Potential Failure of Asea Brown Boveri Circuit Breakers During Seismic EventML031180711 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
03/15/1989 |
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From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-89-029, NUDOCS 8903090021 |
Download: ML031180711 (13) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 15, 1989 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-29: POTENTIAL FAILURE OF ASEA BROWN BOVERI
CIRCUIT BREAKERS DURING SEISMIC EVENT
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
This information notice Is being provided to alert addressees to potential
failures of ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB) K-Line circuit breakers (CBs) during a
seismic event. It is expected that recipients will review the information
for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information
notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or
written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
ABB submitted two letters, dated January 13 and February 16, 1989, to the NRC
in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 regarding a deficiency
in K-Line CBs, model numbers K-225 through K-2000, that were delivered to cus- tomers before July 1974.. These CBs have a slow-close lever that could move
during a seismic event and prevent the CBs from closing upon an electrical
demand. The slow-close lever is used to perform diagnostic checks on the
CB internals during initial installation. The lever is located in the rear
portion of the CB and is only accessible while the CB is out of its cubicle.
Discussion:
In late 1988, Rancho.Seco personnel asked ABB why some K-Line CBs used at the
Rancho Seco plant had springs on the slow-close lever and others did not. ABB
investigated the matter and determined that rebound springs were added to CBs
manufactured after July 1974 as a response to CB failures that occurred during
seismic testing of K-Line CBs.
The seismic testing was conducted on several sample K-Line CBs at Wyle Labora- tories in 1974 and consisted of 123 test runs under varying seismic conditions.
During test run number 100 (which consisted of side-to-side sine dwell at 23 hertz, amplitude 0.5 g, duration greater than 20 seconds), one K-1600 CB jammed
and failed to close on demand. During test run number 101 (which consisted of
(A 8903090021 ZA )
ML cl
S' IN 89-29 March 15, 1989 side-to-side sine dwell at 30 hertz, amplitude 0.36 g, duration greater than
20 seconds), a second K-1600 CB failed to close on demand. The causes of the
breaker malfunctions were not immediately recognized. ABB later determined
that the CBs had failed to close because of vibration-induced movement of the
slow-close lever to a position where It interfered with the closing mechanism
of the CB. As a result, a rebound spring that prevents any undesired movement
of the slow close lever was added to the CB design and Installed in all CBs
manufactured after mid-1974.
ABB sent the letters of January 13 and February 16, 1989, to all nuclear power
plants that have purchased safety-related electrically operated K-Line CBs, model numbers K-225 through K-2000, and requested that all users of these
CBs add rebound springs to the slow-close levers. The letters are included
as Attachment 1 and Attachment 2 respectively. Attachment 1 also includes
a sketch of the location of the slow-close lever with the rebound spring in
place and the field installation procedures for adding the rebound spring
to the slow-close lever. Additional information on this subject may be
obtained by contacting the appropriate ABB representative.
It is important for addressees to determine whether any of the subject CBs, regardless of their delivery or installation date, are installed at their
facilities and to verify that the CBs are seismically qualified.
In addition, addressees are reminded that component manufacturers do not
typically notify customers who have procured commercial grade items of design
changes and deficiencies identified in their components. Therefore, it is
Important that this fact be considered when purchasing components that were
procured as commercial grade and dedicated for safety-related applications
by entities other than the component manufacturer.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Charles E. Rossi, Dre or
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Jalme Guillen, NRR
(301) 492-1170
Attachments:
1. ASEA Brown Boveri Letter dated January 13, 1989
2. ASEA Brown Boveri Letter dated February 16, 1989
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Attachment 1 IN 89-29
[larch 15, 1989 IL ll lbEt ft Albert FKaiser
loPresident
ASEA BROWN BOVERI
January 13, 1989
Mr. Carl Berlinger, Branch Chief
Office of Generic Communications
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject: Slow Close Lever Rebound Spring for
ABB Power Distribution K-Line
Electrically Operated K-225 through
K-2000 Circuit Breakers
(Part 21 Report)
Gentlemen:
Recently SMUD Rancho Seco personnel questioned why some of.their K-Line
Circuit Breakers had a rebound spring on the slow close lever and some did
not.
