Information Notice 1989-05, Use of Deadly Force by Guards Protecting Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage

Use of Deadly Force by Guards Protecting Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage

ML031180489
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	01/19/1989
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-89-005, NUDOCS 8901120432
Download: ML031180489 (8)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 19, 1989 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-05: USE OF DEADLY FORCE BY GUARDS PROTECTING

NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS AGAINST RADIOLOGICAL

SABOTAGE

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to present NRC responses to questions

raised during safeguards inspections and discussions with licensees concerning

use of deadly force by guards protecting nuclear power reactors against radio- logical sabotage. The information provided in this notice does not constitute

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

During recent inspections and discussions with the NRC staff, some licensees

expressed reservations about their authority to use deadly force to protect

nuclear power reactors. The NRC considers use of deadly force Justifiable

in protecting nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage in circum- stances under which a guard could reasonably believe that the use of deadly

force is necessary to counter an immediate threat of death or severe bodily

injury to self, to others in the facility, or to members of the public. This

is already embodied in NRC regulation 10 CFR 73.55(h)(5), which requires

licensees to "instruct every guard and all armed response personnel to prevent

or impede attempted acts of theft or radiological sabotage by using force suf- ficient to counter the force directed at him including the use of deadly force

when the guard or other armed response person has a reasonable belief it is

necessary in self-defense or in the defense of others."

Discussion:

The staff considers use of deadly force Justifiable in protecting nuclear

power reactors against sabotage if there is reasonable belief that an act

of radiological sabotage will be perpetrated unless deadly force is used

to prevent it. Radiological sabotage as defined in 10 CFR 73.2(p) means

any "deliberate act" directed against a plant or against a component of

_ '-~ l>I/C

IN 89-05 January 19, 1989 a plant, that "could directly or indirectly endanger the public health

and safety by exposure to radiation." At nuclear power reactors, the

principal focus of safeguards is to protect against deliberate acts that

could result in substantial meltdown of the core. Components of a plant

that must be protected are those considered "vital equipment," defined in

10 CFR 73.2(i) as "any equipment, system, device, or material the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the

public health and safety by exposure to radiation. Equipment or systems

which would be required to function to protect public health and safety

following such failure, destruction, or release are also considered to

be vital."

Some situations and circumstances that could justify the use of deadly force

inprotecting nuclear power reactors are as follows:

(1) Defending Against Violent Armed Assault

Use of deadly force could be justified in defending a power reactor

against a determined violent armed assault.

(2) Defending Against Armed Attack By Stealth

Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting

armed intruders who have penetrated the protected area and are at- tempting to break into an area containing vital equipment, ignoring

-- de-f-nders' cha~lenges and warnings to stop.

(3) Defending Against Attackers Employing Explosives

and/or incendiaries

Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting

intruders placing explosives or incendiary devices near vital

equipment ifthe intruders ignore defenders' warnings to stop.

(4) Defending Against Perceived Armed Attack

Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting

heavily armed intruders who enter the protected area ignoring

challenges and warnings.

Under these and similar conditions, facility guards do not have to abandon

cover and concealment or their defensive positions, or wait for the ad- versaries to fire the first shot. Such actions may expose the guards to

casualties and jeopardize their ability to defeat or contain the attacking

forces.

IN 89-05 January 19, 1989 No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the

technical contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. ossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Nancy Ervin, NRR

(301) 492-0946 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment

11 89-05 Jenucry 19. 1989 Page 1 of I

LIST OF RECENTLYISSUED

NRCINFORMATIONNOTICES

14ta of

Notice No. SubJect Issuance Issued to

89-04 Potential Problem from 1/17/89 All holders of OLs

the Use of Space Heaters or CPsfor nuclear

power reactors and

test and research

reactors.

89-03 Potential Electrical 1/11/89 All fuelcycle end

Equipmsnt Problem major nuclear materials

licensees.

89-02 Criminal Prosecution of 1/9/89 All holders of a

Licensees Formir President U.S. NRCspecific

for

Intent

ional Safety license.

Violations

88-23. Potential for GasBinding 1/5/89 All holders of OLS

Supp. I of High-Pressure Safety or CPsfor PfRs.

Injection PuMPS During a

Loss-of-Coolant Accident

89-01 Valve Body Erosion 1/4/89 All holders of OLs

or CPsfor nuclear

power reactors.

88-46 Licensee Report of Defective 12/30/88 All holders of OLs

Supp. 2 Refurbishod C1rcuit Breakers or CPsfor nuclear

pow reactors.88-101 Shipment of Contaminated 12/28/88 All holders of OLs

Equipment between Nuclear or CPsfor nucle ar

Power Stations powr reactors.88-100 Maoorrndtu of Understanding 12/23/88 All major nuclear

between NRC andOSHA materialS licensees

Relating to NRC-licensed and utilities holding

Facilities (53 FR 43950. CPsand OLs.

