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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555February 5, 1988NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-04: INADEQUATE QUALIFICATION AND DOCUMENTATIONOF FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALS
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 5, 1988 NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICE NO. 88-04: INADEQUATE
 
QUALIFICATION
 
===AND DOCUMENTATION===
OF FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION
 
SEALS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.
:
All holders of operating
 
licenses or construction
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
:This notice is to alert addressees that some installed fire barrier penetrationseal designs may not be adequately qualified for the design rating of thepenetrated fire barriers. It is expected that recipients will review thisinformation for applicability and consider actions, if appropriate, to precludea similar problem and correct existing problems at their facilities.However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute newNRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
: This notice is to alert addressees
 
that some installed
 
fire barrier penetration
 
seal designs may not be adequately
 
qualified
 
for the design rating of the penetrated
 
fire barriers.
 
It is expected that recipients
 
will review this information
 
for applicability
 
and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem and correct existing problems at their facilities.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this information
 
notice do not constitute
 
new NRC requirements;  
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances:
The NRC has been reviewing
 
fire barrier penetration
 
seal designs installed
 
in several nuclear power plants. The reviews focused on whether the installed configuration
 
was qualified
 
by adequate testing and documentation.
 
The current NRC review was prompted by reports, inspection
 
findings, allegations, and other information
 
that indicated
 
the possibility
 
that NRC requirements
 
for fire barrier penetration
 
seals were not being met in all aspects. The review included:
evaluations
 
of fire barrier penetration
 
seal specifications
 
and pro-cedures developed
 
by licensees, licensee agents, and licensee contractors;
evaluations
 
of various fire barrier penetration
 
seal tests and test data; and inspections
 
of various fire barrier penetration
 
seal designs and installations.
 
The types of concerns identified
 
to date and mentioned
 
below are related to weak-nesses in the implementation
 
of NRC requirements
 
and guidelines
 
as related to fire barrier penetration
 
seal design qualification.
 
The staff identified
 
instances
 
where installed
 
fire barrier penetration
 
seal designs could not be verified as qualified
 
for the design rating of the pene-trated fire barrier. In some cases,-test
 
qualification
 
documentation
 
was not 8802020228 IN 88-04 -: February 5, 1988 available.
 
In other cases, qualification
 
test documentation
 
was available
 
but incomplete
 
or inadequate
 
because all qualification
 
requirements
 
had not been satisfied
 
or the installed
 
seal design configuration
 
or design parameters
 
were significantly
 
different
 
from the tested seal.The NRC review also has identified
 
a current practice that can affect the qualification
 
status of installed
 
seals. Plant modifications
 
are being made that require running new cable and conduits through existing penetration
 
seals.These modifications
 
are generally
 
being made without an associated
 
technical review to ensure that the resulting
 
penetration
 
seal design configuration
 
or design parameters
 
are consistent
 
with those validated
 
by initial qualification
 
tests. Over a period of time, numerous minor modifications
 
to the same area could cumulatively
 
result in a degraded fire barrier rating.Discussion:
NRC requirements
 
and guidelines
 
for fire barrier penetration
 
seals are con-tained in various documents, including
 
Appendix R to 10CFR 50, Appendix A to Branch Technical
 
Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1, "Guidelines
 
for Fire Protec-tion for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976," and NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan. The extent to which these requirements
 
or guidelines
 
are applicable
 
to a specific plant depends on plant age, commitments
 
established
 
by the licensee in developing
 
the fire protection
 
plan, the staff safety evalua-tion reports (SERs) and supplements, and the license conditions
 
pertaining
 
to fire protection.
 
The goal is to provide a fire barrier penetration
 
seal that will remain in place and retain its integrity
 
when subjected
 
to an exposure fire, and subse-quently, a fire suppressing
 
agent. This will provide reasonable
 
assurance
 
that the effects of a fire are limited to discrete fire areas and that one division of safe-shutdown-related
 
systems will remain free of fire damage.A number of licensees
 
have conducted
 
a comprehensive.assessment
 
of the adequacy of in-plant fire barrier penetration
 
seals. Their efforts began by determining
 
which specific NRC guidelines/requirements
 
apply and which specific commitments
 
were made to respond to those guidelines
 
or requirements.
 
Typically, in-plant seal assemblies
 
were surveyed to catalogue
 
the various types of existing seal configurations.
 
Finally, the documentation
 
was analyzed to confirm that in-plant designs were fully qualified
 
by a fire test and were installed
 
in a proper manner.If these efforts revealed instances
 
where seals were not installed
 
where re-quired, were not installed
 
properly, or were not qualified
 
by a standard fire test, then the licensees
 
have considered
 
the seals degraded and have imple-mented compensatory
 
measures, such as fire watch patrols, per the appropriate
 
technical
 
specifications
 
or administrative
 
procedures.
 
These measures remain in force pending final resolution
 
of the issue. Final resolution
 
may include replacing
 
existing penetration
 
seals with fully qualified
 
seals, qualifying
 
in-plant seal assemblies
 
by supplemental
 
fire tests, and justifying
 
in-plant configuration
 
by fire hazards/safe
 
shutdown analysis.
 
IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 Appendix A contains a summary of various technical
 
considerations
 
that have been used for evaluating
 
the qualification
 
adequacy of fire barrier penetration
 
seal designs and installations, associated
 
testing, and test data.No specific action or written response is required by this information
 
notice.If you have questions
 
about this matter, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
 
of the appropriate
 
NRC regional office.a~r'es E. Ross ,Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contact(s):
Dennis Kubicki, NRR (301) 492-0825 Joseph Petrosino, NRR (301) 492-0979 Attachments:
1. Appendix A -Summary of Existing Staff Guidance Related to Fire Barrier Penetration
 
Seals 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices
 
Attachment
 
1 IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 APPENDIX A SUMMARY OF EXISTING STAFF GUIDANCE RELATED TO FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION
 
SEALS A. General Considerations
 
Concerninq
 
the Use of Test Results To Qualify Fire Barrier Penetration
 
Seal Designs The (fire barrier seal) test specimen shall be truly representative
 
of the construction
 
for which classification
 
is desired, as to materials, work-manship, and details such as dimensions
 
of parts, and shall be built under conditions
 
representative
 
of those obtaining
 
as practically
 
applied in building construction
 
and operation.
 
The physical properties
 
of the materials
 
and 2 ingredients
 
used in the test specimen shall be determined
 
and recorded.B. Seal Acceptance
 
Criteria 1. The fire resistance
 
rating of the penetration
 
seal should bS equiva-lent to the rating of the barrier in which it is installed.
 
2. The fire resistance
 
rating of the penetration
 
seal should be deter-mined by a 4 standard fire test (i.e., ASTM E-814, ASTM E-119 or IEEE-634).
 
3. The test should be conducted
 
by an independent, recognized
 
testing authority.
 
The tested assembly should be representative
 
of in-plant assemblies.
 
The exposure fire should correspond
 
to at least the time-temperature
 
curve of ASTM E-119. Thermocouples
 
should be positioned
 
at representative
 
locations
 
on the cold side of the tested assembly (including
 
the interface
 
of seal material and through penetrations).
 
The cold-side
 
temperature
 
should not exceed 250 0 F above ambient during the test or 325 0 F maximum, although higher temperatures
 
at through penetrations
 
are permitted
 
when justified
 
in terms of cable insulation
 
ignitability.
 
There should be no burn-through
 
of the seal during the test, nor the passage of hot gases sufficient
 
to ignite cotton waste material.
 
The assembly should withstand
 
t e effects of a hose stream, as stipulated
 
in the standard test method.4. The seals should be installed
 
by qualified
 
individuals.
 
6 5. Appropyiate
 
quality assurance/quality
 
control methods should be in force.6. Fire barrier penetrations
 
that must maintain environmental
 
isolation or pressure differentials
 
should be qualified
 
by test to maintain the barrier integrity
 
under such conditions.
 
Attachment
 
1 IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 C. Hose Stream Testing9 1. Hose stream testing is a requirement
 
for all fire barrier penetration
 
seal qualification
 
testing, regardless
 
of whether the penetration
 
seal is for a wall or a ceiling or a floor.2. Hose stream testing should be performed
 
on tested specimens
 
that have successfully
 
withstood
 
the fire endurance
 
test requirements.
 
3. The hose stream shall be delivered
 
in one of the following
 
ways: a 1-1/2-inch
 
nozzle set at a discharge
 
angle of 300 with a nozzle pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge
 
of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 5 ft from the exposed face; a 1-1/2-inch
 
nozzle set at a discharge
 
angle of 150 with a nozzle pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge
 
of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 10 ft from the exposed face; a 2-1/2-inch
 
national stan-dard playpipe equipped with 1-1/8-inch
 
tip, nozzle pressure of 30 psi, located 20 ft from the exposed face.4. The duration of the hose stream test should meet the minimum require-ments specified
 
in ASTM E-119 for fire barriers.
 
During hose stream testing, the fire barrier penetration
 
seal should remain intact and should not allow a projection
 
of water beyond the unexposed
 
surface.D. Deviations
 
1 0 Deviations
 
from NRC requirements
 
or accepted industry standards
 
for fire barrier penetration
 
seals should be technically
 
substantiated
 
as part of the review and approval of the fire protection
 
plan or in other separate formal correspondence.
 
Supplemental
 
guidance is provided in Generic Letter 86-10.References
 
1. "The design of fire barriers for horizontal
 
and vertical cable trays should, as a minimum, meet the requirements
 
of ASTM E-119, Fire Test of Building Construction
 
and Materials, including
 
the hose stream test."[Section D.3.(d) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1]."Penetration
 
seal designs shall utilize only noncombustible
 
materials
 
and shall be qualified
 
by tests that are comparable
 
to tests used to rate fire barriers." (Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50)."The penetration
 
qualification
 
tests should use the time temperature
 
exposure curve specified
 
by ASTM E-119." (Section C.5.a. of BTP CMEB 9.5-1).
 