An evaluation of this matter revealed that the rebound spring (Part Number
146119A00) had been added to the K-Line circuit breakers in July 1974. A
search of the archives showed that during seismic testing conducted earlier in
1974 that a circuit breaker malfunctioned by not closing normally during the
testing. Subsequent evaluation revealed that persistent sine dwell vibration
could occasionally cause the slow close bar to move into a position such that
the breaker, when called upon to close, went into a slow close rather than
closing normally. The addition of the rebound spring to the slow close lever
prevents the slow close bar from vibrating to this undesired position.
Subsequent seismic testing over the years has demonstrated that the addition
of the rebound spring in July 1974 solved the problem.
Users of K-Line K-225 through K-2000 circuit breaker that were delivered prior
to July 1974 should add the rebound spring (Part Number 146119A00) to the slow
close pin in accordance with the instructions included in I.B. 8901, a copy of
which is included with this report.
A copy of this report is being sent to all Nuclear Generating Stations with K-
Line equipment utilized in Nuclear Safety Related applications. A list of
Nuclear Generating Stations where K-Line equipment was delivered prior to July
1974 is included as an Appendix to this report.
If there is any doubt on the part of the user, the manufacturing date by month
and year is clearly stamped onto the nameplate of the circuit breakers.
ABB Power Distribution Inc.
.ABB Power Distribution Inc. Telephone: Telefax:
201 Hickman Drive 407 323-8220 407 322-8934 P0. Box 1978 Sanford, FL 32772-1978
Attachment 1 IN 89-29 ASEA BROWN BOVER:
March 15, 1989 Mr. Carl Berlinger January 13, 1989 Page 2 The rebound spring may be ordered through ABB Power Distribution
Sales
Offices.
No reports of in-service misoperation of a circuit breaker without
this spring
have been received. Also it should be noted that if a K-Line.circuit
breaker
without this spring is in the closed position, it will open
or trip normally
without any misoperation.
A. F. Kaiser, President
ABB Power Distribution, Inc.
EWR/jm
Enclosures
cc: J. Clark
R. Dietrick
R. Garzon
E. Johnson
M. Kangas
D. Purkey
E. Rhoads
Attachment 1 ASEABROWN BOVERI
IN 89-29 March 15, 1989 LIST OF USERS OF K-LINE
CIRCUIT BREAKERS DELIVERED
PRIOR TO JULY 1974 Arkansas Power & Light Arkansas Nuclear One
Carolina Power & Light Brqnswick
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Zimmer
Consumers Power Palisades
Duke Power Oconee
Duke Power McGuire
Florida Power Corporation Crystal River
Florida Power & Light St. Lucie
Florida Power & Light Turkey Point
Indiana & Michigan D. C. Cook
Iowa Electric Duane Arnold
Philadelphia Electric company Peachbottom
Public Service Colorado Ft. St. Vrain
Portland General Electric Trojan
Public Service Electric & Gas Salem
SMUD Rancho Seco
Virginia Electric Power Company North Anna
Virginia Electric Power Company Surry
~- Attachment 1 IN 89-29 A RIg March 15, 1989 ASEA BROWN BOVERI
IB-8901 FIELD INSTALLATION OF: Slow Close Lever Rebound Spring
Electrically Operated K-225 through
K-2000 Circuit Breakers.
PART REQUIRED: Spring Number 146119AOO
PROCEDURE:
1. Turn the motor disconnect switch off.
2. Trip the circuit breaker and rack the circuit
breaker to the "Disconnect" position.
3. Double check to make sure the closing springs
are discharged, then remove the four screws which
retain the
black front escutcheon to the black housing protruding
through the front door of the circuit breaker
cubicle. (It
will not be necessary to open the front door of
breaker cubicle to perform this procedure.) the circuit
Retain
screws for future reuse and catch the local electric the
and/or trip push buttons that may be on electrically close
circuit breakers. operated
4. Locate the slow close lever by looking to
right inside the black box. the
It will be protruding through a
small rectangular opening in the silver-grey
painted front
frame of the breaker.