October 31, 1988)

88-99 Detection and Monitoring 12/20/88 All holders of OLs

of Sudden and/or Rapidly or CPsfor PWRs.

Increasing Primary-to- Secondary Leakage

01

• Opereting License

CP

• Construction Permit

UNITED STATES FIRS CLSSMAIL1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IPOSTAGE At FEESPAIDI

USNAC

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 1 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

IN 89-05 January 19, 1989 No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the

technical contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Nancy Ervin, NRR

(301) 492-0946 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• See previous concurrence

OFC :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :TECH EDITOR :D:DRIS:NRR :OGC

NAME :NErvin:bjp* :LLBush* :RAErickson* :BCalure* :BKGrimes* :RFonner*

DATE :12/21/88 :12/21/88 :12/21/88 :12/20/88 :1/3/89 :12/28/88 X-e, /)

OFC :OE :OGY: NRR :D:DOEA:NRR:  :

NAME :JLieberman* :C8 r inger  :

DATE :1/4/89 :1//If89 :1//1/89

(3) Defending Against Attackers Employing Explosives

and/or Incendiaries

Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting

intruders placing explosives or incendiary devices near vital equipment

if the intruders ignore defenders' warnings to stop.

(4) Defending Against Perceived Armed Attack

Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting heavily

armed intruders who enter the protected area ignoring challenges and

warnings.

Under these and similar conditions, facility guards do not have to abandon cover

and concealment or their defensive positions, or wait for the adversaries to

fire the first shot. Such actions may expose the guards to casualties and

jeopardize their ability to defeat or contain the attacking forces.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events

Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Nancy Ervin, NRR

(301) 492-0946 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• See previous concurrence

OFC :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :TECH EDITOR :D:DRIS:NRR :OGC

NAME :NErvin:bjp* :LLBush* :RAErickson* :BCalure* :BKGrimes* :RFonner*

DATE :12/21/88 :12/21/88 :12/21/88 :12/20/88 :1/3/89 :12/28/88 OFC :OE :OGCB:DOEA:NRR :D:DOEA:NRR  :  :  ::

_____

________________ ______________ ------- - - - -------------

NAME :JLieberman* :CBerlinger :CERossi  : 7fl  :

DATE --------

1/4/89 _ 1/ /-------------

1//- 8-9-----

/89 ------------------

DATE :1/4/89 :1/ /89 :1/ /89 :R//o

(3) Defending Against Attackers Employing Explosives

and/or Incendiaries

Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting

intruders placing explosives or incendiary devices near vital equipment

if the intruders ignore defenders' warnings to stop.

(4) Defending Against Perceived Armed Attack

Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting heavily

armed intruders who enter the protected area ignoring challenges and

warnings.

Under these and similar conditions, facility guards do not have to abandon cover

and concealment or their defensive positions, or wait for the adversaries to

fire the first shot. Such actions may expose the guards to casualties and

jeopardize their ability to defeat or contain the attacking forces.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events

Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Nancy Ervin, NRR

(301) 492-0946 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• See previous concurrence

OFC :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :TECH EDITOR :D: R :OGC

--

______-________________ - ______________- ______________- __ _ _ __ _ _ ----- ------------- __ ___

NAME :NErvin:bjp* :LLBush* :RAErickson* :BCalure* I s :RFonner*

DATE :12/21/88 :12/21/88 :12/21/88 :12/20/88 :GtI 3 /89 :12/28/88 OFC :0~s :OGCB:DOEA:NRR :D:DOEA:NRR  :

NAME rJ

mran :CBerlinger :CERossi

DATE  : '.r /88 :12/ /88 :12/ /88

0\

(3) Defending Against Attackers Employing Explosives

and/or Incendiaries

Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting

intruders placing explosives or incendiary devices near vital equipment, if they ignore defender's warnings to stop.

(4) Defending Against Perceived Armed Attack

Use of deadly force could be justified for defenders intercepting heavily

armed intruders who enter the protected area ignoring challenges and

warnings.

Under these and similar conditions, facility guards do not have to abandon cover

and concealment or their defensive positions, or wait for the adversaries to

fire the first shot. Such actions may expose the guards to casualties and

jeopardize their ability to defeat or contain the attacking forces.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events

Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Nancy Ervin, NRR

(301) 492-0946 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

OFC :RSGB:NR :RSGB:NRR :RSGB:NRR :TECH EDITOR :D:DRIS:NRR gee

NAME :NErvin:bjp :LLBush / :RAE on  ::BKGrimes.

DATE :12/PA /88 :124a //88 :12/1 - /88 :12/ /88 :12/ /88 :12/9?/88 OFC :OE :OGCB:DOEA:NRR :D:DOEA:NRR  :  :

NAME :JLieberman :CBerlinger :CERossi  :  :  ::

DATE :12/ /88 :12/ /88 :12/ /88  :