mile radius of the control room. However, according to Kaiser (Reference 6), it maintains two refrigerated storage tanks containing anhydrous amonia within the 5 mile radius of the LaSalle control room. One of these tanks is 20,000 tons capacity and the other is 22,500 tons capacity, i
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k R@ vision 3 Anhydrous ammonia is generally shipped by barge in specially constructed refrigerated cylinders (Reference 7). The nonnal cargo
- size of these barges ranges between 2400 and 2800 tons with two cylinders per barge (Reference 8). DuPont and CF Industries each receive ammonia in special 3600-ton barges which unload at the Seneca Port Authority terminal (Reference 9). This annonia (30,000 tons) is stored in a refrigerated tank at the Seneca Port Authority (located at river mile 253.8, outside the 5 mile radius of the control room) and is metered out to each industrial facility.
Exhibit'2 is a presentation of anhydrous ammonia users and distributors and annual barge shipments in the vicinity of the LaSalle County Station. The Marseilles Lock and Dresden Lock statistics for 1984 are also shown on this exhibit.
It can be seen that the nonnal annual tonnage of annonia shipped by the surveyed transportation companies (310,500 tons) compares very well with the Marseilles lock -annual tonnage for 1984 (308,800 tons). The calculated average cargo weight of 2566 tons (310,500/121) carried by barges on the Illinois River also compares very well with the nonnal cargo weight ranging between 2400 and 3600 tons carried by the ammonia barges.
The results of the 1986-1987 surveys indicate the following:
I 1.
Shipment of anhydrous ammonia on two nearest highways (U.S.
Highway 6 and State Highway 47) and the nearest railroad Chicago Rock Island & Pacific need not be considered in the LaSalle County Station control room habitability analysis. The highways and railroad are more than 5 miles away from the control room.
2.
The nearest public road, County Road 6, is approximately 2560 feet away from the nearest air intake of the control room; the nearest station service road that could be used to transport the fertilizer tanks is approximately 550 feet away from the nearest air intake of the control room; annonia tanks carrying i
i approximately 6350 lbs of aninonia need to be considered in the l
analysis.
3.
A total of 10 fertilizer tanks may be used in a year on the leased lands with one tank remaining at the site for one day.
4.
A shipment of approximately 310,500 tons by 121 barges on the Illinois River is representative of an annual barge shipment of i
anhydrous anunonia in the vicinity of the LaSalle County Station. The annonia is shipped in specially constructed 4
refrigerated cylinders and the maximtm carrying capacity of one cylinder is 1800 tons.
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Revision 3 4.0 DISPERSION ANALYSIS AND CONTROL ROOM INFILTRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH REGULATORY GUIDE 1.78 The accidental release considered in this analysis is the complete rupture of a non refrigerated 1800-ton amonia container which instantly releases its contents.
Upon release, approximately 21% flashes imediately to the remainder is a liquid at -25 P, which gradually boils off by 0
vapor.
transfer of heat from the environment. This scenario is based on Regulatory Guide 1.78.
The flashed vapor constitutes the principal hazard to the station. The dispersion and propagation to the LaSalle site is predicted in accordance with methods described in Regulatory Guide 1.78.
The stability class considered is Pasquill, Type F, which results in control room concentrations which would te exceeded in less than 5% of all occurrences.
Exhibit 3 describes the basis of the analysis and the results from the release from a barge on the Illinois River. The control room air exchange rate used in the analysis is that of a control room in the non-isolated i
mode. According to Regulatory Guide 1.78, this control room is classified as a Type C control room. Exhibit 4 shows the results of the dispersion analysis as the rise.in concentration with respect to time.
According to this analysis, a response time that is rapid enough to avoid exposure to toxic concentrations is less than 48 seconds. According to Regulatory Guide 1.78, the toxic concentration level for anhydrous amonia is 100 ppm. The maximim concentration (480 ppm) shown in Exhibit 3 is for a 2-minute interval af ter the presence of the chemical in the control room i
becomes noticeable by its odor to personnel.
However, as noted in the 1986 survey, many barges, especially the large ones, are refrigerated and not pressurized. Experiments of smaller scale (50 gallons) spills of refrigerated amonia on water show that 27 to 50 percent of the liquid spflied is vaporized and that the vaporization is i
rapid (Reference 14). The results presented for the release of compressed j
liquid amonia are applicable as an approximation to the release of refrigerated ammonia on water. Although the slightly larger fraction vaporized will result in slightly higher control room concentrations, they are shown to be above the toxic level. Therefore, a probability analysis was undertaken to show that accidental releases of ammonia are not a design i
l basis event (see Section 5.0).