5. Locate also the upper right Phillips pan head
screw which attaches the black housing to the
front frame. Loosen this screw approximately silver-grey
two turns. See
Figure 1.
6. Hook on end of spring 146119AOO over the
loosened screw. Stretch the spring so that the
hook can be
slid down on the slow close lever.
7. Retighten the screw to secure the spring at
top. This completes the spring installation. its
S. Reposition the local electric close and/or
push buttons, if necessary, in the front escutcheon, trip
line it up to reinstall on the front of the breaker. then
reinstalling the four screws, make sure the padlock Before
positioned properly and that the white reset button hasp is
through the front escutcheon. With everything passes
in order, reinstall the four screws.
ABB POWER DISTRIBUTION INC.
Circuit Breaker Division TELEPHONE TELEFAX
1-95 a MECHANICSVILLE HIGHWAY {BO3) 665-4144 (803' 667 5109 PO BOX F-7 O8sos 664 0520
FLORENCE. S C 29501 U S A
Attachment 1 IN 89-29 SA Ro it March 15, 1989 ASEAB3ROWN
BOVERI Page 2
9. Check the operation of the various operating
levers and buttons to make sure they work freely. When all
checkouts prove satisfactory, the breaker can be returned to
service.
NOTE: On circuit breakers with bell alarms or
solenoid reset of the auto trip indicator, access to the slow
close lever is more difficult. In those situations, it may
be easier to hook the spring over the slow close lever first.
The order of installation is left to the installer.
Attachment 1 IN 39-29
ASEA BROWN BONERW
March 15, 1989 .bP]2I'%&
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Attachment 2 A*~IN *j 89-29 March 15, 1989
? IPIP February 16, 1989 ASEA BROWN BOVERI
Hr. Carl Berlinger, Branch Chief
Office of Generic Communications
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555 Subject: Slow Close Lever Rebound Spring for
ABB Power Distribution, Inc. K-Line
Electrically Operated K-225 through
K-2000 Circuit Breakers
(Part 21 Report)
Gentlemen:
The purpose of this report is to provide additional detailed information to
the initial Part 21 Report of January 13, 1989.
Attached is a summary of the details from the Seismic Test of the K-Line
Switchgear that detected this malfunction of the circuit breaker slow close
latch.
This data can be used to assist the user in conducting their evaluation of
this condition. It can be seen that the sine dwell test wherein the
malfunction occurred is an unusually severe test and not likely to be
encountered in most locations.
By way of clarification the vibration induced mislocation of the slow close
latch simultaneously with a close signal to the circuit breaker may result in
a jamming of the breaker and a failure to close.
Racking of the circuit breaker either in or out will not cause any vibration -
to cause this condition.
This malfunction could be reproduced in the factory by near simultaneous trip
and close of the breaker. The tripping shock would occasionally bounce the
slow close bar into a position such that when called upon to close the breaker
went into slow close and jammed. Again, this is not a normal mode of
operation for a circuit breaker.
This supplemental information is being sent to the same distribution list as
the original report.
E. W. Rhoads
Manager, Quality Assurance
EWR/jm
Attachment ABB Power Distribution Inc.
ABB Power Disiribution Inc. Telephone: Telefax:
4379 Counly Line Road 215 822-4270 215822-4271 ChplfonI.PA 18914
Attachment 2 IN 89-29 March 15, 1989 SLOW CLOSE LATCH MALFUNCTION
Wyle Laboratories, Huntsville conducted an extensive
test program on a 4-frame
sample of ITE K-Line Low Voltage Switchgear (completed
May 10, 1974). Results
are reported in Wyle Report No. 42686-1.
Testing was biaxial (1 Horizontal and Vertical Axis)
and consisted of the
following test runs:
Runs 1-5 :F-B Sine Sweep Tests, 1 to 50 Hz, 1 octave/min. 0.2 g and 0.36 g.
