ML19294B924

Discusses Commission Role in Decisions Involving Policy Considerations.Commissioners Must Make & Be Held Accountable for Major Decisions.Requests That Commission Be Involved in Decision to Permit Resumption of Facility Const

ML19294B924
Person / Time
Site:	Marble Hill
Issue date:	12/06/1979
From:	Moffett T HOUSE OF REP., GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
To:	Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML19294B921	List: ML19294B924
References
NUDOCS 8003060404
Download: ML19294B924 (4)

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m .. _. NINETY. SIXTH CONGRESS

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Congress of the Entteb sbtates '"- "-""-

3!)ottge of Ecpttgentatibts ENVIRONMEfiT, ENERGY. AND NATURAL RESOURCES SUB00MMITTE.E

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COMMb iu ON GOVERNMENT 0*ERATIONS ,',

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December 6, 1979

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.:, - p. A Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie '

Chairman /

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Washington, D.C. 20585 _ .. .

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Dear Chairman ~Hendrie:

j( j\ h m During the past year, the Subcommittee 's oversight work has

.given Commission.me an opportunity to closely observe the Nuclear Regulatory I have become increasingly concerned about the lack of policy direction from the Cornission; in f ar toe many areas the Commission neither sets policy nor makes important decisions.

The Subcommittee's recent investigation of the construction problems at Marble Hill has sharpened my concerns. Even though that case raises licensing issues of the greatest importance both to Marble Hill and, more generally, to all plants now under con-struction, the Commission has not to date involved itself in the decision making process nor has it given any indication that it intends to involve. itself in the future. I ask that you and the other Commissioners reconsider your role in this matter and give the most serious consideration to becoming the final decision makers.

Last summer the Committee'on Government Operations 4.ssued a Report, base'd on an investigation hy this Subco==.ittee, on emergency planning.

The Committee concluded that the Cornission had failed to play a meaningful role in emergency planning and had delegated too much responsibility to its staff:

The Commission has failed to involve itself substantially in emergency planning, leaving both the setting and the application of standards to the discretion of the staff.. Delegation of authority to act in an area so directly affecting public practice.1/

health and safety is a. unsound regulate y

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O Emercency ?lannine Around U.S. Nuclear Powerplants: U.S.

1;uclear Reculaccry Comm ssion Oversicht, H.R. Rep. No.96-413, 96ch Congress, 1st Sess. 49 (1979).

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Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie .  ?

December 6, 1979 -

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Th3 President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island .

irsued its Report in October. The President's Corrission found  :

the absence of NRC Commissioner involvement and excessive dele-  ?

gation to staf f to be probicas which extended beyond emergency planning to the entire licensing, process: j The NRC commissioners have largely isolated j themselves from the licensing process. [T] hey i have . . . delegated most of their adjudicative I duties to the Atomic Safety and Licensing l Appeal Board . . . . The commissioners have j also isolated themselves from the overall manage-ment of the NRC.2f  ;

Last August 15 the United States government made a decision to stop safety related construction work at the Marble Hill, -

Indiana, nuclear f acility and to require Marble Hill's owner, -

Public Service Indiana, to demonstrate a nurber of improvements ~

before restarting work. Farble Hill is a $2 billion project, of the greatest importance to the stockholders and the customers of Public Service Indiana and to the thousands of construction workers employed there. The many difficulties that have been experienced in the course of the construction of Marble Hill have also raised serious questions about the safety of the plant in the. minds of many citizens living in the vicinity. Since the government made that decision last August, no safety related . con-struction work has been performed, nor is any expectea for at -

least another month or two. Yet the government's decision to order work stopped at Marble Hill, with all its f ar-reaching consequences, was not made by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners, appointed by the President and accountable to 'the public for their actions , but by a caree: civil servant, the Director of .the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. Furthermore ,

all indications today are that the decision on when and'under what circumstances that order should be lif ted and work allowed to resume will also be made by the staff rather than the Commissioners . ' -- -

Such a decision making process is fundamentally at odds with all. notions of effective and responsive government. In any regulatory endeavor it is essential that major decisions emanate from the top and that accountability be direct and certain. Any decisions as important as those involving Marble Hill, in terms of both their perceived public health ef fects and their economic

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2/ Report of the President's Ccmmission on the Accident at Three Male Island 51 (1979). _

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December 6, 1979 -

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impact, should be made by those who are appointed by the President E and accountable under the law for their actions. It does not h de tract from the competence and dedication of the NRC staf f to j.

suggest that the Commissioners, and not the staff, should be i called upon to make major regulatory decisions, such as those s involving significant safety issues or the terms under which a [

license or permit may be held. J.