-Attachment
 
1 IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 2. ASTM E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction
 
and Materials." 3. Section D.3.(d) of Appendix A to BtP APCSB 9.5-1.4. Section III.M. of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.5. ASTM E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction
 
and Materials." 6. Section C of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Section C.4 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.7. Ibidem.8. Section C.5.a.(3)
of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.9. Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.10. Generic Letter 86-10.r
 
A ment 2 February S. 1988 Pige 1 of I LIST Of RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Lntonuatlol
 
Dats of Notice No. SubJect Issuance Issued to 88-03 Cracks in Shroud Support 2/2/88 All holders of OLs Access Hole Cover WVlds or CPs for BWRs.88.02 Lost or Stolen Gauges, 2/2/88 All NRC licensees authorized
 
to possess gauges under a specific or general license.88.01 Safety Injection
 
Pipe 1/27/88 All holders of OLs Failus ror CPs for nuclear power reactors.86-81, Broken External Closure 1/11/88 All holders of OMs Supp. 1 Springs on Atwood & Iorrill or CPs for nuclear main Steam Isolation
 
Valves power reactors.87-67 Lessons Learned from 12/31/87 All holders of OLs Reional Inspections
 
of or CPs for nuclear Licenses Action$ ia Response power reactors.to It Bolletin a0> -87-65 Inappropriate
 
Application
 
12/31/87 All holders of OLs of Cofher1i1-l6rads
 
or CPs for nuclear Components
 
powr reacton.87-28, Alp Systems Probi e at 12/28/87 All holders of Ms Supp. 1 U.S. 1ight Water Reactors or CPs for nuclear power reactors.87-65 Plant Operation
 
Beyond 12/23/87 All holders of OLs Analyzed Conditions
 
or CPs for nuclear power reactors.87-64 Conviction
 
for Falsification
 
12/22/87 All nuclear power of Security Training Records reactor facilities
 
holding an OL or CP and all major fuel facility licensees.
 
ON : Operating
 
License CP
 
* Construction
 
PermitI : UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMAISSION
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300 FIRST CLASS MAIL POSTAGE 6 FEES PAID USNRC PERMIT No. 0-E7 120555026886
1 1CO1CY1FB11S1 US NRC-OARM-IRM
 
DIV OF INFO SUP SVCS MICROGRAPHICS
 
SPECIALIST
 
RECORDS SERVICES BRANCH 042 WASHINGTON
 
DC 20555 IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 Appendix A contains a summary of various technical
 
considerations
 
that have been used for evaluating
 
the qualification
 
adequacy of fire barrier penetration
 
seal designs and installations, associated
 
testing, and test data.No specific action or If you have questions contacts listed below regional office.written response is required by this information
 
notice.about this matter, please contact one of the technical or the Regional Administrator
 
of the appropriate
 
NRC Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contact(s):
Dennis Kubicki, NRR (301) 492-0825 Joseph Petrosino, NRR (301) 492-0979 Attachments:
1. Appendix A -Summary of Existing Staff Guidance Related to Fire Barrier Penetration
 
Seals 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*Transmitted
 
by memo to C. E. Rossi from J. G.Partlow dated 12/21/87 IC " m-a -044 %i'*SEE PREVIOUS*PPMB:ARM TechEd 01/15/88*OGCB:DOEA:NRF
 
RJKiessel 01/14/88*VIB:DRIS:NRR
 
JPetrosino
 
12/15/87 CONCURRENCES
 
4 **C/OGCB:DOEA:NR
 
R R CHBerlinger
 
a 01/21/88 0245-/88 t *D/DEST:NRR
 
*ADT/DEST:NRR
 
*D/DRIS:NRR
 
*DD/DRIS:NRR
 
LShao JRichardson
 
JGPartlow
 
BKGrimes 12/17/87 12/16/87 12/16/87 12/16/87*ASC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*AC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*ECEB:DEST:NRR*BC/ECEB:DEST:NRR
 
===EBaker JStone DKubicki CMcCracken===
12/15/87 12/18/87 12/16/87 12/16/87 IN 88-XX January XX, 1988 Appendix A contains a summary of various technical
 
considerations
 
that have been used for evaluating
 
the qualification
 
adequacy of fire barrier penetration
 
seal designs and installations, associated
 
testing, and test data.No specific action or written response is required by this information
 
notice.If you have questions
 
about this matter, please contact the Regional Adminis-trator of the appropriate
 
NRC regional office or this office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contact(s):
Dennis Kubicki, NRR (301) 492-9424 Joseph Petrosino, NRR (301) 492-4316 Attachments:
1. Appendix A -Summary of Existing Staff Guidance Related to Fire Barrier Penetration
 
Seals 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information
 
Notices*Transmitted
 
by memo to C. E. Rossi from J. G. Partlow dated 12/21/87*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
 
