Information Notice 1989-80, Potential for Water Hammer, Thermal Strafication, and Steam Binding in High-Pressure Coolant Injection Piping: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555December 1, 1989NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-80: POTENTIAL FOR WATER HAMMER, THERMALSTRATIFICATION, AND STEAM BINDINGIN HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTIONPIPING
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 1, 1989 NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICE NO. 89-80: POTENTIAL
 
FOR WATER HAMMER, THERMAL STRATIFICATION, AND STEAM BINDING IN HIGH-PRESSURE
 
COOLANT INJECTION PIPING


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.
:
All holders of operating
 
licenses or construction
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
:This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential pro-blems resulting from failure of high-pressure coolant injection((HPCI) valvesin a boiling-water reactor (BWR) to prevent leakage of feedwater into the HPCIsystem during operation of the reactor at power. It is expected that recipientswill review the information for applicability to their facilities and consideractions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions con-tained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore,no specific action or written response is required.
: This information
 
notice is being provided to alert addressees
 
to potential
 
pro-blems resulting
 
from failure of high-pressure
 
coolant injection((HPCI)  
valves in a boiling-water
 
reactor (BWR) to prevent leakage of feedwater
 
into the HPCI system during operation
 
of the reactor at power. It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
However, suggestions
 
con-tained in this information
 
notice do not constitute
 
NRC requirements;  
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances:
On February 21, 1989, with Dresden Unit 2 operating
 
at power, temperature
 
was greater than normal in the HPCI pump and turbine room. The abnormal heat load was caused by feedwater
 
leaking through uninsulated
 
===HPCI piping to the condensate===
storage tank. During power operation, feedwater
 
temperature
 
is less than 350 0 F, and feedwater
 
pressure is approximately
 
1025 psi. Normally, leakage to the con-densate storage tank is prevented
 
by the injection
 
check valve; the injection valve, or the discharge
 
valve on the auxiliary
 
cooling water pump. The injection valve and the injection
 
check.valve
 
are shown in Attachment
 
1.On October 23, 1989, with the reactor at power, leakage had increased
 
suffi-ciently to raise the temperature
 
between the injection
 
valve and the HPCI pump discharge
 
valve to 275 0 F and at the discharge
 
of the HPCI pump to 246 0 F.Pressure in the HPCI piping was 47 psia. On the basis of the temperature
 
gradient and the pressure in the piping, the licensee concluded
 
that feedwater leaking through the injection
 
valve was flashing and displacing
 
some of the water in the piping with steam. This conclusion
 
was confirmed
 
by closing the pump discharge
 
valve and monitoring
 
the temperature
 
of the piping. As expected, the pipe temperature
 
decreased
 
to ambient.:891127000
o j, ''@
IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 Accessible
 
portions of the HPCI piping were inspected, and some loose pipe supports were found near the injection
 
valves. Concrete surfaces near the support attachment
 
points were spalled.The licensee declared the HPCI system inoperable
 
on October 23, 1989, and notified NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. After performing
 
a review under 10 CFR 50.59, the licensee opened the normally closed injection
 
valve, closed the normally open discharge
 
valve, and will use the discharge
 
valve temporarily
 
as the injection
 
valve.Temperature
 
measurements
 
on the HPCI piping at Dresden Unit 3 indicated
 
that less significant
 
leakage was occurring.
 
Discussion:
The event at Dresden is significant
 
because the potential
 
existed for water hammer or thermal stratification
 
to cause failure of the HPCI piping and for steam binding to cause failure of the HPCI pump. Further, failure of HPCI piping downstream
 
from the injection
 
valves would cause loss of one of two feedwater
 
pipes.The licensee has not heard the noise that is usually associated
 
with water hammers. Nevertheless, loosening
 
of the pipe supports, damage to concrete surfaces, and the presence of steam in the piping strongly Indicate that water hammers had occurred in the HPCI system, probably during HPCI pump tests or valve manipulations.
 