E The Subcommittee conducted an extensive investigation of the )j' problems at Marble Hill, and it held public hearings on November 27 and 28, 1979. Both the Subcommittee s hearing record and the i

K NRC's inspection reports on Marble , Hill, primarily report number 79-11 which examines the performance of PSI management, further

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buttress the case for Commission, not staff, decision making. f.

They demonstrate that the decision on resumption of full con- f struction on Marble Hill is not a narrow technical one of the E s' ort appropriately left to NRC staff but is one that requires the h collective wisdom and deliberation of the Commission.  ?

E The question, for exemple, of whether PSI should be permitted j to resume construct'.on without benefit of an N certificate from  ;

the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) is not, as it i might seem at first blush, merely technical.. According to i S.W. Shields , PSI's Vice President-Electric Systems , PSI plans to  !

resume construction in January 19 80 on the basis of an " interim i letter" and intends to delay an ASME audit of its quality assurance  !

program, required for the N certificate , "until about six months  ?

after resumption of construction." (Attachment I.) The Indiana i Boiler and Pressure Vessel Boar,d, an independent body, holds to i the view that Marble Hill is at a suf ficiently advanced stage of i construction that PSI should have an N certificate and should not i be allowed to proceed with only an " interim letter" : i The INTERIM LETTER is normally applied fo

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when it is not possible for. the applicant to . . . ,

demonstrate its program. In your case [ PSI) ,

adequate construction has been completed to demonstrate your program. . . . [I)t is '

recommended that you re-apply for the N certificate, instead of the INTERIM LETTER, in order that you (PSI) can demonstrate that you have the capability to perform to the

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specifications of your Quality Assurance Program. ( Attachment II . )

The questions as to whether PSI should be permitted to resume saf ety related construction must be viewed, moreover, in the U L

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Honorable Joseph M. Hendrie - '

December 6, 1979

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i context of the November 12, 1979, report by the independent 5 National Board of Boiler and pressure Vessel Inspectors that i raises serious doubts as to whether PSI has yet demonstrated  ;

significant sensitivity to the need for compliance with AS" -

code requirements: -

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P.S.I..was made aware of serious issues involving i noncompliance and potential noncompliance with (4 ASIE Code requirements regarding material and I material certification documents as early as  ;

July 14, 1977 . . . but has failed to date to  ;

provide comprehensive and responsible corrective -

action.3_/  ;

In short, resolution of this issue recuires a decision on whether construction should proceed in the face of serious questions raised by two inGependent bodies, inclu' ding allegations i by one of them that the Corr.ission 's licensee for two years con- .-

tinued construction with knowledge it was not in compliance i with applicabic requirements. It is not a decision which should -

be left to the NRC staff, state regulatory authorities, or the -

ASME.

In the final analysis, nuclear power cannot go fo ward in this . country without the support of the American people. Crucial -

to that support is the conviction on the part of the public and its elected representatives that those entrusted with resconsi-bility for regulating use of the atom, the NRC Commission'ers ,

have a firm grip on their responsibilities. The Cc=missioners must make the major decisions and be held accountable for them.

Marble Hill is a major decision. It demands a decision bv the Commissioners personally. Accordingly, I request that you' prov.ide a copy of this letter to your fellow Ccmmissioners and that the Commission discuss at its earliest opportunity .the appropriateness of its deciding at what point and under what . . . . . ,

circumstances construction should be resumed at Marble Hill.

Sincer ly, O' A o.4v.gffetf, hairmin

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-u.39-A::achments 'e)a> L\ Ar i

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y Le :er from D.J. McDon ald , Director of Inspections , Naticnal Board of Sciler and pressure Vessel Inspectors , to S.W. Sh elds,

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