PPMB:ARM C/OGCB: DOEA:NRR D/DOEA:NRR
 
TechEdM CHBerlinger
 
CERossi 01/1</88 01/ /88 01/ /88 OGCB:DOEA:
V *D/DEST:NRR
 
*ADT/DEST:NRR
 
*D/DRIS:NRR
 
*DD/DRIS:NRR


==Description of Circumstances==
RJKiessel
:The NRC has been reviewing fire barrier penetration seal designs installed inseveral nuclear power plants. The reviews focused on whether the installedconfiguration was qualified by adequate testing and documentation.The current NRC review was prompted by reports, inspection findings, allegations,and other information that indicated the possibility that NRC requirements forfire barrier penetration seals were not being met in all aspects. The reviewincluded: evaluations of fire barrier penetration seal specifications and pro-cedures developed by licensees, licensee agents, and licensee contractors;evaluations of various fire barrier penetration seal tests and test data; andinspections of various fire barrier penetration seal designs and installations.The types of concerns identified to date and mentioned below are related to weak-nesses in the implementation of NRC requirements and guidelines as related tofire barrier penetration seal design qualification.The staff identified instances where installed fire barrier penetration sealdesigns could not be verified as qualified for the design rating of the pene-trated fire barrier. In some cases,-test qualification documentation was not8802020228 IN 88-04 -:February 5, 1988 available. In other cases, qualification test documentation was available butincomplete or inadequate because all qualification requirements had not beensatisfied or the installed seal design configuration or design parameters weresignificantly different from the tested seal.The NRC review also has identified a current practice that can affect thequalification status of installed seals. Plant modifications are being madethat require running new cable and conduits through existing penetration seals.These modifications are generally being made without an associated technicalreview to ensure that the resulting penetration seal design configuration ordesign parameters are consistent with those validated by initial qualificationtests. Over a period of time, numerous minor modifications to the same areacould cumulatively result in a degraded fire barrier rating.Discussion:NRC requirements and guidelines for fire barrier penetration seals are con-tained in various documents, including Appendix R to 10CFR 50, Appendix Ato Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1, "Guidelines for Fire Protec-tion for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976," and NUREG-0800,Standard Review Plan. The extent to which these requirements or guidelinesare applicable to a specific plant depends on plant age, commitments establishedby the licensee in developing the fire protection plan, the staff safety evalua-tion reports (SERs) and supplements, and the license conditions pertaining tofire protection.The goal is to provide a fire barrier penetration seal that will remain inplace and retain its integrity when subjected to an exposure fire, and subse-quently, a fire suppressing agent. This will provide reasonable assurance thatthe effects of a fire are limited to discrete fire areas and that one divisionof safe-shutdown-related systems will remain free of fire damage.A number of licensees have conducted a comprehensive.assessment of the adequacyof in-plant fire barrier penetration seals. Their efforts began by determiningwhich specific NRC guidelines/requirements apply and which specific commitmentswere made to respond to those guidelines or requirements. Typically, in-plantseal assemblies were surveyed to catalogue the various types of existing sealconfigurations. Finally, the documentation was analyzed to confirm thatin-plant designs were fully qualified by a fire test and were installed in aproper manner.If these efforts revealed instances where seals were not installed where re-quired, were not installed properly, or were not qualified by a standard firetest, then the licensees have considered the seals degraded and have imple-mented compensatory measures, such as fire watch patrols, per the appropriatetechnical specifications or administrative procedures. These measures remainin force pending final resolution of the issue. Final resolution may includereplacing existing penetration seals with fully qualified seals, qualifyingin-plant seal assemblies by supplemental fire tests, and justifying in-plantconfiguration by fire hazards/safe shutdown analysis.


IN 88-04February 5, 1988 Appendix A contains a summary of various technical considerations that havebeen used for evaluating the qualification adequacy of fire barrier penetrationseal designs and installations, associated testing, and test data.No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have questions about this matter, please contact one of the technicalcontacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRCregional office.a~r'es E. Ross ,DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contact(s): Dennis Kubicki, NRR(301) 492-0825Joseph Petrosino, NRR(301) 492-0979Attachments:1. Appendix A -Summary of Existing StaffGuidance Related to Fire BarrierPenetration Seals2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
IjNA LShao JRlchardson


Attachment 1IN 88-04February 5, 1988 APPENDIX ASUMMARY OF EXISTING STAFF GUIDANCE RELATEDTO FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION SEALSA. General Considerations Concerninq the Use of Test Results To Qualify FireBarrier Penetration Seal DesignsThe (fire barrier seal) test specimen shall be truly representative of theconstruction for which classification is desired, as to materials, work-manship, and details such as dimensions of parts, and shall be built underconditions representative of those obtaining as practically applied inbuilding construction and operation. The physical properties of thematerials and2ingredients used in the test specimen shall be determinedand recorded.B. Seal Acceptance Criteria1. The fire resistance rating of the penetration seal should bS equiva-lent to the rating of the barrier in which it is installed.2. The fire resistance rating of the penetration seal should be deter-mined by a4standard fire test (i.e., ASTM E-814, ASTM E-119 orIEEE-634).3. The test should be conducted by an independent, recognized testingauthority. The tested assembly should be representative of in-plantassemblies. The exposure fire should correspond to at least the time-temperature curve of ASTM E-119. Thermocouples should be positionedat representative locations on the cold side of the tested assembly(including the interface of seal material and through penetrations).The cold-side temperature should not exceed 2500F above ambient duringthe test or 3250F maximum, although higher temperatures at throughpenetrations are permitted when justified in terms of cable insulationignitability. There should be no burn-through of the seal during thetest, nor the passage of hot gases sufficient to ignite cotton wastematerial. The assembly should withstand t e effects of a hose stream,as stipulated in the standard test method.4. The seals should be installed by qualified individuals.65. Appropyiate quality assurance/quality control methods should be inforce.6. Fire barrier penetrations that must maintain environmental isolationor pressure differentials should be qualified by test to maintain thebarrier integrity under such conditions.
JGPartlow