I Exhibit 5 shows the control room concentration that could be caused by an accidental release of anhydrous amonia on County Road 6.
The nearest location of the container, on this road, is considered in this analysis.
The container size is the largest size identified for this application.
The concentration in the control room is found to be less than the toxic limit. -
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Revision 3 Exhibit 6 shows the control room concentration that could be caused by an accidental release of anhydrous ammonia on the station service road.
Exhibit 7 shows the results of the dispersion analysis as the rise in concentration with respect to time. The maximum concentration of 2434 ppm shown in Exhibit 7 exceeds the 2-minute toxic concentration level of 100 ppm.
Therefore, a probability analysis was undertaken to show that accidental releases of ammonia on the station service road and the leased farm lands are not a design basis event (see Section 6.0).
5.0 PROBABILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN THE CONTROL ROOM BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING RIVER TRAFFIC The dispersion analysis shows that the calculated annonia concentration in the unisolated control room is 480 ppa at 2 minutes after the odor is detected. The dispersion analysis is based on a complete rupture of a 1800-ton amonia container and the consequent release of the entire content. The toxic level specified in Regulatory Guide 1.78 is 100 ppm.
i' However, the Standard Review Plan and Regulatory Guide 1.70 provide criterja for acceptance based on probability calculation. An exposure risk of 10-applies when the calculation is perfomed with realigtic assumptions.
With conservative assumptions, the risk of 10- applies.
A probability analysis was perfomed by the following method. Statistical 4
meteorological data for the LaSalle site (33-foot level) were used which i
consisted of occurrence probabilities of stability class, wind direction and wind magnitude. Exhibit 8 shows the orientation of the wind direction sectors of the meteorological data with respect to the Illinois River and LaSalle Station. The probability that the control room could be made 1
uninhabitable is calculated from the probability of an accident within each sector, the probability that the wind had a direction which would carry l
released vapor to the control room and that the stability classes were E, i
F, or G.
Under these stability classes, the control room was found to be uninhabitable based on the diffusion analysis described in Regulatory Guide 1.78.
Only the portion of the river within a distance of 5 miles from the I
station was considered it this analysis according to Regulatory Guide 1.78.
Exhibit 9 shows the computations performed and the exposure risk per barge shi; ment.
In Exhibit 9, nisnerical values are given for the occurrence pro) abilities of wind direction and stability class for each sector and the length of the river in each sector. The probability of control room uninhabitability per shipment is calculated by the sisenation of the contribution made by each sector and stability class. 7For a total of 121 shipments per year a risk exposure level of 3.63 x 10- per year is i
estimated (Exhibit 9). The barge accident statistic vas obtained from Reference 15 and the meteorological data was obtained from Reference 16.
The results of the probability calculation show that the LaSalle County Station control room will remain habitable for up to 121 barge shipments of i
amonia on the Illinois River for an acceptable exposure risk of 3.63 x 10-7 per year.
Revision 3 6.0 PROBABILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN THE CONTROL ROOM BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING STATION SERVICE ROAD AND LEASED FARM LANDS Two probability analyses were performed. One involved accident on station service road and the other involved eccidents of storage tanks on the leased lands.
6.1 Accidents on Station Service Road It was conservatively assumed that all the 10 tanks either pulled by tractors or pickup trucks are transported on the service road and these tanks travel the entire length of service road. Although these tanks can be pulled in tandem, it was assumed that 10 trips are made on this road every year.
Wind direction sectors and the meteorological data with respect to this road and the control room were ignored in this probability analysis to conservatively estimate the accident probability.
Exhibit 10 shows the computations performed and the exposure risk per truck shipment. For a total of 10 shipments per year a risk exposure level of 2.7 x 10-7 per year is estimated.
These results show that the LaSalle County Station control room will remain habitable for up to 10 shipments of amonia on the station service road for an acceptable exposure risk of 2.7 x 10-7 per year.
6.2 Accidents on Leased Land The probability that the control room could be made uninhabitable was calculated from the probability of an accident on leased land under all stability classes and within all wind sectors.
It was assumed that a total of 10 tanks are utilized in a year and that each tank remains on leased lands for one day.
Exhibit 10 shows such computations perfonned. The results of the probability calculation show that at an exposure risk of 2.74 x 10-7 per year, the control room will remain habitable if there were any releases from these tanks.