Temperature-monitoring
 
instrumentation
 
on the piping near the injection
 
valves was useful in detecting
 
the leak. NRC Information
 
Notices 85-76, 86-01, 87-10, and 88-13 all address water hammer events at other facilities.
 
Attachment
 
2 lists these and other references
 
mentioned
 
in this notice.Concern for potential
 
thermal stratification
 
in the HPCI piping is related to three events in pressurized-water
 
reactors (PWRs) that were the basis for issuing NRC Bulletin 88-08 and the three supplements
 
to that bulletin.
 
These events occurred in one of the Farley units and in two foreign reactors.
 
In all of the events, water leaked either from or to the reactor coolant system through closed valves in an emergency
 
coolant system. Thermal stratification
 
of water in the piping of the emergency
 
coolant system and fluctuations
 
of the interface
 
between the hot and cold streams of water resulted in thermal fatigue and cracking of the piping wall in the heat-affected
 
zones of welds and in the base metal. For these reactors, the configuration
 
of the piping between the reactor coolant system and the first valve in the emergency
 
cooling system is approximately
 
like the configuration
 
of the piping at Dresden. The licensee for Dresden does intend to examine the piping ultrasonically
 
at the next scheduled
 
outage to determine
 
whether detectable
 
damage has occurred.During the event at Dresden, the potential
 
for steam bindingv the HPCI pump existed because the discharge
 
valve was normally open. Events have occurred in PWRs that have resulted in steam binding of auxiliary
 
feedwater
 
pumps.Because the NRC staff was concerned
 
about the availability
 
of the auxiliary
 
''-$ '
'4, IN 89-80 December 1, 1988 feedwater
 
pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences
 
of an accident, the staff Issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees develop Procedures
 
for monitoring
 
the temperature
 
of the pump discharge
 
to ensure that it remains at less than saturation
 
temperature
 
and to identify steam binding and restore the operability
 
of the system if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional
 
information
 
as more inspection
 
and analysis is completed.
 
This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
NRR project manager. I* e4 Charles E. Rossi, Drec Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contacts:
Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure
 
Coolant Injection
 
Line 2. Referenced
 
===Generic Communications===
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices I
 
_ , r 1.5/1 1/89 7/18 /89 1 0/23/89 A 140 F 175 F 248 F B 180 F 220 F 275 F c INJECTION VALVES D I SCHARGE VALVE B FEEDWATER A FPC I PUMP TEST RETURN*(DRESDEN 2 -HIGH-PRESSURE
 
COOLANT INJECTION
 
LINE ul 0 C- +VD (D oFr a to c-, CD (D CO O CD CX)o -1 CDM..0
Attachment
 
2 IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 REFERENCED
 
===GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS===
1. NRC Information
 
Notice No. 85-76, "Recent Water Hammer Events," September
 
19, 1985.2. NRC Information
 
Notice No. 86-01, "Failure of Main Feedwater
 
Check Valves Causes Loss of Feedwater
 
System Integrity
 
and Water Hammer Damage," January 1, 1986.3. NRC Information
 
Notice No. 87-10, "Potential
 
for Water Hammer During Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps," February 2, 1987.4. NRC Information
 
Notice No. 88-13, "Water Hammer and Possible Piping Damage Caused by Misapplication
 
of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm
 
Globe Valves," April 18, 1988.5. NRC Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary
 
Feedwater
 
Pumps," October 29, 1985.6. NRC Bulletin No. 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected
 
to Reactor Coolant Systems," June 22, 1988; Supplement
 
1, June 24, 1988; Supplement
 
2, August 4, 1988; and Supplement
 
3, April.11, 1988.
 