Attachment 1IN 88-04February 5, 1988 C. Hose Stream Testing91. Hose stream testing is a requirement for all fire barrier penetrationseal qualification testing, regardless of whether the penetrationseal is for a wall or a ceiling or a floor.2. Hose stream testing should be performed on tested specimens that havesuccessfully withstood the fire endurance test requirements.3. The hose stream shall be delivered in one of the following ways:a 1-1/2-inch nozzle set at a discharge angle of 300 with a nozzlepressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm with the tipof the nozzle a maximum of 5 ft from the exposed face; a 1-1/2-inchnozzle set at a discharge angle of 150 with a nozzle pressure of 75psi and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle amaximum of 10 ft from the exposed face; a 2-1/2-inch national stan-dard playpipe equipped with 1-1/8-inch tip, nozzle pressure of 30 psi,located 20 ft from the exposed face.4. The duration of the hose stream test should meet the minimum require-ments specified in ASTM E-119 for fire barriers. During hose streamtesting, the fire barrier penetration seal should remain intact andshould not allow a projection of water beyond the unexposed surface.D. Deviations10Deviations from NRC requirements or accepted industry standards for firebarrier penetration seals should be technically substantiated as part ofthe review and approval of the fire protection plan or in other separateformal correspondence. Supplemental guidance is provided in GenericLetter 86-10.References1. "The design of fire barriers for horizontal and vertical cable traysshould, as a minimum, meet the requirements of ASTM E-119, Fire Testof Building Construction and Materials, including the hose stream test."[Section D.3.(d) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1]."Penetration seal designs shall utilize only noncombustible materials andshall be qualified by tests that are comparable to tests used to rate firebarriers." (Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50)."The penetration qualification tests should use the time temperatureexposure curve specified by ASTM E-119." (Section C.5.a. of BTP CMEB9.5-1).
BKGrimes O1/ll/88 12/17/87 12/16/87 12/16/87 12/16/87*VIB:DRIS:NRR


-Attachment 1IN 88-04February 5, 1988 . ASTM E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials."3. Section D.3.(d) of Appendix A to BtP APCSB 9.5-1.4. Section III.M. of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.5. ASTM E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials."6. Section C of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Section C.4 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.7. Ibidem.8. Section C.5.a.(3) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.9. Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB9.5-1.10. Generic Letter 86-10.r
*ASC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*AC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*ECEB:DEST:NRR*BC/ECEB:DEST:NRR


A ment 2February S. 1988Pige 1 of ILIST Of RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESLntonuatlol Dats ofNotice No. SubJect Issuance Issued to88-03 Cracks in Shroud Support 2/2/88 All holders of OLsAccess Hole Cover WVlds or CPs for BWRs.88.02 Lost or Stolen Gauges, 2/2/88 All NRC licenseesauthorized to possessgauges under aspecific or generallicense.88.01 Safety Injection Pipe 1/27/88 All holders of OLsFailus ror CPs for nuclearpower reactors.86-81, Broken External Closure 1/11/88 All holders of OMsSupp. 1 Springs on Atwood & Iorrill or CPs for nuclearmain Steam Isolation Valves power reactors.87-67 Lessons Learned from 12/31/87 All holders of OLsReional Inspections of or CPs for nuclearLicenses Action$ ia Response power reactors.to It Bolletin a0> -87-65 Inappropriate Application 12/31/87 All holders of OLsof Cofher1i1-l6rads or CPs for nuclearComponents powr reacton.87-28, Alp Systems Probi e at 12/28/87 All holders of MsSupp. 1 U.S. 1ight Water Reactors or CPs for nuclearpower reactors.87-65 Plant Operation Beyond 12/23/87 All holders of OLsAnalyzed Conditions or CPs for nuclearpower reactors.87-64 Conviction for Falsification 12/22/87 All nuclear powerof Security Training Records reactor facilitiesholding an OL or CPand all major fuelfacility licensees.ON : Operating LicenseCP
JPetrosino