Runs 6-19 :F-B RMF Biaxial Tests, > 16 sec. duration up to 1.5 g ZPA.
Runs 20-44 :F-B Sine Dwell at selected resonant frequencies 0.36 and 0.5 g >
20 sec. duration.
Runs 45-62 : F-B Sine Dwell at low frequencies at machine limits,
> 20 sec.
duration.
Runs 63-66 : S-S Sine Sweep Tests, 1 to 50 Hz, 1 octave/min. 0.2 g and 0.36 g.
Runs 67-80 :S-S RMF Biaxial Tests, > 16 sec. duration up to 1.5 g ZPA.
Runs81-105 : Sine Dwell at selected resonant frequencies, 0.36 and 0.5 g, > 20
sec. duration.
Runs 105-123 : S-S Sine Dwell at Low Frequencies at
machine limits, > 20 sec.
duration.
The latch malfunctions occurred on two K-1600 breakers.
Run 100 (side-to-side sine dwell at 23 Hz, amplitude Breaker 4C jammed on
0.5 g, duration greater
than 20 seconds). Breaker 5C jammed on Run 101 Hz, amplitude 0.36 g, duration greater than 20 (side-to-side sine dwell at 30
seconds.)
It should be noted that this phenomenon did not occur
test runs and the sine dwell testing is an unusually during any of the prior 99 performed) test method. severe (and ordinarily not
The cause of the jamming was not identified at the
test
inspection and tests at the factory verified the cause lab. Subsequent
mislocation of a slow-close latch simultaneously with as vibration-induced
a close signal to the
breaker.
The probability of this occurrence is very small.
This
that many high level RMF tests did not cause this type is borne out by the fact
of malfunction.
Circuit Breaker Engineering proceeded to add a spring
which prevents vibration-induced movement of the slow to the breaker design
close latch. With this
change the latch can only be mechanically engaged by
use of the slow close tool.
No change was required in other parts to implement
this improvement. All K-Line
circuit breakers manufactured since approximately mid-1974 have this spring
installed.
Attachment 3 IN 89-29 March 15, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
89-28 Weight and Center of 3/14/89 All holders of OLs
Gravity Discrepancies or CPs for nuclear
for Copes-Vulcan power reactors.
Air-Operated Valves
89-27 Limitations on the Use 3/8/89 Al.l holders of OLs
of Waste Forms and High *or CPs for nuclear
Integrity Containers for power reactors, fuel
the Disposal of Low-Level cycle licenses and
Radioactive Waste certain by-product
materials licenses.
89-26 Instrument Air Supply to 3/7/89 All holders of OLs
Safety-Related Equipment or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
89-25 Unauthorized Transfer of 3/7/89 All U.S. NRC source, Ownership or Control of byproduct, and special
Licensed Activities nuclear material
licensees.
89-24 Nuclear Criticality Safety 3/6/89 All fuel cycle
licensees and other
licensees possessing
more than critical
mass quantities of
special nuclear
material.
89-23 Environmental Qualification 3/3/89 All holders of OLs
of Litton-Yeam CIR Series or CPs for nuclear
Electrical Connectors power reactors.
89-22 Questionable Certification 3/3/89 All holders of OLs
of Fasteners or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
89-21 Changes in Performance 2/27/89 All holders of OLs
Characteristics of Molded- or CPs for nuclear
Case Circuit Breakers power reactors.
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 89-29 March 15, 1989 side-to-side sine dwell at 30 hertz, amplitude 0.36 g, duration greater than
20 seconds), a second K-1600 CB failed to close on demand. The causes of the
breaker malfunctions were not immediately recognized. ABB later determined
that the CBs had failed to close because of vibration-induced movement of the
slow-close lever to a position where it interfered with the closing mechanism
of the CB. As a result, a rebound spring that prevents any undesired movement
of the slow close lever was added to the CB design and installed in all CBs
manufactured after mid-1974.