Attachment
 
3 IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Information
 
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 89-79 89-56, Supp. 1 89-78.89-77 Degraded Coatings and Corrosion
 
of Steel Containment
 
Vessels Questionable
 
===Certification===
of Material Supplied to the Defense Department
 
by Nuclear Suppliers Failure of Packing Nuts on One-Inch Uranium Hexafluoride
 
===Cylinder Valves Debris in Containment===
Emergency
 
Sumps and Incorrect
 
===Screen Configurations===
Biofouling
 
Agent: Zebra Mussel Falsification
 
of Welder Qualifications
 
for Contractor
 
Employees Clarification
 
of Trans-portation
 
===Requirements===
Applicable
 
to Return of Spent Radiopharmacy
 
Dosages from Users to Suppliers Potential
 
===Overpressurization===
of Low Pressure Systems 12/1/89 11/22/89 11/22/89 11/21/89 11/21/89 11/20/89 11/7/89 11/1/89 All holders of OLs or CPs for LWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All NRC licensees authorized
 
to possess and use source material and/or special nuclear material for the heating, emptying, filling, or shipping of uranium hexafluoride
 
in 30-and 48-inch diameter cylinders.
 
All holders of OLs or CPs for PWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All manufacturers
 
and distributors
 
of radiopharmaceuticals
 
for medical use, nuclear pharmacies, and medical licensees.
 
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.89-76 89-75 89-74 89-73 OL = Operating
 
License CP = Construction
 
Permit
 
IN 89-80 December 1, 1988 feedwater
 
pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences
 
of an accident, the staff issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees develop procedures
 
for monitoring
 
the temperature
 
of the pump discharge
 
to ensure that it remains at less than saturation
 
temperature
 
and to identify steam binding and restore the operability
 
of the system if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional
 
information
 
as more inspection
 
and analysis is completed.
 
This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger (301)Woodruff, NRR 492-1180 Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure
 
Coolant Injection
 
Line 2. Referenced
 
===Generic Communications===
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
EAB: NRR*RWoodruff:db
 
11/12/89 C:PB1:RIII
 
*WShafer 11/13/89 IRB:AEOD*EWeiss 11/14/89 C:EAB:NRR*CHaughney
 
11/15/89 TECH EDITOR*RSanders 11/15/89 C:OGCB:NRR
 
*CBerlinger
 
11/22/89 EAB:NRR*PBaranowsky
 
11/1§/89 D:06A.CERossi DO 11/;1/89 PM:PD32:NRR
 
*BSiegel 11/15/89 I NRCIN 88-xx November x, 1988 monitoring
 
the temperature
 
of the pump discharge
 
to ensure that it is at less than saturation
 
temperature
 
and to identify steam binding if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional
 
information
 
as more inspection
 
and analysis is completed.
 
No specific action or written response is required by this information
 
notice. If you have questions
 
about this matter, please call one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
 
of the appropriate
 
regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure
 
Coolant Injection
 
Line 2. List of Recently Issued Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS EAB:NRR*RWoodruff:db
 
11/ /89 C:PB1:RIII
 
*WShafer 11/ /89 CONCURRENCE
 
IRB:AEOD*EWeiss 11/ /L6 TECH EDITOR EAB:NRR PBaranomsky
 
11/1 5/89 PM:PD32:NRR
 
BSiegelrP 11115189 Ko D:DOEA:NRR
 
CERossi 11/ /89 1 /WY/89 Doc: 299A
 
4.1.d NRCIN 88-xx November x, 1988 temperature
 
of the pump discharge
 
to assure that it is at less than saturation
 
temperature
 
and to identify steam binding if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional
 
information
 
as more inspection
 
and analysis is completed.
 
No specific action or written response is required by this information
 
notice. If you have questions
 
about this matter, please call one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
 
of the appropriate
 
regional office.Charles E. Rossi. Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:
1. Dresden 2 -High Pressure Coolant Injection
 
Line 2. List of Recently Issued Information
 
Notices EAB:NRR RWoodruff:db
 
11/11189 3BM tricpkoa~C:PB1:RILI~
WShafer-Cd,'
11/13/89 IRB:AEOD EWei S 11/1 /89 C:EAB:NRR CHaughney 11/ /89 TECH EDITOR 11/1ST/89 C:OGCB:NRR