* Construction PermitI :UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMAISSIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555OFFICIAL BUSINESSPENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300FIRST CLASS MAILPOSTAGE 6 FEES PAIDUSNRCPERMIT No. 0-E7120555026886 1 1CO1CY1FB11S1US NRC-OARM-IRMDIV OF INFO SUP SVCSMICROGRAPHICS SPECIALISTRECORDS SERVICES BRANCH042WASHINGTON DC 20555 IN 88-04February 5, 988Appendix A contains a summary of various technical considerations that havebeen used for evaluating the qualification adequacy of fire barrier penetrationseal designs and installations, associated testing, and test data.No specific action orIf you have questionscontacts listed belowregional office.written response is required by this information notice.about this matter, please contact one of the technicalor the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRCCharles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contact(s):Dennis Kubicki, NRR(301) 492-0825Joseph Petrosino, NRR(301) 492-0979Attachments:1. Appendix A -Summary of Existing StaffGuidance Related to Fire BarrierPenetration Seals2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*Transmitted by memo to C. E. Rossi from J. G.Partlow dated 12/21/87IC " m-a -044 %i'*SEE PREVIOUS*PPMB:ARMTechEd01/15/88*OGCB:DOEA:NRFRJKiessel01/14/88*VIB:DRIS:NRRJPetrosino12/15/87CONCURRENCES 4 **C/OGCB:DOEA:NR R RCHBerlinger a01/21/88 0245-/88t *D/DEST:NRR *ADT/DEST:NRR *D/DRIS:NRR *DD/DRIS:NRRLShao JRichardson JGPartlow BKGrimes12/17/87 12/16/87 12/16/87 12/16/87*ASC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*AC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*ECEB:DEST:NRR*BC/ECEB:DEST:NRREBaker JStone DKubicki CMcCracken12/15/87 12/18/87 12/16/87 12/16/87 IN 88-XXJanuary XX, 1988 Appendix A contains a summary of various technical considerations that havebeen used for evaluating the qualification adequacy of fire barrier penetrationseal designs and installations, associated testing, and test data.No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Adminis-trator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contact(s): Dennis Kubicki, NRR(301) 492-9424Joseph Petrosino, NRR(301) 492-4316Attachments:1. Appendix A -Summary of Existing StaffGuidance Related to Fire BarrierPenetration Seals2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices*Transmitted by memo to C. E. Rossi from J. G. Partlow dated 12/21/87*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCESPPMB:ARM C/OGCB: DOEA:NRR D/DOEA:NRRTechEdM CHBerlinger CERossi01/1</88 01/ /88 01/ /88OGCB:DOEA: V *D/DEST:NRR *ADT/DEST:NRR *D/DRIS:NRR *DD/DRIS:NRRRJKiessel IjNA LShao JRlchardson JGPartlow BKGrimesO1/ll/88 12/17/87 12/16/87 12/16/87 12/16/87*VIB:DRIS:NRR *ASC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*AC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*ECEB:DEST:NRR*BC/ECEB:DEST:NRRJPetrosino EBaker JStone DKubicki CMcCracken12/15/87 12/15/87 12/18/87 12/16/87 12/16/87  
===EBaker JStone DKubicki CMcCracken===
}}
12/15/87 12/15/87 12/18/87 12/16/87 12/16/87}}


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Revision as of 12:27, 31 August 2018

Inadequate Qualification and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals
ML031150660
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date: 02/05/1988
From: Rossi C E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-004, NUDOCS 8802020228
Download: ML031150660 (9)


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 5, 1988 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE NO. 88-04: INADEQUATE

QUALIFICATION

AND DOCUMENTATION

OF FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION

SEALS

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

This notice is to alert addressees

that some installed

fire barrier penetration

seal designs may not be adequately

qualified

for the design rating of the penetrated

fire barriers.

It is expected that recipients

will review this information

for applicability

and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem and correct existing problems at their facilities.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice do not constitute

new NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description

of Circumstances:

The NRC has been reviewing

fire barrier penetration

seal designs installed

in several nuclear power plants. The reviews focused on whether the installed configuration

was qualified

by adequate testing and documentation.

The current NRC review was prompted by reports, inspection

findings, allegations, and other information

that indicated

the possibility

that NRC requirements

for fire barrier penetration

seals were not being met in all aspects. The review included:

evaluations

of fire barrier penetration

seal specifications

and pro-cedures developed

by licensees, licensee agents, and licensee contractors;

evaluations

of various fire barrier penetration

seal tests and test data; and inspections

of various fire barrier penetration

seal designs and installations.

The types of concerns identified

to date and mentioned

below are related to weak-nesses in the implementation

of NRC requirements

and guidelines

as related to fire barrier penetration

seal design qualification.

The staff identified

instances

where installed

fire barrier penetration

seal designs could not be verified as qualified

for the design rating of the pene-trated fire barrier. In some cases,-test

qualification

documentation

was not 8802020228 IN 88-04 -: February 5, 1988 available.

In other cases, qualification

test documentation

was available

but incomplete

or inadequate

because all qualification

requirements

had not been satisfied

or the installed

seal design configuration

or design parameters

were significantly

different

from the tested seal.The NRC review also has identified

a current practice that can affect the qualification

status of installed

seals. Plant modifications

are being made that require running new cable and conduits through existing penetration

seals.These modifications

are generally

being made without an associated

technical review to ensure that the resulting

penetration

seal design configuration

or design parameters

are consistent

with those validated

by initial qualification

tests. Over a period of time, numerous minor modifications

to the same area could cumulatively

result in a degraded fire barrier rating.Discussion:

NRC requirements

and guidelines

for fire barrier penetration

seals are con-tained in various documents, including

Appendix R to 10CFR 50, Appendix A to Branch Technical

Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1, "Guidelines

for Fire Protec-tion for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976," and NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan. The extent to which these requirements

or guidelines

are applicable

to a specific plant depends on plant age, commitments

established

by the licensee in developing

the fire protection

plan, the staff safety evalua-tion reports (SERs) and supplements, and the license conditions

pertaining

to fire protection.

The goal is to provide a fire barrier penetration

seal that will remain in place and retain its integrity

when subjected

to an exposure fire, and subse-quently, a fire suppressing

agent. This will provide reasonable

assurance

that the effects of a fire are limited to discrete fire areas and that one division of safe-shutdown-related

systems will remain free of fire damage.A number of licensees

have conducted

a comprehensive.assessment

of the adequacy of in-plant fire barrier penetration

seals. Their efforts began by determining

which specific NRC guidelines/requirements

apply and which specific commitments

were made to respond to those guidelines

or requirements.

