Information Notice 1989-26, Instrument Air Supply to Safety-Related Equipment

Instrument Air Supply to Safety-Related Equipment

ML031180589
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	03/07/1989
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-89-026, NUDOCS 8903010207
Download: ML031180589 (7)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 7, 1989 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-26: INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY TO SAFETY-RELATED

EQUIPMENT

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees of instrument

air inadequacies Identified by licensees in response to Generic Letter 88-14,

"Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment,"

dated August 8, 1988. It is expected that recipients will review the infor- mation for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appro- priate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this

information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific

action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

During a review of the instrument air supply to safety-related equipment, as

requested by Generic Letter 88-14, the Boston Edison Company, licensee for

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, discovered two design inadequacies. These

problems affect the integrity of the secondary containment and the primary

containment.

On December 22, 1988, during leak rate testing of the secondary containment, the standby gas treatment system was unable to achieve the 0.25-inch water

vacuum required by the technical specifications because of in-leakage of

outside air past the inner door of the reactor building trucklock (RBTL).

The test was being conducted with revised procedures as a result of the

review requested by Generic Letter 88-14. The new procedures required the

test to be conducted with the RBTL outer door open and the RBTL inner door

closed, but with the inner door's inflatable seal deflated. Since the plant

began operating in 1972, previous 'leak rate testing had been performed with

the inner door seal inflated by the. non-safety-related instrument air system

and with the non-seismically qualified RBTL outer door closed.

890 10207 Z e4-

IN 89-26 March 7, 1989 The licensee's corrective action involved installing a

non-inflatable-type

rubber gasket to the RBTL inner door frame, which allowed

completion of the leak rate test. subsequent successful

The same problem of relying on the non-safety-related instrument

to inflate seals on doors to maintain the integrity of the air system

ment was identified at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station secondary contain- Power Plant, Unit 2, on January 4, 1989, and February 8, and Fermi Atomic

1989, respectively.

The second design inadequacy at the Pilgrim station was discovered

January 10, 1989. The containment isolation valves in the on

building vacuum breaker lines, which are redundant to the torus-to-reactor

breakers, use instrument air pressure to maintain the valvestorus vacuum

position. Upon loss of air pressure, these valves are designed in the closed

allow the vacuum breakers to perform their safety function to open to

containment implosion. When the valves fail open, the isolationof preventing

of the valves is lost. At Pilgrim the design requires an function

adequate supply

of air pressure to the vacuum breaker isolation valves for

30 days

instrument air system fails. The licensee for Pilgrim determined if the

that the air supply provided by the safety-related accumulators by a test

depleted in less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, resulting in the loss of one would be

of the two con- tainment isolation barriers. To correct this situation, additional larger qualified accumulators and a qualified the licensee installed

to pressurized air bottles. Portable air bottles-can be air line that connects

line to provide adequate air-pressure if needed for the connected to the air

The licensee also instituted surveillance to ensure that long-term-requirement.

acceptable accumulator

air pressure will be maintained for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Similar problems involving the use of non-safety-related

affecting the integrity of the primary containment have instrument air systems

been discovered at

Oyster Creek Nuclear Power-Plant on February 8, 1989, and

Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, on January 31, at Browns Ferry

1989. At Oyster

Creek, the licensee determined that the air accumulators

to the main steam

isolation valves would rapidly depressurize if the normal

non-safety-related

air supply was interrupted. At Browns Ferry, the instrument

be relied on without accumulators during a design-basis air system would

accident to provide

the air pressure for the containment isolation valves in the

suppression

vacuum relief lines to maintain the valves in the closed position. pool

/

IN 89-26 March 7, 1989 No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of

the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

rle

E.RosE, rect~or -

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: T. Silko, AEOD

(301) 492-9059 T. Greene, NRR

(301) 492-1176 J. Lyash, RI

(215) 337-5132 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Athment

IN 89-26 March 7, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRCINFORMATION NOTICES

19f^.+4^"

a, W,"&I wit Date of

Notice No. SubJect Issuance Issued to

89-25 Unauthorized Transfer of 3/7/89 All U.S. hRC source, Ownership or Control of byproduct. and special

Licensed Activities nuclear material

licensees.

89-24 Nuclear Criticality Safety 3/6/89 All fuel cycle

licensees and other

licensees possessing

more than critical

masa quantities of

spec1al nuclear

material.

89-23 Environmental Qualification 3/3/89 All holders of OLs

of Litton-Vear CIR Series or CPs for nuclear

Electrical Connectors power reactors.

89-22 Questionable Certification 3/3/89 All holders of OLs

of Fasteners or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

89-21 Changes in Performance 2/27/89 All holders of OLs

Characteristics of Molded- or CPs for nuclear

Case Circuit Breakers power reactors.

88-73. Direction-Dependent Leak 2/27/89 All holders of OLs

Supplement 1 Characteristics of Contain- or CPs for nuclear

ment Purge Valves power reactors.

89-20 Weld Failures in a Pump 2/24/89 All holders of OLs

of Byron-Jackson Design or CPSfor nuclear

power reactors.

89-19 Health Physics Network 2/23/89 All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

Dower reactors, and

the following fuel

facilities: Nuclear

Fuet Services of Erwin, General Atomic, UNC

Montville, BSU LRC

Lynchburg, and 8IW

Lynchburg.

OL

• Operating License

CP* Construction Permit

UNITED STATES FIRST CLASS MAIL

POSTAGE & FEES PAID

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION USNRC

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 PERMIT No. 04J

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

Q-

IN 89-26 March 7, 1989 No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of

the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: T. Silko, AEOD

(301) 492-9059 T. Greene, NRR

(301) 492-1176 J. Lyash, RI

(215) 337-5132 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

• EAB:NRR *EAB:NRR *TECH:ED *RI:NRR *C:EAB:NRR *PLB:DEST

TGreene:db PBaranowsky JLyash WDLanning JCragi

2/23/89 2/27/89 2/28/89 2/23/89 2/28/89 3/1/89

• C:OGCB:NRR

CHBerlinger

2/28/89 3/ / /89

IN 89- March , 1989 No specific action or written response is required by this informationone of

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact of the

the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: T. Silko, AEOD

(301) 492-9059 T. Greene, NRR

(301) 492-1176 J. Lyash, RI

(215) 337-5132 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

• EAB:NRR *EAB:NRR *TECH:ED *RI:NRR C.NRR

TGreene:db PBaranowsky JLyash W anning

/ /89 / /89 / /89 V% /89 C: O R D:DOEA:NRR C;,'%L: DEST

CHBer inger CERossi

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IN 89- February , 1989 Deficiencies have also been identified in the testing procedures that

demonstrate that a negative pressure can be maintained within the secondary

containment. The licensee for Pilgrim was performing this test with the

non-seismically qualified outer RBTL door closed, therefore taking credit for

the door's sealing capabilities. The revised procedures requires the test to

be conducted with the non-seismically qualified RBTL door open.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of

the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: T. Silko, AEOD

(301) 492-9059 T. Greene, NRR

(301) 492-1176 J. Lyash, RI

(215) 337-5132 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

EAB:NR ' EAB *k(CLE ,RI:NRR I C:EAB:NRR

TGreent db PBa anowsky A//ctJLyash / 9o WDLanning

St-/ 43/89 1 /p/89 Att$89 .'/.,./89 / /89 C:OGCB:NRR D:DOEA:NRR

CHBerlingeyr CERossi

/ /89 / /89