==Description of Circumstances==
CBerlinger
:On February 21, 1989, with Dresden Unit 2 operating at power, temperature wasgreater than normal in the HPCI pump and turbine room. The abnormal heat loadwas caused by feedwater leaking through uninsulated HPCI piping to the condensatestorage tank. During power operation, feedwater temperature is less than 3500F,and feedwater pressure is approximately 1025 psi. Normally, leakage to the con-densate storage tank is prevented by the injection check valve; the injectionvalve, or the discharge valve on the auxiliary cooling water pump. The injectionvalve and the injection check.valve are shown in Attachment 1.On October 23, 1989, with the reactor at power, leakage had increased suffi-ciently to raise the temperature between the injection valve and the HPCIpump discharge valve to 2750F and at the discharge of the HPCI pump to 2460F.Pressure in the HPCI piping was 47 psia. On the basis of the temperaturegradient and the pressure in the piping, the licensee concluded that feedwaterleaking through the injection valve was flashing and displacing some of thewater in the piping with steam. This conclusion was confirmed by closing thepump discharge valve and monitoring the temperature of the piping. As expected,the pipe temperature decreased to ambient.:891127000o j, ''@
IN 89-80December 1, 1989 Accessible portions of the HPCI piping were inspected, and some loose pipesupports were found near the injection valves. Concrete surfaces near thesupport attachment points were spalled.The licensee declared the HPCI system inoperable on October 23, 1989, andnotified NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. After performing a review under 10CFR 50.59, the licensee opened the normally closed injection valve, closedthe normally open discharge valve, and will use the discharge valve temporarilyas the injection valve.Temperature measurements on the HPCI piping at Dresden Unit 3 indicated thatless significant leakage was occurring.Discussion:The event at Dresden is significant because the potential existed for waterhammer or thermal stratification to cause failure of the HPCI piping and forsteam binding to cause failure of the HPCI pump. Further, failure of HPCIpiping downstream from the injection valves would cause loss of one of twofeedwater pipes.The licensee has not heard the noise that is usually associated with waterhammers. Nevertheless, loosening of the pipe supports, damage to concretesurfaces, and the presence of steam in the piping strongly Indicate thatwater hammers had occurred in the HPCI system, probably during HPCI pumptests or valve manipulations. Temperature-monitoring instrumentation onthe piping near the injection valves was useful in detecting the leak. NRCInformation Notices 85-76, 86-01, 87-10, and 88-13 all address water hammerevents at other facilities. Attachment 2 lists these and other referencesmentioned in this notice.Concern for potential thermal stratification in the HPCI piping is relatedto three events in pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) that were the basis forissuing NRC Bulletin 88-08 and the three supplements to that bulletin. Theseevents occurred in one of the Farley units and in two foreign reactors. Inall of the events, water leaked either from or to the reactor coolant systemthrough closed valves in an emergency coolant system. Thermal stratificationof water in the piping of the emergency coolant system and fluctuations ofthe interface between the hot and cold streams of water resulted in thermalfatigue and cracking of the piping wall in the heat-affected zones of weldsand in the base metal. For these reactors, the configuration of the pipingbetween the reactor coolant system and the first valve in the emergency coolingsystem is approximately like the configuration of the piping at Dresden. Thelicensee for Dresden does intend to examine the piping ultrasonically at thenext scheduled outage to determine whether detectable damage has occurred.During the event at Dresden, the potential for steam bindingv the HPCI pumpexisted because the discharge valve was normally open. Events have occurredin PWRs that have resulted in steam binding of auxiliary feedwater pumps.Because the NRC staff was concerned about the availability of the auxiliary ''-$ '
'4,IN 89-80December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, thestaff Issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licenseesdevelop Procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge toensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identifysteam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis iscompleted.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR projectmanager. I* e4Charles E. Rossi, DrecDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD(301) 492-9005Roger Woodruff, NRR(301) 492-1180Attachments:1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line2. Referenced Generic Communications3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesI


_ , r1.5/1 1/897/18 /891 0/23/89A140 F175 F248 FB180 F220 F275 FcINJECTIONVALVESD I SCHARGEVALVEBFEEDWATERAFPC IPUMPTEST RETURN*(DRESDEN 2 -HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION LINEul 0 C- +VD (D oFra to c-,CD (D CO OCD CX)o -1 CDM..0
11/ /89 EAB:NRR PBaranowsky
Attachment 2IN 89-80December 1, 1989 REFERENCED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS1. NRC Information Notice No. 85-76, "Recent Water Hammer Events,"September 19, 1985.2. NRC Information Notice No. 86-01, "Failure of Main Feedwater Check ValvesCauses Loss of Feedwater System Integrity and Water Hammer Damage,"January 1, 1986.3. NRC Information Notice No. 87-10, "Potential for Water Hammer DuringRestart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps," February 2, 1987.4. NRC Information Notice No. 88-13, "Water Hammer and Possible Piping DamageCaused by Misapplication of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm Globe Valves,"April 18, 1988.5. NRC Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps,"October 29, 1985.6. NRC Bulletin No. 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to ReactorCoolant Systems," June 22, 1988; Supplement 1, June 24, 1988; Supplement 2,August 4, 1988; and Supplement 3, April.11, 1988.


Attachment 3IN 89-80December 1, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to89-7989-56,Supp. 189-78.89-77Degraded Coatings andCorrosion of SteelContainment VesselsQuestionable Certificationof Material Supplied tothe Defense Departmentby Nuclear SuppliersFailure of Packing Nutson One-Inch UraniumHexafluoride CylinderValvesDebris in ContainmentEmergency Sumps andIncorrect ScreenConfigurationsBiofouling Agent: ZebraMusselFalsification of WelderQualifications forContractor EmployeesClarification of Trans-portation RequirementsApplicable to Return ofSpent Radiopharmacy Dosagesfrom Users to SuppliersPotential Overpressurizationof Low Pressure Systems12/1/8911/22/8911/22/8911/21/8911/21/8911/20/8911/7/8911/1/89All holders of OLsor CPs for LWRs.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All NRC licenseesauthorized to possessand use source materialand/or special nuclearmaterial for the heating,emptying, filling, orshipping of uraniumhexafluoride in 30-and 48-inch diametercylinders.All holders of OLsor CPs for PWRs.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All manufacturersand distributors ofradiopharmaceuticalsfor medical use,nuclear pharmacies,and medical licensees.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.89-7689-7589-7489-73OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
11/ /89 PM:PD32:NRR


IN 89-80December 1, 1988 feedwater pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident, thestaff issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licenseesdevelop procedures for monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge toensure that it remains at less than saturation temperature and to identifysteam binding and restore the operability of the system if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis iscompleted.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR projectmanager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:Eric W. Weiss, AEOD(301) 492-9005Roger(301)Woodruff, NRR492-1180Attachments:1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line2. Referenced Generic Communications3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEEAB: NRR*RWoodruff:db11/12/89C:PB1:RIII*WShafer11/13/89IRB:AEOD*EWeiss11/14/89C:EAB:NRR*CHaughney11/15/89TECH EDITOR*RSanders11/15/89C:OGCB:NRR*CBerlinger11/22/89EAB:NRR*PBaranowsky11/1§/89D:06A.CERossi DO11/;1/89PM:PD32:NRR*BSiegel11/15/89 INRCIN 88-xxNovember x, 1988 monitoring the temperature of the pump discharge to ensure that it is at lessthan saturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis iscompleted.No specific action or written response is required by this informationnotice. If you have questions about this matter, please call one of thetechnical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of theappropriate regional office.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:Eric W. Weiss, AEOD(301) 492-9005Roger Woodruff, NRR(301) 492-1180Attachments:1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure Coolant Injection Line2. List of Recently Issued Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUSEAB:NRR*RWoodruff:db11/ /89C:PB1:RIII*WShafer11/ /89CONCURRENCEIRB:AEOD*EWeiss11/ /L6TECH EDITOREAB:NRRPBaranomsky11/1 5/89PM:PD32:NRRBSiegelrP11115189 KoD:DOEA:NRRCERossi11/ /891 /WY/89Doc: 299A
BSiegel 11/ /89 D:DOEA:NRR