Typically, in-plant seal assemblies

were surveyed to catalogue

the various types of existing seal configurations.

Finally, the documentation

was analyzed to confirm that in-plant designs were fully qualified

by a fire test and were installed

in a proper manner.If these efforts revealed instances

where seals were not installed

where re-quired, were not installed

properly, or were not qualified

by a standard fire test, then the licensees

have considered

the seals degraded and have imple-mented compensatory

measures, such as fire watch patrols, per the appropriate

technical

specifications

or administrative

procedures.

These measures remain in force pending final resolution

of the issue. Final resolution

may include replacing

existing penetration

seals with fully qualified

seals, qualifying

in-plant seal assemblies

by supplemental

fire tests, and justifying

in-plant configuration

by fire hazards/safe

shutdown analysis.

IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 Appendix A contains a summary of various technical

considerations

that have been used for evaluating

the qualification

adequacy of fire barrier penetration

seal designs and installations, associated

testing, and test data.No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice.If you have questions

about this matter, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

NRC regional office.a~r'es E. Ross ,Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact(s):

Dennis Kubicki, NRR (301) 492-0825 Joseph Petrosino, NRR (301) 492-0979 Attachments:

1. Appendix A -Summary of Existing Staff Guidance Related to Fire Barrier Penetration

Seals 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

Attachment

1 IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 APPENDIX A SUMMARY OF EXISTING STAFF GUIDANCE RELATED TO FIRE BARRIER PENETRATION

SEALS A. General Considerations

Concerninq

the Use of Test Results To Qualify Fire Barrier Penetration

Seal Designs The (fire barrier seal) test specimen shall be truly representative

of the construction

for which classification

is desired, as to materials, work-manship, and details such as dimensions

of parts, and shall be built under conditions

representative

of those obtaining

as practically

applied in building construction

and operation.

The physical properties

of the materials

and 2 ingredients

used in the test specimen shall be determined

and recorded.B. Seal Acceptance

Criteria 1. The fire resistance

rating of the penetration

seal should bS equiva-lent to the rating of the barrier in which it is installed.

2. The fire resistance

rating of the penetration

seal should be deter-mined by a 4 standard fire test (i.e., ASTM E-814, ASTM E-119 or IEEE-634).

3. The test should be conducted

by an independent, recognized

testing authority.

The tested assembly should be representative

of in-plant assemblies.

The exposure fire should correspond

to at least the time-temperature

curve of ASTM E-119. Thermocouples

should be positioned

at representative

locations

on the cold side of the tested assembly (including

the interface

of seal material and through penetrations).

The cold-side

temperature

should not exceed 250 0 F above ambient during the test or 325 0 F maximum, although higher temperatures

at through penetrations

are permitted

when justified

in terms of cable insulation

ignitability.

There should be no burn-through

of the seal during the test, nor the passage of hot gases sufficient

to ignite cotton waste material.

The assembly should withstand

t e effects of a hose stream, as stipulated

in the standard test method.4. The seals should be installed

by qualified

individuals.

6 5. Appropyiate

quality assurance/quality

control methods should be in force.6. Fire barrier penetrations

that must maintain environmental

isolation or pressure differentials

should be qualified

by test to maintain the barrier integrity

under such conditions.

Attachment

1 IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 C. Hose Stream Testing9 1. Hose stream testing is a requirement

for all fire barrier penetration

seal qualification

testing, regardless

of whether the penetration

seal is for a wall or a ceiling or a floor.2. Hose stream testing should be performed

on tested specimens

that have successfully

withstood

the fire endurance

test requirements.

3. The hose stream shall be delivered

in one of the following

ways: a 1-1/2-inch

nozzle set at a discharge

angle of 300 with a nozzle pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge

of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 5 ft from the exposed face; a 1-1/2-inch

nozzle set at a discharge

angle of 150 with a nozzle pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge

of 75 gpm with the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 10 ft from the exposed face; a 2-1/2-inch

national stan-dard playpipe equipped with 1-1/8-inch

tip, nozzle pressure of 30 psi, located 20 ft from the exposed face.4. The duration of the hose stream test should meet the minimum require-ments specified

in ASTM E-119 for fire barriers.

During hose stream testing, the fire barrier penetration

seal should remain intact and should not allow a projection

of water beyond the unexposed

surface.D. Deviations

1 0 Deviations

from NRC requirements

or accepted industry standards

for fire barrier penetration

seals should be technically

substantiated

as part of the review and approval of the fire protection

plan or in other separate formal correspondence.

Supplemental

guidance is provided in Generic Letter 86-10.References

1. "The design of fire barriers for horizontal

and vertical cable trays should, as a minimum, meet the requirements

of ASTM E-119, Fire Test of Building Construction

and Materials, including

the hose stream test."[Section D.3.(d) of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1]."Penetration

seal designs shall utilize only noncombustible

materials

and shall be qualified

by tests that are comparable

to tests used to rate fire barriers." (Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50)."The penetration

qualification

tests should use the time temperature

exposure curve specified

by ASTM E-119." (Section C.5.a. of BTP CMEB 9.5-1).

