Information Notice 1989-38, Atmospheric Dump Valve Failures at Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3

Atmospheric Dump Valve Failures at Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3

ML031180803
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	04/05/1989
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-89-038, NUDOCS 8903300021
Download: ML031180803 (8)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 April 5, 1989 INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-38: ATMOSPHERIC DUMP VALVE FAILURES AT

PALO VERDE UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential

failures of main steamline atmospheric dump valves (ADVs). It is expected

that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facil- ities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC require- ments; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On March 3, 1989, Palo Verde Unit 3 experienced a large load rejection and a

subsequent automatic reactor power decrease from 98 percent to 45 percent power.

The turbine bypass valves opened but the bypass valve controller malfunctioned, causing excessive steam relief and overcooling of the reactor coolant system

(RCS). A main steamline isolation and reactor trip were caused by low pressure

in the number 2 steam generator. Safety injection and containment isolation

activated upon low RCS pressure. Following steamline isolation, the ADVs

remained closed after operators attempted to open them first from the control

room and then from the remote shutdown panel. The valves do not receive an

automatic signal to open. After the ADVs failed to open remotely, auxiliary

operators experienced difficulty in opening the ADVs using the handwheels

because of the lack of lighting (including emergency lighting), poor labeling

of ADV equipment, poor procedures and training, a disengaged handwheel, and

considerable noise caused by the opening of the main steamline safety relief

valves. The operators partially opened two ADVs.

The pneumatic operators on the ADVs are actuated by using either plant instru- ment air or a stored, pressurized nitrogen supply. The valves were manufactured

by Control Components, Inc. (CCI). CCI indicated that previous problems had

been experienced in the testing of ADVs at Palo Verde Unit 1 and other facil- ities. Excessive bonnet pressure caused by abnormally high leakage past the

main valve plug piston ring is suspected to have contributed to these problems.

Foreign particles from the steamlines in the clearance areas and under the

piston ring sealing surfaces may produce the high piston ring leakage. CCI

has developed design modifications to address this problem. X

'/V

( 8903300021 Z4-j)

,11 ~ -~ _i

IN 89-38 April 5, 1989 Following the failures of the ADVs to open remotely at Palo Verde Unit 3, the

licensee tested the ADMs at the other two Palo Verde units. Four of the eight

valves failed the functional tests. Preliminary results indicated that there

were problems with valve positioners, possible valve stem binding problems, and calibration problems with nitrogen pressure regulators. The licensee for

Palo Verde is continuing to investigate the cause of valve failures but has

not yet identified a root cause.

Contributing to the simultaneous ADV failures at Palo Verde is the lack of in- service testing under hot steam conditions. The valves are routinely tested

during refueling outages with the steamlines cold and depressurized. For

testing, the pneumatic operators are actuated with plant air rather than

with the pressurized nitrogen supply.

Licensees may wish to reassess the frequency of ADV testing and to evaluate

their ADV surveillance test procedures and consider performing the tests under

conditions that better simulate inservice conditions.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Ross,, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Horace Shaw, NRR

(301) 492-0906 Walton Jensen, NRR

(301) 492-1190

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

IN 89-38 April 5, 1989 Following the failures of the ADVs to open remotely at Palo Verde Unit 3, the

licensee tested the ADYs at the other two Palo Verde units. Four of the eight

valves failed the functional tests. Preliminary results indicated that there

were problems with valve positioners, possible valve stem binding problems, and calibration problems with nitrogen pressure regulators. The licensee for

Palo Verde is continuing to investigate the cause of valve failures but has

not yet identified a root cause.

Contributing to the simultaneous ADV failures at Palo Verde is the lack of in- service testing under hot steam conditions. The valves are routinely tested

during refueling outages with the steamlines cold and depressurized. For

testing, the pneumatic operators are actuated with plant air rather than

with the pressurized nitrogen supply.