4.1.dNRCIN 88-xxNovember x, 1988 temperature of the pump discharge to assure that it is at less thansaturation temperature and to identify steam binding if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional information as more inspection and analysis iscompleted.No specific action or written response is required by this informationnotice. If you have questions about this matter, please call one of thetechnical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of theappropriate regional office.Charles E. Rossi. DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:Eric W. Weiss, AEOD(301) 492-9005Roger Woodruff, NRR(301) 492-1180Attachments:1. Dresden 2 -High Pressure Coolant Injection Line2. List of Recently Issued Information NoticesEAB:NRRRWoodruff:db11/111893BM tricpkoa~C:PB1:RILI~WShafer-Cd,'11/13/89IRB:AEODEWei S11/1 /89C:EAB:NRRCHaughney11/ /89TECH EDITOR11/1ST/89C:OGCB:NRRCBerlinger11/ /89EAB:NRRPBaranowsky11/ /89PM:PD32:NRRBSiegel11/ /89D:DOEA:NRRCERossi11/ /89  
CERossi 11/ /89}}
}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 12:15, 31 August 2018

Potential for Water Hammer, Thermal Strafication, and Steam Binding in High-Pressure Coolant Injection Piping
ML031190089
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date: 12/01/1989
From: Rossi C E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-89-080, NUDOCS 8911270002
Download: ML031190089 (9)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 1, 1989 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE NO. 89-80: POTENTIAL

FOR WATER HAMMER, THERMAL STRATIFICATION, AND STEAM BINDING IN HIGH-PRESSURE

COOLANT INJECTION PIPING

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

This information

notice is being provided to alert addressees

to potential

pro-blems resulting

from failure of high-pressure

coolant injection((HPCI)

valves in a boiling-water

reactor (BWR) to prevent leakage of feedwater

into the HPCI system during operation

of the reactor at power. It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

con-tained in this information

notice do not constitute

NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description

of Circumstances:

On February 21, 1989, with Dresden Unit 2 operating

at power, temperature

was greater than normal in the HPCI pump and turbine room. The abnormal heat load was caused by feedwater

leaking through uninsulated

HPCI piping to the condensate

storage tank. During power operation, feedwater

temperature

is less than 350 0 F, and feedwater

pressure is approximately

1025 psi. Normally, leakage to the con-densate storage tank is prevented

by the injection

check valve; the injection valve, or the discharge

valve on the auxiliary

cooling water pump. The injection valve and the injection

check.valve

are shown in Attachment

1.On October 23, 1989, with the reactor at power, leakage had increased

suffi-ciently to raise the temperature

between the injection

valve and the HPCI pump discharge

valve to 275 0 F and at the discharge

of the HPCI pump to 246 0 F.Pressure in the HPCI piping was 47 psia. On the basis of the temperature

gradient and the pressure in the piping, the licensee concluded

that feedwater leaking through the injection

valve was flashing and displacing

some of the water in the piping with steam. This conclusion

was confirmed

by closing the pump discharge

valve and monitoring

the temperature

of the piping. As expected, the pipe temperature

decreased

to ambient.:891127000

o j, @

IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 Accessible

portions of the HPCI piping were inspected, and some loose pipe supports were found near the injection

valves. Concrete surfaces near the support attachment

points were spalled.The licensee declared the HPCI system inoperable

on October 23, 1989, and notified NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72. After performing

a review under 10 CFR 50.59, the licensee opened the normally closed injection

valve, closed the normally open discharge

valve, and will use the discharge

valve temporarily

as the injection

valve.Temperature

measurements

on the HPCI piping at Dresden Unit 3 indicated

that less significant

leakage was occurring.