-Attachment

1 IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 2. ASTM E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction

and Materials." 3. Section D.3.(d) of Appendix A to BtP APCSB 9.5-1.4.Section III.M. of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.5. ASTM E-119, "Fire Test of Building Construction

and Materials." 6. Section C of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Section C.4 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.7. Ibidem.8. Section C.5.a.(3)

of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.9.Section III.M of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.10. Generic Letter 86-10.r

A ment 2 February S. 1988 Pige 1 of I LIST Of RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Lntonuatlol

Dats of Notice No. SubJect Issuance Issued to 88-03 Cracks in Shroud Support 2/2/88 All holders of OLs Access Hole Cover WVlds or CPs for BWRs.88.02 Lost or Stolen Gauges, 2/2/88 All NRC licensees authorized

to possess gauges under a specific or general license.88.01 Safety Injection

Pipe 1/27/88 All holders of OLs Failus ror CPs for nuclear power reactors.86-81, Broken External Closure 1/11/88 All holders of OMs Supp. 1 Springs on Atwood & Iorrill or CPs for nuclear main Steam Isolation

Valves power reactors.87-67 Lessons Learned from 12/31/87 All holders of OLs Reional Inspections

of or CPs for nuclear Licenses Action$ ia Response power reactors.to It Bolletin a0> -87-65 Inappropriate

Application

12/31/87 All holders of OLs of Cofher1i1-l6rads

or CPs for nuclear Components

powr reacton.87-28, Alp Systems Probi e at 12/28/87 All holders of Ms Supp. 1 U.S. 1ight Water Reactors or CPs for nuclear power reactors.87-65 Plant Operation

Beyond 12/23/87 All holders of OLs Analyzed Conditions

or CPs for nuclear power reactors.87-64 Conviction

for Falsification

12/22/87 All nuclear power of Security Training Records reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP and all major fuel facility licensees.

ON : Operating

License CP

  • Construction

PermitI : UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMAISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300 FIRST CLASS MAIL POSTAGE 6 FEES PAID USNRC PERMIT No. 0-E7 120555026886

1 1CO1CY1FB11S1 US NRC-OARM-IRM

DIV OF INFO SUP SVCS MICROGRAPHICS

SPECIALIST

RECORDS SERVICES BRANCH 042 WASHINGTON

DC 20555 IN 88-04 February 5, 1988 Appendix A contains a summary of various technical

considerations

that have been used for evaluating

the qualification

adequacy of fire barrier penetration

seal designs and installations, associated

testing, and test data.No specific action or If you have questions contacts listed below regional office.written response is required by this information

notice.about this matter, please contact one of the technical or the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

NRC Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact(s):

Dennis Kubicki, NRR (301) 492-0825 Joseph Petrosino, NRR (301) 492-0979 Attachments:

1. Appendix A -Summary of Existing Staff Guidance Related to Fire Barrier Penetration

Seals 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*Transmitted

by memo to C. E. Rossi from J. G.Partlow dated 12/21/87 IC " m-a -044 %i'*SEE PREVIOUS*PPMB:ARM TechEd 01/15/88*OGCB:DOEA:NRF

RJKiessel 01/14/88*VIB:DRIS:NRR

JPetrosino

12/15/87 CONCURRENCES

4 **C/OGCB:DOEA:NR

R R CHBerlinger

a 01/21/88 0245-/88 t *D/DEST:NRR

  • ADT/DEST:NRR
  • D/DRIS:NRR
  • DD/DRIS:NRR

LShao JRichardson

JGPartlow

BKGrimes 12/17/87 12/16/87 12/16/87 12/16/87*ASC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*AC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*ECEB:DEST:NRR*BC/ECEB:DEST:NRR

EBaker JStone DKubicki CMcCracken

12/15/87 12/18/87 12/16/87 12/16/87 IN 88-XX January XX, 1988 Appendix A contains a summary of various technical

considerations

that have been used for evaluating

the qualification

adequacy of fire barrier penetration

seal designs and installations, associated

testing, and test data.No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice.If you have questions

about this matter, please contact the Regional Adminis-trator of the appropriate

NRC regional office or this office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contact(s):

Dennis Kubicki, NRR (301) 492-9424 Joseph Petrosino, NRR (301) 492-4316 Attachments:

1. Appendix A -Summary of Existing Staff Guidance Related to Fire Barrier Penetration

Seals 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information

Notices*Transmitted

by memo to C. E. Rossi from J. G. Partlow dated 12/21/87*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

PPMB:ARM C/OGCB: DOEA:NRR D/DOEA:NRR

TechEdM CHBerlinger

CERossi 01/1</88 01/ /88 01/ /88 OGCB:DOEA:

V *D/DEST:NRR

  • ADT/DEST:NRR
  • D/DRIS:NRR
  • DD/DRIS:NRR

RJKiessel

IjNA LShao JRlchardson

JGPartlow

BKGrimes O1/ll/88 12/17/87 12/16/87 12/16/87 12/16/87*VIB:DRIS:NRR

  • ASC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*AC/VIB:DRIS:NRR*ECEB:DEST:NRR*BC/ECEB:DEST:NRR

JPetrosino

EBaker JStone DKubicki CMcCracken

12/15/87 12/15/87 12/18/87 12/16/87 12/16/87