7.0 PROBABILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN THE CONTROL ROOM BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING OFFSITE AP910NIA STORAGE TANKS l
The Regulatory Guide 1.70 and the SRP require a review of facilities and i
activities at distances greater than 5 miles if they otherwise have the l
potential of affecting the control room habitability. As indicated above, the Kaiser Agricultural Chemical Company stores anhydrous amonia in two refrigerated tanks (20,000 and 22,500 tons).
These tanks are located on i
the fringes of the 5 mile radius. The Seneca Port Authority also stores 30,000 tons of ammonia in a refrigerated tank at river mile 253.8 mile, is approximately 5.75 miles from the plant.
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Revision 3 A probability risk analysis was performed for these tanks. As before, the analysis is based on a complete rupture of the tanks and consequent release L
of the entire content. Statistical meteorological data for the LaSalle site (33-foot. level)' were used which consist of occurrence probabilities'of stability class, wind direction and wind magnitude. The Kaiser tanks and Seneca tank are located North and NE of the plant, respectively. The probability that the control room could be made uninhabitable was calculated from the probability of an accident within each sector and the probability that the wind had a direction which would carry released vapor to the control room under all stability classes (A, B, C, D, E, F & G).
Exhibit 11 shows such computations performed. The results of the probability calculation show that at an exposure risk of 1.1 x 10-6 p,7 year, the control room will remain habitable if there were any releases from these tanks.
8.0 AGGREGATE PROBABILITY OF CAUSING-UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN THE CONTROL ROOM BY ACCIDENT INVOLVING ArugoNIA RELEASES The aggregate acceptable exposure risk to maintain habitable conditions in the control room is the sum of the probability of annonia releases due to barge accidents, offsite storage tank and onsite fertilizer t nk rupture.
Exhibit 12 shows that this aggregate probability is 2.0 x 10 g/ year.
j 9.0 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS The maximum individual probability of offsite and onsite sources of anhydrous ammonia that cou d result in uninhabitable conditions in the control room is 6.60 x 10-}6 per year. Similar aggregate probabilities of these sources are 2.0 x 10- per year.
These probabilities are acceptable, if, when combined with reasonable qualitative arguments, the realistic probability can be shown to be lower.
The use of this probability assessment is conservative and the realistic probability can be shown to be lower because of the following conservatisms:
1.
Amonia when spilled on water produces a buoyant plume of ammonia vapor. On the basis of spill studies of liquid anunonia on water and corresponding numerical models developed (Reference 17), the height i'
of rise of anunonia plume can be predicted. The height of rise of an ammonia plume due to a 1800-ton spill at a distance where the plant is located is estimated to range between 700 and 5000 feet depending upon atmospheric stability conditions. These heights of rise are based on the wind velocity which results in maximum control room concentration of amonia. Therefore, any amonia plisne released due to barge accidents may not affect the control room air intake which is located approximately 370 feet above the normal river elevation. 1
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Revision'3-2.
.The probability of causing uninhabitable conditions due to release of
- ansionia from the refrigerated storage tanks (Exhibit 11) is based'on accidents involving complete rupture and subsequent release of entire
- tank contents. Since amonia is stored in refrigerated tanks at atmospheric pressure, there is less likelihood that the whole contents of the-tank will become airborne. Auuming a partial (10%)
release of amonia from the refrigerated Kaiser Agricultural Chemical (20,000 and 25,000 tons) and Seneca Port Authority (30,000 tons) tanks, the probability of causing uninhabitable conditions due to releases from he Kaiser and Seneca Port. tanks will be 2 x 10-7fy,,7 and 1.62 x 10 p/ year, respectively, and the aggregate probability due to barge accid nts and these stora e tank releases will be reduced from 1.5 x 10 g/ year to 7.25 x 10 / year. The new aggregate probability is based on stability classes E, F, and G only, rather than all stability classes considered in the analysis described in Section 7.0.
3.
A conservative factor of 10 can be applied to the aggregate probability to identify the number of operator incapacitation events that in itself would result in exposures in excess of 10CFR100 guidelines (Reference 18). Therefore, the agg gate probability for l
the LaSalle County Station would be 7.25 x 10 g/ year.
In this regard, NUREG/CR-2650 (Reference 19) specifies allowable shipping frequencies for a maximum allo operator incapacitation of 10 gable probability of occurrence of per year.
4.