ABB sent the letters of January 13 and February 16, 1989, to all nuclear power
plants that have purchased safety-related electrically operated K-Line CBs, model numbers K-225 through K-2000, and requested that all users of these
CBs add rebound springs to the slow-close levers. The letters are included
as Attachment 1 and Attachment 2 respectively. Attachment 1 also includes
a sketch of the location of the slow-close lever with the rebound spring in
place and the field installation procedures for adding the rebound spring
to the slow-close lever. Additional information on this subject may be
obtained by contacting the appropriate ABB representative.
It is important for addressees to determine whether any of the subject CBs, regardless of their delivery or installation date, are installed at their
facilities and to verify that the CBs are seismically qualified.
In addition, addressees are reminded that component manufacturers do not
typically notify customers who have procured commercial grade items of design
changes and deficiencies identified in their components. Therefore, it is
important that this fact be considered when purchasing components that were
procured as commercial grade and dedicated for safety-related applications
by entities other than the component manufacturer.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Jaime Guillen, NRR
(301) 492-1170
Attachments:
1. ASEA Brown Boveri Letter dated January 13, 1989
2. ASEA Brown Boveri Letter dated February 16, 1989
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCURRENCE
CHBerlinger
03/9 /89 t3/8/69
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR *SELB:DEST:NRR *AD/SAD:DEST:NRR *D/9EST:NRR *PPMB:ARM
JGuillen FRosa AThadani LShao TechEd
02/20/89 02/28/89 03/6/89 03/7/89 02/23/89
IN 89-XX
February xx, 1989 side-to-side sine dwell at 30 hertz, amplitude 0.36 g, duration greater than 20
seconds), a second K-1600 CB failed to close on demand. The causes of the
breaker malfunctions were not immediately recognized. ABB later determined
that the CBs had failed to close because of vibration-induced movement of the
slow-close lever to a position where it interfered with the closing mechanism
of the CB. As a result, a rebound spring that prevents any undesired movement
of the slow close lever was added to the CB design and installed in all CBs
manufactured after mid-1974.
ABB sent the letters of January 23 and February 16, 1989, to all nuclear power
plants that have purchased safety-related electrically operated K-Line CBs, model numbers K-225 through K-2000, and requested that all users of these CBs
add rebound springs to the slow-close levers. The letters are included as
Attachment 1 and Attachment 2 respectively. Attachment 1 also includes a
sketch of the location of the slow-close lever with the rebound spring in place
and the field installation procedures for adding the rebound spring to the
slow-close lever. Additional information on this subject may be obtained by
contacting the appropriate ABB representative.
Addressees
are encouraged to determine whether any of the subject CBs, regard- less of their delivery or installation date, are installed at their facilities
and to verify that the CBs are seismically qualified.
In addition, addressees are reminded that component manufacturers do not
typically notify customers who have procured commercial grade items of design
changes and deficiencies identified in their components. Therefore, it is
suggested that this fact be considered when purchasing components that were
procured as commercial grade and dedicated for safety-related applications by
entities other than the component manufacturer.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Jaime Guillen, NRR
(301) 492-1170
Attachments:
1. ASEA Brown Boveri Letter dated January 13, 1989
2. ASEA Brown Boveri Letter dated February 16, 1989
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
At D/DOEA:NRR C/OGC4D EfNRR
CERossi CHBerlinger
02/ /8 OJ/ K/89 EA:NRR SELB4Di$$+ RR AD/SAD:DEST:NRR D/D E PPMB:ARD or
JGu en FRosWi< 4 haflani LSh TechEdX
02f2 89 02/2i189 e C' 89 0f /89 02/23/89' ja-dy ^
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list | - Information Notice 1989-01, Valve Body Erosion (4 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-02, Criminal Prosecution of Licensee'S Former President for Intentional Safety Violations (9 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-03, Potential Electrical Equipment Problems (11 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-04, Potential Problems from the Use of Space Heaters (17 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-05, Use of Deadly Force by Guards Protecting Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage (19 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-06, Bent Anchor Bolts in Boiling Water Reactor Torus Supports (24 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-07, Failures of Small-Diameter Tubing in Control Air, Fuel Oil & Lube Oil Systems Render Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable (25 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-08, Pump Damage Caused by Low-Flow Operation (26 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-09, Credit for Control Rods Without Scram Capability in the Calculation of Shutdown Margin (26 January 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-10, Undetected Installation Errors in Main Steam Line Pipe Tunnel Differential Temperature-Sensing Elements at Boiling Water Reactors (27 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-11, Failure of DC Motor-Operated Valves to Develop Rated Torque Because of Improper Cable Sizing (2 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-12, Dose Calibrator Quality Control (9 February 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-13, Alternative Waste Management Procedures in Case of Denial of Access to Low-Level Waste Disposal Sites (8 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Authorized possession limits)