Discussion:

The event at Dresden is significant

because the potential

existed for water hammer or thermal stratification

to cause failure of the HPCI piping and for steam binding to cause failure of the HPCI pump. Further, failure of HPCI piping downstream

from the injection

valves would cause loss of one of two feedwater

pipes.The licensee has not heard the noise that is usually associated

with water hammers. Nevertheless, loosening

of the pipe supports, damage to concrete surfaces, and the presence of steam in the piping strongly Indicate that water hammers had occurred in the HPCI system, probably during HPCI pump tests or valve manipulations.

Temperature-monitoring

instrumentation

on the piping near the injection

valves was useful in detecting

the leak. NRC Information

Notices 85-76, 86-01, 87-10, and 88-13 all address water hammer events at other facilities.

Attachment

2 lists these and other references

mentioned

in this notice.Concern for potential

thermal stratification

in the HPCI piping is related to three events in pressurized-water

reactors (PWRs) that were the basis for issuing NRC Bulletin 88-08 and the three supplements

to that bulletin.

These events occurred in one of the Farley units and in two foreign reactors.

In all of the events, water leaked either from or to the reactor coolant system through closed valves in an emergency

coolant system. Thermal stratification

of water in the piping of the emergency

coolant system and fluctuations

of the interface

between the hot and cold streams of water resulted in thermal fatigue and cracking of the piping wall in the heat-affected

zones of welds and in the base metal. For these reactors, the configuration

of the piping between the reactor coolant system and the first valve in the emergency

cooling system is approximately

like the configuration

of the piping at Dresden. The licensee for Dresden does intend to examine the piping ultrasonically

at the next scheduled

outage to determine

whether detectable

damage has occurred.During the event at Dresden, the potential

for steam bindingv the HPCI pump existed because the discharge

valve was normally open. Events have occurred in PWRs that have resulted in steam binding of auxiliary

feedwater

pumps.Because the NRC staff was concerned

about the availability

of the auxiliary

-$ '

'4, IN 89-80 December 1, 1988 feedwater

pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences

of an accident, the staff Issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees develop Procedures

for monitoring

the temperature

of the pump discharge

to ensure that it remains at less than saturation

temperature

and to identify steam binding and restore the operability

of the system if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional

information

as more inspection

and analysis is completed.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager. I* e4 Charles E. Rossi, Drec Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts:

Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure

Coolant Injection

Line 2. Referenced

Generic Communications

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices I

_ , r 1.5/1 1/89 7/18 /89 1 0/23/89 A 140 F 175 F 248 F B 180 F 220 F 275 F c INJECTION VALVES D I SCHARGE VALVE B FEEDWATER A FPC I PUMP TEST RETURN*(DRESDEN 2 -HIGH-PRESSURE

COOLANT INJECTION

LINE ul 0 C- +VD (D oFr a to c-, CD (D CO O CD CX)o -1 CDM..0

Attachment

2 IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 REFERENCED

GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS

1. NRC Information

Notice No. 85-76, "Recent Water Hammer Events," September

19, 1985.2. NRC Information

Notice No. 86-01, "Failure of Main Feedwater

Check Valves Causes Loss of Feedwater

System Integrity

and Water Hammer Damage," January 1, 1986.3. NRC Information

Notice No. 87-10, "Potential

for Water Hammer During Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps," February 2, 1987.4. NRC Information

Notice No. 88-13, "Water Hammer and Possible Piping Damage Caused by Misapplication

of Kerotest Packless Metal Diaphragm

Globe Valves," April 18, 1988.5. NRC Bulletin 85-01, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary

Feedwater

Pumps," October 29, 1985.6. NRC Bulletin No. 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected

to Reactor Coolant Systems," June 22, 1988; Supplement

1, June 24, 1988; Supplement

2, August 4, 1988; and Supplement

3, April.11, 1988.