In a study conducted to evaluate spill hazards associated with the modal transport of hazardous materials, it was found that the expected annual exposure rate associated with the entire shipment of a substance by one mode was generally the lowest for barge and that the barge mode of transport is better inspected and regulated i
i from a safety point of view (Reference 20).
In a similar study, it was concluded that for 9 hazardous chemicals,.that transport by barge is safest for 6 chemicals including anhydrous ammonia.
(Reference 21).
5.
The probability of causing uninhabitable conditions due to the release of amonia from farm fertilizer containers on the station service road and from land on the station site which is leased for farming assunes that every release results in toxic concentrations in the control room.
If meteorological conditions of wind direction and atmosphere stability were considered in this part of the analysis, a smaller exposure risk to the control room would have been predicted.
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10.0 CONCLUSION
S The aggregate probability of causing uninhabitable conditions at the a-LaSalle Cg/ year as shown in Exhibit 12.
unty Station control room has been calculated to be 2.0 x 10' It should be noted that a major portion of this probability is due to accident probabilities associated with offsite storage tanks owned by Kaiser Agricultural Chemical and Seneca Port Authority.. This calculation is based on conservative asstaptions. However, 'as discussed in Section 9.0, when the conservatism in the calculated probability is re ved by reasonable assumptions the exposure risk becomes 7.25 x 10 p/ year.
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11.0 REFERENCES
1.
U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.78, " Assumptions for Evaluating the Habitability of_ a Nuclear Power Plant Control Room During a Postulated Hazardous Chemical Release," June 1974.
2.
U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard Fomat and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 3 November 1978.
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3.
U.S. NRC Standard Review Plan NUREG-0800, Revision 2, July 1981.
4.
Bill Woessner, County Agent, University of Illinois Agriculture Extension Service, in a telephone conversation with Sargent &
Lundy Engineers, February 14, 1986.
4 l
S.
John Schuh, Commonwealth Edison Company, Fam Leasing Manager, Real Estate Department, in conversations with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, December 18, 1986 and January 6,1987.
i 6.
Billy Joe Ryan, Plant Operations Manager, Kaiser Agricultural Chemical, in a telephone conversation with Sargent a Lundy i
Engineers, April 23, 1986.
7.
William Pichocki, Traffic Manager, Olin Barge (Olin Chemical Company), in telephone conversations with Sargent a Lundy j
Engineers, February 21, 1986, May 5, 1986.
l 8.
Howard Case, Southern Towing Company, in a telephone conversation with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, February 20, 1986.
1 9.
William Stegbauer, Vice President, Operations, Southern Towing Company, in telephone conversations with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, February 20, 1986, May 5, 1986.
10.
Christine Pershey, LaSalle Station Onsite Nuclear Safety Group, in a telephone conversation with Sargent a Lundy Engineers, February i
21, 1986.
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Revision 3 11.
. Jim Farley, Jesse Brent, Traffic Dept., Brent Towing Co., in
. telephone conversations with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, February 21, 1986, May 5, 1986.
12.
Dennis Adson, AgriCo., in a telephone conversation with Sargent &
Lundy Engineers, February 21, 1986.
13.
Kevin Conway, Port Arthur Towing Co., in telephone conversations with Sargent & Lundy Engineers, February 21,1986, May 5,1986.
14.
G. Bennett, F. S. Feates, and I. Wilder, editors, Hazardous Materials Spills Handbook, Part 4, pg.10-35 through 10-51, McGraw Hill, 1982.
J 15.
U.S. NRC NUREG-0170 (Vol.1), Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material By Air and Other Modes, i
December 1977.
16.
LaSalle County Station Onsite Meteorological Monitoring Data (October 1, 1976 - September 30, 1978) collected by Murray &
Trettel for Connonwealth Edison Company.
17.
Arthur D. Little, Inc., " Prediction of Hazard of Spills of I
Anhydrous Ammonia on Water," NTIS AD-779-400, Report to U.S. Coast Guard, March 1974.
i 18.
Duquesne Light Company Report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Beaver Valley Power Station Control Room Habitability," December 28, 1981.
19.
D. E. Bennett and D. C. Heath, " Allowable Shipment Frequencies for i
the Transport of Toxic Gases Near Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG/CR-2650, SAND 82-0774/R4, October 1982.
20.
G. R. Angell and A. S. Kale 1kar, "The Cost and Relative Spill i
Hazards Associated with the Model Transport of Hazardous Materials," Proceedings of 1974 National Conference on Control of I
Hazardous Materials Spills, San Francisco (A.I. ChE. New York, 1976).