- Information Notice 1989-15, Second Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Failure at Crystal River (16 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-16, Excessive Voltage Drop in DC Systems (16 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Battery sizing)
- Information Notice 1989-17, Contamination and Degradation of Safety-Related Battery Cells (22 February 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-18, Criminal Prosecution of Wrongdoing Committed by Suppliers of Nuclear Products or Services (24 August 1990)
- Information Notice 1989-20, Weld Failures in a Pump of Byron-Jackson Design (24 February 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-21, Changes in Performance Characteristics of Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (27 February 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-23, Environmental Qualification of Litton-Veam Cir Series Electrical Connectors (3 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-24, Nuclear Criticality Safety (6 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-25, Unauthorized Transfer of Ownership or Control of Licensed Activities (7 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-26, Instrument Air Supply to Safety-Related Equipment (7 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-27, Limitations on the Use of Waste Forms and High Integrity Containers for the Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste (8 March 1989, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1989-28, Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies for Copes-Vulcan Air-Operated Valves (14 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-29, Potential Failure of Asea Brown Boveri Circuit Breakers During Seismic Event (15 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-30, High Temperature Environments at Nuclear Power Plants (1 November 1990)
- Information Notice 1989-31, Swelling and Cracking of Hafnium Control Rods (22 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-32, Surveillance Testing of Low-Temperature Overpressure-Protection Systems (23 March 1989, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1989-33, Potential Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical Plugs (23 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-34, Disposal of Americium Well-Logging Sources (30 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-35, Loss & Theft of Unsecured Licensed Material, Attachment 1 to NRC Information Notice 1990-014: Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials. (Also includes Attachments 2 & 3) (30 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-35, Loss & Theft of Unsecured Licensed Material, Attachment 1 to NRC Information Notice 1990-014: Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials. (Also Includes Attachments 2 & 3) (30 March 1989, Topic: Moisture-Density Gauge)
- Information Notice 1989-36, Excessive Temperatures in Emergency Core Cooling System Piping Located Outside Containment (4 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-37, Proposed Amendments to 40 CFR Part 61, Air Emission Standards for Radionuclides (4 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-38, Atmospheric Dump Valve Failures at Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 (5 April 1989, Topic: Emergency Lighting)
- Information Notice 1989-39, List of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement or Non-Procurement Programs (5 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-40, Unsatisfactory Operator Test Results and Their Effect on the Requalification Program (14 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-41, Operator Response to Pressurization of Low-Pressure Interfacing Systems (20 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-42, Failure of Rosemount Models 1153 and 1154 Transmitters (21 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-43, Permanent Deformation of Torque Switch Helical Springs in Limitorque SMA-Type Motor Operators (1 May 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-44, Hydrogen Storage on the Roof of the Control Room (27 April 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-45, Metalclad, Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers Refurbished with Substandard Parts (8 May 1989, Topic: Commercial Grade Dedication, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-46, Confidentiality of Exercise Scenarios (11 May 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-47, Potential Problems with Worn or Distorted Hose Clamps on Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (18 May 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-48, Design Deficiency in the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cooling Water Systems (22 May 1989, Topic: Coatings, Temporary Modification)
- Information Notice 1989-49, Failure to Close Service Water Cross-Connect Isolation Valves (22 May 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-50, Inadequate Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Supply (30 May 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-51, Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations (31 May 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-52, Potential Fire Damper Operational Problems (8 June 1989, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Shutdown Margin, Fire Barrier, Fire Protection Program)
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