Attachment

3 IN 89-80 December 1, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 89-79 89-56, Supp. 1 89-78.89-77 Degraded Coatings and Corrosion

of Steel Containment

Vessels Questionable

Certification

of Material Supplied to the Defense Department

by Nuclear Suppliers Failure of Packing Nuts on One-Inch Uranium Hexafluoride

Cylinder Valves Debris in Containment

Emergency

Sumps and Incorrect

Screen Configurations

Biofouling

Agent: Zebra Mussel Falsification

of Welder Qualifications

for Contractor

Employees Clarification

of Trans-portation

Requirements

Applicable

to Return of Spent Radiopharmacy

Dosages from Users to Suppliers Potential

Overpressurization

of Low Pressure Systems 12/1/89 11/22/89 11/22/89 11/21/89 11/21/89 11/20/89 11/7/89 11/1/89 All holders of OLs or CPs for LWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All NRC licensees authorized

to possess and use source material and/or special nuclear material for the heating, emptying, filling, or shipping of uranium hexafluoride

in 30-and 48-inch diameter cylinders.

All holders of OLs or CPs for PWRs.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All manufacturers

and distributors

of radiopharmaceuticals

for medical use, nuclear pharmacies, and medical licensees.

All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.89-76 89-75 89-74 89-73 OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit

IN 89-80 December 1, 1988 feedwater

pumps when needed to mitigate the consequences

of an accident, the staff issued NRC Bulletin 85-01. The bulletin required that certain licensees develop procedures

for monitoring

the temperature

of the pump discharge

to ensure that it remains at less than saturation

temperature

and to identify steam binding and restore the operability

of the system if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional

information

as more inspection

and analysis is completed.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger (301)Woodruff, NRR 492-1180 Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure

Coolant Injection

Line 2. Referenced

Generic Communications

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

EAB: NRR*RWoodruff:db

11/12/89 C:PB1:RIII

  • WShafer 11/13/89 IRB:AEOD*EWeiss 11/14/89 C:EAB:NRR*CHaughney

11/15/89 TECH EDITOR*RSanders 11/15/89 C:OGCB:NRR

  • CBerlinger

11/22/89 EAB:NRR*PBaranowsky

11/1§/89 D:06A.CERossi DO 11/;1/89 PM:PD32:NRR

  • BSiegel 11/15/89 I NRCIN 88-xx November x, 1988 monitoring

the temperature

of the pump discharge

to ensure that it is at less than saturation

temperature

and to identify steam binding if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional

information

as more inspection

and analysis is completed.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have questions

about this matter, please call one of the technical

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 -High-Pressure

Coolant Injection

Line 2. List of Recently Issued Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS EAB:NRR*RWoodruff:db

11/ /89 C:PB1:RIII

  • WShafer 11/ /89 CONCURRENCE

IRB:AEOD*EWeiss 11/ /L6 TECH EDITOR EAB:NRR PBaranomsky

11/1 5/89 PM:PD32:NRR

BSiegelrP 11115189 Ko D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi 11/ /89 1 /WY/89 Doc: 299A

4.1.d NRCIN 88-xx November x, 1988 temperature

of the pump discharge

to assure that it is at less than saturation

temperature

and to identify steam binding if it occurs.The NRC may issue additional

information

as more inspection

and analysis is completed.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have questions

about this matter, please call one of the technical

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

regional office.Charles E. Rossi. Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts: Eric W. Weiss, AEOD (301) 492-9005 Roger Woodruff, NRR (301) 492-1180 Attachments:

1. Dresden 2 -High Pressure Coolant Injection

Line 2. List of Recently Issued Information

Notices EAB:NRR RWoodruff:db

11/11189 3BM tricpkoa~C:PB1:RILI~

WShafer-Cd,'

11/13/89 IRB:AEOD EWei S 11/1 /89 C:EAB:NRR CHaughney 11/ /89 TECH EDITOR 11/1ST/89 C:OGCB:NRR

CBerlinger

11/ /89 EAB:NRR PBaranowsky

11/ /89 PM:PD32:NRR

BSiegel 11/ /89 D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi 11/ /89


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