21.
A. S. Kale 1kar, L. J. Partridge, and R. E. Brooks, Jr., " Decision l
Analysis in Hazardous Material Transportation," Ibid.
i 22.
J. A. Simmons, R. C. Erdmann, and B. N. Naf t, " Risk Assessment of l
Large Spills of Toxic Materials," Ibid.
23.
A Modal Economic and Safety Analysis of the Transportation of i
Hazardous Substances in Bulk. Arthur D. Little, prepared for Maritime Administration,1974.
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EXHIBIT 1 Revision 3 DOCK AND ANCHORAGE FACILITIES ON THE 4
ILLINOIS RIVER NEAR THE SITE
' RIVER MILE FACILITY 244.1 Borg Warner Chemical Co.
247.5' Snug Harbor Boat Club (1) small boat launching ramp (1)
- 247.9 Pittsburgh - Des Moines Steel Co.
248.7 Kaiser Agricultural Chemical (2) 249.8 Beker Industries (3) 252 Spring Brook Marina (1) i 251.8 Connonwealth Edison 252.7 L Peavey Grain Co.
252.7 R Continental Grain Co.
252.8 Seneca Boat Club (1)
Anchor-Inn Marina (4) 253.0_
Anchor Marine, Inc.
253.4 Conti-Carriers & Terminals 7
253.8 Seneca Port District 253.9 Boat slip (1) 1.
small boat launching and docks only 2.
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical replaced Illinois Nitrogen Corp. at this l
location in 1981.
Kaiser Agricultural Chemical is a 1985 spin-off of Kaiser Alumintan and Chemical.
3.
The UFSAR Table 2.2-3 indicates that Beker utilized anhydrous annonia.
i The 1986-1987 surveys revealed that Beker no longer handles or stores 4 -
anhydrous ammonia.
j 4.
both small boats and barge facilities I
L or R Lef t or Right River Bank Source:
U.S. Army Engineer District, Corps of Engineers, Chicago, Illinois, Clerk of the Illinois Waterways, From Mississippi River at Graf ton, Illinois
- to Lake Michigan at Chicago & Calumet Harbors, April 1974.
i Illinois Department of Transportation, Water Resources Division, Chicago, Illinois from Directory of Lake and River Terminals in Illinois, June 1982.
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EXHIBIT 2 Revision 3 SURVEY OF USERS / DISTRIBUTORS OF ANHYDROUS AMONIA IN THE VICINITY OF THE LASALLE COUNTY STATION Anhydrous Amonia Users Yearly Tonnage Seneca Port Authority (Reference 10) 150,000*
Kaiser Agricultural (Reference 6) 67,500**
Total 217,500 Frequency Tonnage (barges /
(Tons /
Transportation Companies year) year)
Southern Towing Companies (Reference 9) 68 172,000 Brent Towing (Reference 11) 24 67,500 Olin Barges (Reference 7) 15 36,000 (01in Chemical) i AgriCo (Reference 12) 4 10,000 Port Arthur Towing (Reference 13) 10 25,000 Total 121 310,500 Nitrogeneous Chemical Lock Statistics 1984 (Reference 10)
Fertilizers (Tons)
Marseilles Lock 308,800 Dresden Island Lock 65,300
- Anhydrous amonia is delivered to Seneca Port Authority and then metered out to DuPont and CF Industries.
Of 150,000 tons received, 30,000 tons is stored in a refrigerated tank and 60,000 tons each is metered out to DuPont and CF Industries respectively (Reference 9).
- 0f 67,500 tons received, 45,000 tons is stored in two refrigerated tanks.
1 I 4
EXHIBIT 3 Revision 3 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ANALYSIS (BARGE ON ILLINOIS RIVER)
Material spilled anhydrous am onia Weight 1800 tons Minimum distance from control room 22,700 ft.
Control room air exchange rate 0.8 per hour (not isolated)
Atmospheric Stability Class F
Ambient air temperature 90 F 0
Concentration detectable by odor 10 ppm Toxic concentration (2 minutes after 100 ppm detection)
Maximin calculated concentration at 23300 ppm air intake Maximin calculated concentration in 480 ppm control room 2 minutes after detection Wind speed causing maximin concentration 5 m/sec in control room r i
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g-Exhibit 4 Concentration in Control Room after 1800 ton spill of anhydrous ammonia.
U 4
5 m/see wind, F stability.