Licensees may wish to reassess the frequency of ADV testing and to evaluate

their ADV surveillance test procedures and consider performing the tests under

conditions that better simulate inservice conditions.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Horace Shaw, NRR

(301) 492-0906 Walton Jensen, NRR

(301) 492-1190

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

• EAB:NRR *EAB:NRR *TECH:ED *DEST/EMEB *EMEB:NRR *AD:EMEB:NRR

WJensen:db RLobel HShaw LBMarsh JERichardson

3/27/89 3/27/89 / /89 3/28/89 3/28/89 3/28/89

• D:DEST *C:EAB:NRR *C:OGCB:NRRD 4 IR/>

LShao WDLanning CHBerlinger eUoI'l

3/29/89 3/29/89 3/29/89 3 /70/89

IN 89- April 1989 Following the failures of the ADVs to open remotely at Palo Verde Unit 3, the

licensee tested the ADYs at the other two Palo Verde units. Four of the eight

valves failed the functional tests. Preliminary results indicated that there

were problems with valve positioners, possible valve steam binding problems, and calibration problems with nitrogen pressure regulators. The licensee for

Palo Verde is continuing to investigate the cause of valve failures but has

not yet identified a root cause.

Contributing to the simultaneous ADV failures at Palo Verde is the lack of in- service testing under hot steam conditions. The valves are routinely tested

during refueling outages with the steamlines cold and depressurized. For

testing, the pneumatic operators are actuated with plant air rather than with

the pressurized nitrogen supply.

Licensees may wish to reassess the frequency of ADY testing and to evaluate

their ADV surveillance test procedures and consider performing the tests under

conditions that better simulate inservice conditions.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of

the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Horace Shaw, NRR

(301) 492-0906 Walton Jensen, NRR

(301) 492-1190

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

• EAB:NRR *EAB:NRR *TECH:ED *DEST/EMEB *EMEB:NRR *AD:EMEB:NRR

WJensen:db RLobel HShaw LBMarsh JERichardson

/ /89 / 89 /1 / /89 / /89 / /89

• D:DEST C: C:O-CBNRR D:DOEA:NRR

LShao Wti0nniRng CHBerlinger CERossi

/ /89 i' 9 Y89 3b/89 / /89

IN 89- April , 1989 Following the failures of the ADVs to open remotely at Palo Verde Unit 3, the

licensee tested the ADYs at the other two Palo Verde units. Four of the eight

valves failed the functional tests. Preliminary results indicated that there

were problems with valve positioners, sizing of nitrogen accumulators, and a

failure of and calibration problems with nitrogen pressure regulators. The

licensee for Palo Verde is continuing to investigate the cause of valve

failures but has not yet identified a root cause.

Contributing to the simultaneous ADY failures at Palo Verde is the lack of in- service testing under hot steam conditions. The valves are routinely tested

with the steamlines cold and depressurized. For testing, the pneumatic

operators are activated with plant air rather than with the pressurized nitrogen

supply.

Licensees may wish to evaluate their ADY surveillance test procedures and

consider performing the tests under conditions that better simulate inservice

conditions.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of

the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Horace Shaw, NRR

(301) 492-0906 Walton Jensen, NRR

(301) 492-1190

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Not:i ces

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

• EAB:NRR *EAB:NRR *TECH:ED DEST/EM*EP EMEB:NRR AD: XEihRR dD:DEST

WJensen:db RLobel HShaw O LBMarsh JERichardso#JlShao

/ /89 / /89 / /89 V A--'Y89 '3 /.7/89 )/ U4/89 -\ /N>89 C:EAB:NRR C:OGCB:NRR D:DOEA:NRR

WDLanning CHBerlinger CERossi

/ /89 / /89 / /89

IN 89- April I 1989 Following the failures of the ADYs to open remotely at Palo Verde Unit 3, the

licensee tested the ADVs at the other two Palo Verde units. Four of the eight

valves failed the functional tests. Preliminary results indicated that there

were problems with valve positioners, sizing of nitrogen accumulators, and a

failure of and calibration problems with nitrogen pressure regulators. The

licensee for Palo Verde is continuing to investigate the cause of valve

failures but has not yet identified a root cause.

Contributing to the simultaneous ADV failures at Palo Verde is the lack of in- service testing under hot steam conditions. The valves are routinely tested

with the steamlines cold and depressurized. For testing, the pneumatic

operators are activated with plant air rather than with the pressurized nitrogen

supply.

Licensees may wish to evaluate their ADV surveillance test procedures and

consider performing the tests under conditions that better simulate inservice

conditions.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of

the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Horace Shaw, NRR

(301) 492-0906 Walton Jensen, NRR

(301) 492-1190

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

• EAB:NRR *EAB:NRR *TECH:ED DEST/EMER D:DEST iMEB:NRR AD:EMEB:NRR

WJensen:db RLobel HShaw LShao LBMarsh JERichardson

/ /89 / /89 / /89 3/X7/89 / /89 3 /4/89 / /89 C:tAB:NRR C:OGCB:NRR D:DOEA:NRR

WDLanning CHBerlinger CERossi

/ /89 / /89 / /89

IN 89- April , 1989 Following the failures of the ADVs to open remotely at Palo Verde Unit 3, the

licensee tested the ADYs at the other two Palo Verde units. Four of the eight

valves failed the functional tests. Preliminary results indicated that there

were problems with valve positioners, sizing of nitrogen accumulators, and a

failure of and calibration problems with nitrogen pressure regulators. The

licensee for Palo Verde is continuing to investigate the cause of valve

failures but has not yet identified a root cause.

Contributing to the simultaneous ADV failures at Palo Verde is the lack of in- service testing under hot steam conditions. The valves are routinely tested

with the steamlines cold and depressurized. For testing, the pneumatic ac- tuators are energized with plant air rather than with the pressurized nitrogen

supply.

Licensees may wish to evaluate their ADV surveillance test procedures and

consider performing the tests under conditions that better simulate inservice

conditions.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of

the technical contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the

appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Horace Shaw, NRR

(301) 492-0906 Walton Jensen, NRR

(301) 492-1190

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

EAB EA*BdZV TECH:ED DEST/EMEB D:DEST C:EAB: NRR C:OGCB:NRR

WJensen RLobel HShaw LShao 'DLanning CHBerlinger

S3/Z7/89 5/Z7/89 / /89 / /89 / /89 / /89 / /89 D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi

/ /89

. . I I

Attachment

IN 89-38 April 5, 1989 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

89-37 Proposed Amendments to 4/4/89 All U.S. NRC licensees.

40 CFR Part 61, Air

Emission Standards

for Radionuclides

89-36 Excessive Temperatures 4/4/89 All holders of OLs

in Emergency Core Cooling or CPs for nuclear

System Piping Located power reactors.

Outside Containment

88-86, Operating with Multiple 3/31/89 All holders of OLs

Supp. 1 Grounds in Direct Current or CPs for nuclear

Distribution Systems power reactors.

89-35 Loss and Theft of Un- 3/30/89 All U.S. NRC byproduct, secured Licensed Material source and special

nuclear material

licensees.

89-34 Disposal of Americium 3/30/89 All holders of an

Well-Logging Sources NRC specific license

authorizing well- logging activities.

89-33 Potential Failure of 3/23/89 All holders of OLs

Westinghouse Steam or CPs for PWRs.

Generator Tube

Mechanical Plugs

89-32 Surveillance Testing 3/23/89 All holders of OLs

of Low-Temperature or CPs for PWRs.

Overpressure-Protection

Systems

89-31 Swelling and Cracking 3/22/89 All holders of OLs

of Hafnium Control Rods or CPs for PWRs with

Hafnium control rods.

89-30 High Temperature 3/15/89 All holders of OLs

Environments at or CPs for nuclear

Nuclear Power Plants power reactors.

OL = Operating License

CP - Construction Permit