1 I
EXHIBIT 5 Revision 3 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ANALYSIS (COUNTY ROAD 6)
Material _ spflied anhydrous annonia Weight 6344 pounds Minimum distance from control room 2560 ft.
Control room air exchange rate 0.8 per hour (not isolated)
Atmospheric Stability Class F
0 Ambient air temperature 77.9 F Concentration detectable by odor 10 ppe Toxic concentration (2 minute exposure) 100 ppm Maximum calculated concentration at 4246 ppe air intake Maxima calculated concentration in 99.7 ppm control room 2 minutes af ter detection Wind speed causing maxima concentration 0.55 m/sec in control room I
EXHIBIT 6 Revision 3 CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ANALYSIS (STATION SERVICE ROAD)
Material spilled anhydrous ammonia Weight 6344 pounds Minimte distance from control room 550 ft.
Control room air exchange rate 0.8 per hour (not isolated)
Atmospheric Stability Class F
0 Ambient air temperature 77.9 F Concentration detectable by odor 10 ppm Toxic concentration (2 minute exposure) 100 ppm Maximum calculated concentration at 162,000 ppm air intake Maximum calculated concentration in 2434 ppm control room 2 minutes af ter detection Wind speed causing maximum concentration 0.255 m/sec in control room
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a EXHIBIT 9 Revision 3 CONTROL ROOM RISK ANALYSIS FOR BARGE SHIPMENTS OF ANHYDROUS AMONIA ON THE ILLINOIS RIVER Probability of Length of occurrence of Sumation river within wind direction and of river length sector and stability class and probability within 5 miles (include all by class Wind of site wind speeds)
Sector Li (miles)
Mi ELixMi (miles)
(stability class)
E F
G NNW 0.35 0.0173 0.0037 0.0064 0.00959 N
2.10 0.0072 0.0012 0.0016 0.0210 NNE 1.90 0.0045 0.0009 0.0012 0.01254 NE 0.095 0.0109 0.0030 0.0023 0.01539 (Stamation of river length and probability by E LixMi = 0.05852 class and wind sector)
Probability of control rop / year where Pa = 5.13 x 10 g shipment =
uninhabitability per barg Pa x E LixMi = 3.0 x 10-accident / year (Reference 15)
Probabigity of control room uninhabitability due to 121 barge shipments = 121 x 3.0X10-
= 3.63 x 10-7/ year,
,._.,-.,,,-,n._
a-EXHIBIT 10 Revision 3
. PROBABILITY OF CAUSING UNINHABITABLE CONTROL ROOM CONDITIONS A5 A RESULT OF ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF AlWONIA ON STATION SERVICE ROAD AND LEASED LAND FOR FARMING Station. Service Road Approximate length of station service
=1 road, miles No. of vehicles towing ammonia
= 10
- Accident failure rate per year
= 27 x 10-9 (accidents / vehicle mile) (Reference 23)
Probability of control room uninhabitability
= 2.70 x 10-7 due to accidents on the service road Leased Land No. of anunonia tanks stored / year
= 10 Length of time each tank remains on premises
=1 af ter delivery, days Estimated accident frequency' per year
= 10-5 (Reference 22)
Probability of control room uninhabitability
= 2.74 x 10-7 due to accidents on the leased land (10 x x 10-5)
-e.
EXHIBIT 11 Revision 3
- ~
CONTROL ROOM RISK ANALYSIS FOR POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS INVOLVING STATIONARY SOURCES Kaiser Agricultural Seneca Port Source Chemical Authority Quanti ty 1 - 20,000 ton tank 30,000 tons 1 - 25,000 ton tank Distance from LaSalle Station 5 miles 5.75 miles Wind Sector N
NE Probability of wind blowing from sector (all stability 0.0334 0.0487 classes a wind speeds)
Estimated accident frequency 10-5 10-5 per year (Reference 21)
Probability of control room 6.60 x 10-7 4.87 x 10-7 becoming uninhabitable per year l
i i
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^
~ EXHIBIT 12 Revision 3 AGGREGATE PROBABILITY OF UNINHABITABLE CONDITIONS IN LASALLE COUNTY STATION CONTROL ROOM Probability / Year Barge Traffic 3.63 x 10-7 Kaiser Agricultural Chemical Tanks 6.68 x 10-7 Seneca Port Authority Tanks 4.87 x 10-7 Fertilizer Tanks on Station Service Road 2.70 x 10-7 Fertilizer Tanks on Leased Land 2.74 x 10-7 2.0 x 10-6fy,,7 Aggregate Probability
=
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